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RECORDS OF THE UNITED STATES

NUERNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. CARL KRAUCH ET AL. (CASE VI)

AUGUST 14, 1947-JULY 30, 1948

Roll 40

Prosecution Document Books

XXXIV-XLI



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1976

INTRODUCTION

On the 113 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records of Case VI, *United States of America v. Carl Krauch et al.* (I. G. Farben Case), 1 of the 12 trials of war criminals conducted by the U.S. Government from 1946 to 1949 at Nuernberg subsequent to the International Military Tribunal (IMT) held in the same city. These records consist of German- and English-language versions of official transcripts of court proceedings, prosecution and defense briefs and statements, and defendants' final pleas as well as prosecution and defense exhibits and document books in one language or the other. Also included are minute books, the official court file, order and judgment books, clemency petitions, and finding aids to the documents.

The transcripts of this trial, assembled in 2 sets of 43 bound volumes (1 set in German and 1 in English), are the recorded daily trial proceedings. Prosecution statements and briefs are also in both languages but unbound, as are the final pleas of the defendants delivered by counsel or defendants and submitted by the attorneys to the court. Unbound prosecution exhibits, numbered 1-2270 and 2300-2354, are essentially those documents from various Nuernberg record series, particularly the NI (Nuernberg Industrialist) Series, and other sources offered in evidence by the prosecution in this case. Defense exhibits, also unbound, are predominantly affidavits by various persons. They are arranged by name of defendant and thereunder numerically, along with two groups of exhibits submitted in the general interest of all defendants. Both prosecution and defense document books consist of full or partial translations of exhibits into English. Loosely bound in folders, they provide an indication of the order in which the exhibits were presented before the tribunal.

Minute books, in two bound volumes, summarize the transcripts. The official court file, in nine bound volumes, includes the progress docket, the indictment, and amended indictment and the service thereof; applications for and appointments of defense counsel and defense witnesses and prosecution comments thereto; defendants' application for documents; motions and reports; uniform rules of procedures; and appendixes. The order and judgment books, in two bound volumes, represent the signed orders, judgments, and opinions of the tribunal as well as sentences and commitment papers. Defendants' clemency petitions, in three bound volumes, were directed to the military governor, the Judge Advocate General, and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The finding aids summarize transcripts, exhibits, and the official court file.

Case VI was heard by U.S. Military Tribunal VI from August 14, 1947, to July 30, 1948. Along with records of other Nuernberg

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and Far East war crimes trials, the records of this case are part of the National Archives Collection of World War II War Crimes Records, Record Group 238.

The I. G. Farben Case was 1 of 12 separate proceedings held before several U.S. Military Tribunals at Nuernberg in the U.S. Zone of Occupation in Germany against officials or citizens of the Third Reich, as follows:

<u>Case No.</u>	<u>United States v.</u>	<u>Popular Name</u>	<u>No. of Defendants</u>
1	<i>Karl Brandt et al.</i>	Medical Case	23
2	<i>Erhard Milch</i>	Milch Case (Luftwaffe)	1
3	<i>Josef Altstoetter et al.</i>	Justice Case	16
4	<i>Oswald Pohl et al.</i>	Pohl Case (SS)	18
5	<i>Friedrich Flick et al.</i>	Flick Case (Industrialist)	6
6	<i>Carl Krauch et al.</i>	I. G. Farben Case (Industrialist)	24
7	<i>Wilhelm List et al.</i>	Hostage Case	12
8	<i>Ulrich Greifelt et al.</i>	RuSHA Case (SS)	14
9	<i>Otto Ohlendorf et al.</i>	Einsatzgruppen Case (SS)	24
10	<i>Alfried Krupp et al.</i>	Krupp Case (Industrialist)	12
11	<i>Ernst von Weizsaecker et al.</i>	Ministries Case	21
12	<i>Wilhelm von Leeb et al.</i>	High Command Case	14

Authority for the proceedings of the IMT against the major Nazi war criminals derived from the Declaration on German Atrocities (Moscow Declaration) released November 1, 1943; Executive Order 9547 of May 2, 1945; the London Agreement of August 8, 1945; the Berlin Protocol of October 6, 1945; and the IMT Charter.

Authority for the 12 subsequent cases stemmed mainly from Control Council Law 10 of December 20, 1945, and was reinforced by Executive Order 9679 of January 16, 1946; U.S. Military Government Ordinances 7 and 11 of October 18, 1946, and February 17, 1947, respectively; and U.S. Forces, European Theater General Order 301 of October 24, 1946. Procedures applied by U.S. Military Tribunals in the subsequent proceedings were patterned after those of the IMT and further developed in the 12 cases, which required over 1,200 days of court sessions and generated more than 330,000 transcript pages.

Formation of the I. G. Farben Combine was a stage in the evolution of the German chemical industry, which for many years led the world in the development, production, and marketing of organic dyestuffs, pharmaceuticals, and synthetic chemicals. To control the excesses of competition, six of the largest chemical firms, including the Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, combined to form the Interessengemeinschaft (Combine of Interests, or Trust) of the German Dyestuffs Industry in 1904 and agreed to pool technological and financial resources and markets. The two remaining chemical firms of note entered the combine in 1916. In 1925 the Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, largest of the firms and already the majority shareholder in two of the other seven companies, led in reorganizing the industry to meet the changed circumstances of competition in the post-World War markets by changing its name to the I. G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, moving its home office from Ludwigshafen to Frankfurt, and merging with the remaining five firms.

Farben maintained its influence over both the domestic and foreign markets for chemical products. In the first instance the German explosives industry, dependent on Farben for synthetically produced nitrates, soon became subsidiaries of Farben. Of particular interest to the prosecution in this case were the various agreements Farben made with American companies for the exchange of information and patents and the licensing of chemical discoveries for foreign production. Among the trading companies organized to facilitate these agreements was the General Anilin and Film Corp., which specialized in photographic processes. The prosecution charged that Farben used these connections to retard the "Arsenal of Democracy" by passing on information received to the German Government and providing nothing in return, contrary to the spirit and letter of the agreements.

Farben was governed by an Aufsichtsrat (Supervisory Board of Directors) and a Vorstand (Managing Board of Directors). The Aufsichtsrat, responsible for the general direction of the firm, was chaired by defendant Krauch from 1940. The Vorstand actually controlled the day-to-day business and operations of Farben. Defendant Schmitz became chairman of the Vorstand in 1935, and 18 of the other 22 original defendants were members of the Vorstand and its component committees.

Transcripts of the I. G. Farben Case include the indictment of the following 24 persons:

Otto Ambros: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief of Chemical Warfare Committee of the Ministry of Armaments and War Production; production chief for Buna and poison gas; manager of Auschwitz, Schkopau, Ludwigshafen, Oppau, Gendorf, Dyhernfurth, and Falkenhagen plants; and Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer.

Max Brueggemann: Member and Secretary of the Vorstand of Farben; member of the legal committee; Deputy Plant Leader of the Leverkusen Plant; Deputy Chief of the Sales Combine for Pharmaceuticals; and director of the legal, patent, and personnel departments of the Works Combine, Lower Rhine.

Ernst Buergin: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief of Works Combine, Central Germany; Plant Leader at the Bitterfeld and Wolfen-Farben plants; and production chief for light metals, dyestuffs, organic intermediates, plastics, and nitrogen at these plants.

Heinrich Buetefisch: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; manager of Leuna plants; production chief for gasoline, methanol, and chlorine electrolysis production at Auschwitz and Moosbierbaum; Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer; member of the Himmler Freundeskreis (circle of friends of Himmler); and SS Obersturmbannfuehrer (Lieutenant Colonel).

Walter Duerrfeld: Director and construction manager of the Auschwitz plant of Farben, director and construction manager of the Monowitz Concentration Camp, and Chief Engineer at the Leuna plant.

Fritz Gajewski: Member of the Central Committee of the Vorstand of Farben, Chief of Sparte III (Division III) in charge of production of photographic materials and artificial fibers, manager of "Agfa" plants, and Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer.

Heinrich Gattineau: Chief of the Political-Economic Policy Department, "WIPO," of Farben's Berlin N.W. 7 office; member of Southeast Europe Committee; and director of A.G. Dynamit Nobel, Pressburg, Czechoslovakia.

Paul Haefliger: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; member of the Commercial Committee; and Chief, Metals Departments, Sales Combine for Chemicals.

Erich von der Heyde: Member of the Political-Economic Policy Department of Farben's Berlin N.W. 7 office, Deputy to the Chief of Intelligence Agents, SS Hauptsturmfuehrer, and member of the WI-RUE-AMT (Military Economics and Armaments Office) of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) (High Command of the Armed Forces).

Heinrich Hoerlein: Member of the Central Committee of the Vorstand of Farben; chief of chemical research and development of vaccines, sera, pharmaceuticals, and poison gas; and manager of the Elberfeld Plant.

- Max Ilgner: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief of Farben's Berlin N.W. 7 office directing intelligence, espionage, and propaganda activities; member of the Commercial Committee; and Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer.
- Friedrich Jaehne: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; chief engineer in charge of construction and physical plant development; Chairman of the Engineering Committee; and Deputy Chief, Works Combine, Main Valley.
- August von Knieriem: Member of the Central Committee of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief Counsel of Farben; and Chairman, Legal and Patent Committees.
- Carl Krauch: Chairman of the Aufsichtsrat of Farben and Generalbevollmaechtigter fuer Sonderfragen der Chemischen Erzeugung (General Plenipotentiary for Special Questions of Chemical Production) on Goering's staff in the Office of the 4-Year Plan.
- Hans Kuehne: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief of the Works Combine, Lower Rhine; Plant Leader at Leverkusen, Elberfeld, Uerdingen, and Dormagen plants; production chief for inorganics, organic intermediates, dyestuffs, and pharmaceuticals at these plants; and Chief of the Inorganics Committee.
- Hans Kugler: Member of the Commercial Committee of Farben; Chief of the Sales Department Dyestuffs for Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, and Austria; and Public Commissar for the Falkenau and Aussig plants in Czechoslovakia.
- Carl Lautenschlaeger: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief of Works Combine; Main Valley; Plant Leader at the Hoechst, Griesheim, Mainkur, Gersthofen, Offenbach, Eystrup, Marburg, and Neuhausen plants; and production chief for nitrogen, inorganics, organic intermediates, solvents and plastics, dyestuffs, and pharmaceuticals at these plants.
- Wilhelm Mann: Member of the Vorstand of Farben, member of the Commercial Committee, Chief of the Sales Combine for Pharmaceuticals, and member of the SA.
- Fritz ter Meer: Member of the Central Committee of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief of the Technical Committee of the Vorstand that planned and directed all of Farben's production; Chief of Sparte II in charge of production of Buna, poison gas, dyestuffs, chemicals, metals, and pharmaceuticals; and Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer.

Heinrich Oster: Member of the Vorstand of Farben, member of the Commercial Committee, and manager of the Nitrogen Syndicate.

Hermann Schmitz: Chairman of the Vorstand of Farben, member of the Reichstag, and Director of the Bank of International Settlements.

Christian Schneider: Member of the Central Committee of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief of Sparte I in charge of production of nitrogen, gasoline, diesel and lubricating oils, methanol, and organic chemicals; Chief of Central Personnel Department, directing the treatment of labor at Farben plants; Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer; Hauptabwehrbeauftragter (Chief of Intelligence Agents); Hauptbetriebsfuehrer (Chief of Plant Leaders); and supporting member of the Schutzstaffeln (SS) of the NSDAP.

Georg von Schnitzler: Member of the Central Committee of the Vorstand of Farben, Chief of the Commercial Committee of the Vorstand that planned and directed Farben's domestic and foreign sales and commercial activities, Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer (Military Economy Leader), and Hauptsturmfuehrer (Captain) in the Sturmabteilungen (SA) of the Nazi Party (NSDAP).

Carl Wurster: Member of the Vorstand of Farben; Chief of the Works Combine, Upper Rhine; Plant Leader at Ludwigshafen and Oppau plants; production chief for inorganic chemicals; and Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer.

The prosecution charged these 24 individual staff members of the firm with various crimes, including the planning of aggressive war through an alliance with the Nazi Party and synchronization of Farben's activities with the military planning of the German High Command by participation in the preparation of the 4-Year Plan, directing German economic mobilization for war, and aiding in equipping the Nazi military machines.¹ The defendants also were charged with carrying out espionage and intelligence activities in foreign countries and profiting from these activities. They participated in plunder and spoliation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, France, and the Soviet Union as part of a systematic economic exploitation of these countries. The prosecution also charged mass murder and the enslavement of many thousands of persons particularly in Farben plants at the Auschwitz and Monowitz concentration camps and the use of poison gas manufactured by the firm in the extermination

¹The trial of defendant Brueggemann was discontinued early during the proceedings because he was unable to stand trial on account of ill health.

of millions of men, women, and children. Medical experiments were conducted by Farben on enslaved persons without their consent to test the effects of deadly gases, vaccines, and related products. The defendants were charged, furthermore, with a common plan and conspiracy to commit crimes against the peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Three defendants were accused of membership in a criminal organization, the SS. All of these charges were set forth in an indictment consisting of five counts.

The defense objected to the charges by claiming that regulations were so stringent and far reaching in Nazi Germany that private individuals had to cooperate or face punishment, including death. The defense claimed further that many of the individual documents produced by the prosecution were originally intended as "window dressing" or "howling with the wolves" in order to avoid such punishment.

The tribunal agreed with the defense in its judgment that none of the defendants were guilty of Count I, planning, preparation, initiation, and waging wars of aggression; or Count V, common plans and conspiracy to commit crimes against the peace and humanity and war crimes.

The tribunal also dismissed particulars of Count II concerning plunder and exploitation against Austria and Czechoslovakia. Eight defendants (Schmitz, von Schnitzler, ter Meer, Buergin, Haefliger, Ilgner, Oster, and Kugler) were found guilty on the remainder of Count II, while 15 were acquitted. On Count III (slavery and mass murder), Ambros, Buetefisch, Duerrfeld, Krauch, and ter Meer were judged guilty. Schneider, Buetefisch, and von der Heyde also were charged with Count IV, membership in a criminal organization, but were acquitted.

The tribunal acquitted Gajewski, Gattineau, von der Heyde, Hoerlein, von Knieriem, Kuehne, Lautenschlaeger, Mann, Schneider, and Wurster. The remaining 13 defendants were given prison terms as follows:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Length of Prison Term (years)</u>
Ambros	8
Buergin	2
Buetefisch	6
Duerrfeld	8
Haefliger	2
Ilgner	3
Jaehne	1 1/2
Krauch	6
Kugler	1 1/2
Oster	2
Schmitz	4
von Schnitzler	5
ter Meer	7

All defendants were credited with time already spent in custody.

In addition to the indictments, judgments, and sentences, the transcripts also contain the arraignment and plea of each defendant (all pleaded not guilty) and opening statements of both defense and prosecution.

The English-language transcript volumes are arranged numerically, 1-43, and the pagination is continuous, 1-15834 (page 4710 is followed by pages 4710(1)-4710(285)). The German-language transcript volumes are numbered 1a-43a and paginated 1-16224 (14a and 15a are in one volume). The letters at the top of each page indicate morning, afternoon, or evening sessions. The letter "C" designates commission hearings (to save court time and to avoid assembling hundreds of witnesses at Nuernberg, in most of the cases one or more commissions took testimony and received documentary evidence for consideration by the tribunals). Two commission hearings are included in the transcripts: that for February 7, 1948, is on pages 6957-6979 of volume 20 in the English-language transcript, while that for May 7, 1948, is on pages 14775a-14776 of volume 40a in the German-language transcript. In addition, the prosecution made one motion of its own and, with the defense, six joint motions to correct the English-language transcripts. Lists of the types of errors, their location, and the prescribed corrections are in several volumes of the transcripts as follows:

- First Motion of the Prosecution, volume 1
- First Joint Motion, volume 3
- Second Joint Motion, volume 14
- Third Joint Motion, volume 24
- Fourth Joint Motion, volume 29
- Fifth Joint Motion, volume 34
- Sixth Joint Motion, volume 40

The prosecution offered 2,325 prosecution exhibits numbered 1-2270 and 2300-2354. Missing numbers were not assigned due to the difficulties of introducing exhibits before the commission and the tribunal simultaneously. Exhibits 1835-1838 were loaned to an agency of the Department of Justice for use in a separate matter, and apparently No. 1835 was never returned. Exhibits drew on a variety of sources, such as reports and directives as well as affidavits and interrogations of various individuals. Maps and photographs depicting events and places mentioned in the exhibits are among the prosecution resources, as are publications, correspondence, and many other types of records.

The first item in the arrangement of prosecution exhibits is usually a certificate giving the document number, a short description of the exhibits, and a statement on the location of the original document or copy of the exhibit. The certificate is followed by the actual prosecution exhibit (most are photostats,

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but a few are mimeographed articles with an occasional carbon of the original). The few original documents are often affidavits of witnesses or defendants, but also ledgers and correspondence, such as:

<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>Doc. No.</u>
322	NI 5140	1558	NI 11411
918	NI 6647	1691	NI 12511
1294	NI 14434	1833	NI 12789
1422	NI 11086	1886	NI 14228
1480	NI 11092	2313	NI 13566
1811	NI 11144		

In rare cases an exhibit is followed by a translation; in others there is no certificate. Several of the exhibits are of poor legibility and a few pages are illegible.

Other than affidavits, the defense exhibits consist of newspaper clippings, reports, personnel records, Reichgesetzblatt excerpts, photographs, and other items. The 4,257 exhibits for the 23 defendants are arranged by name of defendant and thereunder by exhibit number. Individual exhibits are preceded by a certificate wherever available. Two sets of exhibits for all the defendants are included.

Translations in each of the prosecution document books are preceded by an index listing document numbers, biased descriptions, and page numbers of each translation. These indexes often indicate the order in which the prosecution exhibits were presented in court. Defense document books are similarly arranged. Each book is preceded by an index giving document number, description, and page number for every exhibit. Corresponding exhibit numbers generally are not provided. There are several unindexed supplements to numbered document books. Defense statements, briefs, pleas, and prosecution briefs are arranged alphabetically by defendant's surname. Pagination is consecutive, yet there are many pages where an "a" or "b" is added to the numeral.

At the beginning of roll 1 key documents are filmed from which Tribunal VI derived its jurisdiction: the Moscow Declaration, U.S. Executive Orders 9547 and 9679, the London Agreement, the Berlin Protocol, the IMT Charter, Control Council Law 10, U.S. Military Government Ordinances 7 and 11, and U.S. Forces, European Theater General Order 301. Following these documents of authorization is a list of the names and functions of members of the tribunal and counsels. These are followed by the transcript covers giving such information as name and number of case, volume numbers, language, page numbers, and inclusive dates. They are followed by the minute book, consisting of summaries of the daily proceedings, thus providing an additional finding aid for the transcripts. Exhibits are listed in an index that notes the

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type, number, and name of exhibit; corresponding document book, number, and page; a short description of the exhibit; and the date when it was offered in court. The official court file is summarized by the progress docket, which is preceded by a list of witnesses.

Not filmed were records duplicated elsewhere in this microfilm publication, such as prosecution and defense document books in the German language that are largely duplications of the English-language document books.

The records of the I. G. Farben Case are closely related to other microfilmed records in Record Group 238, specifically prosecution exhibits submitted to the IMT, T988; NI (Nuernberg Industrialist) Series, T301; NM (Nuernberg Miscellaneous) Series, M-936; NOKW (Nuernberg Armed Forces High Command) Series, T1119; NG (Nuernberg Government) Series, T1139; NP (Nuernberg Propaganda) Series, M942; WA (undetermined) Series, M946; and records of the Brandt case, M887; the Milch Case, M888; the Altstoetter case, M889; the Pohl Case, M890; the Flick Case, M891; the List case, M893; the Greifelt case, M894; and the Ohlendorf case, M895. In addition, the record of the IMT at Nuernberg has been published in the 42-volume *Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal* (Nuernberg, 1947). Excerpts from the subsequent proceedings have been published in 15 volumes as *Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunal Under Control Council Law No. 10* (Washington). The Audiovisual Archives Division of the National Archives and Records Service has custody of motion pictures and photographs of all 13 trials and sound recordings of the IMT proceedings.

Martin K. Williams arranged the records and, in collaboration with John Mendelsohn, wrote this introduction.

MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO. _____
CASE NO. VI _____
Prosecution Document Book No. XXXIV

English



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TO

DOCUMENT BOOK XXXIV

Count I-D

Case No. VI

FARBER PARTICIPATED IN CREATING AND EQUIPPING
THE NAZI MILITARY MACHINE FOR AGGRESSIVE WAR

Exhibit No.	Document No.	Description of Document	Page No.
	NI-7771 (al- ready intro- duced in con- nection with "Plants")	Original cover agreement between OKH and DAG in connection with plants mentioned befor.	1
	NI-7772 (al- ready intro- duced in con- nection with "Plants")	1) Copy of cover agreement between Reichswehrminister and Wasag, re erection of a plant for the production of nitroglycerine, dated 7 November 1934. 2) Declaration of guarantee and obligation signed by Westfaelisch-Anhal- tische Sprengstoff and November 1937, stating "by the present the undersigned partners to the Deutsche Sprengchemie guarantee to the German Reich without limitation that the activities of the Deutsche Sprengchemie will be limited exclusively to the purposes of the Reich War Department."	11
	NI-4498 (al- ready intro- duced in con- nection with "Plants")	Agreement between I. G. and Wirtschaftliche Forschungsgesellschaft (Wifo) on the emergency plant Wolfen, dated 1937 and 1938.	18
	EC 144	Memorandum from I. G. Farben files dated February, 1939, re importance of produc- tion of sulphuric nitric acid.	19
	NI-7567	Correspondence between Ministry of Econo- mics and OKW re operation of Melbeck factory and production of concentrated nitric acid by I. G., dated 16 September 1937.	22
	NI-7568	Memorandum saying that the Melbeck plant for concentrated nitric acid is now operated by I. G., dated 7 November 1939.	25
	NI-7776	Letter from Wifo dated 15 April 1937, re concentrated sulphuric acid.	25
	NI-5894	Meeting of technical directors at Hoechst, 22 February 1937 (Lautenschlager and Jachna present) re plan for production of various explosives.	29




Exhibit No.	Document No.	Description of Document	Page No.
	NI-5945	Meeting of Commercial Committee, 11 August 1939, (Schnitzler and Oster present) re mercury and use in explosives.	30
	NI-7402	Copy of agreement between I. G. and OKH dated 4 November 1939 re production of N4 salts, an explosive.	32
	NI-8790	Report dated 9 February 1939 by Army Ordnance Office (found in the files of the German Office for Economic Expansion —Krauch's office), concerning explosives status, listing products and plants producing same.	39
	NI-8646	Report dated 7 August 1939, same source, showing status of explosives production according to plants producing same.	42
	NI-7745	Affidavit of Dr. Jacobi, Office of International Nitrogen Cartel and former I. G. Farben official on Nitrogen Syndicate, re activities of I. G. Farben and Nitrogen Cartel after 1938.	108
	NI-10008	Table prepared by Dr. Struss showing I. G. Farben's production of 18 strategic materials from 1932 to 1943.	115
	NI-10019	Affidavit of Dr. Struss explaining preceding chart.	116
	NI-10026 Photo, in both Eng. & Ger. book.	Graph prepared by Dr. Struss re preceding chart.	122
	NI-10020	Chart prepared by Dr. Struss showing dependence of Wehrmacht on I. G. Farben production of strategic war materials.	125
	NI-10580	Excerpts from U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey dated January, 1947, re powder, explosives, war gases, smoke acid, etc.	126
	NI-10025	Graph prepared by Dr. Struss	151

S e c r e t

(Rubber Stamp):
Army High Command

(Rubber stamp):
Army Ordnance Office

(Stamp):
Document Fee
3 Reichsmark
(handwritten)

RM 3,— Documents Fee
for this copy
Berlin, 9.4.1940
(signature)
Illegible

Oberzahlmeister
(First Finance Officer)

B e t w e e n

the German Reich (Reich Army Treasury)
represented by the Army High Command, hereinafter
referred to as "OKH"

a n d

the firm of Dynamit-Aktiengesellschaft, formerly
Alfred NOBEL & Co., Troisdorf, represented by its
Vorstand, hereinafter referred to as "Firm",

the following

O m n i b u s A g r e e m e n t

is concluded.

This contract is to regulate the collaboration of
both contracting parties for the purpose of
founding, setting up, starting, operating and
maintaining, the plants in Doemitz, Guesen,
Hossich-Lichtenau, Clausthal-Zellerfeld and
Ueckermünde, which are to manufacture products
for the Wehrmacht. Financial tasks are allotted in
this manner, that the OKH provides the means to
procure the real estate, buildings, machines, tools
and other installations, which become the legal
property of the OKH. The plant will be taken over
by the Verwertungsgesellschaft fuer Montanindustrie
G.m.b.H. Manich ("MONTAN"), acting for the OKH
and will be

(Page 2 of original)

leased to the subsidiary, the Gesellschaft zur
Verwertung chemischer Erzeugnisse G.m.b.H. in
Troisdorf, founded by the Firm with an original
capital of RM 300,000.—, for the purpose of
operation and maintenance.

The Firm thus comes under the system of contracts
known to it and applicable to army-owned industrial
enterprises (consisting of the preliminary order,
the present omnibus agreement, the statutes of the
subsidiary and the lease contract between this
subsidiary and Montan) in accordance with the
following regulations.

(page 2 of original cont'd)

Clause 1

I. The Firm has founded by order and for account of the OGH: the following plants in Doemitz, Reuter Works, on the site shown in the enclosed plan, (Appendix 1)

- 1.) on the basis of order No. 4 - 7013/34
 - a) a plant for the production of 1000 tons of trinitrotoluene per month with a coagulation-point of at least 80° C, in 25 working days with three shifts;
 - b) a filling plant for filling bombs, with a capacity of 1,700 tons per month Fp.60/40 (explosive mixture of 60% trinitrotoluene and 40% ammonium nitrate), also in 25 working days with three shifts;
 - c) a plant for the production of center columns and smoke fillers needed for bombs;

(page 3 of original)

- 2.) in accordance with order No. 4-A-1005/36 of 2.6.36, a production plant for picric acid with a capacity of 100 tons per month of 25 working days with three shifts;
- 3.) in accordance with order No. 4-A-1021 of 15.9.36; a pressing plant for igniting and primer charges from picric acid.

On the basis of order No. 9-7045/37 of 25.7.1937, the Firm has further increased the toluene stock by 500 tons.

II. On the basis of provisional order No. 4-7012/34 placed on 19.9.1934, the Firm, on orders from and for the account of the OGH, has constructed the following plants on the site shown in the enclosed plan (Appendix 2):

- 1.) a production plant for nitrocellulose with a capacity of 800 tons per month of 25 working days, with three shifts;

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-7771
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original)
cont'd)

2.) a filling plant for filling high explosive bombs, with a capacity of 1700 tons of explosives per month (Trinitrotoluene and ammonium nitrate in proportion of 60:40).

This installation is to guarantee production of the following quantities of smoke generators and pressing bodies (Pressko rper) from trinitrotoluene :

The filling plant should fill per month :

a)	96,700	high explosive bombs	S. C. 10
b)	14,000	"	S.C. 50
c)	2,300	"	S. C. 250
d)	600	"	S. C. 500
e)	9,000	"	S. D. 50

(page 4 of original)

and, in addition S. C. 250 and S. D. 50, until the total filling capacity of 1,700 tons per month is reached ; also, the separate parts belonging to these, namely

96,700 No. 1 smoke generators
96,700 each, large and small filling bodies (Fuellkoerper) from trinitrotoluene,

as well as the center columns from trinitrotoluene for S.C. 250 and S.C. 500, are to be manufactured there and inserted and fixed into the high explosive bombs, in accordance with the conditions of delivery. The technical installations of the filling plant must also be such as to permit a levelling of the monthly quantities under a - e.

In accordance with order No. 4-1-1029/36, dated 18.12.1936, the firm has also built in Guesen, a plant for the production of trinitroanisol, with a capacity of 600 tons per month of 25 working days with three shifts and, in accordance with order No. 9-6050, dated 1.11.1937,

a pressing plant for highly explosive irritants with a capacity of 12,000 shots L.F.H. and 24,400 shots S.F.H. per month of 25 working days with three shifts .

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-7771
CONTINUED

(page 4 of original cont'd)

III. On the basis of order No. 4-7104/35, placed with the Firm on 7.9.1935 and supplemented on 4.10.1937 and 31.8.1938, the Firm, by order and for account, of the OKH, has further constructed the following plants in Hessisch-Lichtenau, Friedland Works, on the site shown on the enclosed plan (Appendix 3) :

- 1.) a plant for the production of trinitrotoluene, with a capacity of 1,000 tons trinitrotoluene per month with a coagulation-point of at least

(page 5 of original)

- 8000, in 25 working days with three shifts;
- 2.) a filling plant to fill grenades and bombs with a capacity of 1,700 tons per month. Fp. 60/40 (explosive mixture of 60% trinitrotoluene and 40% ammonium nitrate) in 25 working days with three shifts ;
- 3.) a plant for the production of picric acid, with a capacity of 250 tons per month of 25 working days with three shifts;
- 4.) a pressing plant for igniting and primer charges from picric acid ;
- 5.) a pressing plant for engineer and naval ammunition from trinitrotoluene, in addition, the Firm has
- 6.) increased the capacity of the trinitrotoluene plant by about 400 tons per month
- 7.) undertaken to build a Nitropenta plant with a capacity of 150 tons per month of 25 working days with three shifts.
- 8.) On the basis of order No. 9-7043/37, dated 24.7.1937, the Firm has further increased toluene stocks at Hessisch-Lichtenau by 1,000 tons and
- 9.) On the basis of order No. 9-5009/36 dated 18.2.1937, has created the conditions for the alternative production of dinitrobenzene at the trinitrotoluene plant.

IV. On the basis of order No. 4-7017/34 given to the Firm on 14.2.1935 and supplemented on 31.8.1938 Firm, by order and for account of, the OKH further undertakes to construct the following plants in Clausthal-Zellerfeld, Tonne Werke, on the site shown on the enclosed plan (Appendix 4) :

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-7771
CONTINUED

(page 6 of original)

1.) a plant for the production of trinitrotoluene with a capacity of 1,000 tons per month, with a coagulation-point of at least 80° C, in 25 working days with three shifts;

2.) a filling plant for filling grenades and bombs, with a capacity of 1,700 tons per month of 25 working days with three shifts.

This latter plant is to guarantee a filling capacity of Fp. 60/40 (explosives mixture of 60% trinitrotoluene and 40% ammonium nitrate);

3.) (the firm) has expanded the trinitrotoluene plant by 400 tons per month of 25 working days with three shifts;

4.) the firm has further undertaken to increase the toluol stocks by 1,000 tons, in accordance with order No. 9-7042/37 given on 24.7.1937 and

5.) in accordance with order No. 9-5009 of 18.2.1937, to create the conditions for the alternative production of dinitrobenzene at the trinitrotoluene plant.

V. On the basis of order No. 4-A-1012/36, given to the firm on 2.7.1936, the Firm, by order and for account of the OKH, further undertakes to construct the following plant in Ueckermünde See I Works, on the site shown on the enclosed plant (Appendix 5):
a plant for the production of nitrocellulose,

(page 7 of original)

with a capacity of 800 tons per month of 25 working days with three shifts.

Clause 2.

- 1.) The Firm is authorized and, at the request of the OKH, obliged to delegate to its subsidiary any obligations and rights resulting from this contract.
- 2.) The claims of the OKH against the Firm on the basis of this contract will not be affected, however, by this delegation, which is demanded by the OKH, with respect to operation and maintenance. Its subsidiary nature may on no account be asserted in the relations of the subsidiary company with the parent company, as regards its financial structure as well as its technical and commercial organization.
- 3.) The Firm undertakes to give to the subsidiary company, free of charge, its inventions and experience (Erfahrungen), its improvements on previously known processes and equipment, including patents, granted or applied for, patterns etc., which can be used for the construction or operation of the production plants. Whenever the firm is obliged to pay royalties for acquired patent rights, the same shall apply to the subsidiary.

(page 7 of original cont'd)

- 4.) The Firm accepts responsibility for granting the requisite trade concessions to Montan, in accordance with Article 16 ff Trade Regulations.
- 5.) The development of the plants shall proceed according to the provisional orders mentioned in Clause 1. The right is reserved to develop the plants later;

(page 8 of original)

this contract shall be binding for individual contracts for later stages of development. The OKH does not accept any obligation to give orders to the plants.

- 6.) The OKH agrees to furnish the means required for the carrying out of these building stages in the measure that funds are available. This includes expenses incurred in connection with the preparation of the site and processing the drafts.
- 7.) The OKH shall at all times be free to make the requisite installations, machines and other equipment available to the plant, to procure them itself or to have them made or procured by the Firm or by third parties.

In building the plants, the firm shall at all times be guided by technical and economic considerations in its choice of a suitable installation; it shall exercise the greatest possible thrift, and undertakes at the same time to use the means made available only for the purposes of the contract. Far-reaching consideration must be given to the requirements of air-raid protection, particularly to the following:

- a) steam and water pipe lines as well as transmission lines are to be arranged in a ring system;
- b) the roofs of essential buildings must afford protection against incendiary bombs;
- c) all buildings have to be furnished with black-out devices
- d) the state of the woods has to be preserved, if possible,
- e) suitable shelters for active and passive personnel have to be constructed.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT N. NI-7771
CONTINUED

(page 12 of original)

Clause 6.

- 1.) The Firm is responsible to the OKH for seeing that while this contract is in force all plants transferred to its subsidiary by means of a lease contract, including machines and other appliances, pipe lines and other transmission lines are constantly kept in good repair and working order, during construction and upon completion,

(page 13 of original)

that they are modernized or renewed upon request of the OKH and that they are managed with the care a good businessman would give them.

- 2.) Fire insurance policies for plants and equipment shall only be taken out where it is prescribed by law. All other insurance agreements shall be made only with the consent of the OKH unless they are prescribed by law.
- 3.) The costs incurred by the obligations listed in clause 1 will be refunded within the framework of the lease contract between the subsidiary and Montan, unless otherwise provided for in clause 7 which deals with maintenance.

(page 17 of original)

Clause 12.

- 1.) The Firm declares explicitly:
 - a) that it will manage the plants which are the object of this contract as trustee of the OKH. It will do everything in its power and leave nothing undone to protect the property rights of the OKH at all times, and will on no account use the plants in any manner as security to obtain credit;

(page 17 of original cont'd)

- b) that it will notify the OKH immediately if it meets with financial difficulties or if important changes in its constitution or administration are about to take place;
 - c) it is responsible for the careful selection of the people entrusted with processing and carrying out the projects, as well as with managing the plants.
- 2.) The OKH declares that it will indemnify the Firm against any obligations and consequences which may arise from this contract, unless the Firm is bound by the provisions of this contract.

Clause 13.

This contract shall become effective retroactively for each plant on the date of the individual order. Simultaneously, all other agreements concerning the contracting plants shall become void. The contract is valid until 31 March 1949 and until then cannot be terminated by either of the contracting parties. After that date the contract may be terminated at one-year's notice, to be given on 31 March of each year by registered letter. The OKH may give premature notice of termination if, within a certain period, to be fixed by the OKH, the Firm fails to carry out the conditions of the contract.

(page 18 of original)

Clause 14.

- 1.) The Firm herewith binds itself to keep secret the correspondence concerning the plant, as well as the documents pertaining thereto, and to disclose details therefrom only to the extent absolutely necessary and only to those persons who are needed - indirectly or directly - for the fulfilment of the contract.
- 2.) Those persons shall be pledged to strict secrecy; it shall be pointed out to them that a violation of the secrecy regulation may be punished by law, according to Articles 88-93a and 353 b and c of the Reich Penal Code in the versions of 24 April 1934, 2 July 1936 and 16 September 1939.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-7771

CONTINUED

(page 18 of original cont'd)

Clause 15.

- 1.) The Berlin District Court shall be competent for any disputes arising from this contract regardless of the amount involved by the dispute.
- 2.) At the start of a legal action the contracting parties shall request the exclusion of the public and the pledging of all participants in the lawsuit to secrecy according to Article 172, 174, GVG, and the keeping of the files under lock and key.

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Clause 16.

This contract is drawn up in triplicate. The OKH shall receive two copies and the Firm one copy.

(page 19 of original)

Clause 17.

The costs of this contract shall be borne by the Firm.

Berlin, the 4th March 1940, Troisdorf, the 4th March 1940

(Rubber Stamp:)

Army High Command

DYNAMIT-ACTIEN-GESELLSCHAFT
FORMERLY ALFRED NOBEL & Co.

Represented by :

(signatures) MÜLLER

(signature:) BORLEY (?)

Dr. SCHMIDT

(Handwritten figures)

20/2

illegible

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-7771

CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

26 August 1947

I, Samuel S. HORN, C AGO-443 113, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7771.

.....

Samuel S. HORN
AGO-443 113

10

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-7772
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(page 1 of original)

C O P Y :

Annex 2/

Pencilled note :
Klietz & Moschwig

B e t w e e n

the German Reich (treasury of the Reichwehr - National Defense Forces), represented by the Minister of National Defense - hereafter briefly called "Rw.M" -

and

the Westfaelisch-Anhaltische Sprengstoff-Aktiengesellschaft Chemische Fabriken, Berlin .9, Linkstr.25, represented by Dr. Matthias, Generaldirektor - hereafter briefly called "Firma"

the following omnibus-contract is being concluded:

Art. 1.

(1) By order and for account of Rw.M., but in its own name, Firma undertakes to establish a plant for the manufacture of Nitroglycerine, Nitroglycerine-raw powder material and Nitroglycerine-powder without solvents on the site placed at its disposal on the basis of a lease contract to be concluded and according to its experiences, guaranteeing a manufacture of 1,000,000 kos. Nitroglycerine-powder without solvents, i.e.

600 metric tons Nitroglycerine tubular powder with a thickness of wall of 2mm,

300 metric tons Nitroglycerine-powder in the form of flakes 10:10:1,5 and

100 metric tons Nitroglycerine-powder in the form of flakes 4:4:1

in 25 days at triple shifts.
A plant for the manufacture of the requisite Nitrocellulose is not to be established.

(2) The plant is to be constructed according to the

(page 2 of original)

manufacturing process of the Reinsdorf works; however, it has to be provided for, that instead of Nitroglycerine, Nitroglycol can also be used, providing that up to the construction of the Nitroglycerine-plant the process of the large-scale manufacture of Nitroglycol has been tested in practice.

(3) When constructing the plants, the requirements for a protection from air-raids must extensively be taken into account. Consequently, the following is especially to be considered:

- a) The plant is to be divided into 2 completely independent operating units locally separated from each other, with a capacity of 500,000 kos. Nitroglycerine powder for each operation unit (specified according to (1)).
- b) Similar plants of the two operating units have to be arranged for as distant from one another as possible,
- c) Steam- and water pipe lines, as well as electric cables have to be arranged in a ring system,
- d) roof construction of the most essential buildings has to give protection against incendiary bombs,
- e) all buildings have to be equipped with black-out appliances,
- f) the state of the woods has to be preserved, if possible,
- g) concrete air-raid shelters have to be constructed for the active and passive personnel.

Art. 2.

(1) All expenditure arising to Firma from the purchase of the grounds, the rafting, construction, administration, and up-keep of the plant will be borne by R.w.M.

(2) The supply of the Nitrocellulose required for the

manufacture of the powder will be taken over by R.w.M.

Art. 3.

(1) The determination of the grounds, the carrying through of its purchase, and the construction of the plant will be settled by individual contracts, to which the stipulations of this contract will apply.

(2) The completion of the plant is to be effected in several constructional stages. Decisive for this will be the budgetary appropriations which will be at the disposal of R.w.M. No obligations whatsoever concerning the carrying through and the completion of the plan will result herefrom to R.w.M.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT FO.WI-7772
CONTINUED

(page 7 of original)

(1) Firma will be entitled to use the equipment of the plant for the production of the Nitroglycerine, of the powder raw material and of the powder for the execution of orders of R.W.M. Before starting the plant, the consent of R.W.M. has, however, to be asked for.

(2) Orders given by third parties may only be executed in the plant after previous consent of R.W.M. has been applied for. The conditions have to be arranged for from case to case.

(page 10 of original)

Art. 19.

(1) If a court of arbitration according to the attached special arbitration contract (annex 2) should not be competent, the Court of Justice in Berlin is competent for disputes resulting from this contract irrespective of the value of the object of the disputes.

(2) Right at the beginning of a legal dispute, the contracting parties have to make applications for exclusion of the public, and the obligation of the parties to the lawsuit to secrecy according to Paras. 172, 174 C.V.G. as well as to careful keeping of the files.

Art. 20.

(1) Firma undertakes to keep secret this contract, the subsequent separate contracts, and the correspondence carried on for their accomplishment, as well as the lists and files belonging to it. Their contents or the individual stipulations thereof are only to be disclosed to the absolutely necessary extent and merely to those persons who have to be entrusted, directly or indirectly, with the dealing with and execution of the contracts.

(2) Firma shall bind the persons referred to to strictest secrecy and refer them to Paras. 88 and the following St.G.B. (penal code) in the version of April 24th, 1934.

Art. 21.

With regard to the stamping of the contract, the legal regulations will apply.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-7772
CONTINUED

(page 10 of original cont'd)

Art. 22.

Modifications of this contract can only be agreed to in writing,
i.e. in form of a document signed by both parties.

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Art. 23.

The contract has been drawn up in duplicate and signed by both
parties as follows. Each party will receive one copy.

Berlin, November 7th, 1934,

The Reich Minister for
Defense Forces
by order
signed: L i e s e
Major General and Chief of
the Army Ordnance Department

Berlin, November 7th, 1934
Westfälisch-Anhaltische
Sprengstoff-Aktiengesellschaft
Chemische Fabriken

signed: M a t t h i a s .

(page 39 of original)

Declaration of guarantee and obligation.

The undersigned partners to the Deutsche Sprengchemie G.m.b.H., Berlin W 9, Linkstrasse 25, guarantee to the German Reich (Treasury of the Armed Forces) without limitation of time and irrevocably.

- 1.) that the activities of the Deutsche Sprengchemie G.m.b.H. will be limited exclusively to the purposes of the Reich War Minister.
- 2.) that "Firma" does not change its legal status without consent of the Reich War Minister or its deputy and that the partners to "Firma" will not sell their shares or parts of their shares to third parties without the consent of the Reich War Minister or his deputy.
- 3.) to grant seat and vote in the supervisory board to the Reich War Minister (High Command of the Army - Wa B) or his deputies.
- 4.) to procure authorization for the members of the supervisory board referred to under 3.), in order that they or their deputies may at any time inspect the production and the main- and works-bookkeeping as well as the books and records of "Firma".
- 5.) to pay a contract penalty of Reichsmarks 10,000.-- as joint debtors to the German Reich for any case of non-compliance with one of the duties under number 1 - 4. The claim on fulfillment is not invalidated by the payment of such penalty.
- 6.) to be liable as principal debtors for possible claims arising from delayed or improperly executed orders for equipment and delivery, given by the Reich War Minister (High Command of the Army), to the Deutsche Sprengchemie G.m.b.H., and of orders given by "Montan"

(for instance for the construction of workers' homesteads owned by the Reich); the debtors renounce the right of objecting the contestability, of making counter-claims and of preliminary proceedings.

Berlin, 26 November 1937

Berlin, 26 November 1937

WESTFÄLISCH-ANHALTISCHE
SPRENGSTOFF-AKTION-GESellschaft
CHEMISCHE FABRIKEN

2 signatures
(illegible)

GESELLSCHAFT FÜR
CHEMISCHE FORSCHUNG UND VER-
WALTUNG .B.H. BERLIN

signature
(illegible)

(page 58 of original)

The undersigned declares on behalf of Montan Industriewerke G.m.b.H. that the KRAIBURG and GERETSRIED plants of Deutsche Sprengchemie located in the American Zone of Occupation, were established by the Westfaelische-Anhaltische Sprengstoff-gesellschaft by order of the German Reich (High Command of the Army), and after completion and acceptance were leased to the Deutsche Sprengchemie by us as trustee designated by the German Reich. Although no special omnibus- or lease contracts were signed for these plants, there was full accord between the High Command of the Army, Wasag, Deutsche Sprengchemie, and Montan Industriewerke, that all rights and obligations of the existing omnibus contract of November 7th, 1934, between the German Reich and Westfaelisch-Anhaltische Sprengstoff-gesellschaft, and of the lease contract of November 26th, 1937/ August 31st, 1939, between Montan Industriewerke and Deutsche Sprengchemie, shall also apply to these plants.

Signature:
on behalf of Montan-Industrie G.m.b.H.
signed: Schmid-Losburg Baumgaertner

Bodenfelde, November 8th, 1945
Fuerstenhagen, November 9th, 1945

The above statements of Montan Industrie G.m.b.H. are correct, with the restriction that the above mentioned plants have not been established by the Westf.-Anh.Sprengstoff A.G., but by the Deutsche Sprengchemie G.m.b.H.

Deutsche Sprengchemie
G.m.b.H.
in liquidation

signed

Wasag-Chemie
Aktiengesellschaft

signed

Westfaelisch-Anhaltische Sprengstoff A.G.
Chemische Fabriken

signed

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-7772
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

8 August 1947

I, Samuel S. HORN, GO-443 113, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7772.

.....
Samuel S. HORN
GO-443 113

- 3 -
"END"

117

WIRTSCHAFTLICHE FORSCHUNGSGESSELLSCHAFT M.B.H.
(Economic Research Association)
Berlin W 8, Franzoesische Strasse 17

Telephone
17 66 41

Bank Account
Deutsche Bau- und Bodenbank
Aktiengesellschaft Berlin

To the
IG Farbenindustrie A. G.

Frankfurt on the Main
Grueneberg Platz 20

Your Reference	Your Letter of	Our Reference	Date
		Dr. G/Fr	9 April 1937

SUBJECT: Extension of the Cleum Factory/Contract.

We refer to the contract concluded between yourselves and us concerning the extension of the new plant in Wolfen and Daeberitz.

We confirm that the new plants to be set up will be erected solely for the purposes of the Wehrmacht, that is for the "A-Fall", and that it would be contrary to the meaning of the contract if the products manufactured in the new plants were used for other purposes as well, or if they were used for the purposes of the Wehrmacht, so long as the requirements of the Wehrmacht can be fulfilled by the IG from its former factories.

We further confirm that through the achievements of the Wifo in accordance with this contract IG does not assume the character of a subsidized undertaking in the sense of Part 1, Chapter V, Paragraph 1 of the Reich President's decree for the stimulation of economy, of 4 September 1932 (Reich Legal Gazette, Page 425).

Signature:

Heil Hitler!
Wirtschaftliche Forschungsgesellschaft
m.b.H.

per pro
2 illegible signatures.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

1 July 1947

I, VICTORIA CRTON, 20129, herewith certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts from document No. NI-4498.

VICTORIA CRTON
20129

"ED"

18

(Translator's Note: Handwritten Note:
Handed to Major Dref on 15 February 193
Thi

Progress in the Supply of Chemical Raw Materials, since the seizure of Power
1933, especially through the Four Year Plan

According to the very restricted military power in the year 1933, only the most centralized part of Germany -- in the West up to the River Weser (therefore excluding the Ruhr area) -- could be considered for covering demand in the military economy. This caused a hopeless situation for national defence in the field of the chemical industry as well as in other fields. As our military power increased since we have back our military freedom, automatically there has been a considerable improvement in this because gradually important chemical plants, formerly situated in the border zone, could be considered as safe, and because the chemical industry, especially in the course of the Four Year Plan, was considerably expanded. The progress of this expansion is shown by a few examples:-

Sulphur, found as a natural product in tremendous quantities in Italy and in the U.S. was in Germany, up to some time ago, a product which had to be imported at an average rate of 50,000 tons, and in 1933 even of 80,000 tons. We do not have any sulphur deposits in Germany, but German coal contains a little sulphur (about 3-5 %). These amounts of sulphur, formerly escaped into the waste gases of the carbonisation of coal and were burned together with them. We can find the same waste gases containing sulphur in the hydrogenation plants, which have been established in the course of the extension of German mineral oil production. The idea was quite obvious to extract from these waste gases the sulphur they contain, similar to the former procedure of extracting ammonia, tar, benzol, etc. Tremendous progress, especially through the Four Year Plan, has been made in the de-sulphurization installations, which work according to all sorts of processes. The increase in consumption in Germany and the increase in our own sulphur production can be seen from the enclosed chart (Encl. No. 1). As sulphur in the form of carbon (disulphide) is used in the production of cellular wool-"H" and as 80 % of the German sulphur requirements are used in the form of carbon disulphide,

(Translator's Note: Various illegible handwritten notes and initials: Thi

(Page 2 of original)

the importance of the self-sufficiency of Germany as to sulphur is obvious. Moreover, the case of sulphur for the production of sulphuric acid can be considered if sulphur is produced in still larger quantities in Germany.

Up to now, sulphuric acid has been produced mainly by the roasting (Abroesten) of pyrites, of which Germany can only cover about one-fifth of its own demand. The remaining 4/5 were imported, mainly from Spain. In the chemical industry, sulphuric acid has a similar importance as iron has in the machine and construction industry; therefore, any progress in the raw material supply from indigenous sources is welcome from the point of view of military economy, especially as sulphuric acid has become indispensable in the production of powder and explosives, as well as in the mineral oil and fertilizer industry. Thus, the German chemical industry took up plans which had been used during the World War because of the lack of raw materials, namely the production of sulphuric acid from German gypsum. One plant for the production of sulphuric acid on the basis of gypsum is already working very satisfactorily. This plant for gypsum sulphuric acid also produces besides this the by-product: Cement, which is still very much in demand. In this connection, attention can be drawn to another very important raw material for the production of powder and explosives:

Nitric acid is nowadays produced by burning ammonia by means of oxygen or air, whereas in the former process, it was produced by disintegration of salpêtre, especially of Chile Salpêtre. (TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Handwritten alterations of the text of this sentence). The capacity of the installations which are of special interest to the military economy has grown to 10 times its former production since the seizure of power.

(Page 3 of original)

Another very important raw material of the chemical industry is rubber. Formerly it was a purely foreign natural product; as is generally known, it can now be replaced to the greatest extent by synthetic products; in this, the synthetic products, as for example Buna, are already, in many ways, showing advantages over natural rubber. About one-quarter of the German demand for rubber can be covered this year by synthetic rubber. The raw materials needed for the production of this product are, apart from electric power, coal and chalk, of which there is no lack in Germany.

During these last years, a number of other synthetic products, in addition to Buna, have steadily increased in importance. The plastic materials, made on the basis of phenol and cresol - also by-products of the coking industry - have been used for a long time in electrical engineering, in machine construction, household goods, etc. The increase in production can be estimated at from 10,000 tons a year in 1934 to 30,000 tons a year in 1939. In addition, synthetic materials have also been developed on the basis of other raw materials. Of special importance are synthetics produced on the basis of carbide (Ethylene). Whereas production of this kind was only introduced to the chemical industry a few years ago, it will have increased to 15,000 tons this year, in the course of the Four Year Plan. Considering that with these synthetic materials we can replace valuable scarce metals, rubber, foreign wood, etc. one can only then judge their real significance for any military economy.

The supply of textiles requires special attention, as wool and cotton are almost exclusively imported products. By the rapid expansion of the cellulose wool industry and by the constant improvement of cellulose wool, which is nowadays an acknowledged new textile raw material, a quite remarkable easing in this field of raw materials has occurred. In 1933 the

(Page 4 of original)

cellulose wool production of 5,000 tons could cover only three-quarters of the total German demand for textiles; today it can be assumed that the cellulose wool production is sufficient to cover 25 % of the entire demand for raw material for clothing. The preliminary product of cellulose wool is cellulose, which, apart from paper production, is necessary as a basic product for powder production. Up to now pine wood cellulose has mainly been used which necessitated considerable imports of pine, whereas in future the supply of cellulose will be improved by the greater use of indigenous beech and pine wood and also of straw.

As to its methods of production, the fields of mineral oils and fuel also fall within the chemical industry. At the time of the seizure of power, all that was available besides a small output of German petroleum, were benzol as a by-product of the coking industry, the spirit resulting from the fermentation and an installation for the synthetic production of hydrogenated gasoline. In 1933, we could count on a mineral oil production of 800,000 tons from indigenous raw material sources. The main part of the fuel required in Germany was imported. The motorization promoted by special order of the Fuehrer and the German increase in fuel consumption of all kinds caused by it, caused German production to be enlarged to such an extent that the output of fuel can now be estimated as a total of about 2,300,000 tons. The main reason for this increase is the 10-fold increase

of hydrogenation and synthetic capacity. The goal of covering the entire demand for fuel by German production has not yet quite been reached, as the demand has jumped over production owing to the completely unexpected increase in motorization.

(Translator's Note:
Handwritten note:) Thi 15/2

(Page 5 of original)

Re III d

14 February 1939

While the mineral oil production from indigenous raw materials in the year 1932, was:

50,000	tons of petroleum and low-temperature gasoline
100,000	" hydrogenated gasoline
230,000	" benzol
140,000	" spirit

TOTAL: 510,000 tons of carburetors fuel

65,000	tons of Diesel fuel
165,000	" heating fuel
60,000	" lubricating oil

TOTAL: 800,000 tons of mineral oil

(TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Above two tables
crossed out in original)

The present production is estimated at a total of about 2,300,000 tons a year, which are:

900,000	tons of hydrogenated gasoline
150,000	" "Fischer" gasoline
120,000	" petroleum and low-temperature gasoline
450,000	" benzol
100,000	" spirits

TOTAL: 1,700,000 tons of carburetors fuel

100,000	tons of Diesel fuel
300,000	" heating fuel
150,000	" lubricating oil

The main part of the increase is due to a 16-fold increase of hydrogenation and synthetic capacity.

As a result of the large scale motorization, which could not be anticipated to that extent, the demand of 1,200,000 tons of carburetor fuel per year has more than doubled in the years 1932-1939.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, ETO No. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. EC-144.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
ETO No. 34079

(E N D)

(5th page of original)
(page 1 of original)
Draft

Reich War Ministry
File reference 66 b 2161 III a
WStb Department W Raw materials 1400/37 c III a
2 September 1937
Secret

To
the Reich and Prussian Ministry of Economics,
for the attention of Herrn Min. Rat Godlewski,
or his deputy,

Berlin 7 8,
Behrenstrasse 43

Subject: Nitric acid plant Holbeck.

I. Necessary completion or alterations.

- (handwritten);
- 1) In consequence of an inspection on 26 August 1937 of the nitric acid plant under construction at Holbeck-Emsen it was decided that the storage space planned at the moment for ammonia and concentrated nitric acid was insufficient. The storage capacity is reckoned on an eight day basis. If one assumes that the average storing of the finished product will be for 3-4 days, a shut-down would occur after 4-5 days if transportation difficulties should arise. The same applies in a lesser degree to the initial product ammonia. In these circumstances the satisfactory running of the plant is not guaranteed under mobilization conditions in consideration of the transport difficulties to be expected at that time. The firm Demag-Meguin was therefore requested to work out a project for the extension of the nitric acid tank storage to 14 working days (as at the other nitric acid plants) and of the ammonia plant to about 12 working days. You are requested to direct the Wirtschaftliche Forschungsgesellschaft to carry out the building project in this modified manner.
 - 2) B.Raw materials
I S.K.
K.G. 9²/9
 - 3) III w.w.
13 September 1937
and 4 September

For the files
W Raw Materials
III

Furthermore, the fact that the transformers envisaged were to be placed a bare 100 meters apart from each other was objected to.

(6th page of original)

(page 2 of original)

It was suggested that the two structures should be erected at least 200, and if possible 300 meters apart from each other. You are requested to give appropriate directions to the Wirtschaftliche Forschungsgesellschaft.

II. Commencement of operations at the Holbeck plant.

In contrast to the stand-by plants previously erected for the production of concentrated nitric acid, the Holbeck plant lies at a great distance from all the industrial centers concerned. Particular difficulties would therefore be encountered in setting it in operation when mobilization begins. In the view of the Military Economy Staff the situation could be effectively remedied if the Holbeck works were already set in operation in peace-time.

The present scarcity of concentrated nitric acid has led to the leasing of the Piesteritz stand-by plant to the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. for the peace-time production of nitric acid. According to the information available here, it may be assumed that the peace-time nitric acid requirements will rise still higher in the coming years. As the commencement of operations at Piesteritz when mobilization starts involves fewer difficulties, in contrast to Holbeck, it seems suitable to lease the latter plant to the I.G. Farbenindustrie for peace-time production when it is complete, and to close Piesteritz to this end. In view of the Northwest German explosives factories' high requirements of nitric acid, such a solution, besides a few disadvantages, should have important industrial advantages. In particular the long transportation routes for concentrated nitric acid could be considerably shortened, or rather, the essentially lesser and cheaper transportation for ammonia could be used as far as the Holbeck works.

The I.G. Farbenindustrie is concerned in an effort not to allow any outsiders to penetrate into the nitrogen industry. They should therefore be prepared immediately to take over the running of the Holbeck plant.

(7th page of original)

(page 3 of original)

If this should not be the case, the Wehrmacht could enforce the supply of nitric acid from Holbeck through pressure on the explosives supply firms.

If Holbeck is to be set in operation in peace-time, the expansion of the settlements for the employees will at once have to be pressed forward with vigour. Apart from this, it would be necessary to submit the project in hand to the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. for an opinion as to whether certain alterations or additions (which can probably be allowed for without difficulty during the building) are still necessary from the point of view of operating the factory.

(7th page of original, cont'd)

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

Information is requested as to whether the suggestion of the peace-time operation of Melbeck would be agreed to for the sake of guaranteeing preparedness for mobilization. If this should be the case, you are requested to arrange a discussion with the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. and the Wirtschaftliche Forschungsgesellschaft, with the Wehrwirtschaftsstab participating.

On behalf of

1 September

Initial : C

.....
-.-.-.-.-

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

30 July 1947

I, Patricia WOOD, No. 20139, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts from document No. NI-7567.

Patricia WOOD
No. 20139

W Ro III (a)
File Reference 66 b 2161/IVc

Berlin, 7 November 1938

Memorandum

concerning the inspection of the Hoko-plant (plant for production of highly concentrated acids) Melbeck-Embsen, of the concentrated sulphuric acid concentration plant and of the explosives factory Kruemmel, of the pyrite depot of the "Lifo in the port of Hamburg on 2 and 3 November 1938.

- 1) In the Hoko plant Melbeck all buildings, with the exception of the administrative building, have been completed. The assembly of about 90 per cent of the apparatuses has been completed, so that one can reckon on the operation of the Hoko-plant on a trial basis in 1939. Before this date the oxygen plant and the cooling plant will be tested out, already in December 1938.

(Hand-written note:)
8 Nov. R for information illeg. 11 Nov. A

During a conversation with Dr. DIEKMANN (I.G., Vermittlungsstelle W) concerning the securing of labor requirements for the Hoko-B plants in the Mob-case - several laborers working on the building site at Melbeck and a few of the SS-men who are keeping guard have expressed their willingness to remain as workers in Melbeck when the plant comes into operation - Dr. DIEKMANN invited attention to the following: During the period of tension Dir. Dr. MUELLER (D.A.G.) had come to see him and had suggested, that in the event of mobilization (Mob-Fall) the I.G. should give up some of the workers, who are working in the I.G. in nitrating and similar plants, to the D.A.G. In the event of a mobilization the D.A.G. would be short of approximately 50,000 workers to bring their factories to a maximum of production. At that time the I.G. was willing to support the D.A.G. in this matter; but declared that they were not in a position to supply from their works the full number of workers required by the D.A.G. If the figure mentioned by Dr. DIEKMANN was correct, it would mean that, in the event of a mobilization, the D.A.G. would have at their disposal only about half of all the labor required (present strength of staff approximately 50,000 men).

- 2) During the visit to the Explosive factory Kruemmel, which took place on 3 November, the problems of acid transport from Melbeck to Kruemmel were mainly discussed. As the distance from Kruemmel to Melbeck is approximately 25 kilometers as the crow flies the obvious thing to do was to arrange road truck convoys.

OVER

(page 2 of original)

MINISTER FOR WAR
and Commander in Chief
of the Wehrmacht

Berlin W 35,
Tiroitzufer 72-76
Telephone: El Kurfuerst 8191

(Please quote the above file
reference, date and brief summary of
contents in your reply)

However, at Kraemmel the Elbe river can only be crossed by means of a
ferry with the following dimensions and holding capacity:

Ferry Tespe - Kraemmel
16 by 4 meters = 15 tons.

Since the acid truck convoys are approximately 25 meters long and
when loaded to capacity weigh 40 tons, the Kraemmel ferry does not
suffice for crossing purposes. The next ferry up the Elbe river, that
could be used, is the one located between Lauenburg and Hohnstorf and
which has the following capacities:

Ferry Lauenburg/Elbe - Hohnstorf

1. 16 by 4 meters = 14 tons
2. 22 by 5 meters = 22 tons
3. 8 by 3 meters = 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ tons.

To cross the Elbe river at Lauenburg would mean a detour of about 20
kilometers. Therefore, until such time as the road conditions have
been thoroughly examined to see if they can take heavy truck convoys,
the transport of acids from Melbeck to Kraemmel and Lauenburg will for
the time being have to be effected by rail via Hamburg.

However, still another problem arises in connection with the start-
ing up at Melbeck. Up to the present the waste mixed acid available
at Kraemmel was shipped back from Kraemmel to Wolfen in empty tank cars
for the purpose of being worked up. Since there is no working-up plant
available at Melbeck, the necessity arises for setting-up such a plant
at Kraemmel so as to avoid additional shipments of waste mixed acid
to Wolfen in the future.

- 3) The Wifo pyrite depot is being set up on and near to the site of
the former repairing and breaking-up wharf Koehlbrenndt in port of Ham-
burg. The Koehlbrenndt wharf is located at a distance of $\frac{1}{2}$ kilometer
down the Elbe river from the Howaldt wharf. The site owned by the
Wifo is approximately 32,000 square meters, there are three sheds stand-
ing on it, one of which has been already filled with natural rubber.
The area rented by the Wifo amounts to approximately 150,000 square
meters. Pyrite will be stored there in lots of 25,000 tons each. So
far, the Koehlbrenndt wharf

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7568
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original)

has no rail-connection; however, this will be provided for in the near future.

At the time of the inspection the second pyrite ship was being unloaded. Both ships carried a total of about 5,000 tons of pyrites, a third one bringing 7,000 tons is expected in a few days.

Initialed: Thi (Thieror)
8 November

W42
Goering

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

6 August 1947

I, Victoria ORTON, No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7568.

Victoria ORTON
No. 20129

- 3 -
"END"

27

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-7775
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

To the
Dynamit A.-G.
formerly Alfred Nobel & Co.

Freisdorf (District Cologne)

Dr.G/Er

15 April 1937

Extension of the Concentrated Sulphuric Acid - Factory Krusmehl/Agreement.

We refer to the agreement concluded between you and ourselves concerning the extension of the concentrated sulphuric acid plant at Krusmehl.

We confirm that the new plant to be set up is for the purpose of the Wehrmacht exclusively, i.e. for the A-Fall, and that it would be against the meaning of the agreement, if the products manufactured at the new plant were also used for other purposes, or if they were used for purposes of the Wehrmacht, as long as the Dynamit A.-G., formerly Alfred Nobel & Co., could satisfy the Wehrmacht from their present plants.

We also confirm that through the actions of the Wife, in conformity with this agreement the Dynamit A.-G., formerly Alfred Nobel & Co., will not have the character of a subsidized enterprise within the meaning of the first part, chapter V, paragraph 1 of the decree by the Reich President for the Revival of Industry, dated 4 September 1932 (Reich Penal Code page 425).

Heil Hitler!
Wirtschaftliche Forschungsgesellschaft
m. b. H.

ppc.

(signature) initial

(signature) initial

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

7 August 1947

I, BRIGITTE TURK, ETC 35130, herewith certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI-7775.

BRIGITTE TURK
ETC 35130

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT No. NI-589/
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Minutes

of the meeting of Technical Directors in Frankfurt/Main-
Hochst on 22 February 1937.

Attended by:

Hermann
Lautenschlaeger
Jachno
Jacobi
Kraenzlein
Roth (Initial) H
Steib
von Bruening
Engelbortz
Fehrle
Hagenbecker
Hilken
Moller
Renzonberger
Tumpke
Hirschol.

.....
(page 6 of original)

.....
The Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials has imposed on the I.G. the task of constructing a plant to produce 500 tons of Polyvinylchloride per month. Bruns is instructed to deal with the supply of carbide from Rheinfelden, in case Monovinylchloride production is increased there.

.....
(page 7 of original)

.....
Kraenzlein announces that the Army Ordnance Department (Heereswaffenamt) has ordered installations for the manufacture of Dichlor- Chlorocetophenone via Troisdorf.

.....
(signature) Hirschol.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

21 May 1947

I, ARTHUR MACNAMARA, Civ. No. 20 191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts of the document No. NI-589A.

ARTHUR MACNAMARA
Civ. No. 20 191.

Provisional draft of minutes
of the 24th meeting of the commercial committee held
at Frankfurt/H. on 11 August 1939.

The following gentlemen were present:

von Schnitzler,	Chairman,
Krueger,	
Mueller,	
Oster,	
Otto,	
Weber-Andreae,	
Frank-Fahle,	recorder.

In addition:

Kehler,
and, for part of the time
Kugler,
Papst.

1) Spain.

a) Pursuant to the resolution made during the 20th meeting on 10 March 1939, the suggestions of Herr Papst were discussed and accepted, in which connection it was pointed out that confidential treatment of the matter was obligatory.

b) Dr. Frank-Fahle reported on the results of the negotiations which state counsel Wehltat conducted in Spain during June and July.

He further reported that an invitation had been extended by Mr. Birk in the name of I.G. to Messrs Albe and Glemes of the Spanish ministry of industry and trade; these gentlemen, however, would not be visiting Germany, in the near future; the Spanish head of the national organization for trade and industry had therefore requested that the Spanish trade advisory counsel (Beirat) of the legation at Berlin, Mr. Aguirre, should be invited.

(page 2 of original)

A vacancy, previously filled by Messrs. Roura and Fergas of London, had occurred for a representative of the Italc-Spanish Mercury Cartel. The problem of who might possibly take over representation of the mercury cartel was discussed, with Dr. Mueller pointing out the importance of mercury in the international explosives industry. Herr Weber-Andreae was to discuss this problem further with the Metal Company.

.....
(Page 5 of original)

Berlin, 15 August 1939
FF/Fm. 24/39

signed: Frank-Fahle

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-5945
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT
NO. NI-5945

23 May 1947

I, Leonard LAWRENCE, ~~20138~~, herewith certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpt of document no. NI-5945

LEONARD LAWRENCE
20138

- 2 -
END

31

(5th page of original)

(page 1 of original)

File No: Wa J Rue V c/11 Oct 1939

Translator's note: these letters probably stand for :

Wa - Ordnance Office - Waffenamt
J - Legal Department - Juristische Abt.
Rue - Ammunitions - Ruestungen

STAMP:

Office Dr. Ambros
received: 1 November 1939
No.: 432 c

A g r e e m e n t

between

the German Reich (Financial Department of the Army)
represented by the High Command of the Army
hereinafter referred to as "OKH"

and

the firm I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.,
Frankfurt on Main,
represented by its Vorstand,
hereinafter referred to as " the firm ".

Upon instructions issued by OKH, the firm has installed a pilot plant for the production of 5/15 tons of N_4 salts per month (or 4/12 tons if pure salt in accordance with the quality standards of the CTR ((Reich Institute for Technics and Chemistry)) is delivered). In order to test as speedily as possible from the technical point of view the results gained in the pilot plant, another plant of greater dimensions, owned by the firm, is to be erected in Ludwigshafen for the production of 25/75 tons of N_4 salts per month (or 20/60 tons per month if pure salt in accordance with the quality standards of the Reich Institute for Technics and Chemistry is delivered). In order to finance the building of this second pilot plant, the parties agree to the following :

Article 1.

The firm has undertaken to erect, and, if possible, to prepare for operation in all parts before the 1 January 1940, the second pilot plant mentioned in the preamble.

(6th page of original)

(page 2 of original)

The costs of this plant are calculated at 3 000 000 Reichsmarks in the estimate which has been submitted and which is attached to this agreement. Expenditure in excess of this estimate is permitted only if previously approved by OKH.

Article 2.

- 1.) As the plant is erected exclusively in the interests of the Wehrmacht, OKH grants the firm a loan up to the amount of the construction and installation costs within the meaning of article 1 par. 2. The loan is free of interest.
- 2.) The loan is to be used exclusively for the purpose of erecting the pilot plant for the production of 25/75 tons of N_2 salts per month. The final amount of the loan is to be calculated after completion of the plant on the basis of the final schedule of expenses.

Article 3.

- 1.) The loan is to be paid to the firm in instalments as required to cover the payments made or to be made by the firm for the erection of the plant.
- 2.) The firm is to book the amounts received to a special account. The representatives of OKH and of the Supreme Audit Office of the German Reich (Rechnungshof des Deutschen Reiches) are at all times entitled to audit the special account and the bills, vouchers and other documents pertaining to it as well as to inspect the experimental plant.

Article 4.

The loan is to be secured by a guaranty of payment to be undertaken by the Deutsche Laenderbank A.G., Berlin, for the actual amount of the loan. The guarantor

(7th page of original)

(page 3 of original)

is to renounce his rights to claim that the guaranty agreement is defeasible, that counterclaims should be set off against his obligation and that action should be previously taken against the firm. The firm is to procure the guaranty document as soon as possible; the document is to be attached to the first certified copy of this agreement.

Article 5.

- 1.) The loan is granted for a period of five years, beginning with the commencement of operation of the plant, and is to be repaid in five equal instalments due at the end of each year, the year being reckoned from the commencement of operation. For repayment, the firm is to use the amounts deducted as depreciations from the value of the experimental plants, amounts which are to be recognized by the Price Control Office as justifiable additions to the sales prices charged to OKH. Basis for the calculation of depreciations is an output of 700 tons per year; at this figure the depreciation rate for buildings is 5% and for machinery and apparatus 20% per year, on condition that renewals and such repairs as increase the value of the respective assets are to be taken into account only with the approval of the Price Control Office of OKH.
- 2.) The firm may redeem the loan within a shorter period. The firm is obliged to do so if and in as far as the depreciation amounts included in the sales prices exceed the redemption instalment defined in paragraph 1. The redemption instalments are to be paid into the special account which the Economic Office of OKH has with the Reich Bank branch in Berlin-Charlottenburg, Leibnitzstrasse.
- 3.) The firm is not entitled to set off against OKH own counter-claims, if any, against the loan. The sales prices which are charged to OKH must not be increased by any surcharges for redemption instalments beyond the correctly calculated depreciation amounts.
- 4.) The annual redemption instalments are due on the 1. November following the expiration of a full year from the commencement of operation at the plant.

(8th page of original)

(page 4 of original)

- 5.) Should a redemption instalment be more than three months overdue, then OKH may demand the repayment of the full amount of the loan still outstanding at that time.
- 6.) A respite for the repayment of the loan is granted the firm for periods during which no orders of OKH are carried out at the pilot plant if, during that period, work for private customers within the meaning of article 6 is not available either. The same applies - in spite of the fact that the plant is working to full capacity - if the depreciation amounts within the meaning of No. 1 are not sufficient to cover the redemption instalments and if the firm cannot in all fairness be expected to make up the deficiency out of profits accruing from the operation of the plant.

Article 6.

- 1.) In the first place, the pilot plant is to carry out orders from OKH. The firm may, however, use the entire plant or parts of it to carry out work for private customers on condition that OKH gives its permission in each case. If that is done, depreciation amounts proportional to the degree to which the plant is operated for non-Mohrmacht purposes are to be used for the repayment of the loan according to article 5.
- 2.) Over and above the payments mentioned in No. 1, 5% interest is to be paid on the amount of the loan then still outstanding. The interests are to be paid in the same way as the redemption instalments.

Article 7.

Should part of the loan remain unpaid at the end of the period for which the loan has been given, the outstanding amount will then be converted - if the Reich Minister of Finance agrees - into a subvention equalling the remaining book value of the pilot plant which, in its turn, is to be written off immediately by deducting a 100% depreciation rate.

(9th page of original)

(page 5 of original)

This having been done, sales prices charged to OKH must not be further increased by depreciation amounts. Should the pilot plant continue to carry out work for private customers, article 6 remains in force, and the depreciation amount is to be calculated in accordance with article 5. If a conversion in accordance with paragraph 1 takes place, the guaranty given as security is to be released except for 1/5 of the subvention.

.....

Article 9.

- 1.) The firm herewith undertakes to keep the correspondence and all documents pertaining to it secret and to reveal details of them only to those persons who are to be directly or indirectly concerned with the fulfilment of this agreement, and that only as far as is absolutely unavoidable.
- 2.) These persons are to be bound to strictest secrecy and to be informed that a violation of their obligation to maintain secrecy might lead to proceedings in a Criminal Court for an offense against articles 88 - 93 a and 353 b and c of the modified Reich Penal Code as published on 24 April 1934, 2 July 1936 and 16 September 1939. The conclusion of insurance contracts, with the exception of those made obligatory by law, is - for security reasons - permitted only with the express approval of OKH.

.....

(10th page of original)

(page 6 of original)

.....

(10th page of original, cont'd)

(page 6 of original, cont'd)

Article 12.

Should the conversion into a subvention of an amount of the loan still unpaid - as stipulated in article 7 - have come into force after the expiry of the period fixed for the loan and, following this, should the loan not be fully repaid in payments as laid down in article 6 within the period fixed for this agreement, the contracting parties will ascertain, at the end of the period for which this agreement is valid, the value for the firm in the near future, if any, of the pilot plant which is the subject of the loan or the subvention; in doing so, they will take all circumstances into consideration.

The value thus ascertained is to be paid to OKH by the firm, but only up to the amount of the loan still unpaid. The method of repayment is to be agreed upon when the case arises.

(11th page of original)

(page 7 of original)

The firm must not accumulate, - for the purpose stated in paragraph 1, - reserves increasing the sales prices charged to OKH during the period of the agreement.

Article 13.

The firm does not, by virtue of assistance given by the Reich within the framework of this agreement, become a publicly assisted enterprise (subventioniertes Unternehmen) within the meaning of the Ordinance of the Reich President concerning the revival of industry dated 4 September 1934 (Reich Law Gazette part I, Page 431, Part 4, Chapter five.).

Article 14.

The document tax for this agreement and the expenses connected with the procurement of the securities mentioned in this agreement are to be borne by the firm.

Article 15.

Of this agreement, three copies have been made. OKH receives two copies, the firm one copy.

Berlin, 28 December 1939

High Command of the Army

By order

(signed) Becker

General, Artillery,

Chief of Army Ordnance Office

Ludwigshafen, 4 November 1939

I.G. Farbenindustrie Akt. Ges.

(signed) Ambros (signed)

Heintzeler

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

30 July 1947

I, Walter K. GALEWSKI, ETO 20 145, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts from document No. NI-7402.

Walter K. GALEWSKI
ETO 20 145

Rubber stamp:

TOP SECRET

Report

on the journey made together with representatives of the
Army Ordnance Office from 31 January - 3 February 1939

Situation concerning: Explosives
Toluol
Chemical warfare agents and intermediates

(page 2 of original)

2nd copy

Berlin, 9 February 1939

Rubber stamp:

TOP SECRET

Subject: Situation concerning explosives on the basis of the
journey made between 31 January and 3 February 1939

- 1) Hexogen (SH-)
I.G. Ludwigshafen

(Expert: Dr. Schnurr DAG Troisdorf)

The SH-process has been worked out and tested to a point where the construction of a large installation can be started. It has been deemed expedient to give to the DAG as soon as possible an order for the planning and construction of the first large installation according to the Schnurr-Hanning-process. First stage of development 500 tons per month in two aggregates of 250 tons per month each. Total capacity in the final stage 1,000 tons per month. In addition production of highly concentrated nitric acid and filling installation. The question, whether Hexamin should be produced in the explosives installation or near a methanol plant is still open and is being investigated.

- 2) Hexogen (K-)
W.SAG Berlin (Elszig)
I.G. Ludwigshafen

v. Buehlendorf, W.SAG, Berlin
(Experts: Dr. Schoenemann, I.G. Ludwigshafen)

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

Before further plans are made, the results of the experiments, especially in regard to regenerating the waste nitric acid, or the ammoniac nitrate carried out in Ludwigshafen, must be awaited. It can be assumed that during the next few months the experiments will be sufficiently far advanced to warrant a start being likewise made on the planning and construction of a large installation with an output of 1,000 tons per month. As regards the supply of raw materials, the same applies here as to SH-Nitrogen.

- 3) N_4 - Salt (page 3 of original)
I.G. Ludwigshafen

(Expert Dr. Ulrich)

Although the Army Ordnance Office admits the advantages of N_4 -Salt, the experiments have not yet been concluded. For the time being, therefore, only the construction of the installation for an output of 1,000 tons per month, as provided for in the rapid plan, can be considered. The raw material Ethylenedichloride is a by-product of chlorhydrine. If it is planned to produce more than 1,000 tons of N_4 -Salt per month, the necessary Ethylenedichloride would have to be produced separately. These plans, however, are not considered urgent and will therefore be postponed for the time being; the same applies to the laying in of Ethylenedichloride stocks. The technical experimental installation (75 tons per month) at present under construction will start to operate in September of this year. Taking into consideration the time which is necessary to gain experience in regard to this installation, the 1,000 tons-per-month-installation can be completed at the required time (according to the quantity of Ethylenedichloride obtained).

- 4) Fuming Sulphuric Acid - Regeneration
D.G. Schlobusch und Lurgi G.m.b.H. Frankfurt

(Expert: Dr. Stahl, Lurgi)

Under the rapid plan it is proposed to attach to every Tri-factory a fuming sulphuric acid-regenerating plant. In regard to the present stage of the process it can be said that in the light of the experience gained the experimental installation at Schlobusch must be reconstructed. According to information received from the D.G. it is safe to assume that it cannot be built into the explosives factory before two years. This period, however, seems much too long and every effort will have to be made to speed up the experiments on this important raw material saving-process. Appropriate reminders for the speeding up are being sent to D.G. and Lurgi.

(page 4 of original)

Summary.

- 1) Developmental research in the industry has proceeded successfully. The required changes which have been incorporated in the rapid plan, and which are dependent upon developmental research, have proved to be correct, so that Hexogen and N_2 -Salt will be ready for use at the scheduled time.
- 2) Since it can be determined, on the basis of the present stage of experimental research, that all Wehrmacht demands concerning raw material for the various kinds of explosives can be satisfied if systematically developed, a new overall plan must be drawn up jointly with the Wehrmacht for the continuation of the rapid plan.
- 3) The Wehrmacht can make any demand as far as quality is concerned which is justified by military requirements.

Everything goes to show that these demands can be made after 1940 on the basis Trinitrotoluol as well as on the basis Hexogen if developmental research is carried out systematically.

(page 5 of original)

Berlin, 9 February 1939

Distributor:

1. Dr. Krauch
2. Dr. Ritter
3. Dr. Rau/Ringlob
4. Dr. Sorg
5. Dr. Ahl
6. v. Muehlendahl
7. Army Ordnance Office
8. " " "
9. " " "
10. V Stb.

Subject: T o l u o l - Situation according to the journey made between 31 January and 3 February 1939

1) I.G. Ludwigshafen (Expert Dr. Hopff)

Owing to the employment of molecular quantities of aluminum chloride, the regeneration of which has not yet been technically solved and which in any case will be expensive, the synthesis of toluol gained from benzole and methyl chloride can to all intents and purposes be eliminated.

2) I.G. Ludwigshafen (Expert Dr. Schoenemann)

Production of toluol from naphthalene, whereby the latter

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

oxidizes into phthalic acid and by separation of carbonic acid and hydrogenation is converted into toluol, is not possible because of the small basis of naphthalene raw material. Direct nitration of naphthalene into trinitronaphthalene etc. would, in case of mobilization, be more expedient for the production of a substitute explosive.

3) I.G. Ludwigshafen (Expert Dr. Schoenemann)

The suggestion, to produce toluol from cymol, must first be examined by determining the quantities of ~~yielded~~ (in the sulphite waste lye).

4) I.G. Ludwigshafen (Expert Director Dr. Pier)

Toluol from highly aromatic aviation fuel.

At the present stage of the process a production of 2 million tons aviation fuel

(page 6 of original)

on the basis of pit coal, yields approximately 300,000 tons of toluol, with an approximate toluol content of 15% as a component part of the benzine. Assuming that roughly 1/3 of this (approx. 100,000 tons) of toluol can be made available without essentially affecting the properties of the aviation fuel, especially the octane rating and the combustible qualities, a very promising basis for the supply of the explosives industry presents itself.

The question as to how far aviation fuel can be de-toluolated, will be clarified by discussions with the Air Ministry.

Ludwigshafen will immediately work out a project for the production of 5,000 tons of pure toluol per year, as provided for in the rapid plan. The pure toluol will be produced from the aviation fuel by distillation and extraction.

5) I.G. Ludwigshafen (Expert Director Dr. Pier)

Production of toluol by direct coal tar hydrogenation.

For the production of comparatively large quantities of toluol in a special installation the medium oil fraction of the ~~crude tar~~ can be processed directly to toluol by hydrogenation. The process has been tested and can be introduced immediately. The toluol yield is dependent on the composition of the tar oil used. This process as well as the process mentioned under 4 supersedes the former suggestion of Dr. Pier to cut out certain fractions from pit coal hydrogenation products and convert them separately into toluol. Circumstances permitting, the first toluol project of 5,000 tons per year could be realized also on this basis.

(page 7 of original)

6) Bochum, Benzole Association (Expert Dr. Weller)

Toluol synthesis from benzole and methanol by means of phosphor acid-catalyser.

According to the laboratory tests made so far this process seems to be very promising. The process is now being tried out by the Benzole Association (Benzol Verein) in co-operation with Krupp, Essen, on a small scale - 1 ton per month. Dr. Mueller, Krupp, has promised full support. It is proposed to develop the important, and, from the point of view of raw material, interesting process, by employing a greater number of chemists. Prof. Martin, Ruhrchemie, has been asked to facilitate the experiments, and this has been promised. Dir. Mueller suggests that later on the process be carried out on a large scale in those places where methanol can be obtained.

As the Ruhrbenzin have a great deal of work in connection with their benzine process and their toluol synthesis (compare point 7), it seems important to call in the best chemical experts and to start collaboration with the I.G. The Benzole Association appears to be prepared to collaborate with the I.G., as suggested by Krupp.

It is hoped to make a final report on the small scale experiments in six months time.

7) Ruhrbenzin Holten. Ruhrbenzin A.-G. (Expert Prof. Dr. Martin)

Toluol synthesis from Hepten (and Hepten) through closing a ring (Ringschluss). Hepten or Hepten will be aromatized according to the U.O.P.C. process with a 90% yield. For this the medium pressure oven of the Fischer synthesis can be used without any considerable modifications. The conditions required by the process for the aromatizing are to a large extent the same as those of the medium pressure synthesis. The problem which this process presents consists in increasing the Hepten or Hepten yield in the Fischer-primary product,

(page 8 of original)

from about 15% as hitherto to about 30% to make it an economic proposition. Technically speaking, this question has not yet been completely clarified. The quantities of Kerosin (70 - 85 %) which are yielded together with Hepten and Hepten can be used immediately as motor gasoline - low upper ignition point (O.Z.)

The experimental plant produces 25 liters per day and at present is being extended to 250 liters per day. The new plant will be put into operation in approx. 6 weeks. By exchanging knowledge gained with the U.O.P.C., a matter which, however, still remains to be clarified, the experiments could be speeded up. Circumstances permitting large installations could be put into operation by the

(page 8 of original, cont'd)

end of 1940. The process offers the best prospects for large scale operations.

8) Essen, Krupp (Expert Director Dr. Mueller)

The process whereby aluminum chloride benzaldehyde is produced from benzole, carbon oxide and hydrogen by using molecular quantities, and toluol is obtained through hydrogenation under high pressure and temperature, has been carried through in the laboratory, but, owing to great technical difficulties and the regeneration of aluminum chloride, is of no practical interest.

9) Concordia, Oberhausen (Expert Director Doehmanns)
Otto-Projection Tube (Vorlage) (Second Suction)

By fixing an additional (second) suction device to the coke furnaces and a connecting pipe between both projecting tubes for periodical reversing it is possible, by lowering the temperature in the gas collecting chamber to increase the toluol yield of the coking plant benzole considerably without influencing in the very least the quality and fermentation period of the coke.

Experiments in the Concordia coking plant have shown a toluol increase of roughly 80%. By minor constructional modifications toluol production on the Ruhr

(page 9 of original)

can already now be increased in the case of 5% of all coke furnaces by combining the existing second suction pumps. 25% of all modern coke furnaces can easily be fitted with a second projection tube. Whether and to what extent a second projection tube can be fitted to the remaining coke furnaces has yet to be investigated.

The Otto projection tube will remedy the decrease in the percentage of toluol caused by the short fermentation period which is usual today owing to the high temperatures in the gas collecting chamber. Furthermore speedier suction will increase the total benzol yield by 10%. Simultaneously, with the increase of the toluol yield the phenol content in tar increases also.

10) I.G. Ludwigshafen (Expert Director Dr. Pier)

Selective extraction.

Inferior quality toluols which, owing to their aliphatic content, cannot be used for the production of explosives, can be converted into pure toluol by selective extraction. This concerns mainly the toluol obtained by the "Still" inner suction method (Saar) and from gas works benzole.

It might perhaps be possible to improve the quality of the pure toluol still further on the basis of this process, and thus increase

(page 9 of original, cont'd)

the safety in the production of trinitrotoluol.

In collaboration with the industry concerned, it is intended to draw up an individual plan within the framework of the whole chemical development to decide what can be achieved in the way of toluol production.

This plan will be discussed with the Army Ordnance Office and the Wehrmacht.

Enclosed is a summary giving a rough estimate of what it is possible to produce by the various toluol processes.

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Summary:

- 1) The efforts by the industry to open up new ways for an increased toluol production have been successful.
- 2) The following methods have been established as practicable for large scale production:
 - a) Toluol through high pressure hydrogenation of pit coal (I.C.)
 - b) Toluol synthetic ally produced from benzole and methanol (S.V.)
(Benzol Association)
 - c) Toluol from products of the Fischer-synthesis (Ruhrbenzine)
- 3) The additional quantities of Toluol which it would appear possible to produce, given the maximum technical facilities, are:

1940/41	aprox. 150.000 tons per year
1942/44	aprox. 260.000 tons per year
(Production 1939 (Rapid Plan)	aprox. 60.000 tons per year)
- 4) Toluol synthesis, opens up new and amazing possibilities for planning in the field of explosives, which, in co-operation with the Wehrmacht, will be taken into consideration when planning beyond the rapid plan and which will in practice satisfy even highest demands in regard to the production of explosives.

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Copy 2

Berlin, 9 February 1939 Moe

Subject: Situation with respect to chemical warfare agents and intermediate products, on the basis of the trip of 31.1.-3.2.1939.

1) I.G. Ludwigshafen
Omega Salt (Specialist Dr. Pflaumer)

The process elaborated in Ludwigshafen is being carried out there on a large industrial scale in a 65 tons-per-month plant. Starting from benzol it proceeds with acetyl chloride to acetophenone and immediately following further chlorination to chloracetophenone. At the present time a new process is being developed; it proceeds by oxydation of ethyl benzol in air to acetophenone. This also requires the use of aluminum chloride which, however, amounts to only 1/5 of the quantities necessary in connections with the other process. The reaction has been completely worked out in accordance with laboratory methods. Since, to begin with, no further omega salt capacities are planned beyond the development carried out thus far, the process is of no very great practical interest at the moment. But it is to be matured for an experiment on a large scale. Since the omega salt plant Hahnenberg is already under construction (600 tons per month), but the necessary aluminum chloride and chlorine have not yet been made available, there is being prepared immediately an estimate of costs, which permits of a comparison of the old process with the new one up to and including the starting materials. But presumably the completion of the Hahnenberg plant will not be influenced thereby. But if necessary the knowledge gained can still be evaluated.

A further method for the production of chloracetophenone is provided by the reaction of benzoic acid and acetic acid, in which case the benzoic acid would be prepared out of naphthalene via phthalic acid. However, since, as was already stated in connection with the synthesis of toluol, naphthalene is considerably more important for other uses, the process must be dispensed with because of raw material reasons.

(page 13 of original)

2) I.G. Ludwigshafen
UP Salt (Specialist Dr. Ulrich)

In Ammendorf there is now a 30-ton-per-month experimental plant for the production of UP salt. The experiments with this were carried out thus far by the Orgacid GmbH. But since considerable difficulties have arisen, which Orgacid alone cannot cope with, I.G. was recently utilized again to a considerable extent. On the basis of the statements of the I.G. specialist it seems that the process is promising and can be carried out on a large industrial

(page 13 of original, cont'd)

scale. In May 1939 a decision will be made as to the construction of a large scale plant. It is planned to make provisions at Huels for a capacity of 4 - 500 tons per month.

The process is being worked out in such a way that it will be continuous. Recently it has been possible to have complete control of the thiophenyl chloride circulation; there are no longer serious losses of any importance.

Whether considerable quantities of the UP salt will be required depends on the decision of Production and Examination Group 9 of Army Ordnance Office (fa Pruef 9). In any event, the experiments are being speeded up as much as possible and the I.G. is being asked to furnish more chemists.

In view of the simplification of the production of UP salt, special interest attaches to the oxydation in air of ethylene directly into ethylene oxide (cf.3) in order to avoid the use of chlorine for the hydrated chlorine stage.

3) I.G. Ludwigshafen
Ethylene oxidation (Specialist Dr. Wittwer)

The process of obtaining ethylene oxide by the direct oxydation of ethylene is based on French patents which are already being used in England, the United States and Italy on a small scale. By this direct oxydation it is possible to avoid the roundabout way via ethylene hydrated chlorine and the subsequent splitting off of hydrochloric acid with lime. Experiments have been under way at Ludwigshafen for some time already to duplicate this process, for which an agreement with the French licensors was instituted.

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(Experimental plant with 0,5 tons per day capacity). The experiments had a positive result and will be completed by the end of the year.

The use of this process by the Schkopau, Huels and Trostberg plants, which are now under construction, is no longer feasible, but there is a possibility of installing it additionally, and the amounts of chlorine thus freed could be used otherwise in case of mobilization. But it is noteworthy that at present one is calculating on an increased consumption of 20 to 25 % ethylene. These losses can be explained by a continuing oxydation of the ethylene. It was requested that the experiments be facilitated, with greater energy also in view of the diglycol production necessary beyond the accelerated plan.

4) I.G. Leverkusen
Continuous thiodiglycol esterification
(Specialist Dr. Beck)

(page 14 of original, cont'd)

The process for the continuous esterification of thiodiglycol into oxol-L is being worked on under high pressure. The present-laboratory installation has a capacity of 200 kg in 24 hours. The experiments will be concluded by the middle of March, so that one can proceed to the erection of the first industrial plant of 300 tons of oxol-L per month. The design work for this initial plant for the Huels, location has already been completed. An immediate issuance of the orders was agreed on.

- 5) I.G. Leverkusen
D-L-Production (Specialist Dr. Noack)

The experiments for the production of D-L were shelved for the time being. They are to be resumed after completion of the oxol esterification experiments. The process has been carried to completion on laboratory basis. One can count on completion of the large-scale experiments by the end of 1939. The construction of large-scale plants could then follow directly

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according to schedule. In order to gain time one could perhaps think of beginning construction work of the ethylene production plants already earlier at the locations provided for in the accelerated plan.

In order to accelerate the extremely important chemical warfare agents experiments and also in order to have chemists and technicians for the large-scale plants ready at the proper time, the I.G. has been requested to increase substantially the employment of personnel in connection with this work.

- 6) I.G. Leverkusen
Z-material (Z-Stoff) (Specialist Dr. Noack)

The work in conjunction with Production and Examination Group 9 of Army Ordnance Office (A A Pruef 9) has thus far been confined to the stabilization of the material. It is suggested that the questions with respect to the synthesis for large-scale production be examined in detail and that the raw material requirements be calculated, even though a final program for the production has not yet been fixed. On the basis of this data the raw material situation is then to be examined.

- 7) Ethylene from gas piped from a distance (grid gas)
Holtel Chemical Works
Herne - Sodingen (Specialist Dr. Feller)

The experimental plant in Sodingen for the production of ethylene according to Lindo (special process for the removal of carbonic acid) was viewed. The plant promises sure results in approximately 6 months. The grounds and the buildings of the closed-down

(page 15 of original, cont'd)

nitrogen plant (Mont Cenis) can perhaps be utilized advantageously for the construction of the first D-L project of the accelerated plan. Ethylene will be produced there from grid gas in quantities of approximately 15,000 tons per year (in conjunction with ethane, which is thermally split up into ethylene). It is being examined whether plant "DL - Sodingen" can be declared to be a project that is ready for construction work.

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Summary:

- 1) The developmental work for UP-salt and Oxol-L is progressing according to schedule and will be completed on time for the large-scale plants.
- 2) For the questions of the D-L a still greater employment of chemists is desired, although here there is still sufficient time for development before one can begin with the construction of the large-scale plants.
- 3) The basic questions of raw materials and processes, in order to develop the chemistry of chemical warfare agents into a modern chemical technology, have been solved in principle.
- 4) In the large raw material basis of the chemical warfare agents the Wehrmacht has available, in the case of systematic development of the plants for the production of chemical warfare agents, the greatest, practically unlimited possibilities for the acquisition of extremely effective chemical warfare agents for development beyond the accelerated plan.

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Berlin, 20 February 1939

Report on an inspection tour.

The tour made with a representative of the Army Ordnance
Office on 15 and 16 February 1939.

Subject: Explosives, Chemical warfare agents and the development
of preliminary products

1. Highly concentrated potassium nitrate acid
Bayerische Stickstoffwerke, Piesteritz
(Experts Dr. von Wilm, Dr. Wendland)

The plant can now be considered efficient down to the last details. Oxidation by means of oxygen under pressure is proving entirely satisfactory. The space needed for the plant is not large, the staffing simple, so that this unit built by the Remag can also be installed in later stand-by plants.

The present output capacity amounts to 2,500 of acid (550 tons of nitrogen per month). An increase to 4,000 tons of acid per month (900 tons of nitrogen per month) is feasible with minor additions. Price thereof one and a half million RM.

If the necessity of extending the highly concentrated acid production in continuance of the rush plan should arise, Piesteritz is considered the most expedient place to fall back upon as a site.

2. Highly concentrated acid
I.G. Loune
Expert: Dr. Willfroth

The pressure combustion carried out in Loune at 5 atmospheres for the production of thin acid for the manufacture of fertilizer is the only plant of its kind in Germany. The system has stood the test well. It has now become possible

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to convert into highly concentrated acid the product separated by the pressure liquefaction apparatus in corresponding to the Piesteritz method by oxygen under pressure. Apparently the yield per unit of time and space is greater than in Piesteritz. It was suggested that Loune and Piesteritz should pool the result of their experience. If necessary considerable quantities of highly concentrated acid could be produced with relatively little industrial expenditure in Loune if the production capacity of highly concentrated acid for gunpowder and explosives were to be increased.

(page 24 of original, cont'd)

A plan will be put forward.

3. Decomposition of calcium nitrate to extract ammonia.
Bayerische Stickstoffwerke Piesteritz
(Expert: Dr. Wendland)

A part of the decomposition plant built during the war, which can still produce 20,000 tons of nitrogen per year, is still partly intact. The method is very complicated and involves heavy costs and great expenditure of labor. It is intended to maintain the plant as an emergency reserve in the meantime until the Linz nitrogen plant has been completed. It should not, however, be repaired at present; later it can be demolished.

4. Ammonium nitrate
I.G. Bitterfeld and Wolfen-Farben
(Expert: Director Dr. Petersen)

The projected supplementary constructions for the production in the calcium ammonium nitrate plants, by a simple rearrangement, of ammonium nitrate for casting mixtures, are nearing completion. The method is technically thoroughly developed and reliable. The output capacity amounts in Bitterfeld and Wolfen together to 9,300 tons per month = 3,200 tons of nitrogen per month.

5. Ammonium nitrate
I.G. Leuna
(Expert: Dr. Willfroth)

The calcium ammonium nitrate works were inspected. It is possible by the addition of a casting drum

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for which space is available in the plant, to make the plant capable of producing a considerable quantity of ammonium nitrate. Details will be examined. Leuna would be the first choice, as far as ammonium nitrate production is concerned, for an extension program in connection with the furtherance of the rush plan. A production conversion to about 140,000 tons of ammonium nitrate, i.e. about 50,000 tons of nitrogen per year, is considered possible.

6. Calcium sulphate and sulphuric acid compound
I.G. Wolfen
(Expert: Dr. Lang)

The plant connected with the cement factory was inspected: The ground allows for their being doubled. The plant is working steadily and is technically efficient. A certain quantity of cement results from the production of a certain quantity of acid. The production in this place is also economical. The output capacity amounts to 60,000 tons of sulphur trioxide per year.

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7. Calcium hypochlorite and "Losantin"

I.G. Bitterfeld

(Expert: Dr. Vorlaender)

The method for "Losantin" production has been technically completely mastered. It is quite possible to set up at any time similar plants in other places, making use of the experience gained in Bitterfeld. It was stated that "Losantin" is storable for many years practically without loss of chlorine, when in simple metal containers painted with Igelit varnish. It has been impossible to date to elicit from the Wehrmacht, or more particularly from the Reich Air Ministry, a conclusive statement as to the production target for "Losantin" as a decontaminating agent. A plan for "Losantin" production must be implemented immediately at the same time as a storing maintenance plan. It seems expedient to connect the new "Losantin" factories to be erected with the chemical warfare agent plants, and to start production of "Losantin" as a reserve stock in peace time to exploit the chlorine stand-by plants.

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8. Diglycol

I.G. Wolfen

(Expert: Dr. Vierck)

The plant built by the Army Armaments Office was inspected. The output potential of 500 tons per month is at present exploited only to the extent of about 300 tons per month, as the available tank storage space will soon be filled with diglycol. The building periods for aluminium storage tanks, which are concerned here, are apparently still so long as to make maximum production impossible at the moment. This loss of diglycol is difficult to support in view of the fact that we are supposed to be at mobilization pitch. An attempt will be made to install immediately sufficient emergency storage tanks, to enable production to be exploited once to the full.

9. Oxol mustard gas

Orgacid G.m.b.H. - Ammendorf

(Expert: Dr. Engelhardt, Dr. v.d.Linde of the Army Armaments Office).

The plant for the non-continuous process of esterization of Oxol was inspected. The building of the extension serving in part as a reserve is under way. Furthermore the production plant for hydrogen sulphide was inspected.

10. "UP" Salts

Orgacid G.m.b.H. Ammendorf

(Expert: Dr. v.d.Linde of the Army Armaments Office, Dr. Ulrich,
I.G. Ludwigshafen)

The experimental plant now going into production promises good technical results shortly. The question of continuous production seems most important. It is unlikely that production of "UP" salts will exceed 10-20% compared with other chemical warfare agents even

(page 26 of original, cont'd)

in future estimates; this fact is significant for raw material planning.

11. Hydrogenation of Acetylene
Bunawerke Schkopau G.m.b.H.
(Export: Dr. Wulff)

The experiments for the catalytic hydrogenation of acetylene into ethylene have been practically concluded in a major experimental plant. The method is ready for large scale production and can suitably be included as arranged with the appropriate chemical warfare agent and diglycol plants in the Rush Plan.

12. Hexogen (K-)
WASAG Elsnig
(Export: Dr. Knoeffler)

Besides the trinitrotoluene plant and the filling station belonging to it, the experimental plant for the production of Hexogen (K-) from Hexa-methylene-tetramine, ammonium nitrate and nitric acid was inspected in particular. The method in the nitration stage was considered ready for large scale production. Acid processing still presents certain difficulties, especially when particularly large quantities of Hexogen are to be produced. (cf. Inspection tour of 31 January - 3 February 1939).

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Rubber stamp:
Top Secret !

1st copy Dr. Ahl
2nd " Dr. Rau
3rd " Dr. Kusenack
4th " Dr. Ritter
5th " Lieutenant Colonel Kirschner

Berlin, 25 May 1939
Dr. A./D.

The following is the present position with regard to the stock of the main-, preliminary- and finished-products of the rush plan, which must be stored in tanks.

I. Diglycol.

1. Production (cf. page 1: lower black curve).

At present the production capacity is (Ludwigshafen and Wolfen 500 tons per month each)	1000 tons per month
as from 1 January 1940 on completion of the Schkopau plant	1600 tons per month
as from 1 July 1940 on completion of the Huels plant	2200 tons per month
as from 1 July 1941 on completion of the Trostberg plant	2300 tons per month

Beyond that no further plants are, for the time being, planned or under construction.

At present 600 tons approx. are produced per month, 400 tons approx. per month being processed into "Pol-Pulver", the rest being stored.

2. Storage.

The completion of the diglycol-tank-depots is shown on sheet 1 as a blue line. The individual installations are as follows:

Place	Firm	Capacity of the depot in tons	Deadline (according to latest reports from the firms)
Wolfen	I.G.	5000 tons (filled with diglycol and triglycol up to 70 - 80 %)	completed
Schkopau	Buna GmbH	250 tons	May 1939
Schkopau	Buna GmbH	500 tons	August 1939
Huels	Chemische Werke	1000 tons	October 1939

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Place	Firm	Capacity of the depot in tons	Deadline (according to latest reports from firms)
Bomlitz	Wolff & Co.	1500 tons	November 1939
Duenberg	D.S.C.	1500 tons	January 1939
Klietz	D.S.C.	1500 tons	April 1939
Torgelow	D.S.C.	1500 tons	May 1940
Trostberg	B.St.W.	1000 tons	July 1940
Hohensaaten	D.S.C.	1500 tons	September 1940
Muschdorf	D.S.C.	1500 tons	December 1940
Liebenau	Wolff & Co.	1500 tons	July 1941
Forst	D.S.C.	1500 tons	September 1941
Ettringen	D.A.G.	1500 tons	October 1941 (?)
Cruennae	D.S.C.	1500 tons	December 1941

It is further planned to set up a depot of 1500 tons at Reinsdorf-Wasag; the firm has not however been commissioned accordingly so far. By the end of 1941 total storage space for approx. 23 000 tons of diglycol will have been made available. There is furthermore storage with approx. 12 000 tons of glycerine. On the same sheet (sheet 1) there is a red line showing storage space, which would be required, if the "Pol-Pulver" plants completed after this date are not put into operation, i.e., if there is no increase in the near future, in the quantity of diglycol (now amounting to 400 tons per month) processed into "Pol-Pulver". As it is intended at present to put all "Pol-Pulver" plants, which have been completed, into operation, the red line is of purely academic interest. Therefore, the storage space required, if all the plants nearing completion are put into operation, is shown as a green line, the deadlines for completion of the individual plants being based on the latest statements of the building contractors (65% steel allocation and corresponding allocation of all other building materials required).

3) Conclusions to 1) and 2) :

The conclusion to be drawn from the above exposé is, that even if "Pol-Pulver" plants are put into operation on completion using

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diglycol 100% (i.e. no use of glycerine), a shortage of storage space for diglycol will occur early in 1941, forcing the diglycol plants to cut down production. Since from 1941 onwards, no further depots will be set up or are at any rate planned in the meantime, and since it can furthermore be assumed that at that time some "Pol-Pulver" plants would cease operating - so that actual storage space requirements would lie between the red and green lines - a very considerable decrease in production will take place. It is therefore suggested, even if the mobilization requirements should be increased in the near future beyond the present requirement of 2000 tons per month of

(page 38 of original, cont'd)

diglycol, that no more diglycol plants with their comparatively high money-, material- and labor-requirements should be set up, but that increased mobilization requirements should be met by means of an energetic stockpiling policy.

A simple comparison showed the sound economic sense of such an arrangement. The costs for a depot for 10 000 tons of diglycol are approx. 1,5 million RM. The storage of say 60 000 tons would therefore cost:

6 depots	approx. 10 million RM
diglycol (approx. 1,5 RM per kg.)	<u>approx. 90 million RM</u> *)
	<u>approx. 100 million RM</u>

A diglycol plant for the production of 30 000 tons per year, which would have to be in operation for 2 years to produce the quantity mentioned above, costs approx. three times as much. Approx. five or six times as much material (especially iron) is necessary

- *) These funds to buy diglycol must be raised in any case - except for a time lag involving gain respectively loss of interest. Quotation of this total amount would therefore really not be necessary in the estimate mentioned above.

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quite apart from the considerably higher requirement of workers for construction and later on operation. *)

Later, after the depots have been filled, there would be available, in case of mobilization, during the first 2 years:

from depot	approx. 30 000 tons per year
Production	<u>approx. 30 000 tons per year</u>
	<u>approx. 60 000 tons per year</u>

During the first 2 years of the war, in which sufficient diglycol would be available, there would be ample time in hand for an appropriate extension of the plants if necessary.

Since the necessary additional depots would have to be available, according to the above mentioned estimate, from the beginning of 1941 onward and a construction period of 1 - 1 1/2 years must be taken into account, it is necessary that a decision on their construction should be taken as soon as possible.

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II. Mustard Gas (including Oxol and Arsinoil).

1. Production.

The production potential for mustard gas and arsinoil are detailed on sheet 2. The position is accordingly as follows:

a) mustard gas (green line) at present (Ammendorf; also actual production) :	350 tons per month
as from 1 October 1939 (extension of Ammendorf up to 450 tons per month of oxol and esterisation facilities up to 700 tons per month, use of oxol from Ludwigshafen)	700 tons per month
as from 1 January 1940 (on completion of Huels plant)	1300 tons per month
as from 1 January 1940 (on completion of Trostberg plant)	2100 tons per month
b) Arsinoil (blue line): at present (Stassfurt; also actual production)	100 tons per month

-
- *) It is desirable to replace cylindrical containers in large store rooms by spherical ones. A standardization should furthermore be effected. Suitable suggestion have to be ... (Translator's note: Line missing in original).

(page 40 of original)

as from 1 April 1940 (on completion of the Hahnenberg installation)	500 tons per month
--	--------------------

The red line represents the total production potential of mustard gas and arsinoil.

2. Storage.

The dates for completion of the storage tanks are shown on sheet 3.

a) Oxol (blue line): At present Ammendorf (This depot will be filled 100% with the present production of the Ammendorf plant until 1 October 1939).	5000 tons
---	-----------

(page 40 of original, cont'd)

As from 1 October 1939 (on completion
of the Huels depot) 6000 tons

On completion of the Trostberg depots

as from 1 January 1940	7000 tons
as from 15 February 1940	9000 tons
as from 1 April 1940	10000 tons

From these 10 000 tons of oxol approx. 13 000 tons of mustard gas
can be produced.

- b) Mustard Gas (green line) (These depots are simultaneously filled with arsinoil which is added to the mustard gas to raise the solidification point).

At present (Arrendorf and Munster with 3000
tons each; these depots will be filled 100%
with the present production of the Arren-
dorf and Stassfurt plants until 1 October
1939) 6000 tons

As from 1 October 1939 (on completion of
the depot in Loednitz) 9000 tons

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As from 1 July 1940 (on completion of the
Hohenbrunn *) 12000 tons

As from the summer of 1940 there will therefore be storage space for
10 000 tons of oxol and 12 000 tons of mustard gas (in terms of mus-
tard gas: total approx. 25 000 tons of mustard gas).

On sheet 3 a red line indicates the requirement for storage space
required, when all oxol-, or mustard gas- and arsinoil-installations
will be operating 100%.

On sheet 2 a black line indicates the production of mustard gas and
arsinoil, which can be manufactured subject to the storage space
available. It shows that given a production of approx. 800 tons per
month until 1 January 1941 all available depots will be filled and
therefore production would have to stop.

3. Conclusions to 1) and 2) :

From the above exposé it follows that from the summer of 1940 there
will be a considerable shortage of storage space for oxol or mustard
gas. From 1 January 1941 the mustard gas- or oxol-production which
is actually utilized to a small extent only would have to be disconti-
nued completely owing to lack of storage space.

(page 41 of original, cont'd)

In view of the small mustard gas production - the mobilization requirements will probably be much greater even after the first few months of the war - it is suggested to construct further considerable depots.

In regard to the saving of money, materials and labor the same holds true as was said when recommending, the setting up of further diglycol depots.

An early decision will have to be made in this respect - as in the case of diglycol-storage.

- * This installation is planned; no definite contract has, however, been placed with the building contractor.

(page 42 of original)

- III. Toluene (cf. particularly the supplement to the rush plan of 13 August 1938 "Preliminary products for explosives - toluol -; the following notes should merely be taken as supplements to this report).

1. Production.

At present approx. 45 000 tons of toluene can be produced per year, i.e. approx. 3 750 tons per month, this production capacity will be increased to 55 000 tons per year, i.e. approx. 4 600 tons per month, by the end of 1939.

At that point maximum output of the toluene stills at coking plants will to all intents and purposes have been reached. The production of synthetic toluene which is at present in its experimental stages might yield additional supplies (cf. the relevant memoranda, inspection reports and file notes).

2. Present consumption of toluene.

The following trinitro-toluene factories are in operation at present:

<u>Plant</u>	<u>Monthly production of tri:</u>
Kruemmel	1 000 tons per month
Doernitz	1 000 tons per month
Hess.-Lichtenau	1 000 tons per month
Schlebusch	600 tons per month
Clausthal	400 tons per month (this production will shortly be increased to 1000 tons per month)

(page 42 of original, cont'd)

Elsnig	1 000 tons per month
Schoenebeck	<u>600 tons per month</u>

5 600 tons per month trinitro-toluene.

2 000 tons of toluene per month are required for this trinitro-toluene production. The export of toluene amounts to

approx. 500 tons per month

present consumption : 3 300 tons of toluene per month.

(page 43 of original)

3. Storage.

The dead-line for the completion of the several toluene storage tanks is shown on the attached diagram No. 4. It can be seen that at present storage tank space of approx. 24 - 25 000 tons is available, which must be considered as fully taken up to all intents and purposes. Construction target is storage space of approx. 50 000 tons. According to the exposés 1) (production) and 2) (consumption) it can be estimated, that at present approx. 3 750

- 3 300

450 tons of toluene per month

can be stored, if all plants producing toluene are working 100%.
At the end of 1939 the situation will be as follows:

4 600 tons of toluene per month
<u>- 3 300 " " " " "</u>

1 300 tons of toluene stored each month.

This figure will probably be much lower, since - as mentioned in the above statistics - the Clausthal plant will increase their production considerably during the next few months, so that only approx. 500 - 700 tons per month can be stored during the next few months.

Should further plants be put into operation besides the trinitro toluene plants mentioned above, storage of toluene will not be possible at all.

Therefore, there can be no question of shortage of toluene storage space in the near future.

Enclosure: 4 diagrams.

(Initialed:) P H.

(page 48 of original)

5 copies

Berlin, 3 May 1939

1. Copy to Dr. Krauch
2. " " Dr. Ritter
3. " " Lt. Col. Kirschner
4. " " Dr. Ahl
5. " " Dr. Rau

Rubber Stamp:
Top Secret

Re.: Continuation of the Rush Plan

If, beginning with the III quarter of 1939, full allocation of materials, i.e. 40 000 tons of iron per month (including 12 000 tons of bar iron per month) also

about 35 000 cbm wood and
about 48 000 tons cement,

were made for the next few years, the following could be done:

Deadlines for the Rush Plan would only be delayed by 6 to 9 months approx., chemical warfare agents would remain as scheduled.

Production capacity in tons per month

	End of 1940	End of 1941	End of 1942	End of 1943	End of 1944 etc.
Gun Powder	16 500	22 500	28 500	34 500	40 500
Explosives (without additions)	14 000	20 000	26 000	32 000	38 000
Chemical War- fare Agents (Mustard gas)	4 200	6 200	8 200	10 200	12 200

Yearly Production Increase from 1940/41

Gun Powder	6 000 tons per month
Explosives	6 000 " " "
Chemical Warfare Agents (Mustard gas)	2 000 " " "

(page 48 of original, cont'd)

Production Targets of the Rush Plan:

(original plan of 13.8.38)	Gun Powder	18 100 tons per month by end of 1940
	Explosives (without additions)	18 600 tons per month by the beginning of 1941
	Chemical Warfare Agents (mustard gas)	7 600 tons per month by middle of 1942

(page 49 of original)

Supplementary Program for Chemical Warfare Agents.

If, beginning with the III. quarter of 1939, additional allocation of 5 000 tons of iron per month, as well as the other materials, were made for the next few years, and if these orders are given equal priority with the navy program, the following can be done:

Production capacity in tons per month

Additional capacity
for chemical warfare
agents (mustard gas)

	End of 1940	End of 1941	End of 1942	
additional	-	10 000	24 000	can be attained with about 5 000 tons of steel per month
Rush-plan schedule	4 200	6 200	8 200	can be attained with about 1 250 tons of steel per month
Total:	4 200	16 200	32 200	possibly, further increases in 1943 etc.

(page 50 of original)

For the continuation of the Rush Plan and the simultaneous beginning of a supplementary program for chemical warfare agents.

If, beginning with the III. quarter of 1939, once again the full allocation of 40 000 tons of steel per month (including 12 000 tons of bar iron per month, about 35 000 cbm wood and about 48 000 tons

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(page 50 of original, cont'd)

cement) is made for the next few years, and if of that allocation 6 250 tons per month (not 1 250 tons per month approx., as up to date) are set aside for the old and the supplementary program for chemical warfare agents, (5 000 tons of that quantity to be given equal priority as navy orders) the following can be achieved:

Production capacity achieved, in tons per month

	End of 1940	End of 1941	End of 1942	End of 1943	End of 1944
Gun Powder	14 500	20 000	25 000	30 000	35 000
Explosives (without additions)	12 000	17 500	23 000	28 000	34 000
Chemical Warfare Agents (Mustard gas)	4 200	16 200	32 200	Further increases are possible	

(page 59 of original)

Copy made 23 April 1942/D.

Berlin, 27 February 1939

6 copies

4th copy

(three copies made for
Dr. Ritter).

Essay on the ways and means of estimating the German
extension target for gunpowder and High Explosives.

Considering that the extension target as defined so far in the Rush Plan (Schnellplan) is only just equal to the Hindenburg program of the world war, it seems necessary to clarify the basic considerations underlying estimates of the scale for further extensions. The Hindenburg program was considered sufficient for the requirements of the German Wehrmacht during the world war. In our opinion, this program can only be taken as a minimum starting point for future planning if we take modern conditions into account, especially as during the world war the German Air Force and the Anti-Aircraft artillery used only negligible quantities of bombs and ammunition respectively. Moreover, the requirements of the Armour were practically nil, and the big battleships of the navy used only very little ammunition.

In order to get particulars for estimating future requirements, the individual users of gunpowder and high explosives within the Wehrmacht have been examined. The estimates are shown in the attached diagram. The left half of the diagram shows the gunpowder situation, the right half part that of high explosives. Generally, a probable minimum consumption figure was chosen for the individual graph curves (green lines) and contrasted with an estimated figure for very high requirements (red lines).

A. Gunpowder:

1. Gunpowder requirements of the Army (including Anti-aircraft artillery, but excluding the rest of the Luftwaffe, West Wall, Armored Corps, engineers etc.)
-

(page 60 of original)

Basis for the calculations is a highly detailed analysis of the armament of a division and of the Corps artillery. It has been assumed in the calculations that a corps has three divisions and its own corps artillery (for details see the appendix). The gunpowder re-

(page 60 of original, cont'd)

quirements given in this table are based on the average intensity of battles in the world war 1914 - 1918 ¹⁾ and are represented by the lower line in the various graphs ²⁾. The upper lines represent the gunpowder and high explosives consumption of the Entente during 1918, the last year of the war (average daily number of rounds fired by field guns: U.S.A. = 30, France = 34, England = 35 ³⁾). This method of showing the figures has also been used in the graphs for the consumption of gunpowder and high explosives at the West Wall (machine guns and guns).

2. West Wall:

a) Gunpowder requirements for machine guns

For this figure, a maximum number of 15 000 machine guns has been assumed (see the speech of the Fuehrer).

b) Gunpowder requirements for guns

The requirements are based on an estimated number of 3 000 or 5 000 guns and an estimated sub-division among the individual arms as follows (example for 3 500 guns):

-
- 1) see appendix
 - 2) Calculations made from the reports of general Gembere to Mussolini (as published in newspapers) yielded the result that fighting activity on such a scale would be roughly equal to the consumption of ammunition of all calibres by the Corps of Volunteers (Freiwilligenkorps) during the battle in Catalonia.
 - 3) See bibliography given under 1) (Appendix).

(page 61 of original)

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>
2 cm Anti-aircraft Guns	1 000
3,7 cm Anti-Tank Guns	500
7,5 cm Field Guns	350
10,5 cm light Field Howitzers	350
8,8 cm anti-aircraft Guns	350
15 cm heavy Field Howitzers	250
21 cm Mortars	250
15 cm light guns	250
10,5 cm guns on wheeled mountings	<u>200</u>
	3 500

If the number of 3 500 guns is sub-divided differently among the various weapons it would make no noticeable difference to the total

(61 of original, cont'd)

requirements of gunpowder and high explosives since these minor requirements do not vitally affect the total requirements.

3. Gunpowder requirements of the Armoured Corps (Panzerwaffe):

The figures are based on the assumption that the Armoured Corps is composed of

- 40% light tanks (1 machine gun)
- 40% medium tanks (2 machine guns and one 3,7 cm anti tank gun) and
- 20% heavy tanks (5 machine guns and one 3,7 cm anti tank gun),

and on the further assumption that the tanks would fire from built in machine guns 10 000 rounds per day and from the 3,7 cm anti tank guns approximately 200 rounds per day when in action (i.e. from 5-10 times a month). Alterations of these estimated figures do not influence decisively the total gunpowder requirements.

4. Gunpowder requirements of the Luftwaffe (fighter and bomber aircraft):

Estimates are limited to maximum use of Luftwaffe subject to fuel situation. (The figures estimated sub B for the employment of bombers have been taken into consideration).

(page 62 of original)

5. Gunpowder requirements of the Navy

Requirements from 3 000 to 5 000 tons per month respectively are estimates only. For chemical warfare, gunpowder requirements of between 2 000 and 5 000 tons per month were assumed on the basis of the extension target for chemical warfare ammunition as laid down in the express project (approximately 9 000 tons of chemical warfare ammunition per month = viz. approximately 3 000 tons per month for bombs plus approximately 6 000 tons per month for poison gas shells).

Synopsis:

The green column next to the graph curves shows the total requirements in tons per month, representing the sum total of the consumption figures taken from the graph curves, the red column shows the corresponding maximum figures as taken from the graph curves. Several important figures are given on the scale adjoining the columns in order to make comparative studies possible.

B. High Explosives:

The figures given throughout the entire extract refer to the requirements of pure high explosives only (i.e. without admixture of ammonium nitrate).

(page 62 of original, cont'd)

1. High Explosives requirements of the Army:

The figures and supporting particulars given correspond with the method used in the analysis of the gunpowder situation.

2. High Explosives for bomber aircraft:

Estimates are subject to the exigencies of fuel supply. (See also A 4).

(page 63 of original)

3. West Wall:

The quantities of high explosives required have been calculated in accordance with the number of guns (see gunpowder requirements A 2b) and based on the same sub-division among the various weapons.

4. High Explosives for Navy and Engineers. Requirements were estimated to amount to 1 000 to 3 000 and 1 000 to 2 000 tons per month respectively.

Synopsis:

In the same way as in the graphs for gunpowder requirements, the sum total of requirements for high explosives is shown: in the case of the smaller figures taken from the graph curves in form of a green column, and in the case of the maximum figures in form of a red column. Next to them is a scale with figures for comparison.

C o n c l u s i o n s

Although exact data for planning cannot be obtained from comparing the various figures, the following conclusions can be drawn from this inquiry:

The estimated lower figures (green columns) will certainly be adequate to the requirements of modern warfare. The highest figures in these green columns (65% approx. in case of gunpowder, 55% approx. in case of High Explosives) represent the requirements of the Army with an assumed strength of 20 Corps of fighting troops.

These probable consumption figures are already considerable higher than the extension target as laid down in the rush plan (see scale).

The maximum requirements (red columns) are considerably higher than the figures given in the green columns and are designed for the requirements for 30 Corps of fighting troops. The production target shown by the maximum figures is several times as high as the extension

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target hitherto fixed in the rush plan.

Therefore, any measure taken to increase the capacity for gunpowder and high explosives production will be sound for many years to come, and it does not appear necessary to waste time with detailed calculations of the exact figure for these requirements. Main basis for fixing exactly the extension target is principally the study of the Army requirements of gunpowder and high explosives and of the Luftwaffe requirements for high explosives needed for bombs; this can be seen from the proportional values of the figures shown in the various graph curves.

All deliberations for the purpose of fixing an extension target are, however, without practical value so long as it is not decided to allocate a fixed well-balanced long-term quota of steel, other building materials, money, labor etc. to the rush plan now under way and later to the projects which will be its logical continuation.

On principle it can be stated that the German chemical industry has achieved a sufficiently high standard with regard to machinery and processes to deliver the basic materials and that the manufacturers of gunpowder and high explosives are able to finish the task.

Today, the production capacity for gunpowder and high explosives amounts to only 35% of the rush plan target, and this target amounts to only a fraction of the maximum requirements (red column) themselves and is noticeably lower than the minimum requirements (green columns). If, even at this stage, the argument is put forward that the mechanical side of the gunpowder and high explosives production would lag behind because it could not keep up with the extension of gunpowder and high explosives manufacture - then it becomes unavoidable to plan, and to complete, on this side too, a corresponding fundamental extension.

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Appendix: Evaluation of bibliography.

To 1): Cf. "What we don't know about the World War" by Lieutenant General (ret'd.) Schwarto, publishers H. Fikentschor, Leipzig O 5. From this publication, the following figures can be taken or worked out: average daily number of rounds fired by each field gun, at the beginning of 1915 = 5 to 7 (about the same for Allies and Germany), 1918: Entente = 30 to 35, Germany = no figures available, but much less, according to the ammunition production figures about 10 to 15. From these figures follows an average battle intensity of approx. 400 rounds fired per month and field gun (approx. 10 to 15 per day). This figure is based on the following number of guns: 1914: Germany = 6 300 guns, France = 4 800; 1918: Entente = 22 000, Germany = 25 000. Accordingly, the following average battle intensity has been assumed: Rifles: 600, light machine guns: 10 000; heavy machine

(page 65 of original, cont'd)

guns: 20 000; 2cm anti aircraft gun: 2 000; 8,8 cm anti aircraft gun: 400 rounds per month. These figures add up for the entire anti aircraft artillery (including Corps anti aircraft artillery, but excluding that of the West Wall) on the assumption of 20 Corps of fighting troupes:

225 000 rounds per day fired by 2 cm guns
13 000 " " " " " 8,8 cm guns,

and assuming a battle intensity equal to that of the Entente in 1918:

approximately 600 000 and approx. 35 000 rounds per day.

Enclosures:

- 1 Schedule
- 1 Diagram

End

(page 68 of original)

4 copies

(Handwritten note:) Has been submitted
to Dr. Dierichs.
7 June 1939
v(on) B(ruening)

1st copy

Berlin, 1 June 1939

Rubber stamp: Top Secret

Report on tour of inspection

25 May 1939.

Subject: Chemical warfare agents - Work in Leverkusen

Those present:	Dr. Noack	}	Inorganics Department Leverkusen
	Dr. Dierichs		
	Dr. Zimmermann		
	Dr. Jones		
	Chief Engineer Mueller		

part of the time Dr. Moder, Chief of the Inorganics Department
Leverkusen.

1. Esterization of Oxol

The pilot plant for the esterization of Oxol was thoroughly inspected while in operation. The apparatus can produce 150 tons per month and is to be carried over directly to large scale production. The counter current process is employed to bring about the reaction which occurs at 80-85°. The reaction chamber is a horizontal container in which metal vanes direct the ester against gaseous HCl introduced through the bottom of the reaction container by means of perforated tubes. The reaction chamber is traversed by cooling pipes made of tantalum. The supply of these pipes from Siemens presents some difficulties. It has been proposed that we get in touch with Siemens to expedite production. Through an overflow the finished ester reaches a sedimentation vessel. The liquid hydrochloric acid runs off and is returned into circulation. The ester left at the bottom is siphoned off and dehydrated by pre-heated air in a drying cylinder. The finished ester goes through a cooler into a storage container.

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In the laboratory 200 kilos a day are being produced at the moment. The production equipment for Huels should be planned for a production of 300 tons per month. Nine men will be needed to run the

(page 69 of original, cont'd)

apparatus producing 2.000 tons per month in Huels. Three months will be assumed as construction time for esterization plants under the conditions occasioned by mobilization, that is with the fullest support in material and workers. The cost of the process of esterization will amount to about 5 pfennigs per kilo.

It can be said that the solution of the technical problem of esterization is satisfactory, so that the process is now ready to be transferred to large scale production, and that the experiments have developed so satisfactorily that there would seem to be no reason why the idea which had already been formulated of storing large quantities of the harmless preliminary product Octol and quickly esterizing it as necessity arose should not now be put into practice even on the largest possible scale.

One curious observation made by the factory's head doctor, should be pointed out, i.e. that an extraordinary supersensitiveness appears in people who have been affected by mustard gas and that at a second contact with the substance they show much more serious symptoms of illness.

2. Direct mustard gas production

Only various preliminary experiments have up to date been made in this sphere, particularly in the direction of manufacturing direct mustard gas from sulphur dichloride instead of sulphur monochloride, to prevent the sulphur from separating out. Here they continued to work with solvents. The experiments will now be pursued with the utmost vigour after the conclusion of the esterization, and it is firmly believed that in the course of about six months a practicable method of producing direct mustard gas will have been evolved.

Enclosure:

Appendix (Original only) 1 diagram of the esterization apparatus
Leverkusen.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

14 July 1947

We, Victoria ORTON, No. 20129, Herbert RODECK, No. B 397944, Leonard LAWRENCE, No. 20136, hereby certify that we are thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Excerpts from Document No. NI-8790.

Victoria ORTON
No. 20129

Herbert RODECK
No. B 397944

Leonard LAWRENCE
No. 20136

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8846
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(page 23 of original)

W Ro III c
File No. 66 b 1161

Berlin, 17 August 1939.

Raw Material Requirements for Gunpowder,
Explosives, Chemical Warfare Agents and
Smoke Screen Materials in accordance with
the Capacity of the Finished Products
Factories up to 1 April 1940.

	Requirements in tons per month					Supplier
	used		recovered		consumption	
	goods	SO ₃	goods	SO ₃	SO ₃	
<u>Sulphuric Acid</u> calculated for SO ₃						(Handwritten notes)
<u>Wasag, Reinsdorf</u>						
H ₂ SO ₄ 14H (monohydrate)	184	158				Wasag, Coswig
Oleum 20%	1 809	1 545				Wasag, Coswig
Mixed acid with 14H	195	168				I.G. Wolfen
" " SO ₃ 100%	31	31				" "
Waste mixed acid with 14H	47	40	908	780		
		1 942		780	1 162	
<u>Deutsche Spreng- chemie, Kietz</u>						
Mixed acid with 14H	276	238				I.G. Wolfen
Returned acid 96%	65	51				
Waste mixed acid with 14H			294	253		
		289		253	36	
<u>DAG, Guesen</u>						
Oleum 35 %	798	702				Giesche, Mag- deburg
Mixed acid with MH	156	134				I.G. Doeberitz
Returned acid 96%	660	517				
Waste mixed acid with MH			1 194	1 030		
	1 353			1 030	323	
<u>Deutsche Celluloid- fabrik, Eilenburg</u>						
Oleum 20%	800	683				I.G. Wolfen
Mixed acid with MH	158	136				
Waste mixed acid with MH			238	205		
	819			205	614	

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8846
CONTINUED

(page 23 of original, cont'd)

	Requirements in tons per month					Supplier
	used		recovered		consumption	
	goods	SO ₃	goods	SO ₃	SO ₃	
						(In hand-written)
<u>D/G, Dueneberg (S.S. bei Krummel)</u>						Norddeutsche Fäbrie I.G. Hoechst
Oleum 27 %	39	34				
" 35 %	5	5				
" 65 %	235	211				
Mixed acid with MH	228	196				
Returned acid 96 %	183	144				
Waste mixed acid with MH			163	140		
		590		140	450	

(Handwritten note:) Returned acid and waste mixed acid in columns 1/2 are to be deducted from the figure of columns 3/4 of the waste acid.

(page 24 of original)

<u>D/G, Krummel</u>						
H ₂ SO ₄ MH	189	163				H. deutsch. Affinerie, Hamburg " 425 own 208
Oleum 27 %	2 891	2 505				I.G. Hoechst Erbesen
" 65 %	565	530				
Mixed acid with MH	58	50				
Returned acid 96 %	1 162	910				
Waste mixed acid with MH			4 414	3 790		
		4 158		3 790	368	
<u>D/G, Westerheese (S.S. bei Benkenburg (Krummel))</u>						
Oleum 35 %	235	207				Nord.d. Affinerie Hamburg Erbesen
Mixed acid with MH	63	54				
Waste mixed acid with MH			65	56		
		261		56	205	
<u>D/G, Tuerndorf (S.S. Troisdorf)</u>						
Mixed acid with MH	37	32				Leverkusen
Waste mixed acid with MH			35	30		
		32		30	2	

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TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8846
CONTINUED

(page 24 of original, cont'd)

	Requirements in tons per month					Supplier
	used		recovered		consumption	
	goods	SO ₃	goods	SO ₃	SO ₃	
<u>DAG, Troisdorf</u>						
H ₂ SO ₄ MH	6	5				(In hand-writing) Leverkusen
Oleum 35 %	523	461				"
Mixed acid with MH	91	78				
Waste mixed acid with MH			357	307		
		544		307	237	
<u>Tolff, Walsrode</u>						
Oleum 65 %	837	784				Fahlberg-List 100 I.G. Hoechst 684
Mixed acid with MH	442	380				
" " " SO ₃ 100%	5	5				
Returned acid 96%	259	203				
Waste mixed acid with MH			314	270		
		372		270	1 102	
<u>DAG, Hohensaaten (Iller. handwritten note)</u>						
Oleum 35 %	471	415				
Mixed acid MH	126	109				
Waste mixed acid MH			130	112		
		524		112	412	
<u>Deutsche Sprengchemie, Hohensaaten</u>						
Mixed acid MH	252	217				
Returned acid 96 %	63	49				
Waste mixed acid MH			348	266		
		266		266	0	
<u>Eibia, Doerwerden (MS. a.d. Weser)</u>						

(page 25 of original)

<u>Eibia, Doerwerden</u>					
Oleum 65 %	255	239			
Mixed acid MH	64	55			
Waste mixed acid MH			53	46	
		294		46	248

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8846
CONTINUED

(page 25 of original, cont'd)

	Requirements in tons per month					Supplier
	used		recovered		consumption	
	goods	SO ₃	goods	SO ₃	SO ₃	
<u>Deutsche Spreng- chemie, Muehldorf</u> <u>(Fichte II)</u>						(In hand- writing)
Mixed acid MH	110	90				
Returned acid 96 %	32	25				
Waste mixed acid MH			70	57		
		115		57	58	
<u>AG, Muehldorf (MS. a.Inn)</u> <u>(Fichte I)</u>						
Oleum 35 %	525	462				
Mixed acid MH	142	116				
Waste mixed acid MH			145	118		
		578		118	460	
<u>Ebenhausen (Feld) (MS.</u> <u>b.Ingolstadt)</u>						
Oleum 35 %	365	321				
Mixed acid MH	69	57				
			227	185		
		378		185	193	
<u>Deutsche Spreng- chemie, Torrelow</u> <u>(See II)</u>						
Mixed acid MH	213	174				
Returned acid 96 %	63	49				
Waste mixed acid MH			229	187		
		223		187	36	
<u>DAG, Eggesin</u>						
Oleum 35 %	449	396				
Mixed acid MH	125	102				
Waste mixed acid MH			130	106		
		498		106	392	
<u>DAG, Clausthal</u>						
Oleum 27 %	2 560	2 220				(Illeg. note)
Mixed acid MH	204	167				Gonarshausen?
Returned acid 96 %	1 162	910				
Waste mixed acid MH			3 850	3 140		
		3 297		3 140	157	

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8346
CONTINUED

(page 25 of original, cont'd)

	Requirements in tons per month					Supplier
	used		recovered		consumption	
	goods	SO ₃	goods	SO ₃	SO ₃	
<u>DAG, Doemitz</u>						
H ₂ SO ₄ MH	23	19				
Oleum 27 %	1 715	1 490				
Mixed acid MH	99	81				
Returned acid 96 %	297	233				
Waste mixed acid MH			2 198	1 800		
		1 823		1 800	23	
(Illegible handwritten note)						
(page 26 of original)						
<u>DAG, Hess.Lichtenau</u>						
H ₂ SO ₄ MH	58	48				
Oleum 27 %	2 560	2 220				
Mixed acid MH	216	177				
Returned acid 96 %	1 729	1 360				
Waste mixed acid MH			4 395	3 590		
		3 805		3 590	215	
<u>Vasag, Elsnig</u>						
H ₂ SO ₄ MH	1 500	1 230				
Oleum 27 %	2 520	2 180				
Mixed acid MH	131	107				
Waste mixed acid MH			2 700	2 200		
		3 517		2 200	1 317	
<u>DAG, Schlebusch</u>						
Oleum 27 %	1 317	1 140				
Mixed acid MH	92	75				
Waste mixed acid MH			1 370	1 120		
		1 215		1 120	95	
<u>Lignose, Schoenebeck</u>						
Oleum 27 %	976	845				
Mixed acid MH	70	57				
Returned acid 70 %	138	79				
" " 96 %	656	515				
Waste mixed acid MH			1 710	1 400		
		1 496		1 400	96	

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TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. WI-8846
CONTINUED

(page 26 of original, cont'd)

	Requirements in tons per month					Supplier
	used		recovered		consumption	
	goods	SO ₃	goods	SO ₃	SO ₃	
<u>DAG, Allendorf (N.S. illeg. note, Hessen)</u>						
Oleum 27 %	1 285	1 115				
Mixed acid MH	102	83				
Returned acid 96 %	560	455				
Waste mixed acid MH			1 925	1 570		
		1 653		1 570	83	
<u>DAG, Malchow (N.S.b. Neu-Strelitz)</u>						
Mixed acid MH	5	4				
Returned acid 96 %	250	196				
Waste mixed acid MH			216	173		
		200		173	22	
<u>DAG, Wolfratshausen</u>						
H ₂ SO ₄ MH	23	19				
Mixed acid MH	5	4				
Returned acid 96 %	227	178				
Waste mixed acid MH			216	173		
		201		173	23	
(page 27 of original)						
<u>Fahlberg-List, Hardeburg</u>						
Oleum 100 %		870		-	570	
<u>v. Heyden, Weiszig</u>						
Oleum 100 %		783		-	703	
<u>I.G., Hoechst</u>						
Oleum 100 %		326		-	326	
<u>I.G., Leverkusen</u>						
Oleum 100 %		435		-	435	
<u>I.C. Uerdinen</u>						
Waste mixed acid MH	115	94		-	94	

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. MI-2846
CONTINUED

(page 27 of original, cont'd)

	Requirements in tons per month				Supplier	
	used		recovered			consumption
	goods	SO ₃	goods	SO ₃		
<u>I.G., Wolfen</u> H ₂ SO ₄ MH	569	464	-	-	464	
<u>Hiag, Niederlehme</u> (MS. illegible note) Returned acid 78 %	212	136	-	-	136	
Total		34 551	23 114		11 437	
of which Oleum 20-27 %		15 977				
Oleum 35 %		2 969	(MS)			
Oleum 65 %		1 764	23155			
		2 445				
(In handwriting:)						
O ₄ MH and mixed acid		5 482				
Returned and waste mixed acid		5 914				
therefore fresh acid		28 637				
returned and waste mixed acid		5 914				

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(page 28 of original)

W Ro III c
File No. 66 b 1161

Berlin, 17 August 1939.

Raw Material Requirements for Gunpowder, Explosives,
Chemical Warfare Agents and Smoke Screen Materials
in accordance with the Capacity of the Finished
Products Factories up to 1 April 1940.

	Requirements in tons per month				Supplier
	used goods	HNO ₃	recovered goods	consumption HNO ₃	
<u>Nitric Acid</u> <u>calculated for HNO₃</u>					
1. <u>Wasag Reinsdorf</u>					
Highly concentrated		2 769			Pisteritz 2500 Doebe- ritz 269 395 Wolfen
Mixed acid		395			
Waste mixed acid		21	580		
		3 185	580	2 605	
2. <u>Deutsche Spreng- chemie, Kietz</u>					
Mixed acid		465			Wolfen
Waste mixed acid			145		
		465	145	320	
3. <u>DAG, Guesen</u>					
Highly concentrated		42			29/8 Doeberitz 12 Wolfen 907 Doeberitz 20 highl. conc.
Mixed acid		1 187			
Returned acid 45 %	32	14	104	47	
" " 90 %	13	12			
Waste mixed acid			172		
		1 255	219	1 036	
5. <u>Deutsch Celluloid- fabrik, Eilenburg</u>					
Mixed acid		1 117			Wolfen
Waste mixed acid			123		
Returned acid 40 %			36		
		1 117	159	958	

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TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8046
CONTINUED

(page 28 of original, cont'd)

	Requirements in tons per month					Supplier
	used		recovered		consumption	
	goods	HNO ₃	goods	HNO ₃	H ₂ O ₂	
6. <u>DAG, Dueneberg</u>						(In hand-writing)
Highly concentrated Mixed acid		2				Embsen
Returned acid 45 %	25	11	321	14		Embsen
" " 90 %	3	3				
Waste mixed acid				163		
		905		177	726	
7. <u>DAG, Kruemel</u>						Embsen
Highly concentrated Mixed acid		821				Embsen
Returned acid 90 %	58	52				
" " 55	498	274	35	19		
Carried over		3 582		19		
						(page 29 of original)
Brought forward		3 582		19		
Waste mixed acid				881		
		3 582		900	2 682	200 in 6 months 200 in 12 "
8. <u>DAG, Westerheese</u>						Embsen
Highly concentrated Mixed acid		12				Embsen
Returned 45 %	16	7	53	24		
Waste mixed acid				19		
		481		43	438	
9. <u>DAG, Wuergendorf</u>						Hoechst
Mixed acid		69				
Waste mixed acid				4		
		69		4	65	
10. <u>DAG, Troisdorf</u>						Hoechst Leverkusen
Highly concentrated Mixed acid		142				
Returned acid 45 %	21	673	68	30		
Waste mixed acid				169		
		825		199	626	

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8846
CONTINUED

(page 29 of original)

	Requirements in tons per month					Supplier
	used		recovered		consumption	
	goods	HNO ₃	goods	HNO ₃	HNO ₃	
12. <u>Wolff, Walsrode</u> Mixed acid Returned acid 45 % Waste mixed acid		2,000				(In hand-writing) (Emsen 1379 (Hoechst 62.
	33	15	57	17	98	
		2 015		115	1 900	
14. <u>DAG, Hohensasten I</u> Highly concentrated Mixed acid Returned acid 45 % Waste mixed acid		25				
	320	932	105	47	38	
		971		85	886	
14a. <u>Deutsche Spreng- chemie, Hohensasten</u> Mixed acid Waste mixed acid		434		212		Illegible note
		434		212	222	
15. <u>Eibia, Doerverden</u> Mixed acid Waste mixed acid		465		42		
		465		42	423	
(page 30 of original)						
16. <u>Deutsche Spreng- chemie, Muehldorf II</u> Mixed acid Waste mixed acid		196		113		371 in 12 months 145 in 2 years
		196		113	83	
<u>DAG, Muehldorf I</u> Mixed acid Waste mixed acid Returned acid 45 %		1,050		43		12 months
			118	53		
		1,050		96	954	
17. <u>Ebenhausen (Feld)</u> Highly concentrated Mixed acid Returned acid 45 % Waste mixed acid		19				B + C
	16	501	52	23	66	
		527		89	438	

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(page 30 of original, cont'd)

	Requirements in tons per month					Supplier
	used		recovered		consumption	
	goods	HNO ₃	goods	HNO ₃	HNO ₃	
19. <u>Torgelow II</u>						(In hand-writing) Dobernitz as highly conc
Mixed acid		379				
Waste mixed acid				127		
					252	
20. <u>DAG, Eggesien</u>						Brudershausen
Highly concentrated		24				
Mixed acid		923				
Returned acid 45 %	32	14	105	47		
Waste mixed acid				38		
					876	
21. <u>DAG, Clausthal</u>						Brudershausen
Mixed acid		1 504				
Returned acid 55 %	498	274				
Waste mixed acid				280		
					1 498	
22. <u>DAG, Doeritz</u>						Doeritz "
Highly concentrated		35				
Mixed acid		726				
Waste mixed acid		198		210		
					719	
23. <u>DAG, Hess. Lichtenau</u>						Hochst "
Highly concentrated		408				
Mixed acid		1 591				
Returned acid 55 %	498	274				
Waste mixed acid				510		
					1 763	
(page 31 of original)						
25. <u>DAG, Schlebusch</u>						Leverkusen
Mixed acid		676				
Waste mixed acid				173		
					503	
24. <u>Wasag, Elsnig</u>						Wolfen 429 Doe's 477 Wolfen
Highly concentrated		906				
Mixed acid		957				
Waste mixed acid		300		1 011		
					1 152	

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TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8846
CONTINUED

(page 31 of original, cont'd)

	Requirements in tons per month					Supplier
	used		recovered		consumption	
	foods	HNO ₃	goods	HNO ₃	HNO ₃	
26. <u>Lignose, Schoenebeck</u>						
Highly concentrated		39				Wolfen
Returned acid 11H				153		
Mixed acid		511				Wolfen
		550		153	397	
29. <u>DAG, Allendorf</u>						
Mixed acid		753				B + C
Returned acid 55 %	249	137				
Waste mixed acid				140		
		890		140	750	
30. <u>DAG, Malchow</u>						
Highly concentrated		407				440 A + B
Mixed acid		35				
Waste mixed acid				233		
		442		233	209	
<u>DAG, Wolfenhausen</u>						
Highly concentrated		407				B + C
Mixed acid		35				
Waste mixed acid				233		
		442		233	209	
<u>J.G., Uerdingen</u>						
Waste mixed acid		142		-	142	
<u>Total</u>		29,197		6,333	22,864	
of which fresh acid		27,418				

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8846
CONTINUED

(page 32 of original)

W Ro III
File No.

16 August 1939

Suppliers of Acids to the Gunpowder and Explosives Factories
Peace time basis
According to statements of Dr. Schmidt, Wa J Rue 9

Eilenburg	HS HS HS	Wolfen Hoechst Pisteritz	Oleum Oleum	Doerberitz Wolfen
Doemitz	HNO ₃ HS HS	Wolfen Wolfen Hoechst	Oleum 20 % " 27 % H ₂ SO ₄	Doerberitz Doerberitz Wolfen
Hessisch-Lichtenau	HS	Hoechst	Oleum 27 % " 27 %	Ludwigshafen Leverkusen
Kruemmel	HS HS HS HNO ₃ " 65 %	Hoechst Wolfen Pisteritz Wolfen Pisteritz Mixed acid ??	Oleum 65 % " 65 % " 65 % " 27 % " 27 %	Wolfen Ludwigshafen Hoechst own Doerberitz
Schlebusch	HS	Leverkusen	Oleum 27 %	own
Troisdorf	HS HNO ₃ "	Leverkusen Hoechst Leverkusen	Oleum 35 %	Leverkusen
Clausthal	HS HS	Hoechst Pisteritz	Oleum 27 % " 27 %	Doerberitz Wolfen
Griesheim	HS HS	Hoechst Wolfen		
Ueckermuende	HS	Pisteritz	Oleum 27 %	Doerberitz
Schoenebeck	HNO ₃ HS	Hoechst Wolfen	Oleum 27 %	Giesche
Elsnig	HS HS HS	Hoechst Wolfen Pisteritz	H ₂ SO ₄ Oleum 27 % " 27 %	Giesche Giesche v. Heyden
Reinsdorf	HNO ₃ Mixed acid	Coswig Hoechst Wolfen Pisteritz	H ₂ SO ₄ Oleum 20 %	Coswig Coswig

(Handwritten
Note:
To file
66 b 1161

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8846
CONTINUED

(page 33 of original)

Klietz	Mixed acid 65 %	Wolfen	H ₂ SO ₄	Union Stettin
Torgelow	65 % Mixed acid	Wolfen	H ₂ SO ₄	Union Stettin
Wolf Bomlitz	HNO ₃	Hoechst	Oleum 35%	Fahlberg-List
	65 % Mixed acid	Hoechst	"	65% Fahlberg-List
	HS	Wolfen	"	65% J.G.-Lever- Klein
	HS	Ludwigshafen		
Blumau	238 tons per month			
	HNO ₃	D. Teerfarben A.G., Wien		
		(In handwriting:)		
		20.6	Oleum	393 SO ₃
				von Liesing (Fa. Tegemann)

(page 34 of original)

DRAFT

W Ro III

(Stamp:) Top Secret

Berlin, 27 February 1939

2 copies
2nd copy

Highly Concentrated Nitric Acid Requirements
of the Explosives Factories

(as of 1 April 1939)

Plant	from	(capacity)	tons per month
Kruemmel	Embsen	(5000)	500
Walsrode (new plant)	"		255
Doemitz	"		500
			1 256
Eggesin	Doerberitz	(2500)	601
Torgelow	"		372
Guesen	"		940
			2 113
Doemitz	Wolfen	(4600)	709 (Handwritten note)
Klietz	"		522 H
Schoenebeck	"		526 H
Reinsdorf	"		303 M (Illeg. handwr. note)
Eilenburg	"		1,266 M
Elsnig	"		640 H + (Illeg. handwr. note)
Wolfen	(own use)		333
			4,299
Reinsdorf	Fiesteritz	(2500)	2,300
			2,300
Clausthal	Sondershausen	(2500)	1,095
			1 095
Kruemmel	Hoechst	(7000)	1,568
Walsrode (old plant)	"		1,122
Troisdorf	Leverk.)		704
Schlebusch	") v. Hoechst		507
Muergendorf	Hoechst		26
D.A.G. Lichteneu	"		1,492
Griesheim (chemical warfare agents)	"		983

(Illegible handwritten note and initial)

6,402
17,465

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(page 35 of original)

Raw Material Requirements for Gunpowder, Explosives, Chemical Warfare Agents and Smoke Screen Materials in accordance with Capacity and Mobilization Requisitioning of the Finished Products Factories and their Subcontractors.

Material: Nitric Acid (HNO₃)
=====

<u>Agency requiring and entitled to:</u>	<u>Requirements, tons per month, according to capacity</u>	<u>Requirements, tons per month, according to mobilization orders, as of 1 Oct. 1938</u>	<u>Subcontractor</u>
(without regard to recovery)			
I. <u>for factories that are ready (1 Oct. 1938)</u>		<u>and provided for mobilization fabrication *</u>	
Wasag, Reinsdorf Monohydrat Mixed acid Waste mixed acid (H))	3,195	2,740	Chem. Stickstoffwerk Piesteritz 90% IG-Farben, Wolfen 10%
Deutsche Sprengchemie, Klitz Mixed acid) Waste mixed acid (H))	465	463	IG-Farben, Wolfen 100%
Wolff & Co., Walsrode Mixed acid) Waste mixed acid (H))	647	1,400	(Illegible handwritten note) IG-Farben, Hoechst 100%
D.A.G. Kruemmel Monohydrat) Mixed acid) Returned acid 90%) " " 55%) Waste mixed acid 45%)	3,073	2,420	(Illegible handwritten note) IG-Farben, Hoechst 100%
D.A.G. Clausthal Mixed acid) Returned acid 55%) Waste mixed acid (H))	1,269	1,074	IG-Farben, Hoechst 100%
D.A.G. Schleebusch Mixed acid) Waste mixed acid (H))	676	507	IG-Farben, Oppau-Hoechst 100%

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8846
CONTINUED

(page 36 of original)

<u>Agency requiring and entitled to:</u>	<u>Requirements, tons per month, according to capacity</u>	<u>Requirements, tons per month, according to mobilization orders, as of 1 Oct. 1938</u>	<u>Subcontractor</u>
(without regard to recovery) and provided for mobilization fabrication *			
D.A.G. Doemitz			
Monohydrat)			
Mixed acid)			
Waste mixed acid MH)			
Returned acid 96 %)	1,245	1,082	IG-Farben, Wolfen 100%
D.A.G. Hess.Lichtenau			
Monohydrat)			
Mixed acid)	911	1,130	IG-Farben, Hoechst 100%
Wasag, Elsnig			
Monohydrat)			
Mixed acid)			
Waste mixed acid MH)	1,288	640	IG-Farben, Wolfen 100%
Lignose, Schoenebeck			
Monohydrat)			
Mixed acid)			
Returned acid MH)			
Waste mixed acid)	703	468	IG-Farben, Wolfen 100%
D.A.G. Guesen			
Monohydrat)			
Mixed acid)			
Returned acid 45 %)			
" " 90 %)			
Waste mixed acid MH)	1,255	1,483	IG-Farben, Wolfen 100%
D.A.G. Troisdorf			
Monohydrat)			
Mixed acid)			
Returned acid 45 %)	825	396,5	IG-Farben, Oppau-Hoechst
D.C.F. Eilenburg			
Mixed acid)			
Waste mixed acid MH)			
Returned acid 45 %)	1,117	1,005,5	IG-Farben, Wolfen (Handwritten note:) Hoechst, Pisteritz

(page 37 of original)

<u>Agency requiring and entitled to:</u>	<u>Requirements, tons per month, according to capacity</u>	<u>Requirements, tons per month, according to mobilization orders, as of 1 Oct. 1938</u>	<u>Subcontractor</u>
(without regard to recovery and provided for mobilization fabrication *)			
I.G., Wolfen			
Monohydrat)			
Mixed acid)			
Returned acid)	343	343 *	own production
D.A.G. Wuergeendorf			
Monohydrat)			
Waste mixed acid 1/1H)	68	25,5	I.G.-Farben, Hoechst
D.A.G. Hanau			
Monohydrat)			
Waste mixed acid 1/1H)	62	62 *	IG-Farben, Hoechst
Eggesin-Torgelow			
Monohydrat)			
Mixed acid)	--	966	IG-Farben, Hoechst
(Handwritten note:)		(Handwritten notes)	
Criesheim		983	Hoechst

(page 38 of original)

Raw Material Requirements for Gunpowder, Explosives, Chemical Warfare Agents and Smoke Screen Materials in accordance with Capacity and Mobilization Requisitioning of the Finished Products Factories and their Subcontractors

Material: Sulphuric Acid (SO₂)

<u>Agency requiring and entitled to:</u>	<u>Requirements, tons per month, according to capacity</u>	<u>Requirements, tons per month, according to mobilization orders, as of 1 Oct. 1938</u>	<u>Subcontractor</u>
(without regard to recovery)			
I. <u>for factories that are ready (1 Oct. 1938)</u> and intended for mobilization fabrication *			
Wasag, Reinsdorf			
H ₂ SO ₄ 11H)		194,2	IG-Farben, Wolfen 45%
Oleum 20 %)		1,320,0	IG-Farben, Hoechst 55%
Mixed acid (H ₂ SO ₄ 11H))			Chem. Fabr. Coswig 100%
SO 100 %)			
Waste mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ 11H)	1,934		
Deutsche Sprengchemie, Kietz			
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ 11H)		261,1	IG-Farben, Wolfen 100%
Returned acid H ₂ SO ₄ 96 %)			
Waste mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ 11H)	277		
Wolff & Co., Walsrode			
Oleum 65 %)		505,4	Norddt. Affinerie 100%
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ 11H)		221,1	IG-Farben, Hoechst 100%
Waste mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ 11H)	418		
D.A.G. Kruemmel			
H ₂ SO ₄ 11H)		262,9	IG-Farben, Hoechst
Oleum 27 %)		1,584,8	(
Oleum 65 %)		79,1	(SO ₂ Betrieb Kruemmel
Oleum 27 %)		123,6	(
Oleum 35 %)		119,7	(Norddt. Affinerie 100%
Oleum 65 %)	3,548	119,3	(
D.A.G. Clausthal			
(Handwritten note)			
Oleum 27 %)			La + Hoc
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ 11H)		1,585,0	Ccker 100%
Returned acid H ₂ SO ₄ 96 %)		119,5	IG-Farben, Hoechst 100%
Waste mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ 11H)	2,374		

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8846
CONTINUED

(page 39 of original)

<u>Agency requiring and entitled to:</u>	<u>Requirements, tons per month, according to capacity</u>	<u>Requirements, tons per month, according to mobilization orders, as of 1 Oct. 1938</u>	<u>Subcontractor</u>
(without regard to recovery) and intended for mobilization fabrication #			
D.A.G. Schlebusch			
Oleum 27 %	}	854,7	D.A.G. Schlebusch
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH		56,4	IG-Farben, Leverkusen
Waste mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH		1,259	
D.A.G. Doemitz			
H ₂ SO ₄ MH	}	120,4	IG-Farben, Wolfen
Oleum 27 %		1,485	IG-Farben, Dossberitz
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH			76,7 %
Returned acid H ₂ SO ₄ 96 %	}		Giesche's Erben 23,3%
Waste mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH		1,852	
D.A.G. Hess. Lichtenau			
H ₂ SO ₄ MH	}	282,1	IG-Farben, Leverkusen
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH			
Returned acid H ₂ SO ₄ 96 %		1,349	95,9
Oleum 27 %		1,086,8	IG-Farben, Leverkusen
Wasag, Elsnig			
H ₂ SO ₄ MH	}	219,5	Giesche's Erben 60,3%
Oleum 27 %		1,454,9	IG-Farben, Hoechst 39,7%
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	}		Chem. Fabr. v. Heyden
Returned acid H ₂ SO ₄ 96 %		2,514	(Weissig 333%
			(Giesche's Erben,
			(Magdeburg 666%
Lignose, Schoenebeck			
Oleum 27 %	}	844,4	Giesche's Erben, Magdeb.
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH		47,7	IG-Farben, Wolfen
Returned acid H ₂ SO ₄ 96 %			
Waste mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	}		
Returned acid H ₂ SO ₄ 70 %		1,509	
D.A.G. Troisdorf			
H ₂ SO ₄	}	32,5	IG-Farben, Leverkusen
Oleum 35 %			193,6
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH			
		542	

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8846
CONTINUED

(page 40 of original)

<u>Agency requiring and entitled to:</u>	<u>Requirements, tons per month, according to capacity</u>	<u>Requirements, tons per month, according to mobilization orders, as of 1 Oct. 1933</u>	<u>Subcontractor</u>
(without regard to recovery)			
<u>and intended for mobilization fabrication *</u>			
D.A.G. Guesen			
Oleum 35 %) 1,354	597,5	Giesche's Erben, Magdeburg
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH		320,0	IG-Farben, Wolfen 58,3
Returned acid H ₂ SO ₄ 96%			IG-Doeberitz 41,7%
D.C.F. Eilenburg			
Oleum 20 %) 814	580,0	IG-Farben, Wolfen
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH		111,9	" "
I.G. Wolfen			
H ₂ SO ₄ MH) 295	295 *	own production
Oleum 27 %			
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH			
Fahlberg-List, Magdeburg			
SO ₃ 100 %	870	870	own production
v. Heyden, Weissig			
SO ₃ 100 %	783	783	" "
I.G. Hoechst			
SO ₃ 100 %	326	326	" "
I.G. Leverkusen			
SO ₃ 100 %	435	435	" "
D.A.G. Wuergendorf			
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	33	10,7	IG-Farben, Hoechst
D.A.G. Hanau			
H ₂ SO ₄ MH	23	23 *	" "
(Handwritten note:) Ludwigshafen		(Handwritten note:) 287	

(page 41 of original)

Raw Material Requirements for Gunpowder, Explosives,
Chemical Warfare Agents and Smoke Screen Materials
in accordance with Capacity and Mobilization Requisitioning
of the Finished Products Factories and their
Subcontractors.

Material: Hydrochloric Acid (33%)

<u>Agency requiring and entitled to:</u>	<u>Requirements, tons per month, according to capacity</u>	<u>Requirements, tons per month, according to mobilization orders, as of 1 Oct. 1938</u>	<u>Subcontractor</u>
<u>I. for factories that are ready (1 Oct. 1938) and intended for mobilization fabrication *</u>			
I.G. Uerdingen	34,6	34,6 *	IG-Farben, Leverkusen
I.G. Wolfen	67,7	67,7 *	" Bitterfeld
Ergetan, Stassfurt	600	600	own production
Riedel de Haen, Seelze	165	160	" "
Fahlberg-List, Magdeburg	130	130	" "
von Heyden, Weissig	117	117	" "
IG Hoechst	49	49	" "
I.G. Leverkusen	65	65	" "

(page 42 of original)

W Ro III a (Illegible handwritten note) 8 July 1938
File No. 66 b 1161

Raw Material Requirements for Gunpowder, Explosives, Chemical
Warfare Agents and Smoke Screen Materials in accordance with
Capacity of the Finished Products Factories.

Material: Nitric Acid (HNO₃)

Agency requiring and
entitled to:

<u>I. for factories that are ready 1 Oct. 1938)</u>	<u>Requirements (tons per month)</u>		
	<u>used</u>	<u>recovered</u>	<u>Consumption</u>
Wasag, Reinsdorf			
Monohydrate	2,769		
Mixed acid	395		
Waste mixed acid 1:1	21	530	
	3,185	580	2,605
Deutsche Spreng- chemie Klietz			
Mixed acid	465		
Waste mixed acid 1:1	-	145	
	465	145	320

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. WI-8846
CONTINUED

(page 42 of original, cont'd)

	<u>Requirements (tons per month)</u>		
	<u>used</u>	<u>recovered</u>	<u>Consumption</u>
Wolff & Co, Walsrode			
Mixed acid	647		
Waste mixed acid MH	-	58	
	<u>647</u>		58%
D.A.G. Krümmel			
Monohydrate	821		
Mixed acid	2,005		
Returned acid 90 %	52		
" " 55 %	195		
Waste mixed acid MH		801	
" " " 45 %		<u>16</u>	
	<u>3,073</u>	<u>817</u>	2,256
D.A.G. Clausthal			
Mixed acid	1,074		
Returned acid 55 %	195		
Waste mixed acid MH		<u>200</u>	
	<u>1,269</u>	<u>200</u>	1,069
(Illeg. handwr. note)			

(page 43 of original)

D.A.G. Schlebusch			
Mixed acid	676		
Waste mixed acid MH		<u>170</u>	
	<u>676</u>	<u>170</u>	506
D.A.G. Doemitz			
Monohydrate	35		
Mixed acid	726		
Waste mixed acid MH	198	210	
Returned acid 96 %	<u>286</u>		
	<u>1,245</u>	<u>210</u>	1,035
D.A.G. Hess. Lichtenau			
Monohydrate	824		
Mixed acid	<u>87</u>		
	911	-	911
Wasag, Elsnig			
Monohydrate	650		
Mixed acid	638		
Waste mixed acid MH		<u>740</u>	
	<u>1,288</u>	<u>740</u>	548

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8846
CONTINUED

(page 43 of original, cont'd)

	<u>Requirements (tons per month)</u>		
	<u>used</u>	<u>recovered</u>	<u>consumption</u>
Lignose, Schoenebeck			
Monohydrate	39		
Mixed acid	511		
Returned acid 1H	153		
Waste mixed acid		<u>162</u>	
	<u>703</u>	162	541
D.A.G. Troisdorf			
Monohydrate	142		
Mixed acid	673	170	
Returned acid 45 %	<u>10</u>	<u>31</u>	
	825	201	624
D.A.G. Guesen			
Monohydrate	42		
Mixed acid	1,187		
Returned acid 45 %	14	47	
" " 90 %	12		
Waste mixed acid 1H		<u>172</u>	
	<u>1,255</u>	219	1,036
D.C.F. Eilenburg			
Mixed acid	1,117		
Waste mixed acid		123	
Returned acid 40 %		<u>48</u>	
	<u>1,117</u>	171	946
I.G. Wolfen			
Monohydrate	301		
Mixed acid	42		
Returned acid		<u>10</u>	

(page 44 of original)

D.A.G. Wuergendorf			
Monohydrate	68		
Waste mixed acid		<u>4</u>	
	<u>68</u>	4	64
D.A.G. Hanau			
Monohydrate	62		
Waste mixed acid 1H		<u>48</u>	
	<u>62</u>	48	14
Total I	17,132	3,735	13,397

(Handwritten note:)
J02113/2

(page 45 of original)

W Ro III a
File No. 66 b 1161

26 July 1938

Raw Material Requirements for Gunpowder, Explosives, Chemical Warfare Agents and Smoke Screen Materials in accordance with Capacity of the Finished Products Factories

Material: Sulphuric Acid (H₂SO₄)

<u>Agency requiring and entitled to:</u>	<u>Requirements (tons per month)</u>		
<u>I. for factories that are ready</u>	<u>(1 Oct. 1938)</u>		
	<u>used</u>	<u>recovered</u>	<u>consumption</u>
Wasag, Reinsdorf			
H ₂ SO ₄ MH	150		
Oleum 3 20 %	1,556		
Mixed acid (H ₂ SO ₄) MH	159		
SO ₂ 100 %	31		
Waste mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	38	745	
	1,934	745	1,189
Deutsche Spreng- chemie Kietz			
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	225		
Returned acid H ₂ SO ₄ 96 %	52		
Waste mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	-	240	
	277	240	37
Wolff & Co., Walsrode			
Oleum 65 %	343		
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	75		
Waste mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	-	60	
	418	60	358
D.A.G. Kruemmel			
H ₂ SO ₄ MH	155		
Oleum 27 %	1,875		
" 65 %	530		
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	224		
SO ₂ 100 %	99		
Returned acid H ₂ SO ₄ 96 %	665		
Waste mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	-	2,740	
	3,548	2,740	808

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D.A.G. Clausthal			
Oleum 27 %	1,590		
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	119		
Returned acid H ₂ SO ₄ 96 %	665		
Waste mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	-	2,245	
	2,374	2,245	129

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8846
CONTINUED

(page 46 of original, cont'd)

	<u>Requirements (tons per month)</u>		
	<u>used</u>	<u>recovered</u>	<u>consumption</u>
D.A.G. Schlebusch			
Oleum 27 %	1,180		
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	79		
Waste mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	-	1,150	
	1,259	1,190	69
D.A.G. Doemitz			
H ₂ SO ₄ MH	19		
Oleum 27 %	1,490		
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	81		
Returned acid H ₂ SO ₄ 96 %	240	1,790	
Waste mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	22		
	1,852	1,790	62
D.A.G. Hess.			
Lichtenau			
H ₂ SO ₄ MH	845		
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	10		
Returned acid H ₂ SO ₄ 96 %	494		
Waste mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	-	1,230	
	1,349	1,230	119
Wasag, Elsnig			
H ₂ SO ₄ MH	820		
Oleum 27 %	1,460		
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	71		
Returned acid H ₂ SO ₄ 96 %	163		
Waste mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	-	1,560	
	2,514	1,560	954
Lignose Schoenebeck			
Oleum 27 %	847		
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	57		
Returned acid H ₂ SO ₄ 96 %	520		
Waste mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	-	1,400	
Returned acid H ₂ SO ₄ 70 %	85		
	1,509	1,400	109

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D.A.G. Troisdorf			
H ₂ SO ₄	5		
Oleum 35 %	464		
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	73		
Waste mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	-	292	
	542	292	250

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8846
CONTINUED

(page 47 of original, cont'd)

	<u>Requirements (tons per month)</u>		
	<u>used</u>	<u>recovered</u>	<u>consumption</u>
D.A.G. Guesen			
Oleum 35 %	704		
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	128		
Returned acid H ₂ SO ₄ 96 %	522		
Waste mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	-	910	
	1,354	910	444
D.C.F. Eilenburg			
Oleum 20 %	684		
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	130		
Waste mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	-	195	
	814	195	619
I.G. Wolfen			
H ₂ SO ₄ MH	230		
Oleum 27 %	61		
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	4		
Waste mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	-	295	
	295	295	-
Fahlberg-List Magdeburg			
SO ₃ 100 %	870		870
v. Heyden Weissig			
SO ₃ 100 %	783		783
I.G. Hoechst			
SO ₃ 100 %	326		326
I.G. Leverkusen			
SO ₃ 100 %	435		435

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D.A.G. Wuergendorf			
Mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	33		
Waste mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	-	31	
	33	31	2
D.A.G. Hanau			
H ₂ SO ₄ MH	23		
Waste mixed acid H ₂ SO ₄ MH	-	23	
	23	23	-
Total I	<u>22,509</u>	<u>14,946</u>	<u>7,563</u>

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W Ro IIIa
File No. 66 b 1161

Berlin, 27 July 1938.

Raw Material Requirements for Gunpowder, Explosives, Chemical Warfare Agents and Smoke Screen Materials in accordance with Capacity of the Finished Products Factories.

Material: Hydrochloric Acid (33%)

Agency requiring and entitled to:

I. for factories that are ready (1 Oct. 1938)

	<u>Requirements (tons per month)</u>
I.G. Uerdingen	34,6
I.G. Wolfen	67,7
Ergetan, Stassfurt	600
Riedel de Haen, Seelze	165
Fahlberg-List, Magdeburg	130
von Heyden, Weissig	117
I.G. Hoechst	49
I.G. Leverkusen	65
Total:	1,228,3

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W Ro III a
File No. 66 b 1161

Berlin, 27 July 1938

Raw Material Requirements for Gunpowder, Explosives, Chemical Warfare Agents and Smoke Screen materials in accordance with Capacity of the Finished Products Factories.

Material: Phosphoric Acid (H₃PO₄)

Agency requiring and entitled to:

I. for factories that are ready
(1 Oct. 1938)

Requirements (tons per month)

I.G. Uerdingen
I.G. Wolfen

1,7
2,3

Total:

4,0

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Wa B
File No. 70 f 20/22 Wa B 9, VII
No. 741/37 top secret

8 November 1937

2 copies:
1st copy

Stamp: TOP SECRET

Distribution:

1st copy to Stb (I Ro)

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(Wa Stb Ib encls. designated
as 3rd copy)

To

W Staff (I Ro)

(Rubber Stamp:)

WStb ?

12 Nov. 1937

3131/37 gK 2 encl.

Subject: Detailed compilation of
information on acids

Antecedents: B.No. 316/37 Top Secret Wa B 9, VII of 7 June 1937
Conference Dr. Thierer (W Stb, W Ro) - Dr. Foll (Wa B 9).

Transmitted herewith are 2 lists, containing the acid requirements for the plants in existence, or those which are under construction or which are to be begun in the fiscal year 1938, respectively, with details according to acid concentrations.

2 enclosures

(Signed) ?

(Illegible handwritten note)

(page 53 of original)

TOP SECRET

Enclosure to No. 741/37 Top Secret A B 9, VII

Detailed compilation of Information on Acids in connection with Enclosure 1 No. 316/37
Top Secret A B 9, VII of 7 June 1937.

As of 2 November 1937.

A) Plants in Existence.

Conso- cutivo No.	Company and Location	NO ₂ H ₂ O		H ₂ O ₂ H ₂ H a) 100 % b) 78 %	Oleum 27 %	Total 30 %		Remarks
		used, tons	recoov- ered, tons			used tons	recoov- ered tons	
1.	Vasag, Reinsdorf	a) 2.479 b) ---	373	a) 302 b) 11	1.4-3	1.544	533	Figures for acid as for H ₂ O are indicated both for explosives and for the preliminary product oxalacrythrite
2.	Vasag, Klietz	a) 314 b) ---	4	a) 56 b) ---	117	164	116	
3.	Volf & Co, Alserode	a) 153 b) ---	93	a) 96 b) ---	4/0	321	113	
8.	L.A.G. Kruasol	a) 1.057 b) 130 c) 347	37 32	a) 134 b) 17 c) 59	2.183 --- 209	2.160 222	1.625 93	See remark under 1) + additional for P-plant of 260 Mgl.P. and 10 Mgl.P. completed in the meantime in Duenaberg
9.	L.A.G. Glausthal	a) 822 b) 130	---	a) 105 b) ---	1.790	1.636	1.453	
10.	L.A.G. Schlobusch	a) 494 b) ---	---	a) 63 b) ---	1.072	926	828	
11.	L.A.G. Doornitz	a) 942 b) 130	29	a) 120 b) ---	1.990	1.822	1.636	
12.	L.A.G. Hossisch-Lichtenna	a) 1.152 b) 130	73	a) 1.050 b) ---	2.290	2.101	1.911	
13.	Vasag, Alenig	a) 1.270 b) ---	---	a) 105 b) ---	1.790	1.636	1.453	
14.	Lignoso, Schenobock/E.	a) 535 b) ---	---	a) 68 b) ---	1.000	1.000	897	

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TRANSMISSION OF KERN'S PRO DOCUMENT No. HI-8346
CONTINUED

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Consecutive No.		HNO ₃ 1H		H ₂ SO ₄ 1H		Oleum 27%	Total SO ₃		Remarks
		a) 100% used tons	b) 35% recovered, tons	a) 100% used tons	b) 78% recovered, tons		used tons	recovered, tons	
15.	D.A.G. Troisdorf	a) 759	118	a) 34 b) 17		446	479	103	See remark under 1,
16.	D.A.G. Guesen	a) 1.414	163	a) 732		679	1 423	632	
17.	Deutsche Zelluloidwerke Eilenburg	a) 994 1.030	98 111	a) 896 1.020		---	623 715	145 166	beginning 1 Nov. 1937 for 300 tons per month (2).
20.	I.G. Urdingen	a) 101	---	a) 81		---	63	---	
21.	I.G. Jolfen	a) 243	---	a) 401		---	249	64	
22.	Bergtham, Stassfurt	---	---	a) 9		---	0	---	

First Encl. to No. 3181/37 Top Secret in Staff

(page 54 of original)

TOP SECRET

Enclosure to No. 741/37 Top Secret in B 9, VII

Detailed compilation of information on acids in connection with Enclosure 2 or 3 respectively, No. 316/37 Top Secret in B 9, VII of 7 June 1937.

Plants under construction, or expansions, respectively. (These plants have been definitely begun in B or will be definitely begun in RJ 33, respectively).

1)	Wasag, Hohensaaten b. Oderberg	a) 1.372 b) ---	126	a) 241 b) ---	823	801	371	
2)	D.A.G. Vorgehewerke, Stettiner Haff	a) 1.223 b) ---	---	a) 201 b) ---	752	778	319	
3)	Wasag, Klietz	a) 224	40	a) 66	120	157	70	
4)	Wolff & Co, Walsrode	a) 1.350	122	a) 221	825	357	356	

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(page 54 of original, cont'd)

5)	D.A.G. Dueneberg	a, 1249 517	186 48	a) 190 84	747 316	769 326	321 134 *	for 400 Hgl.P. and 20 Hgl.P. compare List A, No 8.
8)	Halmenberg 400 tons Arsine oil	---	---	a) 20	---	16		
24,	out of List C Masag, Trittau now Hainholz	a, 546	297	a) 23 b, 99	300	342	274	Figures for acids for Hg are indicated both for explosives and for the preliminary product ant.arythrite

as of 2 November 1937

Second Encl. to No. 3181/37 Top Secret W Staff

(page 62 of original)

V Ro (IIIa)
File No. 66 b 1161

14 November 1936.

File Memorandum

concerning a session at the Office for German Raw Materials and
Plastics on 12 November 1936.

Concerning: Acid requirements of the powder and
explosives plants; chemical warfare agents.

Present: Dr.-Ing. Thierer) V Stb. V Ro III
Min.Rat Dr. Zahn)
Dr.-Ing. Ehmann) Wa B 4

Dr. Ritter)
Dr. Beur) Office for German Raw Materials
Dipl.-Ing. Reese) and Plastics

Mr. Kuntze, Wasar)
Mr. Meine, Lignose) Temporarily

A. In order to determine the acid requirements of the Wasar the repre-
sentative of this company gave the following figures. These are
valid for the production of the individual plants after conclusion
of their present building program in tons per month.

1. Reinsdorf

Nitropenta

planned capacity 60 tons
present production 30 "

(in accordance with production plan the total
nitropenta production will amount to 105 tons).

NC powder 725 tons
Npl " 1,050 "
(of which 30 tons with solvents, 970 tons without solvents)
Nitrocellulose now 1,100 tons.

(page 63 of original)

(The nitrocellulose requirements amount to 1,425 tons; 325 tons
are now obtained from Eilenburg. Planned for Reinsdorf is a
maximum production of 1,500 tons nitrocellulose.)

Nitroglycerine 325 tons
Diglycol (under construction) ca.150 tons.

(para 63 of original, cont'd)

2. Coswig.

Processed 60 tons nitrogens from Rheinhardt.

3. Klietz.

Powder without solvents (dinitrolycol) 2,000 tons
gets 700 tons nitrocellulose from (Klietz),
gets the excess glycerine or 10,000 tons nitrogens.

4. Geellichau (Bucko).

After expansion produces 700 tons NC powder,
gets nitrocellulose from Silberberg (Klietz).

5. Elsnis (Tornau).

Produces trinitrotoluol from mononitro; for the time being
600 tons mononitro will be obtained from Gieschein; later on
wants to produce tri from toluol.

6. See.

Corresponds to Klietz, only without PL powder plant.
Gets 700 tons K-cellulose from Gieschein (D.A.G.)

B. For the plants included with license there are valid the figures
as represented in the conference on 13 October 1936 (see file
memorandum of 13 Oct. 1936).

(para 64 of original)

C. Other firms discussed were:

1. Walsrode. Here there must be distinguished:

a) Private possession Wolff & Co.,

Rebilitation production 205 tons NC powder

b) On the same grounds as a), but rented from R.K.M.:

Waldhof 300 tons NC tube powder.

The second part of Waldhof will be ready at the spring of 1937.

c) Wals. Own operation of the Reich War Ministry (Montan Plant).

An experimental plant for 100 tons of powder without solvents
(dinitrolycol) will be ready at the end of 1937.

(page 64 of original, cont'd)

A project for an additional, 1,000 tons of powder without solvents (dinitroglycol) is being worked out. Construction time ca. 1 1/2 years.

2. Eilenburg. (D.A.G.) shall, when expanded, produce

1,125 tons nitrocellulose
925 tons NC powder

The other D.A.G. factories shall be reserved for a later session.

D. Plannings. With regard to these Min.Rat Dr. Zahn made the following statements:

Incolstadt is planned for 300 tons NC
Donauwoerth is planned for 1,000 tons di-lycol powder
Instead of Heustadt an Ruebenberg there shall be produced in Walo 1,000 tons of di-lycol powder.
Forst-Guben 1,000 tons di-lycol powder
Instead of Forst-Guben (N-hexorene 600 tons) the location of Boppingen (F.P. No. 25) shall be chosen.

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(F.P.No. 26): Trinitrobenzol (Ceissmar) is not possible, since acid requirements are enormous.

(F.P.No. 27): Altenvehlingen 600 tons ethylene diaminedinitrate.

(F.P.No. 28): N-hexorene plant shall be located in region of southern Harz.

E. Chemical Warfare Agents.

Min.Rat Dr. Zahn made the following statements concerning the situation with regard to the production of chemical warfare agents.

1. Mustard Gas. The plant in Amrendorf is putting out 10 tons per day = 3,600 tons per year; is to be enlarged by 1/3 (ready in 1937) = 5,000 tons per year. Starting raw material: carbide spirits.

Stocked in Amrendorf are 1,000 tons of oxol = ca. 1,000 tons of mustard gas. The finished mustard gas goes from here to the filling stations. In order to cover the present requirements (60,000 tons per year) there must therefore be built an additional three plants with 20,000 tons per year each. Of this one plant is to go over to the Center Bavaria.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8846
CONTINUED

(page 65 of original, cont'd)

2. Chloracetophenone.

Ludwigshafen	present capacity	60 tons per month	= 720 tons
			per year
Seelze	" "	75-80 " "	= ca. 900
			tons per year.

In order to cover the requirements (1,150 tons per month) there are required 2 plants at 550 tons per month each = total of 13,000 tons per year (locations Minden and Ruedersdorf) or Frankfurt a/O, respectively.

3. Blue Cross. Present stock of arsenic: 2,000 tons. Question as to whether imports shall be made from Sweden.

(page 66 of original)

4. Green Cross.

It would be relatively inexpensive to double the phosgene plants for stabilizers; for this no new buildings would be necessary. In this way 450 tons of phosgene per month could be released in Wolfen.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

11 August 1947

I, Herbert RODECK, No. B 397944, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Excerpts from document No. NI-8846.

Herbert RODECK
No. B 397944

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"END"

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AFFIDAVIT OF WALTER JACOBI

WALTER JACOBI, being duly sworn deposes and says:

I have given in a previous statement the facts relating to my association with I. G. Farben. In that affidavit I indicated my connection as a representative of I. G. Farben, with the Nitrogen Syndicate and the International Nitrogen Cartel. This affidavit sets forth the facts in connection with the International Nitrogen Cartel and I. G. Farben's participation therein.

At the end of the first World War the three main sources of nitrogen apart from Chilean nitrate which had to be imported available to the German agriculture were: the products derived from synthetic ammonia produced in the plants of the Badische at Oppau and Leuna; the products derived from ammonia coming as by-product from the coke oven plants and gas works; and calcium cyanamide. The total German post war production capacity was by far greater than the prewar capacity due to the increase of facilities which had taken place during the war. Although it was anticipated that the demand for nitrogen for agricultural use would also be greater than before the war, nobody could foresee what would be the effect on the market, not only of the heavily increased production but also of the new fertilizers in forms which had never been offered before. In this situation the three producing groups mentioned above formed, in 1919, a sales combination called the "Nitrogen Syndicate" for the purpose of stabilizing the domestic market. Each producing group (synthetic nitrogen represented by Badische, by-product nitrogen represented by the heavy industries in the Ruhr and Upper Silesia districts, and calcium cyanamide represented by the Bayerische) was represented by a Managing Director. The members of the Syndicate pooled and effected their sales through a central sales agency where sales, quotas and prices were

(page 2 of original)

fixed. The Syndicate was by various agreements periodically renewed and extended. It was broken when the Occupation began in 1945.

From 1919 to 1924 the demand of the German agriculture exceeded the domestic production of nitrogen fertilizer. It was only after 1924 that small quantities of nitrogen became free for export. The export price was higher than the domestic German price. Before Germany entered the export market, the total demand for nitrogen fertilizer in the world market had been covered almost entirely by Chilean nitrate, British manufacture of by-product nitrogen, and a relatively small tonnage of Norwegian nitrate produced by a special ure process.

The appearance of German production on certain world markets caused some anxiety in British and Chilean circles. In 1925 at the initiative of the British, an informal price understanding covering only certain markets was reached. In 1929 formal agreements were executed between I. G. Farben and Imperial Chemical Industries Limited, and I. G. Farben by separate agreement with the German Nitrogen Syndicate subjected its agreement with Imperial to the Syndicate Operations.

Meanwhile in 1927, Norsk-Hydro had decided to extend its activity in world market and for that purpose increased their production facilities. After an extensive survey of the various processes in effect in the world they decided to use the Haber-Bosch process of I. G. Farben. Accordingly, in 1927 an agreement was made between I. G. Farben and Norsk-Hydro in which I. G. Farben granted Norsk-Hydro licenses under their patents, and agreed to give them their technical experience and know-how. I. G. Farben also agreed to furnish technical advice in the erection and operation of a synthetic nitrogen factory in Bjukan. The sale of the Norwegian production of nitrogen fertilizers in all countries except Norway,

(page 3 of original)

was to be made by a joint sales organization and both concerns agreed to exchange a certain number of their respective shares and each concern was to be represented in board of the other by one member. Subsequently, Dr. Schmitz became a member of the Board in Norsk-Hydro and Dr. Aubert became a board member in I. G. Farben. Later, I believe in 1941, Dr. Oster also became a member of the board of Norsk-Hydro.

In the Treaty of Versailles the Allied countries had acquired rights on the Badische patents and now made use of these rights. The French Government, however, needed the technical assistance of Badische. It was compelled, therefore, to seek an agreement for such assistance. In or about 1924 Badische agreed to furnish technical advice to the French and assisted in the erection of a large synthetic nitro an factory near Toulouse. Other European countries such as Belgium, Holland, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Poland, had been cut off from the regular supply of Chilean nitrate during the war, built up their own synthetic nitrogen industries. The Badische and later I. G. Farben refused, as a matter of principle, repeated requests for patents/licenses and technical assistance. This required intensified research in other countries and finally a French chemist—Claude—and an Italian chemical engineer, Casale—had discovered a competing process which was patented and licensed. This broke the I. G. Farben hold and further increased the world production capacity. In 1928-1929 it became apparent that it exceeded by far all the sales possibilities.

The Chilean nitrogen industry was particularly alarmed by this development and the Chilean Government sent in the Spring of 1929, a delegation to Berlin which suggested an arrangement which should secure the sale of their products at reasonable prices. A one-year agreement was made first with the German Nitrogen Syndicate and immediately afterwards with the British Imperial Chemical Industry and Norsk-Hydro. It soon became clear

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that the agreements made so far were no remedies against the future deterioration of the situation on the nitrogen world markets.

In the Spring of 1930 the German Nitrogen Syndicate together with the British and Norwegian industry, invited the European and Chilean nitrogen industries to a conference and submitted at that time proposals for an International Cartel. The conference was held under the chairmanship of Lord Mellchett and Dr. Schmitz of I. G. Farben took a leading part in the negotiations which resulted in the establishment of the first international cartel agreement. The German, British, Norwegian, Belgium, French, Italian Swiss, Dutch, Czechoslovakian, Polish and Chilean industries became members of the cartel and there were informal understandings with the Swedish, Austrian and Japanese industries. Dr. Schmitz of I. G. Farben was unanimously elected president of the International Nitrogen Cartel.

The agreement expired in 1931 and efforts to renew the cartel for 1931 and 1932 were unsuccessful. Then followed a period of open competition and prices fell from 50 to 60 percent. The members got together again and renewed the cartel for successive periods of 2, 3, and 5 years. It was last renewed in August 1938 for 5 years. Dr. Schmitz remained the president of the cartel during its lifetime.

The cartel operated substantially in the following manner: The domestic market of each member was reserved for the national producers of that country. In effect, therefore, the cartel arrangements dealt only with the export market. All production of nitrogen for export was pooled in the cartel through which all sales had to be made. Sales quotas for each member of the cartel were fixed and thus production of nitrogen, at least for use as fertilizer, was controlled. Prices were fixed on a uniform basis so that each member received the same return for

(page 5 of original)

a fixed unit of nitrogen sold, regardless of what his own cost of production was. This stabilization was accomplished by using gold as the medium of accounting between the members and the cartel.

The cartel arrangement also required each of the members to give to the cartel detailed figures on its production capacity, and monthly figures of actual production and inventory. This information furnished the basis for fixing the sales quotas of the respective members. Dr. Baetefisch, of I. G. Farben, worked out the technical details whereby uniform standards were established upon which the production capacity of each member was determined. He was head of the technical committee of the cartel which visited the plants of the members and conducted an investigation and certified the production capacity of each of the members. This technical committee was empowered to conduct a similar investigation of its members production facilities at any time. Each member knew therefore what the nitrogen production capacity of every other member was.

In 1938, there was much talk of war among the members of the cartel and I recall the following significant events which gave rise to such discussion:—

After the invasion of Austria in March of 1938, I. G. Farben and the German Syndicate asserted that Austria was now part of Germany and should be treated by the International Cartel as belonging to the domestic German market. The other members considered Austria as belonging to the export market and declined to agree that it be considered as the domestic market of Germany. In the renewal in July of the cartel agreement a clause was inserted to take care of the matter which was drawn in such a way as to take care of the situation which arose after the Czechoslovakian invasion.

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(page 5 of original, cont'd)

1938 was especially significant, for it was in that year that the German Nitrogen Syndicate advised the International Cartel that it could not deliver sufficient nitrogen to meet its full

(page 6 of original)

export quota and sold its quota rights to the British and Norwegian members. The reason given at the time was that the German consumption of agricultural nitrogen had so increased as to leave no surplus available for export. As we all had the monthly production figures of each member, and the members assumed that honest reports were furnished, we in our discussions appraised the situation as indicating that the German nitrogen production was being diverted principally for synthetic gasoline and explosives.

After the Munich agreement in September, 1938, the talk of war in the cartel was no longer academic. The International Nitrogen Cartel, with its domicile at London, had substantial assets, the beneficial ownership of which was in the members of the cartel, and it was apparent to all the members that a procedure had to be taken to protect these assets from seizure in the event of war, for England was sure to be involved. The members then agreed upon the following procedure: A Norwegian company, the counterpart of the London company, was set up through that Norway would not be involved in the war. All documents transferring the bank accounts and assets to the Norwegian company were drawn. Anticipating communication difficulties in the event of war, the members appointed an agent with authority to decide when to transfer the assets to the Norwegian company and when to cancel the cartel. On August 22, 1939, when Ribbentrop went to Moscow, the cartel transferred its assets to the Norwegian company, in accordance with the procedure

(page 6 of original, cont'd)

previously arranged. On September 3, 1939, the cartel was cancelled and liquidated through the Norwegian company. Dr. Schmitz during the period of time was President of the International Cartel, and personally participated in the meetings when these matters were discussed. In addition, he always received the minutes of the meetings and all other notices. Dr. Oster was also informed of these matters.

(page 7 of original)

I had left Germany, and I. G. Farben in 1935, and from 1935-1939 was employed by the International Nitrogen Cartel in London and the facts related above are known to me as of my own knowledge.

Signed: Walter Jacobi

Sworn to before me this 7th day of July, 1947.

Signed: Morris Anchan
Attorney, Office of Chief of
Counsel for War Crimes
AGO. 229649

"A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY"

- 7 -
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PRODUCTION OF 18 STRATEGIC MATERIALS OF I.G. AND I.G. CONTROLLED COMPANIES.

4-10008

Produktion der I.G. und von der I.G. kontrollierter Gesellschaften für 18 wichtige Erzeugnisse.

In 1000 Metric Tons.

	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
Nitrogen (Ammonia N) / Stickstoff / Ammoniak (N)	218,-	265,-	281,-	325,-	400,-	456,-	520,-	554,-	557,-	552,-	Figures not available		
Diglycol / Diglykol	-	-	-	-	0,1	0,5	0,8	1,3	1,3	1,8	5,8	11,2	12,1
Explosives / Sprengstoffe) Gunpowder / Schiesspulver)	9,7	10,9	14,5	23,9	40,4	55,2	68,7	80,8	101,6	182,-	254,2	352,6	
Synthetic Gasoline / Synthetische Treibstoffe	102,-	108,-	148,-	247,-	332,-	362,-	380,-	400,-	Figures not available	504,-	510,- estim.	510,- estim.	
Tetraethyllead / Tetraäthylblei	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,4	6,9	7,6	Figures not available	
Synthetic Rubber / Synthetischer Gummi	-	-	-	0,2	0,8	3,5	5,7	22,-	40,7	70,5	100,5	118,5	
Magnesium / Magnesium	1,1	1,3	3,4	10,8	11,6	12,-	13,-	16,6	18,4	20,7	25,1	27,4	
Aluminum / Aluminium	1,4	1,5	3,0	5,2	8,2	9,5	13,5	16,5	19,-	19,5	24,-	24,-	
Poison Gas / Kampfgas	Figures not available.												
Sulphuric Acid / Schwefelsäure	283,-	369,-	417,-	482,-	556,-	591,-	644,-	726,-	672,-	735,-	711,-	704,-	
Chlorine / Chlor	70,-	78,-	94,-	109,-	124,-	161,8	190,8	237,5	250,4	282,6	325,2	346,-	
Caustic Soda / Natronlauge	64,6	75,8	93,6	114,4	134,-	173,-	204,-	253,-	271,-	305,-	347,5	367,-	
Calcium Carbide / Kalziumkarbid	101,-	124,-	171,-	206,-	209,-	217,-	249,-	400,-	476,-	517,-	548,-	598,-	
Sodium Cyanide / Cyannatrium	2,2	2,3	2,6	3,3	4,1	4,7	4,4	7,9	7,1	7,3	7,5	7,-	
Stabilizers / Stabilisatoren	0,1	0,4	0,6	0,9	1,4	1,6	1,8	2,7	4,-	6,2	9,2	10,9	
Methanol / Methanol	13,7	16,9	19,2	25,5	92,8	104,5	86,2	86,6	116,3	152,3	185,4	246,9	179,-
Other Solvents / Andere Lösungsmittel	22,4	28,1	37,5	45,8	53,3	67,1	80,2	108,2	118,9	136,9	159,5	171,3	

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Ernst A. STRUSS, Frankfurt (Main), Gärtnerweg 59, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

I was Director of I.G. Farben, Chief of TEA Bureau of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of I.G., Manager of Division II (Sparte II) of the Verwertungsstelle II, and, since 1943, Production Manager of the entire German dyestuffs industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry.

By virtue of said offices I acquired full and complete knowledge of the "Production of Strategic Material of I.G. and I.G. controlled companies". I have been shown and have carefully examined this chart captioned "Production of Strategic Material of I.G. and I.G. controlled companies".

This chart is, to my best knowledge and belief a true and faithful representation of the topic.

I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

Dr. Ernst A. Struss

Dr. ERNST A. STRUSS

Sworn to and signed before me this 21 day of June 1947 at Frankfurt (Main) by Dr. Ernst A. Struss known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Otto Heilbrunn

Dr. OTTO HEILBRUNN

Civilian, EPO 30140. Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes US War Department.

(Page 1 of original)

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. ERNST A. STRUSS, Director of I.G. Farben, Chief of TEA Bureau of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of the Vorstand of I.G., Manager of Division II (Sparte II) of the Vermittlungsstelle W, and, since 1943, Production Manager of the entire German industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

The figures in the chart captioned, "Production of Strategic Materials by I.G. and I.G. Controlled Companies" and known as Document VI-10008, have been compiled by me in the following way:

I. The figures for the products of Division I (Sparte I) have been obtained by me from official material of I.G. This material is almost complete and only in exceptional cases was it necessary to insert estimates in the charts. The products in question of Division I are nitrogen, gasoline and tetraethyllead.

For explosives and gunpowder the production figures of the Dynamit A.G. and Verwertchemie were taken from material collected under the supervision of Mr. Helmut Deichfischer of the I.G. Control Office in Frankfurt.

For the other products which all belong to Division II, official ledger cards are available at the TEA in the I.G. Control Office in Frankfurt.

II. The chart contains the production figures for all plants of I.G., for Leuna, Baux-Schkopau, Knapsack, Dynamit A.G., Hüls, Riebeck and Goppel, Aluminum Bitterfeld and Aken. Also included is the production of Gendorf in respect to chlorine, caustic soda and

DOCUMENT NO HI - 10019
CONT'D

(Page 1 of original, cont'd)

dyglycol. Also included for chlorine is the production of Wacker
firm and finally for sulphuric acid, the production of the Schle-
busch and Kruemmel plants of the DAG.

(Page 2 of original)

III. In regard to the products enumerated in the chart I state the following:

1. Nitrogen

The chart contains the production figures for Leuna and Oppau. Since the Wifo plants processed nitrogen only without producing it, figures for these plants are not included in the chart.

2. Diglycol

The chart contains only the production figures for Ludwigs-hafen and Gendorf. Figures for Huels and Wolfen are not available.

3. Explosives and Gunpowder

The chart contains the figures for the I.G. plants Hoechst, Leverkusen, Griesheim, and for the DAG and Verwertchemie plants.

4. Synthetic Gasoline.

The production of Leuna is shown in the chart. For Heydebreck and the pilot plants at Oppau, no figures were available and no accurate estimates could be made.

5. Tetraethyllead

The figures contain the production at the Frose and Gaspel plants. The Gaspel plants appear with the full production figure in the chart since the American partner of I.G. in this enterprise had no share in the production.

6. Buna

The chart shows the production figures for Buna I, II, III and Leverkusen. The small production of a special product in the Hoechst plant is not shown in the chart.

(Page 2 of original, cont'd)

7. Magnesium

In the chart appears the production of the plants Bitterfeld,
Alcen and Stassfurt.

8. Aluminum

Only half the production in the Aluminum plants

(page 3 of the original)

Bitterfeld South, North and Aken is shown in the chart in accordance with I.G. shares in the plants.

9. Poison Gas

Production figures for Uerdingen, Falkenhagen, Gendorf and Dyhernfurt are not available and can not be estimated either.

10. Sulphuric Acid.

The chart shows the production of the I.G. plants, Hoechst, Leverkusen, Dernagen, Uerdingen, Ludwigshafen, Wolfen, Doberitz and Leuna and of the D&G plants, Schlobusch and Kruckmel.

11. Chlorine and Caustic Soda

The chart contains the production figures for I.G. plants Hoechst, Gersthofen, Leverkusen, Ludwigshafen, Rheinholden, Schkopau, Bitterfeld, Wolfen and Hoydobreck. Also included are the plants at Huels and Gendorf.

12. Calcium Carbide

The chart shows the production figures for the plants Ludwigshafen, Schkopau and Knapsack.

13. Sodium Cyanide

In the chart appears the Ludwigshafen production.

14. Stabilizers.

The chart shows the production of Uerdingen and Wolfen. The Wolfen figures are estimated.

15. Methanol.

The production of the plants Leuna, Oppau, Waldenburg, Hoydobreck and Auschwitz are shown in the chart.

(page 3 of the original cont'd.)

16. Other Solvents

The production of the following plants appear in the chart, Leuna, Hoechst, Wolfen, Ludwigshafen, Schkopau, Rheinfelden, Zweckel, Gersthofen, Offenbach, Bitterfeld, Knapsack and Huels.

(page 4 of the original)

I have carefully read each of the four pages of this declaration and have signed them personally. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them and I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

signed: Dr. Ernst A. Struss

DR. ERNST A. STRUSS

Sworn to and signed before me this 12 day of June 1947
at Frankfurt/Main by Dr. ERNST A. STRUSS known to me to be
the person making the above affidavit.

signed: Dr. Otto Heilbrunn

DR. OTTO HEILBRUNN
Civilian ETO, 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

"A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY"

Production of Strategic Material of I.G. and I.G. Controlled Companies

Produktion von wichtigen Erzeugnissen der I.G. und von der I.G. kontrollierter Gesellschaften (in 1000 tons)

Chart I

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Ernst A. STRISS, Frankfurt (Main), Gürbenweg 59, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

I was Director of I.G. Farben, Chief of TGA Bureau of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of I.G., Manager of Division II (Sparte II) of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke A.G., and, since 1943, Production Manager of the entire German dyestuffs industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry.

By virtue of said offices I acquired full and complete knowledge of the "Production of Strategic Material of I.G. and I.G. controlled Companies". I have been shown and have carefully examined this chart captioned "Production of Strategic Material of I.G. and I.G. controlled companies".

This chart is to my best knowledge and belief a true and faithful representation of the facts.

I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

Dr. Ernst A. Striss


Dr. ERNST A. STRISS

Seen, for and signed before me this 26th day of June 1947 at Frankfurt (Main) by Dr. Ernst A. Striss known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Dr. Otto Heilbrunn

Dr. OTTO HEILBRUNN

CIVILIAN, ETO 30940 Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes US War Department



Production of Strategic Material of I.G. and I.G. Controlled Companies

Production von wichtigen Erzeugnissen der I.G. und von der I.G. kontrollierter Gesellschaften. (in 1000 tons)

Chart II

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Ernst A. STROSS, Frankfurt (Main), Götzenweg 39, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

I was Director of I.G. Farben, Chief of RA Bureau of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of I.G., Manager of Division II (Sparte II) of the Vordrillmaschinenfabrik, and, since 1943, Production Manager of the entire German dyestuffs industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry.

By virtue of said offices I acquired full and complete knowledge of the "Production of Strategic Material of I.G. and I.G. controlled Companies". I have been shown and have carefully examined this chart captioned "Production of Strategic Material of I.G. and I.G. controlled Companies."

This chart is to my best knowledge and belief a true and faithful representation of the facts.

I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

Ernst A. Stross


Dr. ERNST A. STROSS

Seen to and signed before me this 26 day of June 1947 at Frankfurt (Main) by Dr. Ernst A. Stross known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Otto Heilmann

Dr. OTTO HEILMANN

CIVILIAN, LTD 3040 Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes US War Department.



Production of Strategic Material of I.G. and I.G. Controlled Companies.

Produktion von wichtigen Erzeugnissen der I.G. und von der I.G. kontrollierter Gesellschaften (in 1000 tons)

Chart III

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Ernst A. STRUSS, Frankfurt (Main), Bismarck 59, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

I am Director of I.G. Farben, Chief of KA Bureau of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of I.G., Manager of Division II (Sparte II) of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG, and, since 1933, Production Manager of the entire German Chemical Industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry.

By virtue of said offices I acquired full and complete knowledge of the "Production of Strategic Material of I.G. and I.G. controlled companies". I have been shown and have carefully examined this chart entitled "Production of Strategic Material of I.G. and I.G. controlled companies".

This chart is to my best knowledge and belief a true and faithful representation of the topic.

I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

Ernst A. Struss


Dr. ERNST A. STRUSS

Seen to and signed before me this 26 day of June 1947 at Frankfurt (Main) by Dr. Ernst A. Struss known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

G. H. Hillman

Dr. G. H. HILLMAN

CIVILIAN, ESO 30740 OFFICE of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes US War Department



THE WEHRMACHT'S DEPENDENCE ON I.G. FARBEN'S PRODUCTION (1943)

Abhängigkeit der Wehrmacht von der Produktion der I.G. Farben (1943)

Production in 1000 Metric Tons

	1943		1943
	I.G.	Germany Deutschland	I.G.'s share in % I.G. Anteil in %
Nitrogen (N) / Stickstoff (N) (Ammonia and Calcium Cyanamide) / (Ammoniak und Kalkstickstoff)	600	800	75
Diglycol / Diglykol	11.2	?	?
Explosives / Sprengstoffe	221	263	34
Gunpowder / Schiesspulver	132	188	70
Synthetic Gasoline / Synthet. Treibstoff..	850	2600	33
Lubricating Oil / Synthet. Schmieröl ..	60	60	100
Tetraethyllead / Tetraäthylblei	7.6	7.6	100
Synthetic Rubber / Synthet. Gummi	118	118	100
Magnesium / Magnesium	27.4	30.9	88
Aluminum / Aluminium	24	300	8
Poison Gas / Kampfgas	?	?	95
Sulphuric Acid / Schwefelsäure	707	2000	35
Chlorine / Chlor	346	620	56
Caustic Soda and Potash / Natron- und Kali- lauge	367	1026	36
Calcium Carbide / Kalziumkarbid	830	1370	61
Sodium Cyanide / Cyannatrium	6.9	12.1	52
Stabilizers / Stabilisatoren	10.9	10.9	100
Methanol / Methanol	247	251	100
Other Solvents / Andere Lösungsmittel.	171	228	75
Plasticizers / Weichmacher	27.9	30.4	92
Organic Intermediates . / Organ. Zwischenprod.	1489	1650	90
New Synthetic Plastics / Neue synthetische Kunststoffe	57	63.9	90
Pharmaceuticals / Pharmazeutika	4.4	8	55
Insecticides and Fungicides / Pflanzenschutzmittel.	24.6	45	55
Synthetic Resins / Synthet. Lackharze ..	29.9	55.9	53
Spun Rayon / Zellwolle	53	189	28
Artificial Silk / Kunstseide	17	72	24
Dyestuffs / Farbstoffe	31.7	32.5	98
Synthetic Tannings / Synthet. Gerbstoffe .	30.1	32	94

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Ernst A. STRUSS, Frankfurt (Main), Südringweg 30, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:
I was Director of I.G. Farben, Chief of REA-Bureau of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of I.G., Manager of Division II (Sparte II) of the Verwaltungsstelle 8, and, since 1943, Production Manager of the entire German dyestuffs industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry. By virtue of said offices I acquired full and complete knowledge of the production figures of I.G. and I.G. controlled companies. The figures "Total German Production" are estimated and a result of my investigations. This chart is to my best knowledge and belief a true and faithful representation of the topic. I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

Ernst A. Struss

Dr. ERNST A. STRUSS

Seems to me signed before me this 22nd day of June 1947 at Frankfurt (Main) by Dr. Ernst A. Struss known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Walter Heilbrunn

Dr. WALTER HEILBRUNN

Civilian, ETO 301, Office of Chief of Counsel for the Crime & War Department

EXCERPTS FROM
THE UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

POWDER, EXPLOSIVES, SPECIAL
ROCKETS AND JET
PROPELLANTS, WAR CASES
AND SMOKE ACID

OIL DIVISION

January 1947

- Page 1: Para.2. From 1933, explosives and powder manufacturing capacity was expanded practically continuously until the end of the war by the construction of government owned plants. Capacity for the manufacture of war cases, smoke acid and special propellants was similarly expanded up to the last few months of the war.
4. With regard to the essential raw materials, such as methanol, ammonia, ethylene oxide, toluene, etc., the Germans were not as far sighted. They depended largely on chemical manufacturers for these materials, and production was concentrated mainly in a few large chemical plants, such as Leuna, Ludwigshafen-Opau, Linz, Hydrebreck and Waldenburg. Apparently the Germans depended almost entirely on their large existing production capacity for raw materials and intermediates, as little or no stocks were accumulated in preparation for the war. This was the most vulnerable part of the entire set-up.
5. By suppressing the manufacture of methanol and ammonia the intensive bombing attacks on the important hydrogenation plants producing aviation gasoline at Leuna, Opau and Hydrebreck has a profound effect on Germany's powder and explosives production. This was an unintentional and unrecognized bonus of the attacks on oil. In spite of extreme measures (including the dilution of high explosives with inert extenders, such as rock salt, to the extent of 60 to 70 per cent by weight, with consequent depreciation in effectiveness) a serious shortage in munitions occurred. In February 1945, munitions output had dropped to about one-third of that in October 1944. In particular there were critical shortages in ammunition for field artillery and flak. This, of course, meant less resistance for our bombers.

Excerpts from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey
-1- (cont'd)

Page 1: Para. 6. The bombing of the large chemical plants resulted in a sharp decrease in the production of smoke acid and thereby limited the Germans' ability to screen their vital installations from view of our bombers.

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Excerpts from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey
- 2 - (cont'd)

- Page 2: Para 11. German Air Force Staff, Plans Division No 1337/44. 25 April 1944. "The production of nitrogen, methanol, Buna and fuel are critical points of attack. These are basic materials which are inherently bottlenecks, due to the huge quantities required, together with the fact that they are manufactured in a very large plants. Within the chemical sector these might be first choice for a 'short term' target."
12. "About 30 per cent of the production of nitrogen is concentrated in the two large plants at Leuna and Oppau (near Ludwigshafen) and 15 per cent to 20 per cent in three other plants in the Ruhr area; accordingly more than 75 per cent is concentrated in the five plants mentioned. In the course of this year, Heydebreck (Upper Silesia) will be added to these, with another 20 per cent.
13. "A very great part of the production of powder and explosives depends upon nitrogen; as well as the synthetic fertilizer supply for agriculture ... The supply situation in both cases is seriously strained. Methanol production is distributed as follows: 60 per cent at Leuna, 15 per cent at Oppau, 25 per cent at Heydebreck; this year Auschwitz (Upper Silesia) will be added to these with a percentage equal to that of Heydebreck. Methanol is a basic material for the manufacture of explosives, hexogen and toluol..."
- Page 3: 18. Memo of conference with Dr. Ritter of Gebchem on 31 October 1944: "Fears for the future are therefore concentrated primarily upon the nitrogen methanol plants. In this respect the explosives supply is most susceptibly endangered, by far more than through possible attacks upon the explosives plants themselves. With nitrogen and methanol only a small number of great plants of higher sensitivity to air attack are involved."
- Page 4: 22. It is believed that a serious mistake was made in not selecting ammonia and explosives plants as primary targets. Elimination of either of them at earlier stages of the war would undoubtedly have meant an earlier defeat of Germany. It is difficult to understand why these targets were neglected. Destruction of the productive capacity of hydrogen peroxide plants, of which there were only two, would also have seriously affected the capacity of the Germans to wage rocket war.

Excerpts from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey
- 3 - (cont'd)

Page 4: POWDER AND HIGH EXPLOSIVE INDUSTRY

1. Foreward

- a. For a clear appreciation of the effect of strategic bombing on the German powder and explosives industry, a knowledge of the interrelation of this industry with, and dependence upon, the synthetic ammonia, methanol and oil industry is necessary. Methanol and ammonia are important raw materials, as shown in Exhibit R in the Appendix. These three synthetic manufactures were all high pressure processes which required a source of large volumes of hydrogen of a high degree of purity, using the same type of equipment. In fact the same equipment was used for the production of methanol and ammonia in some German plants, and in several cases all three processes were conducted in the same works. The bulk of the ammonia and methanol syntheses was concentrated in a few plants. In certain plants, it was planned, when the synthetic oil facilities were installed, that they should be dependent in part, on hydrogen capacity installed previously for ammonia production, when full capacity ammonia operation was not required. For this reason, in such plants there was insufficient hydrogen production capacity to operate to capacity all three syntheses simultaneously. Consequently synthetic ammonia production never reached the full capacity for which the plant was designed. Hydrogen was allocated to the three syntheses according to the relative demands for the products at the time. At that plant, aviation gasoline was given priority until November 1944, when ammonia was given a top priority.

- Page 4 & 5 b. The production of powder and explosives was bound to the manufacture of synthetic ammonia and methanol in three ways. All the principal explosives and propellants (exceptions were the initiating or primary explosives, lead azide and stychnate, and mercury fulminate) depended on nitric acid or nitrates in one form or another for their production. Synthetic ammonia was the main raw material for the production of nitration grade nitric acid. Two of the most modern and effective explosives, hexogen and penta, required formaldehyde, which in turn was made from methanol, which was also used in important quantities for the synthesis of toluene for TNT. In the first half of 1944, about 36 per cent of the total synthetic ammonia and 41 per cent of the methanol went to the produc-

Excerpts from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey
- 3 - (cont'd)

tion of explosives and propellants. The principal competitor for ammonia was the fertilizer industry.

Page 5 c. When the large synthetic oil and chemical plants were bombed with the object of knocking out

Excerpts from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey
- 4 - (cont'd)

- Page 5: c. synthetic oil production, ammonia and methanol production suffered directly by destruction of equipment and indirectly by shift of priority of production and repair to oil. As a result the explosives industry was brought practically to a standstill by the bombing of four large chemical plants (Leuna, Oppau, Linz, Heydebreck) just as certainly and with less effort than had the 12 large plants making concentrated nitric acid, the 35 powder and explosive plants, or the 5000 munitions plants been bombed.
- Page 6: d. Complete detailed data for production, imports and exports of powder and explosives during the period 1918 to 1932 were not obtained, but it was estimated by Dr. Dickmann, of Gebechem, and by the British Economic Advisory Branch, Ministry of Economic Warfare, that the volume of production ranged from approximately 1000 to 2000 tons per month. The Haslock plant was permitted to produce sporting powders to the extent of about 49 tons per month and the Schlebusch plant 1000 tons per month of TNT and 800 tons per month of nitroglycerin.
- Page 8: 1. The table and chart comprising Exhibit C show the progress of the actual expansion from 1933 to the end of the war. In the four years 1934 to 1938 the powder production capacity had been increased to 5000 tons per month and total explosives capacity to 13,500 tons per month, including about 5500 tons of pure high explosives and 8000 tons of extenders, principally ammonium nitrate. A fair amount of new construction was included in this increase. Actual production was appreciably below the nominal capacity (2000 tons per month powder and 2700 tons per month pure high explosives estimated in 1939 Gebechem production curves). By operation of this expanding capacity from 1933 to the beginning of the war, a stock of 187,000 tons of powder was accumulated.
- Page 9: k. The expansion of the explosive industry is further reflected in the labor requirements for operation as follows:
- | | |
|------|----------------|
| 1934 | 1,000-2,000 |
| 1938 | 30,000 |
| 1944 | 50,000-100,000 |

Excerpts from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey
- 5 - (cont'd)

- Page 11: t. The main technical advances to eliminate dependence on imports of raw materials were: (1) the development of DEGN (diethyleneglycoldinitrate) as a substitute for nitroglycerin in propellant manufacture, (2) the development of a process for the synthesis of toluene from benzene and methanol, (3) the adoption of the shell process for the synthesis of glycerin, and (4) the development of new and more economical processes for the manufacture of hexogen. Owing to the shortage of fats and animal and vegetable oils in Germany, a shortage of glycerin existed from the beginning of the armament program. This was alleviated mainly by the substitution of diglycol, which could be made from coal and limestone, and partly by synthesis of glycerin from isopropyl alcohol. Two plants for the synthesis of glycerin were constructed, one at Osau and one at Heydebreck. Although the bulk of double-base powders was made with diethyleneglycol dinitrate instead of nitroglycerin, 100 tons of glycerin per month, out of a total German production of 500-900 tons per month, was allocated to powder manufacture in early 1944.
- u. The shortage of toluene was further alleviated by the adoption of hexogen, which could be made from synthetic methanol and ammonia, as a high explosive. According to German reports it had certain advantages, being sufficiently insensitive for use in armorpiercing ammunition and reportedly 2.25 times as effective as TNT.
- v. Another important class of raw materials for powders is the so-called stabilizers -- diphenalimine, diphenylurethane, ethylphenylurethane, akardites and centralities -- which plasticize nitrocellulose and neutralize traces of acid which would promote its decomposition. The production of these stabilizers was to a large extent concentrated in two plants, one in Wolfen and the other in Urdingen, each having a capacity of 550 tons per month. According to Dr. Dickmann, no stocks of these materials existed after 1941. However, one letter found in the Speer Ministry documents stated that a supply of 1500-2000 tons, sufficient for two to three months, was available in September 1944.
- Page 12: y. Technical men were provided and trained for the operation of the new plants by the industrial firms, DAG, WASAG, and IG, who were to operate them. Many foreign laborers and as many as 350 trained chemists, physicists and engineers were procured from Russia, Poland, etc., at first on a voluntary basis. Foreign labor ran as high as 50 to 60 per cent later in the war.

Excerpts from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey
- 6 - (cont'd)

Page 50: 3. The "X-stoff" Program in Preparation for War

- a. There is evidence of development work on war gases by I.G. Farbenindustrie prior to 1939 as I.G. correspondence revealed a controversy over inventorship concerning Michlost, presumably a form of mustard gas. The I.G. plant at Leverkusen shipped thionyl chloride for the manufacture of poison gas as early as 1938 (21 tons) to Ammendorf, the site of a World War I war gas factory. Correspondence found by CIOS in the files of Dr. TER MEER, the TEA Dept. and the Law Dept. of I.G. shows that a definite plan for the participation of I.G. in the development of the German war gas program was drawn up at a conference in Berlin in February 1939.
- b. I.G. organized a 100 per cent subsidiary Luranil, for the construction of plants and another one, Anorgana, for their operation. These were in reality cover names to conceal ownership and partly to relieve I.G. of responsibility, but the capital was owned by I.G. This firm also provided the key personnel. Montan, the government-owned corporation which functioned under control of OKW as shown already in Exhibit A, erected many of the plants with government funds and normally with the assistance of Organization Todt. Montan held title to such plants and leased them for operation to I.G. or other subsidiaries on contracts of three types: (a) lease of property to subsidiary of the industrial firm, (b) management contract with industrial subsidiary on a cost-plus-fee basis, (c) grant or loan to subsidiary for erecting uneconomic plants for war purposes. Montan was controlled by government officials, and Luranil and Anorgana by a mixed board of I.G. and government officials. Exhibit CA shows how the war gas activities (C-Program) fitted into the PSV Program.

- Page 51:
- c. Apparently I.G. did considerable research and development work on poison gases in its own laboratories.
 - d. In September, 1939, OKW requested I.G. to proceed as rapidly as possible with operations at Dyhernfurth, using a process stated to have been developed in Reich laboratories in Spandau and Reichkrug. The Orange Plan which provided for the expansion of war gas capacity to 15,000 metric tons per month was adopted 25 November 1939, but was abandoned in favor of more modest plans a few months later. Plans for phosphoric shell filling plant at Wolfen were under way in December 1939. In March 1940, conferences were held concerning a plant to be built in Gendorf and to apply a process developed by I.G. Subsequent planning

Excerpts from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey
- 7 - (cont'd)

Page 51: d. was continuous and ever expanding until about mid-1944 when the program was seriously curtailed by shortage of labor, apparently as a result of loss of personnel to the Jager airplane program and the Gallenberg repair and reconstruction agency, both of which had higher priority. The program was, however, not entirely stopped at that time.

4. The Program during the War Years.

b. Apparently I.G. furnished the trained technical and supervisory personnel for the operation of the plants, and both war and political prison laborers were used. Two thousand were employed at Dyhrenfurth. There appear to have been many arguments between I.G. and government officials over the suitability of such laborers for controlling the dangerous operations involved.

Page 52:

c. The following older and well-known war gases were made: (1) Mustard Gas (Lst, OL, DL) was made at the plant at Gendorf by two different processes. The plant was intended to use the Direct Process (Levinstein-DL) from ethylene and sulfur chloride, but the product was so unstable that the plant was converted to the Indirect Process (Chiodiglyool-OL) based on ethylene oxide. The plant at Gendorf started with carbide from Knapsack and acetylene was made from that. Electrolytic chlorine and sulfur were the other raw materials.

(2) Rosgene (Ocl F) was made conventionally as was Chloracetophenone (C-Salz) and Adamsite (Azin). Azin was made at Uerdingen near Krefeld. From August 1940 to October 1944, at least 3600 tons were made. CTSCIOS representatives were informed that it was mixed with a liquid toxic material and filled into projectiles.

d. The following new materials were developed:

(1) Arsinool (A-Dil) was made from aniline, arsenic and chlorine. It was further processed to make Clark (Cl), and was also mixed with mustard to make winter-lost (OK!) a low freezing-point mustard. Clark I, was diphenylarsin-chloride and Clark II was diphenylarsinocyanide. Another agent of this type was diphenylaminarsinocyanide.

(Page 8 of the original)

Excerpts from the United States Strategic Bombing
Survey - 8- (cont'd)
Page 52: d.

- (2) Nitrogen mustard (T9) was made from ethylene oxide, ammonia and chlorine.
- (3) Sarin and Tabun were fluoro and cyano phosphates, respectively. They were made from phosphorus oxychloride. Sarin was rated by the Germans as six times as effective as Tabun. They were very toxic and very insidious in that they possessed practically no odor. They were Germany's main contribution to war gas development in this war.

f. Other war gases made in small quantities were T-150 (cyanogen chloride), and T-155 (Hydrocyanic Acid).

Page 53: h. Also included in the C-Program were activated charcoal for gas masks, Decontaminants 40, (trichlor cyanuric acid), weapons decontaminant WEH, a solution of methyl sulfonamid dichloride in trichloroethyl phosphate, bleaching powder, Losantin (high test bleach tablets), decontaminating ointment, and sodium bisulfate (for decontaminating nitrogen mustard).

Page 54: q. Records show that the war gas program was seriously handicapped by indirect effects of the bomber offensive, such as shortages of raw materials and coal, and transportation difficulties. Taking mustard, which was recognized as the most important war gas, for example, the thiodi-lycol process was generally adopted after early experience with the direct process (ethylene and sulfur chloride) resulted in a product having inadequate storage stability. The direct process, which consumed only about one-fifth as much chlorine as the thiodi-lycol process was preferred from the manufacturing standpoint. The thiodi-lycol process competed with lycol anti-freeze and double base powder (POL Pulver) manufacturers for the important raw material, ethylene oxide.

Page 56: 5. Smoke Screen Materials:

- a. The main smoke agent used by the German army and for the screening of industrial plants and military installations was Nebelsaure, a mixture of chlorosulfonic acid and sulfur trioxide. I.G. at Leverkusen developed an apparatus used exclusively for shore installations by the German navy for producing fogs from this mixture.

(Page 8 of the original cont'd)

- b. Leverkusen produced the smoke acid in quantities as follow:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Tons</u>
1939	111	1943	6513
1940	0	1944	5400
1941	0	1945	155
1942	1811		

(page 1 of the original)

Excerpts from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey -
- 9 - (cont'd)

Page 56 c. The production was greatly expanded during the war, and plants were constructed with capacities about as follows:

Page 37:	Planned capacity for 1945 tons per month	actual capacity end 1944 tons per month
	-----	-----
Leverkusen (not finished)	3,500	800
Hochst	2,500	1,500 x
Lucidshafen	1,500	800 x
Hofien (new plant)	1,000	800
Loospiersum	2,000	800 x
Luna	300	300
Fahlberg List, Magdeburg	2,400	2,400
V. Heyden, Weissen	700	700
Sollwelle Schwarza	2,000	-
	-----	-----
Total	15,900 tons per month	8,100 tons per month

(Page 10 of the original)

Excerpts from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey
- 10 (cont'd)

POWDER, EXPLOSIVES AND EXHIBIT C
FINISHED PRODUCTS

Flake - Powder for Howitzers.

a) for Propellants

- 1) 35.80 % Diglykol
65.65 % Nitrocellulose (N - 13 %)
0.50 % Akardit
0.05 % Magnesiumoxyd

- 2) 44.50 % Diglykol
54.40 % Nitrocellulose (N - 13 %)
0.50 % Akardit
0.05 % Magnesiumoxyd
0.05 % Graphit
0.50 % K₂SO₄

- 3) 31.12 % Diglykol —
38.03 % Nitrocellulose (N - 13%)
30.00 % Nitroguanidin
8.50 % Akardit
0.10 % Graphit
0.25 % Magnesiumoxyd

b) for primary charges

- a) 44.37 % Nitroglycerin
54.23 % Nitrocellulose (N - 13 %)
1.50 % Akardit
8.05 % Magnesiumoxyd
0.05 % Graphit

Maceroni - Powder for Guns (Nitroguanidin - Base)

a) Powder for 750 Calories for 8.8 on Flak at

41 H.E. Shell.

- 18.64 % Diglykoldinitrat
- 43.51 % Nitrocellulose (N - 12 %)
- 30.00 % Nitroguanidin
- 3.75 % Äthylphenylurethan
- 5.25 % Diphenylurethan
- 0.25 % Magnesiumoxyd
- 0.10 % Graphit
- 0.50 % Akardit

(Page 10 of the original cont'd)

b) Powder with 730 Calories for 8.8 cm Flak Al Armor

Piercing.

16.92	%	Diglykoldinitrat
39.48	%	Nitrocellulose (N - 12 %)
30.00	%	Nitroguanidin
5.00	%	Aethylphenylurethan
4.25	%	Dyphenylurethan
0.25	%	Magnesiumoxyd

(Page 11 of the original)

Excerpts from the United States Strategic Bombing
Survey - 11 - (cont'd)POWDER, EXPLOSIVES AND EXHIBIT Q
RELATED PRODUCTSPowder with 750 Calories for 8.8 cm Flak 41 Armor Piercing0.10 % Graphit
4.00 % ENO 3

Macaroni - Powder for Guns (extruded) (Diglykol-Base).

a) Powder with 825 calories for 8.8 cm Flak 18 and
s. 10 cm k 18.29.00 % Diglykol
47.65 % Nitrocellulose (N - 12 %))
3.00 % Centralit
0.25 % Magnesiumoxyd
8.10 % Graphitb) Powder with 870 calories for 8.7 cm Flak and
3.7 cm Flak.29.23 % Diglykol
68.22 % Nitrocellulose (N - 12 %))
1.70 % Centralit
0.50 % Akardit
0.25 % Magnesiumoxyd
0.10 % Graphitc) Powder with 700 calories, none Flashless, for
S.F.H. 12.26.72 % Diglykol
62.33 % Nitrocellulose (N-12 %))
6.00 % Centralit
1.80 % Vaseline
0.80 % Phthalate
0.25 % Magnesiumoxyd
0.10 % Graphitd) Do Flashless for 8.10 cm K 18.7.50 % Centralit
61.53 % Nitrocellulose (N-12 %))
7.50 % Centralit
1.80 % Vaseline
0.65 % Phthalate
0.75 % Magnesiumoxyd
0.10 % Graphit
2.00 % K₂SO₄

(Page 11 of the original cont'd)

c) Powder with 730 calories for 8.8 cm Flak.

27.47	%	Dialykol
64.08	%	Nitrocellulose (N-12 %)
5.35	%	Centrolit
1.25	%	Valoline
0.90	%	Phthalate
0.25	%	Magnesiumoxyd
0.10	%	Graphit

(Page 12 of the original)

Excerpts from the United States Strategic Survey
- 12 - (cont'd)

POWDER, EXPLOSIVES AND RELATED PRODUCTS EXHIBIT

New-Powders (to utilize the waste materials)

a) Powder with 730 calories for 3.8 cm Fleck and other guns

14.83	%	Dilykoldinitrat
69.92	%	Nitrocellulose (N-12 %)
10.00	%	Dinitrotoluol
2.00	%	Alphanitronaphthalin
3.00	%	Centralit
0.15	%	Magnesiumoxyd
0.10	%	Graphit

b) Powder with 730 calories for all important guns.

25.95	%	Dilykoldinitrat
60.55	%	Nitrocellulose (N-12 %)
3.00	%	Hydrocellulose
4.00	%	Dinitrotoluol
2.50	%	Alphanitronaphthalin
3.75	%	Centralit
0.15	%	Magnesiumoxyd
0.10	%	Graphit

c) Powder with 720 calories for all kinds of guns.

18.85	%	Dilykoldinitrat
44.00	%	Nitrocellulose (N-12 %)
20.00	%	Nitroguanidin
3.50	%	Dinitrotoluol
2.00	%	Alphanitronaphthalin
1.50	%	Aethylphenylurethan
1.50	%	Diphenylurethan
0.40	%	Akerdit
4.00	%	Hydrocellulose
0.15	%	Magnesiumoxyd
0.10	%	Graphit
4.00	%	ENO ₃

Rockets - Munition

1) Powder with 900 calories for all Mortars

35.55	%	Dilykoldinitrat
60.17	%	Nitrocellulose (N-12,60 %)
1.50	%	Hydrocellulose
1.40	%	Aethylphenylurethan
1.00	%	Diphenylurethan
0.35	%	IG-Tachs E
0.25	%	Magnesiumoxyd
0.80	%	KNO ₃

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(Page 13 of the original)

Excerpts from the United States Strategic Bombing
Survey -13- (cont'd)POWDER, EXPLOSIVES AND EXHIBIT Q
RELATED PRODUCTS2) Powder with 865 calories for 30 cm Mortars

34.82 % Diälykoldinitrat
59.036 Nitrocellulose (N-12.60 %)
3.00 % Hydrocellulose
1.90 % Äthylphanylurethan
0.50 % Vaseline
0.50 % Akardit
0.25 % Magnesiumoxyd

Macroni Powder for Navy Guns.a) Powder with 820 calories for important Navy Guns.

25.27 % Diälykoldinitrat
69.38 % Nitrocellulose (N-12.2%)
5.00 % Centralit
0.25 % Magnesiumoxyd
0.10 % Graphit

b) Powder with 730 calories for important Navy Guns

23.87 % Diälykoldinitrat
65.65 % Nitrocellulose (N - 12.2)
9.00 % Centralit
1.25 % Phthalate
0.25 % Magnesiumoxyd
0.10 % Graphit

c) Do, to save Centralite, by replacement with
Alphanitronaphthalin.

23.94 % Diälykoldinitrat
65.71 % Nitrocellulose (Np12.2%)
7.00 % Alphanitronaphthalin
2.50 % Centralit
0.50 % Akardit
0.25 % Magnesiumoxyd
0.10 % Graphit

c) Powder with 650 calories propellants for Star shells.

25.10 % Triälykol
58.55 % Nitrocellulose (N-12.2 %)
12.00 % Centralit
0.25 % Magnesiumoxyd
0.10 % Graphit
4.00 % K₂SO₄

(Page 14 of the original)

Excerpts from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey-
14--(cont'd)
POWDER, EXPLOSIVES AND RELATED PRODUCTS EXHIBIT Q

Incarni Powder for Navy Guns

a) Powder with 820 calories for 5.7 cm SKC/32.

71.75 %	Diallyldinitrat
35.50 %	Nitrocellulose (N-12.2 %)
40.00 %	Nitroguanidin
0.50 %	Akadit
0.70 %	Aethylphenylurethan
0.70 %	Diphenylurethan
0.25 %	Magnesiumoxyd
0.10 %	Graphit
0.50 %	K ₂ SO ₄

b) Powder with 730 calories for most important Navy Guns

18.20 %	Kinglyoldinitrat
42.45 %	Nitrocellulose (N-12 %)
25.00 %	Nitroguanidin
4.50 %	Diphenylurethan
4.50 %	Aethylphenylurethan
0.25 %	Magnesiumoxyd
0.10 %	Graphit
5.00 %	K ₂ CO ₃

sign: Signature

I, Norris, Amchen, U.S. Civilian
D-229649, certify that the above
is a true and correct copy of
excerpts taken from the United
States Strategic Bombing Survey
POWDER, EXPLOSIVES, SPECIAL
ROCKETS AND JET PROPELLANTS, AND
GASES AND SMOKE ACID (Ministerial)
Report No. 1)
Oil Division
January 1947
which is located

handwritten:
in Office of Deputy Chief of Counsel
at Nürnberg.

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY

- 14 -

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(handschr.) GIG/4 III

THE UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY


POWDER, EXPLOSIVES, SPECIAL
ROCKETS AND JET
PROPELLANTS, WAR GASES
AND SMOKE ACID

(MINISTERIAL REPORT No. 1)

OIL DIVISION

JANUARY 1947

EFFECTIVE PRODUCTION CAPACITY
REACHED AT THE END OF THE YEAR IN THOUSANDS OF TONS
PER MONTH



A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY

- 2 -
END

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Excerpts from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey:

p.35

32. The really serious loss in powder and explosives production came as an indirect effect of the destruction of the large synthetic oil, ammonia, and methanol plants at Leuna, Oppau, Linz and Heydebreck. The primary object of these attacks was the destruction of the synthetic fuel production. Ammonia and methanol curtailment was an unintended and unexpected bonus. These attacks resulted in shortages of Hoko nitric acid, methanol, formaldehyde, hexamine, penta-erythritol, toluene and ammonium nitrate, which cut explosives production to one third and powder production to one half in the period July 1944 to February 1945.

p.60

Acardit	Diphenylurea
Centralit I	Diethyldiphenylurea
Centralit II	Dimethyldiphenylurea
Di - DNB	Dinitrobenzene
DNP	Dinitrophenol
DNT	Dinitrotoluene
Hexa	Hexanitrodiphenylamine
Hexogen	Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine
NC	Nitrocellulose
Ng1	Nitroglycerin
Ptn, Penthryt, Nitropente	Pentaerythritoltetranitrate
Tetra-Tetryl	Trinitrophenylmethylnitramine
Guni	Guanidin Nitrate
Nigu-G Salz	Nitroguanidin
Pol-Powder	Solvent-less Powder -Double Base Powder
Degn	Dinitrodiglycol
P.H. Salt	Ethylenediaminedinitrate ?
S.H. Salt	Potassium salt of methyleneamino-sulfonic acid
T-Stoff	82-85% Hydrogen Peroxide

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DOCUMENT NO. NI-10580
(EXCERPTS) CONTINUED

B-Stoff	Hydrazine Hydrate
Z-Stoff-C	Calcium Permanganate
Z-Stoff-N	Sodium Permanganate
K-Stoff	Gas warfare material
Cherrystone (Kirschstein)	V2 Flying Bombs

Excerpts from the United States Bombing Survey:

EXHIBIT C- 1

CAPACITIES IN POWDER AND EXPLOSIVES INDUSTRIES

Capacities Actually Reached

Figures extrapolated from actual production figures and planning figures.

Metric tons per month

	<u>1934</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1936</u>	<u>1937</u>	<u>1938</u>	<u>1939</u>
Powders	1,000	2,000	3,000	4,000	5,000	6,500
Explosives	2,000	3,000	4,000	4,500	5,500	8,000
Extenders	4,000	4,000	4,000	5,000	8,000	12,000
Nitric acid Hoko	10,000	12,000	14,000	16,000	20,000	26,000
	<u>1940</u>	<u>1941</u>	<u>1942</u>	<u>1943</u>	<u>1944</u>	<u>1945</u>
	9,000	11,000	15,000	18,000	25,000	28,000
	12,000	16,000	20,000	24,000	27,000	34,000
	15,000	17,000	22,000	30,000	35,000	43,000
	33,000	35,000	46,000	54,000	65,000	70,000

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Excerpts from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey:

p. 21 a

POWDER, EXPLOSIVES AND RELATED PRODUCTS

Table 9

		<u>HOUSARE</u> (tons per month)		Berlin, 3 March 1944
		<u>Production</u>	<u>Military use</u>	<u>Industrial use</u>
1938	I	15,900	10,900	5,000
	II	13,000	8,000	5,000
	III	15,500	10,500	5,000
	IV	17,000	12,000	5,000
1939	I	17,600	12,600	5,000
	II	19,600	14,600	5,000
	III	18,100	13,100	5,000
	IV	23,300	18,300	5,000
1940	I	21,000	16,000	5,000
	II	24,000	19,000	5,000
	III	29,000	24,000	5,000
	IV	26,500	21,500	5,000
1941	I	28,000	23,000	5,000
	II	33,500	28,500	5,000
	III	36,500	31,500	5,000
	IV	39,300	34,300	5,000
1942	I	35,300	30,300	5,000
	II	39,300	34,300	5,000
	III	41,800	36,800	5,000
	IV	56,500	51,800	4,700
1942	I	62,000	56,650	5,350
	II	70,000	64,750	5,250
	III	66,000	61,050	4,950
	IV	72,000	66,900	5,100

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END

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G16/4 #111

THE UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

POWDER, EXPLOSIVES, SPECIAL
ROCKETS AND JET
PROPELLANTS, WAR GASES
AND SMOKE ACID

(MINISTERIAL REPORT No. 1)


OIL DIVISION

JANUARY 1947

W 31639

EFFECTIVE PRODUCTION CAPACITY

REACHED AT THE END OF THE YEAR IN THOUSANDS OF TONS PER MONTH



1508

M1-10570

Investments in 18 Strategic Materials of IG and IG controlled companies.

Ausgaben der IG und von der IG kontrollierter Gesellschaften für 18 wichtige Erzeugnisse. (in Million RM.)

Chart I

371 2487

I, Dr. Ernst A. STRUSS, Frankfurt (Main), Germany, do hereby certify that I will be liable for publication for making a false statement, shall have with me the original, or by the first of the following:

I was Director of I.G. Farben, Chief of I.G. Bureau of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of I.G., Manager of Division II (Chemicals) of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke A.G., and, since 1941, Production Manager of the entire German Synthetic Industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry.

By virtue of said offices I acquired full and complete knowledge of the investments in 18 Strategic Materials of I.G. and I.G. controlled companies. I have been shown and have carefully examined this chart captioned "Investments in 18 Strategic Materials of I.G. and I.G. controlled companies".

This chart is to my best knowledge and belief a true and faithful representation of the facts.


I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth in the best of my knowledge and conscience.

Dr. Ernst A. Struss
Dr. ERNST A. STRUSS

Seen to and signed before me this 20 day of June 1947 at Frankfurt (Main) by Dr. Ernst A. Struss known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Otto Heilmann
Dr. OTTO HEILMANN

CIVILIAN, ETO 30940 Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes IS War Department



Investments in 18 Strategic Materials of I.G. and I.G. controlled companies

Ausgaben der I.G. und von der I.G. kontrollierter Gesellschaften für 18 wichtige Erzeugnisse (in Million RM)

Chart I

EXHIBIT

I, Dr. Ernst A. STRÖB, Frankfurt (Main), Germany, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

I am Director of I.G. Farben, Chief of the Sales of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of I.G., Manager of Division II (Chemicals) of the I.G. (Frankfurt/Main), and, since 1933, Production Manager of the entire German Synthetic Industry within the framework of the I.G. Farben Group, Chief of Industry.

By virtue of said position I acquired full and complete knowledge of the investments in 18 Strategic Materials of I.G. and I.G. controlled companies. I have been thus and have carefully examined this chart entitled "Investments in 18 Strategic Materials of I.G. and I.G. controlled companies".

This chart is to my best knowledge and belief a true and faithful representation of the facts.

I declare herewith under oath that I have given the same truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

Dr. Ernst A. Ströb


Dr. ERNST A. STRÖB

Seen to and signed before me this 26 day of April 1947 at Frankfurt (Main) by Dr. Ernst A. Ströb known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Dr. Otto Hellmuth

Dr. OTTO HELLMUTH

CHIEF, PROSECUTOR OFFICE of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes (U.S. War Department)



Investments in 18 Strategic Materials of I.G. and I.G. controlled companies.

Ausgaben der I.G. und von der I.G. kontrollierter Gesellschaften für 18 wichtige Erzeugnisse. (in Million RM.)

Chart III

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Ernst A. STROSS, Frankfurt (Main), Gutenbergstr. 57, after having first been sworn that I will be liable for perjury for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

I was Director of I.G. Farben, Chief of R&D Bureau of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of I.G., Manager of Division II (Sulfuric Acid) at Industriell-Anstalt II, and, since 1943, Production Manager of the entire German dyestuffs industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry.

By virtue of said office I acquired full and complete knowledge of the "Investments in 18 Strategic Materials of I.G. and I.G. controlled companies". I have been shown and have carefully examined this chart captioned "Investments in 18 Strategic Materials of I.G. and I.G. controlled companies".

This chart is to my best knowledge and belief a true and faithful representation of the topic.

I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

Ernst A. Stross


Dr. ERNST A. STROSS

Sworn to and signed before me this 20 day of June 1947 at Frankfurt (Main) by Dr. Ernst A. Stross known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Otto Heilmann

Dr. OTTO HEILMANN

CIVILIAN, ETO 3090 OFFICE of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes US War Department



MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO. _____
CASE NO. VI
Prosecution Document Book No. XXXV

Engel



INDEX

TO

DOCUMENT BOOK XXXV

Count I - D

FARBEN PARTICIPATED IN CREATING
AND EQUIPPING THE NAZI MILITARY
MACHINE FOR AGGRESSIVE WAR.

Exhibit Document No. No.	Description of Document	Page No.
NI-9203	Affidavit of Dr. Zeidelhack, official of Army Ordnance Office, stating I.G. Farben performed most of research for development of poison gas for war.	1
NI-8980	Affidavit of Dr. Wagner, former official of I.G. Farben's Vermittlungsstelle W, re I.G.'s production of poison gas and cooperated with Army Ordnance Office.	3
NI-10557	Affidavit of von Klenck, former I.G. chemist under Ambros, re code names for different poison gases.	10
NI-9620	Affidavit of Dr. Murek, former official of Reich Ministry of Economics, listing all plants used in Germany for production of poison gas- (of 7 plants, I.G. owned or operated 6). Cf. NI-4043.	15
NI-6127 (already in evidence in Book XIII as Exhibit 356)	Audit report on Gendorf plant showing Anorgana, operator of plant, as 100 % subsidiary of I.G. Farben	17
NI-6131 (already in evidence in Book XIII as Exhibit 357)	Audit report on Dyhernfurth plant to same effect.	23
NI-5669	I.G. Farben file memorandum dated 29 April 1938 showing its participation in the Orgacid G.m.b.H. and that Farben being the technical manager of the company, was confidential. (Cf. NI-5681 for agreement between I.G. Farben and Orgacid).	



Exhibit No.	Document No.	Description of Document	Page No.
	NI-6788 (already in Book XIII - "for identification only"- as Exhibit 350)	Affidavit by defendant Ambros on I.G.'s poison gas production.	31
	NI-5929 (already in evidence in Book V as Exhibit 104)	Correspondence in October, 1933, between I.G. Farben and Reich Air Ministry re poison gas.	43
	NI-6193 (already in evidence in Book VII as Exhibit 167)	Notes in 1934 and contract in 1935 re aluminummethylchloride for use as tear gas.	45
	NI-6239	Chart " The interplacement of raw materials for the production of powder, explosives and basic materials", drawn up by the Reich Office for Armament Economic Planning as part of the report of the section raw material allocation for the balance sheets 1936.	46
	NI-5681 (already in evidence in Book XIII as Exhibit 351)	1) Contract dated 22 July 1935 between I.G. Farben, per Ambros, and Orgacid re construction of Ammendorf plant for production of ethyl-oxide (intermediate for poison gas). Secrecy clause. 2) Letter from Orgacid to I.G. Farben dated 9 August 1935 re above contract, confirming that plant will be used "exclusively" for production dichloroethylsulfide (mustard gas) 3) Contract, 22 July 1935, between I.G. Farben and controlling partners of Orgacid assuming obligations of Orgacid to I.G. Farben.	50
	NI-4695	Confidential letter from I.G. Farben Bitterfeld to I.G. Frankfurt, dated 30 June 1936, indicating I.G. Farben's participation in Ammendorf plant re production of mustard gas.	56

Exhibit No.	Document No.	Description of Document	Page No.
	NI-4490 (already in evidence in Book V as Exhibit 114)	File note of Pistor, deceased Vorstand member, on discussion with Zahn of 13 September 1936. Zahn conferred on Germany's chlorine situation with Ritter (V/W Sparte), and was apprehensive that there was insufficient chlorine for Case A. Pistor and Zahn discussed location of new calcium sulphuric acid plant and Zahn said still two more plants were needed as emergency or preparedness plants. Diglycol capacity of Ludwigshafen mentioned as sufficient for present, since all powders not yet tested. Soon I.G. Farben must increase phosgene production, etc.	57
	NI-6764 (already introduced in connection with "Plants")	Letter from I.G. Farben Ludwigshafen, 7 December 1936, re plans for construction of plant for ethylene oxide (poison gas intermediate).	59
	NI-7274	Letter, 4 March 1937, from I.G. Farben to Th. Goldschmidt re I.G.'s position in Orgacid and indicating I.G. constructed "the entire plant (Ammendorf) and have put our processes and experience at its disposal." (Copies went to Ambros, ter Meer and Wurster).	62
	NI-7275	Series of letters, March 1937, between I.G. Farben and Th. Goldschmidt re Orgacid, involving von Knieriem, Ambros, ter Meer, and Wurster.	64
	NI-4484	Copy of letter from I.G. Ludwigshafen to defendant Ambros and others with enclosure, dated 6 April 1937, on the Orgacid agreement as related to Wolfen and Ammendorf plants.	66
	NI-5692	Confidential memorandum, 31 May 1937, re conference on Orgacid (Ambros present) and I.G. discussing construction, through fictitious nominees, poison gas plants in Italy and Japan.	71
	NI-5693	Note of Vermittlungsstelle W, 14 May 1937, re subject matter of preceding document. NI-5692.	73
	NI-4707	Secret File note by I.G. passed on to the defendants ter Meer and Ambros to the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials, re Trostberg plant, dated 28 April 1937.	75

Exhibit No.	Document No.	Description of Document	Page No.
	NI-5632 (already in evidence in Book XIII as Exhibit 352)	Confidential memorandum of I.G. Farben, 13 January 1939, re Orgacid.	77
	NI-6499	Confidential letter from management department T Hoechst to Vermittlungsstelle W, concerning experiments with screening cases (Tutogen), dated 17 February 1937.	79
	NI-6500	Memorandum of I.G. Farben dated 15 September 1938 re putting Tutogen production (intermediate for mustard gas) on 3-shift per day basis.	81
	NI-4049	Copy of letter from I.G.'s Legal Department Chemicals to TEA Buero, showing that I.G. attempted to acquire in France a formula for tetrachlortitan, a carrier for poison gas, dated April, July 1937.	83
	NI-7430 (already introduced in connection with "Explosives")	Copy of letter from I.G. re standby plant for production of glycol, acetic acid, etc., signed by the defendants ter Meer and Ambros, to the Office of German Raw and Synthetic Materials.	85
	NI-8841 (already in evidence in Book X)	Files of the Reichsstelle fuer Wirtschaftsausbau, containing secret memorandum on speeding up of poison gas production, dated 30 June 1938, and mentioning available and planned capacities for poison gas production at Ludwigshafen, Huels and Ammendorf.	91
	NI-7376	Memorandum from Army High Command, 28 March 1938, re production at Trostberg standby plant for production of poison gas.	96
	NI-7379 (already in Book X as Exhibit 255)	Copy of Letter from I.G. to OKH re supply of propylenoxide (used in mixed mustard gas) to various plants, dated 15 August 1938.	99
	NI-7380 (already introduced in connection with "Explosives")	Original carbon copy of letter from I.G. signed by defendant Ambros to the OKH, re construction project Huels, dated 18 May 1938, for diglycol and oxide.	101
	NI-5687 (already introduced in connection with "Explosives" and also Book XX.)	Copy of I.G. memorandum, dated 30 June 1938, addressed to defendant Krauch, starting with: "We comply with your wish and give you personally our impressions on the execution of the expansion program for poison gas and explosives in Germany."	104

Exhibit No.	Document No.	Description of Document	Page No.
	NI-7428	Letter from Krauch's office to I.G. Ludwigshafen re diglycol plant, ethylene experiment plant, Sodingen, and E-Loat experiments, dated 26 August 1938 and also introduced in connection with "Explosives")	108
	NI-7431	Letter from defendant Krauch to defendant Ambros on ethylene, dated 10 February 1939	111
	NI-7422	Letter from I.G. Farben to defendants Ambros, Buergin and others on requirements and production of Perstoff, dated 1 August 1939.	113
	NI-6146	Cover agreement, June 1940, re Huels plant. Preamble contains recitals of earlier orders for poison gas intermediates.	120
	NI-7769 (already introduced in connection with "Rubber")	I.G. report entitled " Buna Werk Huels ", dated 22 March 1938.	127
	NI-4990	Cover agreement, July 1940, re Gendorf plant.	132
	NI-12678	Affidavit of Mr. Emil Lehmann	143
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AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Max ZEITELHACK, at present living in Munich 42, Von der Pfordtenstrasse 25, retired Ministerial Director, having been duly advised that I shall render myself liable to punishment by making a false statement, herewith depose the following on oath, voluntarily and without coercion:

1. I became an employee of the Army Ordnance Office in 1934. In the same year, I became Government Councillor and Senior Government Councillor; in 1935 I was promoted Ministerial Councillor and in 1940, Ministerial Director. I retained the latter position in the Army Ordnance Office until January 1945.

From 1938-1943, I was Department Chief (Abteilungschef) of the Industrial Administrative Department (Betriebswirtschaftliche Abteilung), which dealt with commercial problems and questions connected with contracts, arising within industry. From 1935 to January 1943, I was, in addition, the first manager of the firm "Verwertungsgesellschaft fuer Montanindustrie G.m.b.H." the stocks of which were owned by OKH.

2. OKH controlled a total of 3 research stations, namely, the Grundstuecks G.m.b.H., Steglitzerstrasse 7, for ballistics, the Development Station at Penemuende for V-2 projectiles and the Department of Research of the Army Ordnance Office (Arbeitsgruppe WaF) (Department for Development and Research) for all other special questions and research work. In theory, this last-mentioned Department was also responsible for the research work to be carried out in the field of chemical warfare agents. As they had been granted funds amounting only to approximately 300,000RM per year since 1935, however, they undertook no research work worth mentioning, nor had they any practical results to show for their work as far as I know.

The vast majority of research and development work in the field of chemical warfare agents was in the hands of the I.G. Konzern.

(p.2.) I have read carefully the 2 (two) pages of this affidavit and have countersigned them with my own hand, I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and have countersigned them with my initials and I herewith declare on oath that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, I have spoken the absolute truth in this statement.

Signature: Dr. Zeitelhack, Max

Dr. Max ZEITELHACK

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NY-9203
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

Sworn to and signed before me this 1st day of August
1947 at the Palace of Justice, Nurnberg, Germany, by
Dr. Max Zeidelhack, known to me to be the person
making the above affidavit.

Signature: Otto Heilbrunn

Dr. Otto HEILBRUNN
ETO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes.
US War Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Deryl C. DESICK Civ. No. D-427 459, hereby certify
that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and
German languages and that the above is a true and
correct translation of the document No. NY-9203
(a copy of doc.)

Deryl C. DESICK
Civ. No. D-427 459

-2-

"ENDE"

Affidavit

I, Dr. Hans WAGNER, born on 9 July 1903 in Frankfurt/Main, Chemist in the I.G. Farbenindustrie AG, from 1928-1945, Member of the Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin NW 7, present address Stierstadt/Tanus, Untergasse 10, after having been warned that I shall be liable to punishment for making a false statement, herewith declare the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion:

1. In 1928 I joined the Hoechst Werk as laboratory chemist and remained there until the middle of February 1938, when I was transferred to the Vermittlungsstelle W in Berlin. My personal dossier was, however, kept in Frankfurt from then on, at the request of Dr. TER MEER. In the Vermittlungsstelle W I took over the work relating to patents mainly for Sparte II and partly for Sparten I and III; furthermore developmental work and supplies to the Wehrmacht within the range of Sparte II.

2. All matters pertaining to poison gas were, with few exceptions classified as "Top Secret", by order of the Army Ordnance Office. At their request code words were introduced in individual cases, and these documents, which contained only these code words, were usually circulated openly; sometimes they were stamped "Secret".

The manufacture of the poison gas sarin or tabun came under the project, of which Professor HOERLEIN and Dr. SCHRADER were in charge and which was also kept secret from the Vermittlungsstelle W. Even Professor KRAUCH never informed the Vermittlungsstelle W about this project. I know that these poison gases were manufactured in Dyhernfurth, but I was never permitted by Dr. AMEROS to inspect this plant. I also know that

(page 2 of original)

the same poison gas as in Dyhernfurth was manufactured in the Seewerk Falkenhagen, half of which was Wehrmacht property; while the other half was property of the I.G. Farbenindustrie AG. But I was not informed about the negotiations which Dr. AMEROS conducted in regard to poison gas production in Dyhernfurth as well as in the Seewerk Falkenhagen.

Two men within the Vermittlungsstelle W, namely Dr. GORR and Dr. PFANDLER, know about these matters, but not in their capacity as members of the Vermittlungsstelle W. Dr. GORR was charged with representing Dr. AMEROS in Berlin in his capacity as head of the Special Committee C (Chemical Warfare and Smoke Screen Agents), and Dr. PFANDLER was in charge of the Berlin Office of this Special Committee.

With reference to the ANGRONA Gesellschaft mbH, which was mainly in charge of the manufacture of poison gases, I can say only that a direct liaison existed between their office in Ludwigshafen and the Reich Office (Reichsstellen) concerned, and that we in the

(page 2 of original cont'd)

Vermittlungsstelle W only knew about their activity in regard to the allocation of iron, steel, wood, and cement, which was required for the establishment of new plants, through our Mr. NOLZE.

3. During the years 1935 - 1945 the I.G. Farbenindustrie AG. developed the manufacturing process for the following poison gases and carried out their manufacture, in the chronological order mentioned below:

- a) O (oxol-) mustard gas
- b) Chlorine-acetophenone
- c) Nitrogen mustard gas (cover name C₆ Salt resp. C₆ base)
- d) Direct mustard gas-process
- e) Adamsite
- f) Phosgene.

(page 3 of original)

to a) O (oxol-) mustard gas:

O-mustard gas was developed by the I.G. Farbenindustrie AG. in collaboration with the High Command of the Army in 1935 in Ludwigshafen. Production places existed ever since 1938 at the firms of IONAL in Berlin and ORGAZIT at Armendorf, where, as far as I know, O-mustard gas was manufactured and stored. Reserve containers were filled there, which, as far as I know, were stored on a terrain in Munster in the Lueneburger Heide, which was at the disposal of the Air Force. From the purely organizational point of view the firms of IONAL and ORGAZIT did not belong to the I.G. Farbenindustrie AG., only from the economic point of view, Dr. ULLRICH from Ludwigshafen and Dr. AMBROS sometimes visited these two plants to advise them on the question of manufacture and storage of O-mustard gas.

Oxol, which was the last step in the manufacture of mustard gas, was for some time produced in Ludwigshafen in small quantities, which were provided for in the acetylene plan, namely approx. 60-70 tons per month, as early as 1937 or 1938, but, as far as I remember, was not converted into mustard gas in the I.G., but delivered to ORGAZIT.

The I.G. Farbenindustrie AG. has also constantly delivered small quantities of oxol, at least since 1930, for the manufacture of dyestuff pastes or for the use in paper calico printing, (Papierzeugdruck) which was known in the trade by the name of glyocin A. This preparation was also supplied abroad.

Large quantities of oxol were first produced in 1940. Furthermore the ANCRGANA/ Gendorf had an O-mustard gas plant at their disposal, which, however, was not in operation, as far as I know. But I know that in the plant at Gendorf, which belonged to the ORGAZIT, O-mustard gas was manufactured. These facts came to my knowledge through studying the files in the Vermittlungsstelle W, because all

(page 3 of original cont'd)

files in the Vermittlungsstelle W, which concerned my sphere of work, were at my disposal.

(page 4 of original)

To b) Chlorine-acetophenone:

Chlorine-acetophenone, which had the code name Omega salt within the I.G. Farbenindustrie AG. and the Wehrmacht, and which is used as tear gas, was manufactured by the I.G. Farbenindustrie AG. in quantities of 90 tons per month from 1936 - 1941 in the Ludwigshafen plant.

The production was taken over immediately after completion in the plant, paid for by the Wehrmacht and stored in a depot belonging to the Wehrmacht.

The orders for the deliveries of Omega salt were not given to us by the competent department of the Army Ordnance Office, the WaB9 (later WaJ Armament Munition 3 or WAJ Armament Munition 6, whose chiefs were successively Ministerialdirigent Dr. ZAHN, Colonel SCHMARGER and Ministerialrat Dr. EHMANN), because the Wehrmacht did not want any written documents about the supply of this product, as the supply of this product was against the Geneva Convention, which Germany had also signed, according to which manufacture to that extent was unauthorized.

The channel chosen by the Army Ordnance Office gave the impression that a member of the staff of the Army Ordnance Office became a representative of a fictitious firm, which gave its orders to the I.G. Farbenindustrie AG. and which later on also paid the bills. The name of this firm was Dr. NAUMANN with its location in Berlin-Charlottenburg. The shipments, which left Ludwigshafen, were sent to a firm of forwarding agents, consisting of former Wehrmacht officials, which in turn forwarded the goods to munition plants or army depots. The name of the forwarding agents was PANKOWER TRANSPORTGESELLSCHAFT.

All supplies of omega salt in the course of 1936 - 1941 were ordered by the firm of Dr. NAUMANN and delivered in the manner described above. The history of the firm of Dr. NAUMANN was told to me by a member of the staff of the Army Ordnance Office, Major Dr. MUELLER, who signed for the firm of Dr. NAUMANN.

(page 5 of original)

For azinsite, which was known under the cover name azin, the same arrangement holds true as for chlorine-acetophenone.

(page 5 of original cont'd)

From the middle of 1938 on the Army Ordnance Office demanded from the I.G. Farbenindustrie AG. that they too should route the entire correspondence and the execution of the omega salt and azin orders via a fictitious firm. To comply with this request the I.G. Farbenindustrie AG. founded the "Institut fuer Bodenveredelung" (Institute for Soil Improvement). I was charged with the management of the firm.

From that time on all orders, delivery arrangements, invoices and payments were directed via the two fictitious firms mentioned above, up to the time when the Army Ordnance Office decided to do their own purchasing. That was above 1942. In that year the Institut fuer Bodenveredelung was again dissolved, as it had served its purpose.

The Institut fuer Bodenveredelung, which dealt only with the two aforementioned products, had an account which the I.G. had opened on their behalf at the Reichs-Kreditgesellschaft, to which the order was applied that all incoming payments must be transferred immediately to the account of the I.G. Zentralfinanzverwaltung in Berlin NW 7.

The Institut fuer Bodenveredelung was founded at the instigation of Major Dr. MUELLER by Mr. von HEIDER in his capacity as Counter Intelligence Officer (Abwehrbeauftragter) for the firm of Grueneberg in Frankfurt/Main, especially for the sale of chemicals.

To c) Nitrogen mustard gas (cover name C₆ salt or C₆ base respectively):

The work on the development of a process for the manufacture of nitrogen mustard gas (C₆ base) or nitrogen mustard gas hydrochloride (C₆ salt) was started at the Leverkusen plant in about 1935. The names C₆ salt and C₆ base were introduced in about 1942. Until then the description UP salt or UP base was used (according to Dr. ULLRICH and Dr. PAIM from Ludwigshafen).

(page 6 of original)

The work in connection with this development led to a German patent application which at the request of the Army Ordnance Office was not published, but treated as a secret patent. I believe that if the patent had been made public it would not have been granted because its publication abroad might have impaired its novelty.

In the course of the work at Ludwigshafen an experimental plant and later on a production plant for nitrogen mustard gas hydrochloride was established, with a capacity of approx. 20 tons per month. This plant, which had at first to overcome great difficulties before it could start working, was established in 1938 and in 1939, as far as I know, produced the first large quantities. This production, I think, was kept up until 1945. The finished product

(page 6 of original cont'd)

was immediately delivered by the I.G. Farbenindustrie AG. to be converted into nitrogen mustard gas at a different place, not known to me.

I remember that in 1941 an inventors' dispute arose with the Army Ordnance Office about the part played by the officials of the Army Ordnance Office in the development of the process.

To Direct Mustard Gas Process:

The direct mustard gas process was developed in 1938/39 at Leverkusen. This method was somewhat strange, in so far as the experiments up to the Institute of Technology stage at Leverkusen were under the control of Dr. WACK and the construction of the production plant proper at Trostberg under the control of Dr. MEROZ. In the meantime a preliminary plant for direct mustard gas was maintained at Kuels.

I believe that in 1940 the agreement relating to the patents, the refunding of the experimental costs and the compensation for the inventors amounting to approx. RM 40,000.- was worked on by the Leverkusen Patent Department under Dr. REDIES,

(page 7 of original)

but that the agreement for the construction of the Gendorf or Trostberg plant was dealt with by the ANFANGA/Ludwigshafen.

To c) Adamsite:

Adamsite, which was known under the cover name azin and which was a poison gas (throat irritant), was developed by the I.G. Farbenindustrie AG. at the request of the Army Ordnance Office in 1938 at Uerdingen.

After a reliable process had been found for the manufacture of this product, and after the quality of the product obtained by this process had been approved by the Army Ordnance Office, a plant was built with temporary equipment at Uerdingen by order of the Army Ordnance Office, which could produce approx. 35 tons per month of adamsite.

The product manufactured in this plant was supplied in the manner mentioned above via the firm of Dr. NAUMANN to the Army Ordnance Office and as far as I know, stored by them.

In about 1941 the Army Ordnance Office gave the order for the construction of a large plant for the manufacture of adamsite at the Uerdingen works. This plant was built for a capacity of 150 tons per month, but could manufacture 210 tons per month. As far as I remember this plant was in operation from about 1942 to the end of 1944 and was then dismantled, with the idea of setting it up again

(page 7 of original cont'd)

in Central Germany in a place determined by the Army Ordnance Office. But I believe that this plant was not set up again. The work at Uerdingen was under the management of Dr. HABERLAND, who was at that time the works manager there, and later, after Dr. KUEHNE had been pensioned off, also took over the Leverkusen works.

As far as I know, by order of the Wehrmacht, Russian prisoners of war were to be assigned to operate the grinding mill for edensite. I believe this was done,

(page 8 of original)

because strong German workers were no longer available in sufficient numbers. In spite of gas mask protection edensite is in the long run detrimental to the human organism owing to its extremely fine form.

To f) Phosgene:

Phosgene, which, at the request of the Air Force, was given the cover name Oil F, was manufactured in large quantities in the Z plant at Wolfen, which was owned by the Reich. The Z plant was a factory built by the I.G. Farbenindustrie in 1936/37 with funds belonging to the Reich (Montangesellschaft), with production plants for glycol, diglycol, triglycol and stabilizers.

As preliminary product phosgene was constantly needed for the production of stabilizers, and the phosgene plant was then expanded at the request of the Air Force, to carry out the deliveries for them. Furthermore, by order of the Air Force and at the expense of the Reich, an emptying contrivance for phosgene was built at about the beginning of 1940 on the terrain of the Z plant, which made it possible to fill the liquid phosgene under pressure directly into aerial bombs. On the same terrain was also a building, which contained a plant for filling phosgene into grenades for the Army Ordnance Office. This plant, however, was not completed and was not used.

The I.G. Farbenindustrie was bound by contract to take over the management of the Z plant at Wolfen and this it did until the end of the war.

The chemists employed in the Z plant were under Dr. BUEGGIN in his capacity as chief of the Bitterfeld-Wolfen plant. At the request of the I.G. Farbenindustrie AG, the bombs filled with phosgene were removed from the works terrain on the same day, as they

(page 9 of original)

were a great danger to the neighboring I.G. plants, especially during the aerial warfare, and, as far as I remember, stored in that part of the experimental station at Munster in the Luenoburger Heide, which was at the disposal of the Air Force.

I have carefully read each of the 9 (nine) pages of this affidavit and countersigned it with my own hand, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialled them, and I herewith declare under oath that I have stated the full truth in this affidavit to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signature) Dr. Hans WÄGNER

Sworn to and signed before me this 13th of June 1947 at Murensberg by Dr. Hans WÄGNER, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signature) Peter F. MILLER

U.S. Civilian AGO D 145338
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

2 August 1947

I, Brigitte TURK, Civ.No. 35130, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the original document No. NI-8980.

Brigitte TURK
Civ.No. 35130.

AFFIDAVIT

I, Juergen^E von KLENCK, at present residing in Koenigstein in Taunus, Adelheid Str. 5, having been warned that I render myself liable to punishment for any false statement, hereby declare under oath of my own free will and without coercion as follows : -

At the end of 1943, I was taken by Dr. AMBROS into Special Committee "C" (chemical warfare). My predecessor was Dr. EMBERT from the Textile Auxiliaries (TA) Department, Ludwigshafen. So far as I know, the Special Committee "C" was established about the beginning of 1943. Before this date, Department of Army Ordnance Office 6 (Wa.Rue.Nun.6) (formerly Munitions Department 3) (Mun.3) had looked after the production of chemical warfare agents. About 1942, the Ministry for Armaments and War Production (RWM) was established. The field of chemical warfare agents was turned over to this Ministry and Special Committee "C" was formed for this purpose. The management of Special Committee "C" can be seen from the following plan :

	Special Committee "C"
	Chief : AMBROS
	Working Committees
Chemical Warfare & Decontamination Agents Chief : AMBROS	Acid Smoke Active Carbon for Gas masks Chief: Wurster Chief : NIEMANN, Leverkusen

Army Ordnance Dept. 6 (Mun.6) furthermore transmitted Army orders for Chemical Warfare Agents to the works. Special Committee "C" had to look after the distribution of production and to send reports on this to the Speer Ministry. Special Committee "C" consulted with Ordnance Dept. 6 as to how the chemical warfare agents' production planned by the High Command of the Army (OKH) could be carried out. I can state the following with regard to the building of the Sarin Works, Falkenhagen. On the advice of Schiebor, of the Speer Ministry, the OKH planned to build the new Sarin plant in Falkenhagen. This occurred despite the protests of Dr. AMBROS, who considered the site unsuitable. The final decision was arrived at about May, 1943. The factory was built by Luranil, which turned over the surveying and construction of the buildings to the engineering construction firm of Max H. F. in Stuttgart. Luranil cooperated in the plans of the factory and carried out the installation of the machinery.

About May, 1943, the Turon Gesellschaft was founded to carry on the works.

(page 2 of original)

It emerged later that there already existed a firm named "Turon" in Frankfurt (it manufactured pharmaceutical products). For this reason, the name of the firm operating the Falkenhagen Works was changed to "Monturon". Monturon belonged as to 50% to the I.G. and as to 50% to the Montan. Ambros was the managing director of the Monturon.

The plant in Falkenhagen was built originally for the manufacture of fog (N-Stoff). This compound has been known since about 1920. Prof. Schuhmacher (Armament Office Research, W/F) wanted to use this strongly reactive stuff as incendiary material. Dr. GLUPE (W/F) who had worked on fluorine compounds, was charged with the planning of the manufacture. There was a semi-technical plant and testing site in Gottow, near Kummersdorf, Berlin. The construction of the N-Stoff factory in Falkenhagen, planned for 50 tons a month, was begun about 1939. Later on, the participating offices (Army Ordnance, Armaments & War Production, Monturon and Montan) decided to complete a plant of only 5-10 tons monthly. This plant came into operation in October 1944.

In spite of the establishment contract of the Monturon, which gave to the latter the operation of the whole of the Falkenhagen Works, Monturon at first handled only the hiring and care of the workers in the Sarin plant. As Dr. Ambros, however, for organisational reasons, did not wish to have two leading offices (viz. OKH for N-Stoff and Monturon for Sarin), the Monturon endeavoured to get the management of the whole Falkenhagen Works, including the N-Stoff factory, actually into its own hands. This development was gradually effected, so that by the middle of 1944 the Monturon controlled the entire Falkenhagen Works.

The following works were known to me as production centres for chemical warfare agents :

Chemical Warfare Agent	Place of Production	Operating firm
Omega salt	Seelze	Riedel de Haen
" "	Hahnenberg (never operated)	Army (built by Riedel de Haen)
" "	Ludwigshefen	I.G. Farben

(page 3 of original)

Chemical Warfare Agent	Place of Production	Operating firm
Clark I (diphenyl chlorot arsine)	Spandau-Häselhorst	Lonal G.m.b.H. (OKH and Auer and perhaps Boldschmidt)
Arsine oil (arsenic trichloride, Clark I, monophenyl dichloro arsine, tri- phenyl arsine)	Leese (never operated)	Lonal G.m.b.H.
"	Stassfurt	Ergetan (1) OKP & Kalichemie)
Azine (adamsite)	Uerdingen	I.G. Farben (2)
(Translator's note: Drawing of structural formule in ink) produced from Diphenyl- amine and Arsenic tri- chloride		
Phosgene	Ludwigshafen	I.G. Farben
"	Uerdingen	I.C. Farben
"	Wolfen	State Plant (Army) (Technical Man- agement) I.G., Wolfen)
Tabun	Dyhornfurth	Anorgana
Sarin	"	"
"	(never operated)	"
Mustard gas (Oxol)	Felkenhegen (unfinished) Immendorf	Monturon Orgacid
"	Huels (Trial operations)	Montan
"	Gendorf (never operated)	Anorgana
Mustard gas (DL)	Gendorf (under con- struction, experi- mental production of 2000 tons)	Anorgana
Cyanogen chloride	Dyhornfurth (altogether about 25 tons)	Anorgana
N-Mustard gas	Immendorf	Orgacid

(page 3 of original cont'd)

(1) Ergetan produced the arsine oil and Lonel distilled the Clark I from it. A small part of the production of Clark I was converted with sodium cyanide to diphenyl cyanogen arsine (Clark II). During my activity on Special Committee "C" about 50 tons of Clark II were produced.

(2) As the war drew to an end, it was planned to transfer this factory to Dyhernfurth of Schwarza, but this became no longer possible.

(page 4 of original)

The below-mentioned code names have, so far as my knowledge goes, the following meaning :

<u>Code name</u>	<u>Meaning</u>
Ne Salz	Sodium cyanide (Name used in Dyhernfurth)
OB	Mustard gas, which by heating was partly dimerised. This product had a low melting point. Trial operation in Huelo.
OL	Oxol Mustard gas
OKK	Winter Mustard gas
Polyglycol H	Oxol for Winter Mustard gas
T 9	M-Mustard gas
T 150	Cyanogen chloride
T 155	Prussic acid
Weissalz	Possibly a combination of <u>White-cross</u> and <u>Omega Salt</u> , also <u>chloroacetophenone</u> .
Winterlost	Mixed Mustard gas (Mustard gas with substitution in manufacture of 20% of the ethylene oxide by propylene oxide)
Zachlost	Mustard gas mixed with Buna or with a similar material in order to make it adhesive.

(page 4 of original cont'd)

I have carefully read through each of the 4 (four) pages of this affidavit and countersigned them with my own hand, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them and I hereby declare under oath that in this statement I have told the absolute truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signature : Juergen E. von Klenck

Sworn to and signed before me this third day of September 1947 at Nuernberg by Juergen E. von Klenck, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Signature : Edward J. Stevens

U.S. Civilian AGO D-428 172
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

16 September 1947

I, Anne MARTIN, AGO No. 20 144, hereby certify that I am a duly appointed translator for the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-10557.

.....
Anne MARTIN
AGO No. 20 144

AFFIDAVIT.

I, Dr. Herbert MURECK, at present at Huerth near Cologne, Dr. Kuertenstr. 21-23, after having been warned that I shall be liable to punishment for making a false statement, herewith declare the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion:

1. In 1933 I joined the Army Ordnance Office first as deputy adviser and later on as adviser for chemical raw materials in the Economic Department. In 1935 or 1936 I was taken over together with the department by the newly established Military Economy Office (Wehrwirtschaftsamt), and was there promoted to Regierungsrat in 1936 and to Oberregierungsrat in 1938 in the department for raw materials. In 1943 I left the Military Economy Office and, at the same time, the Civil Service.
2. During my activities in the field of chemical raw materials and preliminary products I came into contact with chemical warfare agents in as far as some of these chemicals, e.g. chlorine, ethylene, arsenic, sulphur, phosphorus, etc. were necessary for the production of chemical warfare agents as well as for other purposes.
3. Through the demands based on requirements and through the plans of the Army Ordnance Office, which were sent to the Military Economy Office, the following plants are known to me as producers of chemical warfare agents, or intended producers (stand-by plants):

Ammendorf,
Ludwigshafen,
Huels,
Gendorf,
Dyhernfurt,
Falkenhagen,
Hahnberg.

No other important plants in the field of chemical warfare agents existed as far as I know, and I should think that there could not have been any, without them coming to my knowledge through meeting their requirements of preliminary products.

4. I do not know the circumstances in regard to ownership at Ammendorf. The same holds true for Falkenhagen. All other plants, with the exception of

(page 2 of original)

Hahnberg, were regarded by the Military Economy Office as plants operated by I.G.

5. The production capacity of the chemical warfare agents plants which are known to me as being the property of I.G. probably amounts to 85% of the total German capacity.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

I have carefully read each of the 2 (two) pages of this affidavit and countersigned it with my own hand, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialled them, and I herewith declare under oath that I have stated the full truth in this affidavit to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signature) Herbert G. Mureck
Dr. Herbert MURECK

Sworn to and signed before me this 15th day of August 1947, at the Palace of Justice, Nurnberg, Germany, by Dr. Herbert MURECK, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signature) Otto Heilbrunn
Dr. Otto HEILBRUNN
ETO 36110
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
US War Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

27 August 1947

I, Brigitte TURK, ETO 35130, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-9620.

Brigitte TURK
ETO 35130

- 2 -
"END"

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-6127
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR MR CREEG

Copy No. _____

Rubber Stamp:

Top Secret !

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. Only to be handed over personally or delivered under double cover against receipt, to a personal address.
3. To be forwarded, if possible, by courier of a trustworthy person, if sent by post value to be quoted as over RM 1,000.-
4. Duplication of every sort including preparation of excerpt forbidden.
5. To be kept, at responsibility of addressee, in a safe; in exceptional cases in a steel-cabinet with combination-lock.
6. Offences against these orders will result in most severe punishment.

REPORT VI/10438

of the

Deutsche Revisions- und Treuhend-Aktiengesellschaft

Berlin

on the auditing of the works balance sheets,

as at 31 March 1942, of the

Anorgana G.m.b.H., Ludwigshafen/Rhein,

Condorf Works.

(page 1 of original)

1. The Management of the

Anorgana G.m.b.H., Ludwigshafen/Rhein
(hereinafter referred to as Anorgana or company)

commissioned us to audit the works balance-sheets, as at 31 March 1942, of the Condorf and Dyhernfurth works which they had leased from the Montanindustrie G.m.b.H. (abbreviated Montan). Furthermore we have also audited the final balance-sheet of the company resulting from the two works balance-sheets and the balance-sheet of the administrative office in Frankfurt/Main.

2. We report the following on the result of the audit of the works balance-sheets of the

Condorf works

which we attach to the report as enclosures I and II.

.....

(page 2 of original)

I. The basis of the contract.

- 3b. The Army High Command (OKH) has nominated the Montan as the responsible party (Trägerin) for the Condorf works which were earmarked for Wehrmacht projects. Under an agreement of 18 July/1 September 1940 the Montan has leased the installation, which was set up at the expense of the Army High Command, to the Anorgana which belongs 100% to the I.G. In connection with the lease contract a cover agreement was concluded between the German Reich (Wehrmacht treasury) and the I.G. on 2/18 July 1940, in which these authorities sanction the lease contract between the Montan and the Anorgana. In consideration of the fact that the chemical apparatus section of the plant was constructed and built by the I.G. and that the plant is to be operated according to the process laid down by the I.G., the cover agreement contains, furthermore, general directives in regard to the operation of the plant, which will, in part, remain valid even after the expiry of the lease contract. Amongst other points the cover agreement includes agreements in regard to the modification of the articles of association of the Anorgana to comply with the requirements of the Montan, arising from the lease agreement, furthermore, that the plant may only be operated by I.G. or by a company which is owned 100% by I.G. Finally, an option-clause, in favor of I.G., has been inserted for the event of a sale of the plants by the Montan after the expiry of the lease contract.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

The lease contract, which is concluded for an indefinite period, will come into force with effect from the completion of the plants; such date to be agreed upon, in writing, by Anorgana and Montan.

.....

(page 3 of original)

7. The operation of the plant can only be demanded for purposes of the Wehrmacht. The Anorgana, however, is authorized to use the plant for other purposes if express permission has previously been granted by the Montan. Orders from the OKW have nevertheless priority.

.....

(page 4 of original)

10. The agreements concluded between the Reich and the Montan on the one hand and the I.G. and the Anorgana on the other hand were supplemented on 17 June 1941 by agreements between the I.G. and the Anorgana with regard to making available

(page 5 of original)

inventions and patents, regulating the sale of the products manufactured in the Anorgana works, and dealing with central administration matters.

According to this the I.G. is obliged, for the duration of the lease contract, to make all present and future patents, processes and practical experience which are at their disposal and suitable for the leased plant available to the company. On the other hand the Anorgana has assumed the obligation to hand over to I.G. the use of all practical knowledge gained in the works, whether or not it is patentable, without charge, as their sole property and for their exclusive use at home and abroad.

11. The sale of products manufactured in the Anorgana works, in so far as those manufactured for home use of the Wehrmacht are concerned, will be arranged by I.G., without commission, in the name and for the account of the Anorgana. If products are manufactured for purposes other than those of the Wehrmacht at home, which is only permissible with the approval of the Montan and I.G., they are to be delivered to I.G. for re-sale.

(page 6 of original)

II. The plants covered by the lease contract.

13. The Gondorf works were set up by order and with the funds of the OKH on ground in Gondorf near Burgkirchen (Upper Bavaria), belonging to the Montan. The construction of the installations intended for the manufacture of chemical products was entrusted to the Bayerische Stickstoff Werke Aktiengesellschaft (abbreviated: B.St.W.) for the technical-construction part, and to the I.G. Farbenindustrie (abbreviated: I.G.) for the chemical apparatus part of the installations. The construction program, the extent of which we will explain briefly in the following lines, was extended whilst the work was in progress, as compared with the original plans. Even today it has not yet been finally settled, on the contrary at present the drawing-up and the execution of a so-called narrow pass program (Engpassprogramm) is being carried out.

14. According to the cover agreement installations were to be built for production of

600 tons per month of glycerine D
600 " " " " Oxol and
3.350 " " " " DL

Owing to the expansion of and supplements to the building program undertaken during the building operations, quite a considerable increase in the production capacity of the other plants has been attained besides the setting up of an Acetaldehyde plant which was not originally planned and therefore not mentioned in the agreements. According to the calculations of the works management as at 31 March 1942 the capacity is

1.275 tons per month Glykol	compared with	600 tons per month
		according to the preliminary report
600 " " " Oxol	compared with	600 tons per month
		according to the preliminary report
4.000 " " " DL	compared with	3.350 tons per month
		according to the preliminary report
1.000 " " " Acetaldehyde		

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT FROM DOCUMENT No. RI-6127
CONTINUED

(page 7 of original)

17. In the following lines we can, therefore, only show how the planned costs of the installations are made up. After the extension of and supplements to the original program the building costs (without real estate values) were estimated at a total of RM 104,91 million (so-called program values). According to a statement submitted to us by the Anorganika the breakdown is as follows:

(page 8 of original)

RM	40.741	million	for	the	Glykol	plant
"	1.286	"	"	"	Oxol	"
"	19.607	"	"	"	DL	"
"	6.685	"	"	"	Acetaldehyde	"
"	35.091	"	"	"	power installations	the value of which was not divided amongst the main installations *)
"	<u>1.500</u>	"	"	"	cracking of watergas	
						RM 104.910 million

- *) RM 3,19 million have already been divided between the main plants Glykol, DL and Acetaldehyde according to the demands of the plants.

.....

(page 26 of original)

Berlin, 18 June 1943.

Deutsche Revisions- und Treuhand Aktiengesellschaft

(signature)
Chartered Accountant

(signature) BURIGERDT
Chartered Accountant

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-6127
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

27 May 1947

I, John FOSBERRY, Civ. No. 20179, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpt from document No. NI-6127.

John FOSBERRY
Civ. No. 20179

- 6 -
"END"

22

Copy No. _____

Rubber Stamp :

Top Secret!

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. Only to be handed over personally or delivered, under double cover against receipt, to a personal address.
3. To be forwarded, if possible, by courier or a trustworthy person; if sent by post, value to be quoted as over RM 1,000.-
4. Duplication of every sort including preparation of excerpts forbidden.
5. To be kept, at responsibility of addressee, in a safe; in exceptional cases in a steel cabinet with combination-lock.
6. Offenses against these orders will result in most severe punishment.

Report VI/10626

of the

Deutsche Revisions - und Treuhand-Aktiengesellschaft

Berlin

on the audit of the works balance sheet as at 31 March 1942

at the Anorgana GmbH., Ludwigshafen/Rhein,

Dyhornfurth Works.

(page 1 of original)

1. The Management of the Anorgana GmbH., Ludwigshafen/Rhein, (hereinafter abbreviated Anorgana or company) commissioned us to audit the works balance sheets as at 31 March 1942 of the Gendorf and Dyhernfurth works which they had leased from the Verwertungsgesellschaft fuer Montanindustrie GmbH., Berlin (abbreviated Montan).
2. We have therefore audited the final company balance sheet, drawn up from the two works balance sheets and the balance sheet of the administration in Frankfurt/Main.
3. We submit the following report on the result of our audit of the Dyhernfurth works balance sheet in which we also express our views on the methods of book keeping and on the works balance sheet, after having described the economic basis of the works resultant from the lease contract and other agreements.

.....

(page 2 of original)

.....

I. The contractual basis.

6. The Dyhernfurth works which is to be made available by the I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft (abbreviated I.G.) at the expense of the Army High Command (OKH) shall serve Wehrmacht purposes. The OKH has appointed the Montan as manager of the undertaking. The Montan in turn has concluded a lease contract dated 1 October/23 November 1941 with the Anorgana, whose shares are wholly owned by I.G., according to which the maintenance and operation of the plant are in the hands of the Anorgana. The German Reich (Wehrmacht Treasury) and the I.G. have approved the conclusion of the lease contract in a cover agreement of 23 September/1 October 1941 and guarantee that the regulations as laid down in the lease agreement will be fully observed. Furthermore it was agreed in the cover agreement that the plant, for the operation of which the I.G. will make available all present and future patents, processes and practical experience which are at their disposal and suitable for this plant, will only be operated by the I.G. or a subsidiary which is wholly owned by the I.G., as long as the I.G. or their subsidiary carry out the agreements. Furthermore the I.G. agreed to provide the necessary number of workers, a suitable manager and the necessary working capital required for operating the plant, neither to sell the shares of the Anorgana during the duration of the lease contract nor to offer them as security and not to alter the statutes of the company without the approval of the OKH.

(page 3 of original)

7. The lease contract shall come into force as from the completion of the plant and shall run for 20 years. It will be extended automatically for 5 years if neither party gives one year's notice before the expiration of the contract. The date on which the plant was completed shall be recorded in writing between the Montan and the Anorgana. Since the construction has not yet been completed in its entirety, the date has not been fixed as yet. In parts of the basic installation operations commenced at the end of 1941, Montan has been informed of this by the Dyhernfurth works.
8. Should the Montan or its legal successor wish to sell the plant as a whole or in part after the expiration of the lease contract, the installations or installation parts shall first be offered to I.G. Only after I.G. has refused the offer may a sale to a third party take place, however, only under conditions which are not more favorable than those offered to I.G.
9. For the duration of the contract the company in its capacity as a trustee of Montan shall undertake, i.e. to treat the installations and all accessories with the diligence of a conscientious businessman and technician and to maintain it in a good operating condition. Upon request by the OKH the plant is to be modernized and renovated at the expense of OKH.
10. Until the Dyhernfurth plant starts operations, the costs of maintenance including taxes and public dues as well as any insurance premiums shall be borne by Montan. The Anorgana shall charge cost price for these services, (including the additional costs for welfare- and other general factory-expenses) without profit, plus 2% per year for expenses incurred for general technical supervision. If and while the plant is being operated and if its output during one calendar year is more than 40% of its capacity the costs of its operation

(page 4 of original)

shall be borne by the Anorgana as leaseholder and included in the sales price of its products. While the plant is being operated and its output is less than 40% of its capacity during one year, Anorgana shall only pay operating costs in proportion to capacity utilized, this proportion being included in the sale prices, the balance being met by Montan.

11. The OKH can at any time place orders for delivery of goods for Wehrmacht purposes. For purposes other than those of the Wehrmacht the operation of the plant cannot be demanded. Anorgana, however, can, with the approval of Montan, use the plant for other purposes under conditions which have to be separately agreed upon in every case. However, orders from the OKH always have priority.

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

12. While the plant is being operated the company has to pay Montan a certain dividend of the profits from the plant as rent. This dividend shall be fixed every year on the basis of a minimum of 33 1/3% and a maximum of 50%. The rent to be fixed by the Montan in collaboration with the Aufsichtsrat, should take into consideration plant utilization ascertained through orders given on the one hand, and technical development on the other. No rent has been fixed for the past business year which was termed the year of the start of operations, because the plant did not show a profit (RM 177,47 loss).

.....

(page 5 of original)

.....

13. Similarly, plant-depreciation sums for equipment in operation which were included in the selling price are to be handed over to Montan.

.....

(page 7 of original)

15. The agreements laid down in the cover- and lease contract were supplemented on 17 June 1941/19 February 1942 through arrangements between I.G. and Anorgana through which inventions and patents were made available, arrangements about the control of the sale of the products manufactured in the Anorgana-works and the treatment of matters pertaining to central administration and distribution.
16. In this contract, I.G. confirms that it has undertaken to place at the disposal of the company its patents, production processes and practical experience of value to the rented factory (ref. paragraph 6). The Anorgana on its part is under obligation to hand over to I.G. free of charge inventions made in the Dyhernfurth works, irrespective whether they are patentable or not, for I.G.'s sole ownership and disposal at home or abroad.
17. The sale of the goods manufactured at the Anorgana works, as far as they are destined for the purposes of the German Wehrmacht, shall be carried out free of commission payments, by I.G. acting as a representative of Anorgana. The negotiations

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

with public authorities as customers for orders or about prices shall be carried out by I.G.. As far as goods are produced for purposes other than those of the German Wehrmacht- this being permitted only with the consent of Montan and I.G.- the Anorgana shall refrain from direct sales to third parties. Instead, Anorgana is to sell the goods in question, if they are to be delivered to third parties without undergoing further manufacturing or finishing processes, to I.G. for resale. The price which I.G. has to pay is to be worked out according to Article 9, paragraph 1 of the lease contract. Should I.G. receive exceptionally high prices through the resale of these products, it has to pay Anorgana correspondingly higher prices in accordance with more detailed arrangements with Montan. If, in individual cases the I.G. is not interested in purchasing the goods in question for resale on its own account,

(page 8 of original)

Anorgana must sell these goods to third parties through I.G. which can choose whether to act as commission agent or as representative.

18. In view of the fact that the central administration of the Anorgana as well as the sale of its products is carried out to a large extent by departments of I.G., the company, as stated in article 9, paragraph 1 e of the lease contract, has to pay I.G. the costs of central administration and the general sales expenses which are deducted annually for the financial year from the expenses for manufacturing the goods sold (see also paragraph 14 on this).

- . -

II. The plant under lease.

19. The works which are intended for the manufacture of chemical products are being built by order of and with funds provided by the Army High Command on a site belonging to Montan, in Ichni-furth (Lower Silesia). As stated in the introduction to the lease contract, the I.G. has been entrusted with the construction and has delegated the building work to its subsidiary company, the Iurnil Baugesellschaft mbH at Ludwigs-hafen/Rhine. The original construction plan has been enlarged during the building process, as compared with earlier designs.
20. In addition to the plant with an output of 1000 tons per month of " product G " (also called Trilon 83) and capable of increase to 2000 tons per month with 24 hour shifts, which is provided in the cover agreement, a filling plant, for Trilon 83 and two installations, for the production of Trilon 46 and

(page 8 of original, cont'd)

Trilon 300 respectively which are not mentioned in the contracts, have been included in the construction plan. It is recommended to supplement the contracts accordingly in due course.

(page 9 of original)

According to information given to us the plant for Trilon 83 is completed except for some additional installations found necessary during the trial period, and is ready to start production. The additional installations will probably be completed by the end of 1943. At the end of 1941 the plant started small-scale production in the installations for preliminary products and intermediates. In the meantime, production has increased. Up to January 1943 it amounted to approx. 20% of the normal capacity for the main product. The other installations are still under construction.

.....

(page 15 of original)

.....

b) Profit and loss account.

38. The last year has been devoted to constructing and starting the works. Only to a very small extent have preliminary products and intermediates intended for the manufacture of the final product D 7 (also called Trilon 83) been produced, namely

109, 7 tons	D 0,
9,427, 0 cubic meters	D 1,
91, 95 tons	D 2,
79, 9 tons crude	D 4, and
32, 0 tons pure	D 4.

.....

(page 20 of original)

.....

Berlin, 18 June 1943.

Deutsche Revisions-und Treuhand-
Aktiengesellschaft

Signature illegible
certified public
accountant

Signature Burhardt
certified public
accountant

(Wirtschaftspruefer)

(Wirtschaftspruefer)

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-6131
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

4 June 1947

I, Arthur MACNAMARA, Civ. No. 20191, hereby certify that I
am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages
and that the above is a true and correct translation of
excerpts from document No. NI-6131.

.....
.....
Arthur MACNAMARA, Civ. No. 20 191

29

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5669
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I. G. Farbenindustrie - Aktiengesellschaft
Central Finance-Administration
Berlin NW 7.

File-notation.

Orgacid G.m.b.H., Berlin N 65
Friedrich-Krause-Ufer 24.

Finance-Secretariat
St/R.

29 April 1938.

Preliminary remark

The following statements concern the
state of affairs of the 5 October 1937.

Capital Stock: RM 120,000.-

The capital has been paid in up to 25%.

Partners: German Gold- and Silver-Refining Estab-
lishment (Deutsche Gold-und Silber-
Scheideanstalt) through the Degea-Aktien-
gesellschaft in Berlin (50%)

(Pencil-note:)
Purpose?

Is not mentioned owing
to particular circumstances.

Chemical Factory, Buckow (50%)

This company, however, was merged at the
end of 1937 with the Th. Goldschmidt A.G.
at Essen.

Managers: Dr. ing.Hermann ENGELHARDT, Wilhelm
EHLERS, both in Berlin-Frohenau.

Aufsichtsrat: Chairman Prof. Dr.ing.QUASEBART of the
Degea,
Deputy chairman Dr.CORDES, Leipzig, of
the Chemical Factory at Buckow.

Technical management:

(Pencil-mark:)
illegible

I.G. (confidential)

Stamp: I.G. Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 78
321 85

Carbon Copy.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

9 July 1947.

I, Ludwig BORINSKI, No.34486, hereby certify that I am thoroughly con-
versant with the English and German languages and that the above is
a true and correct translation of the document No.5669.

Ludwig BORINSKI
No.34486.

"END"

30

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5788
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Affidavit.

I, Otto MBROS, Ludwigshafen on Rhine, Wechlerstrasse 12, manager of the Anorzana, member of the Aufsichtsrat of the Chemische Werke Huels, responsible member of the Vorstand for the I.G. Auschwitz (Buna and Montantail) having been warned that false statements on my part render me liable to punishment declare herewith under oath, voluntarily and under no duress, as follows:

1. 1934/1935 I heard for the first time of contact having been established between the High Command of the Army (OKH) and the I.G. Farbenwerke, Ludwigshafen, in the field of poison gases. At that time, the OKH (Ministerialrat ZAEN) got into direct communication with the I.G. Farbenwerke Ludwigshafen, represented by Dr. SIEBHIG, Dr. WITTMER and myself. Ludwigshafen was leading in the field of ethylene chemistry. Since 1923, it produced, among other substances, Polyalcol V, also called Oxol.

(page 2 of original)

At that time, OKH (Ministerialrat ZAEN) suggested to the IG to set up a production plant for Mustard Gas (Lost) or Oxol in Ludwigshafen. The production of Oxol or Mustard Gas was to be started in order to be able to keep pace with the general rearmament taking place in Germany. This suggestion is rejected by us, as basic directives, laid down by the Vorstand of the IG., exist in regard to war gas research and production. Among other reasons, the fact that the IG. as an enterprise of world wide importance does not wish to have its name associated with the production of war gases is a consideration.

2. After the refusal in 1934/35 by the IG. to set up a production plant for Mustard Gas or Oxol, the OKH gave this order to the Orgacid at Amendorf.

At the instance of the OKH, the IG., without any compensation,

(page 3 of original)

placed the process up to the production of the intermediate compound Oxol at the disposal of the Orgacid, on condition, however, that the licences granted to the Orgacid may be used only for armament purposes for the OKH, but not for competition in the open market with the IG. Farben.

In 1935, the IG. concludes an agreement with the Orgacid to that effect, and a supplementary agreement with the three partners of the Orgacid, (viz. AUER, OKH, and GOLDSCHMIDT), Basic consent hereto was given by Fritz TER MEER.

The IG. had to furnish technicians to the Orgacid for the assembly and the starting of the plant. These were paid by the Orgacid.

~~5. Even before the war, the toxic substances had to be passed on Professor Heinrich NOELDEIN, IG, Elberfeld, in Elberfeld~~

(page 4 of original)

~~they were tested for their toxic properties. A report on any substances which might have been suitable for war gases was made to the OKH by Elberfeld (Professor Heinrich NOERLICH).~~

(Paragraph 3 is crossed out in the original document.)

4. A further collaboration between the IG. and the OKH pertained to Nitrogen Mustard Gas (N-Lost) Nitrogen-Mustard-Gas created made in our laboratories.

(The last sentence is crossed out in the original document.)

In 1934, it was hoped in the Ludwigshafen Textile Accessories Laboratory that by the chlorination of the 3 ethanolamine, a new intermediate compound for washing- and textile accessories could be produced. The chlorination product, however, had unpleasant by-results (irritated skin, coughing).

In 1935, the OKH demanded a sample of the chlorination product.

In 1937, the OKH expressed the wish to the IG. to set up an experimental installation for N-Lost. After the IG. Ludwigshafen had again declined, it was decided to set up this experimental installation with the Orgacid, with the technical aid of the IG. The experimental installation was completed at the end of 1938.

(Page 5 of original)

Orgacid procures the necessary chemicals from the I.G. and Buchau, among others.

Nitrogen-Mustard Gas was produced only at the Orgacid at Ammendorf.

5. Mustard Gas experiments for the Supreme Command of the Army (OKH) (esterization of Oxol to Mustard Gas) were carried out in the laboratories of the I.G. at Leverkusen about 1938/39.

6. In 1938, further conferences with the OKH followed, concerning the development of the chemical process for the production of Ethylene-Oxyd and its derivatives. They dealt primarily with the production of Glycol and Diglycol. In two cases, the OKH considered the attaching of poison gas plants to Gensdorf and Huels. In this case, the I.G. was to produce the primary product Oxol, and the Orgacid the final product Mustard Gas.

(Page 6 of original)

Principle use of Glycol within the framework of the HWA (Army Ordnance Office):

Antifreeze, warming- and cooling liquid (car- or plane-motors).

Principle use of Diglycol within the framework of the HWA (Army Ordnance-Office):

Propulsive powder.

Before the war, two factories were producing Glycon or Diglycol: Ludwigshafen and Wolfen.

Approximate production:

Ludwigshafen:

1937 for the Army about	300 tons	(?)
1938 " " " "	600 "	
1939 " " " "	600 "	

Wolfen:

Production was not started before 1939.

1939 (8 months) for the Army about 1500 tons.

(Page 7 of original)

In Ludwigshafen there existed since about 1925/26 a small diglycol plant. In order to be able to cope with the army's increased need for diglycol, a Montan plant was erected at Wolfen in 1937. Messrs. PISTOR and BUHL negotiated the Montan-contract, between the army and the I.G. for the latter. The Montan-contract assured the financing by a system of advance payments on part of the Reich, so that the I.G. did not have to advance funds for this Reich-expenditure.

MAY and VIRK, both employees of the IG Wolfen, were in charge of the factory.

The monthly production of the Montanplant was fixed by a liaison officer between the I.G. and the Army.

(page 8 of original)

Fritz ter BEER and Carl KRAUCH (Reich Office) were informed about the production of the Montanworks.

7. The founding of a Montan-factory took place as follows:

Representatives of the Army Ordnance Office - Munitions Dept. 3 or 6 (HWA Mun 3 or Mun 6), possibly accompanied by some gentlemen from the scientific branch - for example from Production and Examination Group 9 of the Army Ordnance Office (na Pruef 9)- come to the I.G., and request that the I.G. - because of their chemical and technical knowledge - take over the construction and operation of a manufacture. The I.G. decide whether they want the factory

- 1) attached to an existing factory, or
- 2) to be newly erected, independent of existing plants.

(page 9 of original)

The financing will be done by the Reich, and the technical management supplied by the I.G.

Thus by a government-owned plant is created, for which the Reich elects as holder and owner under the sphere of influence of the army, the "Montan Industrial Werke G.m.b.H." (Montanindustriewerke G.m.b.H.). For the construction and operation of these government-owned plants, a model contract, the so-called Montan-scheme, was developed by the Reich, which was tendered to the I.G. with small changes as a norm for acceptance.

For the structural part of the installations, construction and installation orders were issued directly to the I.G. by the Army High Command.

After parts of the building projects have been completed, they are accounted for between the I.G. Construction Company Luranil and the Army High Command, and by way of a transfer-conference taken over by the Army High Command. Then the Army High Command transfers the installations to its holding-company the Montan Industrial Werke G.m.b.H. (Montan-Industrie Werke G.m.b.H.).

The establishment of a Montan work of this kind was solely designed for military purposes.

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The Luranil-Construction Company was founded at Ludwigshafen in 1940 by the I.G. and Buna Werke G.m.b.H. The business capital of 100,000 RM was supplied by both at an 80/20 ratio, later by the I.G. alone. Business management was in the hands of AMBROS, SYMANN and SANTO.

The Company was founded exclusively for the purpose of constructing several building projects of the Reich, the construction and establishment of which had to be carried out by the I.G. during 1940 and later within the framework of contract agreements with the Reich, and the execution of which the I.G. did not wish to undertake itself. The Luranil operated solely as Construction Company by reason of sub-contracts issued to them by the I.G., who on their part concluded building and installation contracts for the desired Government installations with the Reich. For the operation the I.G. employed the Anorgana G.m.b.H. as leasing company.

(page 11 of original)

The Anorgana is a G.m.b.H. which was carried on the books of I.G., the only share-holder with an investment of 100,000 RM, as a mere cover. When in 1940/41 the Reich demanded the erection and the operation of Montan plants from the I.G., the Anorgana G.m.b.H. was employed by the I.G., which was not inclined to perform these tasks by itself, as operating firm for the management of these Reich-plants. This was effected by a lease. As the tasks of the Anorgana consisted solely in the administration of plants owned by the Reich, which demanded a certain influence over the management, a Aufsichtsrat was formed in the Anorgana of which various representatives of the Reich were members.

Representatives of the I.G.: ter Meer, as chairman,
v. Krieger(?), Denker(?),
and Stenzig(?).

Representatives of the OKH: Schiffler, Ehmann(?), Reinknecht(?).

Betriebsführer of the Anorganaplanz at Gandorf was Dir. Dr. WITTNER,
of the Anorganaplanz at Dyhernfurth Dr. P.M.

(page 12 of original)

8. Matters relating to Montan agreements or production of the Montan Works were reported in the Chemicals Committee of the I.G.

The Chemicals Committee was under the leadership of von WEBER-ANDREA (some of members were KUEHNE, BUERGIN, HAEFFLIGER, WURSTER, V. HEIDER, FORSTARDT).

Since about 1941 I also belonged to the Chemicals Committee. amongst other things the sphere of the committee comprises all questions pertaining to contract matters relating to chemicals. The Chemicals Committee held meetings practically as often as the Technical Committee.

Resolutions of the Chemicals Committee were reported by WEBER-ANDREA to the Vorstand.

I suppose that the Vorstand was informed of the first Montan contract. I myself reported on the Anorgana in the Chemicals Committee.

(page 13 of original)

9. Montan agreements between the I.G. and the OKH were concluded for the plants named hereafter:

<u>Plant</u>	<u>Management</u>	<u>Year of Construction</u>	<u>Beginning of Production</u>	<u>Chief-Products</u>
Wölfen	I.G.; Manager: Dr. M.Y/VIRK	ca. 1937	End of 1938 Beginn of 1939	Glycol, Diglycol, Stabilizers
Schkopau	I.G.; Deputy-Manager MBROS	ca. 1938	End of 1939	Glycol, Diglycol
Huels	Chemische Werke Huels; IG-partnership decisive; MBROS: member of the Aufsichtsrat	ca. 1939	ca. 1940	Diglycol, Glycol, Polyglycol M (-Oxd) Mustard-Gas-Tests, no production
Gendorf	Inorgana (IG and OKH) MBROS: Manager	Spring 1940	January (..assembling) 1941	Glycol, somewhat later Diglycol; 1943 D - Mustard Gas.
Dyhornfurth	Inorgana (IG and OKH) MBROS: Manager	1940	1942	Tabun
Soewerk	was to be Monturon MBROS: considered as manager	1943	never	Sarin was to be produced
Muschwitz	should have been IG Muschwitz; MBROS: responsible member of the Vorstand for IG Muschwitz for Buna and Montan part	1943	never	intended were Glycol and Diglycol

Monturon was a management company, which one day should have managed Soewerk - not in the sense of the lease agreement.

10. Diglycol was stored at Ludwigshafen in small quantities for army orders.

(Page 14 of original)

At Wolfen storage space for diglycol was provided from the start for one month's production (about 300 tons).

11. About 1937, with permission of the High Command of the Army (OKH), the Monte Cetini (Italy) was granted a licence for the glycol- and diglycol method. With the technical advice from the IG, two factories were erected at San Guiseppe di Ceiro and at Carrara Marina.

12. About 1937/38 I heard for the first time of the A-Fall (outbreak of war) in connection with the extension of emergency plants and the prohibition of new installations at Ludwigshafen. I know that Mr. MOHL represented the I. G. Ludwigshafen at several meetings at the Reich Office Chemistry (Reichsstelle Chemie) concerning the production at Ludwigshafen in case of war. The production at Ludwigshafen was to be stopped with the beginning of the war, because of the exposed position of Ludwigshafen.

(Page 15 of original)

(Information of the Reich Office Chemistry), against which Dr. WURSTER and I entered a protest.

13. The Vermittlungsstelle W, which had the duty of establishing a contact between the IG plants and the army, showed only little activity in my sector, as Ludwigshafen negotiated directly with the Ordnance Department (HWA), respectively the High Command of the Army.

14. In October 1939 Fritz TER MEER, Heinrich HORNBEIN, and I were ordered to come to the Ordnance Department. In the presence of Ministerial Councilor ZAHN and Mr. von der LINDE Colonel (Oberst) SCHMIDT stated by way of introduction that during this war a production of poison gases was necessary, in which the IG Farben and other firms were to render their support in technical matters.

(Page 16 of original)

Colonel SCHMIDT then stated that an installation for the production of Gelsen had to be built. This was the first time I heard about the product Gelsen - later called Tabun. It was stated that preliminary work had been done. Dr. SCHMADER of I.G. Farben, the expert in Gelsen, developed this product while working on insecticides. The OKH intended to build a Gelsen plant with a monthly production capacity of 1000 tons, the organization and technical management of which should be taken in hand by the I.G. Farben. A condition was that the installation should be erected in an airraid proof space. Fritz TER MEER, Heinrich HOLLEBIN and I were asked to make preparations accordingly. Construction engineers of Ludwigshafen (Leitdirektor SAUTO) searched for a suitable site, which was found in Dyhernfurth.

The Vorstand was only unofficially informed about Dyhernfurth.

Handwritten foot-note:

According to my information the I.G. did not produce poison gases before 1939, neither in their own plants nor at any firm under their management.

(Page 17 of original)

15. On 30 December 1939 the building site at Dyhernfurth was fixed. Lursnil contracts the plant Dyhernfurth. In the summer of 1941 Anorgana takes over the management. 120 prisoners of war are employed in building the plant Dyhernfurth. Prior to the start of production I caused the French prisoners of war to leave the building site. As far as I can remember only Italian construction workers are employed in building the plant Dyhernfurth.

About 1 - 2000 Kz- prisoners were employed by Ruobau in 1943 for expansion of the primary production at the southern edge of the plant, separated by a fence.

The total production of Tabun in Dyhernfurth amounted to 13000 t./80%.

16. When the production of Tabun in Dyhernfurth was already in operation the OKH (Lu-Bruf 9) informed us that the product Tabun had many deficiencies. In the meantime I.G. Farben had developed Sarin in collaboration with the Sidem Gas Defence Laboratories, which according to statements of the OKH is more stable than Tabun.

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Plant Dyhernfurth received the order to build an experimental plant with a capacity of 100 tons monthly.

17. The building of a large Sarin-plant in Dyhernfurth was not approved for reasons of civilian defense. The Reich Minister for Armament and War Production (RWM) proposed in 1943, to establish a Sarin-plant at Falkenhagen (Sea-forks), where a subterranean Nitrogen-plant (cost 100 millions) was building for the SS. A production of Sarin did not commence at Falkenhagen anymore.

18. In 1940 the Army High Command proposed to the I.G. to establish a Montan-plant in Bavaria for the production of Glycol and Diglycol. The Gondorf area was designated for this purpose by the Army High Command. In 1940 the I.G. started with the building. In January 1941 the manufacture was begun with ethylene-oxide and

(page 19 of original)

Glycol, and later Diglycol was added. In 1943 the attempts were made to produce Di-Mustard Gas, according to LEWENSTEIN, which had been developed in the I.G. Leverkusen for the Army High Command. The outcome was negative.

In Gondorf, in addition to prisoners of war and foreign workers, 200 KZ-prisoners were employed. Neither foreigners nor KZ-prisoners were employed in the war gas plant (Di-Fabrik). The detainees were employed with construction work.

19. At the Chemische Werke Huels (IG) the Army High Command demanded an annex for their Montan-plant for the utilization of Ethylene-oxide for their purposes, that is to say for the production of Glycol, Diglycol and Thio glycol. The Army High Command was in general interested in every production of Ethylene, in order to utilize it for Glycol, Diglycol, and possibly for Polyglycol as intermediary product for Mustard Gas. The Montan-plant in Huels was built about 1939; the start of production was about 1940.

(page 30 of original)

20. I made the acquaintance of Professor Karl BRANDT in the spring of 1944. He informed me that on orders from HITLER, he has to interest himself with Chemical Warfare Agents and especially with protection against gas, that he, however, does not know much about war gases, but that he would like to inspect some plants where war gases are produced. Thereupon he visited the plants in Dyhernfurt and Gendorf.

I met Karl BRANDT again in the presence of Juergen von KLENCK in the summer of 1944 in Luftwaffenhafen, where he interested himself in plastics for a simplified peoples gas mask.

21. In the year 1942 I was appointed by State Councillor (Staatsrat) Walter SCHIEBER as chief of the Special Commission "C" and therein of the Sub-Division for War Chemicals and Decontamination Materials (Arbeitsgruppe "Gaskampfstoffe und Entgiftungsstoffe"). My collaborator was Juergen von KLENCK.

After the Army High Command (OKH) had established a production schedule, which had been approved by the competent division of the Armaments Deliveries Office, the Special Committee as a council of technical experts, (- practically they were the chiefs of the individual poison-gas plants -)

(page 21 of original)

should guide the production i.e. make proposals to overcome all difficulties

22. In June 1943 I was ordered by State Councillor (Staatsrat) Dr. Walter SCHIEBER to attend a conference at HITLER's Headquarters at Rastenburg, regarding war gases and their chemical defenses and the production of gas-masks and activated charcoal (Aktivkohle). According to my recollection there participated on this conference besides HITLER and SPER: KEITEL, HERRICI of the Army Ordnance Office (AWA), some younger officers unknown to me, and further Walter SCHIEBER, QUASEBARTH (Commissioner for gas-mask production).

I myself had to report on the production to date of Chemical Warfare Agents (Tabun, Sarin, etc.) as well as about the knowledge and strength of the enemy concerning this matter.

Initial: A.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI - 6788
CONTINUED

(page 23 of original)

HITLER had no further reactions to my statements. My general impression was, that the representatives of departments and military agencies, who were present, did not have the intention to recommend the use of poisonous gases. It was, however, to be attempted - by means of some armament - to induce the opposing side to adopt the same attitude.

By my factual representation of the production factor and especially by strong reference to the possibilities on the opposing side, I believe I have considerably contributed to the fact, that Germany did not make use of the chemical weapon.

This discussion took place at my only meeting with HITLER.

23. During the last months prior cessation of hostilities (1944) a general ordinance was issued, according to which all data relative to the field of poison gases, were to be destroyed.

(page 23 of original)

I have, under oath, diligently read each of the 23 (twenty three) pages of this affidavit, and I have with my own hand countersigned them, I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and have countersigned them with my initials and I hereby declare under oath, that I have stated in this affidavit the whole truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

Signature: Dr. Otto AMBROS
Otto AMBROS

Sworn to and signed before me this 1st of May 1947 at Kueraberg; by Otto AMBROS known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Signature: BENVENUTO VON HALLE
U.S. Civilian AGO D 432532
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

13 June 1947

I, Hennis GLEICHMAN, Civ., A 443 029, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI - 6788.

Hennis GLEICHMAN
Civ., A 443 029.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5929
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

THE REICH AIR MINISTER

L S II 4c No.3758/33

Berlin W 8, 9 October 1933
Bohrenstr. 68/70
Tel. a 2 Flora 0047
Telegram address: Reichsluft Berlin

D.P.

To the

Management (Direktion) of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.

Frankfurt/Main

In pencil: Milenz (?)

In the last number of the French periodical "Danger from the Air and Chemical Air Warfare" No. 9/10 (July-August) 1933 the following passage can be found on page 154:

Frankfurt/Main, 22 August. - Final experiments are being carried out at the I.G. Farben Laboratories at Oppau on a new gas, the composition of which is being kept secret. It is said that neither a mask nor any other device can afford any protection against this gas. - (Radio).

I would be obliged to have your comment on the above report.

On behalf of

signed: Dr. KNIPFER

Certified
signature
Office Clerk

In pencil:
Dir.Gaus
for your comment

Rubber stamp:

signature: DUISBERG

Reich Air Ministry Office.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5929
CONTINUED

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT LUDWIGSHAFEN/RHEIN

Nitrogen-Department

Rubber stamp: Dr. MUELLER-CUNRADI
initialled

To the
Reich Air Ministry

Berlin W 8
Behrenstr. 68-70

LS II 4 c
No. 3758/33

20 October 1933 Kl.

In pencil: Dr. MILENZ

We acknowledge receipt of your letter of 9 October 1933 addressed to our firm in Frankfurt. Dr. MUELLER-CUNRADI from our Oppau works will be calling on you next week to give you the required explanation. He will contact you by telephone to find out what time will be convenient to you.

Yours faithfully

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

signed: LAPEE signed: KRAUCH

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

22 May 1947

I, Arthur W.C.N.MARA, Civ.No. 20191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-5929.

Arthur W.C.N.MARA
Civ.No. 20191

(page 2 of original)

Rubberstamp

R 28

I.G. Farbenindustrie
Aktiengesellschaft

Entered for the control in the
controlbook under Serial No. 98

Duty Stamp

Copy

Rubberstamp:
Frankfurt (Main)

for copy RM 1,50 cancelled
for original RM 1,50 used

Hoechst/Main, 13 June 1935
initialled ?

C o n t r a c t

The following contract is concluded between the German Reich, represented by the Reich Air Minister (hereinafter referred to as RLM) on the one hand

and the I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft (hereinafter referred to as I.G.) on the other hand.

1.

I.G. transfers the application for the patent J.45 291 IVa/1203 concerning the "Process for the manufacture of aluminiummethylchloride" to RLM for the purpose of registering it as a secret patent.

2.

The costs for the transfer and maintenance of the patent rights through payment of the annual duties will be borne by I.G. until such time as the Reich uses the patent.

3.

Both parties agree that an appropriate payment as laid down in # 5 of the patent law will only be made in the event of the object of the invention being used by the Reich. The amount of the appropriate compensation will be determined by means of special negotiations, in the event of utilization, by RLM; the latter will also decide what can be considered as utilization within the meaning of the contract and whether such exists.

(page 3 of original)

4.

The I.G. is entitled to allow the patent to lapse at any time by non-payment of the annual duties.

5.

The I.G. is entitled to manufacture the object of the invention for purposes other than those of defense of the country, the I.G., however, must ensure that neither the manufacturing process nor the formulae will come to the knowledge of third parties. In this respect I.G. will take the necessary and customary care to safeguard their secret processes in consideration of the regulations in regard to high treason (Law of 24 April 1934).

6.

The costs for the stamp duty will be born as laid down by law.

Berlin, 6 May 1935.

The Reich Air Minister
I.A. (by order)
KRUCHHOFF ?

Rubberstamp
The Reich Air Minister.

Frankfurt/Main, 7 March 1935

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELL-
SCHAFT
Signatures: HERMANN HUBNER

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

24 May 1947

I, John FOSBERRY, Civ. No. 20179, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpt from document No. NI-6193.

John FOSBERRY
Civ.No. 20179

- 2 -
"END"

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-6193
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(page 4 of original)

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft Ludwigshafen a.Rhein
8.9.1937 B/G.

N o t e.

re: Anhydrous Aluminiumchloride
Installation for the powder factory (Poudrerie)

After having ascertained for what purposes the powder factory intends to use Aluminiumchloride, it must still be ascertained whether or not these would conflict with the secret agreement H.K. No. 1400 regarding the employment of a similar product which could serve the Reich Defence as smoke screen agents, smoke generators and perhaps also as irritant gas.

signed BRENDL.

(written by hand:)

20.9. Reference Dr. PRATJE.

further written by hand:

According to consultation with Dr. BAUER, no conflict is involved with H.K. 1400. Dr. BRENDL agrees with this decision.

Copy to Patent Dept. Ludwigshafen.

COPY

(page 5 of original)

Confidential

7th September 1934
B/G.

Handwritten:
To Dr. PRATJE

N o t e.

for the files "Process for the production of Aluminium-methylchloride" / Registration of Patent J.45 291/IVa/1203(5614).

The matter was discussed with Messrs. Dr. C. MUELLER, Dr. HOLLERMAN and Dr. WURSTER.

Aluminiummethylchloride serves as smoke-screen agent and smoke generator; it may also be employed as antiknock agent. There could only be conflict with other agreements in the case of the Standard Agreements, by reason of its anti-knock quality. Action of any sort (informing the Reich or informing the Standard) is not warranted under prevailing circumstances, since no principle or commitment is involved.

To-day, the undersigned informed Director Dr. HUEBNER by telephone, that there are no objections on the part of the Central

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-6193
CONTINUED

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

Office (zentralstelle).

(illegible initials)

C E R T I F I C A T E O F T R A N S L A T I O N


16 September 1947

I, Victoria ORTON, ETO No. 20 129, hereby certify that I am a duly appointed translator for the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpt from document No. NI-6193.

Victoria ORTON
ETO No. 20 129.

- 2 -
"END"

THE INTERLOCKING OF RAW MATERIALS OF THE PRODUCTION OF POWDER, EXPLOSIVES AND PRELIMINARY PRODUCTS



CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
 23 July 1947
 I, ROBERT BROWN, 2 377499, herewith certify that I
 am thoroughly conversant with the English and German
 languages; and that the above is a true and correct
 translation of the document No. KL-6379.
 Robert Brown, Jr. No.
 2 377499

(Three rubber stamps) - Reich Marks for the original and
- Reich Marks for the duplicate not shown
Revenue Office Exchange for Stamp Duty Berlin 3 Reich Marks (unintelligible word) stamp cancelled.

Berlin, 10 August 1935

Revenue Office Exchange (Finance
office)

(Signature)

Between the

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, Frankfurt am Main
(hereinafter referred to as I.G.)

and the

Orgacid G.m.b.H., Berlin
(hereinafter referred to as Orgacid)

the following contract was concluded:

Article 1.

Under the contract with the Verwertungsgesellschaft of the Montan-Industrie G.m.b.H. and at their expense Orgacid shall build a new plant at Amendorf in Munich for the production of Ethyl-oxide from alcohol and further, the production of polyglycol M. from Ethyl-oxide. After the completion of the plant Orgacid shall conclude a management and maintenance contract with the Verwertungsgesellschaft of the Montan-Industrie G.m.b.H.

Article 2.

Orgacid shall commission the I.G., in agreement with the Buckau Chemical Factory A. G. in Halle(Saale), to build the plant and to make it, including the calculated estimates, structurally efficient. Moreover, the I.G. shall undertake to give all chemical technical advice during building concerning the setting in motion and the running of the factory, including the experimental work which may become necessary. The building direction and supervision shall be looked after by Orgacid alone; to this end I.G. shall place an engineer at their disposal for the duration of the building work, including the trial running of the plant. Orgacid shall undertake the payment of this engineer.

In compensation for their projected activity referred to above I.G. shall receive from Orgacid a sum of 125,000 Reich Marks.

(page 2 of original)

Article 3.

I.G. shall undertake to make and furnish various special apparatus (Kontakktaschen) (o.g. contact pockets). For the special apparatus special purchase contracts shall be effected at any time.

If the management of the plant passes from the Orgacid into other hands, or if there is a change in the ownership of the plant, the agreement of the I.G. shall not be necessary for the cession of the special apparatus, as long as the purpose of the plant remains the same. For any other alteration in the management or change of ownership the agreement of the I.G. shall be required for the cession of the special apparatus. Orgacid shall bind the present owner of the plant, the Verwertungsgesellschaft of the Montan-industrie G.m.b.H. to the same obligations, as far as is necessary and shall undertake the liability for their observance by this company.

Article 4.

I.G. shall hand over free of charge to Orgacid its present and future processes and practical experience for the production of Ethyl-oxide from alcohol and in the production of polyglycol H. from Ethyl-oxide. The application of the processes and practical experience thus passed on can only be made use of by Orgacid and in Orgacid's new plant at Amendorf. Any exploitation of the processes which deviates from this shall be possible only with the express written agreement of the I.G. and requires a special ruling.

If the new plant is put into production for the purpose intended, the I.G. shall at the request of Orgacid, provide a chemist or engineer deemed suitable for the work, whose salary shall be paid by Orgacid.

(page 3 of original)

Article 5.

Orgacid shall keep strictly secret all information gained as to the processes, practical results and supplies of the I.G. This shall apply also to the drawings produced and the apparatus supplied by I.G. During the actual building, care must be taken that only those persons directly employed in the building of the new plant have access to the building site and knowledge of the plans. Orgacid shall also take care that during the actual building and after its completion the new plant can only be viewed with the special approval of the responsible and competent Reich agency in Berlin.

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

Orgacid shall also bind to secrecy those of their employees who are in any way connected with the plant, and shall, within the limits of the law, and at their own expense, prohibit their employees to accept employment with competitors. Orgacid can, with the consent of I.G., renounce the observance of the obligation not to compete.

Article 6.

In so far as the chlorine necessary to Orgacid for the running of the plant cannot be placed at their disposal by their companies, it is to be obtained from I.G. at market prices.

Article 7.

This contract shall be valid for the duration of the existence of the new plant envisaged in Article 1. Either party has the right to terminate the contract

(page 4 of original)

by giving one year's notice up to 31 December 1945. Should such notice not be given, the contract is tacitly extended over a further 10 years.

The obligation to secrecy of Orgacid according to Article 5, paragraph 1, is not affected by the expiration of the contract.

Berlin, 3 July 1935
ORGACID GESELLSCHAFT n.b.H.
(Signature)
Engelhard

Ludwigshafen a.Rh. 22 July 1935
I.G.FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
(Signatures)
(probably) Husserung per pro Ambros

(page 5 of original)

ORGACID G.M.B.H.
Berlin O 17/Naglerstr. 17

Bank account:
Berliner Handels Gesellschaft
Berlin W 8, Behrenstr. (Nr. illegible)
Postal Check :
Berlin NW 148176
Telephone: E 8 Andreas 4840

Registered.

Dr. Bocckler
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Ludwigshafen/Rhein.

Your reference	Your communication	Our reference (to be quoted in reply)	Berlin O 17
Legal Department Dr. Boe/O.	of 22nd of July, 1935	Dr. E/P.	9th August 1935

Re: Contract dated 22nd July 1935.

This is to confirm that the Polyglycol M, produced in the new plant of the Orgacid in Arzendorf will be exclusively used for the production of Dichlordiaethylsulphide. Its use for any other purpose is subject to the provision under Clause 4.

With German Salute

(Signature illegible)

(page 6 of original)

Contract concluded between

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, Frankfurt a.M.,
(hereinafter referred to as I.G.) on the one part

and

Chemische Fabrik Buckau, Anmendorf/Saalkreis,
(hereinafter referred to as Buckau),

Degca Aktiengesellschaft (Luergesellschaft), Berlin
(hereinafter referred to as Degca),

and Th. Goldschmidt Aktien-Gesellschaft, Essen,
(hereinafter referred to as Goldschmidt) on the other part

Clause 1.

Buckau and Degca are the sole partners of the Orgacid G.m.b.H.
with Head Office in Berlin. Their shares amount to 50%. Gold-
schmidt owns the majority of the Buckau shares.

Clause 2.

Buckau, Degca and Goldschmidt are cognizant of the contract
concluded between Orgacid and I.G. on the 3rd July 1935.

Clause 3.

Buckau, Degca and Goldschmidt make themselves responsible for the
strict fulfilment of all obligations undertaken by the Orgacid
in its contract with the I.G. of the 3rd July 1935.

Clause 4.

Buckau, Degca and Goldschmidt likewise undertake for their own
part to fulfil the following obligations incumbent upon Orgacid
in accordance with the contract between I.G. and Orgacid dated
3rd July 1935.

(Page 6 bears stamps to the value of RM 125.-/with an impress
stamp.)

- RM for the original
- RM for duplicate

total 125 RM in stamps duly cancelled.

Berlin, 10th August 1935

Finance-office Boerse (Finanzkasse)
Signature illegible

(page 7 of original)

- 1.) Restrictions concerning use of the special apparatus supplied by I.G. (Clause 3)
- 2.) Renunciation to make any other use of the processes and practical results ceded, unless I.G. agrees. (Clause 4, Paragraph 1).
- 3.) Absolute secrecy (Clause 5, Paragraph 1) and
- 4.) Application of the ban on employees, engaged in the new plant, to accept employment with competing concerns. (Clause 5, Paragraph 2)

Clause 5.

In the event of a change of ownership of the Orgacid shares or of the Buckau shares, Buckau, Degea and Goldschmidt undertake to bind their legal successors to the obligations entered into in the foregoing Clauses 3 and 4, and in the event of a further transfer of Orgacid or Buckau shares, to transfer the said obligations to the future legal successors.

Berlin, 4th July 1935
DEGEA AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
(AUERGESELLSCHAFT)
two illegible signatures

Essen, 6th July 1935
CHEMISCHE FABRIK BUCKAU
two illegible signatures

Th. GOLDSCHMIDT A.G.
(signed) illegible

Ludwigshafen a. Rh., 22nd July 1935
Goldschmidt I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
two illegible signatures

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

4 June 1947

I, Victoria ORTON, No. 20 129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-5681.

.....
Victoria ORTON, No. 20 129

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4495
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR MILITARY CLAIMS

I.G.Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft Bitterfeld, 30 June 1936

To:
Ministerialrat Dr. BUHL

in pencil:
talked to
BONGWARTD
B.

Frankfurt/Main
Gruenburgerplatz

Confidential!
Registered!

Dear Dr. BUHL,

I have received from Department L Frankfurt/Main (reference: Dept. L (E) BGT/SCH) a report dated 29 June on the subject of the licensing for use in Italy of a process for the production of ethylene and glycol. Glycol is produced from ethylene through ethylene oxide. Ethylene oxide is widely used for products of purely industrial importance, as for instance dyeing auxiliaries and glycol for car radiators etc. On the other hand ethylene oxide is the basic material for those products for which we have made an agreement with Dr. ZIEHL (Helye 1) and for the production of which, plants will be set up at GOLDSCHMIDT's at Lippendorf, with the support of Ludwigshafen, (namely glyoxyn and also mustard gas). - Since we work in the closest collaboration with the Government in connexion with these products, following the release of the process for the production of ethylene and diglycol (diglycol can be produced with the same apparatus as glycol), I think it advisable to point out these close connexions to Department L, and before making an offer, to make enquiries at the office of THOMAS or Dr. ZIEHL as to the attitude of the Government towards the granting of a license to Italy.

I should be greatly obliged if you would inform Mr. BONGWARTD of the situation and consult him as to what steps we are to take in order to obtain approval for the making of an offer.

With German greetings
Yours very sincerely
(signature) illegible

Initial: B

Ms. No 17

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

2 August 1947

I, Beryl HESSICK, AGO No. D-427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-4495.

Beryl HESSICK
AGO No. D-427459

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
Bitterfeld

CONFIDENTIAL !

File Note on a conference with Ministerialrat Dr. ZAHN, on 13 November 1936.

1. I called on Dr. ZAHN to show him by means of a map of the dye factory WOLFEN the site recently chosen by us for the new production of calcium sulphuric acid and to ask him whether he had any objections to our choice. He had none. Dr. ZAHN only inquired whether the plant for manufacturing phosgene located in the vicinity did not trouble us.

On this occasion I asked Dr. ZAHN whether any interest existed in our establishing a second calcium sulphuric acid plant beside the first. Dr. ZAHN replied that in future the Reich would grant no more funds if factories were erected on strange territory. For that reason a contract such as was for instance made with us for diglycol was out of the question. Furthermore, Dr. ZAHN told me that in his opinion two more plants for the manufacture of calcium sulphuric acid would be needed as emergency plants (Bereitschaftsanlagen), the location of which, however, was not fixed yet.

2. Dr. ZAHN told me that he himself had unfortunately overlooked sending us the arbitration contracts together with the frame contract for diglycol. In the meantime, he had attended to this and asked that we should soon return the arbitration contract to him that he may sign the frame contract and the matter may be settled.

As to the production facilities for diglycol, Dr. ZAHN referred to the fact that at Ludwigshafen up to 350 tons could be produced monthly, a quantity which he thought would not yet be needed at present, because each powder had not been tested for a possible use of diglycol.

(Page 2 of original)

3. Dr. ZAHN is of the opinion that in the near future, we shall have to increase our phosgene production to a capacity of 500 tons and that soon the building of the acetophenon-plant would be ripe for decision, too. In this connection he drew my attention to the fact that we should inform him if we wanted any assistance in the procurement of raw materials (especially iron) particularly non-rationed raw materials for the plants now under construction e.g. stabilizers (applications concerning the supply of rationed raw materials, especially substitute metals, would be submitted to him in any case and would be recommended). He will then give us a permit to the effect that the non-rationed raw materials wanted by us are needed for direct orders of the Armed Forces, a permit which will help speeding up the supply considerably.

4. I told Dr. ZAHN that Dr. KIBLENZ had not called on us up to now on account of perchloron and that therefore, we could not submit proposals yet.

5. Dr. ZAHN, as he told me, had had a longer talk with Dr. RITTER before the meeting with me. On the basis of that discussion, Dr. ZAHN asked me whether we used chlorine for our magnesium. He had learned from Dr. RITTER that chlorine was not necessary in a certain process. I replied thereupon I could imagine that that process started from carnallit (Wintershall) whereas we worked with magnesia. Dr. ZAHN's inquiry can be traced back to the fact that they had conferred about the chlorine situation with Dr. RITTER and evidently felt apprehension that there was not sufficient chlorine in the "A-Case" (in A-Falle).

(signed) G. PISTER

Ministerialrat Dr. BUHL
Dr. SCHOENER/Dr. VIRCK/O.I. MUELLER
Dr. BURGIN/Director v.d.Bey (for information and return)

Bitterfeld, 14 November 1936

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P. No. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-4490

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
U.K. Civilian
M.P. No. 34079

(E H D)

58

69.268.101 4 607

I. G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

Technical Department

Postal address:	Telegraphic address:	Telephone:
I.G.Farbenindustrie	Anilinfabrik	Local calls 6692
Aktiengesellschaft	Ludwigshafen a.Rhein	Trunk calls 6693
Technical Department		
Ludwigshafen a.Rh.		

9

Business hours:	Banks:
8-17 o'clock, closed Saturdays	Reichsbank-Giro-Account
Visitors:	Postscheck a/c No.5816
1-12 o'clock except Mondays	Office Ludwigshafen a.Rh.

To the

Regierungspräsident ,
M ü n s t e r . i . Westf.

Our reference:
TA/Bá/Fa.

Ludwigshafen a.Rh.,
7.12.1936 n/q.

Re: Industrial and Building Police Approval for the
Construction of a plant for the Production of
Ethyleneoxide in our Works at Zweckel (Gladbeck) .

We send you herewith works specifications, construction and installation plans, capability proofs (Festigkeitsnachweise) for the building of a plant for the production of Ethyleneoxide in our works at Zweckel (Gladbeck) and request you to obtain the approval of the Industrial and Building Police by virtue of Article 22 a of the German Reich Industrial Order through the Economic Ministry.

We would mention that the necessary land for the plant has been made over to us for this purpose by the owners of the Bergwerksgesellschaft HIBERNIA Aktiengesellschaft in Herne, in accordance with the hereditary building rights contract made before the notary Dr. HOHMANN in Herne on 13. November 1936. The necessary sanction in accordance with the Law of Dwelling Settlements has been issued by the Oberbürgermeister of the town of Gladbeck i.Westf. as from the 24. July, 1936.

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
(2 signatures illegible)

140 enclosures
as per list.

All correspondence requested in
triplicate.

(page 2 of original)

I. G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

Telegraphic address	Telephone	Business hours	Banks:
Sulfur Bitterfeld	Bitterfeld No. 2941, 3041	Monday to Fri- day 7 ⁰⁰ - 16 ⁰⁰ hours	Reichsbankneben- stelle Bitter- feld, Schausell & Co., Bitterfeld Commerz- u. Privat- bank, A.G. Zweig- stelle Bitterfeld Postscheckkonto Leipzig 29 516 Berlin 26 719

S e c r e t !

Confidential !

Files 2 W 3/3
-----IV 15887
attached 9/4/37

N 5323 37 E

To the
Regierungspräsident

M e r s e b u r g .

Bitterfeld, 5.4.1937.

Our ref.
Ing. Verw.
A/Schg.

Re: Extension of the Teutschenthal Works.

We have the intention of undertaking an alteration and extension in our Teutschenthal Works. This alteration is necessary in order to convert our Magnesium producing plants, for which the Teutschenthal works supplies a preliminary product, to the use of pure German raw materials. Instead of the preliminary product Magnesiumoxide as hitherto, in future, by addition of condensed Chloride-magnesium¹ye, the preliminary product Magnesiumoxychloride will be produced.

As the Teutschenthal Works has been conceded on grounds of secrecy in accordance with Article 22a RGO, (Reich Legal Regulation) we are of opinion that the proposed extension must also be dealt with in accordance with Article 22 a. With reference to the conversation at the Teutschenthal Works on 2.4.37 with Governmental and Industrial Counsellor (Regierungs- und -gewerberat) Dr. LOCZKA, we send you herewith a plan together with a works specification with scheduled drawing each in duplicate, requesting you to obtain from the Reich and Prussian Economic Ministry the sanction for the extension of the plant, as well as the permission to begin building immediately before the conclusion of the concession procedure.

Heil Hitler !

I.G.FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
(Signature) Burgin

Fencilled note
illegible
Enclosures

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6764
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION .

I, Victoria Orton, 20 129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-6764.

Victoria ORTON
20 129 .

- 3 -
"END".

61

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, Frankfurt (Main) 20
Sales Combine Chemicals.

Our reference Date Page

REGISTERED. Confidential

Stamp:
Chloride Sub-Committee

To:
Generaldirector Dr. Th. Goldschmidt,
c/o Dr. Th. Goldschmidt A.G.
Essen

- - v.H./Dr.B./L.

4 March 1937

Orgacid - G.a.b.H.

Dear Dr. Goldschmidt,

We have already informed you, at the end of our letter of 24 February 1937, that in order to safeguard our interests we shall have to stipulate a few conditions for beginning to operate the Amendorf plant ahead of schedule. In the meantime, we had the opportunity to discuss the matter within our firm. The agreement of 3/22 July 1935 was drawn up to fit a special case. It now becomes apparent that the plant is to be operated partly or in full irrespective of this special case. If this is a fact, the regulations laid down in the agreement cannot, in our opinion, be applied as they are; we assume that you will be of the same opinion. An agreement on the operation of the plant ahead of schedule should, in our opinion, include the following basic clauses:

1. Your company or the Chemische Fabrik Buckau would have to take over the management of the factory. We are prepared within the stipulations of Art. 2 of the agreement of 3/22 July 1935, to give the assistance necessary to get the plant going.
2. The intermediate and finished products of the entire plant, or even the initial production stage of the plant, must be used exclusively for the requirements of the Reich; they must not be marketed either at home or abroad. Any use of the intermediate or finished products which is not in accordance with this stipulation must previously be approved by us; for such cases special regulations will have to be drawn up and agreed upon.

(page 2 of original)
3. If the Orgacid discovers improvements of the processes disclosed to it by us, gains special experience in this sphere, or invents new processes, these advantages are to be disclosed to us without compensation.
4. As long as the regulation given under No.2. is adhered to, we have no share in whatever profit the Orgacid may make.

(page 2 of original cont'd)

5. Deliveries of Chlorine: Clearly the clauses contained in the now existing agreement are valid only for the case for which the agreement has been made. If plant operation is begun ahead of the scheduled date, however, these deliveries are considered, as far as the Chlorine syndicate is concerned, as own consumption of Buckau, which holds officially a 50%-share in the capital of the Orgacid, but between you, Dr. Goldschmidt, and I.G., the position must be considered to be the same as if not you, but we were the holders of 50% of the company's share capital, since we have constructed the entire plant and have put our processes and experience at its disposal. However, we are prepared to settle the question thus that you supply 25% of the requirements and we the remaining 75%.

We should like you to discuss this matter with the executives of the Orgacid and to propose, as soon as possible, a date for a discussion on the details of the agreement.

Mit deutschem Gruss!

I.G. FARBEINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

Distribution of copies: (signed) v. Heider
Dr. Ambros/Dr. Steinig, Ludwigshafen
Dr. Boeckler, Ludwigshafen, Legal Department Dr. Münster, Ludwigshafen
Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt on Main
v. Heider, Frankfurt on Main.

(Distribution is given on the copies only, not on the original)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

25 July 1947

I, WALTER K. GALEWSKI, ETO 20145, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7274.

WALTER K. GALEWSKI, ETO 20145.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7275
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft Ludwigshafen a. Rh.
Legal Department

Rubber stamp: Chlor Uko

Our reference:
Legal Department
Dr. Boe/S

Date:
12 March 1937

Page:

Director Dr. ter Meer,
Director v. Heider,
Director Dr. Ambros,
Director Dr. Wurster,
Dr. Steinig,

Frankfurt a.H.
"
Ludwigshafen a.Rh.
"
"

Orgacid G.m.b.H.

In reply to the letters of which you have copies we have received a letter from the Th. Goldschmidt A.G., dated the 10th inst. copy of which is attached, enclosing a copy of the letter from Orgacid, dated the 4th inst.. We are surprised at the attitude Orgacid and the Th. Goldschmidt AG have taken. In view of the fact that for reasons known to you we should like to refrain from detailed negotiations in writing, we suggested a joint discussion in our letter of today to Dr. Goldschmidt in Berlin, of which we enclose a copy. We shall refer to this matter once more after the discussion.

With German Saluto
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Legal Department
Signature: Boehne (?)

Confidential!
Personell!

(page 2 of original)

Farbonindustrie Aktiengesellschaft Ludwigshafen a. Rh.

Managing Director
Dr. Theo Goldschmidt,
at Hotel Bristol,
Berlin

Legal Department Dr. B. o/B.
12 March 1937

Orgacid G.m.b.H.

Dear Dr. Goldschmidt,

Today we received your letter of the 10th of this month, with enclosure, and have just tried to reach you in Essen by telephone. We were told by your secretary's office that you were in Berlin at the present. We would therefore like to inform you there that we are compelled to maintain our attitude, as expressed in our various letters, in regard to the application of the Orgacid contracts to the Amendorfer Plant now to be put into operation, and that we are unable to recognize the dissenting opinion held by yourself and Orgacid. In view of the fact, however, that this matter is hardly suitable for detailed negotiations in writing, we should like to suggest to you a meeting to take place as soon as possible in order to discuss this subject. This meeting would be attended, on our side, in addition to our local representatives, by Director v. Heider (Management Department Chemicals, Frankfurt a.M.) as regards the chlorine question. Next week, say Friday the 19th, would probably be acceptable for us. Kindly telephone us, as soon as possible, perhaps next Monday, whether that day suits you and whether you would undertake to notify the gentlemen of Orgacid. Otherwise, we will send the invitation to Orgacid from here.

With German Salutes!
I.G. Farbonindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
signed: v. Knieriem

Copies to
Dir. Dr. Ambros,
Dr. Steinig,
Director v. Heider, Frankfurt a.M.
Director Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt a.M.

Copy

(page 3 of original)

Copy!

Th. Goldschmidt A.G., Essen.

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.,
Legal Department,
Ludwigshafen a. Rhein

Your reference:
Dr. Boc/S

Your letter of:
5 March 37

Department
Secretary's office
K.

10 March 1937

Orgacid G.m.b.H.

We refer today to your letter of the 24th of last month and enclose herewith copy of a letter from Orgacid G.m.b.H., dated 4th of this month, commenting on your statements. Unfortunately, according to this, it is not possible to comply with your wish for representation in the Aufsichtsrat of the company mentioned.

In reference to starting the operation of the plant, we are also unable to detect in the contract concluded between the Orgacid G.m.b.H. and yourselves any basis for the distinctions made by you. The plant is being put into operation for the only purpose specified in the contract and under the terms of the contract, so that there is no necessity for any further arrangements, as outlined in your letters of the 4th and 5th of this month. Nevertheless, we are prepared to discuss chlorine deliveries with you, all the more so as the question of our chlorine participation, within the framework of our special agreement of 16 June 1930 on ethylene, is now becoming of interest, in view of the requirements of your spirit ethylene plants in Ludwigshafen and Wolfen.

With German Salutes!
Th. Goldschmidt A.G.
signed: Dr. Theo Goldschmidt

Copy to I.G. Sales Combine
Chemicals, Frankfurt a.M.

Enclosure!

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7275
CONTINUED

(page 4 of original)

Copy:

Orgacid G.m.b.H.,
Berlin O 17, Naglerstr.17

Chemische Fabrik Bockau,
Essen/Ruhr

Berlin O 17, 4 March 1937.

Subject:

I.G./Orgacid G.m.b.H.
Your letter dated 1 March 1937

According to paragraph 7 of the articles of association of the Orgacid G.m.b.H., dated 23 November 1934, the Aufsichtsrat of the company consists of a maximum of 5 persons. As this number has been reached, we regret to be unable to elect another gentleman. I should therefore like to suggest that you notify I.G. in this sense.

I also do not understand what is meant by the terms "a special case" and "operations taken up under different conditions" ("anderweitigen Inbetriebnahme") as mentioned in I.G.'s letter, dated 24 February of this year. The contract between Orgacid and I.G., dated 3/22 July 1935 is perfectly clear and admits of only one interpretation, and gives no grounds for any such interpretations as put forward by you.

Chairman of the Aufsichtsrat
signed: Quaschart

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

23 July 1947

I, JULIUS S. STEUER, AGO 442654, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7275.

JULIUS S. STEUER, AGO 442654.

-4-
"END"

67

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft Ludwigshafen on the Rhine
Department: Legal Department 6.4. 1937
Please state in your reply the above Dr. Bee/Pl.
reference.

Personal

To Messrs.

Director Dr. AMBROS, Ludwigshafen,
Dr. STEINIG, Ludwigshafen
Ministerial Councillor Dr. BUHL, Frankfurt on Main
Director von HEIDER, Frankfurt on Main
BORGELANDT, Frankfurt on Main

Gentlemen:

Subject: Wolfen and Ammendorf.

I am taking the liberty of forwarding to you for your information a copy of a registered letter of Th. GOLDSCHMIDT A.G., Essen, dated 5 inst., received here today. Practically speaking the matter Wolfen is settled, due to GOLDSCHMIDT's reply, as I positively presume that an agreement between Messrs von HEIDER and CORDES on the chlorine deliveries for Wolfen and Ammendorf will soon come about.

In compliance with a wish expressed by Dr. ENGELHARD, Manager of Orgacid, I shall discuss with him this week Orgacid agreement situation. Following the discussion with Herr ENGELHARD I shall revert to the matter.

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Legal Department Ludwigshafen
(sgd) BOECKLER

Enclosure

(2nd Page of original)

Registered

Th. Goldschmidt A.G., Essen

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Legal Department
Att.: Dr. jur. BOECKLER

Ludwigshafen on the Rhine

Strictly Confidential!

Central Office

5 April 1937

Gentlemen:

For order's sake we are confirming the discussion of the undersigned with your Messrs. von HEIDER, BORGELANDT and Dres. AMBROS, STEINIG and BOECKLER in your Main Administration Building in Frankfurt on Main on 24 March. We regret

that owing to a misunderstanding between him and the undersigned, Herr CORDER was not present.

- 1.) Chemical Factory HOLTEN/ Preparation for members' meeting on 16 April 1937.

The proposals which you wish to make for the sale of Triglycol manufactured in Zweckel meet with our approval also that we secure to as large an extent as possible the patent rights of the Société Française de Catalyse Généralisée, for the Chemical Factory in Holten even in the case that the costs should be somewhat higher than we anticipated.

- 2.) Ethylene Plant in Wolfen.

You informed us that at the new plant in Wolfen you would manufacture Diglycol only for the Army Administration, and you asked us to release you from the obligations arising for that plant for the year of 1930 under the special agreement with regard to Ethylene.

We are willing to comply with your request and to hold our rights under the special agreement in abeyance as long and to the same extent as your rights with regard to the Orgacid plant in Amendorf are being held in abeyance. In this respect we merely presume that an agreement will be arrived at as regards the chlorine delivery by the two plants.

- 3.) Orgacid, G.m.b.H.

In our opinion the contracts are so explicit that the agreements suggested in your letter of 4 March 1937 are

(3rd Page of original)

unnecessary. Agreements would become necessary only in case less than the total production would be used for the proposed purpose. According to Herr BORGMANN's report the market situation appears to make it desirable that the A-plant works full capacity. Endeavors should be made to utilize the surplus for the benefit of the Chemical Factory in Holten. As, presumably, no profits will thereby be obtained in Amendorf special agreements are superfluous.

- 4.) Chlorine.

This material will evidently become very scarce so that there will hardly be any interest clashes with regard to delivery. We have agreed that after his return Herr. von HEIDER will settle his wishes with Herr CORDES.

On account of the confidential nature of the letter we are only forwarding it in one copy.

Th. GOLDSCHMIDT A.G.

(sgd) Dr. THEO GOLDSCHMIDT

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-4484
Cont'd

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO NO. X -46355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-4484.

HERTHA C. KNUTH
U. S. Civilian
AGO NO. X 046355

END

M e m o r a n d u m

on the conference re: O r g a c i d,
in the morning of 31 May 1937, at
Ludwigshafen/Rhein

31 May 1937 Dr.Boe/Pl.

P e r s o n a l

CONFIDENTIAL!

Present: Director: Dr. STRUSS, Frankfurt/Main
Director Dr. AMBROS, Ludwigshafen
Dr. STEMMIG, Ludwigshafen
Dr. BOECKLER, Ludwigshafen

1. BOECKLER reports on a discussion he had had with Herr ENGELHARD of Auer, in Berlin, on 13 May 1937. Herr ENGELHARD advised at that time that Auer had received various inquiries from abroad for the erection of poison gas plants. Auer is on principle not averse to taking over establishing same. As only the converting installation would come under the scope of Auer's sphere of work, however Auer was looking for a firm which would erect the Glycol installation. As a result of the cooperation initiated at Ammendorf the idea came up to inquire whether either directly or through a fictitious nominee (Strohmann) I.G. would be prepared to erect the Glycol installation. Auer itself would then erect the converting plant, probably through a fictitious nominee in collaboration with the Hanseatische Apparatebau-Gesellschaft who are business friends and under the influence of GOLDSCHMIT. Auer is asking I.G. to study the case and to give an answer.

STRUSS replies that now as before I.G. wishes to keep aloof from poison gas plants, that there is no change in the decision taken earlier.

AMBROS points out that on the whole we would not be interested in the cooperation because our construction offices are already very busy and because the erection of the installations mentioned by Auer would not yield appreciable profits.

STEMMIG reports that he met ENGELHARD on the 28th and that he concluded from ENGELHARD's utterances that also Auer's interest in the erection of foreign plants has somewhat diminished.

(Page 2 of original)

After continued discussion it is being decided that BOECKLER is to communicate to Dr. ENGELHARD the following: * a basic decision on cooperation with Auer as a general arrangement cannot be made; conditions for the individual projects as they arise might vary too considerably. Therefore I.G. would have to make its decision from case to case. Auer should approach I.G. with each individual project so that I.G. could examine whether cooperation is possible.

2. In connection with the above mentioned matter the two projects for ethylone plants in Italy and in Japan are being discussed. The Japanese project can probably be considered a matter which for I.G. is finished. The Italian project on the other hand, is under all circumstances to be followed up further, if necessary even at a reduction of the license rate now asked.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-5692
Cont'd

3. Orgacid's letter of the 24th inst. to the Legal Department at Ludwigshafen is being discussed. In conformity with Orgacid's request, I.G.'s processes and experiences available also for further installations. The letter of the Legal Department to Orgacid, of 31 May 1937, contains the particular details.

(Initial) "B" (Translator's Note:
Dr. Fritz Boeckler's
initial)

Copies to Director Dr. AMBROS
Dr. STEMMIG
Director Dr. STRUSS, Frankfurt/Main

- (Translator's Note: A handwritten footnote is to go in here:) Processed 31 May. Taken care of on the occasion of a visit by Dr. ENGELHARD and in the presence of W. STEMMIG on 4 June 1937.

(Initial) "B" (Translator's Note:
Dr. Fritz Boeckler's
initial)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO NO. X 046355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI - 5692.

HERTHA C. KNUTH
U. S. Civilian
AGO NO. X 046355

END

I.G. Farbenindustrie
Aktiengesellschaft

Tea - Fuero
(Office of Technical Committee),
attention of: Director Dr. Struss,

F r a n k f u r t / M a i n .

(Stamp): SECRET

1. This is a state secret in the meaning of paragraph 88 RStGf (Reich Penal Code)
2. Transmittal only in sealed letter, in case of postal dispatch as "Registered letter".
3. To be kept under lock and key, at receiver's responsibility.

(Translator's Note:
4 initials illegible).

Dr. G/W.

14 May 1937.

(Translator's Note: Handwritten remark):
Discussed on 31 May with Ambros, Struss
and Steinmig. (Illegible initial).

Gentlemen:

Establishments abroad, for Chemical Warfare Agents.

As we are understanding from Dr. Foeckler, Ludwigshafen, the Degesa A.G. has approached the latter with the question of whether it would not be expedient for our firm to abandon its stand heretofore taken according to which no establishments were to be erected abroad for chemical warfare agents. The Auergesellschaft considers a change in our present standpoint worth considering especially under the following two aspects:

- 1.) Inquiries from abroad whether German firms would take over the erection of chemical warfare agents establishments or would at least grant their assistance are said to have come in so frequently ^{lately} that the very fact of continued negative answers to inquiries from abroad would mean a renunciation of considerable economic profit.
- 2.) In view of the change in public opinion with regard to military questions the standpoint stressed until now by I.G. in particular, to the effect that the erection of such establishments producing chemical warfare agents might detrimentally affect the strictly civilian business interests of our firm in foreign countries, would no longer seem to have the previous significance.

Degesa AG's idea as to possible co-operation in the erection of foreign establishments for the production of chemical warfare agents is that in a manner similar to that used at home, I.G. more or less creates the plants for the primary products while the Auergesellschaft itself - in an arrangement analogous to that with Orgazid G.m.b.H. at home - would work on the final phases of the production of chemical warfare agents.

(page 2 of original)

(Translator's note: Illegible initial).

We should like to ask you to advise us as to the opinion of the I.G. management on the points of view of the Auergesellschaft, in order that we might inform the latter firm appropriately.

(Stamp):
Vermittlungsstelle W
Military Liaison Office
(signed): G o r r .

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION.

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO No. X - 046355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI - 5693.

27 May 1947

HERTHA C. KNUTH
AGO No. X - 046355.

(E N D)

(Transl. Note:
Stamp: SECRET).

Dr. P./F.

26 October 1938.

N o t e .

Subject: Working-association in the field of chemical warfare agents.

The Central Office for Contracts will be interested in the following statements, made under cipher 3 of a file-note, concerning a discussion between director Dr. AMERUS, Dr. ENGELHARD (Auer-Gesellschaft) and Dr. POECKLER in Berlin on 21 October 1938.

Dr. ENGELHARD suggests closer co-operation between Auer and I.G., in the shape of a working-association in the field of chemical warfare agents. The following principles - first drafted quite roughly - are to apply to the working-association:

The working-association is a company in civil law. No foundation of a special corporate body (legal person) will be made.

For the time being, Auer and I.G. are to be the partners of the working-association. Dr. ENGELHARD will join it as a third partner, after he leaves Auer. An extension of the working-association will be possible. The working-association forms a working committee to which each of the partners sends a representative. The working-association will be represented to the outside by Dr. ENGELHARD, particularly with regard to the authorities. The sphere of work of the working-association will be chemical warfare agents. It will therefore be necessary from the very beginning to work in closest connection with the authorities concerned (H.W.A.) (Army Ordnance Office). The different tasks of the working-association within its sphere of action are still to be fixed exactly, for instance giving advice to the official authorities on new problems, planning of experiments, for the interests of the different partners etc. No partner, however, shall be obliged to reveal business-secrets in other fields, which are of importance to him.

Dr. ENGELHARD will discuss the idea of the working-association with Ministerialrat Counsellor ZAHN, without obligation; he will then inform the working-association about the result and likewise submit more precise proposals for the tasks of the working-association and for

(Page 2 of original)

the adjustment as to the results of its work (patents, "know-how" etc.).

(Translator's Note:
Handwritten notes:

Auergesellschaft
chemical warfare agents,
poison-gas
irritant-gas
tear-gas

illegible initials.

Dr. Poesckler informed that it is in my opinion
necessary to inform Prof. Hoerlein about the matter.

31 Oct. 1938 (Signature): Kolbe (?).)

(page 2 of original cont'd.)

Copies of this file-note were forwarded to:

Director Dr. ter Meer	Ffm., (Frankfurt /Main)
Ministerialrat Dr. Euhl	Ffm.,
Director Dr. Ambros	Lu., (Ludwigshafen)
Dr. Steismig	Lu.,
Dr. Wittwer,	Lu.

(page 3 of original)

Central Office for Contracts

October 1938

- S - 895

Auer-Gesellschaft

Deutsche Gasgluehdicht-Auer-Gesellschaft A.G.
- D E G E A -
(German Incandescent Gaslight Auer Joint Stock Co.)

B e r l i n O. 17.

C o m b a t

War-gas

Poison-gas)	
Tear - gas)	see under war-gas.
Irritant-gas)	

(Translator's note) Handwritten check marks against: poison-tear-and
irritant-gas, crosses against: combat and war gas.)

Forwarded to head of Sparten

Draft on

Finally on

(page 4 of original)

According to Dr. Pratzje the matter can be considered settled.

10 April 1941.

(Translator's note: Initial I or J.)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION.

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, E.T.O. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a
true and correct translation of Document No. NI - 4707.

21 May 1947.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
E.T.O. 34079.

(E N D)

76

(Translator's Note:
rubber stamp;) SECRET.

1. This is a State Secret in the sense of paragraph 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be forwarded under cover only, if sent by mail as "registered" only.
3. To be kept under lock and key at the risk of the recipient.

(Handwritten Note): 171.

Ministerialrat Dr. F u h l ,
I.G. Frankfurt.

Legal Dept.
Dr. Poe/S. 13 January 1939.

Aufsichtsrat for trustee firms for Reich plants (Aufsichtsrat bei
Treuhandgesellschaften fuer Reichsanlagen).

Dear Ministerialrat,

As I told you, I enquired yesterday forenoon in Berlin from Dr. Engelhard of the Orgacid as to how the set-up of the Aufsichtsrat at Orgacid had worked out until now. Dr. Engelhard, in reply to my various questions, told me the following main things:

1.) In addition to the representatives of Th. Goldschmidt A.G. and of the Aaorgesellschaft, Ministerialrat Dr. Zahn and Ministerialrat Dr. Zeidelhack belong to the Aufsichtsrat of Orgacid as representatives of the Reich.

2.) Normally an Aufsichtsrat meeting takes place only once yearly in connection with the General Meeting. The balance sheet and profit and loss account are then submitted to the Aufsichtsrat. The Aufsichtsrats meetings have hitherto been of a purely formal nature. More serious discussions and debates never came up. In particular, the representatives of the Reich never at any time made full use of their capacity as Aufsichtsrat member as to obtain through enquiries, answers on such points which the two shareholders (Goldschmidt and auor) would have wanted to treat as confidential.

3.) The members of the Aufsichtsrat of Orgacid receive a yearly remuneration of RM 1200.--. The Reich representatives also receive this remuneration. As regard to the Reich officials, it is so arranged that they must hand over to a specified Reich bank account a certain portion of Aufsichtsrat remunerations; the officials may retain the other part themselves. With the first Aufsichtsrat positions the portion which must be handed

(page 2 of original)

over to the Reich is the lesser; it increases with the additional number of Aufsichtsrat position so that an official holding a number of Aufsichtsrat positions would have only about RM 200.- left from certain positions. Dr. Engelhard emphasized that all the same the financial side played a certain part.

I did not want to fail to inform you of the above details immediately. In this connection I however beg to point out that Dr. Engelhard gave

his information in strict confidence. I must, therefore, ask you kindly not to pass on the source or the details of this information.

With kind regards and

Heil Hitler

I.G. FERREN INDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
Legal Department Ludwigshafen.

(signed) : F o e c k l e r .

Copy through Director Dr. Ambros
to Dr. Steinwig.

(Translator's Note: illegible
Initial . 14.1.39)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION.

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, E.T.O. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI - 5682.

23 May 1947.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
E.T.O. 34079.

(E N D)

Vermittlungsstelle V

Berlin N.W. 7.
Unter den Linden 82

Registered i

confidential i

Dr. v. B/Pf.

4th of February B./H.

17 February 1937

Wetting Agents B/A (Army Ordnance Office) (Tutor: HWA)

Gentlemen:

As regards the experiments which the Army Ordnance Office proposes we should like to offer the following comment:

As early as 1934, we supplied various wetting agents to Privatdozent (Unsalariated lecturer) at a university Dr. KEMP in Freiburg who wanted to bring precipitation of chemical warfare agents (smoke and mist) in closed premises by atomizing wetting agent solvents. Our files reveal that Dr. K. began by admitting that precipitation of "chemical warfare smoke" cannot be brought about by atomizing pure water, but that it can be done-although not completely - by adding Igepon to the water. During a discussion on 6.4. 1934 at Hochst, however, Dr. K. only reported on experiments which he conducted in the manner described with chloridacetophenone when the claimed effect was determined subjectively only. Later on Dr. K. reported about experiments to decompose - by means of wetting agent solvents - mustard gas in the liquid stage, - either suspended or emulsified - these experiments failed to have success in any essential degree. From the fact that he made no more mention of the atomizing experiments at any later date it may be safe to conclude that they did not meet with success.

As long as the chemical reciprocal reaction of two types of smoke is contingent on the particles of one fog having to come into immediate contact with the particles of the other one, no success can be expected. As soon as smoke particles exceed a certain range of size the strike probability (Stoßwahrscheinlichkeit) is very small. For literature on this refer to WINKEL and ZANDER. Suspended matters in gases: Ferdinand ENKE, Stuttgart, 1934; in particular, the curves, on page 37 and following. In the case of chemical warfare smoke one probably deals with particles somewhat larger than those of 10^{-10} g. 10^{-15} , which is the size used as an example in the literature referred to.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI - 6499
CONTINUED

(Page 2 of original)

Today, we sent (by freight prepaid) to the Experimental Command Munster-Nord (MVII), Munster near Hannover, Rohrhofer Weg, in one case, marked I.G. 73 271 2 kgs each, of

Igepon I Plv. High concentrate
Igepon AP high concentrate
Igepon KT
Leonil SB
Nokal BX
Eulphor O.

Management Department
(Signature:) HIRSCHEL AO/

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

11 July 1947

I, Herta KNUTH, Civ.No. AGO X 046 355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6499.

Herta KNUTH,
X 046 355.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6500
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Stamp:
In: 16 September 1938
Several handwritten Initials
Stamp: Secret.

I. G. Frankfurt
Sales Combine Chemicals

To:
I. G. Hoechst
for the attention of Director von Bruening

Your ref.	Your letter of	Our reference (to be quoted in the reply)	Report No.	Date
		Dept. L (E) G/D File No.		15 September 1938

Subject: Tutogen/Reich Ministry of Aviation.

Following the visit of Dipl. Ing. Schlichting, Ministry of Aviation Inspector, and our telephone conversation of yesterday with Dr. Bachran we agreed with you that the Tutogen production capacity should, for the present, be exploited to the full; exclusively to meet the requirements of the Reich Ministry of Aviation, which means that work is to go on in three shifts per day, including Sundays.

The output of Tutogen NK, amounting to approx. 2.5 tons per day, is to be reserved exclusively for the Ministry of Aviation. As a result of the erection of a new boiler, a task which is already under way, you will be able, from next week onwards, to produce 2.4 tons of Tutogen "new I" per day. The production capacity for this brand must also be utilized to the full. No decision has yet been made on the question of whether the output of Tutogen "new I" is also to be taken over by the Ministry of Aviation. We shall receive instructions on this point as soon as possible. If the Reich Ministry of Aviation does not want to dispose of the output of Tutogen "new I", we can use it for the execution of the orders of private customers (the Total has already placed an order for 10,000 kilograms). Until further instructions, however, deliveries of all orders to private customers for "NK" and "new I" are to be postponed as from to-day.

No decision has been made as to the delivery immediately on request of 20 tons of Tutogen NK, ordered by the Office for Industrial Research (wissenschaftliche Forschungsstelle). Mr. Schlichting, as well as we ourselves is going to try and influence the Office for Industrial Research to accept in future Tutogen E instead of "NK" the output of which would then be available to the Reich Ministry of Aviation also.

Department L (E)
Signature: Balor

MS:
to: Dr. Bachran.
MS;
Illegible Initial.

Stamp: Secret.

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of article 68 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be forwarded in sealed envelope only; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under safe lock and key.

(page 2 of original)

I.G.Hoechst
Department of the Directorate

Secret

Receipt.

1 document in original (the words "in original" are deleted)
in copy

from: I.G. Frankfurt - Sales Chemicals -
to: I.G. Frankfurt/Main - Hoechst for the attention of Dr. v. Brucning
dated: 15 September 1938 Reference Dept. L (E) G/D
subject: Tutogen / Reich Ministry of Aviation
received: 16 September 1938

To: Dr. Bachran

Signature: Bachran
Signature

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

27 June 1947

I, BERYL C. BESWICK, No. D 427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6500.

BERYL C. BESWICK, No. D427459.

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE A.G., FRANKFURT/MAIN 20

Grueneburgplatz

(Translator's Note: Handwritten
Note: M 8/7)

Office of Technical Committee
(TEA-Buero)

Very Confidential!

Internal

Legal Dept. Chemistry

6 July 1937

The attached note about Tetrachlortitan was handed to me by a personal acquaintance, who is at present living in Paris. According to his statement, I.G. has already tried to buy the process in France, but the sale was declined for reasons of National Defense. According to the statement of the go-between, there is, however, a possibility of obtaining the process via Austria.

I beg to be informed whether the process is of any interest.

Legal Department Chemicals

Enclosure:

B

(Translator's Note: Handwritten note:) See exchange of correspondence Th. Schott, Berlin, re Titan-White.

Handwritten Notes in Margin: G.F.?)

Note about TETRACHLORTITAN

Important work has been done with respect to the production of anhydrous Tetrachlortitan.

All processes known up to now are based on the influence of chlorine as a reducer in the presence of carbon.

Those processes have a great disadvantage. The carbon remaining after the reduction forms, together with the chlorine, mixtures of carbon-oxichloride which are hard to separate by distilling the Tetrachlortitan.

The resulting chloride titan contains therefore a certain quantity of oxichloride, which may vary from 1½ to 2%; in use the latter can cause serious personal injuries.

Our process is characterized by the direct influence of the chlorine on titan, without any obligation to interpose a reduction by means of carbon. In that way, we get a chemically pure tetrachlortitan, without danger either during the production or in use.

Besides its smoke-producing quality - a use which is well known by all staffs - tetrachlortitan can be used for the charging of projectiles, torpedos, or mortars, or as a solvent for Yperit, or as a composite of Carbonile, Cyanide or "araines" (?). (Translator's Note: Last word is quoted in French in the original with a question mark).

In the modern offensive and defensive war technique, tetrachlortitan has actually assumed an outstanding position. Because of its double quality as smoke forming agent and as carrier, tetrachlortitan has an importance in war technique which is equal to that of explosives. When the explosive fires a projectile and then causes it to explode, tetrachlortitan spreads in the air, carrying that poison which is suitable for the type of combat. Without tetrachlortitan, the poison spreads very little or even not at all.

In order to break through an offensive and to neutralize a territory, tetrachlortitan is the ideal solvent for the new chlorine - salt-petre-types with benzolene or estericyclic function, as they were previously recommended because of their special impregnative properties as regards leather and rubber. Moreover, these new types permit the poisoning of the animal cells without suffering neutralization by passing the cellulose.

Tetrachlortitan is, therefore, the carrier of those chemicals which make access to the area impossible; it has however yet another quality. In an attack on a position, as well as in the neutralization of an offensive, the projectiles charged with tetrachlortitan, even if they do not contain poison, cause a certain insecurity and a physical depression with the enemy, which is much more important than the effect of an invisible poison.

We repeat the reasons for the domination of tetrachlortitan:

(Page 2 of original)

- (a) Smoke forming agent.
- (b) Carrier, which enables the poisons to impregnate the various parts of an area or a house etc.
- (c) Tetrachlortitan makes the gases visible, which, at the time as it produces toxic effects, also causes demoralization amongst the combattants.
- (d) Tetrachlortitan changes the constitution of the gases so that they can penetrate through skin, gas masks, etc.
- (e) As tetrachlortitan is the natural solvent for a great number of poisons, it will be possible to use a great number of these poisons, that is, in a future war, also to disorganize sanitary services.

Possibilities for extension of the process.

The present political situation makes the problem of producing artificial clouds more important than ever.

If the consumption of this product decreases, the production price of our chlortitan and its unusual purity would permit the production of titanoxide, a pigment which is very important for paints on the basis of that chloride.

Paris, 16 April 1937

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P. NO. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-4049.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M.P. NO. 34079

END

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7490
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT LUDWIGSHAFEN ON RHINE

Copy

Registered

To the Office for German raw materials
and synthetics,

Berlin W 8
Behrenstrasse 68/70.

Second Group Dr. Ambros/Pro. 28 April 1937.

Stand-by plant Trostberg.

We acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 22 April and declare ourselves prepared to put our experience at your disposal for the extension of the stand-by plant at Trostberg, and to act as technical advisory office for the building operations.

In accordance with the contractual agreement, we await particulars on the foundation of the company taking control.

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

signed: ter Meer signed: Ambros

Copy To Herr Direktor Dr. ter Meer
" " " Dr. Roth
Building Office Buna-Werke G.m.b.H.

CARBON COPY

(page 2 of original)

Copy.

Ministerpräsident Generaloberst Goering
Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
Office for German raw materials and synthetics. Berlin, 22 April 1937

7 IV.4 Dr. Eck(oll)/Hu.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Subject: Stand-by plant Trostberg.

To the
Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.G.,
for the attention of Dr. Wildhagen,

Berlin NW 7
Schadowstrasse 4-5.

With reference to the conversation which took place yesterday at the office, I beg to inform you that on the model of the Hardt Carbide Works my office is to build a stand-by plant in the wood between Hardt and Techarting for the production of

500 tons of glycol per month
800 tons of thiodiglycol per month
1500 tons of acetic acid per month.

As proposed in the above mentioned discussion, it is envisaged when mobilization begins, as this is purely a stand-by plant, that the quantity of carbide necessary for production will be made available from the Carbide Works at Hardt to the extent of 75 - 80,000 tons.

The I.G. Farbenindustrie has already declared itself prepared to make available the plans and information necessary for the building of this plant, and is furthermore prepared to act as engineering advisory office for the building operations.

Since in yesterday's discussion you agreed to undertake the local building operations and the supervision of the building, I now request you to prepare the necessary directional plans for the further negotiations on the building contract, as arranged, so that closer contractual agreements can be arrived at as quickly as possible between the company set up by my office for this building project and yourselves.

(page 3 of original)

The plant as such, being purely a stand-by plant, will be installed with the Reich's money - closer arrangements on this will be laid down in the framework of the contracts to be concluded.

Furthermore I should like to inform you that my office plans to proceed with the further construction of this plant even in normal times, and to begin the production of carbide alcohol there. For this purpose it is proposed to install a further carbide oven in the Hardt carbide works and at the same time to lay on the necessary power for the running of the oven. On this question, however, details would have to be agreed on at a later date.

I enclose a copy of my letter to the I.G.

By order

signed: Loeb

Colonel of the General Staff
and Department Chief.

Enclosure

(page 4 of original)

Copy.

Ministerpräsident Generaloberst Goering
Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
Office for German raw materials and synthetics.

Berlin, 22 April 1937

Daily correspondence file number 130/37 IV.A Dr. Eckell/Hu.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Stand-by plant Trostberg.

Firm
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
for the attention of Herr Direktor Dr. Ambros,
Ludwigshafen on Rhine.

through Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 82.

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.G. on the stand-by plant to be built at Trostberg.

In accordance with I.G.'s promise, given to my office, to hold

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

themselves available as engineering advisory office for such plants, I request you to assist the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke in the necessary preparations.

By order

signed: Loeb

Colonel of the General Staff
and Office Chief.

Enclosure.

(page 5 of original)

"TOP SECRET"

III/Dr. Wittwer/U.

21 April 1937.

File Memorandum

of the discussion on 21 April 1937

Subject: Plant in Trostberg.

Those present: Baurat Janisch Bayerische Stickstoffwerke
Dr. Wildhagen
Dr. Baur
Captain Dr. Boysen Office for German raw materials
Dr. Eckell and synthetics.
Dr. Wirth
Dr. Wittwer

Dr. Eckell stated that a plant has been decided on in Trostberg for the "A.-Fall" to produce diglycol, Oxol and acetic acid. In the "A.-Fall" 80,000 tons of carbide should be commandeered for these products. The operation of the plant in peace-time is not envisaged. The carbide output capacity of the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke need not be increased, power need be laid on only in so far as it is necessary for the operation of the planned plant (chlorine factory, hydroelectrolysis etc.). The possibility will be considered, after the building projects put forward in the Four Year Plan have been carried out, of the later construction of a carbide oven with a capacity of 40,000 tons, including power, and of operating a corresponding alcohol plant in peace-time. On the basis of these statements, the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke declared that they were prepared to undertake the management of the building for this works. The Reich should found a company (chemistry project) which would conclude the building contract with the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke. Dr. Eckell explained that a directional letter would very shortly be written to the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke on the subject. In consequence of this letter

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke would then approach the I.G. Farbenindustrie, which will be available as consultant engineer for the building of the plant. The wooded tract by the Hardt Carbide works and Untergarchingingen was planned as the site for the plant. The Bayerische Stickstoffwerke will procure ordnance surveys of this land.

(S.S.) signed: Wittwer

(page 6 of original)

Ludwigshafen, 19 April 37.
6x

Trostberg

6,000 tons of diglycol per year
9,600 tons of Oxol-L per year

6,000 tons of diglycol

9,600 tons Oxol-L

↑ ← { 6,700 tons chlorine
2,400,000 cubic meter
H₂ (hydrogen)

7,400 tons Oxol

↑ ← { 2,000 tons sulphur
1,300,000 cubic meters
H₂ (hydrogen)

6,000 tons ethylene oxide

5,600 tons ethylene oxide

11,600 tons ethylene oxide

↑ ← 23,000 tons lime

22,000 tons chlorohydrin

↑ ← 24,000 tons chlorine

9,500 tons ethylene

18,500 tons alcohol

↑ ← 13,000,000 cubic meters
H₂ (hydrogen)

18,500 tons acetaldehyde

37,000 tons carbide

89

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7430
CONTINUED

(pages 7 and 8 of original)

Translator's note: Maps showing location of plants

Words as listed below:

Power station (Kraftwerk)

• Bayerische Stickstoffwerke (BSTW)

Factory (Fabrik)

Carbide factory (Carbidfabrik)

Nitrogen of lime (Kalkstickstoff)

Ammonium plant (Ammon Betrieb)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

6 August 1947

I, Patricia WOOD, No. 20139, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7430.

Patricia WOOD
No. 20139

- 6 -
"END"

90

in quadruplicate
..... Copy

30 June 1938

Stamp: Top Secret

Summary of Plan for stepping-up Production of
Powder and Explosives and Chemical Warfare Agents,
including primary Products.

The previous summary of 9/10 June 1938 described in fullest detail the expansion program; dead-lines for completion take into full consideration the difficulties of delivery as so far experienced.

Today's memorandum concerning the same production plan, but speeded up, of 30 June 1938 has examined possibilities for utmost acceleration and summarizes its findings. The first part of the memorandum gives a complete review in order to set off the difference between the planning contemplated heretofore, - as of 9/10 June 1938 - and today's stepped-up planning of 30 June 1938.

The second part of the memorandum shows in detailed review the individual fields, giving a list of the measures to be carried through.

It must be stressed here with particular emphasis that the expansion plan for speedier action can be put into effect only with the help of a fundamentally new and strict concentration of planning and execution in one hand.

The conditions and powers needed incidental thereto- which appropriately applied concern also other products important for military economy-are set forth in basic outline in a separate memorandum.

It is proposed to show individually the measures to be taken immediately in order to assure the accelerated expansion in the field of powder, munitions and chemical warfare agents.

(Transl's note:
Handwritten notation:
No. 40 received 28 September 38

(page 2 of original)

1.) <u>Explosives, Facilities for</u>	<u>17,100 tons per month</u>
<u>ultimate capacity</u>	
presently on hand	5,400 tons per month
to be readied, for start of	2,000 tons per month
production	
underconstruction and/or	1,100 tons per month
definitely planned	
new planning	8,600 tons per month
	1,600 tons per month
	(expansion)

In the field of explosives an appreciable capacity expansion by way of synthetic explosives (hexogen, ethylene, diaminedinitrate) is not possible for the time being. The research and development work covering this field must by all means be supported, to permit carrying into effect the program as outlined. Since before 1940 the beginning of operations in the first large-scale hexogen plant cannot be expected, immediate expansion of capacity must go by way of trinitro toluol. It is possible to step-up the tri-capacity of 6,300 tons per month, at present, (4,300 tons per month to be available for immediate use) to 9,900 tons per month, 1,600 tons per month (expansion at Kruemmel, Hessisch-Lichtenau, Clausthal, Elsnig) can be completed by the end of 1938; the remaining 2,000 tons per month (project 2) by the beginning of 1940.

Basic prerequisite for the above is that these projects be treated as top priority and that constructing firms be given assistance in every respect. In order to permit meeting the above dead-lines a decision on the part of competent authorities by the middle of July 1938 is necessary.

Expansion of toluol distillations can keep pace with the required speed. An immediate decision and placing of contracts with the firms which will execute building is also a prerequisite.

2.) <u>Powder:</u>	<u>Facilities for</u>	
	<u>ultimate capacity</u>	<u>18,100 tons per month</u>
presently on hand		5,000 tons per month
under construction and/or		
definitely planned		6,600 tons per month
new planning		6,500 tons per month

(page 2 of original, cont'd.)

Speeding-up the powder program is exclusively contingent on cutting-down of the time needed for building. The same

(page 3 of original)

general prerequisites apply, as already stipulated, for explosives. The diglycol needs can be satisfied in the required measure by systematic expansion.

The same also holds true for nitrating crabs.

3.) Chemical Warfare Agents.

a) <u>Mustard Gas</u>	<u>Facilities for</u>	<u>ultimate capacity</u>	<u>7,800 tons per month</u>
presently on hand	600 " " "	(200 as a reserve in Ludwigshafen)	
under construction and/or definitely planned	1,600 tons per month	5,500 " " "	(400 expansion Ammendorf)
New planning			

The superway for Mustard Gas production, from the technical viewpoint and that of raw materials, is that by way of the direct process which proposes 5,200 tons per month. Up to this time, however, tests relative thereto did not go further than the scale which the technical school provides; the first large-scale experimental station is to be erected at Huels, for 200 tons per month of D-Mustard Gas, and will not be ready for a start of operations until the spring of 1940.

Therefore, before one can proceed to build the Mustard Gas installations additionally proposed, based on the direct process (Direktverfahren) the experimental plant in Huels, as covered by present planning, must be in operation. This is the key factor for the establishment of the proposed 5,200 monthly tons of Mustard Gas, based on the direct process.

It should be investigated, however, whether by erecting facilities in a plant which is already in operation - in Schkopau, for example - it would not be possible to start operations at a much earlier date than the spring of 1940 scheduled for the D-L. - Experimental plant proposed for Huels, in which manner the work on constructing the D-L large-scale plant could be undertaken at an advanced date.

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

From a raw materials standpoint alone, i.e. as regards procuring the needed ethylene, the situation is clear since we are amply covered for the ethylene needs of the remaining establishments in terms of coking plant gases available in different places.

From the foregoing remarks it is therefore evident that

(page 4 of original)

the most important point for the procurement of the huge quantities of mustard gas by way of the direct process is to organize experimental and development work immediately and on a far-reaching scale, building on the experiences of organic chemistry's big industry and enlisting the help of the best heads working there.

b) <u>Arsenic Oil:</u>	<u>Facilities for ultimate capacity</u>	<u>750 tons per month</u>
presently on hand	100	" " "
under construction and/or planned	400	" " "
now planning	180	" " "

The expansion can be considered technically assured.

The output facilities for arsenic (in Austria) permits expansion in needed measure. Stockpiling should possibly also be provided for.

c) <u>W-Salt</u>	<u>Facilities for ultimate capacity</u>	<u>735 tons per month</u>
presently on hand	135	tons per month
under construction and/or definitely planned	600	tons per month

The expansion can be considered assured, technically speaking and from the viewpoint of raw materials.

TRANSLATION of DOCUMENT No. NI - 8841
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

2 August 1947

I, H.C. KNUTH, Civ., USA AGO No. 046 355 hereby certify that
I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages
and that the above is a true and correct translation of the
document Nr. KI.- 8841c. C

H.C. K N U T H

Civ., USA AGO No. 046 355

High Command of the Army
File No. 74 o M. 17 Ma B 9 VII
No. 340 / 38 Top Secret

Berlin MI 35, 29 March 1938
Tirpitzufer 72/76
Telephone: 31 00 12

(Please give the above file reference in your reply, quoting the date and a brief summary of the contents.)

(Stamp: TOP SECRET I)

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. Only to be handed over personally or delivered under double cover against receipt, to a personal address.
3. To be forwarded, if possible, by courier or a trustworthy person, if sent by post value to be quoted as over RM 1,000.-
4. Duplication of every sort, including preparation of excerpts, forbidden.
5. To be kept, at the responsibility of addressee, in a safe, in exceptional cases in a steel cabinet with combination lock.
6. Offenses against these orders will result in most severe punishment.

To the
Firm Bayerische Stickstoffwerke AG
Attention: Herr Baurat JÄNISCH
or representative

Berlin MI 7
Schadowstr. 4/5.

(illegible hand-written notes)

PRELIMINARY NOTICE

Subject: Project "Trostberg"
Order No. 9-7CC5/38 (handwritten note: Changed:
9/VII - 247 - C102/38)

The High Command of the Army will take over the establishment and financing of the stand-by plants, planned in the "Trostberg" project, for production of

- a) Diglycol with a capacity of 500 tons per month
- b) Thiodiglycol (Oxol) with a capacity of 600 tons per month,
- c) The plants necessary for the production of ethylene, chlorhydrino and ethylene oxide are included herein; Furthermore, in addition to that
- d) construction of a depot with a capacity of 5,000 tons of diglycol.

Decision concerning the construction of the plants required for the production of ethylene can only be made upon definite determination of the process of ethylene production which is to be used.

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

In spite of this fact the establishment of the plants mentioned above and of the depot will have to be started immediately.

Having regard to the conferences which were held with you and the gentlemen of the IG Ludwigshafen you herby receive the order for the execution of this project.

The planning already initiated by you is to be carried on more expeditiously, the necessary plans and estimates of costs are to be submitted.

(page 2 of original)

Decisive for the entire completion of the construction project will be the provisions of the cover contract or the agreements of the individual contracts which still will have to be signed on the basis of the cover contract.

Inter alia it will be established in the cover contract:

1. For the orders which you may give in each instance three offers have to be received, provided no special constructions are involved. Consideration is to be given to the cheapest offer; if this cannot be accepted, a reason is to be given.
2. Payments will be made to you on the basis of preliminary requisitions in treasury bonds according to the enclosed leaflet 1938 to the same extent as you yourself have to make payments.
3. The control of the prices will be effected through the Price Control Office of the High Command of the Army prior to the final settlement of the accounts, and will be made by presentation of the bookkeeping vouchers, of original accounts of third persons or by proof as to the costs that actually arise on the basis of the cost price accounts.
4. For orders, completion and settling the accounts of construction work the provisions of the Regulations for Submissions for and Construction of Public Buildings (Verdingungsordnung fuer Bauleistungen) will be used as basis.

As soon as the location and the architectural construction of the premises to be built have been established and approved, an examination from the technical point of view as regards air raid protection is to be initiated.

By contacting the High Command of the Army (A 2 9) you are to initiate or report on at the earliest moment possible:

- a) fencing-in of the site in question, giving the requirements of iron necessary for this purpose. WA B 9 will see that the initiated purchase negotiations for the site ...

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-7376
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

are concluded as soon as possible through the Verwertungs-
gesellschaft fuer Rantanindustrie GmbH, Berlin-Charlottenburg
2, PO box 24.

b) Starting the levelling work, construction of streets and
plant tracks and other preparatory construction work, giving
the necessary requirements of iron and steel

(page 3 of original)

c) Listing of iron and steel requirements for buildings,
technical installations, etc., as soon as their construction
has been determined.

It is requested that you will acknowledge the receipt of this
preliminary notice in writing.

(illegible initials)

By order:
Stud(?)

Enclosures: 1 leaflet
1 letter of transmittal.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

8 August 1947.

I, Victoria GRACH, No. 20 129, hereby certify that I am
thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages
and that the above is a true and correct translation of
the document No. HI-7376.

Victoria GRACH
No. 20 129.

98

COPY.

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, Ludwigshafen / Rhein
Zwischenproduktengruppe.

(stamp) SECRET!

1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of article 38 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover, if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of addressee, under lock and key.

To the
High Command of the Army
Via J Rue 9 VII
Attention: Herr Ministerialrat Dr. KAHN,

BERLIN N 35
Tirpitzufer 72/76.

(handwritten figures;) 189

L.K.-Dept. Dr. Wi/Kr. 15 August 1938.

Polyglycol H 1.

The experiments for production of mixed oxol (Polyglycol H 1), made in Ludwigshafen, have shown that for this purpose an admixture of propylene oxide in the ratio of 2 molecules ethylene oxide to 1 molecule propylene oxide is required, so that the finished oxol then has a proportion of 30% propylene oxide.

Accordingly, the following requirements of propylene oxide ensue for the oxol plants, which already exist or are in the process of being constructed:

Amendorf	90 tons per month of propylene oxide = 80 tons per
Huels	180 " " " " " " " = 160 month of
Trostberg	150 " " " " " " " - 160 propylene
Total:	450 tons per month of propylene oxide = 400 tons per month of propylene.

We should like to suggest the following to you for the supply of the plant with propylene oxide:

- 1.) HUELS will construct a plant for the production of 360 tons per month of propylene oxide, consisting of
 - 1 hydrogenation tower, diameter 1600
 - 1 saponification apparatus
 - 1 column.

In the event of "A-Fall" Trostberg will also be supplied from these sources. The apparatuses work with half their capacity for the storage order.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7379
CONTINUED

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

2.) SCHKOPAU will construct a plant which suffices to supply
ALLENDORF and - in case HUELS does not come into question -
Trostberg with propylene oxide, that is to say 270 tons per month
of propylene oxide.

REGISTERED!

(page 2 of original)

Thus, the Trostberg supply is doubly assured, so that in our
opinion we may renounce the idea of a propylene oxide plant there.
The procurement of tank cars will be taken over by Trostberg.

Of course one could also maintain the point of view that
Trostberg should supply itself with propylene. In that case it
would be necessary to establish a cracking plant there, e.g. for
liquid hydrocarbons.

However, we are of the opinion, that, compared with the
other goods required for Trostberg (coal, salt, etc.), of which
several train loads, also from Northern Germany, are coming in
daily, the importation of 180 tons of propylene oxide is so
small that it can be ensured in any case.

Since we have to conclude the final planning of the oxide
plants of Huels and Schkopau now, we should appreciate your
early views on the matter.

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

signed MEHNER signed ppa. STEHMIG.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

8 August 1947.

I, Victoria ORTON, No. 20 129, hereby certify that I am
thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages
and that the above is a true and correct translation of the
document No. NI-7379.

Victoria ORTON
No. 20 129.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. MI-7380
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(handwritten)

Herra Dr. BOECHLER

To the
High Command of the Army
Wa B 9/7 (Army Ordnance Office, section B 9/7)
Berlin W 35
Hirpitsauer 72/76

Dr. A/Pro.

18 May 1938

11 May 1938

We beg to acknowledge receipt of your preliminary order (Vorbescheid) for the building project of HUELS, order No. 9/7 247/0101.

On account of your last discussion with Dr. ter MEER, we have now started the construction of the chemical plants at HUELS. At present the grounds are being prepared and the canalisation system of the plant established.

With regard to the "1" - Plant project itself we beg to state that the various sections which are the responsibility of I.G. viz. Diglycol, Oxol and storehouses are already being planned in detail.

For the planning of the whole of this sector, we now require, as soon as possible, the construction plans for the esterisation plant, Mustard Gas ("Direct lost"), plant and the store-rooms required in connection herewith. We asked - as you will have seen from a copy - the Auergesellschaft for the relevant drawings on 10 May and deem it advisable that you should officially influence Auer in the same direction, so that the required blueprints are placed without delay at the disposal of our construction office Buna II at Ludwigshafen. The centralisation of all building projects connected with HUELS in a central construction office is indispensable for the speedy execution of the entire HUELS project.

As soon as the details have been received from Auer, we shall definitely decide on the site for the "1" - plant and shall then be in a position to draw up estimates for fencing, levelling, rails along the roads and for works railway system (Strassen- und Werksgeleise) and the requirements of iron and steel for the construction work and technical equipment.

(page 2 of original)

section Buna Works

Dr. V/Pro. 18 May 1938

The hereditary construction rights (Erbbaurecht) could then also be settled speedily with your section 10 or with the Montan-Industrie G.m.b.H..

In the letter dealing with your order you confirm having demanded 2 annual deliveries of 8000 tons each of ethylene oxide at a basic price of RM 1.10. We hope it meets with your approval that these quantities of ethylene oxide are transformed in HUELS into Diglycol and Oxol, because as you know, storage of ethylene oxide on such a scale is impossible.

We anticipate negotiations on the cover agreement or on individual contracts still to be concluded in accordance with the cover mentioned by you.

Except in the case of certain specialised work, which we must leave to certain reliable and experienced firms, we shall - as usual - invite tenders and decide according to price and quality.

In questions regarding methods of payment and price control etc., tenders, execution and final accounts concerning the construction work, we shall comply as far as possible, with your instructions and memoranda.

The entire site has been examined from the view point of anti-air raid measures. As soon as we have decided on individual building, we shall once more consult the Air Raid Protection authorities concerned.

Concerning the construction of storerooms we ask for your special advice.

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
section Buna Plants

signed: NIBROS (?) signed: WENNER (?)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI - 7380
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

8 August 1947

I, Leonard LAWRENCE, Civ. No. 20 138, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI - 7380.

Leonard LAWRENCE
Civ. No. 20 238

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft Ludwigshafen a. Rh.

Intermediates Group

201

Herr Direktor Dr. Krauch

Dr. A/Kr. 27 June 1938

In compliance with your request we give you our personal impressions of the development of the program for the manufacture of chemical warfare agents and explosives in Germany.

A.)

Since at present German industry is over-burdened by the many projects of the Four-Year Plan and also by the increase in exports, we request that in future industry should deal only with

one

fully responsible, competent office for matters relating to new projects for the army.

This office must be able to make decisions regarding

- (1) over-all plans for chemical rearmament,
- (2) contractual regulation and financing of the projects,
- (3) allocation of building materials and labor (Arbeitseinsatz).

What is lacking at present is co-operation between the Reich Office for the Development of Economy and the many Wehrmacht Offices, and we give you below a few typical examples:

1) Building up of Diglycol stocks:

The Reich Office, for understandable reasons, is urging the laying in of stocks of Diglycol now, in June, whereas the Army Ordnance Office is reluctant to do this. As late as April, for instance, the productive capacity of the Wolfen plant was reduced by about half and the purchase of the production of Ludwigshafen was stopped entirely.

(page 2 of original)

2) Diglycol Plant at Schkopau

Since last year the Office for Raw and Synthetic Materials, now the Reich Office for the Development of Economy, has been negotiating with I.G. through the Frisia Holding Company regarding the construction of a Diglycol Plant at Schkopau. Negotiations were drawn out because of the financial part of the scheme and because of questions of ownership concerning the real estate to be transferred. In the meantime, however, we have received the impression that the Reich Office has no right whatever of disposal over public means, which means therefore, that only the Army Ordnance Office, which constantly emphasizes its rights in this matter, has any jurisdiction to do this. It is for this reason that we conducted the negotiations, which will presumably be concluded in a few days, with the

(page 2 of original cont'd)

Army Ordnance Office and not with the Reich Office.

The situation now is that the plant for preliminary products at Schkopau, which was provisionally built with I.G. funds, will be completed in a few weeks, but - as we have already stated - negotiations are still being carried on regarding the sector dealing with the processing of ethylene oxide into diglycol.

3) Army Ordnance Office Plant at Trostberg:

On the other hand, however, the Army Ordnance Office has been working on the final stage in the production of poison gases at Trostberg since 1937, although even today it is still not clear what process is used in the production of the preliminary products, and it may be years before one knows how much work the final stage will entail, and all this at a time, when, as is known, there is such great scarcity of materials.

A remarkable fact is that the Reich Office is striving to bring about the merging of the stand-by plants with the existing factories, whereas the Army Offices often prefer the plants to be constructed "out in the green meadows". Even so, we are of opinion that in most cases this does not meet the requirements as regards camouflage; moreover the speedy construction of the plant is always fraught with great difficulties and requires far more materials. This is especially the case where a new power system has to be installed.

When we come to the actual contracts, and more especially the financial side, we always find the slowness of the formalities a great disadvantage. The result is that today industry has to tackle most projects on the basis of preliminary decisions.

(page 3 of original)

As for the problem of the allocation of materials and the correct allocation of labor (Arbeitseinsatz), we would point out that it is not enough to allot quota numbers; what is required is that there should be a definite plan, in other words priorities should be better applied. Today the bottle neck is no longer the scarcity of iron, but the work load in the German machine factories. Surely more progress can be made by carrying out a few projects rapidly than by dragging along laboriously with many new projects, as is very often the case at present. We need hardly mention what a heavy burden this "rush to meet deadlines" puts upon our construction offices, and, above all, the financial effects of this halting method of construction. In addition, there are the control offices which interfere with the distribution of salvage materials. It falls mainly to private enterprise to deal separately with these authorities too.

separate B.)

Also as regards the/competencies of the Reich Office and the various Wehrmacht offices in the field of research, we are equally in the dark.

Actually, the real advances in the field of chemical warfare agents and explosives should come - as is the case in other countries - from the industrial research laboratories. Industry is in the best position to

(page 3 of original cont'd)

judge as to the supply of raw materials and technical processes. It is, therefore, sufficient (it may even be an advantage) if the official agencies confined themselves to reviewing results, financing experiments and issuing directives for further research.

(page 4 of original)

But as mentioned under (1) at present we do not know which of the many official agencies is really competent.

In the Army Offices tests are supervised by officers who, unfortunately, return to active service after a while, so that there is no degree of permanency. The permanent civilian specialists cannot remedy this great disadvantage, for in the organization as it exists at present they do not possess the necessary powers.

In our opinion, for what it is worth, rearmament in the field of chemical warfare agents is inadequate and has to all intents and purposes remained at the 1918 level. Only during the last few months have attempts been made to apply technical advances to the old chemical warfare agents/under the driving force of industry, especially of I.G., to develop new types (Compare mixed mustard gas, N-mustard gas, etc.).

(page 5 of original)

In the interest of our defense, therefore, we consider it expedient to set up the following organization at once:
A single responsible office must be created on the pattern of the English Ministry of Defense (englisches Verteidigungsministerium) which decides all questions pertaining to

research;
planning,
financing and contractual settlements

and supervises the putting into operation and
which is acknowledged to be the voice of the army and of all competent Reich Ministries.

This office should set up a board of trustees (Curatorium) composed of responsible representatives from the Army, the Reich Ministry of Finance, the Reich Office for the Development of Economy as well as from Industry, which will act as a preparatory committee to work out recommendations and submit them for decision, in the same way as the "Defense Council" during the world war.

This council would guide research and determine planning, particularly the sequence of the projects.

The "Defense Ministry" would then make arrangements for the financing and contractual settlement through the Ministry of Economics. The putting into operation, the supply of raw materials, allocation of labor (Arbeitseinsatz), regulating of tariff questions etc. would be effected through the Office of the Four-Year Plan, in other words, by the Reich Office for the Development of Economy.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI5687
CONTINUED

(page 6 of original)

If German rearmament is to proceed with the necessary speed and on national principles, what we need is that we should deal with one single, responsible office.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

3 June 1947

I, VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-5687.

.....
VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129.

- 4 -
"END"

107

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7428
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Dr. C. KRAUCH

Berlin 79, 26 August 1938
Sackendstr. 128

(stamp):

Dr. C. KRAUCH
Plenipotentiary of
Ministerpresident
Fieldmarshal Goering
for Special Problems of
Chemical Production

in pencil: Confirmed on 5 Sept. 1938

OV initials: IK

To

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.

LUDWIGSHAFEN / Rhine

Subject: Diglycol Expansion, Ethylene Experimental Plant
Sodingen, D-L Experiments.

In accordance with the decision of Fieldmarshal GOERING of 22 August 1938 I give you the additional information that the building projects for diglycol expansion, ethylene experimental plant Sodingen, D-L experiments (translator's note: direct-mustard gas ?) have been classified as pressing, urgent building projects, for which no postponement of the deadline set for their completion can be tolerated.

Fieldmarshal GOERING has appointed me his plenipotentiary in this sphere of work. My task is

"most emphatically to further the execution of the production programs, constantly to control the work necessary to carry this out, to remove all obstacles which might arise, as quickly as possible and to create all conditions necessary to carry on the work in accordance with instructions".

Some time ago you already received an order from the Army Ordnance Office for the expansion of the plants mentioned above.

I am responsible for the procurement of the steel, the funds and the workers as well as the supervision of the construction work.

Individual settlements with you in your capacity as trustee as well as individual allocation of steel will also in future be made in the same manner used hitherto by the High Command of the Army, Ordnance Office.

For the orders in regard to the building projects mentioned above a special code-number will be supplied, which I shall make available to you exclusively for the orders pertaining to the building projects mentioned above.

(page 2 of original)

You are responsible to me for misuse of the code-number.

The iron producing and iron processing industry has been instructed by the Control Office Iron and Steel (Ueberwachungsstelle fuer Eisen und Stahl), that all orders bearing a code-number have priority over all inland orders. In case your orders interfere with the suppliers' export orders I request you to contact me at once in order to clarify immediately the case in question with the consent of the Reich Ministry of Economics and to decide the sequence of execution.

I have created a building staff to assist me and charged Dr. AHL with the management of the work in the field mentioned above.

Furthermore, I have commissioned Dr. Max WITTMER, Ludwigshafen/Rhine with the technical advice and supervision of all building projects in the sphere of organic-chemical preliminary products, with the consent of the High Command of the Army He and the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht 1st. Dr. WITTMER is responsible to me for the correct planning of the output and technical procedures, and he has to provide for the technically expedient execution of the projects in regard to location and the layout of the factory. He has to advise and support you continually on the construction of the plants. Basic changes and expansions of the plants have to be discussed beforehand by you with Dr. WITTMER.

I request you to name the technician in charge whom you have charged with the construction of the plants mentioned above. He is responsible for the completion of projects at the given date and has to inform Dr. WITTMER or Dr. AHL respectively at once of possible obstacles such as delivery delays, difficulties in negotiations with the authorities etc. and keep him currently informed.

(page 3 of original)

I also should like to mention that in accordance with an order by the Field Marshal future planning will take place under my direction in close co-operation with the Wehrmacht, and I therefore request you immediately to inform me in future of any questions arising in the field of production of organic-chemical preliminary products. The questions will then be dealt with in closest collaboration with the Wehrmacht offices concerned.

Heil Hitler !
(signature) Dr. C. KRAUCH.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7428
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

8 August 1947

I, Brigitte TURK, Civ. No. 35 130 , hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the original document No. NI- 7428.

.....
Brigitte TURK
Civ.No. 35 130.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7431
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Ms.: 27/39

Dr. C. Krauch
Plenipotentiary General of the Ministerpraesident
General-Feldmarschall Goering
for Special Problems of Chemical Production

encircled: A

Berlin W 9, 10 February 1939
Saarlandstrasse 128
Telephone: 12 00 48

11 February 1939

Journal No. 720/39 r

Dr. R./Sr.

Stamp: Secret!

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee under lock and key.

To the
I.G.-Farbenindustrie
A.G.,
for the attention of Director Dr. Ambros
and Director Dr. Mehner
Ludwigshafen/Rhine

Ms.:
Dr. Ambros (initials)
Dr. Wittwer
Dr. Steimig
Dr. Christ

encircled: 51

Subject: Work within the field of ethylene chemistry.

The state of the experimental work in the field of ethylene chemistry initiated by you, was dealt with during a conference held on 1 February 1939 in conjunction with representatives of the Army Ordnance Office and my co-workers.

First of all, may I express my particular gratitude to you for having put Dr. Wittwer at the disposal of my construction staff in such an obliging way, for the coordination and direction of the experimental work and for the construction of the new plant. May I call special attention to the fact that the work initiated by Dr. Wittwer in such a methodical and far-sighted manner has also won the full recognition of the representatives of the Army Ordnance Office.

Furthermore, may I thank you especially for the great trouble which you have taken and for the use of your resources for the work in hand.

In view of the extraordinarily important goals set for this work as regards State policy, however, I must not omit to ask you expressly to increase your contribution to these efforts still more, and to promote the work with the greatest possible energy.

In this connection, the work on the oxidation of ethylene with air appears to me to be of special significance.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7431
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

The experiments on ethylene production by means of hydrogenation of acetylene will be dealt with on the occasion of a visit to Schkopau in the near future.

Following the inspection of the pilot plant which is in the process of being built at Sodingen for the production of ethylene from coal gas, I should like to ask you to examine as soon as possible the possibility of setting up in the buildings of the Mont Cenis plant in Herne-Sodingen which is out of operation, a plant for the production of D-mustard gas, with a size equivalent to that of a plant producing 15,000 tons of ethylene per year. /plants are being planned/

Since/at the moment, in conjunction with the Reich Air Ministry, for the production of special fuel for the Luftwaffe on a coal gas base, I should like to ask you in this connection, to check, together with Dr. Mueller-Cunradi, Oppau, the appropriate I.G. specialist, the possibilities of considering a combination of D-mustard gas production with a corresponding capacity for special fuel. It is of special importance that the question of the coal gas supply for Sodingen be dealt with, as, when the two processes are combined, the coal gas which serves for the production of ethylene is not returned into the network, but would be completely used for the fuel synthesis.

I therefore request you to hold preliminary discussions with Dr. Feller of the Chemische Werke Holten and, in conjunction with the authorities of the Ruhr-Gas A.G., to arrange a conference at my office in Berlin, in agreement with my specialists, so that, should the need arise, we may be able to declare the Sodingen project ready for construction at the earliest possible moment.

Heil Hitler!
(signature) Dr.C.R (remainder illegible)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

22 August 1947

I, BERYL C. BESWICK, No. D 427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7431.

BERYL C. BESWICK, No. D 427459.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7422
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

In the interest of the secrecy of this correspondence we ask you to submit all letters to us always to the attention of Herr DIRECTOR DR. KRAENZLEIN as Vertrauensmann for W matters in the Hoechst works.

I.G. FARBEINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

11-72197-0,25/3118

(page 2 of original)

I.G. FARBEINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, FRANKFURT (MAIN) - HOECHST
DIREKTIONS-ABTEILUNG T
(Directorate Dept.T)

(Rubber Stamp)
TOP SECRET

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. Only to be handed over personally or delivered under double cover against receipt, to a personal address.
3. To be forwarded, if possible, by courier or a trustworthy person, if sent by post, value to be quoted as over RM. 1,000.-
4. Duplication of every sort, including preparation of excerpts, forbidden.
5. To be kept, at responsibility of addressee, in a safe, in exceptional cases in a steel cabinet with combination lock.
6. Offenses against these orders will result in most severe punishment.

INSURED LETTER:

Frankfurt/Main-Hoechst, 1 August 1939.H.

VALUE: RM. 1,200.-

Director Dr. Ambros	Ludwigshafen
Director Dr. Buerlin	Bitterfeld
Director Dr. Haberland	Urdingen
Office of the Technical Committee	Frankfurt/Main

Subject: "Perstoff" (a poison gas)

After receiving Herr Dr. Ambros' letter of the 19th of last month we, together with Herr Dr. Meissner/Urdingen, discussed the question of "Perstoff"-production with the aid of data available from the last

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

war. In the meantime, prior to the final completion of my report on this conference, Herr Dr. Haberland's letter of the 29th of this month arrived.

In principle the following can be stated quite generally as regards this matter: No doubt it is correct and useful to conduct the experimental development of a war-gas in a larger chemical works while complying with the usual official orders. The danger factor in working with chemical warfare gases in densely populated areas and in a larger factory which also deals with other products, is approximately equal to the one in the production of explosives. (In this connection I need only remind you of the serious accident which Stolzenberg had several years ago with a phosgene storage tank in Hamburg). Already in the development of the hexogen-^W-process here in Hoechst considerable difficulties had been created for us when we intended to carry out experiments with one kilo quantities in a segregated laboratory with people who were subject to special restrictions. Then, when medium amounts of about 30 to 50 kilos were to be experimented with in a vacant factory building of the local works, the difficulties increased; in particular it was demanded that the entire quantity of explosives obtained from one production process was to be removed from the factory immediately and was to be transferred to an officially approved storage room of our neighboring works Griesheim. Then we built a

(page 3 of original)

hexogen plant with an output of 10 tons per month in the Wolfsgang works near Hanau, and great difficulties were created for us there as well when we intended to increase the ten tons per month output to twenty tons per month, and it was said that if production was to be increased any further, the erection of expensive blastwalls would be insisted upon, and that an increase to 50 tons per month would not be approved at all because in the event of a mishap in the manufacture the inhabited zone would be too much endangered. Similar difficulties are also to be expected in the establishment of factories for war gases; one will, therefore, never be able to establish a larger plant in a densely settled living and production area.

It would therefore be advisable for reasons of safety, as already indicated in Herr Dr. Haberland's letter, to divide the production of 800 tons per month of "Perstoff" between two plants, which, similar to the cooling and filling plant constructed by us at present in Munsterlager for the authorities, would have to be built on open ground (perhaps in the Lueneburger Heide). However, it would be appreciated if independently from this, Uerdingen could build a small-sized plant for the preparation of "Perstoff", so that all modern improvements, such as the continuous production of formic acid chloromethyl ester and the reduction of the chlorination period could be studied there.

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

An estimated staff-requirement of 482 men has been determined for the chemical and bottling department of a "Perstoff" plant producing 800 tons per month, as you can see from Enclosure 1.

During the war "Perstoff" was produced in Hoechst by chlorinating formic acid chloro ester and formic acid ester. However, the production figures show that formic acid chloro ester was definitely preferred, which is quite understandable since a higher degree of heat develops during the chlorination of formic acid ester than during the chlorination of formic acid chloro ester, and since explosions were observed more frequently during the chlorination of formic acid chloro ester.

(page 4 of original)

You will find the statistics requested by Herr Dr. Ambros in Enclosure 2; just as with the staff figures we could only estimate them, so that the figures may still change a little during the construction of a new plant. In spite of this fact, however, the enclosed calculation is likely to give valuable information as to probable production costs. The Ludwigshafen prices have been taken for phosgene and pure methanol; no shipping costs were included for these two products because it is to be expected that with the establishment of large-scale production these two products will be manufactured locally. Hoechst production costs were taken for chlorine, soda lye and sulphuric acid, also without shipping costs. We have taken RM. 15.- as processing costs for the chlorination of formic acid chloro-methyl ester, based on the expenses arising here in Hoechst in the chlorination of methane (RM. 12.- to RM. 15.- per 100 kilogram). We had originally determined the expenses arising for "Perstoff" production in 1917 and had taken into consideration the influence of the inflation which had already made itself felt at that time. By this means we arrived at a cost of approximately RM. 25.-, a sum which because of the numerous uncertain and inaccurate factors arising in the re-calculation, is really rather vague and is certainly to be considered as too high. It can also be seen from Herr Dr. Haberland's letter, that for instance through the use of quartz lamps as a source of light in the chlorination, a considerable amount of time can be saved as compared with the chlorination with ultraviolet lamps, which were then in use; even this alone would lower production costs in the manufacture of "Perstoff".

Signature: KRAENZLEIN

- Enclosures -

(Handwritten note)
In the loose leaf folder
under 2

(page 5 of original)

I.G. HOECHST
DIREKTIONS-ABTEILUNG T

Enclosure I

Stamp: TOP SECRET !

The following staff is required for a 800-tons-per-month "Perstoff" plant:

	Master			
	Chemists	Craftsmen	Foremen	Workers
Linde plant)				
CO plant)	-	-	-	12
COCl ₂ plant)				
Chlorine electrolysis plant	2	2	12	100
Formic acid chloro- methyl ester)	4	4	15	300
"Perstoff")				
Bottling	2	3	15	70
Total	8	9	42	482

The number of locksmiths and lead welders required is not included in these figures.

(page 6 of original)

(Handwritten:)

Enclosure II

Stamp: TOP SECRET

I.G. HOECHST
Statistics

Date 1 August 1939

Rubber Stamp:
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Exchange group

Period of time

Chloro-Esters

(monthly production quantity)

	Actual pro-duction figures Kilos	Production figures per 100 kg input	Production figures per 100 kg output	Cost per 100 kg. RM	Basic value for actual production figures RM	Output share per 100 kg. RM
Phosgene, liquid	740000	100	140.15	15.23	112702	21.35
Pure methanol	190000	25.68	35.99	19.49	37031	7.01
					149733	28.36
Finished goods	528000	71.35	100			

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7422
CONTINUED

(page 7 of original)

(Handwritten:)

Enclosure II

I.G. HOECHST
Statistics

Stamp: TOP SECRET
Print: Date
1 August 1939

Rubber Stamp:
SECRET

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"Perstoff"

(monthly production quantity)

	Actual production figures, kilos	Production figures per 100 kg. input	Production figures per 100 kg. output	Cost per 100 kg. RM.	Basic value for actual produc. fig. RM.	Output share per 100 kg. RM.
Chloro-Esters	528000	100	66	28.36	149733	18.72
Chlorine, gaseous	1440000	272.7	180	6.83	98352	12.29
Soda lye, 40°	54000	10.2	6.75	2.93	1582	-.20
Sulphuric acid 60°	6000	1.1	-.75	2.31	139	-.02
					249806	31.23
minus recovery:						
Hydrochloric acid 30 %	1680000	318.2	210	1.82	30576	3.82
Cost of materials:					219230	27.41
Processing expenses:						15.-
Production costs per 100 kg.						42.41
Finished goods:	800000	151.5	100			

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7422
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

14 August 1947

I, Arthur MACNAMARA, No. 20191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7422.

.....
Arthur MACNAMARA
No. 20191

Rubber Stamp:
Top Secret !

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. Only to be handed over personally or delivered, under double cover against receipt, to a personal address.
3. To be forwarded, if possible, by courier or a trustworthy person, if sent by post value to be quoted as over RM 1,000.--
4. Implication of every sort including preparation of excerpts forbidden.
5. To be kept, at responsibility of addressee, in a safe; in exceptional cases in a steel cabinet with combination-lock.
6. Offences against these orders will result in most severe punishment.

Stamp:

Secret

1. This document is a state-secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the R.St.G.L. (Reich Penal Code)
2. To be forwarded in sealed envelope only; to be "registered" if dispatched by mail.
3. To be kept under lock at responsibility of addressee.

COVER - AGREEMENT

between

the German Reich (Wehrmacht Treasury) represented by the Supreme Command of the Army (Chief of Army ordinance and Commander of the Army Reserve) hereinafter referred to as "OKW"

and

the Chemische Werke Kuels G.m.b.H. Marl i/W. Hereinafter referred to as "Kuels".

The OKW desiring the construction of a stand-by plant for the production of Diglycol, Oxol I, Oxol II, Acetophenone and Ethyl Alcohol, designated the Verwertungsgesellschaft fuer Montan-industrie m.b.H. in Munich, hereinafter referred to as "Montan", as executors of this project. The proposed site of the plant is at Marl i/W. on ground owned by I.G. Farben. A hereditary Building Rights Contract (Erbbauvertrag) to be concluded between Farben and Montan, will put the site at Montan's disposal. Regarding construction, maintenance and operation of the plant the following is agreed between Kuels and OKW:

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

- (1) Huels undertakes the construction on behalf and at the expense of OMA of a plant on above mentioned site for the production of

600 tons Diglycol per month and 480 tons Oxol I per month in accordance with preliminary instructions of 11 May 1938 order no. 9/VII - 247 - 0101 ref. 74 O 23.
17 Wa = 9 VII no. 506/38

600 tons Oxol-lost (Oxol Mustard Gas) per month in accordance with preliminary instructions of 11 May 1938 order No. 9/VII - 247 - 01-01- ref. 14 O 23.
17 Wa = 9 VII no. 506/38

1000 tons acetophenone per month in accordance with preliminary instructions of 23 Sept, 1939 order No. 9/VII - 240 - 1052/39 ref. 74 O 44
17 Wa J Rue 9 VII a Nr. 8492/39

200 tons p/m Ethyl Alcohol, in accordance with preliminary instructions of 7 May and 11 June 1940 order No. 9/VII - 247 - 0101/38 ref. 74-0-23
17 Wa J Rue (Mun 3 VIIa) 1262/40 - 15747/40.

As a rule these plants are to be operated in 8 hour shifts.

(page 2 of original)

with the exception of the Oxol L - production, which, as also here, will be operated on the basis of a 6 hour shift.

- (2) The plants to be constructed shall include all auxiliary and accessory plants required Power (Steam electrical current, water, air, nitrogen etc.) shall be provided by Huels.

Article 2.

Huels undertakes to construct the plants with the diligence of a conscientious businessman and technician subject to the exigencies of economy and speed and to take advantage of all appropriate patents, production-methods and experience at its disposal.

Article 3.

- (1) Huels undertakes to obtain all necessary Licences from the building - and trade police.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

- (2) Huels shall comply with the relevant trade police regulations. Alterations of plant equipment and working methods, required in this connection by the appropriate authorities, shall not be effected without reference, for examination, to O.M. All costs and fees caused by this procedure shall be borne by O.M. The situation and building plans for the plant having been decided upon in detail, Huels shall apply to the appropriate military and civil A.M.P. authorities for the requisite licence.
- (3) In the interests of Air Raid Protection special attention should be paid to the following points, when drawing up plans
 - a) Steam - water - and electricity supplies are to be arranged in a ring system
 - b) Roofs of main buildings are to be constructed in such a way as to afford protection against incendiary-bombs.
 - c) All buildings are to be provided with black-out devices.
 - d) Air raid shelters to be constructed with a capacity sufficient to accommodate both Passive Air Defense Personnel and ordinary employees

(page 3 of original)

article 4.

- (1) Huels undertakes to submit on request an estimate for each successive stage of the building operations to O.M. for examination and approval by its experts. Any deviations from approved estimates shall require the explicit approval of the O.M. Closest cooperation with the experts of the O.M. for the clarification of details must be aimed at under all circumstances. They shall be kept currently informed of the progress of operations.
- (2) Estimates shall be subdivided as follows:
 - a) Estimate for purchases and additional costs resulting from the acquisition of the site, including the costs for the plan, which shall contain the relevant data as to the size of the property.
 - b) Estimate for the construction of the buildings and other constructional operations. To this estimate shall be attached
 - I. a description of each building.
 - II. Plans on a scale of 1 : 200 for each building.

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

III. a list, detailing, for each building, ground area (in square meters), cubic capacity (in cubic meters) and the price per cubic meter of plant taking into consideration all installations and foundations for machines, where applicable.

IV. a compilation of costs for additional work (grading operations, drainage, light and power supplies, laying of rails etc.) detailing quantities measurements and dimensions.

c) Estimates for the purchase of necessary machines, including appliances, tools and gauges.

Article 5.

- (1) Fuels dealing with supplies in pursuance of this construction-agreement, will do so in its own name at the expense of the O&K.
- (2) Invitations for tenders, construction operations and settlement of bills shall be based on the provisions of the Building Contract Regulations (Verdingungsordnung fuer Bauleistungen) and the Building Price Regulations (Baupreisverordnung) of the 16th of June 1939 and the explanatory notes thereto of the 16th of January 1940.

(page 4 of original)

- (3) With the exception of highly specialised work, three offers shall be examined, before orders are placed for any particular project fuels shall in all cases accept the most advantageous offer, taking it all round. When the lowest offer is not accepted, fuels shall state the reasons why in their final settlement.

Article 6.

- (1) At each stage fuels shall submit to O&K in good time detailed requests for funds, according to their requirements for the construction of the plant. Bonus due to Fuels, mentioned in article 8 will be added to the required amount.
- (2) The O&K shall, without prejudice to the final settlement of accounts, put at the disposal of fuels the amounts requested, as and when payments are made and expenses incurred, by Fuels. Building-interests, exceeding the Reichbank discount by 1% per annum, shall be considered as expenses in the exceptional event of a time-lag occurring between a payment by Fuels and its repayment by O&K, provided due notice is given of the payment.

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

- (3) Final settlement of accounts shall take place on the completion of the plant. Original bills will be produced to prove deliveries from other firms. Fuels' own expenses shall be submitted on an expense account in accordance with I.S.D. (Prices fixed in the directives on price control based on production costs of Government contracts). Turn-over tax accounts to be submitted separately.

article 7.

- (1) The OKH shall, at all times, have the right to examine through its own officials or through representatives the progress of the work, to ensure adherence to the plans agreed upon, and to inspect plants after completion.
- (2) Conclusions arrived at by both parties at each stage on compliance or otherwise, in the construction of the plant, with the provisions of the contract; shall be recorded. The OKH may request at its own expense an experimental operation of the plant in order to test its production capacity.

(page 5 of original)

This test shall be considered successful if the output of 14 successive days corresponds to the production capacity agreed upon in this contract.

article 8.

Fuels will receive a bonus of 6% of the total cost of construction including all accessories, especially machine-installations, for the drafting of plans and estimates, invitation for tenders and their examination, placing of orders, applications for official permits, for direction of construction, further-more for direction and supervision of local construction, for book keeping and filing of claims for defects. This compensation is also to be paid for any installations supplied by Fuels itself.

article 9.

- (1) Fuels undertakes to handle all plants and accessories with the diligence of a conscientious businessman and technician to keep them at all times in good working order, and to effect, on orders from, and at the expense of OKH, to appropriate improvements and replacements.
- (2) According to the wishes of the OKH Fuels undertakes to take charge of the plants and to operate them in the interest of the armed forces. Fuels shall not be required to operate the plant for purposes other than those of the Wehrmacht. Fuels itself on the other hand may with the explicit consent of the Montan use the plants for other purposes than those of the armed forces. The plants are to be operated by Fuels only.

(page 5 of original, cont'd.)

- (3) The detailed instructions for the running and maintenance of the plant are contained in the lease contract between Montan and Busch concluded simultaneously with this contract.

(page 6 of original)

Article 10.

The parties to this contract undertake to keep the content of this contract secret, to inform their employees only as far as necessary, to bind them by an oath of secrecy, and to take all measures to safeguard the secrecy of the contract.

Article 11.

- (1) Disputes originating from this contract shall be submitted to the County - Court at Berlin only, regardless of the relative importance of the object of the dispute.
- (2) At the beginning of legal proceedings the parties shall apply for the exclusion of the public, for the imposition on all persons, involved in the case, of an obligation to secrecy in accordance with articles 172, 174 GVG (Court Procedure Regulations), as well as for the keeping of all files under lock and key.

Article 12.

- (1) The expenses incurred in drawing up this contract shall be equally shared by the contracting parties.
- (2) This contract has been drawn up in quadruplicate, 1 copy to go to each of the contracting parties, two additional copies to OKM.

Berlin, 2nd of July 1940

The Supreme Command of the Army
by order:
signed: LEBE
General of Artillery
and
Chief of the Army Ordnance Office.

Berlin 1/4. 26th of June 1940

Chemische Werke Busch
G.m.b.H.
signed: Dr. GUNTER
signed: HOFFMANN

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6146
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

28 May 1947

I, Leonhard LAWRENCE, Civ.No. D 486 790, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6146.

Leonhard LAWRENCE
Civ.No. D 486 790

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-7769
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

M.S.:
No. 3

-Title page -

File : Buna plant II in Huels , II
Secretariat

Signature : Buhl

Minister. Pet Dr. Buhl
Legal Dept. I.G.F. Control Office, Frankfurt

Buna Works Huels

(page 1 of original)

TA/HR-Bck.

22 March 1938

Re.: Huels Works.

The report on the basic facts regarding the Huels Works, dated 12 November 1937, requires some clarification of a few important points.

The general principles in the light of which the foundation of the Huels Works appeared advisable have not changed as compared with the point of view taken in the previous report. The basis of production continues to be the splitting of water gases from hydrogenation in electrical arc established in the Fuhr, which has advanced sufficiently in technical development to justify a switch-over into large-scale production.

Earlier price calculations show a superiority of the electrical arc process proposed for Huels as compared with the carbide process used in Schkopau, which superiority is based mainly on the possibilities of developing and utilizing the by-products obtained in this process, chiefly soot. This superiority makes it advisable to place the Huels Works on a private economic basis only and to avoid guarantees by the Reich as much as possible. Therefore, no absolute guarantees of purchase and price should be demanded from the Reich. The Huels production is rather to be put on the market at least at the same price as Schkopau. As a consequence, Huels would not be subject to government price control, as prescribed for Schkopau, and the opportunity might arise to make small profits within the limits of the price fixed by Schkopau through improvements of the electrical arc process.

However, it must already now be pointed out that profits, if there are any profits at all, will be very small in the first period of operation, as, compared with the position as reported on 12 November, a certain deterioration has taken place in the supply of power (coal prices), which will have an unfavorable effect, particularly during the first years of operation.

(page 3 of original)

II. Production volume.

The production volume has only slightly deviated from plans hitherto existing. Only the Ox 1 L. (mustard gas) quantity proposed so far has been reduced by the Army Ordnance Office (H. O.) from 9,600 to 7,200 tons per year. Instead, the production of 2,400 tons per year of D.L. is intended.

TRANSLATION OF REPORTS FROM DOCUMENT R. MI-7769
CONTINUED

(page 4 of original)

As a consequence, the production program for Huels will be as follows :

1. Main products

	12,000 tons per year	Buna S)	
	7,200 " " "	Diglycol)	(only in case of mobilization)
	5,200 " " "	Ox 1 I)	
or	7,200 " " "	Ox 1 L resp.)	
	2,400 " " "	D.L.)	

2. By-products

	4,800 Tons per year	spirit		
	370 " " "	Propylene		
	2,000 " " "	butanol		
	1,440 " " "	Butadiene oils		
	2,000 " " "	Residue		
	36,000 " " "	Caustic soda		
	3,570 " " "	Soot		
	60 Millions cbm	Hydrogen		

At the same time, 10,400 tons per year of ethylene and 32,500 tons per year of chlorine (in the case of mobilization only) will be produced as intermediates. This quantity of chlorine is sufficient to cover the esterification of 5,800 tons per year of Ox 1 I and the production of 2,400 tons per year of S.T.

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The production volume of the Huels Works is decisively affected by the stand-by plant, which is very large compared to the Buna production and the operation of which is only intended in the case of mobilization. In order to illustrate the importance of the stand-by plant for the entire Work, reference is made to its share in the consumption of power. Excluding the consumption of the D.L. plant, for which figures are not available, the stand-by plant alone requires the following power supply :

180 tons per hour maximum pressure steam, i.e.	45% of the entire requirement.
35,000 kW electrical power i.e.	46% of the entire requirement.
7 tons per hour high pressure steam, i.e.	33% of the entire requirement.
46 tons per hour low pressure steam, i.e.	41% of the entire requirement.

Approximately 160,000 tons per year of coal or 45% of the entire consumption are required for the production of this quantity of power.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT W-INT-7769
CONTINUED

(page 5 of original cont'd)

It is a matter of course that the establishment of such extensive power plants for the case of mobilization involves considerable expenditure, which will have to be kept low by the utmost utilization possible in time of peace. Such opportunity, however, cannot be expected at once, but only after several years, when a market has been established for the ethylene oxide produced in the stand-by plant, or for another ethylene product, or for chlorine and caustic potash lyce respectively. This market should preferably be located abroad, in view of the fact that its demands could not be satisfied in case of mobilization.

It therefore becomes necessary for the first few years to operate the stand-by plant for the procurement of supplies which are in any case required for storage. This demand is indispensable, particularly because, otherwise, only about 13,000 tons per year KW loss could be obtained from SCHOLVEN and a correspondingly decreased quantity of hydrogen could be in return delivered to SCHOLVEN. SCHOLVEN, however, depends just as much on the entire KW quantity being taken over as they depend on the return delivery of 60 million cbm hydrogen.

In the course of the respective negotiations with the authorities (Amt) and the Army Ordnance Office (H.W.A.), the reasons stated by us in favor of an operation of a stand-by plant were recognized as justified and it was promised that Huels would be given preferential treatment, as far as the storage of supplies was concerned. This is justified, in view of the fact that products can be manufactured in Huels at lower costs than in any of the other stand-by plants, particularly in Wolfen and Ammendorf, which are still working with spirit ethylene. It is intended to guarantee

(page 6 of original)

Huels works that 50,000 tons of ethylene oxide will be taken over within 4 years. This on the whole would ensure the employment of the stand-by plant during this period, as ethylene oxide requires the greater part of the raw products and power of the entire stand-by plant.

It is intended to operate the D.L. plant for a very short time only, namely, for such length of time as is required to obtain experience for the operation of such plants. This plant's consumption of ethylene is negligible; its chlorine requirement amounts to approximately 1300 tons per year.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-7769
CONTINUED

(page 6 of original cont'd)

After Peich orders have been filled, provision must be made for the disposal of all or part of the ethylene or chlorine quantities produced. If part of the plant would have to cease operation after this period, provision must always be made for the utilization of the K quantities, which thereby become available, and for the ensuring of the possibility of training personnel.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

6 September 1947

I, Julius STEUER, AGO No. A-442 654, hereby certify that I am a duly appointed translator for the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7769.

.....
Julius STEUER
AGO-No. A-442 654

- 5 -
"END"

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-4990
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR
CRIMES

(Translator's Note: 3 Reichsmark
in Stamp for document Authentication
Fee.

Stamp: Army High Command.
Group Wa 53 of the Central office
Army Ordnance Office)

(Translator's Note: Second copy with
cancelled stamp of RM 3 for Document
Authentication Fee - (Para 11)
First copy cancelled M 3.- (Para 20, Sub-
Para 2
Fig. 2.)

Berlin, 26 August 1940
(Signature) SASS
Chief Paymaster

Stamp:
Army High Command
Group Wa 53 of the Central Office
Army Ordnance Office)

Cover Agreement.

between

the German Reich (Treasury of the Wehrmacht),
represented by the Army High Command
(Chief of the Army Armament and Commander of the Army Reserve),
hereinafter called OKH, in short

and

the I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, Frankfurt a.M.
hereinafter called I.G., in short

By order of and at the expense of the OKH (Order Nos. 9-7005/38 and
9/VII - 247 - 0102/38) on a site in Gendorf, Post Burgkirchen (Upper Bavaria)
belonging to the Verwertungsgesellschaft fuer Montanindustrie G.m.b.H.,
Munich, hereinafter called "Montan" in short, a plant for the manufacture of
600 tons of Glycerine D. 600 tons Oxol and 3350 tons DL per month, in
continuous shifts has been established. The German Reich has appointed
Montan to undertake this enterprise. With regard to the fact that the chemical
apparatus part of the plant has been constructed and built by I.G. and further
considering that the chemical methods to be applied in the plant have been
developed by and belong to I.G., the OKH and I.G. agree upon the following:

Paragraph I.

- 1.) The plant referred to in the preamble to this contract is intended for
Wehrmacht purposes. The OKH is responsible for it and that the plant is only
used for other purposes with the express permission of I.G.
- 2.) Further the OKH is responsible for it that the plant is only operated by
I.G. or a 100% subsidiary of I.G.

(Page 2 of original)
(2nd Page of original document)

- 3.) For the upkeep and the management of the plant, I.G. has made available
Anorgana G.m.b.H. in Frankfurt a.M. (hereinafter called Anorgana in short)
which belongs to I.G. 100% and with whom Montan has on this day signed a
lease-contract concerning this plant.

4.) The OKH and I.G. herewith give their consent to the contract mentioned in Sub-Paragraph 3 between Montan and Anorgana and are both responsible for it that Montan and Anorgana carry out all obligations accepted by them as per the above-mentioned contract. I.G. will take special care to see that the necessary staff of workers, a suitable manager and the other requisite necessities for the operation of the plant are available.

Paragraph 2.

1.) I.G. undertakes neither to sell nor to debit the shares of Anorgana during the duration of the contract referred to in Paragraph 1, Sub-Paragraph 3, between Montan and Anorgana.

2.) I.G. undertakes not to alter the established organization of Anorgana approved by OKH without the consent of the OKH, during the duration of the contract referred to in Paragraph 1, Sub-Paragraph 3, between Montan and Anorgana.

3.) If desired by the OKH, I.G. must undertake to attend to the appointment of two representatives of the OKH to the Aufsichtsrat of Anorgana for the duration of the contract referred to in Paragraph 1, Sub-Paragraph 3, between Montan and Anorgana.

Paragraph 3.

1.) I.G. undertakes to put at the disposal of Anorgana all patents, methods and "know-how" present and future, suitable for the operation of the plant, which are at the disposal of I.G. The OKH acknowledges the fact and this is to apply to Montan also, that all these patents, methods and "know-how" are to be considered as the sole property of

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(3rd Page of original document)

I.G. and that they may not be utilized in other plants or passed on to third parties without the consent of I.G.; unless other arrangements have been made in a special process contract between the OKH or Montan and I.G. and especially that the processes and "know-how" of I.G. not protected by patents have to be kept strictly secret from third parties. This covers also the time after the expiration of the contract referred to in Paragraph 1, Sub-Paragraph 3, between Montan and Anorgana.

2.) All the processes, "know-how" and patents which I.G. makes available as per Paragraph 1, are placed at the disposal of Anorgana without any remuneration, but are included in the share of profit belonging to Anorgana in its capacity as a subsidiary company of I.G., according to the contract referred to in Paragraph 1, Sub-Paragraph 3, between Montan and Anorgana.

Paragraph 4.

1.) It is guaranteed by the OKH that the plant or parts of it will not be sold by Montan without the consent of I.G. during the duration of the contract mentioned in Paragraph 1, Sub-Paragraph 3, between Montan and Anorgana.

2.) It is guaranteed by the OKH that the plant or parts of it, in case Montan wants to sell them to a third party after the expiration of the contract between Montan and Anorgana as mentioned in Paragraph 1, Sub-Paragraph 3, will be offered first of all to I.G.. In case I.G. declines the offer, the plant or its parts can be sold to a third party, but under conditions which are not more favorable than those offered to I.G. In case of such a sale of the plant, the regulations according to Paragraph 1, Sub-Paragraph 1 and 2 are declared valid.

Paragraph 5.

The contracting parties undertake to keep the contents of this contract absolutely secret and to inform their personnel about it only as much as is most urgently necessary, binding them to a lasting silence and taking measures to vouchsafe this secrecy.

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(4th Page of original document)

Paragraph 6

- 1.) Rights and obligations arising from this contract are only transferable with the consent of the other contracting party.
- 2.) The provisions of this contract are also binding for any possible legal successors of the contracting parties.

Paragraph 7.

- 1.) Any disputes arising over this contract, come under the jurisdiction of the County Court in Berlin, regardless of the value of the matter under dispute.
- 2.) Immediately at the beginning of a law suit both parties are bound to apply for the case to be heard in camera and the litigants to be bound to secrecy in accordance with Paragraphs 172, 174 GVG (Court Constitutional Law) and the records of the case be securely guarded.

Paragraph 8.

Each contracting party to pay half of the costs of this contract.

Paragraph 9.

This contract is executed in 2 copies. The OKH receives one copy, the I.G. one copy.

Berlin, 2 July 1940
Army High Command.
By Order:
(Signature) LEEB
Artillery General and Chief
of the Army Ordnance Office.

Ludwigshafen a. Rhein, 18 July 1940
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
(Signature): O. AMEROS (Per. Pro. Illegible
Signature)

(Translator's Note:
3 Reichsmark stamp for document
authentication fee.
Stamps Army High Command
Group Wa 53 of the Central Office
Army Ordnance Office)

(Translator's Note: Handwritten Notes:
First copy... 3 Marks
The next two copies... 6 Marks
Document authentication fee paid in
Stamps.
Berlin-Charlottenberg, 21 November 1940
(Signature) SASS
Chief Paymaster
Stamp: Army High Command
Group Wa 53 of the Central Army Ordnance
Office)

Lease-Contract

between the

Verwertungsgesellschaft fuer Montanindustrie G.m.b.H., Munich, hereinafter
called "Montan" in short,

and the

Anorgana G.m.b.H. in Frankfurt a.M. hereinafter called "Anorgana" in short.

By order of the German Reich, represented by the Army High Command (hereinafter called OKH in short) on a site belonging to Montan in Gendorf, Post Burgkirchen (Upper Bavaria) at the expense of the Reich a plant for the manufacture of 600 tons of glycerine 'D', 600 tons of Oxol, and 3350 tons of 'IL' per month has been erected. By order of the German Reich this enterprise was undertaken by Montan. With regard to the fact that the chemical equipment had been constructed and erected by I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft (hereinafter called I.G. in short) and considering that the chemical methods which are applied in this installation have been developed by and belong to I.G., the maintenance and operation of the plant is transferred by Montan to Anorgana, which is a 100% subsidiary company of I.G., in accordance with the following Lease-Contract.

Paragraph 1.

Montan leases to Anorgana the plant mentioned in the preamble. This plant consists of plots of land and building according to the attached plan (Enclosure 1). Further the machines and apparatus as listed in the inventory which will be made as soon as possible after the plant has been completed and which will then be added to this agreement. If after the completion of the inventory, apparatus is procured by Anorgana for Montan

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which as a part of the plant will become the property of Montan, these objects must be included in supplementary lists to be added to the inventory which is to be kept up to date.

Paragraph 2.

1.) Anorgana undertakes to handle the plant and all its accessories (Such as machinery and other fittings, all supply lines and pipes and other connections belonging to it) as a trustee of Montan with the care of a proper merchant and technician, always to keep the plant in working order and to modernize and renew, by order of the OKH and at the OKH's expense. Anorgana is responsible

for the careful selection of the persons charged with the administration and operation of the plant.

- 2.) Montan is authorized at any time to inspect the condition of the plant and its capacity.
- 3.) Insurance is to be arranged for all the valuable parts of the equipment as far as it is prescribed by law. Anorgana is further entitled to contract insurance as far as this may be necessary to cover damages for which Anorgana is responsible according to law or contract. Beyond this insurance can only be arranged with the consent of Montan.
- 4.) Anorgana undertakes to act in conformity with any regulations of the industrial inspection police. Changes in plant installations or in working methods demanded by the industrial inspection police are to be submitted to Montan before being carried out. All expenses and fees arising from these above measures will be paid by Montan.

Paragraph 3.

1.) As long as the plant is not in operation, all costs of the maintenance of the plant, including taxes and public rates on it, as well as any insurance payments, have to be paid by Montan. Anorgana will charge the cost price (including extra charges for welfare and other general factory expenses) without profit, plus a yearly extra charge of 2% for expenses of the general technical supervision.

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(7th Page of original document)

2.) At the beginning of each calendar year Anorgana undertakes to submit a non-obligatory specified estimate of costs of current maintenance according to sub-Paragraph 1. and, on demand, also an estimate of costs for possible modernization and supplementation expenses for the coming business year (1 April to 31 March of the following year). The estimate is to be specified as follows:

- I. Maintenance of the buildings.
- II. Maintenance of machinery and technical installations with all accessories.
- III. Administration expenses divided into personnel expenses (wages, salaries, social contributions) and general expenses (including taxes and insurance).
- IV. Any other matters.

3.) The decision on the estimate will be made by Montan before the beginning of the business year. After approval of the estimate, with reservation as to the approval of the final settlement of accounts, means for the maintenance of the plant will be made available by Montan to that extent as Anorgana itself has to make payments or defray expenses. If Montan refuses to supply the means needed for work, which is considered necessary by Anorgana, Montan is entirely liable for any detriment caused by the omission of this work.

4.) Beyond the estimates (Sub-Paragraph 2) small repairs each not to exceed a cost of RM 1000.— can be carried out by Anorgana without special order. In cases of special urgency, Anorgana is to look after the interests of Montan with the care of a proper merchant even without orders.

5.) When, and as long as the plant is in operation and utilized at more than 60% of its capacity, during any quarter of a calendar year, the maintenance costs are defrayed by Anorgana as lessee and are to be covered by calculation

in the prices; as long as the plant is in operation but is utilized during any quarter of a calendar year at less than 60% of its capacity, the maintenance costs are only to be paid by Anorgana in proportion to the capacity utilized, and are to be covered by calculation in the prices; the remainder is, however, to be paid by Montan in accordance with Sub-Paragraph 1.

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(8th Page of original document)

- 1) The OKH may give Anorgana delivery orders for Wehrmacht purposes at any time. In this case Anorgana undertakes to start to run the plant and to operate it. Anorgana undertakes to provide the necessary staff or workers, a suitable works manager and the necessary means for operation necessary for the operation of the plant.
- 2.) The plant can not be claimed for purposes other than those of the Wehrmacht. Anorgana in its turn may only use the equipment for purposes other than those of the Wehrmacht with the express permission of Montan obtained beforehand. Under conditions to be agreed upon separately in each case. Orders of the OKH have priority in every case.
- 3.) In case Anorgana intends to manufacture products other than those mentioned in the preface of this contract, it is to inform Montan of its plans when applying for permission. In this case Anorgana has to see to it that the conversion needed for the manufacture of products intended for the OKH according to the contract can be accomplished within 14 days at the most. The costs of the conversion are to be borne by Anorgana.

Paragraph 5.

Anorgana undertakes to run the plant with the utmost care as is expected from a bona fide technician and to make available such patents, processes, and experience at its disposal for the operation of the plant as are suitable.

Paragraph 6.

Anorgana will keep special accounts in its bookkeeping for this plant and the books of the plant covered by this contract will be kept separately from the books of any other plants. Montan is entitled to inspect the books and all the documents pertaining to manufacture including the balance sheets of the contracted plant at any time, as well as all the processes of manufacture. The same applies to the agents of the Price Control Office of the Army and the representatives of the Court of Accounts of the German Reich.

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(9th Page of original document)
Paragraph 7.

1.) For the duration of the operation of the plant, Anorgana is to pay Montan as rent a certain amount of the profit of the plant. (Sub-Paragraph 2). 33 1/3% is fixed as the share of profit for the first 5 years counted from the first day of operation of the plant. For any later period of lease a suitable rate of profit within the limits of 33 1/3 and 50% from year to year, with consideration on the one hand of orders received and the consequent utilization of the plant, with consideration on the other hand for the value of the further technical developments, made until then, will be established between Montan and Anorgana with the cooperation of the Aufsichtsrat of Anorgana.

2.) The profit according to Sub-Paragraph 1 will be fixed as follows:

The difference between the net profit gained from the sale of products (Paragraph 9) and the net costs according to Paragraph 9, Sub-Paragraph 1 a - f) must be fixed first. From this difference any reserves have to be deducted, as far as they are permissible according to the following regulations. From the amount remaining then the shares of the corporation taxes and the shares of the tax for export promotion must be deducted. (Compare the examples of calculation in Enclosure 2). The obtained amount has to be counted as profit according to Sub-Paragraph 1. Reserved funds for certain purposes may be included in the account, as far as this corresponds with a sound commercial economy. "Aulaufgarantien" (guarantees that the plant will be kept in operation), for example, may be regarded as reserve funds and insure the leaseholder against sudden disturbances in the plant; reserve funds may likewise be kept, to a reasonable extent, for social purposes and payments as well as for repairs and claims.

3.) The rent is to be fixed at the end of the current year (1 April to 31 March) and is payable for the previous year. The annual balance sheet is to be sent to Montan within two months after the conclusion of the current year and is to be settled between Anorgana and Montan with collaboration of the Aufsichtsrat of Anorgana. Within 6 months of the end of the current year the rent is to be paid in cash to Montan. During these 6 months no interest has to be paid to I.G.

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(10th Page of original document)

During this time Montan can claim a suitable discount. In case of overdue payments of the rents, Montan is entitled to claim interest of 2% above the current Reichsbank discount.

Paragraph 8.

1.) According to Paragraph 9, Sub-Paragraph 2, the depreciation amounts of the plant for the operated parts of the plant, gained by the price of the products, are to be expended in cash by Anorgana in accordance with Paragraph 7, Sub-Paragraph 3, to Montan.

2.) As far as there is no other agreement concerning the payment for delivered goods to official customers, according to Sub-Paragraph 1, depreciation amount represents

5% annually for factory buildings, railroad installations, distribution equipments (pipe lines, power lines etc.),

10% annually for machines and apparatus, railroad vehicles, equipment for plants and business-premises,

20% annually for apparatus with limited use, street-vehicles, extra costs for installations,

each of the purchase and/or original price.

If the plant is only partly used, the total annual amortization for the plant taken into operation for each ton of products divided by the amount of tons, which correspond to the annual capacity of the fully utilized plant has to be paid.

Paragraph 9.

1.) Goods which have been manufactured for domestic purposes of the Wehrmacht, must be sold at fixed prices if possible. The following points must be considered in fixing the prices:

- a) Cost of materials (raw materials and intermediary products). As far as the raw materials and intermediary products are bought from a third party, the effective cost prices (market value, freight, wrapping transport, unloading and maintenance expenses) must be settled, deducting any discounts for amounts or prices. For intermediary and preliminary products, supplied by I.G. plants, Anorgana will pay the cheapest prices at which the goods would be sold and/or delivered by I.G. to German customers, if delivered in approximately the same amount. Under the same conditions.
- b) Costs of manufacture.
These costs include the manufacturing wages and general manufacturing expenses

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(11th Page of original document)

including a proportion of the costs for electric power-, auxiliary- and general equipment, taxes and public rates, insurance premia and possible special expenses such as concern the plant.

- c) Expenses for packings and dispatch.
- d) Plant depreciation.
- e) Central administration and general sales expenses, in the amount of 7% of the expenses mentioned in a) to d) with deduction of those intermediary and preliminary products, which according to a) were possibly sold at the cheapest sales-prices.
- f) Turnover tax.
- g) An additional charge for profits for the expenses a) to e) which leaves Anorgana, under an orderly management, and after deduction of the rent, corporation tax and tax for export promotion apart from an appropriate payment of interest on the working capital, an appropriate payment as a compensation for its industrial work and especially for all inventive and technical achievements used in the plant. These payments are to be carried out in accordance with the regulations published in LSOe.No.56 (2).

2.) All products manufactured in the plant which are to be used for purposes other than those mentioned in Sub-Paragraph 1, will be offered by Anorgana for sale to I.G. In this case the Anorgana will fix a price which is to be settled according to the facts mentioned in Sub-Paragraph 1 a) to g). If the I.G. sells the goods manufactured in the plant to a third party at an exceptionally high profit, Anorgana will charge a proportionately higher price.

3.) If the goods manufactured by the plant are to be delivered to other Montan plants which are leased by Anorgana or I.G., or to an I.G.-plant, for further manufacturing for Wehrmacht purposes, a price will be fixed by Anorgana which will be settled according to the facts mentioned in Sub-Paragraph 1 a) to g). In case of further manufacturing, no further increases for profits can be added to the price of these products.

Paragraph 10.

- 1.) Both parties undertake to keep secret the contents of this contract and the method of execution thereof, as well as

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(12th Page of original document)

the correspondence and documents referring to it and only to make these known to those persons who must be included either directly or indirectly for the execution and fulfillment of this contract. Anorgana will see to it that the persons mentioned are bound to secrecy and that they are instructed that any offence against these regulations will be punished according to Paragraph 88 of the RStGB (Reich Penal Code).

- 2.) The liability of the contracting parties according to Sub-Paragraph 1 remains even after the expiration of this contract.
- 3.) Anorgana undertakes to inform Montan immediately if visitors from authorities or offices are announced who do not belong to the competent spheres of the Supply Departments, Montan will give permission for visiting the plant in agreement with the other offices concerned.

Paragraph 11.

- 1.) Montan will release Anorgana from all the obligations and charges which will arise from the execution of this contract, provided that, according to the provisions of this contract, Anorgana does not have to fulfill these obligations or bear these charges finally.
- 2.) With respect to this plant, Anorgana is responsible for taxes for the duration of this contract, according to the taxation law.

Paragraph 12.

- 1.) Rights and obligations arising from this contract can be transferred only with the consent of the other contracting party.

Paragraph 13.

This contract comes into force at the time the plant is finished and is to remain valid indefinitely. The date of the readiness of the plant will be fixed in writing between Montan and Anorgana.

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(13th Page of original document)

This contract can be terminated by notice given in a registered letter by either contracting party at the end of the first 3 months of the calendar year (31 March) with 6 months' notice, but only after the OKH has informed Anorgana by letter that the plant is no longer needed for Wehrmacht purposes and that OKH places no more value on the plant's operation for the Wehrmacht. The notice will be considered as given in time if it is posted on 29 September.

Paragraph 14.

- 1.) Any dispute arising over this contract come under the jurisdiction of the County Court in Berlin regardless of the value of the matter under dispute.
- 2.) At the beginning of a law suit both parties are bound to apply for the case be heard in camera and for the litigants to be bound to secrecy in accordance with Paragraphs 172, 174, GVG (Court Constitution Law), and that all records of the case be securely guarded.

Paragraph 15.

Each of the contracting party to pay half of the costs of this contract.

Paragraph 16.

This contract has been executed in three copies. Each party and the chairman of the Aufsichtsrat of Montan to receive one copy.

Berlin, 1 September 1940

Frankfurt a.M. 18 July 1940

Verwertungsgesellschaft fuer
Montanindustrie G.m.b.H.

Anorgana G.m.b.H.

(Illegible Signature)

(Signatures)
AMBROS

Per Procura: WITTMER

(Page 10 of original)
(14th Page of original document)
(Enclosure 2)

Example

for the calculation of rent according to Paragraph 17, Sub-Paragraph 2.

The proceedings of sale might be.....	RM..10,000,000.--	
After the deduction of the cost price according to Paragraph 9 a-f	RM 8,560,000.--	
and Export Promotion Levy (at 4.4% of the Sales Proceeds)	RM 440,000.--	9,000,000.--
The Profit Remains:		1,000,000.--

Corporation tax is not paid on the gross profit but on the profit minus the profit share of Montan, as this profit share is paid to Montan because of a debt and not on the grounds of any participation in the company. The profit share of Montan is calculated by deduction of the corporation tax from the gross profit. The following calculation is to be made:

$x =$ is that part of the gross profit kept by I.G. after deduction of Montan's share and the corporation tax.

$\frac{1}{3} x =$ is the profit share of Montan.

$\frac{2}{3} x =$ the corporation tax.

$(\frac{2}{3} x = 40\% \text{ of } (x + \frac{2}{3} x))$

$x + \frac{1}{3} x + \frac{2}{3} x =$	RM 1,000,000.--
$x =$	RM 460,000.--

Profit share of Montan is therefore.....	Approximately	RM 230,000.--
Corporation tax.....	"	RM 310,000.--
Net Profit of I.G.....	"	RM 460,000.--
	Total	RM1,000,000.--

CERTIFICATE OF VERIFICATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P. NO. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document no. NI-4990.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M.P. NO. 34079.

END

Case 6
end of book
Doc. bk. 35 46

NI - 12678

is introduced in connection with

Case VI, Document Book 35

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Emil EHMAN, resident in Stuttgart-Moehringen, Kanalstrasse 15, employee of the Army Ordnance Office from 1936-1937, Regierungsrat from 1937-1942, Oberregierungsbaurat from 1942-1943, Ministerialrat in the Army Ordnance Office from 1943-1945, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making false statements, herewith state the following under oath, voluntarily and without coercion:

1. I was chief of the Group: Preliminary Products for Powder, Explosives and Chemical Warfare Agents etc. from 1935-1942, and from 1942 I was chief of the Manufacturing and Procurement Department for Chemical Preliminary Products, Chemical Warfare Agents, Smoke Screen Agents, Rocket Propelling Agents etc.

2. In my interrogation before the Military Tribunal, Case # VI on 30 October 1947 I stated that the IG capacity with regard to chemical warfare agents before the outbreak of war was 8%, including chloride-acetophenone, and excluding this product, 10% of the entire German chemical warfare agents production capacity which was ready for operation. I did not include the chemical warfare agent capacities which were planned before the outbreak of war.

If the figures of the plans are included the following poison gas capacities are arrived at, according to the situation on 1 September 1939:

- | | |
|---|-------|
| a) Plants owned by IG | 3% |
| b) Plants owned by the OKH, which were operated by the IG or by plants in which IG had more than 70% interest | 62.1% |
| c) Plants belonging to firms which were independent of IG | 34.9% |

I arrived at these figures in the following way:

(Page 2 of original)

		Capacity in metric tons per month			
		IG-owned plants	OKH-owned plants operated by IG or by plants in which IG had more than 70% interest	Other firms	Total
<u>Argenic oil</u>					
	Stassfurth	-	-	180	
	Leese	-	-	400	
<u>Admgite (Azine)</u>					
	Verdingen	200	-	-	

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(I sub-divided them):

	Capacity in metric tons per month		
	IG-owned plants	OKH-owned plants operated by IG or by plants in which IG had more than 70% interest	Other firms:
Ammendorf (G-Lost)	-	-	700
Huels	-	600	-
Gendorf	-	4000	-
Ammendorf (N-Lost)	-	-	100
Leese	-	-	400
Uerdingen	200	-	-
Haselhorst	-	-	100
Ludwigshafen (W-Satz)	90	-	-
Seelze	-	-	120
Hahnenberg	-	-	550
Ludwigshafen	290	-	-
Wolfen	-	270	-

(Page 4 of original)

	IG-owned plants	OKH-owned plants operated by IG or by plants in which IG had more than 70% interest	Other firms:
Uerdingen	130	-	-
Dyrhernfurth	-	1000	-
Total	710	5870	1970 8550

In accordance with this, we arrive at the following capacities which were ready or nearly finished according to the opinion of the KRAUCH office: with respect to this I have used the higher of the alternative figures for Gendorf, 4 000 tons per month, since in case of gas warfare this capacity would have been utilized:

- a) IG-owned works 8.3%
- b) OKH-owned works operated by IG or by plants in which IG had more than 70% interest 68.6%
- c) Plants of firms which were independent of IG 23.1%

I wish to remark in this connection that I consider the figures for Huels, Ammendorf (N-Lost) and Hahnenberg to be too high, that Dyrhernfurth could not have been finished before 1944 and that Gendorf would have been nearly finished and ready for operation around the middle of 1943 if it had not been found that the D-Lost produced there did not keep in storage.

I have not counted Ammendorf under IG, but under 'other firms' in the above table.

4. In the evidence I gave in court to which I referred previously I stated that the share which IG and the firms connected with IG had in the actual production of chemical warfare agents up to the end of 1944 amounted to 38% and that of the other firms amounted to 62%.

a) Ammendorf's share in this total production amounted to 39.3% I did not count Ammendorf with IG but with the other firms.

b) The reasons why the actual production of IG was so very much lower

(Page 4 of original)

than had been planned or than the actual IG capacities which existed with regard to chemical warfare agents, were the following:

aa) After the Gendorf plant with a capacity of 4 000 tons per month had nearly been finished, it was found that the D-Lost produced there did not keep in storage and was therefore completely unsuitable for Wehrmacht purposes.

bb) The IG's installations were in general finished much later than the other installations.

cc) There was a shortage of the preliminary and intermediate products required for the production of poison gas. Therefore the Army Ordnance Office had to allocate the quotas of chemical raw materials which were made available for chemical warfare agents to the various firms accordingly. The smaller firms which produced only chemical warfare agents in their works and which had started operating earlier besides were given preference in this allocation, since in case of restrictions on

(Page 5 of original)

or closing down of the plant the personnel which would thus be released could not be employed in some other production of the plant. In this way these firms were always kept in readiness for gas warfare.

I have carefully read each of the five (5) pages of this affidavit and have personally countersigned it, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and have initialled them, and herewith declare under oath that in this statement I have told the pure truth according to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Signature) EMIL EHMANN
Emil Ehrmann

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-12678
(Cont'd)

Sworn to and signed before me this 25th day of November 1947, at
Nuernberg, Germany, by Dr. Emil EHMANN, Stuttgart-Moehringen,
Kanalstrasse 15, known to me to be the person making the above
affidavit.

(Signature) OTTO HEILBRUNN
Otto Heilbrunn
Civilian ETO No. 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department.

(Page 6 of original)

COPY

Berlin, 1 December 1942.
Dr. Ra./Scht.

5 copies
2nd copy.

The situation with regard to chemical warfare
agents.

Situation on 1 December 1942.

The work in this respect is marked particularly by the fact that
the chemical warfare agents have not yet been used in this war. There-
fore the measures dealt with are all only in the nature of preparations.

A. As far as capacity is concerned the situation is as follows:

1. Available plants which are ready or nearly finished:

<u>Product</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Firm</u>	<u>Capacity</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
a) O-Ester	Ammendorf	Orgacid GmbH.	700 tons per month	
b) O-Ester	Huels	Chem. Werke Huels	600	
c) O-Ester	Gendorf	Anorgana GmbH	900)	
d) O-Ester	Gendorf	Anorgana GmbH	4000)	alternative
e) T-9 (N-Lost)	Ammendorf	Orgacid GmbH	100	
f) Arisinic Oil	Leese	Lonal GmbH	400	
g) Azine	Uerdingen	IG Farben AG	200	
h) C 1	Haselhorst	Lonal GmbH	100	
i) Omega salt	Ludwigshafen	IG Farben AG	90	
j) Omega salt	Seelze	Riedel de Haen	120	
k) Omega salt	Hahnenberg	Riedel de Haen	550	
l) Oil F	Ludwigshafen	IG Farben AG	290	
m) Oil F	Wolfen	IG Farben AG	270	
n) Oil F	Uerdingen	IG Farben AG	130	
o) T 83	Dyhernfurth	Anorgana GmbH	1000	

Total capacity for chemical warfare agents 9450 tons per month

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-12678
(Cont'd)

Further it should be noted with regard to the plants and/or production facilities: add: a) The production of 700 tons G-Ester per month requires 575 tons Oxol 1 Per month; out of this only 360 tons per month can be produced in Amendorf itself; the remainder has to be supplied by Ludwigshafen. (215 tons Oxol 1 per month). The plant was already in operation and

- 2 -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, ETO NO. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-12678.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
ETO NO. 34079

END

Case 6
end of book
see Bk. 35 46

NI - 12724

is introduced in connection with
Case VI, Document Book 35

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Gerhard RITTER, at the moment in the Palace of Justice, Nuernberg, having been duly warned that any false statement on my part will render me liable to punishment, do hereby declare the following under oath of my own free will and without compulsion:

1. From 1926-1945 I was employed by I.G. Farbenindustrie, - as a chemist in the Oppau plant from 1926-1934, and as technical assistant to Dr. Krauch from the end of 1934-1945. In this capacity I was in the Vermittlungsstelle until May 1936, then on the raw materials and foreign exchange staff, which later became the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials, and later Reich Office for Economic Development, from autumn 1938 - April 1945. At the same time I collaborated with Professor Krauch in his capacity as Plenipotentiary General for Special Questions of Chemical Production from autumn 1938-1945. I became Prokurist for I.G. Farbenindustrie in 1941.

2. I have been shown the Document NI-11105, Exhibit 1572,* Page 6, a copy of which is attached to this affidavit. The point in question is a passage dictated by me on May 8, 1942, at Professor Krauch's request, which I composed jointly with men of the sub-department PSV (powder, explosives, and preliminary products) which gave the current production possibilities at that time in the Chemical Warfare Agents sector.

If the facts contained in this article are divided among I.G. production, production in Reich plants controlled by I.G., or its subsidiary companies, and the production of other firms, and if Chloracetophenon which is to be considered as an irritant is excluded, the following picture emerges:

* For identification

(page 2 of original)

Production Possibility in metr. tons per month

	I.G.-owned works	OKH.-owned works operated by I.G. or I.G. Partici- pants	Other firms	Total
Huels	-	450	-	
Gendorf	-	4000	-	
Dyhernfurth	-	1000	-	
Stassfurt	-	-	160	
Hahnenberg	-	-	400	
Uerdingen	200	-	-	
Ammendorf	-	-	50	
	200	5450	530	6280

In accordance with this, the Gebechem on 3 May 1942 estimated the possible production of chemical warfare agents as follows:

- a) For I.G. works 3.2 %
- b) For Reich-owned works
operated by the I.G.
or its subsidiary companies 86.6 %
- c) For works of other firms 10.0 %

of the possible total production.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

I have carefully read through each of the two sheets of this affidavit and counter-signed it with my own hand, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialled them, and I hereby declare under oath that in this declaration I have stated the absolute truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signature: GERHARD RITTER

(page 3 of original)

Sworn to and signed before me this 26th day of November 1947, at Nuernberg, Germany, by Dr. Gerhard RITTER, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Signature: OTTO HEILBRUNN
Otto Heilbrunn
Civilian, STC No. 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

26 November 1947

I, Phyllis RAY STC No. 36267, hereby certify that I am a duly appointed translator for the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-12724.

Phyllis RAY
No. 36267

case 6
Doc. Bks. 35
end of book

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. ERNST STRUSS, director of IG Farben, chief of the Office of the Technical Committee of IG Farben, Secretary of the Technical Committee of the Vorstand of IG, chief of Sparte II of Vervollständigung, and production chief of the entire German synthetic industry covered by the economic Group Chemical Industry since 1945, having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making false statements, herewith state under oath, voluntarily and without coercion, the following:

In the affidavit following, I am dealing with the zinc production capacity of IG which had been planned before the outbreak of war:

- 1.) In the discussion of 4 April 1939 between Dr. ter Meer, Dr. Andres, Dr. Kenraf, and myself as representatives of IG, and members of the Reich Office for Economic Development, with Dr. Ackel in the chair, it was decided that the production capacity for the zinc plant Huelshausen should be increased to 40 000 tons per year and that of the zinc plant Gelsenkirchen to 60 000 tons per year.
- 2.) Further a third zinc plant was planned, Fuerstenberg, on the Oder, during 1939 before the outbreak of war. This factory was to have a starting capacity of 12 000 tons per year with possibilities for increasing this to 24 000 tons per year.
- 3.) According to this the total plans of IG for zinc production therefore amounted to 112 000 tons before the outbreak of war; in Fuerstenberg an additional expansion by 12 000 tons per year was intended.

I have carefully read the above affidavit and personally signed it; have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them. I herewith declare under oath that in this statement I have told the pure truth according to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signature) Dr. Ernst Struss

(page 2 of original)

Sworn to and signed before me this 21st day of November 1947 at Muensterberg, Germany by Dr. ERNST STRUSS known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signature) Otto Heilerunn
Dr. Otto Heilerunn
Civilian. MTO 30140
Office of the Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
US War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Dorothea L. Galeski, MTO 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the Document No. MI-12627.

DOROTHEA L. GALESKI
MTO 34079

END

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case 6
 end of book
 Doc. 132, 35 (6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Emil BEMANN, living in Stuttgart-Möhringen, Kesselstrasse 15, employee of the Army Ordnance Office from 1935 to 1937, Regierungsrat (Government Councillor) from 1937 to 1942, Oberregierungsbeamter (Senior Government Construction Councillor) from 1942 to 1943, Ministerialrat (Ministerial Councillor) in the Army Ordnance Office from 1943 to 1945, having been duly warned that I render myself liable to punishment by making a false statement, herewith depose the following on oath, of my own free will and without coercion.

1) I was Chief of the Group for Preliminary Products for Powder, Explosives, Chemical Warfare Agents etc. from 1935 to 1942, and Chief of the Manufacturing and Procurement Department for Chemical Preliminary Products, Chemical Warfare Agents, Artificial Fog Producers, Rocket Fuels, etc. from 1942 on.

2) In my examination as witness before the Military Tribunal, Case VI on 30 October 1947 I testified on:

- a) Production capacity of the plants manufacturing chemical warfare agents which were in existence on 1 September 1939
- b) Production capacity of the plants manufacturing chemical warfare agents which were in existence in December 1944
- c) Total production of chemical warfare agents from the beginning of rearmament to the end of the war.

For this I have given the following figures:

Re. a) Production capacity on 1 Sept 1939:

	I.G.-owned factories	G.I.A.-owned factories which were run by the I.G. or by firms in which the I.G. held a share of over 70%	Figures in metric tons per month	
			other firms	Total
1) <u>Chloro- acetophenone</u>				
Ludwigshafen	70	-	-	
Seelze	-	-	150	
2) <u>Arsine oil</u>				
Stassfurt	-	-	160	
3) <u>Oxol-mustard</u>				
Wess Ammondorf	-	-	430	
<u>Total:</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>780</u>	<u>850</u>

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. I - 13725
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

	I.G.-owned factories	G.I.G.-owned factories which were run by the I.G. or by other plants in which the I.G. holds a share of over 70%	Measure in metric tons per month	
			Other plants	Total
Total of 1 - 3 i.e. Chloro-acetophenone considered as a chemical warfare agent:	70	-	780	850
Total output capacity 8,3 on 1 Sept 1939 ex- pressed in percentages			31,8	100
Total of 2 and 3 i.e. without considering Chloro-acetophenone			830	830
Total output capa- city on 1 Sept 1939 expressed in per- centages	8		100	100

Re b) Production capacity in December 1934

1) <u>Chloro- acetophenone</u>				
Ludwigshafen	70			
Soolze	-		150	
Reimenberg	-		830	
2) <u>Arsine oil</u>				
Strasfurt	-	-	370	
Leese	-	-	400	
3) <u>Clark</u>				
Kasselhorst	-	-	130	
4) <u>Alensit (Azin)</u>				
Verlinden	250	-	-	
5) <u>Phosgene</u>				
Ludwigshafen	130	-	-	
Wolfen	-	400	-	
Verlinden	160	-	-	

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. MI - 12725
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original document)

	I.G.-owned factories			Other firms	Total
	U.S.A. owned factories which were run by the I.G. or by firms in which the I.G. held a share of over 70%				
6) <u>Tabun</u> Dyhernfurth	-	1000	-	-	
7) <u>Cyanozen chloride T 300</u> <u>Krassic acid</u> Dyhernfurth	-	30	-	-	
8) <u>Oxol-mustard gas</u> Ammerdorf	-	-	-	700	
Muels	-	600	-	-	
9) <u>Direct mustard</u> Gondorf (Orgel)	-	-	-	800	
10) <u>Hydrogen-mustard</u> Gondorf (Anerjana)	-	300	-	-	
Ammerdorf	-	1500	-	-	
Total	620	3830	2990	7440	

(page 3 of original)

Total of 1 - 10 i.e. Chloro-acetophenone considered as a chemical warfare agent	620	3830	2990	7440
Total output capacity in Dec 1944 expressed in percentages	8,3	51,5	40,2	100

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. MI - 12725
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original attached)

	I.G.-owned factories	O.K.M.-owned factories which were run by the I.G. or by firms in which the I.G. holds a share of over 50%	Figures in metric tons per month	
			other firms	Total
Total of 2 - 10 i.e. without considering Chloro-acetophenone	550	6830	2340	3720
Total output capa- city in December 1944 expressed in percentages	8,2	57	34,8	100
Re c) <u>Total production of chemical warfare agents from the beginning of rearmament to the end of the war</u>				<u>in metric tons</u>
1) Chloro-acetophenone	3000	-	4000	7000
2) Adamsit (Asin)	3000	-	-	3000
3) Phosgen	-	5 00	-	5000
4) Arsine oil	-	-	7000	7000
5) Clark	-	-	1000	1000
6) Oxol-mustard gas	-	-	22000	22000
7) Direct mustard gas	-	2000	-	2000
8) Nitroson mustard gas	-	-	2000	2000
9) Tabun	-	12000	-	12000
Total of 1 - 9, i.e. <u>with</u> Chloro-acetophenone in percentages	5000 9,8	12000 31,2	36000 59	51000 100
Total of 2 - 9, i.e. <u>without</u> Chloro- acetophenone in percentages	3000 5,5	19000 35,2	32000 59,3	54000 100

In the witness stand I gave the figures 38% and 62% instead of 5,5% plus 35,2% equals 40,7%, and 59% respectively since Tabun (Figure 9) was given as 10,000 tons instead of 12,000 tons in the second column as a result of a clerical error, while the figure 12,000 was correctly given in the last column.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. MI - 12725
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

In my above calculations re a), b) and c) I listed the firm Orgacid G.m.b.H. as not belonging to I.G. The share of this firm, in consideration of its

	<u>with</u> Caloro - acetophenone	<u>without</u>
a) Production capacity with plants in existence on 1 Sept 1939, equals:	52,3	71,4
b) Production capacity with plants in existence in December 1944, equals:	3,4	10,4
c) Total production from the beginning of rearmament to the end of the war, equals:	39,3	44,4

I have carefully read each of the 4 pages of this affidavit and have signed them with my own hand; I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting, and have countersigned them with my initials and I herewith declare on oath that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, I have stated the absolute truth in this affidavit.

Emil F. K. M. M.

Sworn to and signed before me this 26th day of November 1947, at Nuernberg, Germany, by Dr. Emil F. K. M. M. Stuttgart-Moehrin, Kanaltstrasse 15, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Otto PHILBRON
Civilian DTO No. 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

28 November 1967

I, Arthur C. MacAMARA, # 30 191 hereby certify that I am a duly appointed translator for the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. XI - 12725.

.....
Arthur C. MacAMARA

30 191

MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO. 1
CASE NO. II
Prosecution Document Book No. XXXVI

English



INDEX
TO
DOCUMENT BOOK XXXVI
COUNT I - D
FARBEN PARTICIPATED IN CREATING AND
EQUIPPING THE NAZI MILITARY MACHINE
FOR AGGRESSIVE WAR

Exhibit Document No. No	Description of Document	Page in 1 Document Book
NI-4996	Agreement between I.G. Farben and OKH re carrying on of experiments for poison gas intermediates.	1
NI-9198	Affidavit of Dr. Hoffmann, former official in Chemicals Department of Reich Ministry of Economics, re I.G. Farben's production of caustic soda and chlorine.	7
NI-7425	Letter from defendant Kuehne to defendant Ambros re D-Loos plant in Leverkusen, dated 28 September 1939.	10
NI-4988 (already in evidence in Book XIII as Exhibit 355)	Memorandum of meeting, 29 January 1940, (Ambros present) re organization of Lurantil company by I.G. for construction of poison gas plants in order to conceal I.G. Farben's participation.	12
NI-5689	Memorandum re letter from Army High Command to Ambros, 10 January 1941, re measures to be taken to conceal delivery of poison gas products.	15
NI-6523	I.G. file note "about the raw material supply of the VT Installation", dated October 1941, stating that in times of the most radical war, when chemical weapons are used, the nitrogen production from Treestberg will practically cease if at the same time poison gas and lubricants are produced.	17
NI-6676	Memorandum, 28 July 1942, Ambros to Wittwer, re production schedule for poison gas at Gendorf plant.	
NI-1640	Letter dated 10 May 1943, from Ambros to Kuehne, advising that Ambros is carrying out liaison	



Exhibit Document No.	Description of Document	Page in Document Book
	with Supreme Command of Army re experiments on poison gas.	
NI-6633 (already in evidence in Book IX as Exhibit 272)	Note from Farben files, 1 May 1942, re I.G.'s participation in production of poison gas in French plants.	26
NI-7377	Memorandum re meeting of Vorstand of Anorgana (present, Ter Meer, von Knieriem, Ambros) of 23 August 1943, re operation of Seewerk (Falkenhagen) plant and change over of Nanton lease contracts.	37
NI-4994	Two letters -- (1) From Montan 24 October 1944, to Farben Legal Department re lease for Auschwitz plant and (2) Letter, 23 May 1944, from Army High Command to Ambros, re construction of Seewerk plant near Falkenhagen for production of Sarin.	42
NI-8782	Letter, 5 June 1944, from Ambros re construction of Seewerk Falkenhagen plant for production of Sarin.	51
NI-7618	Affidavit of Dr. Gorr, I.G. chemist for Vermittlungsstelle W, re Seewerk Falkenhagen plant's part in production of Sarin and Tabun.	54
NI-9582	Affidavit of Dr. Wagner, formerly of I.G. re production at Falkenhagen plant.	56
NI-1043 (already in evidence in Book I as Exhibit 14)	Correspondence between Himmler and Speer, July 1944, re conflict between SS and I.G. on operation of Falkenhagen plant.	57
NI-7381	Letter from I.G. Farben at Ludwigshafen to I.G. at Leverkusen, dated 22 June 1944, re Falkenhagen plant production of "N-stoff".	60

Exhibit No.	Document No.	Description of Document	Page in Document-Book
No.	NI-4991	Agreement, November 1944, between I.G. Farben (per Ambros) and OKH re operation of Auschwitz plant.	63
	NI-4633	Letter from I.G. (Auschwitz), 24 July 1944, re phosgene production.	67
	NI-6787 (already in evidence in Book XI as Exhibit 296)	Affidavit of Dr. Hoerlein re early experiments on poison gas and toxic substances.	69
	NI-9770	Affidavit of Dr. Schrader, formerly of I.G. Farben, re Sarin and Tabun.	76
	NI-7871	Interrogation of Dr. Schrader re Sarin and Tabun.	79
	NI-9772	Affidavit of Dr. Palm, formerly of I.G. Farben, re poison gas production, Sarin and Tabun.	86
	NI-6927	Affidavit of Dr. Gross, former of I.G. Farben, re experiments in poison gas and toxic substances.	91
	NI-7850	VOWI report on technology for explosives and poison gas.	95
	NI-10008 (already introduced in connection with "Explosives")	Chart "Production of 18 strategic materials of I.G. and I.G. controlled companies", showing that figures for I.G. poison gas production are not available for the years 1932 to 1944, with affidavit by Struss.	99
	NI-10019 (already introduced in connection with "Explosives")	figures for poison gas of I.G. plants Uerdingen, Falkenhayn, Gendorf and Dyhernfurth are not available.	102
	NI-10009	Chart "I.G.'s and subsidiaries' share in total German production of strategic materials 1937 and 1943", estimating I.G.'s percentage in the total production of poison gas in 1943 at 95%, with affidavit by Struss.	108

Exhibit No.	Document No.	Description of Document	Page in Document-Book
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NI-10010	Chart, "The Wehrmacht's Dependence on I.G. Farben's Production (1943)", estimating the figures for poison gas at 95%, with affidavit by Struss. ("Explosives")	110
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NI-10595	Affidavit of Dr. Ehman of Chemical Industry re I.G.'s poison gas production.	112
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NI-9771	Affidavit of Dr. Mair re production figures for acetophenone for period 1935 to 1945.	131
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NI-9126	Affidavit of Karl von Heider of 25 July 1947, containing condensed compilation of statements prepared in May, 1945, by various departments of I.G. Farben on the destruction of files and records in anticipation of the Allied occupation.	133
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NI-8324	Affidavit of Ernst Struss of 29 May 1947, on destruction of the files of the Technical Committee with the defendant ter Meer's knowledge.	147
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NI-8976	Affidavit of Ernst Engelbertz of 12 June 1947, on the destruction of all Griessheim files marked secret, upon the order of the Vorstand communicated by Lautenschlaeger.	150
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NI-8329	Affidavit of Friedrich Engel of 29 May 1947, on the destruction of all Hoechst documents marked secret.	152
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NI-12678	Affidavit of Dr. Emil Chumam	130 j
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NI-12724	Affidavit of Dr. Gerhard Ritter	130 a
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NI-12725	Affidavit of Dr. Emil Chumam	130 d
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Secret

December 1940 (crossed out)

Document No. 37/1941

C o n t r a c t

between

the German Reich (Army Branch of Reich Treasury),
represented by the High Command of the Army, hereinafter
called "OKH",

and

the I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft,
Ludwigshafen/Rhine,
hereinafter referred to as "the firm, represented by its
Vorstand.

Preamble

The firm have perfected at their Leuna factory a process brought about
by splitting carbohydrates in an electric arc for the manufacture of
ethyals by the hydrogenation of acetyles.

The introduction of a process for the hydrogenation of acetyles at the
Army owned experimental plant now in process of construction at Trost-
berg would result in a considerable saving in the costs both of con-
structing and of maintaining the plant.

The process must however first be developed so as to admit of the use
of carbide acetyles, as no others are available for the experimental
plant.

To carry out that development: to finance it: and to define the legal
responsibilities of the contracting parties with regard to the results
of that development: those are the objects of this contract.

Article 1.

According to preliminary instructions contained in OKH Wa J RM 9 VII
dated 20 December 1938 the firm was commissioned to work out a process

(page 2 of original)

for the hydrogenation of carbide acetyles and to continue at their Schkopau works the experiments to that end they had made, up to that date, in their works at Oppau and Ludwigshafen. This made it necessary to transfer from Ludwigshafen to Schkopau those parts of the experimental apparatus which had been purchased from OKH funds (order No. 9 VII 247-0114/38).

According to the estimates submitted by the firm the costs of the project were expected to amount to the following sums:

a) To experiments at Oppau and Ludwigshafen in the years 1937 and 1938	RM 340 644,--
b) To transferring apparatus from Ludwigshafen to Schkopau	50 000,--
c) To installing a "Linde" experimental plant at Schkopau	50 000,--
d) To continuation of experiments at Schkopau	300 000,--
e) To continuation of experiments with the Linde plant according to additional instructions dated 15 August 1939 (Wa J RM O VIIr No.6859/39c)	100 000,--
	<hr/>
	RM 840 644,--
	=====

According to receipted bills and their final bill submitted on the successful conclusion of the experiments on 9 May 1941, the total costs amounted to RM 1 458 951,92. Of this sum the firm credited the OKH with RM 787 912,00 representing the sales value of the quantities of pure ethylene produced in the course of the experiments. The balance of RM 671 039,92 shall be finally settled between OKH and the firm as follows:

(page 3 of original)

- a) After conclusion of experimentation the firm shall pay the OKH the current value of the experimental apparatus procured and provided with funds of the OKH at a price mutually agreed upon by the contracting parties. 9 May 1941 shall be taken as the date on which the experiments terminated.
- b) After deduction of a sum specified in accordance with para a), 75% of the remaining sum shall be borne by OKH, 25% by the firm.

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

In arriving at the ratio of 75 to 25 as mentioned in para b), the contracting parties were of the opinion - subject to a modicum of scepticism about the possibility of making such prognoses - that such a distribution of the costs corresponds with the ratio, in war economy and private industry respectively, of the exploitation value inherent in the results of the experiments, exploitation for the purposes of the former to be reserved to OKH in accordance with the provisions of article 2: for the purposes of the latter to the firm in accordance with the provisions of article 3.

Article 2.

The firm shall grant to OKH the right to use, or to allow its contractors to use, for the purposes of the German Wehrmacht, unreservedly, free of charge, and independent of the expiration of this contract, all the results of research carried out in pursuance of instructions detailed in article 1, all production formulas, samples etc., including any patent rights the firm have already acquired or may acquire in the future. The foregoing shall include the right to publish production formulas and to circulate them to other contractors.

The firm shall furthermore communicate to, and put at the disposal of the OKH for the benefit of the German Wehrmacht

(page 4 of original)

free of charge and independent of the expiration of this contract, any improvements they might make on the modification of the process, as well as experiences they might gain in its practical application, including any patent rights they might acquire. The firm shall also permit OKH to pass that information on, free of further charges, to its contractors.- OKH on the other hand shall, when concluding supplementary contracts employing this method, require its contractors to hand over to the OKH and the firm, independent of the duration of the contract and for use free of further charges, experiences gained and improvements effected in the working of the process, including any patent rights they may have acquired.

Article 3.

The firm shall be at liberty to utilize the results of the development and the patent rights connected therewith (article 2) both at home and abroad for purposes other than those of the German Wehrmacht, provided only that the matters concerned are not subject to security restrictions in the interests of national defence. Decisions on matters involving imposition of obligation to secrecy to rest entirely with OKH.

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

Article 4.

OKH shall keep secret all information and all documents relating to the modified process as well as additional information communicated to OKH by the firm, without prejudice to its right to pass such information on to its contractors, whom it shall moreover require to keep such information secret and to use it exclusively for the purposes of the German Wehrmacht.

(page 5 of original)

Article 5.

In carrying out the development which forms the object of this contract the firm shall be responsible for the methods of operation, for the smooth co-operation of all sections; for maximum structural efficiency of experimental plant and apparatus according to the laws of chemical science and technology, and for the prevention of accidents in the operation of the plant, as well as for the choice of materials according to the highest state of technical knowledge obtaining at any given time. According to the provisions of this contract the liability of the firm shall be limited to criminal neglect and intent at the lower end of the scale, and to profits derived by the firm through its utilization of the results of the development, at the upper end of the scale.

Article 6.

The firm shall not include in the price charged for deliveries to the Wehrmacht any sums calculated to make good those expenses incurred by it in carrying out experiments and research connected with the process, which are to be borne by the firm in accordance with article 1. Such expenses may only be charged where the results of such research are utilized for purposes other than those of the Wehrmacht.

Article 7.

The firm shall grant to the representatives of OKH and of the Supreme Auditing Court of the German Reich (Rechnungshof des Deutschen Reichs) the right to audit in accordance with article 45 c of the Reichs budget decrees (Reichshaushaltsordnung) for the purpose of controlling the execution of this contract and of determining if necessary the limits of liability along the lines provided in article 5.

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

Article 8.

The firm shall be bound to secrecy regarding this contract, the correspondence referring to its execution, and all documents statements and records connected therewith.

(page 6 of original)

Matters to be kept secret may be communicated, in part only and to the minimum extent considered necessary, to those persons directly or indirectly required to ensure the efficient operation and execution of the contract. Such persons must be sworn to absolute secrecy, and it should be pointed out to them that breaches of security regulations are subject to legal prosecution in accordance with articles 88 to 93a and 353 b and c of the Reich Penal Code in the issues of 4 April 1934, 2 July 1936 and 16 September 1939 respectively.

Article 9.

Any disputes arising out of this contract shall be referred to the District Court (Landgericht) at Berlin irrespective of the relative importance of the object of dispute.

On commencement of a legal dispute the contracting parties shall immediately make application for the exclusion from the proceedings of the public and for the imposition on those involved in the proceedings of the obligation to secrecy in accordance with articles 172 and 174 of the GVG (Law of Court Procedure).

Article 10.

The contract shall be effective from the date of signature by both parties. The contract shall be subject to termination at one year's notice on 31 March of each year the first date being 31 March 1942.

The instructions for the development of the process referred to in article 1 shall be held to constitute an essential part of this contract in the sense that neither of the sets of conditions may be altered or cancelled without a corresponding alteration or cancellation of the other.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4996
CONTINUED

(page 7 of original)

Article 11.

Stamp duties (Urkundensteuer) are to be born by the firm.

Article 12.

The contract has been drawn up in triplicate; two copies to OKH, one to the firm.

Berlin, 23 June 1941

For High Command of Army
Signature
General of Artillery and
Chief of Army Ordnance Office

3 Mark stamp.

Inscription on
cancelling stamp mark
High Command of Army
Wa 32
Army Ordnance Office

Seal

Ludwigshafen, 6 June 1941

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELL-
SCHAFT
Signatures
AMBROS pp GUENTER

This is to certify that stamp
duties to the amount of RM 840,50
for the original, and of RM 3,00
for two copies, have been paid
in document registration tax
stamps, and that the stamps have
been cancelled.

Berlin, 5 January 1942

For Army High Command. Wa I/Wa 32
(signed) Dr. von HILSEN
Kriegsvorwaltungsrat.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

23 May 1947

I, Arthur MCMARRA, Civ. No. 20191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-4996.

Arthur MCMARRA
Civ. No. 20191

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Alfred Johannes HOFFMANN, at present living in Minden, Westfalia, Karolinger Ring 12, Trades Assessor at the Reich Ministry of Economics from June 1934 - June 1937, Government Councillor at the Reich Ministry of Economics from June 1934 - February 1940, Senior Government Councillor at the Reich Ministry of Economics from February 1940 until the collapse, at present Department Chief in the Economic Administration Office of the American and British Zones of Occupation at Minden, having been duly advised that I shall render myself liable to punishment if I make a false statement, herewith depose the following on oath, voluntarily and without coercion:

1. At the Reich Ministry of Economics, I was employed as Referent, firstly of the Chemicals Department and then of the Chemicals Division (Abteilung). In this capacity, I obtained a general view of the conditions prevailing in the German Chemical Industry as a whole. I had access to all official information on production and production capacities within the German Chemical Industry, in so far as these concerned my Department. Among other chemicals, caustic soda and chlorine fell within the compass of my Department.
2. As far as I remember, the production capacities of the plants available in Germany for the production of caustic soda and chlorine in 1939 before the outbreak of war, exceeded peace-time requirements. The purposes for which caustic soda and chlorine were used in war production are: caustic soda, cellulose, and chlorine, solvents, glycol and di-glycol.
3. As far as I remember, I.G.'s share in caustic soda and chlorine production before the war exceeded 75% of the total. This estimate corresponds with a survey which I hold of the caustic soda capacities of the German Chemical Industry for the year 1942/1943. The statistics were taken from official records, and I reproduce them in the following:

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-9198
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

Production Capacities of the I.G. and works within the I.G. Konzern:	In tons per month	Capacities of the Remainder of the Chemical Industry:	In tons per month
Bitterfeld	6,660	Bitterfeld	1,950
Gersthofen	1,920	Thann	680
Hoechst	2,330	Hiederau	750
Leverkusen	3,900	Weissir	690
Ludwigshafen	3,500	Ammendorf	1,200
Rheinfelden	2,400	Westereveln	1,220
Schkopau	3,750	Osternienbury	1,080
Wolfen	1,320	Hallein	360
Huels	3,000	Zombkowitz	165
Bruecke	366	Luelsdorf	1,325
Aussig	1,860	Odermuede	145
Burghausen	1,500	Mannheim-Waldhof	180
Mueckenberg	535	Firna	317
Gendorf	<u>3,900</u>	Leyken	114
	36,941	Haynau	75
		Jaworzno	70
			<u>10,321</u>

At the time in question, the I.G. therefore produced approximately 78 % of a total production capacity of approximately 47,000 tons per month.

I have carefully read the 2 (two) pages of this affidavit and have countersigned them with my own hand, I have made the necessary corrections and have countersigned them with my initials and I herewith declare on oath that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, I have spoken the absolute truth in this affidavit.

Signature: Dr. Alfred Hoffmann
Dr. Alfred HOFFMANN

Sworn to and signed before me this 31st day of July 1947 at the Palace of Justice, Nurnberg, Germany, by Dr. Alfred HOFFMANN, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Signature: Otto Heilbrunn
Dr. Otto HEILBRUNN
ETO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9198
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

13 August 1947

I, Beryl C. EESLICK, No. D 427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-9198.

Beryl C. EESLICK
No. D 427459

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No: NI-7425
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Dr. H. Kuehne
Member of the Vorstand
of the I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft

Leverkusen - I.G. Works,
28 September 1939
Telephone - Cologne Office No.60941
Local calls - Cologne Office
No.60741

Rubber Stamp:
TOP SECRET

- 1) This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
- 2) Only to be handed over personally or delivered under double cover against receipt, to a personal address.
- 3) To be forwarded, if possible, by courier or a trustworthy person, if sent by post value to be quoted as over RM. 1,000.-
- 4) Duplication of every sort, including preparation of excerpts, forbidden.
- 5) To be kept, at responsibility of addressee, in a safe, in exceptional cases in a steel cabinet with combination lock.
- 6) Offenses against these orders will result in most severe punishment.

Herr
Director Dr. O. AMBROS
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft

L u d x i n s h a f e n / Rhine

Stamp:
Office of Dr. Ambros
Received: 30 Sep. 1939
No. 355

Dear Herr Dr. Ambros !

I thank you very kindly for your report on the result of the conference at the Army Ordnance Office in regard to D-mustard gas. I again confirm that Leverkusen will take over the planning, construction and operation of the actual D-mustard gas plant including the production of sulphur chloride from sulphur and chlorine. I have commissioned Herr Dr. Mader and Herr Dr. Noack, Herr Dr. Soel of the Engineering Department with the handling of these projects. Preparatory work will be started immediately.

Best regards
Yours
signature: KUEPNE

(Handwritten note:)
Herr Dr. Wittwer and then return to the
OKH (High Command of the Army) file

Illegible initial

Stamp: Return to Dr. Ambros

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7425
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

15 August 1947

I, Arthur MACNAMARA, No. 20191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7425.

.....
Arthur MACNAMARA
No. 20191

(Translator's Note): Stamp: S e c r e t .

1. This is a state secret according to par. 88 penal c.
2. Delivery sealed if by mail send as registered letter.
3. Recipient responsible for safekeeping under lock and key.

29 January 1940 Dr.H/Pl.

The M e m o
about the first discussion on Luranil
on 27 January 1940 at Ludwigshafen/Rhine.

Present

The Managers:

Dr. AMEROS
Dr. EYMANN
Obering. SANTO

(Translator's Note:
handwritten note:
H. Fiehl
Copy 10 February 1940)

The Prokuristen:

Obering. MACH
Ing. LEDERLE
Dr. HEINTZLER

The newly appointed
authorized representative:
(Handelsbevollmächtigter) ZINSER.

Dr. AMEROS opens the conference. As a preliminary it is established that the founding the Luranil has a dual purpose; on one side it must be avoided, as regards certain projects built by the I.G. and financed by a third party, to let the I.G. as such appear to the outside, especially at the building site; also it is intended to establish a clear-cut separation between I.G.'s own projects and those heterogeneous to I.G. through this foundation and by this method to ascertain the exact and complete computation of costs in the handling of I.G.'s outside projects. The I.G. wants no profit from building the Reich plants involved; but there is the danger that the I.G. would simply loose money on account of the difficulties in computing the costs in building these plants, and this must be avoided. Since Luranil will not be a completely independent organization with its own personnel, administration buildings etc., but is rather to carry out the projects assigned to it mostly with I.G. personnel, the difficulties of estimating costs are not lessened by this new foundation. If, however, by the interposition of Luranil, the outside projects of I.G. are marked as such, the most serious source of danger in regard to incomplete computation of costs is eliminated, namely the ignorance of the numerous departments and people involved of the fact that the project in question is of a character heterogeneous to I.G.. Herr LEDERLE and Herr ZINSER, take all other necessary steps to carry out a complete computation of costs.

(page 2 of original)

The following questions were discussed in detail:

- 1.) The first projects to Luranil are DYKHERNFURTH, GRILFO, and the acet-aldehyde plant of TROSTBERG.
- 2.) The method which Luranil is to use for projects assigned to it can be gathered from the draft of a letter of instruction from I.G. to Luranil, added to this record as annex. So far it had not been settled whether

Luranil shall place orders in its own name or in the name of I.G. Since conditions in regard to book-keeping, turn-over tax etc. are so complicated if Luranil places orders in its own name, Luranil shall order in its own name. Any possible difficulties can be prevented from the start by the attachment of a slip to the orders of Luranil, wherein I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. states that Luranil is a 100% subsidiary company of I.G. and that the means for meeting the obligations of Luranil are guaranteed.

3.) Tax questions.

a) Turn-over Tax.

The turn-over between I.G. and Luranil remains exempt from taxes if Luranil is recognized as a part of I.G.. Director DENCKER has lately assured us that he will see to it that the Central Tax Department forwards appropriate application to the Fiscal Office (Finanzamt) in question.

b) Document authentication fee.

As Luranil orders in its own name, the orders placed by it are not covered within the composition-sum agreement between I.G. and the Fiscal Office. In order to simplify business it is recommended that an application be made to have these taxes also replaced by a composition payment as regards Luranil.

c) Corporation Tax, Property Tax, Trade Tax.

It must be cleared up whether these taxes for Luranil should be dealt with by the Central Tax Department in Frankfurt as are those of other companies of the I.G.

(page 3 of original)

4.) Personnel Matters.

Luranil will carry out its tasks chiefly with I.G. personnel. But in so far as in the execution of individual projects the Luranil needs temporary workers the permanent employment of whom with I.G. is not expected, they shall be engaged by Luranil. Matters of personnel - for employees as well as workers - shall be assigned for central treatment to someone in the department for matters pertaining to employees and workers at Ludwigshafen.

- 5.) The OKH (High Command of the Army) has to be advised at the first occasion about the co-operation of Luranil in the execution of projects turned over to it. In this connection it will have to be agreed upon with the OKH that preliminary notice must go to I.G. as before, that each construction-contract is to be drawn up between the OKH and I.G., but that the remaining commercial correspondence (cash requirements) is to be handled by Luranil.

(Illigible Signature)

(Translator's Note:
handwritten note:
attended to by L.
30 January 1940.)

Enclosure:

Copy to Director Dr. AMEROS, Lu. (Ludwigshafen)

Director DENCKER, Frankfurt /Main

Director Dr. EYMANN, Lu.

Senior Engineer SANTO, Lu.

Senior Engineer MACH, Lu.

Herr LEDERLE, Lu.

Herr LING, Lu.

Herr ZINSER, Lu.

Central Tax Department, Frankfurt/Main

Herr BOEHM, Legal Department, Lu.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION.

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, E.T.O. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI - 4988.

23 May 1947

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
E.T.O. 34079.

(END)

Note to letter 16068 of 27 January 1941

H
(handwritten)

Frankfurt am Main, 17 Jan. 1941

52 (handwritten)

File-Memorandum

Subject: Letter of the High Command of the Army, Berlin W 35, Tirpitzufer 72/76, Ch H Ruost u. B.d.E. File Number 65 f 1092
Via J Ruc (Mun 3/II) Number 48/41 Top Secret to the
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, Ludwigshafen, for the
attention of Director Dr. Ambros, dated 10 January 1941.

The following is to be said on the individual points of the OKH's letter cited above:

To preserve the secrecy of the whole affair under all circumstances, the necessary final business stages involved in the dispatch of "oxalsaurus potassium" will not be carried out in section B, in which the product is sold under its proper name, but in section Z, which handles a very large number of consignments for the Wehrmacht besides this, and is as completely separated from section B in its field of activity as in actual location.

By these measures the doubts mentioned in points 1 and 2 of OKH's letter, should be rendered groundless, as those who have signed the individual accounts - according to our statements it is a matter of only 5 different men and not of 10, as stated by the Army High Command - have no information on the standard product, and thus it is entirely out of the question that the sort of subtle distinctions mentioned by OKH could become apparent.

But, to go out of our way in the matter, it is suggested that the "oxalsaurus potassium" accounts sent out from Frankfurt to OKH - contrary to the general instruction of OKH, that all accounts should be twice signed should go out without signature.

(page 2 of original)

On point 3 of OKH's letter it may be said that the "oxalsaurus potassium" accounts sent out from Frankfurt go via Ludwigshafen, whereas the delivery notes, bills of lading and other documents, containing the real name of the product are first made out in Ludwigshafen and added there.

It was suggested that for increased security, the experts who are entrusted with the final stages on the commercial side in Frankfurt should, in addition be sworn to secrecy.

The following would be concerned:

- 1) Walter Baoppler
born on 2 August 1902 in Frankfurt am Main.
Home address: Frankfurt am Main - South 10, Passavantstrasse 1.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5689
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original cont'd)

- 2) Hermann Bonalios
born on 20 May 1904 in Frankfurt am Main.
Home address: Frankfurt am Main, von Rathstrasse 2.
- 3) Berta Dobus
born on 7 July 1903 in Hoechst am Main.
Home address: Frankfurt am Main - Hoechst, Lounastrasse 44.
- 4) Hilde Bossinger
born on 16 March 1914 in Frankfurt am Main.
Home address: Frankfurt am Main - Eschersheim, Kurhessen Strasse 57.

Signed: von Hoider

signed: Mayer-Rolshoven.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

28 May 1947

I, BERYL C. BESWICK, No. D 427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-5689.

.....
BERYL C. BESWICK,
No. D 427459.

Stamp:
S e c r e t .

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be handed over in sealed envelope only; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

Handwritten figures: 157
" " 37A

October 1941

Notes on the demand and supply of raw materials
for the VT Plant.

The following is an examination of the fluctuation of demand and supply of raw materials for the "VT" Plant. The reasons for this examination are the fact that the plans for the Gendorf plant for the production of 10 000 tons of lubricants per year have been declared sufficiently developed to start construction and the plans of the OKH (Army High Command) (General LEEB's visit at Gendorf in August) for the erection of a special carbide factory at Gendorf.

- 1.) In order to arrive at a working basis, in view of the many projects put forward during the last months, the capacities which we are bound to achieve under the preliminary orders and the Cover Agreement of 2./18/7/40 are taken as a starting point.
According to these obligations, (see enclosure 1), Gendorf must produce 12 000 tons of Acetaldehyde, 7 200 tons of Diglykol and 48 000 tons of "direct"-Mustard Gas, which represents a total requirement of approximately 40 600 tons Acetylene approx. 134 000 tons of Carbide. These 134 000 tons of Carbide must be delivered, in the present circumstances, by the Sueddeutsche Kalkstickstoffwerke in equal quantities each month; in exchange for which the Gendorf power station must guarantee the supply of power with electric power produced from coal, amounting in times of drought to approx. 25 000 kilowatt. There is no contract arrangement about this matter between the Anorgana G.m.b.H. and the Sueddeutsche Kalkstickstoffwerke; this procedure has only been discussed.
- 2.) In recent months, various projects which result in far-reaching changes of the above-mentioned production basis as laid down in the Cover Agreement, have been connected with Gendorf. In the first place, Gendorf is being used for assisting in the delivery of Carbide, which will still be necessary during the first nine months of 1942 to keep the Buna Works going by transforming the Trostberg Carbide into Acetaldehyde and in delivering the latter in tank waggons to the Buna Works and the solvent sector (Loesungsmittelsektor). With the concurrence of the OKH and the Reich Office for Economic Development it is planned to put the Acetaldehyde plant at Gendorf, with a capacity of 24 000 tons (full use of reserve plant), into production as soon as possible. Furthermore,

(page 2 of original)

Glykol and Diglykol in equal quantities are to be produced by using the full Chlorine-producing capacity of Gandorf in order to assist in producing the remainder of the required quantities of Glykol and Diglykol; furthermore, it is assumed that some thousands of tons of Acetylene and Ethylene will be available for the experimental start of the "direct" Mustard-Gas plant. Considering all this, the result is a production schedule (see enclosure 2) to be carried out practically speaking from the beginning of 1942:

24 000 tons of Acetaldehyde,
18 000 tons of Ethylene Oxide which will be converted
into 9 400 tons of Glykol and
9 600 tons Diglykol, and
a residual quantity for starting work at the "direct"
Mustard Gas plant.

In this respect we estimate that, altogether, approx. 115 000 tons of Carbide will be required, a quantity which can be supplied by the Sueddeutsche Kalkstickstoffwerke.

- 3.) Beginning in spring 1943, the time will come when 10 000 tons of SS 900 will have to be produced for the purposes of the Ministry for Air in addition to the program of the Army High Command. For this purpose, the following production program is decided upon: The major part of the deliveries intended for the assistance of Buna and solvents sector (Loesungsmittelsektor) will then probably no longer be needed. The acetaldehyde plant will serve as a reserve for this sector in case of breakdowns. On the other hand there remains, the obligation to deliver to or hold available for the Army High Command Sector (OKH Sektor) 12 000 tons Aldehyde (E-plant Acetic acid-anhydride plant Bobingen). According to the latest arrangements, it is intended to deliver 500 tons of Aldehyde per month from VT to Barghausen for conversion into Acetic Acid with which Bobingen is to be supplied. According to the method of military operations applied we must then, presuppose the following production programs:

Case a) (Fall a): 7 200 tons of Diglykol, 48 000 tons of DL
or

Case b) (Fall b): if chemical warfare agents are not used,
9 400 tons of Glykol, 9 600 tons of Diglykol.

As can be seen from Enclosure 3a for case a) and from enclosure 3b for case b), these two alternatives together with a production of Aldehyde amounting to 12 000 tons result in a demand for 40 600 tons of Acetylene in case a) and for 26 400 tons Acetylene in case b). To be added to

(page 3 of original)

these figures is the material needed for the production of 10 000 tons of lubricant SS 900, amounting to 13 300 tons Ethylene or 16 200 tons of Acetylene, so that consumption of Acetylene will, therefore, increase to

56 800 tons in case a) or
42 600 tons in case b).

The corresponding quantity of Carbide amounts
in case a) to 186 000 tons, that is practically the entire production capacity of the Sueddeutsche Kalkstickstoffwerke,
in case b) to 140 000 tons, that is the quantity of Carbide on which the collaboration of the Sueddeutsche Kalkstickstoffwerke with Gendorf has been based.

In detail, the VT plant has been planned in such a way that the following results can be achieved if full use of all reserves is made:

- 1.) The plant for gasifying Carbide can gasify approx. 150 000 tons of Carbide per year, therefore, produce approx. 45 500 tons of Acetylene per year;
- 2.) The plant for purifying Acetylene can purify approx. 50 000 tons of Acetylene per year;
- 3.) The plant for hydrogenating Acetylene can produce approx. 30 000 tons of Ethylene per year;
- 4.) The plant for purifying Ethylene can purify approx. 36 000 tons Ethylene per year;
- 5.) The Chlorine plant can produce approx. 40 000 tons of Chlorine per year;
- 6.) the 3 Hydrogen sources can jointly produce approx. 3 460 tons of Hydrogen per year.

Furthermore, there exists an Ethylene factory using Ethyl Alcohol as a base for production with a maximum capacity of 5 000 tons of Ethylene per year.

This memorandum is intended to show, in form of summary, that it is possible, under the present conditions of warfare, to ensure the production of the ordered 10 000 tons "Lubricant" without using raw materials for the purpose of erecting a new plant. At most, some minor changes and additional installations will be required in order to cope with stoppages of production in view of the lack of reserve apparatus. During a period of the most radical form of warfare, however, when chemical weapons are being used, the production of nitrates in Trostberg will be reduced to practically nil if Diglykol, "direct" Mustard Gas and 10 000 tons of "Lubricant" have to be produced at the same time. In that case, an increase of the above-mentioned production lines up to the capacities stated in enclosure 3a will also be necessary.

(page 4 of original)

If for reasons of our food production policy a reduction in nitrate-production at Trostberg is to be avoided and if, above all, the German building situation permits, we recommend the erection of one of our newly developed Carbide furnaces with a capacity of 50 000 tons per year which is just sufficient to supply the quantity of Acetylene required by the lubricant program. The question as to where this Carbide furnace is to be erected will have to be subjected to further deliberations.

From a purely technical point of view, this one furnace would fit in best at the HARDT plant. Thereby, the troublesome transport of the Carbide could be dispensed with if, at that time, the operation of a pipe line for Acetylene from HARDT to Gendorf can be risked. The questions concerning the dangers of explosions connected herewith are being examined.

Since, however, the OKH - the Montangesellschaft - desires the construction of the VT plant as a self-contained unit, i.e. the installation of the Carbide producing plant in close connection with the big gasifying plant, we have taken this into account in planning the lay-out.

It is our considered opinion that no decision should be made just now since the German machine industry and particularly the electrical industry is occupied with problems of greater importance. The temporary shifting of the Carbide consumption from the Nitrates sector to the VT plant is justifiable in these times of war, the more so as the production of synthetic Nitrogen is being developed by the new plants at Linz and Heydebreck.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

13 June 1947

I, John FOSBERRY, Civ. No. 20 179, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6523.

.....
John FOSBERRY
Civ. No. 20 179

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

hydrogen, which is still to be carried out. In view of your high cost of electricity, it appears to me that an expansion of the watergas plant would be more suited to our purpose than construction of a water electrolysis plant. I have asked Dr. Wach to work on the clarification of this matter.

I would appreciate a recapitulation of your views concerning any measures which ought still to be taken, in order to prepare the Gendorf plant in the fastest way possible for meeting the required Production Schedules with Chemical Warfare Agents and without them.

Best regards and

Heil Hitler,

yours

signed : Ambros


Appendix: Illegible

Ø Herrn Obering. Dr. Wach / 29 August Ø with appendices

(page 2 of original)

Gendorf Production Schedule
with Chemical Warfare Agents

28 July 1942




Department of Directorate T.Ia
Dr.At./68/42

(page 3 of original)

Gendorf Production Schedule
without Chemical Warfare Agents

28 July 1942



Department of Directorate T.Lu Tr 7/42

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

9 June 1947

I, Arthur MACNAMARA, Civ.No. 20 191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6676.

Arthur MACNAMARA,
Civ.No. 20 191

24

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4640
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Dr. Otto Ambros
Member of the Vorstand
of the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
(stamp)

Ludwigshafen/Rhine 10 May 1943
Telephone 6496

SECRET

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. Only to be forwarded sealed, if sent by post to be registered.
3. To be kept at responsibility of addressee under lock and key.

To
Director Dr. Kuehne
I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Leverkusen

Registered

Dear Dr. Kuehne,

Since research work in the field of chemical warfare agents within the I.G., particularly also in the case of other firms, is increasing, and intensive work on very many technical problems is pressing, I have decided to appoint Dr. Hagen/L.K. Department, Ludwigshafen as further support for this purely chemical-technical section. His duties are to carry out liaison between me, the plants and the Supreme Command of the Army and to contribute towards carrying out the research work as quickly as possible.

In this sense, Dr. Hagen should first orient himself above all concerning research work on the production of DL. I hope also that his work and experience will bring new knowledge to the carrying out of the DL-synthesis.

Dr. Hagen will come to Leverkusen on 13 May, together with the gentlemen from Gendorf. I request that you orientate him, as my liaison man, on everything, and in particular, to bring him into contact with Dr. Jonas.

With best wishes

(handwritten)

DR. KLEBERT

~~discussed-~~
initials

yours

(signature) Otto Ambros

DR. NOACK

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

9 June 1947

I, HERBERT RODECK, No. B 397499, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI-4640.

.....
HERBERT RODECK, No. B 397499.

"END"

25

FILE NOTE

Subject: GM 1) - Plants in Northern France /Our Ref.:Dr.Die/Ra Berlin No 7
Security Precautions Unter den Linden 78
Dept.Vermittlungsstelle W. 1 May 1942

Rubber stamp:

Secret !

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. Only to be delivered sealed; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at responsibility of addressee, in a safe.

First of all it was determined that neither Dr. GANTZLER nor Dr. SchaffERNAX, nor Dr. WEINHARDT, the present chief of building and assembling operations have been appointed security officers. These gentlemen were only very superficially familiarized with security questions by Oberingenieur HOFFMANN in his capacity as security officer of the parent plant Ludwigshafen. No application was submitted to the Security Office in Lille for the appointment of security officers for the plants Mu or Va (Mutterstadt or Vaterstadt), either by an I.G.-Office or by a central authority.

After thorough inspection of the plants Mu and Va on 14 and 15 April 1942, together with Dr. GANTZLER and Dr. SCHAFFERNAX, both experts on the development and the later production of GM 1, as well as Dr. WEINHARDT and Diplom Ingenieur DILGER and partly also in co-operation with Chief Clerk JANN, all security questions were thoroughly discussed on the spot. In the evening of 15 April 1942 a conference lasting 3 hours took place in Lille with the Counter Intelligence Officer, Major CUIPERS.

The works police (Werkschutz) for Va and Mu is being provided by the Quartermaster General of the Air Force. It consists of appr. 30 men in Mu and of appr. 15 men in Va. The G.L. works police for Northern France receive their instructions from a central office in Brussels. The men of the G.L. works police have to a large extent already carried out works police duties in industrial plants of the aeroplane industry in Germany; quite a number of the men of the works police in Mu and Va were for instance formerly employed in the plants of Junkers. The main tasks of the works police are the defense against enemy attacks, landings from the air and invasion, and it has special directives regarding their co-operation with the German army of occupation. To increase the understanding between the G.L.-works police and the works management or the management of the assembly plant, a detailed discussion took place between the local representatives in charge of the works police in Mu and Va and the above mentioned representatives of I.G., in which

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

it was especially pointed out that all measures for secrecy as well as the defense against sabotage could only be carried out in agreement and according to orders from the I.G. works management in Lu and Va. The chiefs of the works police also admitted that, apart from the directives in regard to defense against enemy attacks which have to be dealt with, above all, in cooperation with German military units, they have received at the same time from their central office in Brussels a directive to comply with the orders of the firms' or the works' management in regard to all technical questions and all questions concerning secrecy and sabotage.

(page 2 of original)

All points which could endanger the effectiveness of secrecy measures, especially the possibility of drawing conclusions from the characteristics of the buildings, the gas-holder, the assembly and characteristics of the apparatus such as high-pressure containers, compressors, deep-freezing assemblies, the store, shipments etc. were discussed individually with the gentleman from I.G. The works installations are only separated by a wire fence and are visible to a large extent from the flat country as well as from many raised points of the neighboring mines, i.e. from the slag-heaps 80 m. high, from the chimneys 60 m. high, high buildings etc. In spite of this, the opinion is prevalent that up to now the actual purpose of these plants, especially the utilization of the eventual finished product, could be kept secret effectively, and that only with the commencement of production, with the delivery of preliminary products, especially of "white salt" ("Weissalz") and with the appearance of the air force as buyer and using special collecting apparatus etc., a difficult situation in regard to secrecy measures will arise. As far as the salt is concerned, many practical possibilities for camouflage are offered by the circumstance that the cover name "Harnstoff" (Urea) is to be used, as well as by the fact that a number of fertilizers can be produced from "white salt" which is easy to analyze, and that this salt, which can easily be carried out of the GM 1-plants because of its adhesive quality, and because portions of it cling to railroad cars, clothing and shoes, can be used for explosives, as well as by the fact that "gases" are manufactured and compressed in the plants.

During the inspection of the apparatus a number of labels giving chemical and physical data which could aid the intelligence service to spy in the plants were altered or crossed off, especially on measuring instruments, control installations, scales etc. With regard to the consignee's address Dr. CANTZLER and Dr. SPEYERER will conduct certain investigations in Oppau. Similar investigations will be made by Dr. SCHAFFERNAK in agreement with Oppau and Hoechst with regard to the equipment and inscription of the transportation containers and the special trucks designed and built by the Luftwaffe. Both gentlemen will report at the appropriate time for the purpose of submitting to the buyer, in conjunction with ourselves, any suggestions as regards modifications.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

It was determined which parts of the apparatus were most susceptible to sabotage. The possibility of passive sabotage on the part of the management of the mine, such as cutting off gas, water or electricity, creating difficulties in the supply of raw material, workers etc., were also discussed and, as far as possible, counter measures were agreed upon. It was further determined what parts of the internal plant equipment would be especially important or revealing in the event of an enemy airborne landing or invasion from the coast, and also what documents and instruments would have to be destroyed as quickly as possible in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy.

(page 3 of original)

Major CUIPERS will decide whether it is expedient to appoint a special security officer for Mu and Va, or whether the appointment of Dr. WEINHARDT as Vertrauensmann of the Security Office seems advisable on account of the unusual position of the security officer in occupied territory (no training or instruction through circularized letters etc. as in the Reich). In any case it seems advisable to make the specialists for GM 1 more security-minded through constant stimulation and supervision on the part of the Vermittlungsstelle W, as it is obvious that not even the military authorities in Lille will be able to pay much attention to this problem.

signed: DIEKMANN

Dr. SPYERER, Op.
Dr. CANTZLER, Op.
Dr. SCHAFFERNAK, Op.
Dr. WEINHARDT.

(page 4 of original)

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle "

Page

Berlin,

Rubber stamp:

To be re-submitted -22-5-

V 237

To be filed initialled

Op 451 29 April 1942

Rubber stamp: Secret !

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. Only to be delivered sealed; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at responsibility of addressee, in a safe.

In pencil: Dr. DIEKMANN informed by phone (30 April 1942) that the 4 enclosures were not quoted correctly on page 5. 22 May 1942 Initialled.

Reich Air Ministry
GL A/III
Attention of Fliegerstabsingenieur AHRENS

Berlin W 8, Leipziger Strasse 7.

Dr. Die/Bk/8. 25 April 1942.

G.M.1 - Construction plans.

A summarized survey of the present situation of our construction plans as requested by you appears below.

1. Hoechst.

The work in regard to the completion of the G.M.1 - installations in Hoechst is finished. The installation is ready for operation incl. dispatch of product in liquid form under pressure. Of the total production capacity of more than 30 tons per day, 28 tons per day can be made available in liquid form not under pressure, i.e. subcooled.

The storage capacity in Hoechst is 130 tons for goods under pressure, 100 tons for goods not under pressure, subcooled. Shipment of quantities produced can be made from Hoechst either by rail or truck.

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

2. Oppau.

The Oppau installation has also been completed and is ready for operation. Its capacity of 30 tons per day can be made available in liquid form under pressure or in liquid, subcooled form, i.e. not under pressure. The storage capacity is 100 tons for goods under pressure and 60 tons for liquid goods not under pressure. After setting up the 2nd static tank the storage capacity for liquid goods not under pressure will be 120 tons. The G.M.I - installation is suitable for shipment of goods either by rail or truck.

(page 5 of original)

3. Installations in Northern France.

Mutterstadt The location near Lille, or rather, in the mines of Mines de Dourges can be seen from the enclosed plans.

The originally planned output capacity of 30 tons per day of G.M.I under pressure has been completed and is ready to start production; of this 25 tons per day can also be supplied in the form of subcooled goods not under pressure if a sufficient quantity of carbonic acid in a solid form can be made available for cooling purposes. As a result of an arrangement with the suppliers in Lille and Paris as well as the competent occupation authorities this is sufficiently guaranteed. From the middle of 1942, after the setting up of the 3rd compressor, the full capacity of 30 tons per day of G.M.I in subcooled form not under pressure will be independent of the supply of carbonic acid in solid form for cooling purposes.

The following are completed:

- 3 storage-sheds for 200 tons of "White salt" ("Weissalz") each as basic product, the complete low-pressure apparatus, consisting of
- 3 dissolving tanks, 2 supply tanks and 6 disintegration tanks, as well as
- 2 Sodium hydroxide, 2 coke, 3 Potassium permanganate, and 2 Sulphuric acid scrubbers and
- 2 Separator vessels.

Further, the gas holder with a capacity of 3000 cubic meters has been completed and a further gas holder with a cubic capacity of 500 meters is in reserve and ready for connection.

With regard to the high-pressure apparatus, the original construction plan, consisting of

- 2 condensers (1 compressor at 270 cubic meters per hour, 1 compressor at 600 cubic meters per hour),

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

1 dryer installation (2 high pressure containers with Sodium hydroxide + 2 high pressure containers with Potassium hydroxide filling), and the pressurized storage chamber (12 bottles, each with about 2 tons of useful content).

has also been completed.

To begin with the filling can take place provisionally through a borrowed cooling plant and carbon dioxide deep cooling; if necessary also in liquid form not under pressure.

(page 6 of original)

According to a new order (conversion of the total capacity for the production of sub-cooled goods not under pressure)

1 refrigeration plant (NH₃-compressor) as substitute of the rented cooling plant,
1 Oxygen compressor as substitute for Carbon dioxide cooling,

have to be made available, furthermore the storage capacity has to be enlarged (from 25 to 50 tons for goods not under pressure, and setting up of the two static tanks of 60 tons capacity each for sub-cooled goods not under pressure).

Drawing off and shipment of G.M.I in Mutterstadt is intended to be by rail; in exceptional cases a limited number of trucks could be loaded (possibly 10 trucks per day).

Vaterstadt Its location at Pont & Vendin within the mining installations of mines de Lenc on the canal de la Haute Doule can be seen from the enclosed plan.

The salt depot in the already existing large Silo-building is completed. In 1-2 months the complete low-pressure part, consisting of

3 dissolving tanks, 2 supply tanks and 8 disintegration tanks, as well as
2 Sodium hydroxide, 2 coke, 2 Potassium permanganate and 2 Sulphuric acid scrubbers, as well as
3 stripper containers and
1 newly set up gas holder with a capacity of 500 cubic meters are to

be finished.

Also completed is the high-pressure part for roughly half the required output for delivery under pressure, consisting of:

(page 6 of original, cont'd)

1 compressor with a capacity of 360 and 1 compressor with a capacity of 180 cubic meters per hour. If carbonic acid in solid form can be supplied, this quantity can also be made available in liquid form not under pressure. The pressure depot is comprised of 22 bottles with a total of appr. 40 tons of useful capacity.

Yet to be completed is:

The compressor installation with 2 units at 360 cubic meters per hour capacity (according to original plan),

1 refrigeration plant (NH₃-compressor))
1 compressor as substitute for carbon dioxide) according to new
deep cooling) plan

The depot for subcooled foods not under pressure consisting of 2 static tanks each of 60 tons capacity.

By reason of the number of the disintegration tanks in the low-pressure part as well as the installed compressor - capacity, the reserve stock in Matterstadt will be a little lower than in Vaterstadt.

(page 7 of original)

Time involved in construction and assembly work.

The work in Matterstadt and Vaterstadt was started in January 1941. The number of building and assembly workers reached its peak in the period of April to June with 150-200 persons. To begin with the Organization Todt was also engaged in the work, later on French building firms were also engaged.

The number of persons employed started to decrease in September 1941 and at present consists of only appr. 70 employees and workers. During the next few months the number of employees will decrease further and from July 1942 on will only amount to an estimated 30 men. These will be engaged in the assembly of the machines and apparatus which are expected to arrive at intervals, and in the completion of the installations (doing jobs which had been postponed for the time being) until the middle of 1943.

Constant readiness for operation.

After the final completion of the installations appr. 5 German craftsmen will be permanently assigned for maintenance and current technical supervision of the apparatus in Matterstadt and another 5 in Vaterstadt until the commencement of production. Furthermore, a small administrative staff (office) will remain in Matterstadt. In the I.G. works appr. 80 trained specialists will be kept in constant readiness for the operation of the G.M.I.-installations in Northern France. These workers have been carefully listed; they will, apart from their G.M.I. - refresher courses, be employed

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

in work vital to the war effort in other plants of the works Ludwigshafen and Oppau, but will be available at call at any time to the plants in Mutterstadt and Vaterstadt, in concurrence with the works management in Ludwigshafen and Oppau.

Offices and accommodation for the assembly staff as well as for the operating staff to be expected later will be kept available in Mutterstadt and Vaterstadt.

The necessary measures were taken in concurrence with the security office at Lille to ensure secrecy and to safeguard against sabotage etc. The works police will

(page 8 of original)

also in future be supplied by the Quartermaster General of the Air Force (appr. 30 men for Mutterstadt and 15 men for Vaterstadt) and will continue to provide protection against enemy attacks during the period following the completion of the installation. They will work in cooperation with the works management and the competent occupying authority.

Thus, apparatus and special skilled workers for the production of

appr. 100 tons per day of G.M.1 are ready for operation at all times

in the I.G. works Hoechst and Oppau as well as in the two plants in Northern France.

Please let us know in good time as arranged, whether this state of preparedness is to be extended beyond the above plan or whether the apparatus and personnel can be reduced to a certain extent.

Heil Hitler !
VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W

signed DIEKMANN

- ✂ Plenipotentiary General for Chemistry: Prof. Dr. C. MEAUCH, Berlin W 9
- ✂ Dir. Dr. MUELLER-CUNRADI for Dr. GANTZLER, Oppau
- ✂ Dir. Dr. GOLDBERG for Dr. HARTMANN, Oppau
- ✂ Dr. SPYERER for Dr. WEINHART, Oppau

- 4 Enclosures (1. Site plan of Vaterstadt near Lille,
2. " " of Mutterstadt near Mines de Dourges
3. Lay-out plan of Mutterstadt
4. " " " " Vaterstadt)

REGISTERED!

(page 9 of original)

(Map showing sites of Vaterstadt and Mutterstadt)

(page 10 of original)

(Site plan of Mutterstadt)

G.M.I - Buildings
outlined in red.

(page 11 of original)

Lay-out of Mutterstadt

Index of Buildings

95	Salt Building	105 a	Acid and Alkali Containers
95 a	Laboratory	106	Compression II Cooling plant
96	Salt depot I	106 a	Baths
97	Salt depot II	106 b	Steam weighbridge
98	Compression I	107	Repair shop
99	High pressure depot I	108	Low pressure depot
100	Gas holder I	109	High pressure depot II
101	Substation	110	Gas holder II
102	Salt depot III	111	Weighbridge for railtrucks
103	Guard		
104	Cable-car guard		
105	Store		

(page 12 of original)

Lay-out of Vaterstadt

<u>A Living quarters</u>	<u>B Plant</u>
1 - Maison Hannicotte	93 - Fuel gas holder
3 - House Kartel	94 - Weighbridge for railtrucks and carbon dioxide cooling plant
13 - House No.1 near the central plant	
15 - House No.15 " " " "	95 - Salt building
18 - Quarters of the works police	95a- Compressed air plant
	96 - Salt depot
	97 - Salt filling room
	98 - Compressors
	99 - High pressure depot, office, ward, baths
	100 - Gas holder
	101 - Substation
	105 - Repair shop and store
	105a- Acid container
	106 - Laboratory, cooling plant, air raid cellar
	106b- Steam weighbridge
	108 - Low pressure depot

In pencil: File reference
2 April 42 Initials

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Ludwigshafen/Rhein P 1090

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6633
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

13 June 1947

I, Arthur MACNAMARA, No. 20191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6633.

Arthur MACNAMARA
No. 20191

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. MI-7377
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Secret 1

1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

1 September 1943 Dr. D/E

Notes

On the discussion of fundamental questions of contracts on the occasion of the conference of the Vorstand of Ancona G.m.b.H. on 23 August 1943 at Heidelberg.

Participants :

	Dir. Dr. ter Meer
	Dir. Dr. v. Knieriem
	Dir. Dr. Ambros
of I.G.	Dir. Dorcker
	Dr. Steinbig
	Dr. Ulrich
	Dr. Dilthey
	Military-Economic Leader Dir. Schmidt-Lossberg
of Montan	Ministerialrat Dr. Schiffler
or the Army	Dr. Heinemann
High Command	Oberregierungsrat Dr. Reinknecht
	Oberregierungsrat Dr. Ehmann

1.) Set-up of Contract concerning the Seewerk Plant.

It was agreed to hand over operation of the Seewerk plant by means of a contract of operation to a company to be founded on a 50:50 basis by Montan and I.G. at the expense of and for the account of Montan, which company is to be named "Turon Gesellschaft, m. b. H.". The basic points of that agreement as well as the statutes of the new company were laid down the following day in the enclosed drafts of the contract, to which reference is made herein.

2.) Change-Over of Montan Lease-Contracts to Fixed Rents.

Dr. von KNIERIEM explained I.G.'s attitude toward this question and began by stating that the present time of increased difficulties in every field seemed hardly the proper moment in which to begin with such complicated contract work as the change-over desired by Montan must necessarily entail, particularly in view of the fact

(page 1 of original cont'd)

that old contracts still have not been signed.

If, in spite of this the Reich insists on the change-over of the contracts to a fixed rent, I.G. will feel bound to consider this question thoroughly. I.G. quite understands and welcomes the desire of the Munitions Industry to facilitate the de-nationalization of industry. I.G. has always been willing to take a risk

(page 2 of original)

and has often enough proved this in the past; however, de-nationalization must be practiced in the right place. The Montan plants are quite unsuitable since they are plants which were built exclusively for war, and it is quite impossible to say how they will fit into private industry. I.G. feels, therefore, that the system of fixed rents is not suitable for the Montan plants, but rather, that the present lease contract with profit shares, in view of I.G.'s use of its experiences, is the appropriate basis of operation. So far, the only thing which had a disturbing effect on the contract was the fact that Montan has reduced the leaseholder's freedom of action in a manner which is often incompatible with the position of a leaseholder. This applies, above all, to the Montan circular letter of 9 January 1943, according to which the leaseholder has to request prior approval of Montan before making additions to the plants, or effecting value-increasing repairs exceeding RM 200,- which at the present time of increased difficulties often affects the accomplishment of necessary measures in a manner which impairs the military purpose of the plants.

The complaints brought up were acknowledged by the officials of Montan and of the Army High Command and it was granted that the business management of the leaseholder ought to be able, as trustee of Montan, to carry out independently and without regard to a certain money limit all necessary measures within the framework of the operational tasks entrusted to it. However, since Reich funds are involved, approval by Montan is to be obtained in each case as soon as possible, i.e. in special cases prior to, or - if that is not possible, - as soon after the decision as possible. The Montan officials promised to revoke the circular letter objected to for the plants managed by I.G. or rather, Anorgana.

If, despite the fact that this type of contract is unsuitable, the idea of a fixed rent for the Montan plants is approached,

(page 2 of original cont'd)

I.G. would have to demand so many amending clauses that the principle of the fixed rent would be nullified and a distorted picture would result. I.G. would have to demand that

- 1.) Montan obtain the approval of the Price Reviewing Office of the Munitions

(page 3 of original)

Ministry or other offices concerned, that we can include, in the sales price of the products our own costs including amortization, fixed rent, interest on the operating capital and suitable compensation for industrial and inventive services, all of which will considerably increase current prices;

- 2.) the fixed rent is only to be paid in proportion to the facilities utilized, insofar as I.G. is not at fault;
- 3.) we can shut down whenever there are no contracts at adequate prices, (compare 1) with Montan bearing the costs of the shut-down.

Montan realizes and understands our claims and it was explained that the fixed rent is only to be a temporary item.

Dr. v. KATERM further explained that even if these claims are considered, the fixed rent means an insupportable problem for I.G., I.G. cannot be expected to pay a fixed rent even when failure to utilize all production facilities is due to a partner's default. It is completely out of the question that I.G. should bear the onus of proving that any decrease in the utilization of facilities was not due to a default by I.G. or any of its partners. Even if this were acknowledged, I.G. would not be able to bear full responsibility for payment of the fixed rent by its partners, as well, in view of the present precarious conditions of labor allocation of foreigners, prisoners of war, prisoners, unskilled workers and workers allocated to us, concerning whom we have no choice. The responsibility of I.G. or Anorgana would at least have to be limited to intentional and gross negligence of their representatives. This claim is also acknowledged by Montan to be justified.

The (Montan) officials cannot promise, however, that these claims will be approved by the Reich offices to which Montan is subordinated. I.G. emphasized that it only wants to negotiate with Montan and could not undertake to apply directly to all Reich Offices which might have to be consulted.

(page 4 of original)

This ended discussion on the so-called "fixed rent". Toward the end of the Aufsichtsrat conference it was unanimously resolved that the cover and lease agreements for various Montan plants which have not been signed in view of the change-over in question could now be concluded, so that the desire by Montan for a change-over of contracts is no obstacle, any more. The hereditary building contracts are also to be signed immediately; the requests for a change of these contracts once expressed by Montan have been withdrawn.

I.G. will submit to Montan all data on preliminary decisions, contract numbers, file notices etc. necessary for signing contracts still outstanding, in order to conclude them as soon as possible.

As a result of the discussion it is possible that Montan will not come back any more to its request for a change-over of contracts to a fixed rent.

Discussion between Dr. HEINEMANN and Fr. DILTHEY.

3.) Christianstedt.

The Christianstedt Montan-plant was not discussed during the Aufsichtsrat conference. However, this point was broached on the following day, Tuesday, 24 August, during a perusal of outstanding contracts not yet signed which took place in Ludwigshafen by Dr. HEINEMANN and Dr. DILTHEY. We on our side requested immediate conclusion of the processing contract for Hexamin and Formaldehyde which has been ready to be signed for a year, a request which Dr. HEINEMANN promised to carry out. The management of the Christianstedt plant continues, however, to put obstacles in our way. Dr. HEINEMANN asked us to consider whether we could not decide on a fixed rent in this case, at least and persuade the D.G. to accept this system. If D.G. fears that the Christianstedt case could affect its other plants, it should be told that there is no intention to cause this, but rather, that Christianstedt will remain a special case. I pointed out to Dr. HEINEMANN that a fixed rent for the preliminary-products plants continues to be acceptable to I.G. in view of the special conditions at these factories, that, however, the negative attitude

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7377
CONTINUED

(page 5 of original)

of the D.G. is understandable, in view of its considerably greater proportion of explosives in its plant. I asked him to consider whether it would not be possible to employ the contract system of profit sharing for Christienstedt as well, since it has been decided to sign, and thus retain, the present contract system for all other Montan plants. Dr. HEINTZMAN did not oppose this idea and promised to examine it; he stated, however, that I.G. could not expect a type of lease-contract in line with its other contracts, since Montan did not see how it could be done in view of the greatly inferior contracts of D.G. I told Dr. HEINTZMAN that even without discussion with our officials, I felt that we could adopt ourselves in this special case to the D.G. type of contract, insofar as individual provisions are not rendered superfluous by the special conditions of the preliminary-products plants and for the processing agreement. In this connection, I remember that we studied this question with Dr. HEINTZMAN a year ago, and, at the time, were of the opinion that, for Christienstedt we should and could adopt ourselves as far as possible to the D.G. type of contract. In order to clarify this, both types of contract will be compared in the near future.

signed: DULTMEY

(handwritten)

(without enclosures)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

22. August 1947

I, Samuel S. HORN, IGO-443 113, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document N. NI-7377.

.....
Samuel S. HORN
IGO-443 133

Registered

MONTAN
INDUSTRIEWERKE
G.M.B.H.

at present Lippoldsberg,
19 October 1944
(20) Post Office
Bodenfelde/Weser

To:
I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
attention of
Dr. Dilthey, Legal Dept.
Ludwigshafen/ Rhein

Telephone: Bodenfelde 344/345

(Transl. Note: stamp crossed out)

(Trans. Note:)
Partly illegible handwritten
note:
...re Division of Profits
50:30
re Para-725

Secret
: 1.) This is a secret matter of :
: the State according to Art. :
: 88 of the Reich Criminal Code :
: 2.) Forward only sealed, register :
: when mailed. :
: 3.) to be kept sealed by reci- :
: pient under own responsibility

Illegible stamp:
Top secret:

Stamp: Received by Legal Dept.

Stamp: to Dr. DILTHEY

24 October 1944

our reference:
01597/I/IIa 2/Pr.

Subject: Cover Agreement and Lease contract for Mining Works
(Montananlage) Auschwitz.

Enclosures: 6

With reference to correspondence conducted in the interim concern-
ing other mining enterprises and discussions between Dr. v. Knierim,
Dr. Ambros and Dr. Dilthey of your firm and Ministerialrat Dr.
Gase and Dr. Heinemann of our firm on 14 August and 26 September
1944, we are forwarding to you enclosed in triplicate the cover
agreement and lease for Auschwitz. The lease has been signed by
us. We request that you also sign the agreements and forward to
us 2 copies of the lease for our files and all copies of the
cover agreement in order to enable us to obtain the signature of
the C.K.H. (Army High Command).

In accordance with our agreement made in Eisenach the con-
clusion of the contract shall not preclude an amendment of the
insurance clause in Article 2 Par. 2 of the lease in the event
that on the basis of information still to be obtained by the Reich
Minister for Armament and War Production such an amendment is
required in conformity with his directives about non-insurance
of Reich property in armament plants of 21 March 1944.

We are further agreed that the manner of leasing camps and
dwellings separately, which is customary with us, shall be
adhered to if necessary, regardless of the inclusion into the
lease of new installations in accordance with Article 13.

With regard to the building inheritance site you informed
us at Eisenach that the survey of that part of the property
intended for mining installations could not yet be carried out.

42

In signing the cover agreement and the lease we take it for granted that,
(Page 2 of original)

as agreed, you will soon note down our application for our building inheritance right.

Heil Hitler!
Montan Industriewerke G.m.b.H.
(Illegible signature)

(Signat.) H. HEINEMANN (?)

(3rd Page of original)

High Command of the Army
(Commanding Officer of
the Army Reserve)
Az: 70 o 40 -19 H.A.J. Rue (Hun 3 zbV/IX)
No. 1099/44 g.Kdos.

Berlin W-35, 23 May 44.
Tirpitz ufer 72-76
Telephone local: 218191
Long distance: 218091

(Transl. Note: Semi-illegible stamp
Re: 2 June 1944
No. 166

To:

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
attention of
Director Dr. Ambros
Ludwigshafen/Rhein

Subject: Building and installation order for the construction of the Sarin II - Plant (Seewerk) (Lago works)
Order No 3/IX - 4883-9026/43.

1 Enclosure.

1) Heroby you receive formal orders to construct a plant for the production of Sarin (Sarin II) under your own name. But for the account of Army High Command (Ch.H. Ruost. and BDE) on a site near Falkenhagen in the Mark, owned by the Verwertungsgesellschaft fuer Montanindustrie G.m.b.H.

2) The production capacity of the plant is estimated to amount to
500 tons of Sarin

monthly if continuous shifts are worked. Since you do not have technical experience you will not have to bear responsibility for maintaining this estimated production.

3) Total cost of installation for the factory will for the present be estimated by you without obligation at appr. 44 millions Reichsmark. Compensation as provided for you in Par. 9. and sales-tax will be added.

Estimates for the total cost to be computed by you and submitted as soon as possible to the OKH (Ch.H. Ruost. and BDE) for examination and approval are to be subdivided in the following manner:

I. Construction.

Detailed estimates shall be made under consideration of all restrictive regulations issued in agreement with the Plenipotentiary for Construction of Reich Minister SPEER in the district of Armament Inspectorate III, similar to the attached example.

These estimates shall be preceded by an exhaustive description of the construction program, which, by addition of sketches, capacity figures and profit estimates is to illustrate specifically installations supplying power (heat, current, water and gas). It is not intended that you should generate your own power.

The following maps are to be submitted with the estimate:
1 general map (scale 1:25,000) indicating construction site.

(Page 2 of original)
(4th page " ")

1 map of the site of suitable scale, clearly indicating buildings, the removal of earth and the most important outside installations; drawings (sketches) of the various buildings stating their main dimensions. Site maps and ground plans will be furnished with scale and arrow indicating North.

In the interest of air-raid protection, so far as instructions of the Plenipotentiary for Construction for economic reasons do not provide different regulations,

- a) Steam-water- and electric main lines are to be laid in circular arrangement (Ringleitung) as far as possible.
- b) all buildings are to be equipped with blackout devices.
- c) all buildings are to be constructed in a manner offering the best possible resistance against fire and air pressure.

II. Machines.

Cost for delivery of necessary machines including appliances, tools and gauges.

III. Tools and Equipment.

- 4) The Army High Command will examine and approve the estimate of the total cost; it will take over cost of all performances and deliveries including sales tax and overhead expenses (par.9.) As soon as it becomes apparent that there will be unavoidable costs additional to those estimated, or that unexpected building measures or supplies will be necessary appendices to the estimates are to be submitted to the OKH in a form suitable for audit. Construction may only be carried out after approval of these additional costs by the OKH.
- 5) As trustee of the OKH you are to construct the installation by paying attention to all directives and regulations issued by authorities in respect hereto, with the care of a regular businessman and technician, the utmost economy and thrift as well as with the greatest possible speed. Your liability is limited to gross neglect and intent on the part of your building directors as well as your lawful representatives.

In the construction of the installation you are under obligation to utilize all suitable patents, procedures and "know-how" available to you and the companies of your concern, without special compensation.

- 6) You are obliged to obtain all necessary building, air-raid protection and industrial permits issued by the police promptly and to comply with the regulations of the issuing authority in agreement with the OKH.
- 7) If in the fulfilment of this contract you contact delivery firms, you will do so under your own name to the account of the OKH.

(Page 3 of original)
(5th page " ")

The invitation for submission of tenders, execution and settlement of accounts of constructional work are to be based on the regulations of the decree concerning services connected with construction work (VGB, Din 1961-1985). In addition, all the competent laws and so on which have been issued apply to the execution, especially the regulation concerning construction of 16 June 1939 with costs its executive regulation of 16 January 1940, the first enforcement regulation of 11 March 1941 (Reich Law Gazette 1941 par. 140 and circular No. 77/40 of the Reich Commissioner for the fixing of price ceilings of 28 June 1940 about construction cost ceilings and, if applicable, the LSBO)

Tenders from suitable enterprises, which are known to be reliable should be obtained for the orders to be given. You are always to consider that offer which is on the whole the most favorable one. If this one should not be cheapest one, you are to justify your action in the data concerning the invitation for tenders.

All invitations for tenders and placing of construction orders have to be carried out in the district of the Armament-Inspectorate III with the participation of the Plenipotentiary for Construction of Reich Minister SPEER, who will also examine the all offers of the firm.

- 8) According to the proportion of your financial requirements for the construction of the installations, you are to submit a detailed claim to the OKH in good time in each case.

Each time the OKH will put at your disposal the amounts requested to that extent to which you have to make payments yourself and have to cover expenses, on the condition that the final statement is approved. Interest at the rate of 2% above Reichsbank discount per annum will also be considered as expenses; insofar as you advance payments in exceptional cases, but only as far as you reported these payments in due time.

The claims for money for the payment of bills of sub-contractors have to be submitted if possible at a sufficiently early date to enable the use of all discount privileges offered by the sub-contractors. Should the

requests for money be submitted so late as to make it impossible to take advantage of these discounts, the disadvantages to the OKH resulting would become your liability.

The final settlement will take place as soon as possible after the completion of the installation.

It is assumed that the legal regulations generally applying to a "firm" (in this case: "trustee-firm") will sufficiently ensure the proper handling of the vouchers, the giving in of accounts and the book-keeping. For this it is also necessary that the vouchers bear the generally prescribed and customary auditors' notes, which comply in principle with the directives prescribed in the budget of the OKH.

"Technically correct and confirmed". The individual items of the account have to be shown, arranged according to the sections of the estimate, in cost compilations, and the final amounts of these compilations in a total cost compilation.

(Page 4 of original)
(6th page " ")

In this total cost compilation you are to submit a certification on the general completion of the construction project, in accordance with the instructions and according to the best technical knowledge, and on the correctness of the cost accounting with a reference that this certification applies to all vouchers attached to the statement. This certification must bear the auditors' note prescribed by the administration: "Technically correct and confirmed".

Place and date
Signature.

The work done and the supplies made by third persons have to be proved by submitting the original accounts. Your own work is to be proved by producing the calculations of your own expenses according to the LSCo, as well as Aend. LSCo, LSBCo. As far as your work or that of third persons in relation between the OKH and you, is subject to turnover tax, this turnover tax should be indicated separately on the references or on the bills.

- 9) You will carry out this construction order under the condition that the expenses which you have through the execution of this construction order will be repaid, especially those for the working-out of the planning (draft), the drawing up of a estimate of the total cost for audit (according to example) with drawings, the plan for the construction and the drawings for the execution thereof, the invitation for tenders for the supplies and the work, the allocation and placing of orders, for the obtaining of all official approvals and co-operation etc. (Spar-ingenieur- Engineer for economical construction), for the top management, furthermore for the local direction and supervision of construction, for the settling of the bills and the drawing up of the final statement, technical and

financial checking of the sub-contractors' guarantees, as well as for the making of claims against them for possible defects. In order to simplify matters and make them easier to handle, your claim for compensation for your expenses will be balanced by a lump sum for the overhead expenses amounting to 6% of the cost of the construction of the installation, including all accessories, especially the machinery, which you will put down in detail in the estimate according to the sample printed form. You will also receive this lump sum for overhead expenses for those parts of the installations which you supplied yourself.

You are entitled to call upon the "Luranil-Baugesellschaft mbH." (Registered Offices in Ludwigshafen) which is 100% your property for the execution of this construction project and particularly to transfer to this company the whole settlement of accounts with the OKH. Your obligations towards the OKH, especially the contractual and legal liability obligations, will not be affected by your use of the "Luranil-Baugesellschaft mbH" in the carrying-out of this work and "Luranil-Baugesellschaft mbH" will not attain any right to make demands on OKH, particularly none for remuneration.

(Page 5 of original)
(7th page " ")

- 10) At any time during construction the OKH is entitled to checku itself or its authorized representative on the progress of th work, and to make sure that the plans and finishes agreed-upon are complied with as well as to ascertain after completion that the work and the plant are in the condition called for by the contract.

(Transl.Note: Illegible marginal notes)

It will be ascertained in each case whether the state of the plant is in accordance with the provisions of the contract; this will be done together with the offices instituted by the OKH for this purpose, by one- or more acceptance inspections according to the size of the plant if necessary divided into sections. A report has to be made for each acceptance inspection, designating the scope of the inspectio and containing the signatures of all participants, as well as giving place and date. The taking-over of machines and appliances is to be carried out through you from the supplyin firms, in accordance with the principles generally accepted in the industry concerned. Where no directives exist for individual machines etc., the taking-over is to be carried out in a suitable way.

The taking-over of the entire plant in your case is to be carried out by an agent of the OKH after completion of the installations.

- 11.) The plants are to be carried on your books as one entity, so that at any time the expenses and profits can be determined separately.

The agents of the OKH, of the High Command of the Armed Forces and of the Reich Court of Accounts are at all times to be given access to the pertinent books of the

plant and the bills of cost including vouchers and receipts, for the work done by you in accordance with the regulations LSCo, And. LSCo, LSBCo.

- 12) All machines and appliances etc. belonging to the OKH are to be marked as its property in accordance with instructions still to be given.

Inventory lists in a simplified form for the machines etc. belonging to the OKH are to be made out by you in triplicate; two copies are to be sent to the OKH, the third one remains with you and is to be kept up to-date by you. Changes in the inventory are to be reported to the OKH.

- 13) It is agreed that all objects purchased at the expense of the OKH become property of the OKH immediately at the time of purchase, regardless of the taking-over and the documentary transfer of the property later on.

Instead of transferring this property, you will contract to keep it for the OKH (Paras. 930, 368 Civil Code).

- 14) The plant property is to be insured as far as this is legally prescribed. It is permissible to take out an ordinary plant liability insurance; you will inform the OKH about the terms of this insurance. Aside from this, no insurance is to be taken out for goods ordered, or purchased, at the expense of the Reich;

(Page 6 of original)
(8th page " ")

the Reich's own insurance takes its place. You will however inform the OKH what type and amount of insurance policies for goods are in your opinion required to cover the Sarin II plant. Where the OKH declines to take out these goods insurance policies in accordance with the principle of not insuring government property, you are in no way liable for any material damage which would have been covered by the policy concerned if it had been taken out. The OKH will further protect you against all claims of third parties which would have been covered by the insurance declined by it. You remain entitled to take out your usual insurance policies for goods which are not property of the Reich, and to include the cost of the premiums in the building expenses.

- 15) Your claims for reimbursement of your expenses according to the preceding article 9), will not be affected by the accidental destruction of the plant or parts of it.

If the plant were to be only partly finished at the time the damage occurred, then your claim for reimbursement is restricted, according to article 9, par.1, to the amount of work which had by then been completed. This amount will be determined in joint discussion if necessary.

If in such a case the OKH demands the reconstruction of the destroyed parts of the plant, you have to carry out the reconstruction at the expense of the OKH. For this you will be given a special reconstruction order in accordance with the terms of this order. In such a case the total for

your overhead expenses will be specially agreed upon, making due allowances for the planning already executed and the amount of work to be done again.

The risk of an accidental total or partial destruction of the plant, or of individual appliances, is borne by the Reich.

- 16) The entire correspondence with the OKH, as far as this order is concerned is to be carried on in accordance with the "regulations re maintenance of secrecy for firms executing orders of the Armed Forces", which are known to you, and has to be addressed to the OKH, Dept. MAJRUo (Pan 3 zBV), attention of Ministerialrat Dr. EHMANN or his acting deputy, Berlin W 35, Tierpitzufer 72-76.
- 17) Your attention is expressly drawn to the regulations for maintenance of secrecy known to you, especially sect. 88-93a, 353b & c Reich Penal Code, in the versions of 24 April 1934 and 2 July 1936 and 16 Sept. 1939.

You undertake to guarantee that all the secret correspondence as well as the secret drawings and other data of a secret character are kept safely and that they will only be handed out by the plant management with consideration for the regulations for maintenance of secrecy. Apart from that the

(Page 7 of original)
(9th page " ")

"undertaking to maintain secrecy", acknowledged by you, appli

- 18) The County Court of Berlin is competent for any disputes arising out of this contract, regardless of the value of the object of such dispute.

Immediately upon outbreak of such a legal dispute the parties are to apply for the case to be tried in camera and demand that the participants in the proceedings be sworn to secrecy in accordance with section 172, 174 Judicature Act, and the files be kept safely.

- 19) Agreements (for instance additions or amendments) not contained in the original order certificate are only valid when they are expressly confirmed in writing by the OKH.
- 20) Kindly confirm receipt of this order in writing at once, without repeating the contents, and in all letters and bills refer to the reference number given at the beginning of this order.

The Buchr officer concerned is to be informed of this order.

- 21) This contract becomes valid as soon as you have confirmed it. The OKH can cancel this contract at any time. In that case the claim for reimbursement is restricted, according to section 39, para. 1, to the amount of work finished by them, which, if necessary, must be determined according to figure 15 (2).

By order
(SIGNATURE): S c h m e g e .

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, MP 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-4994.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI,
MP 34079.

END

-9-

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8782
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

To be passed on to
Dr. Mach

For your guidance and with the request ^{that you} examine whether the attached estimate of cost is exactly in conformity with the former cost estimate.

Legal Section
Signed Dr. Diltney

(page 2 of original)

Top Secret!

To the Office of
Min. Rat Dr. Engineer Braunn
c/o Ob. Reg. Rat
Dr. Reinkecht
Wittenberg/Lutherstadt
Stamm 3 for special assignment

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. Only to be handed over personally or delivered, under double cover against receipt, to a personal address.
3. To be forwarded, if possible, by courier or a trustworthy person, if sent by post value to be quoted as over RM 1000.—.
4. Duplication of every sort including preparation of excerpts forbidden.
5. To be kept, at responsibility of addressee, in a safe; in exceptional cases in a steel cabinet with combination-lock.
6. Offences against these orders will result in most severe punishment.

25 May 1944

5 June 1944

Construction and equipment order for the construction of the Sarin II Plant (Soowerk) Order No. 3/IX-4888-9026/43.
File number 70 c 14-19 Na J Ruo (Ordnance Office Armaments Section J)
(Item 3 z.b.V. - Ammunition 3 for special assignment II) No. 1099/44
Top Secret.

We acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 25 May 1944 with which you sent us the construction and equipment order for the construction of the Sarin II Plant (Soowerk) and inform you that we agree to the contents of this order.

On the occasion of a conference on 7 June 1944 between Ob. Reg. Rat Dr. Reinkecht and the undersigned (right-hand signature), unity existed on the following items:

- 1) Section 1, paragraph I of the order should read as follows:
"The details of the estimate of cost are to be drawn up by following the enclosed example for compiling a cost estimate. At the same time, in cooperation with Reich Minister Spoor's Commissioner for Construction Work within the district of the Inspectorate III for the Allocation of Armaments Orders, attention is to be paid to all restrictions imposed."
- 2) The principle laid down in figure I, viz. that we shall build the plant in our own name but at the expense of OKH has in no way been altered through the redrafting of the first sentence in section III,

(page 2 of original cont'd)

Fig. 4. In particular, this section must not be construed to mean that any portions of the cost estimate which had not been approved, would have to be taken over by I.G..

- 3) The definition of "Supplier Firms" in figure 7 of the order also includes builders and other firms which have rendered some kind of service in the construction of the Sarin II Plant on orders of I.G. or on orders of Titanil Building Company.

We beg to ask your permission to make personal copies of your original letter relating to this order, which we shall keep in our safe at Heidelberg, for Dir. Dr. Ambros, Dr. Ulrich, Senior Engineer Bilfinger, Zinsor, and for our Legal Department.

Heil Hitler!

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
signed: Ambros signed: i.V. Diltzoy

Distribution List:

1st copy : OKH	} attended to by (initial) 16 June 1944
2nd copy: Dir. Dr. Ambros	
3rd copy: Dr. Ulrich	
4th copy: Senior Engineer Bilfinger	
5th copy: Zinsor	
6th copy: Legal Department	

(page 3 of original)

High Command of the Army
(Commander of the Training Army)

Top Secret!
Berlin W 35, 23 May 1944
Tirpitzufer 72-76

File numbers 70 o 10-19 Wa J Rue (HAn. 3 zbv./IX)
No. 1099/44 top secret

Telephone: Local 218191
Trunk 218091

(Please quote above file numbers in your reply, date and contents in short)

To the firm
I.G. Farbenindustrie A.-G.
c/o Dir. Dr. Ambros
Ludwigshafen/Rhine

Received: 2 June 1944
No. 166

Re: Construction and equipment order for the construction of the Sarin II Plant (Seowork), Order No. 3/IX-4888-9026/43.

1 Enclosure.

- 1) You are herewith formally charged with the construction, in your own name but at the expense of OKH (Ch. H. Ruest. u. Bde. - Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Training Army), on grounds near Falkenhagen in die Mark, property of the Verwertungsgesellschaft fuer Montanindustrie GmbH., a plant for the production of Sarin (Sarin II).

- 2) The output capacity of the plant will probably amount to 500 tons of Sarin per month when employing 24 hour shifts. As you have no technical experience as yet, you will not be held responsible for maintaining this output figure.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-8782
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original cont'd)

- 3) The total costs of this factory are provisionally estimated by you at about 44 million Reichsmark, this figure not being considered binding, to which the refunds in your favor as provided for under figure 9, and also turnover tax, will be added.

The cost estimate for the total costs, which is still to be drawn up by you and submitted to OKH (High Command of the Army) (Ch.H.Ruest. U. BDE - Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Training Army) for examination and approval at your earliest convenience, is to be subdivided as follows:

.....

(page 7 of original)

.....

By order

(signed) Schridoge (?)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

22 July 1947

I, ARTHUR MACNAMARA, No. 20191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8782.

ARTHUR MACNAMARA, No. 20191.

-3-
"END"

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Guenther Gurr, Chemist of the I.G. Farben Industrie AG from 1926 to 1945, Prekurist of the IG Farben Industrie AG since 1940 and co-worker in the Vermittlungsstelle W since December 1936 and its leader for Sparte 2 since April 1937, at present domiciled in Berlin-Charlottenburg, Preussen Allee 28, having been warned that I shall be liable to punishment for making a false statement, herewith state the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion:

1. In 1926 I entered the IG Farben Industrie AG as biochemist at the Ludwigshafen-oppau works. I worked there until 1931, when I was transferred to Hoechst. In December 1936 I was transferred from Hoechst to the Vermittlungsstelle W in Berlin in which I eventually took over the management of the affairs of Sparte 2 after the departure of Dr. von Bruening.

2. I cannot give a precise definition of the proceedings which were to be treated as top secrets. In general I can say that almost all proceedings which were connected with the development, production and storing of chemical warfare agents and explosives were treated as top secrets, as also were all written proceedings from which a more comprehensive view of the armaments production might be gained. Applications for patents in the sphere of chemical warfare agents and in other spheres which, in the opinion of the experts, revealed completely new technical possibilities for military use, were treated as top secrets.

3. Special security regulations existed for the treatment of top secrets. Top secrets could be kept only in safes. They could be handed out to the people working on them only against a receipt. Photostats and copies of extracts from letters could not be made. Every copy of a top secret had to bear a current number.

(page 2 of original)

4. Not all the correspondence of the IG which was treated as top secret passed through the Vermittlungsstelle W. The Vermittlungsstelle was not informed of certain work, for example experimental and developmental work in the sphere of particularly valuable chemical warfare agents (Sarin, Tabun). I had fairly accurate information on this work, as in 1943 I was also employed in the Seewerk Falkenhagen.

Late in the summer of 1943, Dr. Ambros informed me that he had been commissioned to erect a plant for Sarin production in the Falkenhagen works, until then under the exclusive trusteeship of the Wehrmacht. As a rather large group of Wehrmacht officials was already employed in the works in the erection of a plant for the production of an incendiary material, and as Dr. Ambros feared that it would consequently be difficult for the specialists delegated to Falkenhagen by the IG to deal successfully with these Wehrmacht officials, Dr. Ambros thought that the IG should employ someone at Falkenhagen who would be qualified, by virtue of his experience in relations with officials and by virtue of his general personality, to safeguard the IG's claim to management in these works. As since 1941 I had been extremely seriously ill I rejected the post of works manager in

(Page 2 of original cont'd)

Falkenhagen. As Dr. Ambros had no other chemist available who seemed suitable for this purely administrative post, I gave in eventually and in addition to my work in Berlin I took over the temporary administration of the Falkenhagen works. On taking over the new post I was informed under the strictest pledge of secrecy that in Dyrnfurth, of which I already knew, and in Falkenhagen, plants had been, or respectively, were to be set up for now, ostensibly highly effective chemical warfare agents. My activities in Falkenhagen were restricted to visiting the works about once a week, fulfilling the general functions of a works manager, and in particular trying to smooth out personal difficulties between the Wehrmacht officials and the specialists appointed by the IG. No chemical problems had to be dealt with, as the part of the building of which IG was trustee, (Serin), was purely a technical constructional problem. As by 1944, there was still no improvement in my illness, I asked for my final release from Falkenhagen in the spring of 1944. Dr. Ambros complied with my request and entrusted the leading Oberingenieur, Herr Bilfinger, with the position of commissioner for the control of the plant.

(page 3 of original)

I have carefully read through each of the 2 (two) pages of this affidavit and countersigned them personally, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and countersigned them with my initials and herewith state on oath that to the best of my knowledge and belief I have spoken the absolute truth in this affidavit.

(Signature:) Gerr
Dr. Guenther Gerr

Sworn to and signed before me this 4th day of July 1947 at
CCMC, Berlin, by Dr. Guenther Gerr, known to me to be the person
making the above affidavit.

(Signature;) Peter H. Miller
PETER H. MILLER
U.S. Civilian A&D 145338
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

20 August 1947

I, PATRICIA E. C. WOOD, ETC No. 20139, herewith certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document no. NI-7618.

PATRICIA E. C. WOOD
ETC No. 20139

Case 6
after Doc. NI-7618
Doc. Bk. 36 - 26

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI - 9582
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR THE QUINCY

(Page 1 of original)

A F F I D A V I T .

I, Dr. Hans WAGNER, born on 9 July 1903, at Frankfurt, Chemist in the employ of the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. from 1928 - 1945, member of the Liaison Office "Berlin N° 7, currently residing at Neumarkt/Opf., Badstrasse 52, having been informed that I shall be liable to punishment if I make false statements, herewith state voluntarily and without coercion as follows:

In 1928 I got a job as a laboratory chemist in the works at Hoechst and remained there until the middle of February 1938 when I was transferred to the Liaison Office 7 in Berlin. My personal file, however, thereafter was kept at Frankfurt upon the insistence of Dr. TER MEER. In the Liaison Office "I took over the handling of patent questions, mainly of Sparte II and in part also Sparten I and III; furthermore, the work concerning developments and the deliveries to the Wehrmacht within category II.

The product which is known under the name of M-substance is Chlorotrifluoride with the formula ClF_3 . This product is a liquid which upon contact with the oxygen of the air ignites automatically and burns with a relatively hot flame. This product has also been listed under the pseudo-identification of C-3 substance which, however, as a rule only was used in correspondence between the I.G. and the Ordnance Office of the Army.

(Page 1 of original cont'd)

The idea of utilizing Chlorofluoride for military purpose had come up already, as far as I know, before the war, and it was to be used in filling incendiary grenades; besides tests were made during the war to ascertain whether it was suitable

(Page 2 of original)

to ignite incendiary grenades filled with oil, thus replacing powder ignition.

The product was developed in the research division of the Ordnance Office of the Army at Berlin under the direction of Ministerialrat SCHULANN.

As experts also Oberbaurat GLUBE and Baurat PEINERT are known to me. As far as I know, the I.G. Leverkusen manufactured this product on a trial basis approximately during 1942/43 in the inorganic laboratory (Dr. Noack), and that was done on orders from the 7a Pruf 9 Division of the Ordnance Office of the Army, Ministerialrat von der LINDE. The effect of the N-substance was hotly disputed by the Wehrmacht offices. The research division of the Munitions Office of the army attributed great importance to the substance and tried to obtain its introduction as incendiary ammunition either directly or by way of the SS through Hitler.

At times the opinion existed that the products of disintegration, which developed when the N-substance burned, as it was exposed to the air, could be regarded as gases. This view, however, proved to be fallacious.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI - 9582
CONT'D

(Page 2 of original cont'd)

The Army constructed a factory in the Soewerk Falkenhagen for the production of the N-substance, and as far as I know, this started production toward the end of 1943. Since Dr. Ambros was in special charge of the production of gases in Falkenhagen in accordance with agreements between I.G. and the Ordnance Office of the Army, supervision of the N-substance plant of the Falkenhagen Works also was transferred to the I.G.

I have carefully read the 2 (two) pages of this affidavit and signed in my own hand,

(Page 3 of original)

have made the necessary corrections in my own hand, initialed them and declare under oath that in this statement I have said the whole truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

sgd.: Dr. Hans Wagner

Dr. Hans Wagner

Sworn to and signed before me this 8th day of August 1947 at Nuernberg, by Dr. Hans Wagner, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

sgd.: Arthur T. COOPER

Arthur T. Cooper
U.S. Civilian, APO Nr. D-434534
Interrogator, Office of Chief
of Counsel for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI - 9582
CONT'D

(Page 4 of original)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Leslie H. LAWTON, AGO No. B-397990, hereby certify that I am a duly appointed translator for the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document NI-9582.

LESLIE H. LAWTON

AGO No. B-397990

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY

- 4 -

(End)

The Reichsfuehrer SS

Field Command, 31 July 1944

Day Book No. (Illegible)
RF/Bn

Re: Your letter 26 July 1944 - 370-929/44 gRa -

Reich Minister for
Armament and War Production
Party Member Speer
Berlin, Pariser Platz 3

5 copies
5th copy

(TRANSLATOR'S NOTE:
Illegible handwritten notes and
figures)

Dear Party Member Speer,

I thank you for your letter of 26 July 1944. In the meantime, I have talked to SS Obergruppenfuehrer JUETTNER. We will first undertake tests of the "N"-Stoff ("N-Product"). I naturally agree that I.G. Farben should take over the plant in Falkenhagen, or rather that I.G. should run the plants.

Only the question of the sale and the method of payment have still to be examined more closely. About this you will however be informed later on.

Heil Hitler!

Yours,

(signed) H. HIMMLER

Copy has been sent for information:

- 2.) To Chief of SS-Main Direction Office
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer JUETTNER, Berlin
- 3.) To Chief of SS Main Economic Administration Office
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer POHL, Berlin
- 4.) SS-Obergruppenfuehrer GROTHMANN.

A copy of the letter of Reich Minister SPEER dated 26 July, 1944 is enclosed.

By order: Illegible signature

1 Encl.

SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer, 30 July

(Page 2 of original)

The Reich Minister for
Armament and War Production
370-929-44 gRa

Top Secret (Reich) Matter

Berlin, 26 July 1944
Pariser Platz 3

Reichsfuehrer SS and Commander
of Reserve Army HIMMLER
Berlin W 35

Dear Party Member Himmler,

At the end of June, the Fuehrer referred to the insufficient tests

SE Ebe "N-product" by the Army Ordnance Office and told me about his intention to transfer the responsibility for the production and the tests of the "N-product" to the Waffen SS.

At that time, I convinced the Fuehrer that the production should for the time being not be taken over by "Waffen-SS", but that it would be sufficient if the "Waffen SS" were to take over the testing of "N-product".

Even today, I do not yet agree that the production of "N-product" should be taken over by "Waffen-SS", because after all in Germany there is only I.G. Farben that has available the necessary specialists for the constant innovations in chemical processes.

(Page 3 of original)

I do, however, regret that in the course of the Four Year Plan, no competitive firm to the I.G. Farben concern was established, as with the Hermann Goering Works. This would have been easily possible at the time when the numerous new plants of the Four Year Plan were established.

Nowadays, we depend entirely upon the work of I.G. Farben for chemical progress.

A modern chemical plant to work separately from I.G. Farben therefore does not seem advisable to me.

For that reason, I ordered that the Falkenhagen plant which was at first independently run by the Ordnance Office, be handed over for operation to I.G. Farben, into the hands of the best-qualified chemist of I.G. Farben, Dr. Ambros, who succeeded lately in producing a perfect Buna of a quality equal to that of natural rubber.

Furthermore, I cannot agree that the production in Falkenhagen be taken over, (Translator's Note: Handwritten addition:) by the "Waffen-SS", because in connection with and next to the "N-product" - installation, there is an important installation for chemical warfare agents.

KR

Top Secret (Reich) Matter

(TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Handwritten
Notes and Figures:)
370-429/44 gRs
III G (?)

TELETYPE

Reich Minister for Armament and War Production
Attention Hauptdienstleiter SAUR

Gtttd. Oh H Ruest und BdKE, /Stab u. Wa A/Stab (?)
Letter Reichsfuehrer SS

The Fuehrer has ordered that through the Reichsfuehrer SS further experiments with "N-product" be carried out - Chief of Army Armament and Commander of the Army Reserve: Ordnance Office is to submit to Reichsfuehrer SS all the Files, Reference Material and knowledge gathered up to now about the "N-product" and to support purpose of "Reichsfuehrer SS" with all means.

Chief Supreme Command Wehrmacht
Army Staff II, No. 1731/44
G.K.
by order: (signed) BUEHE

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, ETO No. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-4043.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
ETO No. 34079

(E N D)
- 3 -

TRANSMISSION OF DOCUMENT No. WI - 7381
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Registered

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft Ludwigshafen
on Rhine
Intermediate Products Group
Textile Auxiliaries Department (Textil Hilfsmittel
Abtl.).

Dir. Dr. WELDEBERT
I.G. Leverkusen

Secret!

Received 23 June 1944

1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of Article 38 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

Fr. Ul/st. 20365 22 June 1944

In connection with contract problems, which concern the Seewerk, it would be interesting to know to what extent Leverkusen participated in the development of the "W-stoff" and how much information you have placed at the disposal of OKH (High Command of the Army) for the "W-stoff" process. We would also be interested to know how far you consider matters connected with "W-stoff" to be the "mental property" of OKH.

Textile Auxiliaries Department
Ludwigshafen

signed: ULRICH

Copy

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-7384
CONTINUED

(Page 2 of 2)

I.G. Leverkusen

Secret!

Department: Inorganic Chemistry

To Dr. ULRICH
Intermediates Group
Textile Auxiliaries Department
I.G. Ludwigshafen.

1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of Article 38 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

Your reference	Your letter	Our reference	Date
Dr. UL/SF. 20365	of 22 June 1944	Dr. KW/B	30 June 44

Re:

C3-stoff

We beg to give you the following information in answer to the above enquiry:
Leverkusen has been working on the production of fluorine and "C3-stoff" since 1932. OKH was acquainted with these facts through our applications for patents in that connection.

The "C3-stoff" plant within the sewerk and its preparatory phases differs in essential points from the Leverkusen plant (cf. our report of 18 August 1943). Common features are only the following:

- 1) Material for the fluorine-cell: Electronmetal
- 2) Space within the electrolysis-cell free from electric current.
- 3) Labyrinth packing inside the anode chamber.
- 4) Material for the "C3-stoff" oven: nickel.

Items 2 to 4 may be called the "mental property" of Leverkusen, whereas item 1 is already known from literature.

Whereas OKH has been at liberty, since 1935, to obtain, without undertaking any obligations, any information it wants, about technical details of the Leverkusen Plant, and its queries were readily answered, it was not until 13 and 14 August 1943 that we were permitted to inspect the experimental plant for the first time (in order to give our opinion); only and we had to undertake not to make any use of the "mental property" of OKH previous conferences we had to do

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. VI - 7381
CONTINUED

(page 1 of original, cont'd.)

likewise although at such occasions and thereafter we received no technical information whatsoever was from OKH. Representatives of OKH have come to Leverkusen for inspections from 1935 until 1942. (A list of persons who have been in Leverkusen for this purpose is found in our report to OKH of 19 May 1942). According to statements by Dr. GLUPE, however, OKH did not take up research work in earnest until 1940, so that OKH could make use in its researches not only of our positive results but more particularly of our negative experiences. To what extent this is correct or how far the OKH plants were developed separately and independently from our plants, we cannot say on account of this unilateral exchange of experience. Under these circumstances we cannot file any documented claims. In how we should be obliged to you if you would let us have a draft contract, before beginning negotiations with OKH so that we could, if necessary, come back to this matter.

INORGANIC CHEMISTRY DEPARTMENT

(signature) KLEBERT PPA KOACK

Received 4 June 1958

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

8 August 1947

I, Leonard LAURENCE, Civ. No. 20 138, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. VI - 7381.

Leonard LAURENCE
Civ. No. 20 138

- 3 -

"END"

02

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4991
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(Translator's Note: Handwritten Note: To original file Gen.)

MONTAN
INDUSTRIE ERBE
G.m.b.H.

(Semi-illegible stamp giving instructions Safe guarding secrecy of this document)

(Stamp: REGISTERED.)

(Stamp: Dr. MILREY)

(Stamp: 12 March 1945 a.m.)

To
I.G. Farbenindustrie
Aktiengesellschaft
Legal Department Attention Dr. MILREY
Ludwigshafen a. Rh.

At Present:
Lippoldsberg, Feb. 1945
Post Office and Railway-Station
(20 Bodenfelde/Weser.)
Telephone: Bodenfelde 344-345
Post Checking Account:
Berlin 20959

Your Reference:
Dr. u/Kr.

Your letter of
31 October 1944

Our Reference
CS/48/11e2/Schr.

Subject: Cover Agreement Auschwitz.

Enclosure!

We herewith return to you the copy of the Cover Agreement for
Auschwitz intended for you, signed by the Army High Command.

Heil Hitler!

MONTAN INDUSTRIE ERBE G.m.b.H.

(illegible Signature) (Signature)
Name: BREMER?

Translator's Note
Illegible Initial

(Translator's Note:
Stamp: TOP SECRET)

(1st page of original)

(Translator's Note: Stamp:
CONFIDENTIAL)

This is a state secret, according to
paragraph 88 of the Reich Penal Code.

To be forwarded only under sealed cover
by registered mail.

Addressee is responsible for safe keeping
under lock and key.)

Over-~~Agreement~~
between

the German Reich (Wehrmacht Treasury) represented by the Army High Command, hereinafter called "OKH" in short,

and

the I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, Frankfurt a.M., hereinafter called I.G. in short.

By order and to account of the OKH, the following are to be executed on a site owned by the I.G. at Auschwitz (Upper Silesia), a building inheritance right for this site being conceded by the I.G. to the Montan-Industriewerke G.m.b.H., Berlin (hereinafter called "Montan") under an agreement approved by the OKH:

1.) A plant for the production of Glykol/Diglykol and Chlorine as per preliminary note of the OKH of 29 June 1942, Order No. 3/1 b - 4838-0144/41/H, with the following output based on continuous shifts: Assuming a production capacity of 9000 tons of ethyl oxide per annum, the plant is required to supply 250 to 300 tons of Diglykol per month and 400 to 500 tons of Glykol per month; provision is to be made for a change-over to the production of Diglykol only; the plant is to be capable of increasing production to 18000 tons of ethyl oxide per annum, including proportionate quantities of Glykol and Diglykol; the chlorine production capacity is to yield an output of 30000 tons per annum, capable of being stepped up to 50000 tons per annum.

2.) A plant for the production of 500 tons of stabilizing agents per month as per note of the OKH to I.G. of 22 June 1943, Reference No. 74 o 7221 b Wa J Ru. (Mum 3 zbV/1 b2) Order No. 4019-0055.

The German Reich has appointed Montan to control both enterprises. Regarding maintenance and operation of these plants, the OKH and I.G. agree as follows:

Paragraph 1.

(1) On the strength of a lease-contract signed this day, I.G. transfers to Montan the maintenance and operation of

(Page 2 of original)

the plants mentioned in the preamble. The OKH herewith approves this lease-contract signed by Montan by order of the OKH.

(2) The I.G. undertakes to operate the plants and all appurtenances after completion, with all the care of a bona fide business man and technician and to maintain them - after expiration of the lease-contract mentioned in Paragraph 1 at the expense of the OKH - in good working condition at all times and to bring them up to date by modernization and renovation at the request of the OKH.

(3) I.G. undertakes to start operations and operate the plants at the request of the OKH; in case of expiration of the lease-contract mentioned in Paragraph 1, appropriate terms are to be agreed upon as the need arises. The operation of the plants for purposes other than these of the Wehrmacht can be demanded only insofar as the economic exploitation of concern plants of I.G., in which the latter participates with at least 51%, is not prejudiced thereby, and no contractual obligations of I.G. (including the extension of such obligations) exist at the time of signing the contract which would oppose such purpose or could be superseded thereby; care is to be taken that in any case the costs of I.G. are met in accordance with Paragraph 9, Sub-Paragraph 1 a - f of the

66

lease-contract mentioned in Paragraph 1 of this agreement, including a possible export promotion levy, etc. I.G. may operate the plants for purposes other than those of the Wehrmacht with the express permission of the Montan. The plants may be operated only by the I.G. or, under the provisions of Paragraph 3, by a concern company of I.G.

Paragraph 2.

(1) The I.G., in operating the plants, undertakes for the duration of the contract mentioned in Paragraph 1, Sub-Paragraph 1, to apply at all times such patents, processes and experiences at its disposal as are suitable for application in these plants. The OKH acknowledges, on behalf of Montan also, that all these patents, processes and experiences are sole property of the I.G. and - unless provided otherwise by a special agreement between OKH and I.G. or between Montan and I.G.

(Page 3 of original)

or by the law - may not be used in other plants or placed at the disposal of third parties without the I.G.'s consent, and that, in particular, the processes and "know-how" of the I.G. unprotected by patents are to be kept strictly secret from third parties; this also applies to the period subsequent to expiration of the contract mentioned in Paragraph 1, Sub-Paragraph 1.

(2) The making available of processes, "know-how" and patents on the part of the I.G. does not entail a remuneration, and is to be compensated by the share in the profits, due to the I.G. in accordance with the contract mentioned in Paragraph 1, Sub-Paragraph 1.

Paragraph 3.

In the event of the I.G. investing the I.G. owned Auschwitz works and, in connection therewith, the land on which the plants have been erected, in a subsidiary company in which I.G. has a share of at least 51%, the OKH and I.G. agree that the subsidiary company taking control of the works is to replace I.G. as contracting party in the lease-contract mentioned in Paragraph 1, Sub-Paragraph 1, the lease-contract undergoing no alterations but those resulting automatically from the exchange of contracting parties. I.G. guarantees in this case that their subsidiary company will fulfill the obligations entered into by I.G. as per Paragraph 1, Sub-Paragraph 2 and Paragraph 1, Sub-Paragraph 3, 1st and 3rd sentences, of this agreement.

Paragraph 4.

It is possible that additional parts of plants will be erected on the inheritable building site of Montan at Auschwitz in course of an extension of the Glykol or stabilizing-agents plant or in course of the erection of new factories. If, in the course of the future extension of the Montan plants Auschwitz, such new plants are erected it is agreed that, without any special and express extension of the skeleton contract, its present provisions will apply to the additional plant parts, as soon as it has been established by a special order of the OKH (preliminary note, defense order, etc.) that the erection and operation of these plant parts is to be carried out by I.G.

(Page 4 of original)

Paragraph 5.

(1) Both parties undertake to keep the contents of this agreement strictly secret to the outside, not to let their personnel into the secret unless absolutely necessary, to bind them too, to permanent secrecy, and to take all measures to ensure secrecy.

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(2) The OKH and the Court of Accounts of the German Reich as well as the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production - Price Control Office - are entitled at any time to satisfy themselves, either directly or, by their order, through Montan or through a known firm of chartered accountants, of the condition and production capacity of the plants, and to examine the relevant books and documents.

Paragraph 6.

(1) Disputes arising from this agreement, regardless of the value of the matter in dispute, come under the jurisdiction of the District Court, Berlin.

(2) Immediately at the beginning of a lawsuit, the parties are bound to propose that the case be heard in camera and that the litigants be bound to secrecy in accordance with Paragraphs 172, 174/GVG Court Constitutional Law and that the records of the case be securely guarded.

Paragraph 7.

This agreement, as well as the contract dealing with the building inheritance right mentioned in the preamble is valid until 31 March 1933 and will expire automatically on that date.

Paragraph 8.

This agreement has been made in triplicate. Each of the contracting parties and the Chairman of the Aufsichtsrat of Montan will receive one copy each.

Berlin, 8 February 1945

Ludwigshafen a.Rh., 2 November 1944

Army High Command

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

By Order:

(Signature) AMEROS (Signature) Deputy:
DILHEY

(Signature) LEEB
General of Artillery and Chief of
the Army Ordnance Office

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P. NO. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NL-4991.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M.P. NO. 34079

END

-4-

66

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4633
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR THE GERMANS

Secret, No. 87

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Codes.
2. To be passed on only under seal, and registered if forwarded by post.
3. To be kept at the responsibility of the addressee under safe lock.

Office
Ministerial Counsellor
Dr. of Engineering Schmamm
Wittenberg/Lutherstadt
Stamag 3 a.b. V.

(Stamp): Management Division
31.VII.1944
Levorkausen IG plant.
(Handwriting) Auschwitz

74 06831 b Wa J Rue 8 July 44 Ku I 24 July 1944
(Munich .. zbV/Ib)
No. 5128/44 secret. (Handwriting) ø Frl. Klein, Neidingen

Acceleration of the development of phosgene.

We acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter of 8.7.44, in which you inform us of the raising of the priority of the Phosgene plant AZ under reference number JS 4928.

In accordance with the negotiations carried on and the letter of the Army High Command dated 13.7.43, file no. 740 6821 b Wa J Rue (Zun 3 zbV, lb²) no. 1228/43 Top secret we have coordinated the production of Phosgene (Ph) within the (St) plant from the start with the subsequent bottling of oil-F and have already ordered all the apparatuses and the most essential machines for the oil-F plant.

The allotment of iron apportioned to us for the St-plant does not include the oil-F bottling installation and the increase in production of Phosgene (Ph) caused hereby. In order not to lose time we have drawn on the St-plant for the apparatus and machines by way of an advance loan of our allotment, on the assumption that the plenipotentiary general for Chemistry has been informed of the planned enlargement, and with the intention of calling on him to furnish us this allotment subsequently.

We were told, however, by Messrs. Dr. Eckel and Dr. Stephan of the office of the Plenipotentiary General for Chemistry during a conference held at Az on the 20.6. that they had thus far not been informed of this project. But since the final accounts for the allocations of the St-plant had already been made up and an additional claim for them could not be made any more, the gentlemen of the office of the Plenipotentiary General for Chemistry directed that we file our claim for the Oil-F Plant including production increase of Phosgene in the form of an application for a new building project.

According to this advice we filed our application for approval on the 15.7. For your information we wish to state that we shall need for this new building project:

Structural iron	130 tons	Costs of building	500 000.
Iron for machinery	<u>375 tons</u>	Costs of machinery	<u>450 000.</u>
Total amount of iron	505 tons	Total costs of machinery	950 000.

(page 2 of original)

In order that the apparatuses which Oil-F still lacks may be allocated as swiftly as possible, and also that the apparatuses of the St-plant, put aside as a result of the advance supply of apparatus for Phosgene production may be procured within a fixed time, we request you to get in touch with the Plenipotentiary general for chemistry and hence to bring it about that a permit for the new building project may shortly be granted.

We have already begun the grading of the apparatuses in so far as they have already been ordered and allotted in the new priority grades given us.

I.G. FARBE&INDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

Signature: Eisfeld Braus

Plenipotentiary general for chemistry,
Dr. Eckell
Director Dr. Ambros
Director Dr. Haberland
Dr. Huttner
DI John.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

6 June 1947

I, HERBERT RODECK, No. B 397499, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI4633.

.....
HERBERT RODECK, No. B 397499.

68

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No NI-6787
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

A F F I D A V I T .
.....

(initialled in . . . I, Philipp, Heinrich HOERLEIN, (handwritten. Wuppertal-
margin) Elberfeld, Stockmannsuehle 23), having been duly sworn and cautioned
that I render myself liable to punishment for any false statements,
herewith depose voluntarily and without being subjected to any duress:

1.) I, Philipp, Heinrich HOERLEIN, was born on 5 June 1883
at Wendelsheim (Rhine Rasse). I first attended the elementary school
at my home town, . . . the secondary school (Realschule) at Olsey (cor-
rected to Oltey, and initialled in margin), and later the high school
(Oberrealschule) at Darmstadt, which I left at Easter 1900 with the
High School Certificate (Reifezeugnis). Then I began to study
Chemistry at the Technical College (Technische Hochschule) at Darmstadt,
and transferred to Jena University at Easter 1902, where, in December
1903, I took my degree of PhD (Dr. phil.)

From January 1904 until 31 December 1908 I was an assistant
to, or rather collaborated with, my teacher KNORR at Jena in research
work in the field of Morphine and its properties. The results of this
research work were recorded in the reports of the German Chemical
Society, which were published at that time.

2.) On 1 January 1909 I joined the Dye Factories, formerly
Friedrich BAYER & Co. at Elberfeld, as a Chemist, worked there for the
first few months in the sphere of dyestuffs and in the course of this
work I invented the first Supreme-Dyes. Later I returned to Pharmaceu-
tical Chemistry and became in succession department chief, Prokurist,
deputy director, deputy member of the Vorstand and, from 1 January 1931,
regular member of the Vorstand and the Central Committee of the I.G.
Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, which had been founded in the
meantime (1926).

3.) After 1933 I accepted the position of manager of the
Elberfeld plant, but I resigned from it again on 30 June 1941.

My activities always consisted mainly of scientific work,
even though in the early thirties, after Director Dr. BOEHMNER had
been pensioned off, I had been made one of the chief managers at
Elberfeld and Leverkusen, of the manufacture of pharmaceutical products
and insecticides. Of my own pharmaceutical discoveries, I should like
to mention my invention of LUMINAL in the year 1910, which has since
then become the universal remedy for epilepsy, and in the course of
more than 35 years has saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of
epileptics

(page 2 of original)

and has made ^{t heir} life worth living . . . again.

4.) As early as 1910 or 1911, Geheimrat NUSSBERG, then
himself in charge of the administrative department of the entire
pharmaceutical section, made me responsible for the chemical research
laboratory of the pharmaceutical section. Later on I became, in his
place, manager-in-chief of the existing pharmacological, chemical-
therapeutic and bacteriological laboratory. As the years went on
I extended these laboratories and supplemented the medical laboratories
by a physiological institute and by an experimental institute for
pathology. In the years of the depression (1931) the laboratory for
commercial hygiene was transferred from Ludwigshafen to Elberfeld, for

(page 2 of original cont'd)

purposes of economy, because the medical laboratories there could be used for research on special questions. But the laboratory for commercial hygiene has always remained a general I.G. laboratory and its accounts were settled as such.

5.) After the death of the Director MANN, senior, I, being the senior member of the Vorstand of the I.G. pharmaceutical section, became Vorsitz of the pharmaceutical main conference and of the Aufsichtsrat of the Behringwerke; this latter function, however, was a purely nominal one, according to the statutes, whereas the active management was in the hands of Dr. DEMNITZ, and the management-in-chief in those of Professor LAUBSCHLAGER.

6.) In addition to my scientific work within the I.G., I considered it my life-long duty to sponsor numerous Societies for the advancement of Natural Sciences in Germany. So, for example, I was treasurer of the German Chemical Society (Deutsche Chemische Gesellschaft), of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society for the Advancement of Sciences (Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der Wissenschaften), of the Society of German Naturalists and Physicians (Gesellschaft deutscher Naturforscher und Aerzte), of the Adolf BOYER Society for the Advancement of Chemical Literature (Adolf BOYER Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der Chemischen Literatur), and of the Emil FISCHER Society, which financed the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Chemistry (Kaiser Wilhelm Institut fuer Chemie) at Berlin-Dahlem; furthermore I was chairman of the Justus

(page 3 of original)

LIEBIG Society for the Advancement of Chemistry Instruction, which awarded scholarships to chemists who had taken their doctor's degree and granted subsistence allowances for graduated chemists.

7.) My scientific activities brought me also into contact with numerous scientists abroad. I was invited, for example, to give 2 lectures in England about anti-bacterial remedies (Sulphonamides), namely to the Royal Society in London and at the Session of the Society for the Advancement of Science in Nottingham 1937.

Between 1927 and 1938 I visited the United States four times, in order to maintain a close exchange of experiences in the scientific and business field with the Bayer Co. and the Winthrop Chemical Co., to whom we had ceded by agreement the pharmaceutical inventions of I.G. for exploitation in America (e.g. Sulphonamides and Atobrin).

8.) In recognition of my scientific activities I was given an honorary doctor's degree by the medical faculty of Munich University, the Ministry of Education appointed me as an Honorary Professor at the Medical Academy at Duesseldorf, and I was nominated a member of the Reich Health Council (Reichsgesundheitsrat) by the Reich Minister of the Interior, all this before 1933.

In the last war I was awarded the Military Cross 1st Class (Kriegsverdienstkreuz erster Klasse) and the title of Military Economy Leader (Wehrwirtschaftsfuehrer) by the Reich Ministry for Economy, the latter in consideration of deliveries of medicaments vital for war.

9.) In addition to the pharmaceutical research work carried on at Elberfeld, there was also research on chemicals for plant protection and pest destruction. The first great success was the introduction of organic mercury compounds as cereal-immunising agents (Getroidebeizzen). As early as in the first World War large quantities of Uspulum were delivered for that purpose.

(page 4 of original)

10.) After 1933 our activities in both fields met with great difficulties, because the Associations for the Prevention of Cruelty to animals started to take action over a letter of HITLER's to an SS-Oberabschnittsarzt in Hannover. This letter, which had been written a few years previously, said that after the seizure of power animal experiments would soon be brought to an end, a policy which the National Socialist Party had demanded in their motion at the last Prussian Landtag (Provincial Parliament) in the winter of 1932. - I attempted, therefore, to get into touch with functionaries of the Party who I thought to be in direct contact with HITLER. Gelehrter FLORIAN was not interested in this question, so I tried to achieve my aim with the SA. The local SA-leaders brought ROEMER's Adjutant, Standartenfuhrer UEL along to me, and with his help I hoped to persuade HITLER through ROEMER or the Physician General of the SA, that it was impossible to carry out the purport of his letter. The result was unexpected. On my next visit to Munich UEL explained to me that he wished to have nothing more to do with us that we not only were an international Jewish undertaking, but simply traitors to our country, because we had put on the market Germanin against sleeping sickness, Plasmochochin and Atobrin against Malaria, although after the seizure of the German colonies under the Versailles Treaty these products would only benefit former enemy powers. We could consider ourselves lucky that this had happened before 1933, since if there should be any cases of that kind in future, we should be dealt with in quite a different manner.

At about the same time, incidentally in 1933, there were rumors that a paragraph about economic treason was to be added to the penal code, inflicting the severest punishment - possibly with retrospective force - on anybody who, to the detriment of Germany, published scientific and technical information abroad.

I am 100 % convinced that UEL's change of attitude

(page 5 of original)

was backed in the last instance by HITLER - since UEL used to avoid all questions on the subject, I cannot, however, confirm this by oath. But he added, that animal experiments and slaughter according to the Jewish rites would be forbidden, we would soon hear further details about it.

In fact, in August 1933, the famous GOEBLING decree was issued from Berchtesgaden, by which all animal tests were flatly forbidden, and anyone violating this decree was threatened with being sent to a concentration camp.

11.) Thus the whole of our work at Elberfeld was called into question. For a little while I toyed with the idea of accepting a position offered to me in America, but finally decided to stay in Germany and to take up the fight for the freedom of science. With the help of Ministerial Director FREY of the Medical Department of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior and Ministerial Councillor GIESE of the same department of the Reich Ministry of the Interior, I succeeded in the face of stiff opposition in establishing successfully the freedom of animal experiments. At the same time a fight was going on against the periodical "People's Health from Blood and Soil" (Volksgesundheit aus Blut und Boden), edited by the district medical leader (Gemeinschaftsfuhrer) Dr. WILH in Ruernberg and later by STRUCHER himself, a periodical of the same standard as the "Stuermer". In

(page 5 of original cont'd)

every number of the first series of this periodical there appeared a cartoon strip "Isidor G. FARBER" (- I.G. Farben), in which, as also in the written text, the I.G. was attacked in the most vulgar way. It was made out to be an international swindle, which in co-operation with Jewish professors and professors with Jewish wives (SHRLICH and HERRING) was slowly poisoning the German nation and degenerating it from a racial point of view with horse serum etc. The first time I succeeded in carrying out its suppression was with the help of Reich medical leader (Reichsaerztoefuehrer) Gerhard WAGNER and the second and final one I achieved with the help of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda, after negotiating with Dr. THOMALLA, GORB EL's medical advisor.

By means of legal proceedings, I succeeded in silencing quite a number of National-Socialist periodicals in which similar vulgar attacks against the science of medicine and the I.G. appeared.

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In these proceedings I obtained interim injunctions, confiscations, etc., with the result that the slander campaign gradually died down. It was thus possible for us to continue our work, but there was always the risk that we might be charged with treason for introducing some new preparation or other which might be of special value to foreign countries, especially as a decree had been issued in 1935 according to which every application for a patent had to be examined in view of the possibility that it might reveal things which in the interest of national defence should be kept secret.

I found out that now, in contrast to previous times, we required the support and protection of military authorities in making our decisions, and I looked for and found it for our pharmaceutical research work in the person of the Military Sanitary Inspector Professor Dr. WALDMANN, and for our research work on pest control, in the Army Ordnance Office (Heereswaffenamt HWA).

12.) About 1934/35 a decree was issued according to which more powerful toxic substances which might be important for national defence had to be registered with the Army Ordnance Office (HWA).

13.) As a result of the above decree, co-operation regarding more powerful toxic substances was effected between the OKW (High Command of the Army) or the HWA (Army Ordnance Office) and the I.G.

14.) I was kept informed of all toxic substances by the various I.G. plants. The substances were tested at the Industrial Hygienic Laboratory of the I.G. at Elberfeld, and in the case of higher toxic content, were forwarded to the HWA (Army Ordnance Office).

15.) In the years 1935-1939 the I.G. developed among other things the following substances which could be used as poison gas: Direct Mustard Gas (DL-Loet) at I.G. Leverkusen (added in handwriting: without my knowledge at that time), Nitrogen-Mustard Gas at I.G. (added in handwriting: Ludwigshafen) Mustard Gas mixture at I.G. (crossed out).

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Golan, also called Tabun, first at I.G. Leverkusen, then at I.G. Elberfeld

(Dr. SCHRAEDER)

Sarin, at I.G. Elberfeld.

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initial 16.) Galan or Tabun was discovered in January 1937
(crossed out; about) by Dr. SCHRADER, I.G. Leverkusen,
(crossed out; Elberfeld) in the course of his research into
pest control. Because of its high toxic content it was taken
up by the Army Ordnance Office. The Army Ordnance Office
saw in this product great possibilities for the production
of poison gas. The Army Ordnance Office requested Elberfeld
initial (crossed out; me) (handwritten note: whether Dr. SCHRADER
had moved in November 1937) to undertake further experiments
with this product when (one handwritten word illegible) dif-
ficulties arise. Soon afterwards, the Spandau Laboratories
for Protection against Gas (Spandauer Gasschutzlaboratorien)
carried out experiments with Galan.

17.) In 1937/38, I.G. Elberfeld supplied the Army
Ordnance Office and through them the Spandau Laboratories
for Protection against Gas, with small quantities of Galan
or Tabun for experimental purposes.

initial 18.) From about 1937/38 experiences were exchanged
between the Army Ordnance Office and I.G. regarding the
efficiency of poison gas. For example (handwritten: oral)
reports on nitrogen mustard gas were sent to the Army Ord-
nance Office (Dr. von SICHERER). (handwritten note, partly
initial illegible: with reference to the previous publication in
the Journal of the American Chemical Society (??).)

initial 19.) At I.G. Elberfeld, Dr. SCHRADER undertook --
besides his experiments in pest control -- the further
development of Galan as poison gas. (illegible handwrit-
ten note) Professor GROSS tested, among other things, the
efficiency of the Galan substances -- as developed by
Dr. SCHRADER -- at the Industrial Hygiene Laboratory of
I.G. Elberfeld.

20.) In 1937/38, I drove with representatives
of the Army Ordnance Office (von SICHERER, HIRSCH, von
der LINDE, Major RUEDIGER) to Munsterlager, where I
watched a firing of Tabun. The result was absolutely
negative.

21.) In October 1939, Fritz TER MEER, Otto AMEROS
and I were summoned to the Army Ordnance Office, where
we were told by Colonel SCHMIDT that we should build a
Tabun plant for army requirements. Fritz TER MEER and
Otto AMEROS carried responsibility for the construction
of this plant, in behalf of I.G.

initial 22.) Sarin, another substance with a high toxic
content, which was suitable as poison gas, was developed
by Dr. SCHRADER, I.G. Elberfeld, as a result of his
Tabun experiments (handwritten: 1938). After Sarin had
been further developed at I.G. Elberfeld and

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at the Spandau Laboratories for Protection against Gas Sarin production was started on a small scale at the Byhernfurth plant, for experimental purposes. The proposed production of Sarin Falkenhagen (Seework) never materialized.

23.) I established personal relations with leading members of the NSDAP only in so far as they were of value in warding off Nazi measures. I had no social relations with them at all. Neither was my economic position influenced in any way by the Nazi regime.

24.) I did not take part in aryanization proceedings on behalf of the firm, nor did I personally acquire any Jewish property. On the other hand, I helped all Jewish representatives of the Elberfeld plant to leave the country in time. Moreover, I maintained the validity of contracts, signed with emigrated Jewish professors, until such time as the persons concerned themselves requested that their respective contracts be cancelled. I was questioned twice by the Gestapo at Duesseldorf on account of the correspondence which passed between us.

25.) In the face of the Party's threat to destroy the Elberfeld plant before the Americans entered Wuppertal, I had the entire works police confined to the plant and ordered their leader to make use of fire arms if the Party should take action.

26.) After the end of the War, representatives of CIOS (Combined Intelligence Office Scientific) were active at the plant for several months. On 16 August 1945 I was arrested and taken to Kranzberg, then, on 21 November 1946 to Nuremberg.

I have carefully read and personally countersigned each of the nine (9) pages of this affidavit,

initial

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have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and countersigned them with my initials, and I herewith declare on oath that in this affidavit I have told the whole truth, to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signature:) Heinrich HOERLEIN
HEINRICH HOERLEIN

(Page 9 of original continued)

Sworn to and signed before me this 2nd day of May 1947
at Nuernberg by Heinrich HOERLEIN,
known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signature) Benvenute von Halle
BENVENUTE VON HALLE

U.S. Civilian AGO D 432532

Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes.

U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

June 13, 1947

I, Monica WELLWOOD, # E-00525, hereby certify that I am
thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages
and that the above is a true and correct translation of
the document No. NI- 6787.

Monica WELLWOOD
E - 00525

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9770
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Gerhard Schrader, Opladen-Luetzenkirchen (Rheinland), born on 25 February 1903, having been warned that I shall render myself liable to punishment by making a false statement, herewith depose the following on oath of my own free will and without coercion:

1. In 1930 I entered the I.G. Leverkusen. I worked on dyestuffs until 1934.

2. At this point the number of chemists working on dyestuffs was decreased by the I.G. management and the number of chemists working on plastics and other products was increased. In consequence of this change, I was asked in 1934 by Dr. BAYER, my chief at the time, to work on pest control agents.

3. Dr. BAYER suggested that I should investigate fluorine acid compounds as at this time the production of fluorine in the inorganic department in Leverkusen began in greater quantity, and intermediate products containing fluorine were found to be poisonous. In the course of these investigations I synthesized in about January 1937 the material which was later called Tabun.

4. Like all the others, this material was tested, first by Dr. KUENENTHAL in the Biological Department, where the material proved to be a very powerful insecticide; then by Dr. GROSS in the Industrial Hygiene Laboratory. There the material revealed itself as so poisonous to warm-blooded creatures that its use as an insecticide was no longer in question.

5. Before a highly toxic material could be patented, the following steps had to be taken: first we wrote the patent specifications for approval within I.G. Then this internal application had to be submitted to the Army Ordnance Office in Berlin. Samples of the new material had also to be sent to the Army Ordnance Office. On the basis of the specification and the samples the Army Ordnance Office then decided whether the application

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should be classified as a public patent, a secret patent or a top secret.

In the case of Tabun the matter happened to be settled more quickly. When Dr. GROSS gave Professor HERRLEIN his expert opinion, officials of the Army Ordnance Office were actually there, so that the Army Ordnance Office was at once informed on the subject.

(Page 2 of original cont'd)

7. In about November 1937 I received from Professor HORNLEIN the charge of working on the Tabun series in the former analytical laboratory in Elberfeld. This took place firstly for security reasons, secondly to prevent a greater number of people from being endangered by the poisonous materials.

8. Dr. GRASS demonstrated Tabun to officials of the Army Ordnance Office by means of experiments on animals at the beginning of May. Immediately afterwards I received by phone the order to go to the Army Ordnance Office in Berlin for about a week and demonstrate the production of Tabun. The Army Ordnance Office appointed 5 to 8 chemists to work out a technically practicable method for the production of Tabun in bulk. I was not in close connection with this group of chemists, and actually worked with them only when they encountered difficulties and could not make progress. The Army Ordnance Office was to a certain extent our competitor and I heard of things only when a patent for something was applied for.

9. Difficulties were encountered not only in production, but also in the extreme inflammability of the substance. I continued to work in this sphere independently of the Army Ordnance Office, to eliminate the defects of this extreme inflammability. In December 1938 this work led me to Sarin. This combination too was described by Dr. GRASS as extremely toxic. This report went to Professor HORNLEIN and from him to the Army Ordnance Office. Representatives of the Army Ordnance Office came to Elberfeld and Dr. GRASS demonstrated experiments with Sarin on animals to them. The officials asked me for samples and took these with them to Spandau.

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10. In my opinion, Sarin was the most effective compound of this series, for of 300-400 compounds which I produced after discovering Sarin, none was equivalent.

11. In 1942 I received from the I.G. an inventor's bonus for the entire field of organic phosphorus compounds.

12. The experimental production of Tabun was already being carried out in Spandau before the war. There the small quantities of Tabun which were used for firing tests were produced. Shortly after the outbreak of war, I heard of a meeting of the Vorstand of the I.G., in which Prof. Hornlein took part. I heard only the outcome of the meeting, namely that Tabun was to be produced in bulk, and production was to take place in the Dyhernfurt factory which was to be newly erected under the management of the Leverkusen works.

(page 3 of original cont'd)

13. In 1939 or 1940 I heard from Dr. JONAS in Leverkusen, Inorganics Department, that he was working in direct mustard gas. He could not, however, give me any further particulars, as he was pledged to secrecy. Dr. JONAS and his chief, Dr. MACK, could give you more precise information on the subject. Dr. JONAS is at present in Leverkusen.

14. As far as the development of Cx1 mustard gas is concerned, I know that this compound had already been described in about 1870 by Victor MEYER. In particular, the skin irritant effect was indicated. In the course of the first World War, Dr. LEMMEL, Chemist in the main Bayer laboratory, later I.G. Leverkusen, pointed out that this substance could possibly be used for war purposes. Together with Dr. STEINKOPF, Dozent (Lecturer) of Berlin University, he then worked on the synthesis of mustard gas in bulk. The name "Lest" (mustard gas) was formed from the first two letters of the names Lemmel and Steinkopf.

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In the 1930's Dr. Lemmel was Department Chief (Abteilungsleiter) of the scientific laboratory in the sphere of Buna, plastics and textile auxiliaries. He was pensioned in 1938.

I have read through each of the four pages of this affidavit and countersigned them with my own hand, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and countersigned them with my initials and herewith declare on oath that to the best of my knowledge and belief I have stated the absolute truth in this affidavit.

(Signature) Dr. Gerhard Schrader
Dr. GERHARD SCHRADER

Sworn to and signed before me this 13th day of August 1947, at Nuernberg, Germany, by Dr. Gerhard Schrader, (pladen-Lautzenkirchen, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(Signature) Edward J. Stevens
EDWARD J. STEVENS
U.S. Civilian
AG No. 1-428172
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR
CRIMES, U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, PATRICIA E. C. WOOD, ER No. 20139, herewith certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document no. NI-9770.

PATRICIA E. C. WOOD
ER No. 20139

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7671
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR THE CRIMES

RESTRICTED

Interrogation No.

Requested by Mr. STRECHER

Section : I.G. FARBEN

Interrogation of Dr. Gerhard SCHRADER
on 20 May 1947, 10,10 - 10,35 o'clock
in Leverkusen, I.G. Office
by: Mr. Peter H. WILLI
Stenographer: Irnsula MOETACH

Qu. 1: May I ask your full name ?

A. Dr. Gerhard SCHRADER.

Qu. 2: Dr. SCHRADER, I should like to discuss with you the development of the Professor HORLEIN/SCHRADER Poison Gas Project, not from the technical point of view, but more or less from the historical point of view. In which year exactly did this project come into being, and what led to its formulation ?

A. I must go a considerable way back in order to answer that question.

Qu. 3: Please do.

A. I worked here in Leverkusen on dyestuffs from 1930 - 1934. In 1934, dyestuffs were no longer of interest, and we chemists were allotted the task either of working on Buna and Plastics or of working on pest control agents. My then Chief, Professor BYER requested me to work on pest-control agents. That was in 1934. I then began, like all chemists, to seek new chemical compounds, concerning myself primarily with organic fluorine compounds. A whole series of patent applications resulted from this work. In the course of it, I discovered phosphorus compounds quite accidentally and entirely independently and introduced fluorine into them. Then in 1937 came the material which we call Tabun and which, in the first instance, was discovered in the laboratory itself, and not in practical use and which demonstrated its strong toxic properties only in the course of the work.

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Professor HORLEIN ordered me in the interests of science, to go to Elberfeld and not to work here in the large laboratory. The reasons for this were 1) Secrecy 2) the fact that work carried out with such materials might endanger human lives. Those were the reasons for my coming to Elberfeld. At Elberfeld,

(page 2 of original cont'd)

the former laboratory for analytical chemistry was placed at my disposal, to enable me to pursue my work on this class of material without interruption or disturbance. My main aim was to develop insecticides - purely the continuation of what I had always done.

Q. 4: When you came to Elberfeld, did Professor HO RUPIN work with you on the Tabun project, or was this always in your hands ?

A. No, it was entirely in my hands. He only dealt with the main correspondence. There was an order governing all patent applications connected with our work; they were to be examined to discover whether they contained anything which might prejudice the defense of the land. Consequently, Professor RUPIN had to establish channels of communication with the Army Ordnance Office; the Army Ordnance Office then made the decision.

Q. 5: In which year were applications made for the first of these secret patents ?

A. In the course of 1937 .

Q. 6: And this product Tabun was then offered by I.G. to the Wehrmacht, once application had been made for the secret patents ?

A. No.

Q. 7: Or did the Wehrmacht send a request to you ?

A. This was what happened: before we could apply for a patent, we wrote an application for patent to be examined within I.G. We were then obliged to submit this internal application to the Army Ordnance Office in Berlin, in order that the latter might decide whether it was to be a secret patent, a patent suitable for general release, a State Secret etc. At the same time, the Army Ordnance Office demanded that we send samples to the Army Ordnance Office for examination, so that they would know automatically of the discovery or development of any new material.

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Q. 8: In other words, who discovered that this was a highly toxic product, you or the Army Ordnance Office ?

A. That is very simple to explain. I had discovered in the course of my work that the material was toxic. On account of this, I first passed the material on to Professor GROSS, our industrial hygienist. The task of his office was to establish

(page 3 of original)

whether the toxic properties of the material were so strong that we could not consider its use for purposes of plant protection and that it could be put at the disposal of the Army Ordnance Office. At the beginning of 1937, Professor GROSS established the fact that this material was outside the series of materials which could be used for our purposes and must be put at the disposal of the Army Ordnance Office.

Q. 9 : When you began to work on Tabun, was your main idea the development of an insecticide ?

A. Yes.

Q. 10: And when you discovered that you were dealing with a toxic material, did Wehrmacht officials come, when the Army Ordnance Office had been informed, to examine the material developed and to observe the process in greater detail ?

A. This was what happened: Professor GROSS gave his expert opinion to Professor HOTTLIN who was his superior officer. Professor HOTTLIN received a visit from representatives of the Army Ordnance Office, and thus the examination took place by chance. Otherwise the matter would have had to be dealt with through official channels. Tabun was demonstrated to the representatives of the Army Ordnance Office at Elberfeld at the beginning of May in the course of an experiment carried out on animals. As a result, I was instructed by telephone to go to Berlin to the Army Ordnance Office, there to demonstrate the method of production to the officials. That was at the beginning of May 1937.

Q. 11: When did production commence ?

A. Production commenced much later. I should like to draw attention to the following fact. It transpired that production was difficult and the Army Ordnance Office appointed 5, 6, 7 or 8 chemists to work out the technical details.

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Q. 12: Were these chemists working as personnel of the Army Ordnance Office or of I.G. ?

A. No, they were working as full-time officials of the Army Ordnance Office. That lasted for approximately two years, - until 1939 - until the Army Ordnance Office declared it possible, from the technical point of view, to produce the material. That was a relatively long period.

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- Q. 13: Did you continue your work on the technical development with them until 1939 ?
- A. I worked in conjunction with the Army Ordnance Office, but our connections were not in any way close.
- Q. 14: Were you or Professor HOEFLER kept au fait with the progress of work being carried out on Tabun within the Army Ordnance Office ?
- A. On the contrary, the Army Ordnance Office was our rival. Am I permitted to make such a statement in public ?
- Q. 15: Certainly.
- A. The Army Ordnance wished to make use of this affair to utilize and firmly to establish a large department. I, as chemist of I.G., as an employee of long years' standing, was to render assistance should the department encounter difficulties which impeded its progress. I was only informed of progress ^{when} the Army Ordnance Office had applied for a patent for some piece of work and I was confronted with an accomplished fact.
- Q. 16: What was the situation in 1939 then, when war broke out ?
- A. In order to facilitate comprehension, I should like to make the following statement :
The difficulties over and above those arising in the course of production lay in the utilization of the product for bombs and grenades, for the substance was highly inflammable. These two factors together formed the reason for the protracted work on the subject. I never saw a single field test. This technical side of the question as well as the pharmacological aspect was kept strictly secret from me.
- Q. 17: Were you informed that experiments with this gas were being carried out on human beings ?
- A. No. Right up to the present day I have been given no such information. I do not believe that these experiments were made to any considerable extent. I spoke to Professor WIRTH, the Chief of the Pharmacological Department of the Army Ordnance Office in May 1937 and discussed with him what was to be done.

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The war came in 1939 and the development of the product was so far advanced on the technical side as well as on the non-technical that the Army Ordnance Office could undertake to produce it on a large scale. Then came a meeting of the Vorstand with Professor HOERLEIN, in which I did not participate. I only heard of the result of the conference; Ludwigshafen was to manufacture the product on a large scale.

- Q. 18 : Was manufacture of this product commenced before the war or only after the outbreak of war ?
- A. Considerably later.
- Q. 19 : Not even experimentally ?
- A. Only in sufficient quantities to meet the requirements of the field tests. Small quantities essential to current experiments were used at Army Ordnance Office, Spandau.
- Q. 20 : The sequence of events was thus as follows : laboratory experiments within I.G. before the war, research work at Spandau before the war, and production at Ludwigshafen after the outbreak of war ?
- A. Yes, in a works to be newly erected, the Dyhernfurth Works.
- Q. 21 : What was the nature of the contracts concluded on the subject ? Was Tabun given to the Reich by means of a license contract ?
- A. No. I can say nothing whatsoever on this point, as I was given no information on it. I was laboratory chemist. Professor HOERLEIN scarcely spoke to me on the subject. It was rather with the Vorstand that he discussed it. I had no knowledge of these matters.
- Q. 22 : Did you receive a special inventor's gratuity ?
- A. I received such a gratuity in 1942 for all my work in the field of phosphorus compounds.
- Q. 23 : What was the history of the development of Sarin ?
- A. The further development of Tabun led me, in 1938, to the discovery of Sarin.
- Q. 24 : How did it happen ?

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- A. Precisely as in the case of Tabun. Professor GROSS stated that the product was highly toxic. The report was given to Professor HOERLEIN and Professor HOERLEIN informed the Army Ordnance Office of this fact. The representatives of the above came to our premises and the experiments carried out on animals were demonstrated to them; they requested me to give them samples which they took with them to Spandau.
- Q. 25 : Dr. SCHRADEF, when you were working on Serin, which was more or less a derivative of Tabun, were you still working with the end of discovering a new insecticide or improving Tabun in view ?
- A. I shall tell you plainly. The disadvantages constituted by the combustibility and instability of Tabun were so great that I never thought that it would go into production; as a chemist, I was attempting to produce something stable.
- Q. 26 : Were you working on this project by order of the Army Ordnance Office or on your own initiative ?
- A. On my own initiative, as I wished personally to cover the whole of this field.
- Q. 27 : Dr. SCHRADEF, was it your conscious aim to produce a better product than the previous one ?
- A. Of course.
- Q. 28 : Did you also discuss the matter with Professor HOERLEIN ?
- A. Professor HOERLEIN took little interest in the development of this chemical as a whole, but left it to me.
- Q. 29 : You had carried out the entire task by order of Professor HOERLEIN ?
- A. Professor HOERLEIN's main thought - and, in view of the highly toxic nature of the compound, it was obvious that such should be the case - was that, in addition to an insecticide, we could produce something which lay within the realm of pharmacological chemistry: that is my main thought today. Highly toxic means producing a severe effect on the human organism, * the main activities of Elberfeld lay within the field of pharmaceuticals and it was within this field that we found the conditions the most favorable to successful research work.
- * and after all

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- Q. 30 : Did you, in addition, have anything to do with mustard gas ?
- A. No, I had nothing to do with it. I was too overworked in my own sphere of work. Up to 1942, I was the only chemist, with the result that I was not able to undertake any additional tasks.

RESTRICTED

Signature: Ursula ROSEBACH
Court Reporter

Signature: Peter H. Miller
Interrogator

U.S. Civ.
A.G.O. D-145 338

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

20 August 1947

I, Beryl Beswick, Civ. No. AGO-D-427 459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7671.

Beryl Beswick
Civ. No. AGO-D-427 459

AFFIDAVIT.

I, Dr. Albert Palm, Ludwigshafen/Rhine, Hindenburgstr. 45, Manager of the Dyhernfurt plant, after having been warned that I shall be liable to punishment for making a false statement, herewith declare the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion:

On 1 July 1926 I joined the I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft as chemist. From 1926 until 1930 I worked in the ammonia laboratory at Oppau and from 1930 until the beginning of the war in 1939 in the alizarin department at Ludwigshafen (Dyestuffs plant). At the end of September 1939 Dr. Ulrich and I were commissioned by Dr. Ahrens with the planning and organization of the production of tabun, as ordered by the OKH. I was at Dyhernfurt from June 1941 until the evacuation in January 1945. I only received detailed information on the chemical warfare agents connected with the Dyhernfurt plant:

Tabun
Sarin (Not produced, only planned)
water-free prussic acid (Not produced, only planned)
cyanogen chloride (Not produced, only planned)
T 300 (magnesium aluminum arsenide, not produced, only planned) -
construction of the production plant discontinued.

A loose liaison existed with the AMMIGAMA G.m.b.H. plant, Gendorf, in which mustard gas was manufactured. I had nothing to do with other plants. Only by chance did I learn about the Ammendorf plant (mustard gas and n-mustard gas), Urdingen (azin-plant), Ergathen-Stassfurt (production not known), Lonal Werke near Stralsund (Auer-Gesellschaft, production not known), Wolfen with a phosgene installation attached (whether phosgene was destined for normal chemical production or production of chemical warfare agents, is unknown to me).

In October/November 1939 Dr. Ulrich and I were familiarized with the pilot plant at Munsterlager near Hanover, already under construction by the OKH, where Tabun and later on Sarin was to be manufactured by the OKH. As far

(page 2 of original)

as I know, approx. 20 tons of Tabun were manufactured there. I also know that the OKH had to manufacture Tabun; as in 1937 the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. and, as far as I know, the Kali-Chemie as well, had rejected a request to manufacture this. In 1939, after war broke out, the OKH realized that its technical experience was insufficient, so that I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. was then given an order for the construction of a production plant. A small experimental plant for

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

mustard gas was, as far as I know, attached to the Huelz plant; I have further heard the name of Hahnenberg near Soelze (Hanover) in this connection. I know nothing further about this plant. I also heard of the name Loess (probably Organid or Auer-Gesellschaft) but here too, I do not know what was being manufactured. Whether other plants existed besides these I do not know.

About research in this field I only know of the following : the research station of the OKH in Spandau (Army Gas Protection Laboratory) and the OKH office at Munsterlager. I personally did not carry out any research at Dyhernfurt, and the chemists assigned to me were only occupied with analytical tests and with improvements of the manufacturing process. As far as I know, no research was being carried out at Uerdingen; at Elberfeld Dr. Schrader worked on Tabun and Sarin; I know that these two products are based on research work by Professor Michaelis, as described in Liebig's records chemical volume No. 326 of the year 1902, and the research work by Lange, which is described in the reports of the German Chemical Society, as far as I know in volume No. 62. This work in Elberfeld was not started for the purpose of developing chemical warfare agents, but in order to invent insecticides.

With regard to raw materials for the production of chemical warfare agents I can only make a statement about the raw materials required by Dyhernfurt. Needed were:

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Phosphorus	which was supplied by Piesteritz near Wittenberg Elbe
Sodium Cyanide	which was supplied by the Ludwigshafen/Rhine plant, the sugar refinery in Deosau and the Kali-Werk Kolin in the Protectorate, and which was sent to Breslau, from where it was passed on to Dyhernfurt.
Chlorine	obtained mainly from Bitterfeld, a small percentage came from a plant in Upper Silesia. As late as 1943 the construction of a chlorine plant was started at Dyhernfurt, but was never put into operation.
Caustic Soda Solution	was in most cases also supplied by Bitterfeld.
Methanol	was in most cases supplied by Leuna
Ammonia	also from Ammoniakwerk Merseburg, Leuna.
Chloro Benzene	from I.G. Bitterfeld and Wolfen
Spirit	supplied by the Reichs-Monopol-Verwaltung.

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

Sarin	The production of never started
Isopropyl-alcohol	In the field of preliminary products were already available: which, as far as I know, was supplied by the Rheinpreussen pit in the Ruhr district.
Sodium Fluoride	which, as far as I know, was supplied by the firm of Riedel de Haen or by Leverkusen.

The entire sodium cyanide reserve amounted to approx. 7 000 tons as far as I know. Of these approx. 5 000 tons were used for Tabun. In 1944 approx. 1 500 tons had to be given to several firms named by Mr. Dreyer in Frankfurt/Main (Degussa), at the instigation of the Office for Raw Materials or the Armaments Office. These were to be used, as far as I know, as additional steel-hardness. I can only assume that this discontinuance of the sodium cyanide production was due to the fact that the production of Tabun was no longer important, because through the lack of sodium cyanide it practically came to a standstill at the end of 1944. Production of sodium cyanide had been planned and construction started at Dyhernfurt, but never reached the production stage. Furthermore, part of the stock of sodium cyanide was used for the manufacture of alkazid, for which an emergency plant had to be set up at Dyhernfurt to replace the plant in Ludwigshafen/Idin which had been destroyed. (Alkazid is used for purifying hydration gases from sulphuretted hydrogen and carbonic acid).

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I no longer remember the total quantity of phosphorus. By order of the OKH a large phosphorus depot had to be established at Dyhernfurt, and as far as I know, in January 1945, when that depot was evacuated, there were approx. 5 000 tons of phosphorus there (open basins at 100 cbr each, storage under water).

As far as I remember, the total production of Tabun amounted to 11 000 to 12 000 tons. Dyhernfurt (abbreviation Y) delivered the total output of Tabun to the filling installation which had been set up on the factory site by order of the OKH, and which was under the management of two agents, one of whom was authorized to take over deliveries for the Army, the other one for the Air Force. In this filling installation Tabun was filled into grenades and bombs. As far as I know, the final stage in regard to these grenades and bombs was never reached, i.e. completion and equipping with explosives. At any rate I know nothing of the destination and the storage of these missiles. For reasons of safety we had asked the agents authorized to take over deliveries daily to remove the quantities which had been filled into containers. The freight cars were put together as trains at the railroad station at Klein-Breslau near Breslau under the supervision of the Army.

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

As far as I know, the undermentioned code names have the following meanings:

Glycerin	Triodiglycol
Glycerogen	Condensation product of sugar and formaldehyde for textile products.
D 7	Tabun
Galen	Tabun
Lepton	Thionylchloride
Mischlost (Mixed mustard gas)	probably a mixture of ethyl and propyl mustard gas on a basis of sulphur
N-Stoff	manufactured at Falkenhagen by the OKH (Dr. von Klencik, Nuernberg, knows of this).
oxalates Kalium (Potassium oxalate)	sodium cyanide
magasalz	chlorine acetophenon

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Produkt G	probably an OKH term for Tabun
Sarin I	experimental installation for Sarin at Dyhernfurt
Sarin II	a planned Sarin installation at Falkenhagen for 500 tons per month
Stickstofflost (Nitrogen mustard gas)	a mustard-gas-like compound with nitrogen instead of sulphur
Produkt B3	Tabun
Trilon A and B	a watersoftener, I.G. product
Trilon B3	Tabun
T 99	Tabun
Tunnel	the dimer of isobutylene. It was used as anti-knock fuel and was manufactured at Waldenburg and Heydebreck.
T-gas	Ethylene oxide
Tritox	Trichloro acetonitrile, an insecticide
V.T.-Anlage (V.T. installation)	installation for the manufacture of mustard gas at Gendorf
Zyklon	Hydrocyanic acid. Absorbed in an inert substance.

I have carefully read each of the 5 (five) pages of this affidavit and countersigned it with my own hand, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialled them, and I herewith declare under oath that I have stated the full truth in this affidavit to the best of ^{my} knowledge and belief.

Ludwigshafen/Rhine, 24 July 1947

(signature) --- Dr. Albert Palm ---
(Dr. Albert Palm)

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

Sworn to and signed before me this 24th day of July 1947 at
Ludwigshafen a.Rh., Badische Anilin- & Soda-Fabrik by Dr. Albert
Palm known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Edward J. Stevens

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

2 September 1947

I, Brigitte TURK, ETC 35130, hereby certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the English and German languages and that the
above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-9772.

Brigitte TURK
ETC 35130

AFFIDAVIT.

I, Eberhard Gross of Wuppertal-E., Herwarthstr. 3, having been duly advised that I shall render myself liable to punishment by making false statements, herewith declare the following on oath, voluntarily and without having been subjected to any compulsion or duress:

- 1) I joined the I.G. at Ludwigshafen in 1926. Since 1932 I had been Chief of the I.G. Laboratory of Industrial Hygiene (Gewerbe-Hygienisches Laboratorium), Elberfeld (Institute of Industrial Hygiene. I was Professor Heinrich Hoerlein subordinate. In 1935/1936 I became Chief of I.G. Board of Factory Physicians (I.G. Fabrikaerztekongress). In this capacity I was under Dr. Christian Schneider's authority.
- 2) As far as I remember, the collaboration between I.G. and the Army Ordnance Office (Heereswaffenamt- HWA) began in 1935 (shortly after general compulsory military service had been re-introduced in Germany). In this year a conference took place at the I.G., Elberfeld, represented by Professor Heinrich Hoerlein and the then second director of the Elberfeld Works, Professor Schulmann, with 2 or 3 gentlemen of the Army Ordnance Office, among them Captain von Sicherer. I was summoned to this first conference in my capacity as Industrial Hygienist. Through Professor Hoerlein, I was commissioned by those present to place my experience of toxic substances at their disposal.
- 3) It is known to me that some time afterwards, Professor Heinrich Hoerlein acted as an intermediary within Sparte 2, Chemicals. In this capacity, he was to receive records of all highly toxic substances within the I.G.

(page 2 of original)

which he then gave to me for examination. I had to establish whether these substances fitted into the schedule which had been handed over to I.G. Elberfeld by the Army Ordnance Office, i.e. whether they could be used as chemical warfare agents.

- 4) After some of its officials had paid several visits to the I.G. Laboratory of Industrial Hygiene, the Army Ordnance Office handed to us a schedule indicating which substances were to be reported to the Army Ordnance Office before they could be exploited by I.G. or registered at the Patent Office.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

- 5) I drew up records of all experiments with substances which were of interest to the Army Ordnance Office and handed them to Professor Heinrich Hoerlein. He passed them on to the Army Ordnance Office and sometimes, the results to the I.G. works which had originally sent him the preparation. In all reports the purpose of the examination could be perceived. The experiments were carried out at the expense of I.G..
- 6) Among other things experiments were made in the I.G. Laboratory of Industrial Hygiene, Elberfeld on: Ethylenimine (Ludwigshafen 1935), fluor alcohol (Ludwigshafen 1935/1936), nitrogenous mustard gas (Ludwigshafen 1936), and with the Schrader's substances Tabun (from 1936/1937 onwards), and Sarin (from 1939 onwards) (Tabun and Sarin developed as poison gas from insecticides).
A dispute arose about nitrogenous mustard gas (development of poison gas from intermediate) as to who was its inventor. In this case I.G. Ludwigshafen negotiated directly with the Army Ordnance Office and not, therefore, through Professor Heinrich Hoerlein.
From 1936 to 1938, Tabun was known as Le 100 in my laboratory.

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For a while, the Army called it Golan or Trillon. From about 1939/1940 onwards, the name Tabun was generally used. The Tabun series represented a multitude of chemically related substances which were produced by Dr. Schrader.

- Ms. E.G.
- 7) From approximately 1936 to 1944 I made subcutaneous injection tests and inhalation tests with Tabun in the I.G. Laboratory of Industrial Hygiene, Elberfeld, especially on monkeys. One of these tests was observed by Dr. Otto Ambros (Ms) (1942)
- 8) From time to time, chemists from the Army or Army Ordnance Office and Dylernfurth were at the laboratory of Dr. Schrader at Elberfeld, and worked there for approximately 8 to 14 days.
- 9) I.G. Elberfeld sent small quantities of Poison Gas to the Army Ordnance Office for experimental purposes, for example Ethylenimine, fluorene alcohol, Tabun and Sarin. Later on, the Army Ordnance Office itself produced Tabun and Sarin for this purpose.

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

- plant protective agents
- 10) Apart from his / Dr. Schrader brought to my institute substances which he specially wanted to be examined as chemical warfare agents, particularly when he considered them especially effective. Dr. Schrader always hoped to use one or other of the substances developed by him later on as a plant protective agent he was, moreover, undoubtedly interested in Army Ordnance Office's eventually utilizing the substances developed by him, which were highly effective, as chemical warfare agents. Tabun and Sarin were out of the question as plant protective agents they were too strong.

- 11) When the I.G. Laboratory of Industrial Hygiene, Elberfeld was altered

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In the years 1937/38, the fact that tests were carried out for the Army Ordnance Office at I.G. Elberfeld was allowed for, to a certain extent. In order to familiarize myself with the appropriate equipment, I paid three or four visits to the Gas Protection Laboratories of the Army Ordnance Office at Spandau.

- 12) In the year 1942 I was sent by Professor Heinrich Hoerlein to Dr. Otto Ambros at Ludwigshafen to explain once more to him the physiological action of Schrader's substances, Tabun and Sarin. At that time Otto Ambros was to render a report on the question of chemical warfare agents to the Fuehrer's Headquarters. By order of Professor Hoerlein I asked him to intercede against the use of chemical warfare agents.

- 13) At the beginning of September 1944 I received from Professor Heinrich Hoerlein- as far as I remember, it was after he had had a meeting with Dr. Otto Ambros- the order to destroy all preparations and records connected with chemical warfare agents. Dr. Schrader received the same order.

I have carefully perused each of the five (5) pages of this affidavit and signed them with my own hand, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and countersigned them with my initials and I herewith declare on oath that in this declaration I have told

(page 5 of original)

the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

signature : EBERHARD GROSS

Ms.E.G.

Eberhard GROSS

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

Sworn to and signed before me this 16th day of May 1947
at Nuernberg by Eberhard GROSS,
known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Signature : Benvenuto von Halle

Benvenuto VON HALLE

U.S. Civilian AGO D 432532
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

17 June 1947

I, Beryl C. BESWICK, No. D 42 74 59, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6927.

Beryl C. BESWICK,
No. D 427459

- 4 -
"END"

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Word 3. 75

WD-1137

Heading
I.G. Berlin NW
Unter den Linden 82
25263

Secret

1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

On the Technology of Explosives and Chemical Warfare Agents.

I. Explosives

To produce explosives the following are required:

- 1) Nitrating acid
- 2) Basic explosives materials.

With reference to 1): Nitrating acid - the proportions of its component parts depending on the explosive - is composed of highly concentrated nitric acid (so-called Hoko-acid), super concentrated sulphuric acid (Oloun).

The purpose of the sulphuric acid is merely to absorb the water which is a product of the reaction of nitration.

With reference to 2): Basic explosives materials are:

- a) for powder
glycerin or glycol for nitroglycerine or nitroglycol or nitrodiglycol;
cellulose (cotton linters or highly bleached wood cellulose) for nitrocellulose;
- b) for high explosives
toluene for trinitrotoluene
phenol or benzene for picric acid
pentaerythrite (from formaldehyde and acetaldehyde, lastly, from methanol and calcium carbide or alcohol) for nitropenta (other names: Hyperit, pentrit or pentaerythritotranitrate);
hexamethylene tetramine (from ammonia and formaldehyde) for hexogene;
ammonia and dilute nitric acid for ammonium nitrate as diluent for the above explosives.

The following play a certain part as additional agents or diluents: Naphthalene, used as such with ammonium nitrate in the so-called ammonals (ammonium nitrate explosives) or as dinitro naphthalene for diluting picric acid or trinitrotoluene.

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Experience has shown that the requirements of a modern fighting force consist of:

1/3 powder
2/3 high explosives.

On the average powder consists of
and about 40 % nitroglycerine (or nitroglycol or nitrodiglycol)
and about 60% nitrocellulose.

All armies prefer trinitrotoluene as high explosive because it has a high safety factor (no reaction to small-arms fire, little sensitivity to moisture, chemically neutral toward metals), combined with high explosive power. TNT can be diluted with up to 40 % ammonium nitrate without impairing its explosive effect too much.

Picric acid surpasses TNT somewhat in explosive power but is very much more sensitive and therefore unsuitable for large caliber guns with their high pressure; it is not safe under small-arms fire, as an acid it attacks iron and forms highly explosive iron salts, so that the explosive cannot be poured directly into the shell. It is more difficult to process than TNT. It is not possible to dilute it because it is an acid (nitric acid would be liberated). Picric acid can only be diluted with other, aromatic nitro compounds, such as dinitro-naphtaline.

Since benzene is less scarce than toluene, the Western powers will make extensive use of picric acid in this war, in spite of the disadvantages enumerated.

Pentaerythritetranitrate is a special explosive for rapid-fire cannons, since even in small quantities it rapidly reaches full blast. High explosive power, not safe under small-arms fire, difficult to manufacture, consumes 2 1/2 times as much highly concentrated acid as TNT or picric acid which makes it unsuitable for countries with limited production facilities for highly concentrated acid.

Hexogen: Highest explosive effect, stable, chemically neutral, very difficult to manufacture (highly explosive by-products result during the reaction), it can be extensively diluted with ammonium nitrate.

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TNT, picric acid and nitropenta, as well as powder, are certainly being manufactured in America; hexogen is probably still in the experimental stage.

The production of toluene at full utilization of the coke works, which have plants for obtaining by-products, (depending on the iron production) amounts to about 115,000 tons per year.¹⁾

1) In order to obtain toluene, the whole of the crude benzene must be distilled. It is improbable that there are such installations in America with adequate productive facilities. Building time about 6 months.

(page 3 of original cont'd)

Civilian requirements of toluene for dyes, pharmaceuticals, saccharine, solvents and other products, amount to about 20 - 50,000 tons per year; furthermore, in normal times certain amounts of toluene are used in motor benzene in order to lower the freezing point.

Crude benzene output, at full utilization of coke works, amounts to about 875,000 tons per year.

Contents of pure benzene, which could be used as basic material for picric acid about 440,000 tons per year.

Consumption of benzene for chemical purposes in normal times (1937 about 150,000 tons per year) and as motor benzene (1937 - 315,000 tons).

Proportion of toluene to trinitrotoluene and benzene to picric acid is about 1 : 2.

II. Chemical Warfare Agents.

Should the Western powers use chemical warfare agents, the following proportional quantities may be expected to be used:

<u>Type of gas</u>	<u>part in 100%</u>	<u>Raw Material</u>
Loct ²⁾ (Mustard gas) (Dichlorodiethylsulfide) Gelbkreuz (Yellow Cross)	50	Ethylene, chlorine, sulphur, hydrochloric acid
Adamsit (Dyphenylaminchlorarsine) Blaukreuz (Blue cross)	15	Arsenic, hydrochloric acid, dyphenylamine
Phosgene or Perstoff (per chloro formic acid ester)	25	chlorine, carbon monoxide, chlorine, methanol
Chlorpicrin	8	Chlorine, picric acid
Chloracetophenon	2	Chlorine, aluminum chloride, acetyl chlo- ride, benzene, methanol.

²⁾ The Americans are now in the position to produce first-class Gelbkreuz (yellow cross) with the German oxal process.

(page 4 of original)

The raw materials question offers no difficulty in the production of 100,000 tons of chemical warfare agents. All raw materials or intermediates (such as diphenylamin) are plentiful in America or can be manufactured in adequate quantities; in particular, there are large facilities for the most important raw material, chlorine (top output of chlorine electrolysis in 1938 was 540,000 tons per year). Chlorine is needed for all chemical warfare agents except Blaukreuz (blue cross). For the above-mentioned ratio of the various types of chemical warfare agents one part of chemical warfare agents requires an equal part of chlorine.

The machinery for the production of large quantities of mustard gas can only partly be obtained from existing plants. The construction of mustard gas machinery should take a year, at least, unless America returns to the direct process used in the World War (manufacture of mustard gas from ethylenes and sulphur chloride), which, however, produces an impure product. The plants required for this can probably be built in 6 - 9 months. The installations for Adamsit, phosgene and chloro-pierin can probably also be built in about 9 months. Any production plan for Perstoff instead of phosgene would meet great difficulties in the procurement of installations. Similar conditions exist for chloroacetophenone. There, however, only small quantities can be considered.

2.3.1940
L./B./29.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

25 August 1947

I, SAMUEL S. HORN, AGO 443 113, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7850.

SAMUEL S. HORN, AGO 443 113.

PRODUCTION OF 18 STRATEGIC MATERIALS OF I.G. AND I.G. CONTROLLED COMPANIES.

Produktion der I.G. und von der I.G. kontrollierter Gesellschaften fuer 18 wichtige Erzeugnisse.

In 1000 Metric Tons

		1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
Nitrogen (Ammonia N)	/ Stickstoff / Ammoniak (N)	218,-	265,-	281,-	325,-	400,-	456,-	520,-	554,-	557,-	552,-	Figures not available		
Diglycol	/ Diglykol	-	-	-	-	0,1	0,5	0,8	1,3	1,3	1,8	5,8	11,2	12,1
Explosives Gunpowder	// Sprengstoffe / Schiesspulver	9,7	10,9	14,5	23,9	40,4	55,2	68,7	80,8	101,6	182,-	254,2	352,6	
Synthetic Gasoline	/ Synthetische treibstoffe	102,-	108,-	148,-	247,-	332,-	362,-	380,-	400,-	Figures not available		504,-	510,- estim.	510,- estim.
Tetraethyllead	/ Tetraethyl- blei	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,4	6,9	7,6	Figures not available	
Synthetic Rubber	/ Synthetischer Gummi	-	-	-	0,2	0,8	3,5	5,7	22,-	40,7	70,5	100,5	118,5	
Magnesium	/ Magnesium	1,1	1,3	3,4	10,8	11,6	12,-	13,-	16,6	18,4	20,7	25,1	27,4	
Aluminium	/ Aluminium	1,4	1,5	3,0	5,2	8,2	9,5	13,5	16,5	19,	19,5	24,-	24,- estim.	
Poison Gas	/ Kampfgas	Figures not available.												

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DOCUMENT NO. NI - 10008
cont'd.

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	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
Sulphuric Acid / Schwefel- saure	283,-	369,-	417,-	482,-	556,-	591,-	644,-	726,-	672,-	735,-	711,-	704,-	
Chlorine / Chlor	70,-	78,-	94,-	109,-	124,-	161,8	190,8	237,5	250,4	282,6	325,2	346,-	
Caustic Soda / Natronlauge	64,6	75,8	93,6	114,4	134,-	173,-	204,-	253,-	271,-	305,-	347,7	367,-	
Calcium Carbide / Kalziumkar- bid	101,-	124,-	171,-	206,-	209,-	217,-	249,-	400,-	476,-	517,-	548,-	598,-	
Sodium Cyanide / Cyanatrium	2,2	2,3	3,6	3,3	4,1	4,7	4,4	7,9	7,1	7,3	7,5	7,-	
Stabilizers / Stabilise- toren	0,1	0,4	0,6	0,9	1,4	1,6	1,8	2,7	4,-	6,2	9,2	10,9	
Methanol / Methanol	13,7	16,9	19,2	25,5	92,8	104,5	86,2	80,6	116,3	152,3	185,4	246,9	179,-
Other Solvents / Andere Loe- sungsmittel	22,4	28,1	37,5	45,8	53,3	67,1	80,2	108,2	118,9	136,9	159,5	171,3	

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AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Ernst A. G. Struss, Frankfurt (Main), Gaertnerweg 59, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

I was Director of I.G. Farben, Chief of T.E. Bureau of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of I.G., Manager of Division II (Sparte II) of the Vermittlungsstelle W, and, since 1941, Production Manager of the entire German dyestuffs industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry.

In virtue of said offices I acquired full and complete knowledge of the "Production of Strategic Material of I.G. and I.G. controlled companies". I have been shown and have carefully examined this chart captioned "Production of Strategic Material of I.G. and I.G. controlled companies".

This chart is to my best knowledge and belief a true and faithful representation of the topic.

I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

Signed: Dr. Ernst A. Struss
Dr. ERNST A. STRUSS

Sworn to and signed before me this 21 day of June 1947 at Frankfurt (Main) by Dr. Ernst A. Struss known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Signed: Otto Heilbrunn
Dr. OTTO HEILBRUNN
Civilian, LTC 30140, Office
of Chief of Counsel for War
Crimes US War Department.

"I CERTIFIED TRUE COPY"

(Page 1 of original)

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. ERNST A. STRUSS, Director of I.G. Farben, Chief of TEA Bureau of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of the Vorstand of I.G., Manager of Division II (Sparte II) of the Vermittlungsstelle W, and, since 1943, Production Manager of the entire German industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

The figures in the chart captioned, "Production of Strategic Materials by I.G. and I.G. Controlled Companies" and known as Document HI-10008, have been compiled by me in the following way:

I. The figures for the products of Division I (Sparte I) have been obtained by me from official material of I.G. This material is almost complete and only in exceptional cases was it necessary to insert estimates in the charts. The products in question of Division I are nitrogen, gasoline and tetraethyllead.

For explosives and gunpowder the production figures of the Dynamit A.G. and Verwertchemie were taken from material collected under the supervision of Mr. Helmut Deichfischer of the I.G. Control Office in Frankfurt.

For the other products which all belong to Division II, official ledger cards are available at the TEA in the I.G. Control Office in Frankfurt.

II. The chart contains the production figures for all plants of I.G., for Leuna, Buna-Schkopen, Knapsack, Dynamit A.G., Hüls, Riebeck and Geipel, Aluminum Bitterfeld and Aken. Also included is the production of Gendorf in respect to chlorine, caustic soda and

(Page 1 of original, cont'd)

dyglycol. Also included for chlorine is the production of Wacker
firm and finally for sulphuric acid the production of the Schle-
busch and Krummel plants of the DAG.

(Page 2 of original)

III. In regard to the products enumerated in the chart I state the following:

1. Nitrogen

The chart contains the production figures for Leuna and Oppau. Since the Wifo plants processed nitrogen only without producing it, figures for these plants are not included in the chart.

2. Diglycol

The chart contains only the production figures for Ludwigshafen and Gendorf. Figures for Huels and Wolfen are not available.

3. Explosives and Gunpowder

The chart contains the figures for the I.G. plants Hoechst, Leverkusen, Griesheim, and for the DAG and Verwertchemie plants.

4. Synthetic Gasoline.

The production of Leuna is shown in the chart. For Heydebreck and the pilot plants at Oppau, no figures were available and no accurate estimates could be made.

5. Tetraethyllead

The figures contain the production at the Frose and Gapel plants. The Gapel plants appear with the full production figure in the chart since the American partner of I.G. in this enterprise had no share in the production.

6. Buna

The chart shows the production figures for Buna I, II, III and Leverkusen. The small production of a special product in the Hoechst plant is not shown in the chart.

(Page 2 of original, cont'd)

7. Magnesium

In the chart appears the production of the plants Bitterfeld,
Aken and Stassfurt.

8. Aluminum

Only half the production in the Aluminum plants

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Bitterfeld South, North and Aken is shown in the chart in accordance with I.G. shares in the plants.

9. Poison Gas

Production figures for Uerdingen, Falkenhagen, Gendorf and Dyhernfurt are not available and can not be estimated either.

10. Sulphuric Acid.

The chart shows the production of the I.G. plants, Hoechst, Leverkusen, Dornagen, Uerdingen, Ludwigshafen, Wolfen, Doberitz and Leuna and of the DAG plants, Schlebusch and Kruemmel.

11. Chlorine and Caustic Soda

The chart contains the production figures for I.G. plants Hoechst, Gersthofen, Leverkusen, Ludwigshafen, Rheinolden, Schkopau, Bitterfeld, Wolfen and Heydebreck. Also included are the plants at Huels and Gendorf.

12. Calcium Carbide

The chart shows the production figures for the plants Ludwigshafen, Schkopau and Knapsack.

13. Sodium Cyanide

In the chart appears the Ludwigshafen production.

14. Stabilizers.

The chart shows the production of Uerdingen and Wolfen. The Wolfen figures are estimated.

15. Methanol.

The production of the plants Leuna, Oppau, Waldenburg, Heydebreck and Auschwitz are shown in the chart.

(page 3 of the original cont'd.)

16. Other Solvents

The production of the following plants appear in the chart, Leuna, Hoechst, Wolfen, Ludwigshafen, Schkopau, Rheinfelden, Zweckel, Gersthofen, Offenbach, Bitterfeld, Knapsack and Huels.

(page 4 of the original)

I have carefully read each of the four pages of this declaration and have signed them personally. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them and I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

signed: Dr. Ernst A. Struss

DR. ERNST A. STRUSS

Sworn to and signed before me this 12 day of June 1947
at Frankfurt/Main by Dr. ERNST A. STRUSS known to me to be
the person making the above affidavit.

signed: Dr. Otto Heilbrunn

DR. OTTO HEILBRUNN
Civilian ETO, 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

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Methanol	Methanol	104	104	247	247	100	100
Other Solvents	Andere Loesungsmittel	67	90	171	228	75	75

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. A. STRUSS, FRANKFURT (MAIN), Gaertnerweg 59, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

I was Director of I.G. Farben, Chief of T PA-Bureau of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of I.G. Manager of Division II (Sparte II) of the Vermittlungsstelle W. and , since 1943, Production Manager of the entire German Dyestuffs industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry.

By virtue of said offices I acquired full and complete knowledge of the production figures of I.G. and I.G. controll companies. The figures "Total Production" are estimated and a result of my investigations.

This chart is to my best knowledge and belief a true and faithful representation of the topic.

I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

signed Dr. Ernst A. Struss

Dr. Ernst A. STRUSS

Sworn to and signed before me this 22nd day of Juni 1947 at Frankfurt (Main) by Dr. Ernst A. Struss known to me to be person making the above affidavit.

signed : Otto Heilbrunn

Dr. Otto HEILBRUNN

Civilian ETC 30140, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes U.S. War Department

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OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR WAR CRIMES.

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THE WEHRMACHT'S DEPENDENCE ON I.G. FARBEN'S PRODUCTION (1943)

Abhängigkeit der Wehrmacht von der Produktion der I.G. Farben (1943)

Production in 1000 Metric Tons

	1943		1943
	I.G.	Germany Deutschland	I.G.'s share in % I.G. Anteil in %
Nitrogen (N)...../ Stickstoff (N).... (Ammonia and Calcium Cyanide) (Ammoniak und Kalziumcyanid)	800	300	75
Diglycol/ Diglykol	11.2	?	?
Explosives/ Sprengstoffe	221	253	34
Gunpowder/ Schießpulver	132	188	70
Synthetic Gasoline Synthet. Treibstoff	850	2600	33
Lubricating Oil.../ Synthet. Schmieröl	50	50	100
Tetraethyllead .. / Tetraäthylblei...	7.6	7.6	100
Synthetic Rubber / Synthet. Gummi.....	118	118	100
Ingosium...../ Ingosium	27.4	30.9	88
Aluminium...../ Aluminium	24	300	8
Poison Gas/ Kampfgas	?	?	95
Sulphuric Acid .. / Schwefelsäure ...	707	2000	35
Chlorine/ Chlor	346	620	56
Caustic Soda and Potash .. / Natron und Kalilauge	367	1026	36
Calcium Carbide .. / Kalziumkarbid	330	1370	61
Sodium Cyanide .. / Cyannatrium	6.9	12.1	52
Stabilizers/ Stabilisatoren ...	10.9	10.9	100
Iothanol/ Iothanol	247	251	100
Other Solvents .. / andere Lösungsmittel	171	228	75
Plasticizers / Weichmacher	27.8	30.4	92
Organic Intermediates / Org. Zwischenprod.	1489	1650	90
New Synthetic Elastics / Neue synthetische Kunststoffe	57	63.9	90
Pharmaceuticals / Pharmazeutika	4.4	8	55
Insecticides and Fungicides / Pflanzenschutzmittel	24.6	45	55
Synthetic Resins / Synthet. Lackharze.	29.9	55.9	53
Spun Rayon/ Zellwolle	53	189	28
Artificial Silk .. / Kunstseide	17	72	24
Dyestuffs/ Farbstoffe	31.7	32.5	96
Synthetic Tannings Synthet. Gerbstoffe	30.1	32	94

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Ernst A. STRUSS, Frankfurt (Main), Goertnerweg 50, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

I was Director of I.G. Farben, Chief of TEL-Bureau of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of I.G., Manager of Division II (Sparte II) of the Vermittlungstelle W, and, since 1943, Production Manager of the entire German dyestuffs industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry.

By virtue of said offices I acquired full and complete knowledge of the production figures of I.G. and I.G. controlled companies. The figures "Total German Production" are estimated and a result of my investigations.

This chart is to my best knowledge and belief a true and faithful representation of the topic.

I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

sign. Dr. Ernst A. Struss

Dr. ERNST A. STRUSS

Sworn to and signed before me this 22 day of June 1947 at Frankfurt (Main) by Dr. Ernst A. Struss known to me to be person making the above affidavit.

sign. Otto Heilbrunn
Dr. OTTO HEILBRUNN
CIVILIAN ETC
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR WAR CRIMES
WAR DEPARTMENT

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(END)

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-10595
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR WAR CRIMES
APO 695-A U.S. ARMY

affidavit.

I, Dr. Emil A. EHMANN, living at Stuttgart-Moehringon, Kanalstrasse 15, having been duly advised that I shall render myself liable to punishment by making false statements, herewith depose the following on oath, voluntarily and without coercion:

(page 2 of original)

Dr. E.A. EHMANN

The Inclusion of the Chemical Industry, particularly
I.G. in the Production Program for Chemical Warfare Agents

(with reference to the interrogation conducted at Nuernberg
on 15 August 1947)

Prefatory Note:

Basing my facts on the period of my activity in the Army Ordnance Office at the headquarters of the High Command of the Army (OKH) from 1935 - 1945, latterly in the administrative position of Chief of the Department for Special Fields of Chemistry Wa I Rue (Mun 3) (Department I armaments of the Army Ordnance Office, (Munitions 5)), which dealt, among other matters, with the provision of plants for the production of chemical warfare agents, including the supply of such plants to the Wehrmacht as a whole (Army, Luftwaffe and Navy) and on my study of files recording events which took place before my entry into the Office, I give the following account, which is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

The precise information on dates, for example 10 December 1934, is obtained from the original German files which it was my task to study during the period of my imprisonment (1945/1948) at E.P.E.S. - F.I.A.T. c/o H.Q. Usfet, Main U.S. Army, A.P.O. 757 Frankfurt/Hochst in Schloss Krensberg/Taunus, (Dustbin). I do not know whether these files are today in the possession of the American F.I.A.T.

A.: Military Requirements as the Basis for the Introduction of
Production Measures.

In order that the inclusion of the Chemical Industry within the chemical warfare agent production scheme may be better understood, it should be mentioned that the construction of production plants as well as their number and capacity was governed by military

(page 3 of original)

requirements as presented by the General Staff of the Army and the Luftwaffe or the Department for Naval Warfare since the beginning of re-armament.

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

Thus in the year 1936, Production Plan 23 (Fertigungsplan 23) (Abbreviated FP 23), was the one in operation for the Army, that is, the monthly requirements of reserves of new war materials and armaments equipment for 23 Divisions on a war establishment were calculated by the General Staff of the Army. In these calculations, the corresponding figures for requirements during world war I served as a basis. FP 23 was followed later by FP 63 for example (that is to say, for 63 Divisions of the Army in the Field) and after the outbreak of war, the war which developed into World War II, the Production Plans were drawn up according to years. Thus FP 40 signifies the Production Plan drawn up for the year 1940. Finally, in addition to the individual Production Plans for the year in question, there was a "Target" Production Plan (Fertigungsplan "Endziel") or "Fuehrer's Demand".

The directions described for the Army may have been valid similarly, for the General Staff of the Luftwaffe and for the Department for Naval Warfare also.

On the basis of the monthly ammunition requirements for the Infantry and Artillery of the Wehrmacht, requirements of aircraft guns and bombs for the Luftwaffe and of torpedos, mines etcetera for the Navy in the event of war, the requirements of gun-powder, explosives and chemical warfare agents were calculated. Within the Wehrmacht the ensuring of the materials necessary for the fulfillment of these requirements was entrusted to the Army Ordnance Office of the High Command of the Army. In the interest of completeness, may I again mention the fact that the assistance of the Four Year Plan authorities, particularly the Plenipotentiary General for Chemistry and the Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production was enlisted via OKW, the Reich Ministry of Economics and the appropriate Reich Offices for Chemistry, for the Supply of Industrial Fats etcetera and for the Execution of the Production Plan as a whole, to an extent which made their influence decisively felt,

(page 4 of original)

and assume that this fact is known.

B.1 Selection of the Chemical Firms to be entrusted with the Provision of Plants for the Production of Chemical Warfare Agents.

It was necessary as a matter of course to create afresh the conditions then necessary for the large-scale industrial production of chemical warfare agents, as the plants which had served during the 1914-1918 World War, had all been destroyed or dismantled. The Army Ordnance Office therefore endeavoured, from the very beginning of planned re-armament, that is from approximately 1934 onwards, to entrust various chemical firms capable of production with the provision of plants for the production of chemical warfare agents.

In view of the extreme importance which the I.G. Farben Konzern assumed within the German Chemical Industry, it is reasonable to assume that I.G. played a leading role in this field in the initial phase of the actual re-armament. Strangely enough, this is not the

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

case. I.G. Farben-Industrie does not figure in the first years covered by the list of firms which, beginning in 1934, were commissioned by the Reich to provide plants for the production of chemical warfare agents. By indicating that the foreign market for their products could not be endangered and by calling attention to their international trade connections, I.G. succeeded for many years in evading the demands of the Wehrmacht as far as chemical warfare agents were concerned.

This attitude was frequently the cause of serious criticism on the part of the Army Ordnance Office and it was only after the outbreak of war that the Konzern relinquished its attitude of dissent, a fact proved by the commission placed on 15 December 1939 for the erection in Dyhernfurth of the plant for the production of the chemical warfare agent Tabun.

As will be explained in detail later, the assistance of the following firms was enlisted for the provisions of plants for the production of chemical warfare agents from 1934 to the outbreak of war:

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- a) Firma Degussa (Auer-Gesellschaft, Berlin)
 - 1) Mustard Gas Plant, Annendorf, Commission placed: 10 December 1934
 - 2) Arsin Oil Plant, Stassfurt, " " : 19 March 1935
- b) Lonal-Werke G.m.b.H., Berlin Haselhorst
Arsin Oil Plant Leese " " : 13 July 1937
- c) Riedel de Haen A.G., Berlin
Chloroacetophenone " " : 17 February 1937
- d) Chemische Fabrik Buckau, Annendorf
(Th. Goldschmidt A.G., Essen)
Preliminary Products for Aldorf Mustard Gas Plant
Commission placed: 10 December 1934
- e) Kalichemie, Berlin
Preliminary Products for Arsin Oil, Stassfurt,
Commission placed: 19 March 1935
- f) Orgacid G.m.b.H.
Oxol Mustard Gas Plant, Gendorf : 5 March 1937
- g) Chemische Werke Huels
(3/4 I.G., 1/4 Hibernia Bergwerks-Gesellschaft)
Oxol-Mustard-Gas-Plant and Direct Mustard Gas
Plant : 11 May 1938

In the following is given further information, subdivided according to the commissions concerned from which can be seen the part played by I.G. and other chemical firms in the erection of plants for the production of chemical warfare agents or production centers of military importance. The following are the subjects dealt with in detail:

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

- 1) Orgacid G.m.b.H.
- 2) Anorgana G.m.b.H.
- 3) Pommerische Industriewerke G.m.b.H. (P.I.W.)
- 4) Lonalwerke G.m.b.H.
- 5) Plants for the Production of Chemical Warfare Agents, owned by the Firm concerned
- 6) Production of Arsin Oil
- 7) Production of Phosgene

(page 6 of original)

It can be stated here as a principle that, from the point of view of privately owned industry, there was no inducement for the firms to build works for the production of chemical warfare agents from their own funds, as there had been no use for these materials in that sector of industry which catered for civilian needs, either in peace-time or during and after the war. The plants for the production of chemical warfare agents were consequently erected at the expense of the Reich, either as self-contained, independent works or as annexes to chemical factories already in existence or which were to be built and which supplied power or raw materials.

A few exceptions in which apparatus and installations in factories owned by the firm which, after appropriate sums had been written off for depreciation, would, in the course of years, become the property of the firm, were erected with financial assistance from the Reich, and with the help of the firm, were converted from the production of chemical products manufactured in the course of private industrial activities, to the production of chemical warfare agents (e.g. chlorination of acetophenone into chloroacetophenone on the premises of the firms I.G. Ludwigshafen and Riedel de Haen Seelze near Hannover), confirm the rule that plants for the production of chemical warfare agents were erected as Reich-owned plants.

1) Orgacid G.m.b.H.

The Orgacid G.m.b.H. was the first Company founded at the instigation of the Army Ordnance Office - as the Armaments authority of the Wehrmacht dealing with the paper work connected with chemical warfare agents - having the task, in accordance with the above-mentioned military demands, of erecting the first plant for the production of chemical warfare agents. The commission for the erection of the plant was placed by the Army Ordnance Office on 10 December 1934. On 9 or 20 September 1935, the contract concerning the erection of this plant was concluded between the then Reich War

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Ministry, represented by the Army Ordnance Office on the one side and the firms Chemische Fabrik Buckau, Ammerdorf near Halle/Saale (proprietor, the firm Th. GOLDSCHMIDT A.G., Essen) and Degca (Auer-Gesellschaft, Oranienburg near Berlin) on the other side. As the site for this plant, a stretch of land bordering on the Chemische Fabrik Buckau, which had been acquired by the Reich was decided upon. It was laid down in the contract that the commitments

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

of the Chemische Fabrik Buckau should comprise the provision of a plant with a production capacity of 10 tons of Oxol (code name Polyglycol M) per day and of a dump for the storage of 1000 tons of Oxol, while the commitments of the Auer-Gesellschaft should comprehend the provision of a plant for the conversion of the preliminary product Oxol into the chemical warfare agent Oxol mustard gas, with a production capacity of 10 tons per day. In addition, the Chemische Fabrik Buckau was bound by the contract to supply the power necessary for the Reich-owned plant, that is to say water, electric current, steam and chlorine. To this end, the power works and the chlorine electrolysis plant belonging to this firm were accordingly enlarged, with financial assistance from the Army Ordnance Office.

The organic department of the firm Degsa (Auer-Gesellschaft) which produced anti-gas equipment and respirators among other things, was engaged upon the experimental production of chemical warfare agents and also possessed a process for the industrial production of Oxol mustard gas. The Degsa was consequently instructed to provide the first plant for the production of chemical warfare agents, the more so because, as has been already stated, I.G. showed no interest in the work at that time.

The assistance of I.G. in the erection of the plant at Ammerdorf was nevertheless essential. The work of the Chemische Fabrik Buckau included the erection of the Oxol plant with equipment for the preliminary stages, ethylene and ethylene-oxide. I.G. Ludwigshafen was, however, the only German firm which produced Oxol in the course of private industrial activity, for home and foreign consumption. For reasons of military importance, the possibility of a plant for the Production of Oxol in central Germany, which, at that time, was considered safe against air attack, could not be renounced, that is, it was imperative that I.G. accept undertakings towards the Wehrmacht, that is towards the Army Ordnance Office to make available to the Orgacid G.m.b.H., established jointly at a later date by the firms Th. GOLDSCHMIDT and Auer-Gesellschaft, its technical knowledge and the practical results of its experience for use in the construction and operation of the plants for the processing of preliminary products up to the Oxol stage.

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With the consent of the Army Ordnance Office, the Orgacid had to undertake not to offer the preliminary products ethylene, ethylene-oxide and Oxol for sale on the open market. This and other terms such as the I.G.'s renunciation of the right to charge licence fees for the data put at the disposal of the parties concerned, were agreed upon in contract concluded between I.G. and the Orgacid. I do not, however, know details of this contract. The I.G. sent their Chief Engineer LORINSER and several master-builders and mechanics to Ammerdorf to assist in the construction of the Oxol factory and the commencement of operation there. I am unable to state how long these experts remained there. I only know that Mr. LORINSER entered the service of Orgacid and later took over the

(page 8 of original, cont'd)

administration of the stand-by plant for the production of arsin oil at Hahnberg near Leese.

Professor Dr. ENGELHARD was appointed manager of Orgacid G.m.b.H. He, with several scientific experts, left the service of the Auer-Gesellschaft in order to enter that of Orgacid, Dr. MOELLMAY, who had previously worked for the firm Th. GOLDSCHMIDT A.G., Essen, the second partner concerned with the foundation of Orgacid G.m.b.H., was Betriebsfuehrer of the Ammerndorf works.

The Ammerndorf Oxol mustard gas plant, with its original production capacity of 300 tons per month, was completed in 1936, and was then put into operation for a brief period for the purpose of initial tests. The plant was later enlarged. On 5 September 1938 came the order that the capacity of the Oxol plant was to be increased from 300 tons per month to 450 tons per month. In March 1937 the order was given for the enlargement of the Oxol conversion plant from a capacity of 300 tons per month to one of 900 tons per month. (In this case, the preliminary product Oxol would have had to be supplied in part from outside in order to achieve this capacity). In the

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same way, the order was given for the construction of storage space to contain 3000 tons of mustard gas.

The Ammerndorf plant was the only Oxol mustard gas plant which produced for purposes of stock-piling. It was in operation with several interruptions caused by repair work, shortage of materials of all types, including raw materials (chlorine and ethylene-oxide in particular were in very short supply throughout the war) until 1944 and produced a total of approximately 20 - 22,000 tons of Oxol mustard gas part of which was stored in large storage dumps specially built for the purpose, with a storage capacity of 3000 tons each and the rest of which was used for the filling of bombs and artillery ammunition.

It was probably in 1938 that a pilot plant for the production of 50 tons of Nitrogen mustard gas (N-mustard gas, T 9) was constructed in the Ammerndorf works. In this case as in the case of the construction and commencement of operation of the Ammerndorf ethylene-oxide and Oxol plant, I.G. Ludwigshafen was obliged, at the request of the Army Ordnance Office, to put its practical technical experience at the disposal of the enterprise concerned, for the Orgacid had no access to practical results obtained in this field of work and the production of this material was of particular military importance.

Further Commissions placed with Orgacid in the Field Chemical Warfare Agents.

1) In addition to the storage dump at Ammerndorf already mentioned, the construction of additional storage dumps with a capacity of 3000 tons each at

(page 9 of original, cont'd)

- a) Munster/Hannover - commission placed on: 7 July 1937
- b) Loeknitz near Stettin " " : 26 January 1939
- c) Hocrpolding/Upper Bavaria, construction begun: November 1939

(In addition, storage dumps with a capacity of 3000 tons each were built in the Army Ammunition Establishments at Dessau and Lubbeck/Westfalia.)

- 2) Oxol mustard gas plant Gendorf/Upper Bavaria, capacity 800 tons per month, commission placed with the Orgacid on: 6 March 1937 (Construction begun, August 1937, Construction completed at the end of 1941).

The erection as a Reich-owned plant of the Gendorf preliminary products plant directly adjoining this plant was commenced in the following year, 1938. Further information is given on this in the statement on Anorgana G.m.b.H.

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3) A similar combination between the preliminary products of the chemical industry and the production of mustard gas was projected in 1937 for the Ruhr area. In accordance with the project, the Orgacid G.m.b.H. was to set up a plant for the conversion of Oxol into Oxol mustard gas, with a capacity of 800 tons per month, adjoining a works to be erected for the production of synthetic rubber. Thiodiglycol, the base for the preliminary product Oxol was provided as follows: the Army Ordnance Office planned in addition, to erect a Reich-owned plant adjoining this Buna works, in which glycol was to be produced as an anti-freeze agent and diglycol as the preliminary product for the production of gun-powder.

In March 1937, the order for the erection of the mustard gas conversion plant at Dorsten/Westfalia was placed with the Orgacid. Marl-Huels near Becklinghausen and not Dorsten was later chosen, however, as the site for the projected works which led to the foundation of Chemische Werke Huels, a plant founded jointly by I.G. (3/4) and Hibernia-Bergwerks-Gesellschaft (1/4).

The construction of the mustard-gas plant by the Orgacid was never effected, however, as to the best of my knowledge, the Orgacid process for the production of Oxol mustard gas had to be considered as out of date from the technical point of view. This was the reason why I.G. or Chemische Werke Huels was commissioned by the Army Ordnance Office on 11 May 1938, to construct a conversion plant with a production capacity of 600 tons of Oxol mustard gas per month, in addition to the erection of a plant for the production of 600 tons of diglycol, including ethylene-oxide and 480 tons of oxol per month, with corresponding storage space. As the Wehrmacht-owned plants were exceptionally closely linked with the Buna works as far as power and raw materials were concerned, and as the power plants and plants for the production of raw materials such as ethylene and chlorine had, in consequence, to be constructed on a larger scale than had

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originally been projected when the works were planned, loan was granted to Chemische Werke Huels, with the help of which the plants could be built with a larger production capacity.

The glycol and diglycol plants were put into operation immediately after completion, while, after two short test runs lasting from two to three weeks, the conversion plant was brought to a stand-still and never put into operation again. Let me state here, in order to make my account complete, that the Chemische Werke Huels was commissioned in September 1939, to erect a Wehrmacht-owned plant for the production of acetophenone. This product was then to be supplied to the plant at Fahrberg, near Loese/Weser, likewise owned by the Reich, in which the chemical warfare agent chloroacetophenone (omega-salt) was to be produced, and for the construction of which the firm Hiesel de Haen received the order from the Army Ordnance Office in February 1937.

(page 11 of original cont'd)

4.) The Leese Arsen Oil plant was ordered on 13 July 1937 to erect on the wooded land at Hahndberg near Leese/Weser, a plant for the production of chemical warfare agents with a production capacity of 500 tons per month. In the immediate neighbourhood of this plant, the Chemische Fabrik Riedel de Haen erected a plant for the production of chloroacetophenone, likewise on the instructions and at the expense of the Army Ordnance Office, as explained above. The commission was placed on 17 February 1937. The production capacity stipulated was approximately 500 tons per month. Both plants were intended as standby plants and were never put into operation, even for purposes of testing.

In order to make the matter clear, let it be explained that the arsen oil plant at Leese was later transferred to the trusteeship of Lonal-Werke G.m.b.H. As far as the establishment of the Lonal-Werke is concerned, it should be said that a factory was acquired in Berlin-Hasselhorst, with Reich funds

(page 12 of original)

in which the chemical warfare agent Clark I (diphenylchloroarsin) was obtained from arsen oil by means of distillation. In addition, equipment was installed there, with the help of which chemical materials were produced in fairly large quantities for the purpose of research in the field of chemical warfare agents. To this end the Lonal-Werke G.m.b.H. was founded. This, like other OKH-owned plants was placed under the trusteeship of Lontan-Industrie Werke G.m.b.H., the working capital being advanced, to the best of my knowledge, by Professor Dr. ENGELHARD, the manager of Orgacid G.m.b.H. as sole partner. I believe, however, that ENGELHARD had left the service of Orgacid G.m.b.H. before this time. (Engelhard had differences of opinion with the Betriebsfuhrer of the Amendorf Works of Orgacid, which, thanks to the strong Party connections of this Betriebsfuhrer, were decided unfavorably for ENGELHARD).

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2. Anorgana GmbH.

The Anorgana GmbH., a subsidiary company of the I.G. Ludwigshafen, was founded in 1940 or 1941 to take over as operating firm the lease of the plants Gendorf/Obb., in Dyhernfurth/Silesia, which were built at the instance of the Army Ordnance Office, with Reich funds. The lessor was the Reich-owned Montanindustrie Werke GmbH., to which the plants and factories built with the funds of the Army Ordnance Office were made over on completion.

The Chemical Warfare Agents (H-Stoff) plant in Falkenhagen bei Frankfurt/Oder ("Seewerk"), which was still in process of construction at the end of the war and in which H-Stoff Sarin was to be produced, with a capacity of 500 tons a month, would, on coming into operation, presumably not have been taken over by the Anorgana, for it can be assumed that the Monturon Gesellschaft, which was to run the Smoke-Screen (H-Stoff) Plant of the Falkenhagen Works, and which represented as a special case, a formation of the I.G. Farben and the Montan-Industrie Werke GmbH, would have been amalgamated.

a. Gendorf Works ("Hochwerk")

In order to be able to fulfil the military requirements in munitions, it was resolved about 1937, in the process of rearmament, to build a large chemical works in Upper Bavaria with Reich funds. Besides a major power station, based on hard coal, there were to be erected there plants for carbide gasification, chlorine electrolysis, acetylene hydrogenation, spirit acetylene, ethylene oxide, glycol (planned output 600 tons a month) for frost protection and cooling purposes, diglycol (planned output 600 tons a month) for production of gunpowder and oxol (600 tons a month) for the conversion plant for the above-mentioned Oxol-Mustardgas plant of the Orgacid GmbH. Later there came, in addition, acetaldehyde for buna (1000 tons) and D-Mustardgas (3500 to 4000 tons a month).

The building contract was given to the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.G. Berlin, who also supplied the construction plans for the power works and for the acetylene gasification plant, while the technical plans for the remaining chemical plants were supplied

(page 13 of original, cont'd)

to the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke by the I.G. Farben Industrie.

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(page 14 of original)

The building was begun in 1938. Immediately on completion, in May 1941, the works were taken into operation for the production of glycol and diglycol. The manufacture of glycol and diglycol totalled, in the first year of production 1941/42, about 5000 tons together, and in the second year of production 1942/43, about 16,500 tons. The Acetaldehyde plant started operation in the summer of 1942, and the never quite finished D-Mustardgas plant produced experimentally in 1943 or, respectively, 1944, altogether about 3000 tons of mustardgas, of which about 1000 tons were unusable, as they did not come up to the ehrmachts conditions of supply.

b. Dyhernfurth Works ("Niederwerk")

On 15 December 1939, the I.G. Farben received from the Army Ordnance Office the order to erect a Reich-owned plant with a capacity of 1000 tons of Tabun (Gelan T 83) a month, in Dyhernfurth-Oder in Silesia.

The works were put into operation on completion about 1942, and they worked until the autumn of 1944. The quantities of production monthly depended on the prevailing allocation of chemical preliminary products. Altogether these works will probably have manufactured about 10,000 tons of Tabun.

On 27 January 1944, the firm received the order to establish an experimental plant with a capacity of 100 tons of Sarin a month, and on 4 March 1944, a plant for 100 tons a month of T-300 (EiV 99) (this was a question of an arsenic-magnesium-aluminium alloy, which in granular condition with the presence of atmospheric moisture produces arsenic hydride).

The building of this plant was later on suspended. On 1 July 1943, orders were received to arrange for equipment for the production of about 20 to 30 tons per month each of prussic acid and cyanogen chloride.

(page 14 of original, cont'd)

The projected building in May 1943 of a Sarin plant with a capacity of 500 tons a month was dropped on technical air raid precaution grounds, i.e. in order to avoid the massing of plants in Dyhernfurth, and it was decided to establish these works on the land of the fog-screen (Z-Stoff) plant in Falkenhagen ("Seewerk").

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(page 15 of original)

3. Pommersche Industriewerke GmbH. (P.I.W.)

On 3 April 1939, the Hanseatische Apparatebaugesellschaft HANSEAPP and HANSEAPP in Kiel (Hagenau) received an order from the Army Ordnance Office to establish in Barth in Pomerania a Reich-owned plant for the production of fog implements, such as fog handgrenades, fog candles, fog and sulphur bombs, incendiary compounds and incendiary charges.

These works were therefore not occupied in the production of chemical warfare agents (Z-Stoffen); among other things, it only filled solid chemical warfare agents, such as chloracetophenone and Adam-site into bombs. Its principal field of work, however, was the manufacture of fog implements and fog producing means of all kinds. In accordance with the well known Montan system, the completed plant, with the object of its operation by the Montanindustriewerke GmbH., was leased to the newly-founded operating firm, the Pommersche Industriewerke GmbH.

4. Donalwerke GmbH.

Reference is made to the statements on this operating firm on page 11 of this report.

It was in charge of the administration of the Reich-owned works in

a. Berlin Haselhorst

Production of chemical warfare agents of all kinds for the experimental purposes of Production and Examination Group 9 of the Army Ordnance Office (Abteilung 9a Prüf 9 des Heereswaffenamtes) also of

(page 15 of original, cont'd)

Clark I (diphenyl arsenic chloride) manufactured by distillation of arsine oil supplied from the Reich-owned works of the firm of Ergethan in Stassfurth and of Clark II (diphenyl arsenic cyanide). The capacity for Clark I amounted, on an estimate, to 100 tons a month, that of Clark II to considerably less.

b. Leese-Weser Works

Administration and maintenance of the stand-by plant built by the Orgacid GmbH for the production of 500 tons a month of arsenic oil.

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(page 16 of original)

5. Chemical warfare agents works owned by firms.

I. Chloroacetophenone (Teargas)

1. I.G. Farben Ludwigshafen.

The I.G. had long had in their Ludwigshafen Works a plant which produced acetophenone for private consumption. As the Chloroacetophenone already known in World War I as a chemical-warfare agent could be produced by simple chlorination, corresponding additional apparatus was installed in this plant, at the instance of the Army Ordnance Corps. The capacity of the plant amounted to about 60-80 tons a month and it was put into operation for purposes of stockpiling, in accordance with the delivery orders of the Army Ordnance Office.

2. Riedel de Haen A.G. Werk Seelze

With the financial support of the Army Ordnance Office, machinery and apparatus were installed in the Vanillin Fabrik GmbH. in Hamburg-Billbrock, which guaranteed the production of 110 tons of acetophenone a month.

The chlorination into Chloroacetophenone took place in the Seelze Works near Hanover of the firm of RIEDEL de HAEN A.G. Berlin. The installation of the necessary technical equipment for this was effected with the support of the Army Ordnance Office and the capacity of the plant amounted to about 150 tons a month.

(page 16 of original, cont'd)

II. Adamsite (Azine)

2. I.G. Farbenindustrie Uerdingen-Rhine.

The conditions necessary for this stuff to be produced in the firms' own works were, apart from the existence of the buildings, provided by the fact that diphenyl amine, one of the components used in the manufacture of azine, was already regularly produced in the works for other purposes.

The Army Ordnance Office assisted energetically in the adaptation of the works for the production of Azine, because, on account of the existence of the necessary conditions, a capacity of 200 tons of Azine a month was achieved with comparatively small expenditure, and this was able to be increased in March 1942 to about 250 tons a month.

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(page 17 of original)

This plant is the only manufacturing place remaining, although it would never have been capable of fulfilling the military requirements in the case of chemical warfare. The building of a second plant, several times projected, had always to be postponed on account of lack of building materials and in the end was never undertaken.

Concluding remarks:

When, at the wish or on the order of the Army Ordnance Office it was desired to produce in works owned by private firms war-essential stuffs for which there was no ordinary demand and, consequently, the financing of the necessary manufacturing equipment could not be expected of the firms, the equipment of the works was undertaken on the basis of an order from the Army Ordnance Office in the form of:

- a. Installation of Reich-owned machinery and apparatus, allowing the firm the opportunity of later acquiring these investments;
- b. Loans, possibly without interest, for procuring the equipment;
- c. Granting of Reich subsidies (seldom used)
- d. Self-financing and concession of increased rates of depreciation.

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(page 18 of original)

6. Manufacture of Arsine oil

a. Arsine oil - Stassfurt Plant.

The first arsine oil plant was established by the Army Ordnance Office as a Wehrmacht-owned plant on one of the sites acquired by the Salzbergwerk Neustassfurt bei Stassfurt-Anhalt -a works belonging to the Kalichemie A.G. Berlin- and in the immediate neighbourhood of this works.

The order was given on 19 March 1935 and the contractual capacity was 180 tons a month, which later on was increased to about 270 tons a month. The building work was in the hands of the Kalichemie A.G., while the manufacturing process was contributed by the Degea (Auer-Gesellschaft) (Berlin).

The building and equipment contract between the Reich War Ministry (RWM), represented by the Army Ordnance Office of the High Command of the Army (OKH) of the one part, and the firms Degea (Auer-Gesellschaft) and Kalichemie A.G. of the other part, were signed in December 1935. The taking over of the completed works by the Army Ordnance Office and their transfer to the same official office, which in turn assigned them to the OKH-owned Montanindustriewerke GmbH., took place on 3 March 1939. For the purpose of the operation of the works, the Montanindustriewerke GmbH. leased them to the "Ergethan GmbH.", the subsidiary company founded by the Kalichemie and Degea in Neustassfurt. These works, which were the only ones put into operation for arsine oil, produced altogether an estimated 5000 tons of arsine oil up to the end of the war.

b. Arsine oil - Hahneberg bei Leese/Weser Plant.

As already stated above, the firm of Orgacid GmbH. received orders on 13 July 1937 for the construction of this plant with a capacity of 400 tons a month.

Building construction was begun in October 1937, but, owing to repeated stoppages on account of urgent work on more important armaments projects, the plant was not finally completed until May 1943. The plant was never put into operation, even for trial productions. Mention has already been made of the transfer of this Reich-owned plant from the Orgacid GmbH. to the Lonalwerke GmbH.

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(page 19 of original)

7. Production of Phosgene

The use of Phosgene, which forms into a gas on exposure to ordinary temperature, for chemical warfare (filling while in a fluid state into aircraft bombs) was only first taken into consideration when the plan for the large-scale technical manufacture of the more effective fluid, di-phosgene (known since World War I as Per-stoff) had to be continually postponed, on account of its relatively high consumption of material. Corresponding negotiations were conducted in 1936 with the Chemische Fabrik v. HEYDEN & Co., Dresden-Radebeul, by the Army Ordnance Office in the OKH, in which the WEISSIG Works in Saxony belonging to this firm were planned as the location for a new plant.

The industrial use of phosgene for the manufacture of dyes among other things is well known; for Wehrmacht purposes, it was required principally in the production of powder stabilisers. The only available German production centre for powder stabilisers (diphenyl amine, centralite, akardite, diphenylurethane, Ethyl phenyl urethane were used), was a plant belonging to the I.G. works, Uerdingen-Rhein, in which for many years material based on phosgene had been produced, mainly for export purposes.

Phosgene plant at I.G. Farben Works Farbenfabrik
Wolfen.

In 1935, the Army Ordnance Office decided to install with Reich funds a new plant in the area of central Germany, for the purpose of covering the requirements of the Wehrmacht in powder stabilisers for the gunpowder factories being established within the framework of the rearmament program. Another reason why this step was considered necessary was the fact that the only manufacturing centre, Uerdingen, could not be regarded militarily safe, on account of its left-Rhine position, and was furthermore susceptible to air attack. At the same time, a plant for the production of glycol (frost protection material) and diglycol (Ersatz for glycerine) was to be erected. As only the I.G. Farben possessed the necessary production processes for both these products, as well as for the stabilisers and the new plants could therefore also only be planned, built and operated by the I.G., the site chosen was an open area belonging to the I.G. Farben Works Farbenfabrik Wolfen

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near Bitterfeld. On this site were erected, with funds provided by the Army Ordnance Office: -

a. A plant for 400 tons glycol or, respectively, diglycol, a month (later extended to 500 tons a month);

b. A plant for the production of about 250 tons of stabiliser a month, later enlarged for a capacity of about 550 tons a month.

For reasons of administration and technical operation, no separate operating firm was founded -as was usual with other Reich-owned works- within the framework of the Montan system. The plants, which were supplied with power by the adjoining Dyestuffs factory and whose site had had to be obtained from the I.G. by way of a leasehold, were operated under the orders and for the account of the Farbenfabrik Wolfen.

When the Luftwaffe decided on the preparation of bombs filled with fluid phosgene, the firm was instructed to extend the phosgene factory of the stabiliser plant and to erect a filling station for phosgene with a capacity of 400 tons a month. From the beginning of the war until its end, this Wehrmacht-owned plant filled into aircraft bombs under the orders of the Luftwaffe, a total of about 5000-5500 tons of phosgene.

Phosgene Plant I.G. Uerdingen/Rhein.

In the event of the outbreak of chemical warfare, the I.G. Werk Uerdingen was under the obligation to divert about 180 tons of Phosgene from their Phosgene plant for the filling of bombs. No deliveries took place, however, from this firm-owned plant for this purpose.

Phosgene Plant I.G. Ludwigshafen/Rhein.

For the same purpose it was ^{also} provided that, if required, the firm-owned plant of the I.G. Werk Ludwigshafen, should supply up to 120 tons of phosgene per month. There were likewise no deliveries from these works.

Phosgene Plant Auschwitz Project.

In view of the supply to the new powder factories, either projected or in process of construction, and in consideration of the

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susceptibility to air attack of the position of the Urdingen Works, the Army Ordnance Office, from about 1942, demanded a further stabiliser plant and with it also a new phosgene plant. The proposal made by the I.G. Farben to build a Wehrmacht-owned plant within the works of the Donauchemie A.G., to be newly established in Moosbierbaum, met with the approval of the Army Ordnance Office. It was accordingly taken into consideration in the complete planning of the works, and the preliminary work on this plant was already begun.

About the same time, the chemical works in Auschwitz were in process of erection. The Army Ordnance Office, in co-operation with the other armament offices of the Reich, decided to make the ethylene basis there suitable for their own purposes, in order to establish through the I.G., with Reich funds, a plant for the production of glycol and diglycol. It was now proposed by the Reich Office for Economic Development likewise to erect the stabiliser plant in Auschwitz, as, according to estimated figures, the cost of purpose iron for building, which represented a great bottleneck, was less there than in Moosbierbaum. In spite of the justified objection to heavy massing of chemical plants in Auschwitz, it was finally decided to build the stabiliser plant there.

A capacity of 500 tons a month was contemplated, for which about 300 tons of Phosgene a month were necessary. A further 700 tons a month were expected to cover the requirements of the Luftwaffe in the case of chemical warfare and the building of a filling station for bombs similarly owned by the Wehrmacht, was therefore also planned.

In consequence of the ever increasing critical state of the building and machinery market, as a result of which the most urgent work on the armaments sector, which was necessary for the immediate prosecution of the war, could not be carried out fast enough, the Stabiliser Plant Auschwitz including the Phosgene plant building project was postponed, as this project and its execution were after all not of such fundamental importance. Whether the building of the plant was ever begun at all is not within my knowledge, as I never visited Auschwitz.

(Initialed : Eh)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-10595
CONTINUED

(page 22 of original)

I have carefully read through and countersigned with my own hand each of the 22 pages of this affidavit, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialled them and I hereby declare under oath that in this statement I have told the absolute truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signature: Dr. Emil A. EHMANN.

Sworn to and signed before me this sixth day of September 1947 at Nuremberg by Dr. Emil A. EHMANN, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Signature: Edward J. STEVENS

U.S. Civilian AGO D-428172
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION.

15 September 1947.

We, Beryl C. Beswick, D.427459 and Anne Martini, 20 144 hereby certify that we are duly appointed translators for the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI-10595.

Beryl C. BESWICK
D 427459

Anne MARTINI
20 144 .

Ex. 1818

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Gerhard RITTER, at the moment in the Palace of Justice, Nuernberg, having been duly warned that any false statement on my part will render me liable to punishment, do hereby declare the following under oath of my own free will and without compulsion:

1. From 1925-1945 I was employed by I.G. Farbenindustrie, - as a chemist in the Oppau plant from 1926-1934, and as technical assistant to Dr. Krauch from the end of 1934-1945. In this capacity I was in the Vermittlungsstelle until May 1936, then on the raw materials and foreign exchange staff, which later became the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials, and later Reich Office for Economic Development, from autumn 1938 - April 1945. At the same time I collaborated with Professor Krauch in his capacity as Plenipotentiary General for Special Questions of Chemical Production from autumn 1938-1945. I became Prokurist for I.G. Farbenindustrie in 1941.

2. I have been shown the Document NI-11105, Exhibit 1572, * Page 6, a copy of which is attached to this affidavit. The point in question is a passage dictated by me on May 6, 1942, at Professor Krauch's request, which I composed jointly with men of the sub-department PCV (powder, explosives, and preliminary products) which gave the current production possibilities at that time in the Chemical Warfare Agents sector.

If the facts contained in this article are divided among I.G. production, production in Reich plants controlled by I.G., or its subsidiary companies, and the production of other firms, and if Chloracetophenon which is to be considered as an irritant is excluded, the following picture emerges:

* For identification

(page 2 of original)

Production Possibility in metr. tons per month

	I.G.-owned works	OKH.-owned works operated by I.G. or I.G. Partici- pants	Other firms	Total
Huels	-	450	-	
Gendorf	-	4000	-	
Dyhernfurth	-	1000	-	
Stassfurt	-	-	160	
Hahnenberg	-	-	400	
Uerdingen	200	-	-	
Ammendorf	-	-	50	
	200	5450	530	6280

In accordance with this, the Gebeschon on 3 May 1942 estimated the possible production of chemical warfare agents as follows:

- a) For I.G. works 3.2 %
- b) For Reich-owned works
operated by the I.G.
or its subsidiary companies 86.8 %
- c) For works of other firms 10.0 %

of the possible total production.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

I have carefully read through each of the two sheets of this affidavit and counter-signed it with my own hand, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialled them, and I hereby declare under oath that in this declaration I have stated the absolute truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signature: GERHARD KITTER

(page 3 of original)

Sworn to and signed before me this 26th day of November 1947, at Nuernberg, Germany, by Dr. Gerhard KITTER, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Signature: OTTO HEILBRUNN
Otto Heilbrunn
Civilian, ETO No. 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

26 November 1947

I, Phyllis RAY, ETO No. 36267, hereby certify that I am a duly appointed translator for the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-12724.

Phyllis RAY
No. 36267

- 3 -
"END"

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AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Emil EMMAN, living in Stuttgart-Mooslingen, Kesselstrasse 15, employee of the Army Ordnance Office from 1935 to 1937, Regierungsrat (Government Councillor) from 1937 to 1943, Oberregierungsrat (Senior Government Construction Councillor) from 1942 to 1943, Ministerialrat (Ministerial Councillor) in the Army Ordnance Office from 1943 to 1945, being duly warned that I render myself liable to punishment by making a false statement, herewith depose the following on oath, of my own free will and without coercion:

1) I was Chief of the Group for Preliminary Products for Powder, Explosives, Chemical Warfare Agents, etc. from 1935 to 1943, and Chief of the Manufacturing and Procurement Department for Chemical Preliminary Products, Chemical Warfare Agents, Artificial Fog Producers, Rocket Fuels, etc. from 1943 on.

2) In my examination as witness before the Military Tribunal, Case VI on 30 October 1947 I testified on:

- a) Production capacity of the plants manufacturing chemical warfare agents which were in existence on 1 September 1939
- b) Production capacity of the plants manufacturing chemical warfare agents which were in existence in December 1944
- c) Total production of chemical warfare agents from the beginning of rearmament to the end of the war.

For this I have given the following figures:

Re. a) Production capacity on 1 Sept 1939:

	I.G.-owned factories	O.K.A.-owned factories which were run by the I.G. or by firms in which the I.G. held a share of over 70%	Figures in metric tons per month	
			other firms	Total
1) <u>Chloro- acetophenone</u>				
Ludwigshafen	70	-	-	
Sulze	-	-	150	
2) <u>Arsine oil</u>				
Stassfurt	-	-	150	
3) <u>Oxol-mustard</u>				
<u>Wes</u>				
Amberg	-	-	450	
<u>Total:</u>	70	-	700	850

(page 3 of original)

	I.G.-owned factories	O.K.A.-owned factories which were run by the I.G. or by firms held in which the I.G. held a share of over 70%	Figures in metric tons per month	
			other firms	Total
Total of 1 - 3 i.e. Caloro-scotophenone considered as a chemical warfare agent:	70	-	730	800
Total output capacity on 1 Sept 1939 expressed in percentages		-	31,8	100
Total of 2 and 3 i.e. Chloro-scotophenone without considering:	-	-	830	830
Total output capacity on 1 Sept 1939 expressed in percentages	0	0	100	100

Re b) Production capacity in December 1944

1) <u>Caloro-scotophenone</u>				
Ludwigshafen	70	-	-	
Sooze	-	-	150	
Samenberg	-	-	500	
2) <u>Arsine oil</u>				
Stassfurt	-	-	370	
Leese	-	-	400	
3) <u>Clark</u>				
Baselhorst	-	-	130	
4) <u>Alunit (Azin)</u>				
Uerdingen	350	-	-	
5) <u>Phosgene</u>				
Ludwigshafen	130	-	-	
Wolfen	-	400	-	
Uerdingen	160	-	-	

(page 2 of original, cont'd.)

	I.G.-owned factories			O.K.D.-owned factories which were run by the I.G. or by firms in which the I.G. held a share of over 70%		Figures in metric tons per month	
				other firms	Total		
6) <u>Tebun</u>							
Dyhernfurth	-	1000	-	-	-		
7) <u>Cyanoan</u>							
chloride T 300							
Prussic acid							
Dyhernfurth	-	30	-	-	-		
8) <u>Oxol-mustard gas</u>							
Amendorf	-	-	-	700	-		
Muels	-	600	-	-	-		
1) Gondorf (Org. acid)-	-	-	-	800	-		
9) <u>Direct mustard</u>							
gas							
Muels	-	300	-	-	-		
Gondorf (Aner. ann)	-	1500	-	-	-		
10) <u>Hydrogen-mustard</u>							
gas							
Amendorf	-	-	-	50	-		
Total	620	3830	2990	7440			

(page 3 of original)

Total of 1 - 10 i.e.

Chloro-acetophenone
considered as a
chemical warfare
agent

620	3830	2990	7440
-----	------	------	------

Total output
capacity in Dec
1944 expressed in
percentages

8,3	51,5	40,2	100
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(page 3 of original, cont'd)

	I.G.-owned factories	O.K.A.-owned factories which were run by the I.G. or by firms in which the I.G. held a share of over 70%	Figures in metric tons per month	
			other firms	Total
Total of 2 - 10 i.e. without considering Chloro-acetophenone	550	3630	2340	5720
Total output capa- city in December 1944 expressed in percentages	8,2	57	34,8	100
Re c) <u>Total production of chemical warfare agents from the beginning of rearmament to the end of the war</u>				<u>in metric tons</u>
1) Chloro-acetophenone	3000	-	4000	7000
2) Adamsit(Azin)	3000	-	-	3000
3) Phosgen	-	5 000	-	5000
4) Arsine oil	-	-	7000	7000
5) Clark	-	-	1000	1000
6) Oxol-mustard gas	-	-	22000	22000
7) Direct mustard gas	-	2000	-	2000
8) Nitrogen mustard gas	-	-	2000	2000
9) Tabun	-	12000	-	12000
Total of 1 - 9, i.e. <u>with</u> Chloro-acetophenone in percentages	5000 9,8	19000 31,2	36000 59	51000 100
Total of 2 - 9, i.e. <u>without</u> Chloro- acetophenone in percentages	3000 5,5	19000 35,2	32000 59,3	54000 100

In the witness stand I gave the figures 38% and 62% instead of 5,5% plus 35,2% equals 40,7%, and 59% respectively since Tabun (Figure 9) was given as 10,000 tons instead of 12,000 tons in the second column as a result of a clerical error, while the figure 12,000 was correctly given in the last column.

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

In my above calculations re a), b) and c) I listed the firm Orgacid G.m.b.H. as not belonging to I.G. The share of this firm, in consideration of its

	with Caloro - acetophenone	without
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
a) Production capacity with plants in existence on 1 Sept 1939, equals:	52,9	71,4
b) Production capacity with plants in existence in December 1944, equals:	9,4	10,4
c) Total production from the beginning of rearmament to the end of the war, equals:	39,3	64,4

I have carefully read each of the 4 pages of this affidavit and have signed them with my own hand; I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting, and have countersigned them with my initials and I herewith declare on oath that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, I have stated the absolute truth in this affidavit.

Emil ZAKMANN

Sworn to and signed before me this 26th day of November 1947, at Nuernberg, Germany, by Dr. Emil ZAKMANN, Stuttgart-Moehringstr., Kanalstrasse 15, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Otto GILBERT
Civilian ETO No. 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

28 November 1947

I, Arthur C. MACHAMARA, # 20 191, hereby certify that I am a duly appointed translator for the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. HI - 12725.

.....
Arthur C. MACHAMARA

20 191

-5-
"END"

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4. 1820

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Emil EHMANN, resident in Stuttgart-Moehringen, Kanelstrasse 15, employee of the Army Ordnance Office from 1936-1937, Regierungsrat from 1937-1942, Oberregierungsbaurat from 1942-1943, Ministerialrat in the Army Ordnance Office from 1943-1945, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making false statements, herewith state the following under oath, voluntarily and without coercion:

1. I was chief of the Group: Preliminary Products for Powder, Explosives and Chemical Warfare Agents etc. from 1935-1942, and from 1942 I was chief of the Manufacturing and Procurement Department for Chemical Preliminary Products, Chemical Warfare Agents, Smoke Screen Agents, Rocket Propelling Agents etc.

2. In my interrogation before the Military Tribunal, Case # VI on 30 October 1947 I stated that the IG capacity with regard to chemical warfare agents before the outbreak of war was 8%, including chloride-acetophenone, and excluding this product, 10% of the entire German chemical warfare agents production capacity which was ready for operation. I did not include the chemical warfare agent capacities which were planned before the outbreak of war.

If the figures of the plans are included the following poison gas capacities are arrived at, according to the situation on 1 September 1939:

- a) Plants owned by IG 3%
- b) Plants owned by the OKH, which were operated by the IG or by plants in which IG had more than 70% interest 62.1%
- c) Plants belonging to firms which were independent of IG 34.9%

I arrived at these figures in the following way:

(Page 2 of original)

			Capacity in metric tons per month	
	IG-owned plants		OKH-owned plants operated by IG or by plants in which IG had more than 70% interest	Other firms
				----- Total
<u>Arsenic oil</u>				
	Stassfurth	-	-	180
	Loese	-	-	400
<u>Admaito (Azine)</u>				
	Verdingen	200	-	-

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Oxol-Lost (Mustard Gas)

Ammendorf	-	-	900
Huels	-	600	-
Trostberg-Gendorf	-	-	800

Direkt-Lost (Mustard Gas)

Huels	-	200	-
Trostberg-Gendorf (bayer. Stickstoffwerke - (A.G.))	-	3350	-

Stickstoff-Lost (Nitrogen-Mustard Gas)

Ammendorf	-	-	50
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<u>Total</u>	200	4150	2330	6680
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Chloride-acetophenone is not included in the above table. If it is included, we arrive at the following planned capacities:

- a) For IG-owned works 3.6%
- b) For OKH-owned works operated by IG or by plants in which IG had more than 70% interest 55.4%
- c) For plants of firms which were independent of IG 41 %

(Page 3 of original)

I infer that the plan for Gendorf for 3350 tons Direkt-Lost per month was made before 1 September 1939, actually in 1938, from the Document NI-4990, Exhibit 114, which has been shown to me. In the table Ammendorf is not counted as belonging to IG.

3. The Document NI-11105, Exhibit 1572 was submitted to me. On page 8 of this document there are the minutes of 1 December 1942, which are marked PSV/P. This designation represented Powder, Explosives and Preliminary Products and originated with KRAUCH's office, that is, either from the Reich Office for Economic Development or the Plenipotentiary General for Chemistry (Gebechem). A copy of page 1 of these minutes is attached to this affidavit.

According to this, KRAUCH's office drew up the capacities for poison gas which were ready or which were nearly finished according to the situation on 1 December 1942, as follows:-

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-12678
(Cont'd)

(I sub-divided them):

Capacity in metric tons per month

	IG-owned plants	OKH-owned plants operated by IG or by plants in which IG had more than 70% interest	Other firms:
Ammendorf (O-Lost)	-	-	700
Huels	-	600	-
Gendorf	-	4000	-
Ammendorf (N-Lost)	-	-	100
Lesse	-	-	400
Uerdingen	200	-	-
Haselhorst	-	-	100
Ludwigshafen (W-Satz)	90	-	-
Seelze	-	-	120
Hahnenberg	-	-	550
Ludwigshafen	290	-	-
Wolfen	-	270	-

(Page 4 of original)

	IG-owned plants	OKH-owned plants operated by IG or by plants in which IG had more than 70% interest	Other firms:
Uerdingen	130	-	-
Dyhernfurth	-	1000	-
Total	710	5870	1970 8550 6

In accordance with this, we arrive at the following capacities which were ready or nearly finished according to the opinion of the KRAUCH office: with respect to this I have used the higher of the alternative figures for Gendorf, 4 000 tons per month, since in case of gas warfare this capacity would have been utilized:

- a) IG-owned works 8.3%
- b) OKH-owned works operated by IG or by plants in which IG had more than 70% interest 68.6%
- c) Plants of firms which were independent of IG 23.1%

I wish to remark in this connection that I consider the figures for Huels, Ammendorf (N-Lost) and Hahnenberg to be too high, that Dyhernfurth could not have been finished before 1944 and that Gendorf would have been nearly finished and ready for operation around the middle of 1943 if it had not been found that the D-Lost produced there did not keep in storage.

I have not counted Ammendorf under IG, but under 'other firms' in the above table.

4. In the evidence I gave in court to which I referred previously I stated that the share which IG and the firms connected with IG had in the actual production of chemical warfare agents up to the end of 1944 amounted to 38% and that of the other firms amounted to 62%.

a) Ammendorf's share in this total production amounted to 39.3% I did not count Ammendorf with IG but with the other firms,

b) The reasons why the actual production of IG was so very much lower

(Page 4 of original)

than had been planned or than the actual IG capacities which existed with regard to chemical warfare agents, were the following:

aa) After the Gendorf plant with a capacity of 4 000 tons per month had nearly been finished, it was found that the DuLost produced there did not keep in storage and was therefore completely unsuitable for Wehrmacht purposes.

bb) The IG's installations were in general finished much later than the other installations.

cc) There was a shortage of the preliminary and intermediate products required for the production of poison gas. Therefore the Army Ordnance Office had to allocate the quotas of chemical raw materials which were made available for chemical warfare agents to the various firms accordingly. The smaller firms which produced only chemical warfare agents in their works and which had started operating earlier besides were given preference in this allocation, since in case of restrictions on

(Page 5 of original)

or closing down of the plant the personnel which would thus be released could not be employed in some other production of the plant. In this way these firms were always kept in readiness for gas warfare.

I have carefully read each of the five (5) pages of this affidavit and have personally countersigned it, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and have initialled them, and herewith declare under oath that in this statement I have told the pure truth according to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Signature) EMIL EHMANN
Emil Ehmam

Sworn to and signed before me this 25th day of November 1947, at
Nuernberg, Germany, by Dr. Emil EHMANN, Stuttgart-Moehringen,
Kanalstrasse 15, known to me to be the person making the above
affidavit.

(Signature) OTTO HEILBRUNN
Otto Heilbrunn
Civilian ETO No. 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department.

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COPY

Berlin, 1 December 1942.
Dr. Ra./Scht.

5 copies
2nd copy.

The situation with regard to chemical warfare
agents.

Situation on 1 December 1942.

The work in this respect is marked particularly by the fact that
the chemical warfare agents have not yet been used in this war. There-
fore the measures dealt with are all only in the nature of preparations.

A. As far as capacity is concerned the situation is as follows:

1. Available plants which are ready or nearly finished:

Product	Location	Firm	Capacity	Remarks
a) O-Ester	Ammendorf	Orgacid GmbH.	700	tons per month
b) O-Ester	Huels	Chem.Werke Huels	600	
c) O-Ester	Gendorf	Anorgana GmbH	900	
d) O-Ester	Gendorf	Anorgana GmbH	4000	alternative
e) T-9 (N-Loet)	Ammendorf	Orgacid GmbH	100	
f) Arisinic Oil	Leese	Lonal GmbH	400	
g) Azine	Uerdingen	IG Farben AG	200	
h) C 1	Haselhorst	Lonal GmbH	100	
i) Omega salt	Ludwigshafen	IG Farben AG	90	
j) Omega salt	Seelze	Riedel de Haen	120	
k) Omega salt	Hahnenberg	Riedel de Haen	550	
l) Oil F	Ludwigshafen	IG Farben AG	290	
m) Oil F	Wolfen	IG Farben AG	270	
n) Oil F	Uerdingen	IG Farben AG	130	
o) T 83	Dyhernfurth	Anorgana GmbH	1000	

Total capacity for chemical warfare agents 9450 tons per month

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-12678
(Cont'd)

Further it should be noted with regard to the plants and/or production facilities: add: e) The production of 700 tons O-Ester per month requires 575 tons Oxol 1 Per month; out of this only 360 tons per month can be produced in Ammendorf itself; the remainder has to be supplied by Ludwigshafen. (215 tons Oxol 1 per month). The plant was already in operation and .. 2 -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, ETO NO. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-12678.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
ETO NO. 34079

EID

BECKHOFF

I, Josef Beck, Waldschaffen/Rhine, Wolfenstr. 14, Prokurist in the Book-keeping Department of the Deutsche Anilin & Soda Fabrik, Waldschaffen/Rhine, after having been warned that I shall be liable to punishment for making a false statement, herewith declare the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion:

The figures of the following table were taken from my books:

(page 2 of original)

	<u>Production in kilograms, of</u>		<u>Yield of</u>	
	<u>Acetophenone</u>	<u>Methylphenone</u>	<u>Omega Salt</u>	<u>Methylphenone</u>
1935	21 697	270 064	205 476	none
1936	19 112	106 135	116 434	none
1937	32 300	388 261	173 983	none
1938	3 950	464 080	489 636	none
1939	23 206	483 794	537 318	none
1940	22 955	413 901	882 545	366 269
1941	none	none	727 700	from Uerdinger (254 960 from Uerdinger (349 820 from Riedel as then)
1942	none	none	none	none
1943	none	none	none	none
1944	none	none	none	none
1945	none	none	none	none

The majority of the goods was sent to Pharma, Leverkusen.

x) Acetophenone and methylphenone are chemically identical, acetophenone which was destined for the production of omega salt, was called methylphenone in the plant.

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I have carefully read each of the 3 (three) pages of this affidavit and countersigned it with my own hand, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them, and I herewith declare under oath that I have stated the full truth in this affidavit to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signature) Josef Meir
(Prokurist Josef Meir)

Sworn to and signed before me this 29th day of July 1947 at Ludwigshafen/Rhein, Bedruckn. Anilin & Soda Fabrik, by Prokurist Josef Meir known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signature) Edward J. Stevens

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

27 August 1947

I, Brigitte TURK, ETO 35130, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-9771

Brigitte TURK
ETO 35130

A F F I D A V I T

I, KARL von EBNER, Frankfurt a/M., Grillparzerstr. 83, having been warned that I shall be liable to punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

1. On 19 June 1921 I went to work for the Chemische Fabrik Griesheim -- Elektron, Frankfurt/M., one of the founding firms of I.G. Farben, and since that time have been employed continuously by I.G. Farben.

In 1927, I became a procurist; in 1934 I received the title of director. Until 1939 I directed various departments of the Sales Combine Chemicals. In 1939, I took over the supervision of all of the European sales agencies of the Sales Combine Chemicals with the exception of Germany, Switzerland and the Eastern Countries. During the war, I gradually took over the supervision of all sales departments selling inorganic chemicals. In 1943, I became a member of the Commercial Committee and as of 1 January 1944 a member of the Chemicals Committee.

2. In addition to my positions in I.G. Farben, I was appointed Abwehrbeauftragter about the beginning of 1938. Before 1943, the Abwehrbeauftragten were appointed by the Wehrmacht and were subordinated to be local military Abwehr Office. In about 1943, through an agreement between the military authorities and the Reichs Sicherheits Hauptamt (Reich Security Headquarters) the Abwehr-Beauftragten were subordinated to both authorities and had military as well as police Abwehr functions. In 1944 the military Abwehr offices and therefore also the Abwehrbeauftragten were completely subordinated to the Reichs Sicherheits Hauptamt (Reich Security Headquarters). The directives for the Abwehrbeauftragten issued by the High Command of the Armed Forces called "Service Regulations for Abwehrbeauftragte" and the directives issued by the Reichs Sicherheits Hauptamt called "Service Regulations for political-Police Abwehrbeauftragte" were burned before the occupation.

My responsibility was limited to the Administration Office Building, Frankfurt a/M., Grueneburgplatz. My duties were:

(Page 2 of original)

- a) To eliminate untrustworthy people from confidential work.
- b) To issue security measures for supervision over correspondence, telegrams, teletype messages and telephone calls.
- c) To warn the staff to be careful in their discussions inside and outside the office, especially when travelling abroad.
- d) To publish and circularize orders and instructions received from the military Abwehr Office and the Stapoleitstelle (State Police Headquarters).

3. Prior to the Allied occupation of Germany, I received a warning from the Abwehr office by phone to have all confidential files burned in time in order to avoid seizure by the enemy. According to the directives, I informed Mr. von SCHNITZLER and instructed the heads of departments to burn all secret command matters, secret Reich matters, secret matters and any other files that might be useful to the enemy. Among others, all records were to be destroyed which showed dealings with the Wehrmacht and other war agencies of the Third Reich with respect to armament. Selection of such files was made by the head of the departments or their deputies, in doubtful cases my decision was asked for.

4. After the Allied occupation in Germany, I was instructed by the I.G. Investigation Team officials to obtain from the responsible people in each department of I.G. Farben as complete a list as possible of all files burned or otherwise destroyed in each department. I had such a list compiled in each case by the head of the department, his delegate or the best informed person, and I warned everyone not to conceal anything and to do his best to reconstruct such a list of contents by memory where records were not in existence.

5. There follows a compilation in condensed form of the various lists which I received from these officials and which I forwarded on 15 May 1945 to the I.G. Investigation Team. The list indicates the name of the department and the person who prepared the list for that department and his position:

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I. A. Office of the Central Committee. List prepared by Hermann RAESKLER, Office Manager of Central Committee Office. The important files destroyed in this office are:

1. Minutes of meetings of the Vorstand,
Minutes of meetings of the Aufsichtsrat,
Minutes of meetings of the Central Committee,
Minutes of meetings of the Managing Committee
Minutes of meetings of the Commercial Committee,
Minutes of meetings of the Purchasing Commission
Minutes of meetings of the Dyestuffs Committee
Minutes of meetings of the Chemicals Committee
Minutes of meetings of the Patents Commission
Minutes of meetings of the Legal Committee
Minutes of meetings of the Propaganda Commission and the
Minutes of meetings of the Division and Section Chiefs of various
I.G. Farben plants
2. Statistics for the quarterly and yearly report of the Vorstand to the Aufsichtsrat and the reports themselves.
3. Statistics showing I.G. Farben foreign participations and I.G. Farben Plant statistics.
4. Circular letters from the Political Economy Department, Berlin (WIFO) concerning questions of commerce and foreign exchange.
5. Index of I.G. Farben's confidential agents.
6. Secret circular letters from Department A. (Abwehr) Berlin and from the office of von Heider regarding questions of security, defense, plant visits and publication of reports.
7. Reports regarding gifts and contributions to political organizations.
8. Statistics and compilations regarding turnover, wages, costs of propaganda, and employee statistics.
9. News reports from I.G. Farben Press Office
10. Dyestuffs reports for Dr. von Schnitzler.

B. Central Bookkeeping Department. List prepared by Hans MUMCK, head of Central Bookkeeping Department. Mr. MUMCK states that on orders from the Abwehrbeauftragten, the following important files of the Central Bookkeeping Department were destroyed before the arrival of the Allied troops.

1. Records and correspondence regarding plants operated for the Reich or Military Authorities and agreements concerning deliveries and operation of plants such as "Four Year Plan" plants.

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2. Papers regarding connections with firms and persons abroad, which I.G. Farben had promised to keep secret, such as their interests in foreign concerns.

C. Special Bookkeeping Department. List prepared by Jakob Frey, head of Special Bookkeeping Department. The important files destroyed from this office are:

1. All secret circular letters from the office of von Heider concerning security measures.
2. Older reports of our auditors regarding their audits of the following firms:
 - Copenhagen, A/S Anilin-kompagniet
 - Oslo, A/S Anilin
 - Tergen, A/S Anilin
 - Goeteborg, A/B Anilin-kompagniet
 - Helsingfors, O/Y Anilin A/B with subsidiary Tammerfors
 - Riga, Agency "Lataniil"
 - Łódź, Agency "Barwaniil"
 - Warsaw, B. Bodo & Co.
 - Varna, Dotskontor
 - Bielsko, Agency "Bielwaniil"
 - Frankfurt, "Teifa", Teerfarben und Chemikalien-Handels A.G. with subsidiary, Braunn
 - Budapest, "Dudaniil", Farbenverks A.G.
 - Bucarest, "Bowanil" S.A. with subsidiaries Kronstadt and Temesvar
 - Temesvar, "Tiwaniil"
 - Zelien, "Coloron"
 - Belgrad, "Juganiil" k.d.
 - Belgrad, Anilin A.D. with subsidiary in Skoplje
 - Zagreb, "Juganiil" k.d. and/or "Anilokemika" with warehouse Zeman
 - Sofia, Verkaufsgesellschaft Deutscher Anilinfarben
 - "Coloriska"
 - Athen, Farben- und Chemikalien-Handels A.G. "Athenil"
 - Athen, Karameeris
 - Istanbul, "Tuerkaniil"
 - Zuerich, Teerfarber A.G.
 - Milano, A.R.C.A. Azienda Riunite Coloranti e Affini S.A.
 - Barcelona, "Unicolor"
 - Barcelona, Sociedad Electroquimica de Flix
 - Porto, Sociedade de Anilinas Lda, with subsidiary Lisbon
 - Paris, "Copi", Societe pour l'Importation de Matieres Colorantes et de Produits Chimiques
 - Brussels, "G.M.U. La Generale des Matieres Colorantes, Produits Chimiques et Pharmaceutiques Soc. Coop.
 - Arnheim, N.V. "Defa" Maatschappij voor Verfsoffenhandel "Defa Huis"
 - Rotterdam, "Wega"
 - Amsterdam, Indanthrenhaus
 - Cairo, Societe de Matieres Colorantes Allemandes, Waibel &

3. Confidential correspondence with firms listed under paragraph 2 and the following named firms:

Shanghai, Deutsche Farbenhandels-gesellschaft Waibel & Co.
Kobe, Doitsu Senryo Comei Kaisha
Mexico, Compania General de Anilinas S.A.
Mexico, La Union Quimica, S.A.
Buenos Aires "Anilinas Alemanas" Sociedad An.
Rio de Janeiro, Allianca Commercial de Anilinas Ltda.

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Santiago de Chile, Anilinas Alemanas Cia. Ltda.
Bogota, Anilinas Alemanas Cia. Ltda.
Lima, Cia. General de Anilinas S.A.
Montevideo, "Anilinas Alemanas" S.A.

4. Correspondence regarding foreign exchange permits.
5. Balance sheets 1942 and 1943 of the Metallgesellschaft m.b.H. Leipzig and production statistics for 1942, 1943, and 1944 for Aluminiumwerk G.m.b.H., Bitterfeld.

D. Chemicals Cost Accounting Department. List prepared by Karl HISSERICH, deputy head of this department. The following important files were destroyed:

1. Correspondence signed "03" between I.G. Farben Sales Departments, I.G. Farben plants and High Command of Army regarding orders for chemical war materials.
2. Correspondence signed "06" between I.G. Farben, the Montan-Industriewerke G.m.b.H. and High Command of the Army regarding leased plants, which were administered by I.G. as a trustee and operated directly or indirectly for the German High Command of the Army. The destroyed files concerned the following plants and products:

HOLPEN - Intermediates for explosives
Braking fluid and Steam bath fluid (Kochbad-Fluessigkeit)
Stabilizers
Decontamination agents for arms.

SCHKOPAU - Intermediates for explosives
Braking Fluid and Steam Bath Fluid (Kochbad-Fluessigkeit)

DOEBERITZ - Intermediates for explosives

DYHERNFURTH - Intermediates for explosives
Poison Gases

GENDORF - Intermediates for explosives
Poison Gases

3. Correspondence regarding the plants at Auschwitz and the plants at Chemische Werke Huels G.m.b.H.
4. General correspondence regarding the Montan Industriewerke G.m.b.H. producing by order and on behalf of the High Command of the Army
5. Copies of invoices on executed deliveries.

E. Chemical Statistical Cost Accounting Department, Dyestuff Statistical Cost Accounting Department, and Hollerith Department. List prepared by Otto LINDHARDT, head of Chemical Statistical Cost Accounting Department and Hollerith Department?

On 23 March 1945 all copies of invoices of direct deliveries of chemical products to the Wehrmacht for the years 1940-1944, as well as all secret circular letters from the office of the Abwehrbeauftragten were destroyed.

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F. Bookkeeping Department Current Accounts/Germany. List prepared by Guido Kockschmar, head of this department. The following important files were destroyed from this office:

1. Land register of District XI; files on current accounts of German customers.
2. Current account cards for the years 1944/45 covering sales of dyes, chemicals, and metals to the High Command of the Army, High Command of the Navy, Ministry of Aviation and Central office for problems of the Air Forces (A.z.V.)
3. Correspondence with High Command of the Army, the High Command of the Navy, the Ministry of Aviation, and the Central office for problems of the Air Forces, concerning payments.
4. Correspondence register of secret mail as well as the correspondence itself.
5. Correspondence regarding German-Swiss cartel agreements 1930-1939
6. Personnel files; index to Hollerith product numbers for various chemical products.

G. Cartels, Tonnage and Price Accounting Department. List prepared by Walter NEUMANN, head of this department. The following files have been burned:

1. Copies of international cartel agreements regarding sodium sulphide, zinc chloride and rubber accelerators.
2. All statistics showing the yearly deliveries and average prices under various national and international cartel agreements.

H. Banking Department - List prepared by Max BANGERT, head of the Banking Department and Otto MEYER, deputy head of the Banking Dept.

1. All circular letters from the Abwehrbeauftragten and from the Political Economy Department (WIPO) which were classified "secret", "strictly confidential" and "confidential", were destroyed.
2. The files of the Foreign Exchange Control Group up to 1945 were also destroyed.

I. Central Taxation Department.

List prepared by Dr. Karl K o l o n i t s, an employee of this department. In accordance with the directive from the Abwehrbeauftragten, documents regarding salaries of directors and employees abroad and referring to tax questions were destroyed.

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J. Central Insurance Department.

List prepared by Johann R e i c h e r t, deputy head of this department.

The files which were destroyed in this department contained statements showing insurance values and ground plans of I.G. Farben plants and affiliated plants, as well as correspondence dealing with insurance matters of the German Government owned plants at Gendorf, Dyrnornfurth, Seewerk by Briesen in der Mark, Doeberitz, Auschwitz, and Heydebreck.

K. Personnel Department.

List was prepared by Walter B u s s m a n n, an employee in v. Heider's office. The following files were destroyed on 23 March 1945:

1. Personnel statistics.
2. Quarterly reports on personnel employed abroad.
3. Confidential circular letters regarding security.
4. Correspondence with "Gestapo".
5. Gestapo information leaflets.
6. Quarterly reports to Gestapo on foreign employees in administration office building.
7. File containing memoranda and instructions for the plant police. (Werkschutz).
8. Minutes of discussions and make up of Confidential Employees Council and Employers' Advisory Council.
9. Secret circular letters from the Chamber of Industry and Commerce.
10. Official security regulations for war industries.
11. Secret circular letters from Abwehr office of Army district IX in Kassel.
12. Warnings and information regarding individuals. Information received from Abwehr Office IX, Kassel.
13. Personnel data files.
14. Correspondence with military authorities regarding exemptions.

L. Traffic Department.

List prepared by Theodor M a d e r, deputy head of this department.

The files destroyed in this department contained secret shipping instructions and directives for the camouflaging of secret shipments.

II. A. Office of secretary of Dr. von Schnitzler.

List prepared by Lieselotte S c h m i d t, secretary to Dr. von Schnitzler.

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The following important files were destroyed:

1. Reports and correspondence from Political Economy Department (Wipo).
2. Financial statements for 1935 to 1939.

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B. Department of the Directorate Chemicals.

List prepared by Karl B r i c k e r t, head of this department.
The following important files were destroyed:

1. Secret plans regarding the contemplated distribution of the production of the European chemical producers after the war.
2. Confidential correspondence with agent firms abroad.
 - a) Advance Solveta Chemicals Corp., New York
 - b) Allianca Commercial, Rio de Janeiro
 - c) Anilinas Alemanas, Buenos Aires
 - d) Chemicals Ltd., Montreal
 - e) Swift & Co., Sidney.
3. Confidential sales statistics of all I.G. Farben products.
4. Secret files relating to war business with Japan and the Far East.
5. Secret files containing circular letters from Political-Economy Department (WIFO) and security directives from the office of the Abwehrbeauftragten.

C. Legal Department Chemicals.

List prepared by Siegrun B o j u n g a, an employee of this department. Miss Bojunga states that she was present when Miss Frieda H a f n e r, another employee of this department and former secretary to Dr. Bernhard Zuhl, member of the Vorstand of I.G., said to Dr. Stein, head of the Legal Department Chemicals, that the copies of the correspondence and of the Wehrmacht--(Montan) agreements concerning plants worked by other I.G. Farben departments, especially by I.G. Ludwigshafen, had been burned. Mr. von Heider states that a file containing the total investments of I.G. Farben in new plants for war production was, according to Miss Hafner, burned too.

D. Packaging Advisory Office.

List prepared by Carl D e y, head of his department.

Files containing request for iron supplies for packing purposes submitted to Military authorities to be used on materials delivered to them and certificates of urgency for the delivery of the materials ordered, were destroyed.

E. Office of Mr. Haefliger.

List prepared by Berta D e b u s, Mr. Haefliger's Secretary.

The following important files were destroyed:

1. Correspondence with various I.G. Farben plants and offices, correspondence regarding light metals, South America and the Far East, as well as private business correspondence, reports about visits to the U.S. and South America.
2. Reports from Vorstand of Aussig-Falkenau, Donau Chemie A.G. Vienna, Dynamit Nobel A.G., Pressburg, and Grisogen/Autogen, as well as correspondence with these firms.

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3. Correspondence with agencies in Italy and Eastern Europe..

4. Records of damage in plants from air raids.

F. Office of Mr. von Heider.

List prepared by Gertrud S t e h m a n n, Mr. von Heider's secretary.
The following important files were destroyed:

1. Production figures, reports, sales records, minutes and correspondence referring to caustic soda, liquid chlorine, sodium cyanide, carbon bisulphide, tanning materials, light metals and Sulphuric Acid Sub Committee.

2. Correspondence regarding the supplying of liquid chlorine to Anorgan. Werk Gendorf and Dyhernfurth.

3. Correspondence and circulars from Vermittlungstelle W, Berlin, from 1935 to 1945.

4. Reports from agencies abroad.

5. Agreements for the building of Hydrogen Peroxide plants for the German government.

6. Correspondence and agreements with Prof. Schmidt regarding the manufacture of electric lamps.

G. Office of Mr. von Heider/Abwehr Section.

List prepared by Walter B u s s m a n n, employee of this department.
The following important records and files were destroyed on 21 March 1945.

1. All circulars and correspondence with the Chamber of Commerce, Abwehr offices, Stapoleitstelle (State Police Headquarters).

2. Secret files containing Abwehrplan (defense and security plans) and Mobplan (plans for mobilization of I.G. Farben plants).

3. Correspondence with I.G. Farben plants and government authorities regarding security, sabotage and safeguarding against espionage.

4. All circular letters dealing with payments and deliveries of war materials to occupied, neutral or allied countries.

5. Secret files containing information about certain individuals and visits of foreign guests to I.G. Farben plants.

6. Records, invoices and information concerning sodium cyanide.

H. Department A (Caustic alkalis and Alkali G.m.b.H.).

List prepared by Walter M e i e r, Deputy manager of that department.
The following important files were destroyed:

1. All secret correspondence with various Wehrmacht departments and government offices.

2. Minutes of meetings, statistics, production figures, correspondence and reports concerning caustic soda.

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Electro-Chemical Products G.m.b.H. (Elektro-Chemische Produkte G.m.b.H.
Elpro.)

List prepared by Hans Z w e n g e r, Deputy manager of Elpro.
The following important files were destroyed:

Caustic potash correspondence with foreign cartel partners:
Potasse et Produits Chimiques S/A., Thann (Alsace)
Etc. Kuhlmann S.A., Paris
Basel Alkali Soc. Ind. de Produits Chimiques Paris
Jan Dekker, Narmerveer (Holland)
Danck Sojehagefabrik A.S., Copenhagen (Denmark)
Elektrokemiska A.S., Bohus (Sweden)

Department A III- Office for the distribution of bleaching powder.

List prepared by Ingrid K l a i b e r, an employee in this office.
The following important files were destroyed:

1. Records and plans for new chlorine cartel agreements to be made after the conclusion of the war.
2. Circular letters from Reich Office "Chemie" concerning supply and prices of chemicals in occupied countries.
3. Correspondence with High Command of the Army regarding bleaching powder for air protection purposes.

1. Department C - Chemicals.

List prepared by Hans M a g n e r, Georg V o g e l, Hermann S c h o e n f e l d e r, and Karl S e c b a c h, employees of this departments.

The following important files were destroyed:

1. Secret and confidential correspondence with Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, Reich Office "Chemie", I.G. Farben Plesteritz, I.G. Farben Bitterfeld and various customers concerning the production, distribution and delivery of phosphorus products.
2. Secret correspondence and records concerning deliveries of potassium-chlorate for explosives and pre-war cartel agreements on exports of this chemical.
3. Correspondence concerning the construction of a plant in the U.S. for the manufacture of chlorate after the war.
4. All correspondence and memoranda with the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht and I.G. Farben Bitterfeld referring to production and deliveries of nasozogen (briketts with chlorate base for producing oxygen) and permanganate of potash.
5. Records and correspondence regarding delivery and production of various auxiliary products for the manufacture of substitutes for the building industry and memoranda regarding deliveries to Army Building sites.
6. Secret correspondence with High Command of the Army, Reich offices, Organization Todt and various other customers regarding the delivery

of atramentole (solutions of phosphate for metals in order to remove rust).

(Page 11 of original)

J. Chemical Sales Department B.

Sales Office for oxalic and formic acid G.m.b.H.
(Vertrieb G.m.b.H. and Sulphur Extraction and Refining Company.
List prepared by Karl von Heider, a manager in I.G.'s sales combine chemicals.

Copies of sales agreements with firms all over the world were destroyed in order to avoid seizure by the enemy.

K. Chemicals Sales Department S. (Inorganic acids and their salts.)

List prepared by Julius Zimmermann, deputy manager of this department.

All statistical records about the manufacture and sale of sulphuric acid and sulphurous acid, as well as records of monthly supplies to High Command of the Army, of these chemicals, were destroyed.

L. Chemicals Sales Department V. (Ethylene Group and White Pigments Section).

List prepared by Hans-Joachim Grotowsky and Hans Braht, heads of this sections.

Files containing correspondence, delivery records to the Wehrmacht, information on uses and agreements on luminous paints and titanium white, as well as correspondence with Leuchtstoff G.m.b.H., Berlin, were burned; also files concerning capacities, production and delivery of ethylene and ethylene derivatives and the correspondence concerning the planned purchase of the Lithopone factory, Dieuze, together with Kali-Chemie and Sachtleben A.G. and information regarding the so-called peace planning 1940 in which the planned development of the European business after the war was written down, were destroyed.

M. Chemical Sales Department G. (Tanning materials).

List prepared by Wilhelm Pfaff, a correspondent in that department.

All correspondence with Reich Office "Chemie" regarding chrome products and tanning materials were destroyed. Minutes of the Chrome Sub-Commission were also destroyed. Production records, delivery records and correspondence concerning ethylene and lithopone groups which had not been evacuated, were destroyed. One file containing the records of dealings with the Wehrmacht was also burned because it contained figures on capacities as well as post-war plans regarding the future production of chemicals.

N. Schwefel G.m.b.H.

List prepared by Carl van Zuthphen, deputy manager of Sulfat-Vereinigung G.m.b.H.

Minutes of this corporation and minutes of meetings with Reichs Ministry of Economy and Reich Office "Chemie" were destroyed. Statistical compilations of production, import and sales of sulphur, as well as reports of trips to Italy and Norway were also destroyed.

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O. Office of Mr. Borgwardt.

List prepared by Hellmuth B o r g w a r d t, a manager in I.G.'s Sales Combine Chemicals.

The following files and records were destroyed:

1. Production plans for Buna, acetylene and ethylene factories.
2. Reports regarding the plastic materials industry in Italy and France.
3. Technical reports of the plastics and rubber committee.
4. Copies of lectures held before the Technical Committee.
5. Correspondence of Mr. Maibel concerning licensing of Buna-process in Japan.

P. Chemical Sales Department K (Plastics).

List prepared by Heinrich G r e b e, head of this department.

The following files were destroyed:

1. Correspondence with Economic Group Textile Industry, Berlin, concerning the delivery of raw material for the manufacture of gas masks for civilians and reports of Dr. Cramer regarding discussions held by the special committee on handling the problem of manufacturing gas masks "M 44" for civilian.
2. All correspondence with military authorities regarding military uses of various plastics such as coating cloth for protection against gas, in the manufacture of detonating caps, in the manufacture of land mine plugs made of cellulose, in the production of ammunition for signalling purposes, in the manufacture of gas filter material and many other military uses.
3. Circular letters concerning security measures and protection against espionage.

Q. Chemical Sales Department K. (Rubber).

List prepared by Ernst S c h e n c k, a correspondent in this department.

Files containing technical reports on the manufacture of Buna, minutes of meetings of Technical Rubber Committee, correspondence relating to Buna production, stock records, sales records, production capacity statistics and correspondence relating to the product Buna were destroyed to prevent seizure by the enemy.

R. Chemical Sales Department L and L (e). (Solvents and Acetic Acid Products).

List prepared by

Udo B a r t h e l m e s,

Rudolph B i s t e n e r,

Hermann K a i s e r and

Wilhelm K r u e g e r,

of these the first two were procurists and the other two head clerks in these departments.

The following important files were destroyed:

1. Secret files regarding ground-contaminating gas for military exercises (Geldendeübungstoff).
2. Correspondence with Vermittlungsstelle W and I.G. Ludwigsafen concerning Fental 58.

(Page 13 of original)

3. Secret and confidential inquiries from Wehrmacht authorities, Wehrmacht laboratories, research institutes and firms regarding delivery of chemicals. Some of the offices from which inquiries were received are Army Quartermaster, Army Ordnance Depots, Army Experimental Stations, Army Experimental Stations Personnel, Army Gas Protection Laboratory Spandau, Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, and others.
4. Contracts and agreements with firms at home and abroad.
5. Secret correspondence with military authorities regarding delivery of heating gases and erection of oxygen plants during the war.
6. Correspondence with various firms regarding licensing and royalty agreements.
7. Secret files containing delivery and production records of government controlled chemicals such as acetone, methanol, formaldehyde, acetaldehyde and derivatives.
8. Correspondence regarding production and delivery of other government controlled chemicals such as mannite, sorbite, Triethylene glycol (coating for textiles for gas protection), synthetic glycerine, trimethylolathene, glycerine substitutes and other chemicals in which the High Command of the Army had an interest.

5. Chemicals Sales Department Z (Intermediates).

List prepared by Walter F l o t o w, head of this department.

All secret and top secret files containing purchase orders and directives from High Command of the Armed Forces, invoices, correspondence, production records, delivery records, reports and statistics were destroyed. This department handled chemicals used in the manufacture of explosives and ammunition.

III. A. Dyestuffs Sales Department, New products for detergents.

Heinrich K o e h l e r, department chief, states that the circulars issued by the office of the Abwehrbeauftragten concerning security were destroyed.

B. Dyestuffs Sales Department Germany.

List prepared by Hans Benno H o w e k, head of Section VII of Sales Department Germany-Dyestuffs.

The following important files were destroyed:

1. The secret files containing estimates of requirements of dyestuffs and auxiliaries by the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht and secret correspondence concerning deliveries to the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, of camouflaging materials, materials for parachutes and tents, and gas resistant materials, were destroyed.

(Page 14 of original)

2. Secret correspondence with other firms concerning dyestuffs and its military uses were destroyed.

C. Dyestuffs Sales Department Northern Countries.

List prepared by Willy L e i s t e r, office manager of this department.

Mr. Leister states that the files were destroyed on very short notice so that no records could be taken of the material in question. Due to the fact that this material was always kept under lock and key, it being the exclusive domain of Mr. H.Th. Winckler, deputy manager of this department, no member of the staff is in a position to reconstruct by memory the contents of these files. The files destroyed contained private correspondence of Mr. H.Th. Winckler with our representatives in Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland. Apart from this, all documents stamped secret were burned.

D. Dyestuffs Sales Department Belgium.

List prepared by Otto H a y e n b r u c h, head of this department.

All correspondence, memoranda, agreements and personnel matters with the I.G. sales agency in Belgium was destroyed. Directives from the German military authorities in Belgium regarding prices were burned too.

E. Dyestuffs Sales Department France.

List prepared by Julius O v e r h o f f, a titular director of I.G. supervising this department.

The following files were destroyed:

1. Correspondence and agreements between Sopi (I.G. agency in France) and I.G. Farben
2. Correspondence concerning tax problems in France.
3. Minutes of meetings of Commercial Commission of Francolor.

F. Dyestuffs Sales Department Spain/Portugal.

List prepared by Julius O v e r h o f f, a titular director of I.G. supervising this department.

Four folders concerning the general political and economic situation in Spain and documents regarding the building of plants for new chemicals in Spain, were destroyed.

G. Dyestuffs Sales Department Near East.

List prepared by Willy H e r m a n n, correspondent in this department.

About 25 letter files of Director Voigt's containing correspondence addressed to I.G. Farben agencies regarding instructions and administrative decisions and secret files containing government instructions on prices and deliveries, were destroyed.

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H. Dyestuffs Sales Department Far East.

List prepared by Georg S p a n n e r, head of the Japanese Section of this department.

Secret files regarding shipments to Japan and China and letters concerning shipments by blockade runners to South East Asia were burned. Plans for building new chemical factories in the Far East were also burned.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9126
(Cont'd)

I. Dvestuffs Sales Department Latin America.

List prepared by Julius Overhoff, a titular director supervising this department.

Files containing records of shipments, invoices and correspondence with Latin American agencies were burned.

IV. A. "Brissonen" Criesheimer Autoren Verkeufs G.m.b.H., Frankfurt/M.
List prepared by Karl Arent, a manager of this company.

About 50 secret files containing correspondence with the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, the High Command of the Navy, and various firms regarding orders for special tools used for armament and military purposes were destroyed.

I have carefully read each of the 15th pages of this declaration and have signed them personally. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them and I declare herewith under oath that I have stated the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signed): Karl v. Heider
Karl von Heider.

Sworn to and signed before me this 25th day of July 1947 at Frankfurt/M., Germany by Karl v. Heider, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signed): Henry Birnbaum
HENRY BIRNBAUM
AGO NO. D. 229216
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES
U.S. WAR DEPARTMENT.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Arthur C. Macnamara, AGO No. 20191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-9126.

Arthur C. Macnamara,
AGO # 20191.
U.S. Civilian.

END

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. ERNST STRUSS, Director of I.G., Chief of TEL. Bureau of I.G.F., Secretary of the Technical Committee of the Executive Board of I.G. F., Manager of Division II (Sperte II) of the Vermittlungsstelle W, and, since 1943, Production Manager of the entire German Dyestuffs industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

In September 1944, Dr. ter Meer, Dr. Lochr and I discussed in Frankfurt the question of destroying files in the event that the American troops would occupy the town. Dr. ter Meer was of the opinion that as few files as possible should be burned.

I discussed this matter some time later once more with Dr. Lochr, Koenig, Lemeth and Schlitt and we again agreed to burn as little as possible.

A few days before the occupation of Frankfurt by American troops, Mr. van Heider, who was Abwehrbeauftragter, instructed us to burn a greater number of files than we had previously envisaged. We actually burnt however only the files previously earmarked by us for destruction.

The following is a list of the files which were burned:

Monthly reports to Reichsstelle Chemie and other agencies, re reports on consumption and calculation of requirements.

Monthly and quarterly compilation of figures on production and consumption of plastics including guns.

Correspondence with Reichsstelle Chemie re phthalic anhydride, penta erythritol, chlorobenzene, ortho, para dichlorobenzene and other chemicals.

Correspondence with Statistical Reichsamt, Berlin, monthly reports on production of glycerogen, chlorine, caustic soda and other chemical products, light and heavy metals.

Correspondence with Reichsamt fuer Wirtschaftsausbau.

Correspondence with Vermittlungsstelle W, relating to production and deliveries of dinitrodiphenylamine, dinitroanisol, chlorobenzene, ortho and para dichlorobenzene, aniline, dinitrochlorobenzene, dinitrobenzene and other chemical products.

Secret Command Matter "Alberich", on U-Boat protection against ultra sound waves.

Secret Command Matter "Diglycol".

Secret File "Nebelsaewre", correspondence on capacity, production and consumption of ethylene and ethylene oxide, ethylene dichloride, dichloro ethyl ether.

Secret File "Hexogen", Notes on conferences relating to processes for the manufacture of hexogen and intermediated for hexogen.

Secret Files, copies of correspondence between Vermittlungsstelle W and I.G. plants on production and requirements of

Ethylene diamine

Nitro guanidine

Pentaerythritol

Diphenylamine

Expert Committee on recovery of sulfuric acid in explosives plants, copies of minutes of the meetings, 1939-1944.

Report by Dr. Wolff, Ludwigshafen, on the Russian rubber factory at Jofremow.

Draft agreements and calculation of raw materials requirements for the first Buna factories.

Copies of correspondence of Vermittlungsstelle W with I.G. plants relating to capacities and manufacture of nitrobenzene, dinitro benzene, dinitro anisol, dinitro diphenylamine, nitrotoluene, dinitrotoluene, aniline, dinitrophenol, stabilizer for gunpowder and other products.

Copy of secret minutes on nitrogen conference, 1940.

Copies of minutes of secret meetings of the Committee for lacquers, plastics, and synthetic rubber.

Copies of minutes of secret meetings of Intermediates Committee.

Copies of minutes of secret committee meetings relating to electrolyses of alkali chlorides, sulfuric acid, metals and chrome products.

Copy of agreement, dated 6 June 1941, between I.G. and Chemische Werke Huels G.m.b.H., Marl, re production and sale of ethylene derivatives.

I have carefully read each of the three pages of this declaration and have signed them personally. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them and I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

gez.: Dr. Ernst A. Struss
DR. ERNST STRUSS

Sworn to and signed before me this 29 day of May 1947 at Frankfurt Main by Dr. ERNST STRUSS known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

gez.: Otto Heilbrunn
DR. OTTO HEILBRUNN
Civilian, ETO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Ernst ENGELBERTZ, Director and manager of the I.G. plants Griesheim, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, herewith state under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

The I.G. plant Griesheim, chemical factory, had a considerable number of files marked "secret" in accordance with the "directives on secrecy obligations". These files were kept separately and locked in a steel filing cabinet at the I.G. plant Griesheim.

As far as I know, all files were marked secret, which dealt directly with war contracts of I.G., and also a number of those containing directives and decrees of government authorities.

There were no files at the I.G. plant Griesheim marked "top secret" ("Geheime Kommandosache")

Approximately a fortnight before the Americans marched into Frankfurt (March 1945) I was ordered by the Vorstand to destroy all files marked "secret", I received this order from Professor LAUTER-SCHLAGER, member of the Vorstand in Höchst, who was in charge of the Griesheim works. The files were burned in the boilerhouse of the factory in Griesheim.

I have carefully read the one page of this declaration and signed it personally. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them and I herewith declare under oath that I have stated the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signed: Dr. Ernst ENGELBERTZ
Dr. Ernst ENGELBERTZ.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8976
CONTINUED

(Page 2 of original)

Sworn to and signed before me this 12th day of June 1947, at Frankfurt-Griesheim, Germany, by Dr. Ernst ENGELBERTZ, living in Frankfurt-Griesheim, alt Griesheim 86, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Signed: Paul H. HAENI

Paul H. HAENI
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes,
War Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

9 July 1947

I, Walter K. GALEWSKI, LTC 20145, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-2976.

Walter K. GALEWSKI
LTC 20 145

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Friedrich V. A. Engel, Franz Rueckerallee 7, Frankfurt on Main, having been duly warned that I should render myself liable to punishment by making a false statement, herewith declare the following on oath, voluntarily and without coercion:

Some 8 days before the American troops entered Hoechst, about 24 March 1945, a large number of documents and letters were burned at the I. G. plant at Hoechst. Only those documents which had been marked "Secret" were concerned, and according to orders received, all secret documents had to be burned completely. In the I. G. all these documents which dealt with Wehrmacht or Party matters, as well as the correspondence with the authorities in so far as it had any connection with re-armament and war, were marked "secret". These secret documents had always been kept separately and for this reason they could be burnt within the shortest possible time.

As far as I know, the order to burn them did not come from the I. G., but was issued by Gauleiter Spronger, whom in military authority was invested at the time in question.

I have carefully read the one page of this affidavit and signed it with my own hand, I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialled them, and I herewith declare on oath that I have stated the full truth in this declaration to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signature: Dr. Friedrich V. A. Engel.

Sworn and signed before me this 29 day of May, 1947, at Hoechst by Dr. Friedrich V. A. Engel, Franz-Rueckerallee 7, Frankfurt/Main, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(Signature) Max F. V. Frankenberg
Civilian AGC 20051
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U. S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

2 July 1947

I, BERYL C. BESWICK, D 427459, herewith certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document no. NI-8329.

BERYL C. BESWICK
D 427459

"END"

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MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO. 7
CASE NO. 11
Prosecution Document Book No. _____

XXXXVII

Engel.



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TO
DOCUMENT BOOK XXXVII
Count I-D
Case No. VI

FARBEN PARTICIPATED IN CREATING AND EQUIPPING
THE NAZI MILITARY MACHINE FOR AGGRESSIVE WAR

Exhibit Document No. No.	Description of Document	Page No.
NI-9945	Affidavit of Dr. Kuogler indicating that coal and iron industry declined to take part in Four Year Plan but Farben did.	1
NI-9944	Affidavit of Dr. Kuogler, former chief of chemistry department in Reich Ministry of Economics, re monopoly position of I.G. Farben in Four Year Plan projects and dependence of other industry on it.	3
NI-10500	Affidavit of Dr. Lenz, former consultant in chemistry in Reich Ministry of Economics, re I.G. Farben's dominance of office of Four Year Plan.	5
NI-9656 (already introduced in connection with plants)	Affidavit of Koerner, State Secretary in Office of Four Year Plan, that I.G. had largest share in expansion projects.	7
NI-9272	Affidavit of Dr. Wagner, formerly of I.G. Vermittlungsstelle, to the effect that I.G. production for listed products substantially exceeded peacetime needs.	9
NI-12627 NI-7296	<i>Affidavit Dr. E. Stur</i> Files of the Reichsstelle fur Wirtschaftsausbau "Monthly reports of the Heereswaffenamt on the situation of the German war economy", dated September-December 1939, mentioning alongside the most important tasks of the production program the increase of the production of munitions and explosives, the extension of the fuel program and the increase of the production of Buna.	12 a 13
NI-9476	Affidavit of Dr. Mulert, former consultant for chemistry in Reich Ministry of Economics, to the effect that I.G. was the backbone of German preparation for war.	17
NI-6235 (already in evidence in Book IX as Exhibit 261)	Affidavit of Dr. Buctofisch to the effect that without I.G. production of rubber, gasoline and magnesium, "it would have been out of the question for Germany to carry on a war."	19




Exhibit No.	Document No.	Description of Document	Page No.
	NI-10009 (already introduced in connection with "Poison Gas")	Chart "I.G.'s and subsidiaries' share in total German production of strategic materials 1937 to 1943", estimating I.G.'s percentage in the total production of poison gas in 1943 at 95%, with affidavit by Struss.	20
	NI-10021	Affidavit by Dr. Ernst Struss explaining how the figures in the chart NI-10009 were compiled.	21
	NI-7236	Affidavit of Dr. Struss re dominating role of I.G. in chemical field.	26
	NI-6123 (already introduced in connection with rubber)	Unsigned note from I.G. Farben files dated 23 April 1941 re discussion in spring of 1939 with military authorities for exempting personnel during war and indicating importance of Farben production.	31
	NI-6763	Address by von Schnitzler, February, 1943, at a reception for Spanish ambassador, in which von Schnitzler states that without German chemistry "modern warfare could not at all be possible".	33
	NI-5196 (already in evidence in Book I as Exhibit 40 - Also in Book XVI - Schnitzler affidavits	Affidavit of the defendant von Schnitzler of 18 March 1947, on importance of I.G. Farben to German economy and armament.	38
	NI-5197 (already in evidence in Book II as Exhibit 18 - Also in Book XVI - Schnitzler affidavits	Affidavit of the defendant von Schnitzler of 27 March 1947 re dominant position of I.G. Farben in Germany.	63
	NI-8595	List from Reich Office for Economic Development, 20 April 1943, showing the most important plants as of middle of 1942.	104
	NI-8831	Special list from Reich Office for Economic Development, 20 April 1943, showing percentage of production of each plant to total German production.	113
	NI-8594 (already in evidence in Book V as Exhibit 131)	Report, 21 April 1943, prepared by O'Eckel for Krauch, showing the effect of the overall war effort that the bombing of I.G. Farben plants would have.	117
	NI-10002 (already in evidence in Book V as Exhibit 132)	Chart of the sales and gross profits of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. of 11 June 1947 with affidavit by Selmut Deichfischer.	120

Exhibit No.	Document No.	Description of Document	Page No.
	NI-10014 (already in evidence in Book V as Exhibit 133)	Affidavit by Helmut Deichfischer of 11 June 1947 explaining how chart NI-10002 was compiled.	131
	NI-10003 (already in evidence in Book V as Exhibit 134)	Chart "Net Profit of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G." with affidavit by Helmut Deichfischer of 11 June 1947.	133
	NI-10015 (already in evidence in Book V as Exhibit 135)	Affidavit by Helmut Deichfischer of 11 June 1947, explaining how chart NI-10003 was compiled.	134
	NI-10027	Graph prepared by Dr. Struss showing relation between I.G. Farben's turnover gross profit, net profit for years 1932 through 1944.	126
	NI-10005	Chart of the sales and gross profit of Dynamit A.G. and subsidiaries.	137
	NI-10017	Affidavit of Dr. Deichfischer explaining chart NI-10005.	138
	NI-10006	Chart "Net Profit of Dynamit A.G. and Subsidiaries".	130
	NI-10018	Affidavit of Dr. Deichfischer explaining chart NI-10006.	131
	NI-3757	Excerpts from "U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey" dated 30 September 1945, to the effect that from the point of view of waging war, synthetic oil, rubber, and nitrogen were most important in Germany and that the production of these products is the story of I.G. Farben.	132

APPENDIX.

I, Privy Councillor Dr. Max KUEGLER, at present at Minden, Hotel Koenig von Preussen, after having been warned that I shall be liable to punishment for making a false statement, herewith declare the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion:

1. From 1934 until 1942, I was Ministerialrat in the Reich Ministry of Economics, i.e. I was Chief of the Chemistry Department of the Ministry from 1934 until 1938, and Chief of the Department for Oils and Fats from 1938 until 1942.

2. In consideration of the structure of the German economy a raw material plan such as the Four Year Plan should have been based on three economic fields, namely Coal, Iron and Chemistry.

The Four Year Plan was in fact an I.G. plan. The coal and iron industries as well as the chemical industry outside I.G. did not take part in the Four Year Plan.

I do not know why the coal and iron industries did not take part in the Four Year Plan. I do know however that the chemical industry which is not dependent on I.G. refused collaboration with the Four Year Plan. I myself have often discussed this fact with the leading gentlemen of the firms in question, mainly with SCHERING, BOEHRINGER, MERCK, and BAYER, as well as with IGFA (the latter firm was dependent on I.G.). Decisive for their negative attitude were mainly three motives: They were not willing to enter into the close collaboration with the National Socialist State necessary for the Four Year Plan; the outstanding influence of the I.G. in the Four Year Plan and in the office of the Four Year Plan made them fear that their operational secrets would be made available to I.G.; and finally we repeatedly emphasized in our numerous discussions that the firms would have to write off their investments within the Four Year Plan, if there were no war.

Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, in 1936 told me repeatedly that he had time and again warned I.G., i.e. Privy Councillor SCHMITZ as well as von SCHMITTLER, not to take part in the Four Year Plan projects.

(page 2 of original)

The I.G. however placed their full capacity at the service of the Four Year Plan. Beyond that they have succeeded in having almost exclusively I.G. people or people dependant on I.G. appointed in the Office of the Four Year Plan, and it was said that I.G. paid high salaries to these people to secure their loyalty to I.G. Whether this is definitely correct I do not know. From discussions with SCHLICHT in 1936 I knew that SCHLICHT used all his influence on GOERING in order to restrict the absolute, supreme position of I.G. in the Office of the Four Year Plan, and that SCHLICHT, after GOERING's refusal to make any concessions which would be to I.G.'s disadvantage, contacted HITLER in writing for the purpose of obtaining his intervention. SCHLICHT's efforts in regard to HITLER were also unsuccessful.

I have carefully read each of the two (2) pages of this affidavit and countersigned it with my own hand, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them, and I herewith declare under oath that I have stated the full truth in this affidavit to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signature) Dr. Max Kuegler
DR. MAX KUEGLER

Sworn to and signed before me this 25th day of August 1947 at the Police of Justice, Bamberg, Germany, by Dr. Max KUEGLER, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signature) Otto Heilbrunn
Dr. Otto HEILBRUNN
ETO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
US War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

5 September 1947

I, Britte TURK, ETO 35130, hereby certify that I am a duly appointed translator for the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-9945.

Britte TURK
ETO 35130

2

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9944
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF CONSUL FOR WAR CRIMES

AFFIDAVIT

I, Privy Counsellor Dr. Max KUERNER, at present at Linden, Hotel Koenig von Preussen, after having been warned that I shall be liable to punishment for making a false statement, herewith declare the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion:

1. From 1934 until 1942 I was Ministerialrat in the Reich Ministry of Economics, i.e. I was Chief of the Chemistry Department of the Ministry from 1934 until 1938, and Chief of the Department for Oils and Fats from 1938 until 1942.

2. The preponderance of the I.G. Farben Industrie in the German economy was so strong that the former President of the Reichstag and Reich Minister of Economics SCHACHT tried as early as 1933 to counterbalance the power of I.G. It was his intention to bring about a union of that part of the chemical industry which was independent of I.G. I myself have taken part in some of those meetings, and apart from that I have been informed by SCHACHT about the development of the meetings with the industry. SCHACHT's efforts failed, as the Chemical Industry outside I.G. was afraid to challenge the powerful position of I.G.

Thereupon SCHACHT issued a directive to the Reich Ministry of Economics according to which the officials of the Ministry should prevent the I.G. by all possible means from buying up industrial concerns.

3. The German Dyestuff Industry, the Synthetic Tanning Industry, the Plastic Industry as well as the Synthetic Fibre Industry were completely or almost completely dependent on I.G. As far as hardening agents were concerned, the Steel Industry was completely dependent on I.G. as they were the only producers of nickel in Germany and the only processing firm of molybdenum, tungsten and pyrite. The Machinery and Vehicle Constructing Industry was dependent on I.G. for plastic materials and magnesium, the Leather Industry bought synthetic tanning materials from I.G., the Electro-Technical Industry met part of their requirements of plastic materials with the help of I.G. The I.G. controlled

(page 2 of original)

the Light-Metal Industry, to a considerable extent, synthetic rubber was exclusively produced by I.G., and I.G. was also the only producer of synthetic fuels according to the hydration method. The Powder and Explosives Industry was to a large extent dependent on I.G. for nitric acid and diglycol.

Agriculture and Forestry bought synthetic fertilizers exclusively from I.G. and their licensed subsidiaries, and even the Food and Luxury Food Industries were to a certain extent dependent on I.G., e.g. with regard to saccharin.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT W.MI-9944
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

4. To sum up the situation it can be said that numerous German war industries were almost completely dependant on I.C.

I have carefully read each of the two (2) pages of this affidavit and countersigned it with my own hand, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them, and I herewith declare under oath that I have stated the full truth in this affidavit to the best of my knowledge and belief.

signature: Dr. Max KUEGLER

Sworn to and signed before me this 25th day of August 1947 at the Palace of Justice, Nuernberg, Germany, by Dr. Max KUEGLER, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Signature : Otto HEILBRUNN
Dr. Otto HEILBRUNN
ETO 3 1/C
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
US War Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

5 September 1947

I, Brittice TURK CGO No. 35 130, hereby certify that I am a duly appointed translator of the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. MI-9944.

.....
Brittice TURK
CGO No. 35 130

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-10500
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR U. S. CRIMES

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Walter LEYZ, at present living in Wolfsburg near Fallersleben, having belonged to the Reich Ministry of Economics from 1934 - 1943, to wit, as Gewerbeassessor and Gewerberat (Trade Consultant) from 1934-36, as Regierungsrat from 1936-38, as Oberregierungsrat from 1938-1941 and as Ministerialrat from 1941-1943, after having been warned that I shall be liable to punishment for making false statements, herewith declare of my own free will and without coercion:

1. Within the Reich Ministry of Economics, I was an assistant in the Chemistry Department from 1934-1936, consultant in the Chemistry Department from 1936-1941 and Chief Consultant in the same department from 1941-1943.

2. Beginning in 1936, I.G. supported GOERING's economic policy wholeheartedly. When the Office of the Four Year Plan was created, a considerable number of positions within this office was filled by I.G. employees, since, allegedly, no other suitable persons were available. The I.G. played a major part in the development projects of the Four Year Plan.

At approximately the same time, the cooperation of I.G. with all Wehrmacht offices became ever closer, whereas, as I learned from Min.Rat Geh.Rat KUEGLER and Oberreg.Rat HOFFMANN, its relations with the Reich Ministry of Economics grew steadily cooler.

This development was watched with anxiety in the Reich Ministry of Economics. The Reich Ministry of Economics considered it unhealthy that an industrial firm such as I.G. should provide officials for the Office of the Four Year Plan, in consequence of which the officials concerned would have to exercise a double loyalty. Moreover, it caused anxiety in the Reich Ministry of Economics that I.G. officials, as planners of the Four Year Plan, outlined the tasks of I.G. which the latter then executed. As Ministerialrat Geheimrat Dr. KUEGLER and Oberregierungsrat Dr. HOFFMANN repeatedly stated to me, the Reich Ministry of Economics feared, in particular, that I.G.

(page 2 of original)

with the aid of GOERING and the Wehrmacht offices, would be in a position, not only to frustrate the economic policies of the Reich Ministry of Economics but, over and above that, to project and carry out its own economic policies.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-10500
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original cont'd)

The Officials of the Reich Ministry of Economics - KUEGLER-HOFFMANN, etc., on various occasions expressed their fears in memoranda to SCHACHT and pointed out that not only they but also representatives of the chemical industry independent of I.G. were viewing this situation with great anxiety. However, all efforts of the Reich Ministry of Economics to counter-act the effects of I.G. influence remained unsuccessful.

I have carefully read each of the 2 (two) pages of this affidavit and signed them. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them. I herewith declare under oath that I have stated the absolute truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signature: Dr. Walter LENZ

Dr. WALTER LENZ

Sworn to and signed before me this 30th day of August 1947, at the Palace of Justice, Nurnberg, Germany, by Dr. Walter LENZ, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Otto HEILBRONN

Dr. Ott. HEILBRONN
WTO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
US War Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

6 September 1947

I, Samuel S. HORN, AGO No. 443 113, hereby certify that I am a duly appointed translator for the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-10500.

.....
Samuel S. HORN
AGO No. 443 113

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9656
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Affidavit.

I, Paul KERNER, State Secretary in the Four Year Plan from 1936 - 1945, after having been warned that I shall be liable to punishment for making a false statement, herewith declare the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion:

1. The actual preliminary work for the Four Year Plan was started in the middle of 1936 by listing existing production capacities and planning for production capacity expansions in the fields affected by the Four Year Plan. To start with, these plans merely determined which expansions were necessary. At that stage it was not yet determined which firms were to be expanded.

The plans for this preliminary work were forwarded to the Reich Ministry of Economics in their present form, which in turn sent them to the various Reich Offices (Reichsstellen) of the interested industrial groups, and, for the chemical sector, sent them to the Reich Office Chemistry or Mineral oil for discussion with the interested firms. These firms then determined in individual negotiations with the Reich Office, which building projects they wanted and were able to carry out. At the same time these firms made known what guarantees by the Reich in regard to demand and price, what alleviation of taxes or lowering of taxes, and what Reich loans they would demand for the execution of the building projects, and how many workers and how much material they would need for this. The proposals by the industry were then returned to the Reich Ministry of Economics or to the Office for German Raw and Industrial Materials; the Reich Ministry of Economics forwarded financial requests of the Industry to the Reich Ministry of Finance, while the requests for the supply of material and workers were forwarded to the Office for German Raw and Industrial Materials.

2. In the fall of 1936 it became evident that the Iron Producing Industry under the leadership of VOGLER, WENZEL, and others was not willing to open up the Salzgitter area within the framework of the Four Year Plan.

(page 2 of original)

Despite all GOERING's protests they maintained their negative attitude. The Iron Producing Industry was therefore only to a relatively small extent engaged in projects of the Four Year Plan, and the planned large projects in this field were carried out by the Hermann Goering Werke which were founded for this purpose in 1937. The building costs for the Hermann Goering Werke amounted to approx. 1500 million RM up to 1942.

(page 2 of original cont'd)

3. The raw material plan was mainly based on three industrial groups: the Coal Industry, the Iron Producing Industry, and the Chemical Industry. As the existing German coal production capacities for 1937 were sufficient, and as the Iron Producing Industry refused to collaborate in the Salzgitter project, the I.G. and their licensed firms had the largest share in the expansion projects of the raw material plan within the Four Year Plan 1937. As is known, the I.G. was willing to support the Four Year Plan projects at any time.

4. Apart from the above-mentioned negotiations between the Industry and the Reich Offices, direct negotiations had of course taken place between GÖRING and the Industry before publication of the Four Year Plan.

I have carefully read each of the 3 (three) pages of this affidavit and countersigned it with my own hand, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them, and I herewith declare under oath that I have stated the full truth in this affidavit to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signature: Paul Koerner
PAUL KOERNER

(page 3 of original)

Sworn to and signed before me this 15th day of August 1947 at the Palace of Justice, Nuernberg, Germany, by Paul KOERNER, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Signature: Ctto Heilbrunn
Dr. Ctto Heilbrunn
ER 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
US War Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

26 August 1947

I, BRIGITTE TURK, ETC No. 35130, herewith certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI-9656.

BRIGITTE TURK, ETC No. 35130

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Hans MAGER, Chemist employed by I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. from 1928 to 1945, member of Vermittlungsstelle W from 1938 to 1945, at present living at Neumarkt/Oberpfalz, Badstrasse 52, having been duly advised that I shall render myself liable to punishment by making a false statement, herewith depose the following on oath, voluntarily and without coercion:

1. The increases in the production capacities for synthetic rubber, calcium carbide, magnesium and stabilizers effected within I.G. since about 1935/1936, exceeded, sometimes by a considerable amount, Germany's peacetime requirements of these products.

2. German peacetime consumption of synthetic rubber (Duna) is to be placed, according to reliable estimates which were considered authentic by I.G. as well as by the Four Year Plan Authorities, at 80-100,000 tons per year. The normal peacetime requirements of the Wehrmacht are included in this estimate. Within the framework of the Four Year Plan, however, the following production capacities were envisaged for synthetic rubber production within the I.G. or the works controlled by I.G.

Schlopau	72,000 tons per year
Huels	36,000 " " "
Leverkusen	4,000 " " "
	<hr/>
	112,000 " " "

These figures alone already exceed Germany's peacetime requirements by as much as 40%.

3. Calcium carbide is the most important preliminary product for the production of synthetic rubber. In addition, it is used for the production of synthetic acetic acid, synthetic solvents and plastics. In so far as it was used as basic material for the production of synthetic rubber, the production capacities of the I.G. plants exceeded peacetime requirements to the same extent as for Duna.

(page 2
of orig)

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

4. Magnesium: I have been shown Dr. Eberhard NEUKIRCH's work, "The Development of the Light Metal Industry within the Four Year Plan, with particular reference to the period of Greater Germany's Fight for Freedom, from 1939 onwards" Document Number NI-7562. This work was written in the office of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, who, at the same time, was Plenipotentiary for Special Questions connected with Chemical Production. In this book, German peacetime requirements of magnesium, including export figures are quoted as approximately 21,000 tons per year, this amount being utilized as follows:

Home Consumption (Civil)	1,400 tons per year
Export	3,600 " " "
Current requirements of the Wehrmacht	3,600 " " "
Stockpiling for the Wehrmacht	9,800 " " "
Salvaged scrap metal and material used in the production of alloys	2,400 " " "
	20,800 tons per year

Against these consumption figures stood the following figures showing proposed production capacities of works, the enlargement of which was projected or already under way (as of August 1937):

Aken	6,000 tons per year
Bitterfeld	3,600 " " "
Strassfurt	4,100 " " "
Heringen	2,000 " " "
Works I	4,000 " " "
Works II	5,000 " " "
	26,700 tons per year

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

	26,700
Aken Extension Buildings	8,000 tons per year
Strassfurt Extension Buildings	4,100 " " "
Heringen Extension Buildings	2,000 " " "
	<hr/>
	40,800 tons per year

Thus German peacetine requirements, including amounts required for stockpiling for Wehrmacht purposes were exceeded by almost 100%.

At that time, no decision had as yet been made as to who was to be responsible for placing the contract for the erection of Works I and II, who were to be their Betriebs-fuehrer and where the works were to be situated.

(page 3 of original)

According to the table, "The extent of I.G.'s Contributions to the Total of Germany's Production of Important Products in the years 1937 and 1943, expressed in Percentages", Document Number NI- 10009, to the authenticity of which Dr. Ernst A. STRUSS swore on 22 June 1947, I.G. produced 100% of the total of magnesium produced in Germany in 1937 and 86% in 1943.

The statistics used in the above, taken from the HEUNIRCH Report are to be found on pages 83 and 93 of that report, CCC pagination.

5. Stabilisers: Production capacity for the production of stabilisers was divided, in the year 1937/1938, between two plants. Of these, the one in Urdingen, which had an annual production capacity of approximately 3,000 tons, was the property of I.G., while the second plant, also with an annual production capacity of approximately 3,000 tons, was owned by the Reich, and had been erected by I.G., by order of the Reich, on Reich-owned land adjacent to the Wolfen Dyestuffs factory. In accordance with the terms of contracts concluded with the Reich, the management of this stand-by plant was the responsibility of I.G.

I know from previous negotiations with Department "Z" of the I.G. Sales Combine for Chemicals at Frankfurt and from discussions with the Staff of the Army Ordnance Office and the Armaments Supply Department of OKH, that the output of the Urdingen plant- approximately 240 tons per month to 3,000 tons per year- amply covered Germany's peacetine requirements of stabilisers, both for home consumption and for export.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENTS No. NI-9272
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

The capacities of the factories at the disposal of I.G. thus exceeded peacetime requirements by 100%.

I have carefully read each of the four pages of this affidavit and have countersigned them with my own hand, I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and have countersigned them with my initials, and I herewith declare on oath

(page 4 of original)

that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, I have spoken the absolute truth in this statement.

Signature: Dr. Hans WAGNER
~~Dr. Hans WAGNER~~

Sworn to and signed before me this 5th day of August 1947 at Nurnberg, Germany, Palace of Justice, by Dr. Hans WAGNER, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Signature: Otto HEILBRUNN
~~Otto HEILBRUNN~~

Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes,
US War Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Beryl C. BESWICK Civ. No. D-427 459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-9272 (a copy of doc)

Beryl C. BESWICK
Civ.No. D-427 459

-4-

"END"

12

Case 6
Affidavit No. NI 9272
Doc. Pkt. 31 (e/6)

AFFIDAVIT.

I, Dr. ERNST STRUSS, director of IG Farben, chief of the Office of the Technical Committee of IG Farben, Secretary of the Technical Committee of the Vorstand of IG, chief of Sparte II of Vermittlungsstelle W, and production chief of the entire German dyestuffs industry covered by the Economic Group Chemical Industry since 1943, having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making false statements, herewith state under oath, voluntarily and without coercion, the following:

In the affidavit following I am dealing with the Buna production capacity of IG which had been planned before the outbreak of war:

- 1.) In the discussion of 4 April 1939 between Dr. ter Meer, Dr. Ambros, Dr. Konrad and myself as representatives of IG. and members of the Reich Office for Economic Development, with Dr. Eckel in the chair, it was decided that the production capacity for the buna plant should be increased to 40 000 tons per year and that of the buna plant Schkopau to 60 000 tons per year.
- 2.) Further a third buna plant was planned, Fuerstenberg on the Oder, during 1939 before the outbreak of war. This factory was to have a starting capacity of 12 000 tons per year with possibilities for increasing this to 24 000 tons per year.
- 3.) According to this the total plans of IG for buna production therefore amounted to 112 000 tons before the outbreak of war; in Fuerstenberg an additional expansion by 12 000 tons per year was intended.

I have carefully read the above affidavit and personally signed it. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialled them. I herewith declare under oath that in this statement I have told the pure truth according to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signature) Dr. Ernst Struss.

(page 2 of original)

Sworn to and signed before me this 21st day of November 1947 at Nuernberg Germany by Dr. ERNST STRUSS known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signature) Otto Heilbrunn
Dr. Otto Heilbrunn
Civilian ETO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
US War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, ETO 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the Document No. NI-12627.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
ETO 34079.

END

12a

(Rubber Stamp:) Top Secret

(1's.) Copies
of those Sections which concern mineral oils
only

Monthly Reports

of the German Armaments Industry,

for Internal Circulation

(Utilization of the War Diaries of the Staff of the Economic
Armaments Office, Military Economy Office and Raw Materials
Department of the Military Economy Office)

September 1939

OFF Economic Armaments Office
Staff Is 5
Completed to the end of
March 1940

(page 2 of original)

Mobilization

The mobilization of Industry took place gradually, controlled by the political situation. On 25 August, the order for the secret mobilization of the Wehrmacht was issued (L.N.-Day = 25 August). On 29 August, the Economic Armaments Office of OKW¹⁾ issued to the branches of the Wehrmacht the order to prepare for the mobilization of industry and for the drawing up of an Immediate (i. e. Production ?) Plan for the Wehrmacht. On 3 September, the Economic Armaments Office of OKW issued to the branches of the Wehrmacht and to the Armaments Inspectorate its order on the conduct of mobilization and also on the implementation of the Immediate Production Program.

With the commencement of mobilization, the primary task was the inclusion in the Wehrmacht Production Plan of the various armaments programs and programs operating under the Four Year Plan. In the course of a lecture delivered at the headquarters of the Chief of OKW, the Office Chief explained that, as a result of the lack of man-power, factories and raw materials, it was impossible to carry out all the programs simultaneously and to complete them all by the prescribed date. Clear instructions were therefore to be given with all speed on the Fuehrer's wishes as far as the regulation of priority was

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

concerned. Only when these decisions had been clearly laid down would it be possible to undertake a systematic allocation of manpower, factory space and raw materials. The Office Chief made the following suggestion:

- 1) 16 October the name "Military Economic Staff" (Militärwirtschaftsstab) replaced by "Military Economic Office" (Militärwirtschaftsamt), the name "Military Economic Office" (Militärwirtschaftsamt) by "Military Economic and Armaments Office" (Militärwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt), "Military Economic Inspectorates" (Militärwirtschafts-Inspektionen), by * "Military Economic Office" (Militärwirtschaftsstelle) by "Armaments Command" (Kommando des Rüstungsbereiches). In the reports, the newest names are used throughout.

*) Armaments Inspectorates
(Rüstungs-Inspektionen)

(page 3 of original)

- 1) Production of munitions including conversion to production from substitute materials,
- 2) Gun powder and Explosives Plan,
- 3) Ju 88 Program,
- 4) Production Plans of the Branches of the Wehrmacht (the most urgent tasks in connexion with supply) including supply of Anti-Aircraft requirements,
- 5) Fuel Program,
- 6) Increase of the Magnesium and Buna Production Potential,
- 7) Fortified Air Fields,
- 8) Less urgent tasks included in the Production Plan,
- 9) Construction work connected with Air Raid Precautions.

As far as the Navy was concerned, it had been laid down as early as 1 September that the peace time program was cancelled and that the following replaced it, in order of urgency:

- 1) Repair of those ships in the dockyards which are capable of being repaired,
- 2) Armament and alteration of 456 auxiliary vessels,
- 3) Completion of large ships, battle ships within one year, large cruisers over a period of 3/4 years,

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

- 4) Program for the construction of new vessels in accordance with the production Plan.

In the course of a conference with the representatives of the branches of the Wehrmacht on 3 September, the Office Chief again explained the necessity for the establishment of the order of precedence, based on the urgency of the individual Production Programs. Above all, current munitions production was to be increased to the highest possible level and in particular the expansion of munitions production to production from substitute materials still further promoted. In connection with the production of munitions, the increase of the production of explosives was also urgent. The Ju 88 Program and the expansion of fuel production were just as important. The remaining programs were not so urgent and their fulfillment was to be delayed accordingly. Firm direction and control of production by OK was now particularly essential. Attention was also called to the necessity for discontinuing all construction work not essential to the defense of the land.

(page 4 of original)

On 7 September, the instruction of the Economic Armaments Office of OK on the necessity for the establishment of the order of precedence of the Production Programs according to urgency as laid down in the Fuehrer's order of 3 September, was issued to the three branches of the Wehrmacht.

- 1) The most urgent task of German industry is the supply of the fighting sectors of the Wehrmacht with the necessary munitions and those important spare parts for arms and equipment which are in most frequent need of replacement on account of wear and tear.

Alongside the most important tasks of the Production Programs come the following programs which are less urgent:

- 2) Ju 88 Program,
- 3) Increase of the production of munitions and explosives,
- 4) Utilization of "a"-shift materials, the utility of which lies in their economy value and of substitute materials,
- 5) Extension of the Fuel Program,
- 6) Extension of Fortified Air Fields on similar lines,
- 7) Execution of the most important Reich Railroad Program in accordance with Wehrmacht requirements,
- 8) Increase of the Production of Munition and Chemical Warfare Agents,
- 9) Continuation of the work connected with Coastal Defense Fortifications,
- 10) Construction work connected with Air Raid Precautions.

All previously established regulations on priority were herewith invalidated. This order could, however, still provide no clear and conclusive decision on the veritable focal point, a decision which was necessary in view of the tense situation existing in all fields.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. NI-7296
CONTINUED

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

The interruption or restriction to an absolute minimum of other building projects proved necessary for the fulfillment of these programs. Within the Construction Sector, the building projects necessitated by the Program took absolute priority. The branches of the Wehrmacht themselves were to decide on the continuation of construction work undertaken for the Wehrmacht. Here, too, only those buildings which were essential to the defense of the land were to be completed.

.....

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

22 July 1947

I, Beryl C. BESNICK, No. D 427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7296.

Beryl C. BESNICK
No. D 427459

- 4 -
"END"

16

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Botho Malert, Regierungsrat in the Reich Ministry of Economics from 1922 until 1925, Oberregierungsrat there from 1925 until 1930, Ministerialrat in the same ministry from 1930 until 1938 and Ministerialdirigent there from 1938 until 1944, now living at Minden/Westphalia, Bachstr. 44, after having been warned that I shall be liable to punishment for making a false statement, herewith declare the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion:

1) I was consultant for Chemistry in the Reich Ministry of Economics from 1922 until the end of 1933 or 1934 and from 1938 until 1944. From 1934 until 1938 I was consultant for Mineral Oil there.

2) Next to the heavy industry I.G. may be considered the backbone of the German preparation for war, in the first place on account of its own production and in the second place on account of its key-position in the German economy. The German dye-stuff industry, the synthetic tannins industry, the plastics industry as well as the artificial fibre industry were entirely or almost entirely dependant on I.G.. The I.G. was to a great extent predominating in the light metal industry, it was the sole producer of synthetic rubber and together with its licensees, the sole manufacturer of synthetic motor fuel by the hydrogenation process. The gun powder and explosives industry largely depended upon I.G. for nitric acid and diglycol.

3) The above demonstrates the all but complete dependence of the German Chemical and non-chemical War Industries on I.G. with the exception, of course, of the iron producing industry and the industry engaged in the final processing of munition. For the production of tanks, armored vehicles and guns, magnesium was used, which was almost exclusively produced by I.G.. Army vehicles had tires of I.G.'s Buna and were driven on I.G. gasoline. In the airplanes I.G. magnesium was used to a great extent, they were driven on I.G. gasoline and the bombs were filled with explosives which were mostly manufactured by the I.G. Konzern.

4) If one disregards the iron producing industry and the mechanical production of the munitions of war, one could say that there

(page 2 of original)

was no branch of the war industry which did not depend in one way or other on I.G.. In the Reich Ministry of Economics this situation was considered an unhealthy one and once, - I do no longer remember the time - it was contemplated to create a counter-weight to I.G. by establishing a combine of the German chemical industry outside I.G.. These plans, however, came to nothing.

I have carefully read each of the 2 (two) pages of this declaration and counter-signed them with my own hand, I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and have initialled them with the first letters of my name and I herewith declare under oath that I have told the pure truth in this declaration to the best of my knowledge and belief.

signature: Dr. Botho Malert
Dr. Botho Malert

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9476
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original cont'd)

Sworn to and signed before me this 11th day of August 1947 at the
Palace of Justice, Nurnberg, Germany, by Dr. Botho Mulert, known
to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

signature: DR. OTTO HEILBRUNN
DR. OTTO HEILBRUNN
ETO 30140
Office of the Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
US War Department.

--- CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION ---

26 August 1947

I, LEONARD LAWRENCE, ETO-20138, hereby certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the English and German languages and that the above
is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-9476.

LEONARD LAWRENCE, ETO-20138.

- 2 -
"END"

18

A F F I D A V I T

I, Dr. Heinrich BUETEFISCH, Nurnberg, Palace of Justice, after having been warned that I shall be liable to punishment for making a false statement herewith state the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion:

On 23 or 29 August 1939, Dr. Christian SCHNEIDER, the plant leader (Betriebsfuehrer) of "Leunawerk", received from the President of the Government (Regierungspraesident) or from the Commander of the military district the order for mobilization of the plant.

On the same day, Dr. SCHNEIDER called a meeting of the departmental chiefs - about 20 - informed them about the order for mobilization, discussed the measures to be taken and ordered them to inform the subordinate "plant leaders" immediately. I was present at this meeting. Dr. SCHNEIDER closed the discussion with the words: "This is war" and requested those assembled to place themselves now at the disposal of the Fatherland with all their power.

The departmental chiefs for their part informed the "plant leaders" of "Leunawerke" - about 60 - who thereupon informed the foremen. On 29 or 30 August 1939 the whole plant knew that the order for mobilization had been proclaimed.

In 1935 or 1936, it was obvious that the aim of the national socialist economic and military policy was to establish an as complete as possible state of self-sufficiency in Germany. Since the German march into Czechoslovakia, that is since March 1939, it was clear to me that the Military economy could be aiming at development into an aggressive war. Without I.G. Farben, especially without the I.G. production in the fields of synthetic rubber, gasoline and magnesium, it would have been out of the question for Germany to carry on a war.

I have carefully read this affidavit and countersigned it in my own handwriting; I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and marked them with my initials. I declare herewith under oath that I have stated the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signature) Dr. Heinrich BUETEFISCH

Sworn to and signed before me this 16th day of April 1947 at Nurnberg, by Dr. Heinrich BUETEFISCH, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signature) Dr. Otto HEILBRUNN
ETO 30140,
OCCWC, U.S. War Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, ETO No. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-6235.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
ETO No. 34079

(E N D)

I.G.'s AND SUBSIDIARIES' SHARE IN TOTAL GERMAN PRODUCTION
Prozentualer Anteil der I.G. und ihrer Unterbeteiligungen
wichtiger Erzeugnisse in den Jahren 1937 und

Production in 1000 M

	1 9 3 7	
	I.G.	Germany Deutschland
Nitrogen (N)..... / Stickstoff (N)	580	835
(Ammonia and Calcium Cyanamide) (Ammoniak und Kalk- stickstoff)		
Diglycol / Diglykol	0,5	?
Explosives / Sprengstoffe		
Gunpowder / Schiesspulver		
Synthetic Gasoline.. / Synthetischer Treib- and Lubricating Oil / stoff und synth. Schmieröl	360	600
Tetraethyllead..... / Tetraäthylblei.....	-	-
Synthetic Rubber.... / Synthetischer Gummi..	3,4	3,4
Magnesium / Magnesium	12	12
Aluminum / Aluminium	10	132
Poison Gas / Kampfgas	-	-
Sulphuric Acid / Schwefelsäure	593	1700
Chlorine / Chlor	161	370
Caustic Soda and / Natron- und Kalilauge Potash	173	660
Calcium Carbide..... / Kalziumkarbid	515	950
Sodium Cyanide..... / Cyannatrium	5	10,8
Stabilizers..... / Stabilisatoren	1,6	1,6
Methanol / Methanol	104	104
Other Solvents / Andere Lösungsmittel	87	90

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Ernst A. STRUSS, FRANKFURT (MAIN), Gärtnersweg 59, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:
 I was Director of I.G. Farben, Chief of ED-Bureau of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of I.G., Manager of Division II (Sparte II) of the Vertriebsstelle II, and, since 1932, Production Manager of the entire German dyestuffs industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry.

By virtue of said offices I acquired full and complete knowledge of the production figures of I.G. and I.G. controlled companies. The figures "Total Production" are estimated and a result of my investigations.

This chart is to my best knowledge and belief a true and faithful representation of the facts.

I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

Dr. Ernst A. Struss

Dr. ERNST A. STRUSS

was to and signed before me this 22nd day of June 1947 at Frankfurt (Main) by Dr. Ernst A. Struss known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Heinrich Heilmann

Dr. OTTO HEILMANN

Civilian, ETO 30140, Office of Chief of Counsel for
 the Crime (IG) War Department

02

I.G.'s AND SUBSIDIARIES' SHARE IN TOTAL GERMAN PRODUCTION OF STRATEGIC MATERIALS, 1937 AND 1943.

Prozentualer Anteil der I.G. und ihrer Unterbeteiligungen an der gesamten deutschen Produktion wichtiger Erzeugnisse in den Jahren 1937 und 1943.

Production in 1000 Metric Tons.

	1 9 3 7		1 9 4 3		I.G.'s share in % I.G. Anteil in %	
	I.G.	Germany Deutschland	I.G.	Germany Deutschland	1937	1943
Nitrogen (N)...../ Stickstoff (N)	580	835	600	800	70	75
(Ammonia and Calcium Cyanamide) (Ammoniak und Kalkstickstoff)						
Diglycol / Diglykol	0,5	?	11,2	?	?	?
Explosives / Sprengstoffe			221	263		84
Gunpowder / Schiesspulver			132	188		70
Synthetic Gasoline.. / Synthetischer Treib- and Lubricating Oil / stoff und synth. Schmieröl	380	600	910	2660	60	34
Tetraethyllead..... / Tetraäthylblei.....	-	-	7,6	7,6	-	100
Synthetic Rubber.... / Synthetischer Gummi..	3,4	3,4	118	118	100	100
Magnesium / Magnesium	12	12	27,4	30,9	100	88
Aluminum / Aluminium	10	132	24	300	7	8
Poison Gas / Kampfgas	-	-	?	?	-	95
Sulphuric Acid / Schwefelsäure	593	1700	707	2000	35	35
Chlorine / Chlor	181	370	346	620	43	56
Caustic Soda and Potash / Natron- und Kalilauge	173	660	367	1026	25	36
Calcium Carbide..... / Kalziumkarbid	515	950	830	1370	52	61
Sodium Cyanide..... / Cyannatrium	5	10,8	8,9	12,1	46	52
Stabilizers..... / Stabilisatoren	1,6	1,6	10,9	10,9	100	100
Methanol / Methanol	104	104	247	247	100	100
Other Solvents / Andere Lösungsmittel	67	90	171	228	75	75

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Ernst A. STRUSS, FRANKFURT (MAIN), Gärtnersweg 59, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

I was Director of I.G. Farben, Chief of TEA-Bureau of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of I.G., Manager of Division II (Sparte II) of the Vertriebsstelle II, and, since 1943, Production Manager of the entire German dyestuffs industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry.

By virtue of said offices I acquired full and complete knowledge of the production figures of I.G. and I.G. controlled companies. The figures "Total Production" are estimated and a result of my investigations.

This chart is to my best knowledge and belief a true and faithful representation of the topic.

I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

Dr. Ernst A. Struss

Dr. ERNST A. STRUSS

was seen and signed before me this 22nd day of June 1947 at Frankfurt (Main) by Dr. Ernst A. Struss known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

H. Heilbrunn

Dr. OTTO HEILBRUNN

Civilian, ETO 30140, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes US War Department

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-10021
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I, Dr. Ernst STRUSS, Direktor of I.G. Farben, head of the Office of the Technical Committee of I.G., secretary of the Technical Committee of the Vorstand of I.G., head of Sparte II of Vermittlungsstelle W, and, since 1945, production manager of the whole German Dyestuffs Industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making a false statement, herewith state under oath of my own free will and without coercion:

I wish to make the following statements concerning the Table, marked N I 10 009, entitled "Proportional Share of I.G. and its subsidiaries in the Whole German Production of Important Products in the Years 1937 and 1945".

I. Production Data For I.G. in the Table.

1. Nitrogen.

(initials)
Str.

The table contains the total production of the Leuna, Oppau, Piesteritz and Knapsack plants. The production of the Trostberg plant which is also included in the table, is listed with 30%, in accordance with I.G.'s share. Exact production figures are available for Oppau, the remaining production figures have been estimated by me on the basis of production and sales data, in so far as these are available.

2. Di. lycol.

The table contains exact production figures for the Ludwigshafen and Gendorf plants. Production figures for Huels and Wolfen could not even be estimated and were, therefore, not included in the table.

3. Explosives and Gun Powder.

The table contains the production figures of Binitrobenzene for the I.G. plants Griesheim, Hoechst and Leverkusen, further, the production of Dynamit Aktiengesellschaft, formerly Alfred NOBEL & Co. and the Verwertchemie. Exact data are available for the I.G. figures; for the figures of Dynamit A.G. and the Verwertchemie, I have used the statistics which were compiled in April 1946 by the I.G. Control

(Initials) Str.

(page 2 of original)

Office in Frankfurt/Main under the direction of Herr BEICHPFISCHER. Since only the total figures are available for explosives and gun powder of Dynamit A.G. and Verwertchemie, I have estimated the division of these two products to the best of my knowledge.

4. Synthetic Fuel and Synthetic Lubricating oil:

In 1937, only Leuna produced synthetic fuel and these production figures appear in the table. For 1943, the complete fuel production of Heydebreck and Pöchlitz is included in addition to Leuna. Production of Heydebreck is estimated at 60-80,000 tons, production of Pöchlitz at 250-270,000 tons. Synthetic lubricating oil was produced at Schkopau, Leuna, Moosbierhaus and Heydebreck in 1943. The production figures are estimated.

5. Lead Tetra Ethyl

I have no basis for an estimate for 1937. I assume that there was no production that year, or at least, none worth mentioning. No production figures were available for 1943, either, and I therefore took over the figures for 1942. Lead tetra ethyl was produced at Drose and Gppl, both of which are included in the table to the full extent of production.

6. Synthetic Rubber:

Synthetic rubber was produced in Buna plants 1-4, which are included in the table to the full extent, as well as in the I.G. plant Leverkusen. The actual production figures are known for all factories.

7. Magnesium:

Was produced at Bitterfeld, Aken and Stassfurt. Production appears in the table to the full extent. The exact production figures are available.

8. Aluminum:

Was produced at Bitterfeld 1 and 2 and at Aken. I.G.'s share of production of these plants is shown at 50% in the table. Since the figures for 1943 were not available, the figures for 1942 were used in the table. The figures for 1943 should be approximately the same as for 1942.

(initials) Str.

(page 3 of original)

9. Chemical Warfare Gas:

Was produced at Gendorf, Dyhernfurth, Falkenhagen and Uerdingen. I do not know whether I.G. also had a share in Arnendorf. The production figures for the plants are neither known nor can they be estimated. I went on the assumption that only small quantities were produced at Arnendorf and that production was undertaken preponderantly at the aforementioned I.G. plants known to me. On that basis I arrived at an estimate of I.G.'s share for 1943. Presumably, there was no production during 1937.

10. Sulphuric Acid:

Production at Hoechst, Leverkusen, Dormagen, Verdinge, Ludwigshafen, Wolfen, Doberitz, Leuna and the Kruemmel and Schlebusch DAG-Works is included in the table to the full extent. Data for the production figures of all plants are available.

11. Chlorine:

The table lists the full production of the plants at Hoechst, Gersthofen, Leuna, Ludwigshafen, Rheinfelden, Schkopau, Bitterfeld, Wolfen, Heydebreck, Huels, Gendorf and the Wecker-Works at Burghausen and Mueckenberg. Exact data for the production figures of all plants are available.

12. Sodium and Potash Lye:

Were manufactured in the same plant as chlorine. The table shows the full production. Exact production data are available for all plants.

13. Calcium carbide:

(initials) For the Ludwigshafen and Schkopau plants in the table, I have entered the exact figures which are known to me. For Piesteritz and Knapsack, I have estimated the production and have included it 100%,
Str. for Hart (Grostberg) at 30%.
Str.
Str.

Str.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. W110021
CONTINUED

(page 4 of original)

14. Cyanide of Sodium:

The table shows the exact production figures of Ludwigshafen.

15. Stabilizers:

The table shows the exact production figures for Uerdingen, whereas the Wolfen figures are an estimate based on sales figures.

16. Methanol:

Was produced at Leuna, Oppau, Waldenburg in 1937, and in 1943 at Heydebreck and Auschwitz as well. The production of these plants, as shown in the table, are based on exact figures.

17. Other Solvents:

The table shows 100% of the production at Hoechst, Gersthofen, Offenbach, Leverkusen, Uerdingen, Zweckel, Ludwigshafen, Rheinfelden, Schkopau, Bitterfeld, Wolfen, Knappeck and Huels, and 50% of the production at the Wacker-Works Burghausen and Mueckenberg, which represents I.G.'s share. Exact production figures are available.

The above products were produced only at the aforementioned plants by I.G. or its subsidiaries.

II. I have given an estimate of the whole German production for 1937 and 1943 because exact data are for the most part unavailable. My estimates are either based on my own specialized knowledge or on the statements of other I.G. specialists in their special sectors. Naturally, these gentlemen, as well as I, had the data on which to base the estimates. Before accepting the estimates of other specialists, I discussed them thoroughly,

(initials) Str.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-10021
CONTINUED

(page 5 of original)

and therefore, I know that the data given to me are authentic.

I have carefully read each of the 5 pages of this affidavit. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialled each correction. I declare herewith under oath that I have stated the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Signature) Dr. Ernst A. STRUSS

Dr. Ernst A. STRUSS

Sworn to and signed before me this 21st day of June 1947 at Frankfurt/Main by Dr. Ernst A. STRUSS known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(Signature) Dr. Otto HEILBRUNN

Dr. Otto HEILBRUNN

Civilian ETO 30140

Office of Chief of Counsel for War
Crimes

U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

5 August 1947

I, SAMUEL S. HORN, AGC 443,113, herewith certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-10021.

SAMUEL S. HORN
AGC 443 113

- 5 -
"END"

85

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. ERNST STRUSS, Director of I.G. Farben, Chief of TFA Bureau of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of the Vorstand of I.G., Manager of Division II (Sparte II) of the Vermittlungsstelle II, and, since 1943, Production Manager of the entire German dyestuffs industry within the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

Due to the dominating role of I.G. in the chemical field, the chemical industry and numerous other industries were dependent on Farben as it is shown in the following:

I. I-ORGANICS:-

1. Nitrogen

I.G. production amounted to 70% of the total German production. In normal times about 80% of the I.G. production went into fertilizers while the rest was mostly used for explosives and gunpowder and to a very small extent for technical purposes. The gunpowder and explosive industries were almost entirely dependent on I.G. The explosive industries covered about 84% of its nitrate requirements from I.G. while gunpowder producers obtained approximately 70% from I.G.

2. Sulphuric Acid

I.G. manufactured about 35% of the total German production. Its peace-time use covers practically all chemical fields as a basic material for the production of solvents, dyestuffs, pharmaceuticals, plastics and other products. It is also used as basic material for

explosives and in this field the explosive industry was dependent on I.G. at the rate of about 35%. Moreover sulphuric acid is used for smoke screens and here I.G. was practically the only producer.

3. Chlorine

I.G. manufactured 46% of the total German production. It is used as a basic product for poison gases, especially mustard and phosgene and I.G. covered 95% of the deliveries for poison gas production. Chlorine is also a basic product for the manufacture of glycol and diglycol. Both are intermediates for poison gases and explosives. Here again the German industry was dependent on I.G. to the extent of 95%.

4. Caustic Soda and Potash

I.G. produced approximately one third of the total German production. Both products are used in many fields of chemistry, mainly in the rayon and artificial fibers industry. The Wehrmacht depended on I.G. for its textile products, mainly uniforms, tents and so on to the extent of 33%.

5. Calcium Carbide

I.G.'s share in the total German production was over 60%. Calcium carbide is used as a basic product for fertilizers, solvents, and lacquers and to a very great extent in the buna production. It is also used in the manufacture of plastics.

6. Sodium Cyanide

I.G. manufactured 52% of the total German production.

Sodium Cyanide is used as a basic material for buna and also as a disinfectant. I believe it was also used for poison gas in Lyhernfurt.

II. MAGNESIUM:-

I.G. produced 88% of the total German magnesium production. Magnesium went into airplanes and was used for incendiary bombs and metal wheels for Wehrmacht vehicles. For the supply of magnesium, the Wehrmacht depended almost entirely on I.G.

III. Nickel

In regard to domestic nickel production the German industry was completely dependent on I.G. Nickel is used for the hardening of steel for pensers and for many other military purposes.

IV. ORGANIC INTERMEDIATES

I.G. manufactured about 90% of the total German production. Organic intermediates are used as basic products for a great number of chemical products. They are used in particular in the buna and plastics production and also as basic products for explosives, as for instances: nitro and dinitrotoluol, dinitrobenzene, dinitrodiphenylamine and others.

V. SOLVENTS

I.G. accounted for 75% of the total German production. Solvents are used in the lacquer industry for the coating of airplanes in order to reduce air resistance. The lacquers are also used to prevent rusting of the surface of tanks, guns, ships, etc.

Methanol was produced in Germany by I.G. only. Methanol was mainly used as an intermediate for formaldehyde and as an

intermediate for explosives. It is also used in the buna and plastic production. During the second half of the war, a methanol product was also applied as glue for the wood structure of airplanes.

VI. SYNTHETIC RUBBER

In the field of synthetic rubber I.G. had no competitor either. Synthetic rubber is used for all purposes for which natural rubber can be used, mainly for tires and also for shock-absorbers for engines and so on. I.G. was also dominant in the production of accelerators which are used as material for synthetic rubber.

VII. SYNTHETIC GASOLINE

I.G. and the firms working under the I.G. licenses produced about 90% of the total German synthetic gasoline. Synthetic gasoline is in every comparison equivalent to natural gasoline. The Wehrmacht depended upon I.G. to the extent of 50% for its domestic gasoline, viz. natural as well as synthetic gasoline and benzene. Furthermore I.G. was the sole producer of tetraethyllead which is used for the improvement of synthetic gasoline. For synthetic lubricants, I.G. also had a monopoly.

VIII. In the field of new SYNTHETIC PLASTICS I.G. had a dominant position and produced 90% of the total German manufacture. These plastics are used for airplanes and for many other military purposes.

IX. More than 50% of the SYNTHETIC RESINS produced in Germany were manufactured by I.G. This product was used as a substitute of lacquer for coating.

X. I.G. accounted for 90% of the German PLASTICIZERS pro-

duction. Plasticizers are used for plastics, resins and
buna.

XI. I.G. dominated in the production of synthetic TANNING
AGENTS where its share amounted to 94%. These agents
are used for the tanning of leather and this product went
principally entirely to the Wehrmacht.

XII. In other industries I.G.'s share in the German production
was as follows:

98% - Dyes

50% - Dyeing & Printing Auxiliaries

95% - Detergent Materials (Substitutes in the production
of soap and soap powder)

50% - Pharmaceuticals

55% - Insecticides

80% - Sera

60% to 70% - Photographics.

I have carefully read each of the five pages of this declaration
and have signed them personally. I have made the necessary
corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them and I
declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth
to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

s./ Dr. ERNST STRUSS

Sworn to and signed before me this 12 day of June 1947
at Frankfurt Main by Dr. ERNST STRUSS known to me to be
the person making the above affidavit.

s./ OTTO HEILBRUNN
Dr. Otto Heilbrunn
Civilian, ETO 30140
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR WAR CRIMES
U.S. War Department.

"A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY"

(5)
(EGL)

Carbon copy

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE A.G., FRANKFURT (MAIN) 20

Frankfurt/Main, 23 April 1941

The organizations of the Central Administration of the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. and the Sales Combines for Dyes and Chemicals, concentrated in the Hochhaus Frankfurt/Main (20), Gruenburgplatz, and which represent over 50% of I.G.'s world trade, and over 2/3rds of its sales abroad, have from the first day of the war taken the lead of all I.G. organizations, inasmuch as they can claim the highest percentage of male employees called up. At the present time 37% of the male employees are in the Armed Forces. Only in our Financial and Political-Economic Policy Headquarters in Berlin has such a high percentage of men called up been reached. It is far lower in all other plants.

The whole of the business conducted in this building must, with ever decreasing exceptions, be considered as essential to the war effort; the greater part as vital for the outcome of the war. From the distribution of Buna, and articles ranging from synthetics, preliminary products for the explosives industry, detergents, substitute tanning agents and all chemicals essential for the carrying on of the war, right down to aniline dyes, which are used almost exclusively for the indirect and direct needs of the Army, there is not a single branch which does not make its contribution to the war machine.

In the field of export, thanks to the great victories in the field and thanks to the general political situation, business contacts have been maintained with all countries of the world, with the sole exception of the British Empire and the Dutch Indies. In particular, contact has been successfully maintained with South and Southeast Asia as well as Iran and Afghanistan, by transit via Russia. Also it has been possible to keep the South American market supplied via the Pacific, and recently, by means of blockade runners. The result has been that the volume of business carried on by this organization

(page 2 of original)

has proved to be far greater in war time than ever could have been foreshadowed in peace time, and greater than it ever was in peace time. The yearly turnover is at present 1 milliard 250 million RM.

When the undersigned Betriebsfuhrer visited General STEIER von HEIDEKAMPFF in Kassel in the spring of 1939 to request his support to ensure also in time of war, the personnel necessary to maintain the strength of this powerful concern, he expressed the opinion that, in so far as it was at all possible to estimate what the chances were of carrying on business during the war, the percentage of men called-up should not exceed 40% of the male staff if the smooth running of the business was to be guaranteed. When making such an estimate, however, nobody would have thought that the actual business done would assume such proportions as it has today.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

Notwithstanding, we have only made use of the provisional safeguard under the so-called "standstill agreement" in so far as this seemed absolutely necessary after making full use of all available manpower. Consequently, on 1 October 1940 we of our own accord took 275 persons liable for military service from the standstill list and placed them at the disposal of the military authorities. Of these, about 50 have not been called up for military service; we must reckon with the fact that they may be called up any day.

We have at present been granted deferment for 462 officials, = 18% of the male staff. Applications have been made for the deferment of a further 254 = 10% of the male staff, so far no decision has been received. In the above mentioned totals officers have been included. We have 146 officers in the building. Of these 75 have been called up. We have applied for the deferment of 45 of the others; they are, however, almost without exception over 45 years of age.

When the remaining 50

(page 3 of original)

men on the "standstill" list have been called up, any further calling up will open a breach in our organization here, which it will be impossible to fill. For the most part, these men are specialists, who cannot be replaced, as the work they do requires not only a first class brain, but also years of experience, and in many cases a knowledge of the language and the country which other persons do not possess. The Labor Office cannot provide such persons. Incidentally, we have made application to the Labor Office for 170 clerks etc, which it will not be possible to grant.

It is our duty, therefore, to make it clear that further inroads on our personnel are bound to create a situation which will make it extremely difficult to continue to carry on our business, which means that supplies to the Army will suffer as well as our export trade, which Berlin Headquarters consider absolutely necessary.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

21 May 1947

I, Victoria ORTON, 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6123.

Victoria ORTON
20129

I. G. F R A N K F U R T

To Messrs:
Bergwardt Dr. Kugler (Transl's note:) several ille-
Bormann Ludwigs gible initials
Haefliger Dr. Stein
v.Heider Dr. Overhoff 15/2
Koehler
Dr.Kuepper

Your ref. Your letter of Our letter of Our telephone call Our Ref. Frankfurt Direct. (Main)20 Dept. Farben 11.2.43

Subject:

German-Spanish Company, Branch Office Ffm (Frankfurt/Main)
A reception in I.G.'s Skyscraper.

On the occasion of the reception of the Spanish Ambassador,
Dr. v.Schnitzler made yesterday an address as attached.

Because of the comments on pages 5 and 6 we pass it on to
you for your information.

Directorate Department Dyestuffs

Signature illegible.

(Page 2 of original)

(Transl's note: two illegible initials).

To-day, the significance of chemistry has been re-
cognized all over the world. Therefore, branches of chemi-
cal industry can be found in almost every country. They
mostly serve to improve technical capacity, to promote
export and as a basis for the military economy of the count-
ry.

Going further than that, the chemical industry be-
came for the German political economy a factor of economic-
ally truly fundamental significance. It did not confine it-
self to improve technical possibilities or to increase the
superiority of existing goods, thereby making life more
beautiful and more pleasant, but it created the very founda-
tions for the supply, and with it for the existence, of our
nation. This development had its origin to a large degree
in the first world war with its hard effects on Germany.
Due to the loss of her colonies and other separated terri-
tories Germany was cut off from the raw materials' sources

(Page 2 of original cont'd)

of the world and she was dependent on her own inland resource. In this way chemistry became the sole and indispensable resource to relieve the problems of raw materials.

These tasks of the German chemical industry have experienced a tremendous and new stimulus, by the Four Year Plan of our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler. On account of the scarcity of vital materials, chemistry has to safeguard the freedom of economic movement for our people. The task is for chemistry to procure that which nature does not give to us in a sufficient measure or in a usable form. By way of a chemical change thousands of valuable new materials are being created from basic substances as for instance water, air and coal, which are available in sufficient quantities.

(Page 3 of original)

In the In the scarcity of raw materials is also found the real cause for the unique development of the chemical industry in Germany, and it did not happen just by accident that the syntheses of raw materials from abundant and comparatively inferior constituent elements of the earth had to be the special contribution in the field of chemical technique which Germany bestowed on the world. In can rather be said that just because of the adverse situation in regard to raw materials the German chemistry was spurred over and over again towards new inventions and technical accomplishments. Herein lies - in spite of the narrow limits of the German living space of life (Lebensraum) -, an unmistakable power, and it becomes more and more evident that also advantages may arise from it which may possibly remain denied to a country which on account of the abundance of its source of raw materials is not forced to such efforts.

But not until wartime came was the German Chemistry able to stand the great test of its excellence. It is no exaggeration to say that without the accomplishments effected by German chemistry under the Four Year Plan, modern warfare could not at all be possible.

The increasing volume of scientific research, the complexity and expensiveness of technical apparatus, the close technical

(Page 4 of original)

and economic interlacing of the individual branches favored and brought forcibly about a concentration of plants and enterprises in chemical industry at an early time. An element of strong support in this movement towards concentration was first of all I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft whose (capital) stock after the additions and the genuine raise of the preceding year amounts today to 1,4 billion Reichsmark in round figures. But it might nevertheless appear that its share in the German chemical production is often being over-estimated by the general public. On the whole and going by press reports on the subject it will be in order to estimate the share of the Dyestuffs Konzern as about one-third of the total German industry.

(Page 4 of originals cont'd)

In that respect pronounced deviations prevail, upwards as well as downwards.

The share is, of course, outstanding in that branch from which it derives its name, the production of aniline dyes (Teerfarbstoffen). Also as regards nitrogen, I.G. is in the lead, leaving the rest far behind, and the same applies to most of the light chemicals, but the heavy chemicals, for instance those which are compounded into the aniline dyestuffs going into many high-grade products and those which considerable quantities go also into the processing of nitrogen are largely being produced to cover own requirements only.

(Page 5 of original)

In the field of pharmaceuticals especially the trademark products of the founders' firms which merged since 1925 are known at home and abroad; but there, too, there exist a series of largescale manufactures, of equal value, not to mention the great number of medium-size and small firms with frequently remarkable scientific and therapeutic achievements.

As a part of the more recent fields of chemistry it is well known that alongside of the old producers, I.G. and Glanzstoff, quite a number of new, independent establishments took up and scientifically and technically developed the field of artificial fibre (Kunstfaser).

In the sphere of gasoline, the Montan industry and the brown coal industry are working besides the I.G. on the broadest basis, and in that of electro-chemically produced a considerable number of other big enterprises are also active, aside from I.G.

In most recent times I.G. became furthermore known to an especially high degree and all over the world by the production of its Buna. Experience shows, that Buna is not only a fully equivalent hard rubber, but that because of its especially favorable qualities it breaks also into spheres of application in which natural rubber cannot be applied.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is not my intention to give you here a review of the total achievement of German

(Page 6 of original)

Chemistry and of that of my own firm comprised therein. It is merely my desire to initiate you with a few introductory words in the subject of chemistry for which the approach is often difficult to a layman, and to give you by means of the samples displayed before you a slant of what German Chemistry is supplying today to the national economy and to that of the whole of Europe. Not only is it a presupposition for the waging of war in itself-of which not a single building-stone can be dispensed with in the happenings of war-

(Page 6 of original cont'd)

but to a no lesser degree has it become a necessary part of the economic apparatus of all other continental countries. And especially in activities concerning foreign countries I.G. Farbenindustrie has from the beginning held a towering leader position in German Chemistry.

We are maintaining friendly relations with all of the greater chemical enterprises of Spain.

Together with the Cross Group, whose chief, Herr Ripoll, is a personal friend of Herr Weber-Andreac, who is present here we are handling jointly a chlorine electrolysis and related chemical products with Flix on the Ebro.

Within the Fabrication national de colorantes y explosivos, originally a family enterprise of the families Sagnier, Pellicer and Vila y Camps, we are operating a big dyestuffs factory jointly with the former at Barcelona where, at the present time, also a big pharmaceutical department is being developed for the proposed production of Salvarsan and Prontosil.

With the Union espanola de explosivos, whose chief Herr Thiebaut,

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I may include among my personal friends, close relations have been maintained by way of our Nobel-Group, for decades which, in their technical aspects are suspended, it is true, but which in the future are to be resumed in old friendship.

Quite recently we have taken up closer relations with the industry at Bilbao where the head of the Bando de Vizcaya, Conde del Cadagua, in particular assumed an interest in the industrialization of territory in the chemical sector situated in Northern Spain. Large nitrogen establishments are being created there, and a new, young enterprise has taken up the production of plastics on a phenol and formaldehyde basis.

It is our desire jointly with the Spanish chemical industry and its chiefs who are our personal friends to promote the industrialization of Spain, within the frame of its economic potentialities and as far as our Spanish friends want this and to assist them in the care and control of it. Besides this we are supplying the Spanish market with those products which Spain needs for the feeding of her people, and we are convinced that with peaceful times reestablished, the exchange of our experience will be further intensified and our scientific as well as our commercial relations in the chemical sphere will be considerably broadened.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Hertha C. KNUTH, U.S. Civilian, AGO X-046355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-6763.

HERTHA C. KNUTH
U.S. Civilian
AGO X-046355

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY

- 5 -

(End)

A F F I D A V I T

I, Georg von SCHNITZLER, member of the Vorstand of I. G. Farbenindustrie from 1925 until 1945, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making a false statement herewith state the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion.

1. In the first four paragraphs of my affidavit of 4 March 1947, which I swore to before a representative of the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, I have stated the true circumstances under which I gave information, by means of statements and interrogations, concerning the I. G. Farbenindustrie and other matters to Allied investigators in 1945. These four paragraphs should also be considered as an introduction to this affidavit. Below I consider further statements or interrogations which I subscribed to during 1945, and which I have been shown and which I have re-read between 18 February 1947 and the present time. When I subscribed to these statements or interrogations in 1945, the matters to which I subscribed were true to the best of my knowledge and belief at that time. The errors I now find after re-reading the ^{statements or} ~~statements or~~ interrogations mentioned below are set forth below after the text of ~~below-are-given-after-the-text-of-the-statement-I-subscribed-to-in-August~~ each of the statements or interrogations. 1945.

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2. On 8 August 1945 I signed an eleven page statement covering many points in the development of the I. G. Farbenindustrie during the Nazi Regime. I worked on this statement for two or three days in seclusion in Frankfurt in August 1945 and wrote it up in longhand. After the statement was typed up from my longhand original, I signed and certified to the truth of the typewritten statement. The text follows:

"The I. G. by force had to follow the general development in Germany. Whatever government ruled Germany, the key position of the I.G. in the whole chemical field undisputed since I.G.'s foundation in 1925 had to play and always played the decisive role in everything which was connected with chemistry. I remember a remark of Stresemann made to me in 1927: 'What have I as a trump in my hands apart of you, the I.G., and the coal people? That I.G. would follow a line, which was not in conformity with the line of the government, was simply

(signed) G v Schnitzler

unimaginable and that I.G. could refract from an order given by the government or take the attitude of an open or clandestine opposition was out of question - even at a time when Germany was a democratic state and government measures could be openly criticized.

Thus I.G. was "governmental" under Stresemann as well as under Brüning, as under Papen.

When Hitler legally came to power, instituted by old Reichspräsident von Hindenburg, in the beginning the attitude of I.G. in regard of the Nazi government was simply the continuation of the attitude I.G. had taken vis a vis former governments. - But very soon it became evident that the Nazi-regime which had started as a coalition-government together with Deutsch-Nationale Volkspartei - which latter party had 3 ministers in the cabinet - intended to go quite different ways from former governments and by and by we learned what a totalitarian state meant in reality and what consequence that had for us.

The party claimed all power for itself. "Die Partei befiehlt dem Staat" - "The party gives its orders to the state" - was the official device, and the state is the instrument through which the totality of its inhabitants is ruled.

No political influence of professional groups was anymore tolerated - and in short I.G. found itself entirely devoid of all political influence. This state of things in no way was regarded as satisfactory and without a special order given in that direction a large-scale subvention action was started. From the local little bosses up to Hermann Goering personally under the most varied names and through the most varied channels bigger and smaller sums were being given to the party, all with the aim to creating a better atmosphere, because very radical ideas in certain party-circles about the "Gross-Concerns" and particularly about the I.G. were common opinion.

The money was being taken but the result was more or less null and up to the last time of the war I.G. always was suspected to be "a state in the state" and the dismemberment of I.G. never left the clandestine party-program. On the other hand the party in the form of "Adolf-Hitler Spende" and "Winterhilfswerk" - W.H.W. and many other ways converted the subventions given formerly as a sort of bribery into a legal claim. -

When Hitler came to power he had promised to the masses the end of unemployment and he put this part of this program in the foreground.

In order to create work the industry had to get orders, and I.G. undoubtedly was one of the first ones to have advantages of it. As foreign currency was scarce - the great crash of 1931 lay only two years behind - an interior market had to be created and products which had before been imported had now to be manufactured in Germany - with the double aim, to save the foreign currency necessary for the import of textiles, metals, food, etc. and at the same time give additional work to German workmen. Thus, now 12 years later it is difficult to ascertain if the beginning of the "rearmament"-movement was rightout started as a military measure or if the first phase till the end of 1936 was not a primarily economic one in so far as the production of synthetic oil, synthetic rubber, rayon, synthetic fibres, a.s.o. was not only fostered to get materials for warfare but in order to make Germany in those products self-supporting and save the foreign currency for their importation. -

(signed) G v Schnitzler

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The policy of "autarcy" and "rearmament" was so closely interconnected with one another that it really represents unsurmountable difficulties to distinguish which element of both was the prevalent one.

However it was, I.G. very soon profited by it and whereas in 1932 I.G.'s total expenditure for new plants and equipments was, I think, only 10-12 million marks, it climbed in the years 1934 - 36 rapidly and from thereon took a raging trend.

The technical possibilities being involved in that trend had undoubtedly a great fascination upon our technical people. Plans for which they could not see any practical realisation as long as a normal economy existed, became realisable and the most fascinating prospects seemed to lie in the future. That this development in the last must lead 1) to impoverishment that means to a lowering of the standard of living, 2) to war, nobody did or wanted to realize. Even a man so strictly opposed to the Nazi-regime as Dr. Bosch who was the only one who once has dared to contradict openly Hitler - with disastrous result by the way, as I later on was told, had no hesitation to put Krauch at Goering's disposition, when being asked for a high ranking chemist who should take over the leadership of "Amt fur Wirtschaftsausbau" and Bosch was a convinced democrat, a convinced partisan of a peace-policy.

The whole development of I.G. in the years beginning with 1934 and accelerated since the end of 1936 is entirely due to the close team-work with government and Wehrmacht.

The export-trade remained stationary at some 400 - 450 million marks and the buying-capacity of the civil population was not highered (raised) as the nominally higher incomes in toto were counterbalanced by a loss in the so-called "Realeinkommen" and higher taxes.

Practically the whole augmentation in the turnover of I.G. from a little over 1 billion marks to 3 billions in 1943 is a 100% result of the rearmament and the war policy of the German government.

The totality of Buna, of metals, of high-octane oil, of most chemicals, at least 2/3 of the Nitrogen, and a great percentage of dyestuffs and pharmaceuticals went directly or indirectly to the Wehrmacht. A high percentage of this turnover from the very beginning was more or less guaranteed by the Wehrmacht. Agreements of the most different kind were being concluded but nearly all were based on solid ground insofar as the Reich guaranteed the amortization (light metals) or had arranged for a protective duty (oil, buna) or prescribed the use for the consuming industry (synthetic fibre). The result always was identical after a certain time the factories became or should become I.G.'s unburdened property. This latter result could be achieved with a raised rapidity with the so-called Ostwerke where the whole equipment could be amortized in the year of its investment provided that the owner made sufficient profits in the whole.

The direct consequence hereof was that I.G. notwithstanding that it spent some 500 million marks in the average of the last years had not substantially to augment its capital and that I.G.'s balance sheet under "plants and equipment" shows a practically unchanged figure. This state of things and the apparent splendid situation of I.G.'s balance weakened the central administration. - Young and active technicians like Ambros, Büttefisch, Würster, but even men in positions not ranking as high like Altvicker and Ziegler in Bitterfeld

(signed) G v Schnitzler

in the metal-field handled on their own, problems of the greatest importance, engaged I.G. in always greater commitments. They used the word "Auflage", - "impost" of Wehrmachtstelle X, but sometimes it never became quite clear if our technical men themselves had not deliberately induced the Wehrmacht to that "Auflage". The central administration registered the facts, when it

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came to the settlement of the expenses, but had very little to say in the matter. - To a large extent Krauch's office was a governing factor in these relations as the "Amt" under Goering's responsibility in the domains reserved to it, decided what quantities and where the respective production should be erected. In Sparte I Dr. Bütelisch took the lead in this direction and practically rounded out Dr. Schneider in the oil field, but Dr. Müller-Cunradi in close contact with Dr. Krauch did the same in the different domains being connected with Oppau and including the whole high-pressure field with the exception of the oil - but still Dr. Müller-Cunradi being in charge of the new works in Heydebreck was hereby the head of the so-called Tannol-Anlage, which to the best of my knowledge represented a new high octane fuel. A similar development took place in Sparte II. Dr. Ambros and Dr. Hurster as well as the chemists in Bitterfeld, here mostly in the metal field, but in some other domains of chemistry destined for warfare just as well became entirely independent of the "Spartenleitung" and acted immediately with the different authorities of the Wehrmacht.

But things were very complicated in such a sense as the Wehrmacht had 3 or 4 quite independent departments and apart of the Wehrmacht Reichswirtschaftsministerium and Reichsbeauftragter Chemie had many functions reserved to them.

Between Reichsbeauftragter Chemie (Dr. Ungewitter) and Dr. Krauch quarrelling never ceased, overlapping of authority happened all the time.

In the last phase of the war following ideas of President Kehrl of the Reichswirtschaftsministerium, the organization of the "Gewerbliche Wirtschaft" became entitled to get to a large extent as a decisive factor and in principle a corporative system was in full creation. The result for I.G. was - although I.G. men generally were not being put in the foreground, because President Kehrl was in strong opposition against I.G. - that the overwhelming technical position of I.G. rendered it the deciding factor.

As an example I only may cite Dr. Hurster's activity - he indeed was put in the foreground - in the field of sulphur and sulphuric acid, who in fact ruled that important item of warfare chemistry with sovereignty. This system of corporative development was neither invented nor in principle fostered by I.G. but the facts were stronger than Dr. Kehrl's ideas and the industrial potential of I.G. became bigger and bigger.

Surely personal ambition and the pleasure of expending, mostly of the younger chemists, played its role in that development, but on the whole it was natural consequence of the war becoming more and more "total" and because nobody else than I.G. could handle those problems.

The combination of highly qualified chemists, big laboratories, an enormous potential of patents and experiences and a great financial capacity was too strong as not always being the decisive factor to I.G.'s advantage whenever a problem arose which had to be solved.

Apart of this technical situation the development of I.G. during the last 12 years can't be separated from the Government's foreign policy.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

From the very beginning it was the government's intention to make the "Mitteleuropäische Raum" as far as possible self-supporting and direct German import from oversea to the continent. Intensifying trade-relations to the south and the south-east of Europe even at the price of material sacrifices was the "mot d'ordre"; the next one was the intensification of the South-America business on the basis of barter-trading in order to get from there the products which were not available any more for Germany in the U.S. as the Reichsbank did not dispose of the necessary Dollars. Although I.G. was not in the least a partisan of this policy and would have preferred to develop its great international business on the line of a "most favoured nation"

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basis it had to follow the new trend - on the simple reason, that there did not exist any other possibility. Occasional suggestions in order to get a better stand were successful in the case of England for instance, but on the whole the official policy was carried through without giving the export-industry a chance to intervene. During the years from 1933 to 1937 I.G.'s expansion outside of Germany did not make a substantial progress. It kept up its position and its participations, but very little as far as I can recollect, had or could have been done or was added to it in entirely new investments, but what has been done, did not yet happen in the S.E. countries but in the countries of I.G.'s old established industrial activities in the Anglo-Saxon and Latin countries, in England f.i. the foundation of the British Magnesium Co. A complete change took place since 1938. Firstly by purely private negotiations of course with the approval of the government with I.C.I. an important agreement was being concluded, the foundation of the Trafford Park Chemical Co.

Much greater problems, however, had to be approached in by the incorporation of Austria and Sudetenland into Germany, with the creation of the so-called "Gross-Deutschland". To both countries I.G. always had exported on a large scale, in both countries a chemical industry existed, of which the vs "Aussiger Verein" and Dynarit A.G., Pressburg were old established enterprises, built upon a broad basis.

Relations of close team-work with the Aussiger Verein and I.G. had vs been operating for decades. In the dyestuff field a cartel agreement with the Verein had been concluded in 1934.

This dyestuff position of the Verein was the key of the whole problem, I.G. being the only producer of dyestuffs in Germany except one small vs Swiss-owned company in Grenchach on the German-Swiss border. Thus I.G. did not want anybody else enter that domain inside the German territory. As Chemische Fabrik V. Heyden had succeeded to get the permission of Reichswirtschaftsministerium to deal with the Verein about the purchase of the works in Aussig and Falkenau, I.G. had firstly to approach v. Heyden. An agreement was reached that both handled the question jointly on a 50:50 basis. In the then following negotiations the group v. Heyden-I.G. acquire the two factories with their coal-basis at a fair price, formed a new company, called it Chemische Werke Aussig-Falkenau G.m.b.H. and this latter company leased the dyestuff department by a long-termed agreement to I.G.

vs The relations with the Verein remained friendly. Not only was the Verein's position in the remaining Tschecho-Slovakia fully recognized, but a joint plant of synthetic fibre on I.G.'s processes was built up in Pressburg with a participation of 40% of the Verein, reserving to the Verein the supply of raw-materials from the Verein's factories in Nowaky and Handlowa.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Undoubtedly the I.G. as well as v. Heyden took advantage of the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany, but on the other hand the Zivno-Bank and its Generaldirektor Dovrazek were of the opinion that the Verein could not keep the factories under the changed circumstances. Mr. Dovrazek himself took an active part in the negotiations and even helped to find the compromise-formula, upon which the two parties agreed.

Whereas in the Sudetenland no other industrial activity of I.G. became practical the industrialisation of Austria required a substantial participation of I.G. in it. After the Anschluss I.G. had acquired the majority of Skoda Wetzler works from Wiener Kreditanstalt and transformed this company into the Donau-Chemie A.G. The Donau-Chemie in the future became the stepping stone of the great development which took place in the chemical domain and culminated in the building up of huge installations in Moosbierbaum in the domain of power, sulfuric acid, hydrogenation of oil and magnesium. The latter plant, of course, never came to a start as the Luftwaffe stopped all work on it. In connection with this activity in Austria another great step to industrialisation took place in Slovakia. Since long years the D.A.G. (Dynamit A.G.) had a controlling interest in Dynamit Pressburg. Apart of the main works in Pressburg, D.A.G. owned a couple of smaller factories in Austria and participations in Hungary, Roumania and Jugoslavia.

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Of the Austrian factories part was consummated in Donau-Chemie (Bruckl and Landeck), the others remained as such in the form of independent Dynamite Cos. Pressburg itself took a gigantic expansion and developed a great export-trade to Hungary and the Balkan countries. - But the development in the S.E. was by far overrun by the industrial development which took place after the war against Poland. Based upon the coal of Upper-Silesia two gigantic works were being taken under construction, the one in Heydebreck on old German territory (recognised as German after the plebiscite of 1921), the other one on Polish territory in Auschwitz, between Kottowitz and Krakow. The factory in Heydebreck entirely belonged to Sparte I, the one in Auschwitz represented a combination of Sparte I and II, under the leadership of Sparte II and with Buna as the main-product. Both works for my opinion made slow progresses and came into distribution only very late, with more substantial quantities in 1943 and 1944, but they never reached a state of real or full accomplishment. I think, some 800 million marks have been spent on them, half of which nearly, I would say, was written off.

Although at different times Dr. Ambros had invited me to visit Auschwitz, I have never been neither in Auschwitz nor Heydebreck and my knowledge solely relies on reports given by Dr. Ambros and Dr. Müller-Cunradi. In connection with those works he acquired a controlling interest in a coal-mine - the Fürstengrube - and was just dealing about a further interest in it when the war entered in its last phase. Apart of this huge enterprises the Pharma had acquired land not so very far from Breslau on the Oder near Dyhrenfurt with the idea to construct there a pharmaceutical factory.

This never materialized and Dr. Ambros at a date unknown to me took over the leadership of that place. There under the firm of Anorgana G.m.b.H. for the account of the Reich I.G. fabricated the new, as I later on heard, in Elberfeld invented poisoned gases. This fabrication, of course, was kept so secret, that only in the beginning of the year 1945 (January to February) I heard for the first time of it, when Dr. Ambros in strictest confidence told me what I have given as my personal knowledge to Major Tilly at the end of April and what consisted of the fact that such gases based upon an inter-

(signed) G v Schnitzler

mediate of Ludwigshafen "Metaphenylendianine" had been made in a special equipment (all in glass) but that the whole production owing to the Russian advance had been shipped to the interior of Germany. Dr. Ambros at the time spoke of the great danger if ever smallest quantities of this product evaded. -

At that time (end of April) I was still under the impression that I.G. as a firm was only indirectly connected with the fabrication of that gas insofar as we had put chemists at the disposition of the Reich and supplied the intermediates. Later on by Major Tilly I heard that Anorgana which ran the plant was 100% I.G. and that the whole fabrication practically was an affair of I.G. He told me furthermore that these gases had been used by the Nazi authorities as a tentative in Auschwitz concentration camp.

In the last quarter of 1944 I should say, it was at the end of November or in the beginning of December, an allusion was made to me confidentially by Dr. Muller-Cunradi that terrible things had happened in the concentration camps of Auschwitz, that gases had been used there to kill people and that I.G. products were of something in it - of course it was only an allusion. Not knowing anything of Dyhrenfurt at the time, I could not bring this allusion in connection with the new gas, but I was so horrified by it that I only reacted "but do other people know that too", which he confirmed, yes, Ambros and the other men in Auschwitz know of these things. To Schmitz I made a remark about terrible things being connected with Auschwitz and Dyhrenfurt but without going into details. How far he was informed about it, I can't say, for my opinion he should have heard about the general happenings regarding Anorgana a.s.o. as financial interests of great importance were connected therewith and Ambros and Muller-Cunradi must have reported to him about the situation under all its aspects. - But that, of course, can only be heard from the 3 men themselves.

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I myself had never seen the agreement regarding "Anorgana" which was concluded before I took over my activity with the Chemikalien-business. I was of the opinion that the Reich owned plant and equipment of the so-called "Reichsbetriebe" at 100% and that Anorgana was a 50:50 position of Reich and I.G. for the handling of those products which were sold to manufacturers (Weiterver-arbeiter).

How secret all these matters had to be held by the men immediately concerned with them might become evident by the fact that Dr. ter Meer notwithstanding that we always worked together in the dyestuff domain in the closest cooperation never mentioned them to me and I was greatly surprised when I heard by Dr. Loehr only a few days before I was taken in custody (May 7th) that under ter Meer's papers confidential material of this kind had been found. -

What motives induced Dr. Ambros to take over the factory in Dyhrenfurt, which primarily was destined for the management of the Pharma people of Elberfeld, I am completely at a loss to explain. I can only presume that his sometimes illimited technical ambition has driven him in this terrible job.

In Poland furthermore we acquired from TreuhandstelleOst the Boruta and in connection with the Francolor transaction the Winnica, the latter one had to be liquidated as no economical basis for it was still existent.

Boruta practically belonged to the Polish state, the share capital was lost and a state-owned bank which had given the necessary credits to

(signed) G v Schnitzler

the Boruta was the real owner. As the German government in the parts of Poland which had become incorporated in Germany considered itself as the legal successor of the Polish state, no private interests were hurt by this transaction. This was unfortunately the case with Wola but the owners had to leave the place, fled to Warsaw and nobody was on the spot to look after the place. - The Wola had to be closed down as its economic value in war-times was null and the material, as far as it was transportable, was carried over to Boruta. In an extensive statement made on the Boruta/Wola question I explained the reasons for which it was necessary to acquire these factories. The factory of Wola was not acquired by I.G. The liquid assets had been sold out by the Kommissare and then the General Government Krakau sold the factory to a third party, Binder. As 85% of the dyestuff potential of I.G. was on the borders of the Rhine and as this whole territory had to be considered as endangered by air-raids, every capacity in the centre of the Reich and in the East had to be used.

Notwithstanding their relatively small volume the dyestuff factories of Aussig and Boruta became very valuable for keeping up the plans for the manufacturing of dyestuffs and intermediates. Thus Dr. ter Meer and I after the German troops had entered Poland proposed Dr. Schoner (technical chief of Wolfen) and Direktor Schwab, Frankfurt - commercial leader of dyestuff-business in Poland and Russia to the Reichswirtschaftsministerium as "Kommissare" and later on inaugurated the negotiations with the Treuhandstelle-Ost. In my above mentioned statement I said that I never believed we would keep these factories whenever it came to peace negotiations, still we could not let them fall into the hands of a third party and had to use them during the war in our and in the common interest and this was only possible if we secured for us their property.

About Norway it seems to be superfluous to report as these interests we had taken there in the light-metal field became invalid. The Luftwaffe decided that the works at Herøen scattered by air-raids should not be reconstructed.

In Holland and Belgium, to the best of my knowledge, no interests of importance have been acquired. Our relations with the group Solvay in

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in Belgium were immediately resumed and we ourselves interfered at the Reichswirtschaftsministerium that in the majority position of the group Solvay in Deutsche Solvaywerke, Bernburg, where Solvay held 75%, I.G. 25% no change should take place. Certain endeavours of the Salzdetfurth-concern to get part of Deutsche Solvaywerke with the aim to break up Solvay's majority position remained fruitless.

The plans we had elaborated for the handling of the industrial problems in the chemical sector in France are known.

In the first phase after the armistice we thought it necessary that the Government should sequester the whole chemical industry in order to make it work for the German war potential. Later on this policy was changed and after Monthoire the era of collaboration started. I do not think that any seizure had been carried through in this domain. - The key position very soon became the Francolor problem.

The guiding principle in its solution for I.G. was

- 1) the definite reparation of the injustice which I.G. had suffered when its factories in France had been taken away by the Versailles treaty,

(signed) G v Schnitzler)

- 2) a definite peace with the French dyestuff industry granting their industry a full occupation (7000 to of dyestuffs and a substantial development in the most varied fields).

We considered the whole affair as an equitable solution, nobody in France had lost one Franc by this transaction, on the contrary the value of the shares of the so-called mother-houses gained a considerable advance in the stock-exchange - as well as in their intrinsic value; the exchange basis for the I. G. shares being given as a counter-value could not be fairer. - In fact no money has been taken out of France, the dividend-clearing showed a "break-even", the factories not only remained intact but were improved in different domains. The arrangement had been considered by I.G. as a first step to a renewed European dyestuff-cartel, to the negotiating of which the German-French group should appear as one partner and we, that means ter Meer, Waibel, Ambros and I, always understood that Duchemin and Frossard would figure as partners in such negotiations.

The "Führungsanspruch" of I.G. once having been recognized in the handling of dyestuff matters, there was never a contrast or even a friction. I.G. helped Francolor in all its dealings with the Military Commander in France whenever this was possible or necessary and Francolor was a loyal partner. When Dr. Kramer left Paris, he told me, Duchemin said to him: "You have been loyal for us, you will see that we shall be loyal against you." The same principle of fair dealing was the aim of our negotiations with Rhone-Poulenc and Uguine in the field of Buna, plastics and pharmaceuticals. - Not having been an immediate participant in those different negotiations, which were conducted by Dr. ter Meer, v.Knieriem, and Amros or Mann - but having often seen M.Bau as well as M. Painvin, I have never heard the slightest complaint on their part of pressure or unfair dealing. When both gentlemen were in Leverkusen to visit the Buna installations in the late autumn of 1941 or 1942, an atmosphere of cordiality, if I may use that word, and not at all of animosity has reigned between the representatives of both sides.

Always in conformity with the principle of developing the continental Grossraum, I.G. was very active in Spain. The development of the two factories in and near Barcelona FENCE and Flix made substantial progress. In FENCE the installations for the (immediates) intermediates of Azo-dyestuffs were brought to termination, a pharmaceutical factory was in full construction, in Flix the new "Chlorelectrolyse" was gradually improving and plans of making the "Inquiresa" a subsidiary company for the manufacturing of derivatives of Carbure,

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an active business proposition were being followed. - With "Unquinesa" in Bilbao license agreements in the field of Phenol and Formaldehyde for "Phenoplaste" were concluded and to "Altos Hornos" licenses for Nitrogene with technical help on the whole line were being granted. Apart of that the old friendship to Union Explosives Espanola was cultivated.

In Italy the participations in Acna and Bianchi kept on their normal development in the light-metal field the Samis tried to make progress and the two factories in which Buna was fabricated, came into production.

On the whole in all these countries as well as in the planning for a future industrialization of the South-East, I.G. fostered everywhere the industrial evolution with its patents, experiences and know-how and, as far as the government allowed it to do so, also with capital. The men who did the actual work, mostly did not even think of the political meaning of this development in the direction of "European Grossraum-Wirtschaft" and even inside I.G.'s Vorstand that was often forgotten. Words like "rule" and "dominate" were never
(signed) G v Schmitzler

used, and I am sure that all these people having worked with I.G. in Spain and France, in Norway and Finland, in the South-East as well as in Italy have not had the feeling of being pressed or looted. On the contrary, they nearly all had personal profits of this collaboration and were after us to intensify our help. Dozen of files will and can prove that.

Coming back to the general policy: Undoubtedly I.G. had not only followed the government's "Grossraum-Politik" but had drawn substantial profit out of it. In figures as they appear on the balance-sheet an enormous progress has been made. As the export-figures in the whole remained unchanged and only a displacement from oversea to the European continent took place, the turnover in the so-called "Gross-Deutschland" up to the end of 1943 reached nearly four times the size of 1932. - Only part of it could be considered as being a perpetual asset. In Buna, in synthetic fibres and their raw materials and intermediates, in light metals and in hydrogenation many installations to a large extent are to be understood as war-dependent, but as a consequence of the close interdependency of autarkie and rearmament a great deal of the investments made under the four year's plan could be considered as valuable even under a complete peace-policy. - May I give as an example the "Nitrogene". The total German capacity should be - the destruction by air-raids not being taken into account - about 1.000.000 tons of "N". I.G.'s prewar share in N was about 70%. One generally estimated that for agricultural purposes in Gross-Deutschland nearly 700.000 tons of N were needed. Thus with all the possibilities in the development of the "technical Nitrogene" the remaining 300.000 tons should have found a secure market - even without having to press on a forced export! The enormous amortizations which I.G. had been able to carry through would have given it an easy possibility of a revalorisation of its assets without having to lower the figures of its investments as participations on the balance-sheet of the so-called "Handelsbilanz".

Summarizing this part of I.G.'s activity: The close teamwork with Government and Wehrmacht in the joint endeavour to make Germany to a large extent autarchic and rearm her, involved a great amplification of I.G.'s potential and at the same time a substantial increase of her balance-figures.

The collaboration with the Wehrmacht followed two additional lines. In order to keep up a continuous contact in 1934 the Vermittlungsstelle W in Berlin was founded, in 1936 the so-called Abwehr-Delegierten were being designated. The Wehrmacht insisted on the highest secrecy of all its plans

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and let all people being in charge of planning or executing rearmament work, swear that they never let other people know what had been divulged to them in connection with their activity for Wehrmacht purposes. This had gone so far that for instance when Dr. Paul Muller of Dynamit A.G. in 1937 lead the members of Z.A. of I.G. over the Dynamit plant in Troisdorf, he refracted from showing to them entire departments saying "this is under strictest secrecy". Every infringement would have been punished with high penalties of hard labour.

So practically everybody of the high-ranking staff was in such a way sworn in, the survey of what I.G. really did make or not make for the Wehrmacht became more and more a pure guess-work and one abstained of asking in order not to put one's technical colleagues in a difficult position. How far Schmitz himself was informed, who had the last responsibility for the balance figures, I am unable to say. My impression was that even he had only partly a more profound knowledge of what really happened and that a full picture of what had been done can only be got when one has heard every single one of the high ranking I.G. technical leaders, and not only the Vorstands-Mitglieder but also most of the Direktors and Prokurists just as well. -

(signed) G v Schnitzler

But speaking of responsibilities in general Schmitz was responsible insofar as he was in charge of the distribution of the different domains of activity to the individual "Vorstands-Mitglieder". Thus each Vorstandmitglied in the case of having to take a graver and far reaching decision was bound to report about it to the chairman, that means to Schmitz. -

Independently of Abwehr and Vermittlungsstelle W the Wehrmacht engaged I.G. in active helps by asking it to get news out of axis and neutral countries. I reported on that matter in a former statement. I.G. put its means at the disposition of the Wehrmacht but it was understood that I.G. people whenever they were asked for such help had not to enter the typically military espionage but only had to report about economic matters in the largest sense. How far the Wehrmacht had made use of I.G.'s readiness to participate in this service can only be guessed by the satisfaction explained by O.K.W. of what had been done. Every individual man acting under secrecy and being prohibited of speaking about it under highest penalties.

A further team-work between Wehrmacht and I.G. developed under the heading "M-Fragen". This comprised all personal questions regarding men to be made free from service, special plans for the distributions of key-commodities vs to the different branches of I.G.'s technical activity and the so-called "Kriegsspiele", furthermore all questions arising in the military field, eventually not covered by the different activities I have mentioned before.

As I stated in the beginning of this report since 1934 the Wehrmacht first being only an additional factor to the relations having always existed between I.G. and the different Ministerien more and more developed to be the decisive or at least the most important factor.

The Nazi government acted on I.G.'s business through these different Ministerien, but the party itself interfered continuously in the following two directions.

1) After having dissolved all trade-unions, associations of employers a.s.o. the so-called Deutsche Arbeitsfront was constituted. Everybody practically had to participate in it, it became the decisive factor for the handling of all personal problems and found its legal basis in the law "Zur Ordnung der nationalen

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Arbeit". By this law the responsibility of the owner or undertaker of the Co. was not altered insofar as the conduction of the business and the fulfillment of its financial obligations was concerned but rules for the interior functioning were established which had to be strictly observed. Based on that law and in connection with the so-called Nurnberger Gesetze the party exercised a continuous pressure on all I.G. organizations to fulfil all the clauses of the party program, particularly the Nurnberger Gesetze.

Whilst I.G. was a compliant partner in regard of all demands of the Wehrmacht, it tried to refract with all means from this latter intervention into its relations with its leading as well as the other personal. For years it maintained all its jewish employees, to begin with Messrs. von Weinberg and Mr. von Simson, being members of the then still existing Verwaltungsrat, the highest institution of I.G. (a committee of the Aufsichtsrat) on their posts and did not dismiss a single one of these individuals, before his living abroad was guaranteed. Thus Mr. Flechtheim, Mr. von Simson, Mr. Kalisches, Mr. Hummel, Mr. Carl von Weinberg, whenever at last it became necessary to suggest to them to leave Germany, it has taken care of them in such a way that they had not to endure emergency. Only

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Mr. Arthur v. Weinbert, who always had believe that they would except him and some other men like Karf, for whom a prepared situation in England in the last moment did not materialize because the owner of that firm retracted or retired, became victius.

The party resented that attitude and gave I.G. continuous warnings that I.G. was not fulfilling the obligations incumbent to it and a state of tension always subsisted.

The same attitude was that being taken by the A.O. of the party in regard to the foreign representatives. In the first years practically nothing had been done on I.G.'s side to alter anything in the existing conditions. By and by friendly negotiations and with lump sums generously fixed to satisfy them financially I.G. had to sever the connection with those representatives but when going over the files one will recognise that I.G. in every case tried to do its utmost to protect the men who had loyally served it and whom I.G. would never have dismissed if not this hard pressure would have been exercised upon it. That a company at last has to obey its government's orders is inevitable, but I.G. by conviction has always done its best to create as little hardship as possible and often only could get the Governments and the A.O.'s approval to the agreements with these employees by pretending that an ungenerous attitude on the side of I.G. would damage its international prestige. I.G. was driven from A.O. from concession to concession and the agreement made by Mr. Waibel with A.O. in autumn 1937 that in the future only such young men would be sent out who firstly belonged to the vS D.A.F. and secondly were ready to participate in the meetings, a.s.o. on the spot was a compromise on long negotiations by which Mr. Waibel succeeded that at least upon the "old" men on the spot the pressure was lowered.

vS Altogether those relations and negotiations with D.A.F. and A.O. remain and were always a most unpleasant chapter in I.G.'s activity but one may not forget that all the power was with the party and I.G. always was in the position of the defendant.

Apart of these two main domains of party-activity the Gauleiters interfered continuously in local questions but seldom in direct business, mostly in personal questions and then generally in the favour of such employees who were being considered as "confidential men".

(Page 11 of the original)

But up to the last time I.G. could refract from taking any typical party-men on Vorstand or Aufsichtsrat, a fact which should not be overlooked, as pressure from the most different sides in this direction never has ceased. Gauleiter Sprenger for instance always hinted at Avieny of Metall- Gesellschaft becoming member of the Aufsichtsrat.

I stated at the beginning of this report that after Hitler had come to power and before the official subventions of Adolf Hitler-Spende and W.H.N. had been inaugurated subventions of the most different kind had to be given and were given. I had never heard that I.G. before 1933 had fostered NSDAP financial- vS ly, as I.G. had always done with the so-called "bourgeois-parties". It is considered vS this as improbable as Dr. Kalle who presided the committee being charged with these questions always was strongly opposed against the Nazi-party. If notwithstanding this had been done in 1932 Geheimrat Schmitz only can explain it, the question never having come to a discussion in the Zentral-Ausschuss.

To summarize the following must be stated:

(signed) G v Schnitzler

1) With the growing of the military interest in the government's program I.G.'s relations to the Wehrmacht firstly became an additional factor in I.G.'s official relations to the different other ministries, by and by the Wehrmacht became by far the most important one, and with the beginning of the 4 years plan the investment-policy of I.G. was not to be separated anymore from the policy of the Wehrmacht. Nearly all investments were made directly or indirectly for the Wehrmacht. I.G. was on the whole a loyal and compliant partner of the Wehrmacht. That the Wehrmacht was not a typical Nazi-institution and only followed itself in material the line prescribed by the party is well known. The higher officers doing their duty as law-abiding officers were not Nazis by conviction, they have proved it on July 20th, 1944.

2.) I.G. followed the "Grossraum-Politik" of the government because there was no other economic policy to be made.

That I.G. itself would have preferred a policy of "most favoured nation treatment" and "world-wide trade" became a pure theory and could not lead to any real consequences.

3.) In the handling with party matters I.G. acted after the policy "Muddling through" with the result that in the last it always had to yield.

vS 4.) Thus in acting as it had done, the I.G. contracted a great responsibility and constituted a substantial and in the chemical domain decisive help to Hitler's foreign policy, which led to war and to the ruin of Germany.

5.) Thus I must conclude that I.G. is largely responsible for Hitler's policy.

Frankfurt, August 8th, 1945.

Signed: G. von Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) Generally speaking, it does not sufficiently separate the pre-war from the war period.

(b) At page two, paragraph 4, it was erroneous to say that "The whole development of I.G. in the years beginning with 1934 and accelerated since the end of 1936 is entirely due to the close team work with government and Wehrmacht." I would say now that this development "is due to the development of chemistry in general, to autarchy, to rearmament and, finally, to the war itself." I would now make the same qualification to the sixth paragraph on page 2, where I said the whole augmentation of I.G.'s turnover "is a 100% result of the rearmament and the war

(signed) G v Schnitzler

policy of the German government."

(c) In the last paragraph on page 2, I meant no reproach against the technical men of I.G. when I said "It never became quite clear if our technical men themselves had not deliberately induced the Wehrmacht to that "Auflage." An "Auflage" was more or less an order to or imposition of a task upon a concern or plant by the Wehrmacht. In working upon the "Auflage" as team workers with the Wehrmacht, I.G.'s technical men had the opportunity to suggest modifications of an old "Auflage" or to suggest a further project which later became an "Auflage."

(d) At the top of page 3, I should qualify the statement that the various plants became independent of the leadership of the Sparte heads and acted directly with the different Wehrmacht authorities. This result came completely to a head only after the war began, although it began as early as 1938, particularly after the Anschluss in March 1938.

(e) In the last paragraph of page 5, I wish to make some corrections. I stated here that Dr. Muller-Cunradi made "an allusion" in late 1944 that gases had been used in Auschwitz concentration camps to kill people and that I.G. products "were something in it." By this I meant I.G. products could have something to do with it. This was more of a reference to a rumour than it was an "allusion" to the fact. Since August 1945, I have talked to Schmitz and he does not recall that I ever mentioned the matter to him. However, my recollection is that I mentioned the matter to Dr. Schmitz at a lunch in Heidelberg when we were there for a Vorstand meeting in January or February 1945. Schmitz did not say anything at the time and since the Russians at that time were before the doors of Auschwitz, nothing thereafter could have been done about the matter.

(f) At page 6, paragraph 3, I stated that I could only presume that the unlimited technical ambition of Dr. Ambros had driven him to take
(signed) G v Schnitzler

over the factory in Dyhernfurt. That was my impression in August 1945. But in the meantime I have learned that this was not because of the ambition of Dr. Ambros, but because of an "Auflage" from the Wehrmacht.

(g) At page 6, paragraph 5, I stated that the raw materials of the WOLA plant in Poland "was carried over to" the BORUTA plant in so far as it was transportable. It should be added that this was done before I.G. acquired control of the BORUTA plant during the period when the Reichkommissars Schoener and Schwab were administering the Polish chemical plants for the Reich. I.G. had suggested that Schoener and Schwab, who were I.G. officials, be appointed as experts to administer the Polish chemical plants for the Reich. I also wrote in the statement that I had made an extensive statement as to why it was necessary to acquire "these factories". Instead of "these factories" I should have said "the BORUTA factory." As far as the WOLA is concerned, the owner, old Mr. Szpielvogel with his family, had fled to Warsaw. The place had remained deserted.

vs The "Kommissare" for the "Reichs-account" liquidated the dyestuffs-department. The whole property, as Schwab had stated, was later on sold out by the General Government, Krakow, to a third party, whose name I only heard in the summer of 1945: Binder. Shortly after the occupation of Poland I once gave a hint to Schwab that he should try to assist the old gentleman if ever possible, and I think he did something, but later on all traces of him were lost.

(h) On page 9, second full paragraph, the reports of the Vermittlungsstelle W and the Sales Organizations to the Abwehr were reports about economic matters which I.G. acquired in the normal course of business. It was not a typical military espionage. Of course where the Wehrmacht chose and engaged an individual of our sales organizations for its special purposes, I.G. could not influence that and the individual was sworn to secrecy. It only became evident that an I.G. representative

(signed) G v Schnitzler

abroad had Abwehr duties when we sought to recall the man or to free him for military service and then came a general order that we should keep him. VOWI must be dealt with separately, since the Wehrmacht at first wanted to take over VOWI's entire organization at the beginning of the war and Dr. Kurt Krueger, then head of Berlin N.W. 7, was at the same time mobilized as an officer with the Wehrmacht.

(i) On page 9, third paragraph from the bottom, I overstated by saying, without qualification, that the Wehrmacht became the decisive or at least the most important factor in I.G.'s development. I should have said "during the war." The Wehrmacht War Ministry was an important agency after 1934, but between 1934 and 1939, the Ministry of Economics, and between 1936 and 1939, the Four Year Plan were the principal agencies with which I.G. dealt. I might also point out that Hans Kehrl of the Ministry of Economics had continuously frictions with Krauch of the Four Year Plan.

(j) On page 10, paragraph 2, I believe the typist miscopied my longhand at one point. I wrote "refrain" and she typed "refract."

(k) On page 11, paragraph 3, subheading 1), I made a mistake due to my lack of more detailed knowledge of technical matters. The technical development of I.G. concerning buna, artificial fibres, and synthetic oil was not as dependent upon the Wehrmacht's intentions as I thought in 1945. As I have since found out by discussions with my technical colleagues, these matters were developed under the Autarchy Program with the Ministry of Economics and the Four Year Plan and the Wehrmacht did not interfere at all. However, with magnesium, the Wehrmacht had a direct interest from the very beginning. In the other fields the Wehrmacht only became by and by more interested and, of course, interested overwhelmingly when the war broke out.

(l) On page 11, paragraph 3, subheading 1), I said the Wehrmacht followed the party line "in material." I meant in the Latin "in Materia" -
(signed) G v Schnitzler

or in the German "in der Sache, aber nicht in der Ueberzeugung," which can be translated "in the fact but not with conviction."

(m) On page 11, paragraph 3, subheadings 4) and 5), I must now make the following qualifications: I believe that I and I.G. Farben as a whole have contracted a great responsibility before God in that our acts constituted a substantial help to Hitler's foreign policy. However, I did not mean that I accept any responsibility in the legal sense. To the best of my conviction we never did anything unlawful against humanity. But we were in this terrible boat with Hitler, and since we have participated in handling this boat, we have a responsibility before God and consequently before mankind. I can explain this in the words of the "Matthaeus Evangelium": There are two duties for a Christian, the love of God and the love for your neighbor. Concerning mankind, we acted against the love of our neighbor, and that is what I mean when I say we consequently have a responsibility before mankind. The last two paragraphs were inserted because I felt a moral, but not a legal responsibility, because I.G. had contributed a substantial, and in the chemical domain a decisive, help to Hitler's foreign policy which led to war and to the ruin of Germany and Europe, by the mere fact that without a substantial chemical industry modern warfare is impossible. It would not have been possible to carry through in the years 1939 to 1945 without the potential of the chemical industry. By this I do not mean to indicate a graver moral responsibility for I.G. than I believe should also be accepted by other Germans or other German concerns who made a comparable contribution with the necessary implements of warfare in the broadest sense.

3. On 15 August 1945, Dr. Max Ilgner and I signed a one-page statement simply entitled "Statement," the text of which follows:

"Since 1936, I.G. officials paid by I. G. and assisted by a large staff of technicians and personnel all paid by I. G., planned for the Nazi Government, the Rearmament phase in the

(signed) G v Schnitzler

chemical sector with concentration on the building up of such war industries as magnesium, synthetic rubber, oils, etcetera. This was handled by the Reichsamt für Wirtschaftsausbau and the Generalbevollmächtigter für Sonderfragen der Chemischen Erzeugung, under Mr. Krauch.

(signed) G. v Schnitzler

(signed) H. Ilgner"

Frankfort on the Main
August 15, 1945.

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct, except that I would now qualify it in two places as follows:

(a) For the words "The rearmament phase" I would substitute "the autarchy and rearmament phase."

(b) For the phrase "such war industries as magnesium, synthetic rubber, oils, etcetera," I would substitute the words "such industries as magnesium, synthetic rubber, oils, etcetera, which were important industries for the autarchy program and the rearmament program and which we also hoped would be economically workable under a peace time regime."

4. On 21 August 1945, I signed a one-page statement entitled "Statement re Mobilization in the Summer of 1938," the text of which follows:

"Since the peaceful invasion into Austria the whole German country was practically was on the foot of mobilization.

This state of things became even more accentuated, when Hitler had entered into Prague and preparations for a campaign against Poland were started. Since July 1939 many of our employees and particularly the officers of the reserve of the so-called new army were called to their regiments and lined upon the Polish frontier.

Simultaneously the industry was mobilized. Mobilization-plans what in the case of war was allowed or ordered to be produced, had a long time ago been prepared.

These plans, which beginning with 1934 had been made up by individual firms in close team-work with Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie and the competent ministries - became effective in such a way, that Higu returned them to the individual firm with his approval stamped on them.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

vs For my opinion the respective plans had been handed over to the firms in the current of the summer 1939, mostly with the instruction that they should be applicable at the moment of the outbreak of the war. Thus the plan for dyestuffs as far as I can remember became effective the first of September. For some commodities of purely military character, as the so-called implements of war, the mobilisation-order must have become effective to a much earlier date.

I should say, beginning with the spring of 1939, one after another of these latter products or objects has been put in the state of mobilization. The orders by Wigrü-Chemie did not pass through the hands of the commercial administration; or they were sent straight to the producing works or passed through Tea-Büro. - I myself was so firmly convinced, that at the last moment an agreement about Danzig and the so-called Corridor would be reached, that I left Frankfurt about August 11th or 12th on a vacation-trip by car with my wife and my unmarried daughter to Jugoslavia - and was called back about the 27th or 28th of August from Bleč.

Frankfurt, Aug. 21st 1945.

(signed) G. von Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) Instead of the word "mobilization" in the title, and in the first paragraph, I would not use the word "preparedness." The mobilization (in the German "Mobilmachung") had been prepared, both personnel and war materials being mobilized in a certain sense, but the order placing the mobilization plans in final effect was not given until war broke out, as I have been informed since 1945. Therefore, the use of the word mobilization ("MOBILMACHUNG" in the German is a technical term) without qualification might be misleading.

(b) In the second line, first paragraph, I meant to use the word "footing" instead of the word "foot."

5. On 28 August 1945, I signed two one-page statements, the longer one entitled "Statement re 'Tense Situation' in Summer 1939" and the shorter one entitled simply "Statement by Dr. von Schnitzler." These statements are complementary and can be properly commented upon together. The text of each follows:

(signed) G v Schnitzler

28 August 1945

Statement by Dr. von Schnitzler

vs I would say that in my capacity as Deputy Chairman of the Wirtschaft Gruppe Chemie I had occasion to meet with Mr. Ungewitter at least once a month in Berlin. There we discussed official business regarding the different matters concerning the chemical industry. It was in July 1939 at one of these meetings in the presence of Mr. Barnann, Deputy to Ungewitter, that Mr. Ungewitter told me that Hitler was determined to invade Poland and that, in view of the assurance given by England and France to Poland, we must be prepared for an attack on our western front. There could be no doubt in my mind from the manner in which Mr. Ungewitter spoke that the attack would take place as soon as the harvest was collected, which meant some time in September. Ungewitter told me also that the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Economics had informed him that our "Eriegswichtigen", that is, the Ludwigshafen and Oppau works must be moved from the western frontier because they were too close. We feared also that they might have guns which could shoot over the 80 km. distance between our factories and the French frontier. I said at once to Mr. Ungewitter that this idea of moving the works seemed quite impossible to me. When I spoke to Dr. Tar Meier one of the next days, he told me that he was well aware of the plan and he confirmed that it was impossible to move the works and I am certain that Mr. Ungewitter has talked over these questions much more strongly with Dr. Wurster and Dr. Ambros than he did it with me, who was not responsible for the Ludwigshafen - Oppau works. It is incontestable that Mr. Ungewitter acted on behalf of the government, that means the Vier Jahres Plan, when he informed me in the beforementioned way.

(signed) G. von Schnitzler"

"Statement re "Tense Situation" in Summer 1939

When Hitler had entered into Prague, one could not have any doubts that he was ready to go for war. The tension which since the Anschluss of Austria lay over Europe, became nearly intolerable. The German country was in a continuous state of mobilization. This had gone so far that even men like myself being not under any military obligation in March 1939 got a "Mobilmachungs-Order" to be in the case of war, at the disposition of their firm. The plans for the mobilization of the key-industries were handed out to the individual firms, partly, for the so-called implements of war, they at once had to become efficient, for other domains it was provided for that they should enter in force with the outbreak of war — this applies for instance to the best of my knowledge for dyestuffs.

Shortly afterwards, it may be in June, the first incidents were provoked at the German/Polish border, riots in Danzig were "arranged" and as we know from last year in the Sudetenland, how such things were being managed, we were absolutely sure that Hitler would attack Poland, if Poland should not accept his demands.

Optimists like myself remained hopeful that at the last moment an arrangement should be found but the earnestness of the situation could not be hidden as the guaranty of England for Poland was a fact. The public about this was misled by the announcement of the great apothosis which should happen in Tannenberg at the end of August in order to celebrate the anniversary of the battle of Tannenberg as well as to disclose the sepulchrum for old Marshall Hindenburg.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

I think it was in July 1939 that I had in Berlin a conversation with Dr. Ungewitter in the presence of his deputy, Mr. Hermann. In this conversation, Dr. Ungewitter informed me that the conflict with Poland could break out at any time and that after the opinion of the competent ministry in principle the manufacturing of all chemical products important for warfare should be removed from Ludwigshafen/Oppau and be transferred to other works not so near to the French frontier.

I said at once to Dr. Ungewitter that this seemed quite impossible to me as such producing capacities in the other works were not existent.

The same was confirmed one of the next days by Dr. Ter Meer when I talked to him about that conversation and I am certain that Dr. Ungewitter had talked over those questions much more thoroughly with Dr. Warster and Dr. Ambros, then he did it with me, who was not responsible for Ludwigshafen/Oppau. It is incontestable that Dr. Ungewitter acted on behalf of the government, that means the "Vier Jahres - Plan," when he informed me in the before-mentioned way.

Frankfurt, Aug. 28th, 1945

(signed) G. von Schnitzler

Both these statements were made upon the basis of a strong impression I had in August 1945 and they were firmly written in my recollection. The statements both still appear to me to be entirely true to the best of my knowledge and belief except that I would like to make the following explanations:

(a) Recollecting all my anxieties of that summer of 1939, all the wild fury which I felt against Hitler's policy, I am inclined to believe that unknowingly or subconsciously I might have interpolated (unterschoben) certain of my own worries and concerns to Dr. Ungewitter and I believe that this is a psychological and understandable error! Ever since the invasion of Prague, which happened the very day when we were sitting in Düsseldorf on the so-called Anglo-German industrial committee, and after having exchanged reactions on that event with Sir Francis Clarke, the head of the British steel industry, my anxieties about the future steps which Hitler might take never came to an end. Apart from some personal friends not being connected with I.G., I only showed from time to time my deep worries and concerns to Carl von Weinberg, Dr. Hans Kugler, and Richard von Szilvinyi.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

(b) It is clear that I had a specific conversation with Dr. Ungewitter in about July 1939 in which he stated that it was opinion of the competent Reich authorities that the Ludwigshafen/Oppau plant would have to be closed down because they were too close to the French frontier. But as I now view it, he must have meant and must have stated that this order was prepared so that it would go into effect in case of war. Moreover, I am now doubtful if Dr. Ungewitter actually said that Hitler was determined to attack Poland. He could not have known this then. However, since he was the link between the government and the chemical industry, I know he was speaking on behalf of the Four-Year plan concerning the closing down of Ludwigshafen/Oppau plant and I was very impressed by the manner in which he spoke. When he additionally expressed himself to the effect that the international situation was grave and that it was quite possible there could be a war with Poland, which would involve France and England, I probably read into his statement that he said Hitler was determined to attack Poland.

(c) In the second paragraph of the longer statement, I said "we were absolutely sure that Hitler would attack Poland". This was my firm impression in August 1945, but I should have only spoken for myself and not said "we". Moreover, I thought Hitler's foreign policy of bluff backed by the strong fist would probably cause Poland to give in to his demands. However, I was a very worried man, particularly after the invasion of Prague, since I felt that England, France and America were bound to take a stiffer attitude to Hitler's words and actions, and that ultimately Hitler's policy would bring Europe to war and ruin.

6. On 22 August 1945, I signed a one-page statement concerning war preparations, the text of which follows:

"Even without being directly informed that the government intended to wage war, it was impossible for officials of I.G. or any other industrialist to believe that the enormous production of armaments and preparation for war starting from the coming into power of Hitler accelerated in 1936 and reaching unbelievable proportions in 1938 could have any other meaning but that Hitler and the Nazi Government intended to wage war come what may. In

(signed) G. ...

view of the enormous concentration on military production and of the intensive military preparation, no person of I.G. or any other industrial leader could believe that this was being done for defensive purposes. We of I.G. were well aware of this fact as were all German industrialists and on a commercial side, shortly after the Anschluss in 1938, I.G. took measures to protect its foreign assets in France and the British Empire.

(signed) G. von Schnitzler"

This statement represents my impression in August 1945. This statement offers an appropriate basis for making some additional statements concerning the feelings I held before the outbreak of war in September 1939. I resented Hitler's rearmament policy, and I was terribly oppressed by it. I mentioned my feelings confidentially to my close collaborators and to my personal friends, such as Professor Rousselle, Carl von Weinberg, Richard von Szilvinyi, and Dr. Hans Eugler. I often said confidentially that that madman (referring to Hitler) would bring us to ruin because the world in the long run would not tolerate his actions and his offensive speeches. I disapproved of the movement of troops into both Austria and Czechoslovakia. However, my feelings concerning the use of force to effect the Anschluss were influenced by a strong feeling, which I held to this day, that Austria and Germany are basically one nation and that the Austrians wanted a union with Germany. Therefore, the propaganda and the reports which came out concerning Austria, just before and just after the Anschluss, did not necessarily appear exaggerated to me. The military occupation of Czechoslovakia (leaving aside the occupation of the Sudetenland after the Munich Agreement) in March, 1939, was an entirely different matter for me. This military invasion simply shocked me to the deepest depths of my heart. The occupation occurred when I was in Dusseldorf at the German-English Conference of industrialists. On the way to a luncheon party at this time Sir Francis Larko of England gave his reaction to this terrible step. My opinion was identical to his. I was just as shocked as he was and had neither an explanation nor an excuse. I always considered that Czechoslovakia was a godchild of the United States and that this occupation would deeply offend America. The 13th of March 1939 is the decisive date for me with respect to the foreign policy of the Hitler Regime. On that date it

(signed) G v Schnitzler

became absolutely clear to me that Hitler would lead Europe to ruin. I so expressed myself to my close friends, and proof of this can be obtained from them. From the very first moment it was clear to me that it was a terrible wrong to mankind which was done by the occupation of Prague. I knew only too well many Czech people not to be fully aware that they were not Germans and that they did not want to have a German domination. After the Sudetenland was incorporated into the German Reich, I did not believe a word of the propaganda against Czechoslovakia. With respect to the Polish question, I distinctly disapproved from the first moment of any coercive or forceful measure. I didn't accept the Polish border "incidents" as true nor did I accept the propaganda concerning Poland. But, on the other hand, I didn't believe them to be as artificial as I recognized them to be after the collapse of Germany, because I felt that hatred was being made by both sides and that there was injustice concerning the Polish Corridor and East Prussia. I did not think the Polish question would come to war because I thought Hitler, following his policy of bluff, backed up by the strong fist, would secure his demands of the Poles by his bluff. However, I was among that group of Germans who were worried that Hitler might not get away with his bluff toward Poland and that this would mean war not only with Poland but as well with France and England. After Ungewitter had told me in July 1939, that the government was concerned about the proximity of the Ludwigshafen/Oppeu plant to the the French border, I was worried by the prospect of war. As head of the Kaufmannische Ausschuss of I.G., and as the person in charge of the biggest part of I.G.'s export trade, the dyestuffs field, I quite naturally took every precaution of a cautious and considerate business man in case a clash should occur. I was not a gambler myself, and I considered gambling too mild a word to describe Hitler's foreign policy. I then considered Hitler's foreign policy a matter of "Verbrecherisches Spekulieren", which can properly be translated as criminal speculations. The steps I took to protect I.G.'s

(signed) G v Schnitzler

foreign assets abroad were the natural protective steps of a cautious business man against this criminal speculation. At the time in 1939, I felt that a captain should stay with his ship, that I owed certain obligations to my employees, and that I had a responsibility to I. G. Farben, in total, including the shareholders. For these reasons I did not resign or withdraw to an unimportant position in spite of my aversion feelings concerning Hitler's policy.

7. I have carefully read each of the 25 pages of this declaration and have placed my signature at the bottom of each page. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed each correction in the margin of the page. I declare herewith under oath that I have stated the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signed) Georg von Schnitzler
GEORG VON SCHNITZLER

Sworn to and signed before me this 18th day of March 1947, at the Palace of Justice in Nurnberg, Germany, by Georg von Schnitzler, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signed) Drexel A. Sprecher
DREXEL A. SPEECHER

U. S. Civilian, Attorney, AGO No. 473307
Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes

CERTIFICATION

I, ERNA E. UIBERALL, AGO No. D-150096, hereby certify that the above is a true and correct copy of Document No. NI-5196, the original of which is in the English language.

ERNA E. UIBERALL
U. S. Civilian
AGO No. D-150096

end

A F F I D A V I T

I, GEORG VON SCHNITZLER, member of the Vorstand of I.G. Farbenindustrie from 1925 until 1945, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making a false statement herewith state the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion.

1. In the first four paragraphs of my affidavit of 4 March 1947, which I swore to before representatives of the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, I have stated the true circumstances under which I gave information, by means of statements and interrogations, concerning the I.G. Farbenindustrie and other matters to Allied investigators in 1945. These four paragraphs should also be considered as an introduction to this affidavit. Below I consider further statements or interrogations which I subscribed to during 1945, and which I have been shown and which I have re-read between 18 February 1947 and the present time. When I subscribed to these statements or interrogations in 1945, the matters to which I subscribed were true to the best of my knowledge and belief at that time. The errors I now find after re-reading these documents are set forth below after the text of the respective statement or interrogation.

2. On 21 August 1945, I signed a two page statement principally concerning I.G. and the chemical industry of Germany and of Europe generally, the text of which follows :

"When one tries to compare the I.G. with the rest of the chemical industries of Germany, one should never forget that the mother houses of I.G. which constituted the merger in 1925 themselves were by far the biggest enterprises in the chemical domain in Germany. After the revaluation of the mark in 1923 and 1924, the three greatest of the I.G. firms, Badische, Bayer, Hoechst each had a share capital of 150,000,000 marks and by capital turnover, earning capacity, or by whatever aspect is being taken were each at least three to four times bigger in size than anyone of the other chemical firms. It has always been characteristic for the German chemical industry that there was on one side this huge agglomeration of industrial power called I.G. and on the other hand an extremely great number of small enterprises split over the whole country. Wigrü-Chemie gathered four thousand firms and very few of them had a turnover of more than RM 1,000,000. I.G., at the top of her activity, showed a turnover of three billion marks and their subsidiaries including Dynamit A.G. had a turnover of another billion marks. Of this latter billion marks, of course half at least can be considered as typical armaments business without importance for peace time. Compared with this, three and one-half or

(signed) G v Schnitzler

four billion marks, the next one on the list, the so-called Henckel concern of Dusseldorf, manufacturers of soap and other washing products, figures only with a turnover of somewhat two hundred million marks and this gives a true picture of how outstanding I.G.'s position was. As a third firm, the Deutsch Solvay Werke and Schering A.G. of Berlin in fourth place has a turnover of between one hundred and two hundred million marks and that probably closes the list of the combines with over one hundred million marks of yearly turnover. Altogether the German chemical industry in the top year of 1943 including Austria and Sudetenland might have had a turnover of approximately ten billion marks. But if one only compares the six and the four billion, one is far from a true picture of what the real potential of I.G. in relation to the combined total of the other German firms represented. Not only that new inventions of outstanding importance practically were alone made by I.G. and that research work on a large scale was exclusively done by I.G., the real importance of I.G. in her qualities as a supplier of all basic products to the other chemical industries was even much higher. Entire groups of chemistry like the varnish and the lacquer industry and in dyestuffs and solvents were entirely dependent on I.G. and in the pharmaceutical domain even firms like Schering and Hoechst also possessing a big share in the pharmaceutical business of finished products depended on I.G. in her basic organic products like aniline and the different derivatives of acetic acid. It has once been made an analysis which part I.G. had in the pharmaceutical business and as a test case one had analysed the turnover of two Krankenkassen in different parts of Germany. The analysis only showed a share of I.G. of somewhat as 20%, but on the one hand the Kassen did not take articles with a standard name like Aspirin, buying as little as possible and trying to place their orders in the market of the products without the special brand of a firm so that practically I.G.'s share will have to be much bigger (but it must not be forgotten that practically all pharmaceutical products as before said are based on raw materials and intermediates bought from I.G.). It is not exaggerated to make this statement that the entire pharmaceutical industry literally would come to a standstill if I.G. would stop production. The same applies to the entire textile industry which reposes on I.G. for dyestuffs and all kinds of auxiliary products including the cleansing and wetting process. There is only the a soap industry, properly speaking, which to a large extent is self-supporting on their own basis and then of course Solvay and the other less important producers of carbonate of soda and chlorine and caustic soda.

To summarize I may give some samples of I.G.'s relative share in the different key domains of chemistry: dyestuffs - 100%; auxiliary products at least 50%, probably in pharmaceuticals at least 1/3, the other 2/3 all depend on the supply of basic organic products through I.G.; nitrogen, before the war - 70%; general chemicals apart from I.G.'s own consumption

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between 20 % and 80 %; photographic articles - 80%;
carbides at least 80%; buna - 100%; plastics, etc., modern
thermoplastics made by polymerization - 100%; the old
products, phenoplast 30-50%; light metals, magnesium
at least 90%; only one small producer apart from I.G.,
Wintershall, aluminum only, a modest participation.
Thus from whatever angle one takes up the problem, I.G.
has the key position as producer in the whole range in
inorganic and aromatic organic products and a walkover
position in the aliphatic field. This taken together
with the overwhelming position I.G. has in the field
of photographic products and the strong majority in
nitrogen, one has to make the statement that chemistry
in Germany and I.G. is to a great extent synonymous.
But it does not cover the entire position of I.G. in
the chemical field, if one does not analyse the inter-
connection between the German chemistry and that of the
neighboring countries. None of these countries including
France is self-supporting in such a sense that

(signed) G v Schnitzler

they under normal economic circumstances can get rid of I.G.'s supplies and the intercourse with her. Not only the textile industry of Scandinavia, Holland, France, Czechoslovakia can be separated from the supply of dyc-stuffs, auxiliaries, etc., from I.G., but also the chemical industry of these countries is closely related to her and it is fairly unimaginable that for instance Holland, Belgium, and Scandinavia will renounce to any intercourse with the I.G.'s chemical works located on the borders of the Rhine River. Also the pharmaceutical products of "Bayer" can not be thought away from a Belgian or Dutch or Swedish dispensary. Even in France where a much stronger chemical industry exists than in the aforementioned other countries, I.G.'s products as well as I.G.'s licenses will be needed in many important domains and as well the Kuhlman group as Rhone Poulenc will be only too glad to reassume these relations. I can not imagine that England or United States can entirely replace this position which had been held for such a long time and which is based upon scientific and business relations as well as the reciprocal knowledge of the language. After World War I, relations with Holland were being resumed at once, with Belgium after a very short interval, and with France in a slowly climbing tendency up to 1927 when Germany became the first industrial supplier of France and this without competing against the domestic industry in France. The business done in those countries by I.G. was not directed against the English and American importation, which only partly materialized in the same fields and which as far as the English were concerned were mostly protected by cartel agreements. Speaking generally of exports, I.G.'s share in the export of German chemical industries can be considered as being the half of the total export. Exact figures were never available because the official figures did not always coincide with the figures made up by the individual firms and as the handling of turnover figures of subsidiaries of I.G. was not identical in the official way compared with the handling inside of I.G.

G. von Schmitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that in the second paragraph, page one, I exaggerated the importance of the dependence of the other German pharmaceutical firms upon I.G. I.G. did have at least a one-third share of the German pharmaceutical interest, but balance of the German pharmaceutical industry did not all depend on I.G. to supply the basic organic products. I really am not able to make an accurate estimate of the dependence of other pharmaceutical plants upon organic products produced by I.G.

2. On 9 August 1945, I signed a one page statement concerning I.G.'s investment and amortization policy the text of which follows :

"Whenever the I.G. had to make substantial investments for the Wehrmacht's needs and wanted to take the whole risk upon her own shoulders or was compelled to do so, then of course in the agreements, she always endeavored, and to the best of my knowledge, succeeded in getting the high amortizations necessary to write the factories off in the shortest possible time. Apart from the amortization, I.G., tried to get protection of

(signed) G v Schmitzler

such a kind that the product in question should not be replaced by other products in the event of a change in market conditions. The normal amortizations for I.G. installations were calculated at 5 percent for buildings and 10 percent for equipment. In installations for Wehrmacht purposes, we tried to get higher percentages, and for example, in the case of Aken Leichtmetall in Aken, we succeeded in getting 15 percent on the equipment, which meant that in the seventh year the whole equipment was written off. Protection was asked and granted for buna in such a way that for the import of natural rubber, a sliding scale was fixed that the consumer always had to pay as much duty for the imported rubber to the Reich as to cover the difference between the price paid for natural rubber "CIP" Hamburg, and the prices fixed by the government for buna. This price for buna was from time to time modified and continuously lowered with the progressive production and the higher efficiency of I.G. processes.

I think the last price for buna has been something like 2 marks 30 pfennings (2.30) per kilogram weight (KG), but it was hoped that it would go down further to ~~2 marks~~ 90 pfennings (1.90) per kilogram weight or to 1 mark, 80 pfennings (1.80) per kilogram weight. A similar scheme was fixed for the importation of natural oil, and the last price basis which I can recollect should be 22 pfennings per kilogram weight, as compared with 7 pfennings per kilogram weight "CIP" Hamburg.

vs. In the field of synthetic fibre a number of regulations for the textile industry made secure that the production of synthetic fibre which, if I am not mistaken, went to three hundred thousand tons per year, would be consumed. The so-called Ost Steuer Hilfe permitted equipment to be immediately written off by 80 percent, and I believe 20 percent for the plant. Thus I.G. was able to amortize the two great factories at Auschwitz and Heydebrück to almost half the cost value, and these works never had, up to the end of the war, been in full production. Of course, this provision was only granted when the profit of the total enterprise was sufficient to pay the normal taxes on it.

I have read this statement and swear that the facts stated therein are true.

G. v. Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. Of course, I can be mistaken on certain percentages, but the general idea I wanted to demonstrate is absolutely clear from this statement. Dr. Fritz ter Meer, aided by Dr. Buhl, represented I.G. in the negotiations with the Reich Government which resulted in the tax on natural rubber which was equal to the difference in the cost between natural rubber and buna. Dr. Heinrich Bütefisch and Dr. Ernst Fischer represented I.G. for the same purpose with respect to a tax on natural oil equal to the difference in the cost between natural oil and synthetic oil. In securing the government regulations to secure the

(signed) G v Schnitzler

consumption of synthetic fibers, I.G. was represented by Dr. Fritz Gajewski and Mr. Wilhelm Otto.

3. On 18 August 1945, I signed a two page record of interrogation principally concerning the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie, the text of which follows :

"Q. When was the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie organized?

A. The Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie was organized in 1933. It grew out of a private association of the chemical concerns which was a very old organization. However, in 1933 it became a semi-official organization and its functions were to advise the government on policy matters in the chemical industries.

Q. What was your position in the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie?

A. In the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie I was member of the "engerer Beirat", (the inner Board) since 1933.

Q. What official position did you hold?

A. I was deputy chairman of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie which was a component of the Reichsgruppe Industrie.

Q. Who appointed you deputy chairman of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie?

A. In so far as I can remember the chairman of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie was appointed by the Ministry of Economics. I think I was appointed by the chairman of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie as his deputy. Of course, my appointment could not have been made without the consent of the Ministry of Economics.

Q. Who was the manager of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie?

A. Dr. Ungewitter.

Q. Who was Dr. Ungewitter appointed by?

A. Dr. Ungewitter was formerly in the Verein the manager of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie and then, of course, he was appointed by the Ministry of Economics.

Q. Who paid the salaries?

A. The Wirtschaftsgruppe.

Q. How did the Wirtschaftsgruppe get its money?

A. In the form of an "Umlage" on account of the chemical firms based on the totality of wages and the number of employees. Membership in the Wirtschaftsgruppe was compulsory.

Q. In regard to important steps or decisions to be made by the Wirtschaftsgruppe were you informed?

A. Yes. When important steps were to be taken the leader conveyed the "engerer Beirat".

(signed) G v Schnitzler

- Q. Can you give me an example of a policy decision made by the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie?
- A. The two most important things the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie has done were: Firstly the Z.A.V., the "Umlage" of the Z.A.V. on the industry. That was in 1934 or 1935, and secondly during the war it handled the question of the statements of the excess profits from the standpoint of the price commissars.

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- Q. What were the "Job" plans?
- A. The Wirtschaftsgruppe or its different affiliations had the function to control the entire production in the chemical field and to prepare the distribution of the available and the needed commodities. This was done for every important product of the chemical industry. I remember that the most important commodities figures on a special list which was particularly supervised by Dr. Ungewitter personally. The production plans of the different branches of the chemical industry could only be made up in accordance with the prescription of Dr. Ungewitter. Dr. Ungewitter in his person united different functions.
- Q. Can you give us the history of the development of the production plans for war, i.e. the "Job" plans?
- A. From the very beginning of the Nazi regime the Wirtschaftsgruppe was charged with semi-official functions in order to prepare an eventual German mobilization for war. In this connection they made an analysis of every chemical firm in Germany what their producing capacity was and what they had in stock, etc. For the so-called great commodities a production plan has been made up and the distribution for the needs of an eventual war was prepared. Representatives of the Wirtschaftsgruppe, that means officials, acted in close collaboration with the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of War to collect that material and get from the different firms these plans which he did approve or disapprove. With the beginning of the war the long prepared system was put into action and functioned with the greatest accuracy. No firm was allowed to go beyond the production plans fixed beforehand and the commodities used for their manufacturing were strictly controlled. Thus Wirtschaftsgruppe and the other affiliations were from the first beginning an instrument which served as an intermediary between the Ministries of Economics and War and the individual firms.
- Q. When was the order putting the plans into action issued?
- A. All the German industries were mobilized in summer 1939 and in summer 1939 the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie issued an order that the plans for war were in action. In June or July 1939 I.G. and all heavy industries as well knew that Hitler had decided to invade Poland if Poland would not accept his demands. Of this we were absolutely certain and in June or July 1939 German industry was completely mobilized for the invasion of Poland.

G. von Schnitzler."

(signed) G v Schnitzler

The statements made in this record of interrogation still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that my last answer in this interrogation should be qualified by the explanation of Ungewitter's statement to me in June or July 1939 which I have previously given in paragraph 5 of my affidavit of 18 March 1945, where I discuss together two statements I signed on 28 August 1945.

4. On 21 July 1945, I subscribed to a five page record of interrogation principally concerning the Mob-Fragen (Mobilization Questions), the text of which follows :

"Q. What was the M-question?

A. The M-question contained everything with regard to personnel questions connected with the war.

Q. Will you please explain it?

A. For instance, it started in the year 1940, that the Reich permitted that the years 1906 and 1907, if they were occupied in a "wehrwichtige" organization, could stay with their firms. Later on from time to time, the question how far one could ask people to be what we call uk = unbedenklich, free from army service, was dealt with. Then it contained the regulations to the Wehrmacht, generally spoken but not "Abwehr" questions - sometimes Abwehrfragen too - (i.e. C.I.C.) not active but the passive defense against enemy espionage), the inner organization of army questions as far as of interest to us, which ministry was competent for what purposes, always only as far as the commercial side of the problem was concerned.

Q. What does "M" mean?

A. "M" is an abbreviation of "Mobilmachung" (Even I had a yellow slip stating that in case of Mobilmachung to be at the disposal of I.G.)

Q. In respect to I.G. "M" meant what I.G. must do in regard to the war programme?

A. But mostly from the standpoint of organization and to put people into disposition for military authorities. For example, we would not have discussed the erection of a new magnesium plant under "M" questions.

Q. What kind of discussion would you consider that? -----

A. That would be a separate point of business at the same time of military interest. Under "M" we did not take altogether what has to be done and should have to be done in connection with war but mostly the personal side.

Q. Were espionage questions "M" questions?

A. Yes, as well as counter-espionage. Generally the circle was too great in the Kaufmännische Ausschuss. We would have not spoken of things like that.

(signed) G v Schmitzler

Q. To whom would you speak about things like that?

A. Only between 2 or 3 men.

Q. Which men?

A. Possibly I and Ilgner, Kugler and Frank Fahle. I with von Heidor or Kugler, the three of us, Ilgner, Frank-Fahle and I have made statements for Mr. Glaser as regards the relation to the Wehrmacht.

Q. In regard to the actual military phases you and Fahle and Kugler and Ilgner discussed these?

A. If they came up.

Q. Did they ever come up?

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A. Yes. For example, the discussions which we had with officials of the so-called Kanaris staff.

Q. What is that?

A. The Kanaris staff was the head of the Intelligence Department of the Wehrmacht. The men I know in this staff were Oberst Piopenbrock and Major Blech.

Q. What did you discuss with them?

A. They were interested to get news of an economic character out of neutral and axis countries.

Q. They were not interested in getting news from enemy countries?

A. They were of course interested.

Q. Did they speak to you?

A. Yes. They applied for our help to get news out of neutral and axis countries eventually.

Q. We were speaking about countries hostile to Germany. Did they ask for news in regard to those?

A. Not from me.

Q. From whom did they ask information?

A. I can't tell you.

Q. Don't you want to tell us or you don't know?

A. I don't know it.

Q. Whom did they ask in regard to the U.S.? Who made reports on U.S. production?

A. If for instance Col. Piopenbrock would have asked me what I know of U.S. - before 1937 of course I would have told him.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

- Q. Did he ask any other I.G. officials?
- A. We never spoke with one another. All was under strictest secrecy, when we had to deal with those matters.
- Q. Is it not true that before the invasion of France, I.G. officials sat down with the Wehrmacht and planned the invasion in respect of the matters which I.G. know?
- A. I remember in the first years of the war I was once to visit a department of the Wehrmacht, head was an Oberst Becker, and he asked me what I know of the different plants of the Imperial Chemical Industries.
- Q. When was this?
- A. In the first years of the war, 1939/1940. I would not call that a sort of espionage or whatever it is.
- Q. Prior to the invasion of each country that Hitler attacked, I.G. officials were called in by the Wehrmacht and planned the part of the military attack with which I.G.
- A. I am sure they have asked what we knew about the factories, say of I.C.I. in England.
- Q. Whom did they ask?
- A. Different people.
- Q. Did they ask you?

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- A: I can remember only as far as England is concerned. There was only an occasion in Berlin when Oberst Becker showed me a map of England which was much more complete than my knowledge. He asked me whether I knew something of the British Magnesium plant in Coventry. I said no. I have never been there.
- Q. Who else were called for to give this information?
- A. They asked most technical people of I.G. All these people who were technicians and specialists in the chemical field, and then our Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung under Dr. Reithinger in Berlin which belonged to Ilgner's organization did a lot of work for the Wehrmacht as well as for the government. They succeeded in getting so many men free of military service only on account of the work they made.
- Q. I show you a biography of the Aussigen-Haydén Company. Is that an example of the type of report about which you are speaking?
- A. Yes. The ministries, the foreign office, etcetera based their knowledge on these biographies.
- Q. In regard to the purely military aspects of the campaign against France, Russia, etcetera, didn't I.G. experts sit down with members of the Wehrmacht and plan the chemical aspects of that campaign?
- A. Not to my knowledge. I know we made up these biographies as correct as possible and, of course, we made them for ourselves and we made them at the same time for the Wehrmacht and the ministries.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

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Q. When did you begin to make them?

A. This department is nearly over 10 years old.

Q. Is it not true that prior to an invasion and in planning that invasion, I.G. experts and technicians were called in to assist the Wehrmacht on the purely military aspects? And to locate the plants, to be exactly informed where the plants were located, for example?

A. For all European countries they made up plans. Every plant of chemical interest was indicated in a complete map.

Q. Prior to the attacks on France, Russia, etcetera, did I.G. experts and technicians assist the Wehrmacht in making its plans?

A. I don't think so. I never heard it. I know that technicians helped the Wehrmacht to prepare a map. I object to "prior to an attack".

(page 4 of original)

Q. Before they attacked France, they sat down and made out their military plans, in Holland, Belgium and all the conquered countries? Isn't it true that before these plans were carried out, I.G. officials and technicians sat down with the Wehrmacht and planned these campaigns insofar as they touched the chemical industry?

A. I am sure that they asked our technicians about any and every chemical installations and factories, whatever is fabricated in those countries, but if they sat together with technical people of ours to make real plans what has to be destroyed, that I can't tell you.

Q. Who would know that?

A. A lot of our technical people could tell you. You must ask Terkloer and Butefisch, Schneider, and Gajewsky perhaps, then Wurster and Muller-Gunradi, he is an expert on all kinds of nitrogen.

Q. Isn't true that by the M-plans I.G. meant every aspect which was of military nature?

A. Yes, this is absolutely true.

Q. Under what heading would they discuss it?

A. They have had fancy names.

Q. So that in its commercial meetings the military methods were discussed under the heading "M"? In regard to the other committee, like the technical committee, what were the military plans known as?

A. I think they called it also "M" questions.

Q. So I.G. at all times, since the beginning of Hitler's wars, had a separate section which was called the "M" section or some other letter section?

A. You know in Berlin the Vermittlungsstelle W. It is rather complicated. We had to centralize our commercial activities as far as this domain is concerned at Berlin. In the commercial field, M. Fragen/handled partly by Volkswirtschaft A.B.T. and partly by Frank-Pahle. Under H. Fragen, were discussed the military domain, personal defense against

(signed) G v. Schnitzler

espionage, eventual working in neutral countries. With the technical people, it was more complicated because they did not have that unification. They had in Berlin an organization which they called Vermittlungsstelle W. They dealt through this Vermittlungsstelle W. with the different departments, etc. of the Wehrmacht. It seemed that the 3 Sparten inside I.G. never were in full agreement about this Vermittlungsstelle and so Sparten I made use of Vermittlungsstelle W. and did it only partly, and Dr. Gajewsky of Sparte III

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did not want to have to deal with the Vermittlungsstelle W. and did it on his own. So, for instance, say when it came to Agfa film of highest value in competition with Kodak, Gajewsky dealt those questions personally with the Wehrmacht and did not go through the Vermittlungsstelle. I think they used different names on the technical side of I.G. It was not so concentrated as on the commercial. The man for the Vermittlungsstelle in Frankfurt who was the superior of 3 or 4 chemists, is Dr. Struss. He did that for Dr. Ter Meer. Of course, they were in constant contact with the different military authorities. For example: When Russia was invaded, a staff of chemists was kept together - of Buna chemists - to be at once on the spot. They were sitting there. And then when the farthest point was reached, near Kaluga or so, there in a town they found a great Buna plant and they were able to stay there for 6 hours and they came back with the impression that the Russians were able to make buna from alcohol, not as we do from carbide. Under that heading our technicians would for instance, have called this buna action for Russia, I don't know. I think that goes much further than "I" questions.

Q. Isn't it true that I.G. maintained, in regard to the chemical industry, its own warfare planning section which was of service to the Wehrmacht and used by the Wehrmacht in a commercial sense, in an economic sense, in the technical sense and in a military sense, whether it was known under the name "I" or by some other letter it devoted itself to all military matters, and it handled military matters?

A. That is true.

Q. When was the M plan founded?

A. I think the real M plan in such a way, was only founded when war broke out, I think in September, 1939, and then very quickly.

"I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr. Weissbrecht and Mr. Devine, are true".

G. von Schnitzler

(signature)

Vorstandsmitglied I.G. Farben-
Industrie Aktiengesellschaft -
Position in I.G. Farben "

The statements in this record of interrogation still seem to me to be entirely true to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that the last answer needs amplification. When I answered that "the real M plan" was founded when the

(signed) G v Schnitzler

war broke out, I was not referring to the mobilization plans of the Wirtschaftsgruppe or of the Government, but only to the mobilization plans of the Vermittlungsstelle W.

5. In paragraphs six through ten below, are contained records of interrogations which I subscribed to between July and September 1945, which involve Vermittlungsstelle W (V/W) among other things. On my statements on V/W, I would like to point out the following. I am certain that if I had been in seclusion during the entire period of the last one and a half years and would be asked the same questions today, then I would make those statements exactly in the same words as I did in the summer of 1945. But having been together with my technical colleagues in Cransberg, having received so much information from them and having Dr. Fritz Ter Meer's statement of 30 March 1946 concerning V/W at hand, I must now make certain corrections on the basis of this information from my technical colleagues and state that I perhaps made V/W more important than it really was. On the other hand I have no explanation myself for the fact that one of I.G.'s first technical men, Prof. Dr. Karl Krauch, was made head of this section if it were so unimportant as my technical colleagues say. I must thus answer that I have no explanation, because in my own field or domain I would never have put one of my first men on an unimportant job. Not only was Krauch placed to head V/W when it was created, but when Krauch was transferred to other jobs, he was succeeded as the head of V/W by Gustav^{von} Brüning, who was considered a first grade technician and one of I.G.'s future factory leaders. From what my technical colleagues have told me since 1945, I think that I have not put sufficiently in the foreground V/W's function as an intermediary between I.G. and the Wehrmacht. Moreover, in these interrogations the distinction between rearmament and autarchy, always a difficult distinction to establish, is not sufficiently shown.

6. On 25 July 1945, I subscribed to a two page record of interrogation which principally concerned the "Job Fragen", the text of which follows :
(signed) G v Schnitzler

- vs. "Q. In our discussions relative to M. Fragen, you told us a little about the relations between I.G. and the Wehrmacht in regard to military matters. Can you give us more details in regard to this?
- A. Yes. Just now I wanted to tell you that the VOVI, after war had begun, was practically working more for general staff of the Wehrmacht. What they did was more interesting for us, but in the main they worked directly for the Wehrmacht. I think the Chief, Mr. Reithinger, a well known economist, was sworn in by the Wehrmacht.
- vs. Q. Would you say that Mr. Ilgner knew it?
- A. He was ill at the time.
- Q. Would you say that he knew it? When he came back was he informed of it?
- A. I should say so. Ilgner became ill in the winter before the war -- the winter of 1938-39. He was a long time ill. His deputy was Dr. Kruger, and he was an official in OKW. (Oberkommando Wehrmacht).
- Q. Isn't it a fact that Reithinger was preparing his bombing surveys for the Wehrmacht before the outbreak of war?
- A. I can't tell you when the OKW began to take a keen interest in Mr. Reithinger's work. I think this was an independent development and it grew more and more important and of course during the war it took a typically war trend.
- vs. Q. But before the Nazi programs of aggressions these surveys contained fragmentary commercial information. They were more or less balance sheets, and it was on I.G.'s initiative that they began to contain more and more information which could be useful for military purposes, and it was on Mr. Reithinger's and Mr. Ilgner's initiative that the Wehrmacht became convinced that these I.G. surveys could be very useful for purely military purposes?
- vs. vs. A. I would say that you were right. The Wehrmacht got these reports. The interest of the Wehrmacht was aroused and then Mr. Reithinger developed them and followed the suggestions of the Wehrmacht. What I know in effect was that practically the whole VOVI was under the initiative of the OKW., and given a draft exempt status.
- Q. The inference, or conclusion, you draw from their draft status is that the VOVI was officially recognized?
- A. For the Foreign Office just as well. The military value of the VOVI was officially recognized.
- vs. Q. The Vermittlungstelle W was organized in 1933, soon after Hitler came into power. Is that right?
- A. I am not sure about the date.
- Q. But you are sure that it was organized by I.G. after Hitler came into power?
- A. I am sure -- yes.
- Q. How many groups comprised the Vermittlungstelle W?

(signed) G v Schnitzler

A. Only group 2 worked on Vermittlungstello W matters. Later on Group 1 joined to a certain extent.

Q. What was the function of Group 2 of the Vermittlungstello W?

A. All negotiations with military and quasi military authorities for questions (secret questions) regarding the four-year plan and rearmament.

Q. Isn't it true that soon after it was established Group 2 began to prepare plans for the Chemical industry in the case of war?

A. I see it so that the Vermittlungstello W was a consequence of the rearmament plan.

(page 2 of original)

Q. But one of the functions of Group 2 as a consequence of the Hitler military plan was to prepare plans for the Chemical Industry in the case of war?

A. The V.W. did not prepare. As its name implies, it means that it should be an intermediary between the military and the I.G. and the leading men in ^{the} factories.

vs.

Q. Did you know that Group 2 of the V.W. was requested by the Wehrmacht in 1933 to prepare plans for the Chemical industry in the case of war?

A. I don't think that is probable.

Q. If that is true, Mr. Struss or Mr. ter Meer would know it?

A. Yes.

Q. In 1933, I.G. prepared what they called war games to enable the Luftwaffe to practice bombing of industrial establishments. Is that right?

vs.

A. I can only tell you what I know about these things. Of course when the new plants were erected which were considered as safe from the military standpoint, there was a close contact between the different military authorities. As an example, I might recite when the ~~chemical~~ ^{chemical} factories were erected at Aachen (1935), the man responsible there in Bitterfeld with representatives of the Luftwaffe made a tour in the airplane around that country and the General of the Luftwaffe in charge of the problem did not find the place in ~~Aachen~~ ^{Aachen}. He said, "If I, an expert, cannot find the place in ~~Aachen~~ ^{Aachen} I think you have chosen the right spot." All plans were made with the military authorities that a place chosen from a military standpoint would be as secure as possible.

Q. I am speaking of plans made to assist the Luftwaffe in its bombing, to prove its bombing technique in case of war.

A. I am sure that they did because for example this magnesium plant was to a large extent meant for incendiary bombs. That was very clear.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

- Q. Did Mr. Struss or Mr. ter Meer tell you in 1933, or did you learn in any other way, that I.G. was engaged in these so-called Kriegsspiele?
- A. The word came that I.G. was engaged in war plant games. It can be possible that inside the Group I they used the word Kriegsspiele to refer to that. In 1932 our expenses for new plants were very low, about 10 or 12 million marks. And then it climbed slowly. In 1933 or 1934 what has been spent or planned, I am not so sure, it was not of so great importance. In 1935 it started and of course it grew and climbed tremendously.

I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr. Weissbrodt and Mr. Devine are true.

G. von Schnitzler

(Signature)

Vorstandsmitglied I.G.
Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
(Position in I.G. Farben)"

The statements I subscribed to in this record of interrogation still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) This record of interrogation should be considered along with paragraph 5, above, of this affidavit.

(b) My technical colleagues have informed me since 1945 that V/M was originally established to concern itself with questions arising under the High Treason clauses of the penal code which punished every unauthorized bringing of industrial secrets to foreign countries.

(c) V/M did not act as intermediary between I.G. and the Government in working out materials for mobilization questions (M-Fragen), as one might deduce from this interrogation. The plants, Sparten, and the TEA dealt directly with the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie on this matter.

(d) Page 2, fourth answer, lines 4 and 5, "Aachen" should be "Aken". 7. August 1945 I subscribed to a three page record of interrogation of both Dr. Max Ilgner and me which was held on one morning of 4 August 1945 the text of which follows:

"Q. When were the first discussions held with the Wehrmacht in regard to the establishment of the Vermittlungsstelle M.?"
(signed) G v Schnitzler

- A. (Ilgnor) I don't know exactly. The first negotiations were made by Krauch and Solok.
- Q. (Von Schnitzler) I think it was in the year 1933 or 1934, but I am not quite sure. Struss should know.
- Q. What was the gist of these discussions and what was the basis of the establishment of the Vermittlungsstelle W. Why should the Wehrmacht have come to I.G. in 1933 or 1934 for the establishment of a military office in the I.G.?
- A. (Von Schnitzler) I think there were some chemists put into this Vermittlungsstelle W. and they were in constant contact with the Wehrmacht for the reason that the works of I.G. were spread over the whole of Germany.
- (Ilgnor) One of the reasons was that the Wehrmacht prevented us from exporting our technical know how and patents.
- Q. So that in your opinion, Mr. Ilgnor, one of the reasons the Vermittlungsstelle W. was first set up was in order to prevent I.G. from giving out to other countries its experiences, know how, patents, whenever the Wehrmacht felt that it should not go out?
- A. (Ilgnor) This is what I always felt. Yes.
- (Von Schnitzler) This was a part of it, and the other part was its relationships to the Wehrmacht in the whole field of re-armament. As I said at another hearing, it was mostly all Sparte II. Sparte III wanted to conduct its own affairs.
- Q. What was the function of Sparte III?
- A. (Von Schnitzler) This was the whole cellulose chemistry field. That means rayons, textiles and synthetic fibres and also the photographic field.
- Q. So that, since 1934, the Wehrmacht and I.G. were on a war basis in the chemical field. Is that right?
- A. (Von Schnitzler) That is saying too much. Because the German Government considered itself as having left the League of Nations in Geneva. The German nation considered itself free of international obligations. I understood it with others when the Wehrmacht began warfare developments again, lots of questions did arise in the domain of chemical warfare in the large sense, such as munitions and the light metal field, acids and oils. The questions arose as to how far one was technically to take over synthetic rubber. All these questions became of interest for the Wehrmacht, which got in contact with I.G. It seemed to me that the questions and dealings were so many that for this purpose, the technical leaders of I.G. thought it advisable that they put some man in Berlin, who was in closest continuous contact with the Wehrmacht.
- (Ilgnor) Technical people handled things on their own, so how the Vermittlungsstelle W. originated, in my opinion, can only be told by those technical men who made the negotiations, and the name of one of the men was Krauch. I think Solok must also be informed on this too, as I know he had to handle the organization of the Vermittlungsstelle W. So, it is a matter of fact that if such arrangements were made, with the authorities, it could happen that the commercial men were not told at all.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Q. Did you know, Mr. Ilgner, that the Vermittlungsstelle W. had been established?

A. Yes, certainly. It was directed against my organization.

Q. Why was it directed against your organization. What was your organization doing that made them organize the Vermittlungsstelle W., to combat your organization?

A. (Ilgner) Well they didn't want my organization to become bigger.

Q. Did they feel that if they didn't do it, you would do it?

(page 2 of original)

A. They didn't want my organization to handle these questions at all because they were technical matters, and they wanted to handle it by a special technical organization.

Q. Was your organization prepared to handle the technical matters?

A. No, they were not prepared for that. They were afraid that the Vermittlungsstelle W. would be made a part of my organization, and they wanted their own organization, and therefore my organization had to keep our hands out of the pie.

Q. Did you indicate to them that you would take them over?

A. No.

Q. Then, how did you know that they were afraid of your organization taking over?

A. Because Selck told me this personally.

Q. When?

A. When I came back after my far eastern trip in the fall of 1935.

Q. Did you ever make any attempts to get the Vermittlungsstelle W. within your organization?

A. Yes. When I heard it, I said to Mr. Selck that I think it is stupid that you have in Berlin an organization with all the central departments and now you organize other departments. My organization was the central organization in Berlin, and therefore it seems appropriate to me that all centralized affairs should be part of my organization, and that the Vermittlungsstelle W. ~~should therefore have been included~~ in my organization, especially as I saw that the Vermittlungsstelle W. on these matters I mention, like "industrielle ^{Verschleppung} Werke, had to do with the same official authorities as my organization.

11.

Q. Who would have handled the technical matters Mr. Von Schnitzler was talking about?

A. In this case, it would have been quite a new organization.

Q. Were you informed of the real functions of the Vermittlungsstelle W.?

A. (Ilgner) I don't know.

(Von Schnitzler) Yes. As I have explained above.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Q. Now, since 1934, I.G. had an organization to handle all Wehrmacht affairs. That organization was the Vermittlungsstelle W. Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was the first head of the Vermittlungsstelle W.?

13. A. (Ilgnor) My impression was always that the three leaders of the Sparten were the chiefs. Ferner of Sparta II and Krauch of Sparta I, and in regard to Sparta III, I am not sure as to the leader. He was, I believe, Gagowsky.

Q. How what did Sparta I do?

A. (Von Schnitzler) We do not know exactly.

Q. When did Mr. Krauch go over to Mr. Goering's four year plan?

A. (Von Schnitzler) At the end of 1936, because the four year plan was born in that year.

Q. And what was Mr. Krauch's position in the four year plan?

A. He was head of the Department of Wirtschaftsausbau.

Q. What did the Wirtschaftsausbau do for the four year plan?

A. The Wirtschaftsausbau handled the department of the new great factories, answering the demands of the military in the domains of the chemical industry as well as oil and magnesium and Buna, and then to a certain extent, and for a certain time I think, the synthetic fibres, and certain raw materials necessary for the synthetic fibres.

Q. Who paid the salary of Mr. Krauch while he was functioning under Mr. Goering?

A. (Von Schnitzler) I think I.G. continued to pay Mr. Krauch.

Q. And did Mr. Krauch take any other I.G. technicians with him to assist him in his work for Mr. Goering?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell us who they were, and how many he took with him?

A. Oh, quite a lot.

Q. And who paid their salaries while they were working for Mr. Goering?

A. I think they all remained on the I.G. payroll.

Q. So, since 1936, I.G. officials, paid by I.G., and assisted by a large staff of technicians and personnel, all paid by I.G., planned for the Nazi Government, the rearmament phase in the chemical sector with concentration on the building up of such war industries as magnesium, synthetic rubber, synthetic fibers, and oil, etcetera. Is that right?

14. A. (Ilgnor) Yes. The Krauch office was not only ^{Abt. wirts.} ~~Abt. wirts.~~ Wirtschaftsausbau, but also general befohlmacht ~~Abt.~~ für sonder fragen der chemischen erzeugnisse.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Q. Now, would you say that I.G. increased its capital investments tremendously during the re-armament years under the four year plan?

A. (Ilgner) Yes.
(Von Schnitzler) Yes.

Q. Is it a fair statement to say that this tremendous capital increase of I.G. was mainly in the field in which the Wehrmacht was interested?

(page 3 of original)

A. (Ilgner) Yes.
(Von Schnitzler) Yes.

Q. And is it a fair statement to say that I.G. Benefitted tremendously insofar as its capital investments were concerned from the rearmament program of the Nazi Government?

vS. A. (Von Schnitzler) I would say that it is very right and even more. Many of our chemists believed that this new investment was of continuous use even for peace time because, they thought, that the enlargement of Buna, oil and nitrogen, would also serve for peace purposes in filling out the market. We distinguished the purely war plants, mostly financed by the Reich and which were taken under Montona and ^{an}Organa, etcetera, from those developments which we considered as being of aperpetual and peace time use. Our technical people wanted to have them built by I.G. because they thought they would be more independent in ruling those factories. Of course after a certain time, even the war plants all became unburdened property, because the amortization rates were very favorable. We spoke of Aken yesterday which was started about 1936 and also of the beginning of 1944, when Haefliger, Von Heider and I, paid our first visit to Bitterfeld. We saw that the investment in Aken was almost completely written off. And I might also say that side by side with the development of the rearmament program, Germany became more and more autarchic, more corporate, more fascist.*****

vS.

"I have read the record of this interrogation, and swear that the answers given therein by me to the questions of Mr. Weissbrodt and Mr. Devine, are true."

G. v. Schnitzler

Vorstandsmittglied I.G. Farben-
industrie Aktiengesellschaft.

Ilgner
Signature

Member of Board
Position in I.G. Farben Co.

The statements I made in this record of interrogation still seem to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) This record of interrogation should be considered along with paragraph 5, above, of this affidavit.

(b) After Dr. Ilgner answered that one of the reasons V/W was set up was so that the Wehrmacht could prevent I.G. from exporting trade secrets
(signed) G v Schnitzler

(Ilgnor's third answer on page one), I added that V/7 also had relationships to the Wehrmacht in the whole field of rearmament. Also, on page two, eighth question and answer, I answered affirmatively to the statement that V/7 was the I.G. organization for handling all Wehrmacht affairs. On the basis of information given me by my technical colleagues since 1945, these two statements are exaggerated.

(c) My last answer, page three, is mainly to be understood under developments taking place after the war broke out.

8. In August 1945 I subscribed to a five page record of interrogation of 4 August 1945, entitled "Continuation of Interrogation of Von Schnitzler and Ilgnor", the text of which follows :

"Q. In your opinion what did the Vermittlungs W. do for the Wehrmacht?

Von S. A. I can only guess. I think they had talks with high officers of the Wehrmacht and took the plans and suggestions of I.G. to the Wehrmacht and brought the plans and suggestions of the Wehrmacht to the I.G. I consider the activity more or less as an ambassador of a country who has nothing to say on his own, but who had to explain and inform and receive information himself.

Q. What kind of information did the Wehrmacht take from I.G. and what kind of plans do you think I.G. submitted to the Wehrmacht from Vermittlungs W.?

Von S. A. Let us take for example the Alken plant. Everything from the entire process of matters from where the plant would be located, what the plant would produce, what the Wehrmacht required, what transportation was necessary would be matters which would be taken up between the Vermittlungs W. representing I.G. and the Wehrmacht.

Q. Actually you told us this morning that on behalf of the appropriate Nazi government agency in the chemical field, an I.G. man, assisted largely by an I.G. staff and paid by the I.G., planned the building up of the chemical industries and metal industries for the Wehrmacht?

Von S. A. To a very large extent.

Ilgnor A. Yes, in the fields which had been reserved for Mr. Krauch's organization.

Q. In regard to the rearmament policy in special fields, I.G. personnel largely determined that policy. Is that right?

Von S. A. Yes.

Q. And I.G. benefited considerably in capital investments from the rearmament program laid down by I.G. personnel?

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Von S. A. If you go by the balance sheet. You see, a large part of these new investments would have no post-war use to I.G. and we would be left with big factories and a lot of personnel.

(page 2 of original)

Q. Would I.G. have preferred to negotiate with Japan for natural rubber instead of developing the synthetic rubber industry in Germany?

Von S. A. We did not have the necessary counter value to pay for an unlimited amount of natural rubber. We could have bought certain quantities but it would have been insufficient to meet the demands of the Wehrmacht.

Q. Did the Vermittlungs.W. of I.G. handle I.G.'s relations with the Japanese Military?

Von S. A. I don't believe that. I have never heard of it. That would be a very delicate matter and I think the chiefs would do that themselves so that I know that in respect to the hydrogen agreement which was just concluded in January of this year, Dr. Butefisch, Mr. Ringer, and Mr. Pior handled those negotiations themselves.

Q. Did you ever participate in any negotiations with the Japanese? Are you familiar with any negotiations with the Japanese?

Ilgner A. I was only invited for the lunch in Berlin at which the contract was signed and I know that with my foreign exchange department, Mr. Gierlich and Mr. Hentze of the office of the commercial committee, Mr. Saxner assisted in some special questions.

Q. When did I.G. establish its Counter-Espionage Department?

Von S. A. I think it was in the war.

Ilgner A. I think it must be in the end of the year 1940 or the beginning of the year 1941 because Fahl was back from the army. I know that.

Q. What were the functions of the Counter-Espionage Department?

Von S. A. It was the centralization of the questions arising out of that domain. Every I.G. branch factory had its own Counter-Espionage Department. This was a counter-espionage agency in the factory and the men were named Abwehrbeauftragter, Mr. Schneider was made chief of the Berlin central counter-espionage office.

Q. What did the IM-7 have to do in regard to Vermittlungs W. questions?

Ilgner A. The IM-7 really had nothing military to do with Vermittlungs W. matters. However, we had been handling questions in regard to the export of

(page 3 of original)

know-how and licences and patents to foreign countries with which the Wehrmacht was directly concerned.

Q. What did you have to do with the export of know-how, licences, and patents to other countries which concerned the Wehrmacht?

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Ilgner A. We required the agreement of the Reichsstellechemie and handled the foreign exchange matters.

Q. So that you should be competent to tell me all cases in which the Wehrmacht prevented the export of I.G.'s know-how, patents and licenses to foreign countries?

Ilgner A. As far as these questions have come up to our foreign exchange department, we would be able to give you from the files a history of the cases in which the Wehrmacht interfered. In the technical fields, the technical people dealt directly with the foreign representatives and we wouldn't know about it.

Q. In every case in which it was an export of know-how either technical or not, wouldn't the foreign exchange authorities have to be informed about it to arrange for the financial end of the transaction?

Ilgner A. Certainly they would have to know about it, but please ask Mr. Gierlich for the details.

Q. What did your agency do for the Wehrmacht and when did it begin to do it?

Ilgner A. Beginning in 1939, the economic department of my organization established relations with Herr Wirtstab Thomas and I have already told you about Mr. Deithinger's preparation of material for the Wehrmacht and that Mr. Kruger, in the year 1939 before the war, was sworn into the Wehrmacht and handled the relations between my organization and the Wehrmacht. Before 1939, there certainly would have been occasionally contacts between my departments and Thomas, but I can't tell you precisely what the contacts were.

Q. What was Mr. Thomas' job?

Ilgner A. He was the mobilizer of the German economy in preparation for war. He was a member of the general staff of the O.K.W.

(page 4 of original)

Q. Before the war, before Germany began its military aggression, did your organization establish close contact with the Vermittlungsstelle and begin to actively work for the Wehrmacht?

Ilgner A. As to the best of my knowledge, no.

Von S. A. I don't know.

Q. Then to the best of both of your knowledge, the I.G. 7 or any of its departments did not actively engage in Wehrmacht matters either directly or through the Vermittlungsstelle, even though your department, Mr. Ilgner, went on a war basis before the war with your permission?

Ilgner A. If you ask me so precisely, I must say that I wasn't there.

Q. Were you there in 1938, in 1937?

Ilgner A. Certainly.

Q. Then are you telling me that, if you were there, you wouldn't have participated in assisting the Wehrmacht in its plans for aggression?

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Ilgner A. I would have done the things that have been ordered by the authorities.

Q. But you told us this morning that in regard to Vermittlungs W., you wanted to assimilate the Vermittlungs W. in your department. Had you been ordered to assimilate the Vermittlungs W. in your department in 1935 and 1936?

Ilgner A. I explained my purpose in this morning's interrogation.

Q. Before the war broke, Mr. von Schnitzler and Mr. Ilgner, did you intend to establish close working relationships with the Wehrmacht in your own fields?

Von S. A. The Wehrmacht was another agency with which we were in continuous contact.

Summary by Von Schnitzler

In 1934 the Wehrmacht became important and, with increased tempo after 1936, the Wehrmacht became the prominent factor in the whole picture. Since 1934, a strong movement for investments in our plants for commodities of decisive military importance became more and more pronounced with the main objective of increasing the military potential of Germany. At first, autarkic principles to make Germany independent of importation from abroad was one of the leading objectives. Since the

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declaration of the 4-year plan in 1936, this movement took an entirely military character and military reasons stood in the foreground. Hand in hand with this, the relations between I.G. and the Wehrmacht became more and more intimate and a continuous union between I.G. officials on one side and the Wehrmacht representatives on the other side was the consequence of it.

I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr. Weissbrodt and Mr. Devine - and my summarized statement - are true.

G. von Schnitzler

Vorstandsmitglied I.G.
Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft"

The statements I made in this record of interrogation still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) This record of interrogation should be considered along with paragraph 5, above, of this affidavit.

(b) In the "Summary by von Schnitzler", beginning bottom of page 4, I over-exaggerated the degree of I.G.'s relations of the Wehrmacht before the

(signed) G v Schnitzler

outbreak of the war. In the beginning it was not the Wehrmacht, but rather
representatives
vs the RLM and the Four Year Plan which acted as ~~regulations~~ for the Reich in the
different dealings re synthetic oil, bunn, synthetic fibers, a.s.o., and
the Wehrmacht was primarily not directly engaged in these so-called
"autarchy-dealings". Of course, the Wehrmacht was highly interested in
them and made tests with all the products contained in that program.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

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9. In August, I subscribed to a four page record of interrogation of Dr. Ernst Struss, Dr. Oskar Loehr and myself which was held on the afternoon of 11 August 1945, the text of which follows:

"Q. I am interested in the development of the "Auflage" Wehrmacht-stelle X. How did the development take place?

A. (Von Schnitzler) It is characteristic for I. G. that its relationship to the Wehrmacht became more and more intimate. From a relatively small start, a huge investment of 400-500 million marks yearly directly or indirectly by the Wehrmacht was the end. In this way, the central administration lost entirely the survey what had been done or could be done. It was split up in so many different places inside I.G. so that the control and what really happened was difficult to survey by the central administration.

In the intercourse between our men and Wehrmacht it was difficult to say whether it was a real "Auflage" which came from the Wehrmacht or whether the individual technician was interested to produce and brought the "Auflage" for himself from the Wehrmacht. All that has weakened the central management of I. G. and strengthened the local.

My first strong impression I got at my visits to Bitterfeld. They told me there how they had gone into new fields, for example the new alloys of magnesium, etc., and I said to myself: "Is this the Wehrmacht, or is it Dr. Altvicker of I. G.?"

(Struss) -- In the last years, Dr. ter Meer had the opinion that all what we must build was "Auflage". But it came not directly from the Wehrmacht but from Krauch. In most cases, the Wehrmacht was going to Krauch and his men and then I. G. must construct the works. I think we had in the last time the inventions of Dr. Bayer of Leverkusen of "desmophene".

(Loehr) It was a rather new and interesting development that had begun in the laboratories in Leverkusen prior to the war. Dr. Bayer found a new reaction which resulted in products called "disocianates", which were useful for a great many purposes. For instance, one purpose which was very outstanding was that these compounds could bind together rubber and metal in such a way and so close if you put stress on it, it would not break. By combining this disocianate with a certain kind of ester you could get coatings which were very hard and flexible so that you could fold a sheet of metal without breaking the coating. That was not only applied to metal surfaces, but to other kind of material too, wood or plastics. That was the start in 1937/39.

(Struss) The time when it was ripe was 1942.

Die Wehrmacht hat sich an Krauch gewandt und Eckell beauftragt. Eckell hielt eine Sitzung ab, an der 60 Offiziere von allen Wehrmachts-teilen anwesend waren. Sie verlangten 10 mal so viel wie möglich war. Diese Sache ging durch Krauch

(Translation by Dr. Loehr)
The Development from the laboratory stage to the stage of production took about 4 years. At that time, Dr. Krauch called a meeting at which at least 60 officers of the Wehrmacht were present almost everyone brought forward his requirements and it was quite a lot. That was a complicated case.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

(Struss) Einfache Fälle waren Gasoline und buna, centralit, da wurde einfach von einer Stelle bestimmt und uns wurde die Auflage gemacht.

Q If a research was carried on by I. G. personnel in Leverkusen, and you had the necessary materials in Leverkusen, how did the Wehrmacht become familiar with this work of yours?

A (Loehr) There is one point. We had to submit our patent applications to a certain agency who examined it according to their use for the Wehrmacht. By that agency the Wehrmacht knew what was going on.

(Page 2 of the original)

Q You filed your applications up in 1937. Did the Wehrmacht immediately send a man to the plant?

A They met at this meeting with the I. G. officials.

Q Who brought it to the Wehrmacht? Was it Krauch?

A Struss. From the technical men.

Q Tell me how it got to Krauch?

A (Loehr) These were kept as secret patent applications. I don't think that scheme applied to the applications in 1937, that was introduced later on.

Struss:
Ich glaube nicht immer auf dem gleichen Wege. Es war doch wohl zwischen den leitenden Herren, z.B. Ambros, ein enger Konnex mit den militärischen Stellen, dass es ohne weiteres bei den Militärs bekannt werden musste, wenn etwas Neues da war. Es wurde durch die Patente bekannt, keineswegs ist es durch die Zentralstelle gegangen

(Translation by Loehr:
In this case such an interesting development became quickly known in other I. G. Works. Thus, Ambros of course in regard to the Wehrmacht dealt with many things. It might have been that he brought the matter to the Wehrmacht, but that is only a presumption. It might be Dr. Haberland, who had also to do with Wehrmacht authorities. In one way or the other it might have come to the Wehrmacht's attention.

Loehr:
I think, but I don't know, some experiments had to be made with articles, for instance some rubber puffer and in the workshops, Wehrmacht people went out and they might have heard of that in that way too. Outside, the works you never were sure whether the matter was in your hands or the Wehrmacht had it.

Struss:
Der aktivste Teil der Wehrmacht war die Luftwaffe. Die Luftwaffe brauchte Leichtmetall and ging direkt zu den Werken, manchmal unter Ausschaltung von Krauch.

The most active part of the Wehrmacht was the Luftwaffe. It kept close touch with the technicians of I. G. And they very often went after such development without the help of Krauch.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Besonders bei solchen Endprodukten, die direkt den Wehrmachtzwecken dienten, wie Centralit, explosives, da, glaube ich, hat die Wehrmacht meistens direkt verhandelt. zum Beispiel die dritte Centralit-Anlage kam über Krauch, die zweite kam noch direkt von der Wehrmacht.

If a products was concerned as a final product, it originates from the Wehrmacht. The first plant came from the Wehrmacht and was dealt with Wehrmacht and Uerdingen direct. The second plant in Wolfen came also direct from Wehrmacht. In any way, the initiative came from the Wehrmacht and they dealt with the plant. The third plant was Moosbierbaum and later on Auschwitz, that came from Krauch. But the initiative came from the Wehrmacht and they used Krauch to look after the matter.

The reason was that there were too few men and too little steel. Till 1941/42 the Wehrmacht could itself give the iron and steel and other things to the factories. They had a large allocation. Later on they-~~have-not-get-any-steel-that-was-why~~ it had to be handled by Krauch, because he handled the allocation of raw materials.

(Page 3 of the original)

Q The work of I. G. and the Wehrmacht became a completely cooperative one. I. G. went to Wehrmacht, Wehrmacht to I. G. Is that true?

A Struss:
Das hat sich langsam so entwickelt. That was the end of the development. result came to be slowly

Q In 1934 according to your own Top-Buro files, the contact between I. G. and Wehrmacht became so close, there were so many discussions that you had to set up an office to handle that business, - the Vermittlungsstelle W?

A. Struss:
Wir hatten in der Vermittlungsstelle W. schatzungsweise in 1934 einen Patentmann, der allen 4 Wehrmachtstellen die Patente einreichen musste. In 1934 the Wehrmacht had so so many problems to deal with us that it seemed advisable to have an agency in Berlin to handle these problems.

Q Then in 1936 the I. G.-Wehrmacht connection, and the work by I.G. for the Wehrmacht was so great and they (I.G.) wanted a man in the government offices who was familiar with I.G. and Wehrmacht matters, who could handle it efficiently. Therefore they sent Krauch to that office?
(Struss)

A Ich bin nicht genau in Bilde. Man wusste nicht, wie Herr Krauch überhaupt an diese Sache gekommen ist. Krauch hat eines Tages ter Meer mitgeteilt, dass er diese Stelle in Berlin übernommen hätte. In der I. G. war man sehr überrascht, dass einer der führenden Leute einen derartigen Posten in Berlin übernahm. Dann wurde Krauch in diese andere Stelle

(signed) G v Schnitzler

hineingezogen und daraus ergab sich, dass die Vermittlungsstelle ihre ursprüngliche Bedeutung verlor, da nunmehr ja der erste Mann von Brüning war, der ja für Wehrmacht und I. G. verhältnismässig wenig bedeutete. Die Wichtigkeit der Vermittlungsstelle ging an die neue Reichsstelle über. Die enge Verbindung kann nicht geloungnet werden. Natürlich war Krauch nicht nur für die I. G. dort, sondern auch für die andere chemische Industrie in Deutschland.

(Von Schnitzler)

It was Bosch himself who put Krauch at Goering's disposal. He saw in Krauch the possibility of making great developments in the chemical field. He wanted that "keine Dumheiten gemacht wurden" - that it should be done in a reasonable way. It was more autarchy than rearmament.

However, as soon as Goering went in, it was absolutely clear to me that it was a rearmament program.

Loehr:

In 1937 I was convinced too that it was a rearmament program.

Struss:

I feared it was a rearmament program.

(Page 4 of the original)

- Q But Krauch was put in under Goering, i.e.: nominated by Bosch to go into the "Amt" under Goering. If that is so, how could there have been in I. G.'s mind any question of autarchy. This was rearmament. Is that right?
- A (Struss) There was no doubt that it was a rearmament, but I have hoped that it wouldn't come to war.
- Q So you all went along with the rearmament program and you put an I. G. man in to manage the rearmament program?
- A (Schnitzler) We knew that with the rearmament program in 1936, the situation was very dangerous insofar as the possibilities of war were concerned.
- (Loehr)
In 1937, I became convinced of it, because I was abroad and saw the opinion abroad.
- Q In all these rearmament questions, in all the building up of new plants and the war machine, Mr. Schmitz had been advised and he consented. Is that right?
- A (Struss) Yes, that is sure.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Q Which department of I. G. handled the construction of new plants?

A (Struss) That was the TEA - "The Technical Committee".

Q Schmitz was the chairman of the board?

A (Von Schnitzler) Yes. He was also informed beforehand.

Q Who signed the agreement with the Wehrmacht?

A (Loehr) It was signed by the people concerned, Bitterfeld, or the others.

Q They signed it because they had the approval of the technical committee and the board?

A Yes.

Q Was Schmitz's prior approval always received?

A Yes. (Von Schnitzler and Loehr)

(Struss) The works exchanged their projects figures before the TEA meetings, and so the figures were available to the board members. There was a short report on the credits and it was recommended for approval by the board.

"I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr. Weissbrodt and Mr. Devine, are true."

(signed) Struss
(signature)

(signed) G. von Schnitzler
(signature)

(signed) Director
Position in I. G.

(signed) Oskar Loehr
Position in I. G.

The statements I made in this record of interrogation still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) This record of interrogation should be considered along with paragraph 5, above, of this affidavit.

(b) In my first answer, page one, I only wanted to show the close team work which had developed between the Wehrmacht and the different plants. I did not want to criticize the attitude of the technical men-in-question.

10. On 24 September 1945, I signed a four page record of interrogation principally concerning Vermittlungsstelle W, the text of which follows:

(signed) G v Schnitzler

- Q When was the Vermittlungstelle W formed and what was its purpose?
- A It was formed in 1934 and was designed to hold up or maintain continuous contact with the Wehrmacht.
- Q Who was in charge of the activities of the Vermittlungstelle W?
- A Professor Krauch was the head of it, until 1937, and then there were different chemists in charge of the Vermittlungstelle W., to begin with, there was von Bruening and the last one I think was Dieckman.
- Q What section of the Vermittlungstelle W were Bruening and Dieckman in charge of?
- A The Vermittlungstelle W was always in the first instance for Sparta II. It was busy in the interests of Sparta I just as well, but in the case of Sparta III there was never a special delegate in or for the Vermittlungstelle W. I think Dr. Gajewsky did it by himself.
- Q Was not Sparta II in charge of the preparation of mobilization plans for war?
- A I think all Spartas were busy in that. In Sparta II, there were buna and metals, like light metals, and all the chemical products.
- Q Did the various sections of Vermittlungstelle W draw up mobilization plans to be used in the event of war, or were these done by the individual plants.
- A I should say they were done by the individual plants. Of course this was done with the help of the delegates from the Vermittlungstelle W.
- Q And the Vermittlungstelle W would act as intermediary?
- A Yes.
- Q Were these MOB plans first drawn up in 1934 and then submitted to the Wehrmacht?
- A They would be submitted through the office of the Vermittlungstelle W, which was at that time under the direct charge of Professor Krauch. As far as I am informed, all these things were very secret. I only knew from personal knowledge of the MOB plans for the dyestuffs domain. This mobilization plan came through the Reichsbeauftragts Fuer Chemie. It was approved by Dr. Ungewitter. It was of course made up in the individual plants in the dyestuff domain. It was likewise made up by Dr. Struss in the so-called Teabureau.
- Q With respect to the MOB plans, what function, if any, did Dr. Krauch serve?
- A I think that Dr. Krauch only made up the programs for the production. I don't think he made the MOB plans himself. Of course he might have been occupied with some parts of it, and then in the products for which he had specially the duty to

(signed) G v Schnitzler

develop. His offices were called Amt für Wirtschaftsausbau. This means the creation of something new.

(Page 2 of the original)

Q I thought we were talking about 1934. In that year, was Dr. Krauch spending all his time with Farben?

A Yes. He was head of Sparta I.

Q Do you mean with respect to his own products, like buna, hydrogenation, etcetera, that he had drawn up the MOB plan?

A I thought you asked me of Krauch's activity when he became head of the other plants. I think the only MOB plans for which he was responsible were for Sparta I.

Q When Krauch assumed his new position in the Four Year Plan in 1936, in addition to certain technicians whom he took with him, did he likewise take a section of the personnel who were employed in the Vermittlungsstelle ?

vs A No, I do not think so.

Q When Krauch went to work for Goering, did he take along with him certain I. G. personnel, including technicians?

A Yes, quite a substantial lot.

Q In connection with his moving to Goering's plan, did he likewise take persons from the Vermittlungsstelle ?

A I am not quite sure.

Q When and where were the Kriegsspiele held with respect to I.G. plants?

A My Kriegsspiele experience comes second hand. It is not of great value. These were carried out in Louna and Leverkusen too.

Q Approximately when was this?

A In 1934 or 1935 it may have started.

Q Under whose supervision were these Kriegsspiele held, both from the standpoint of I. G. and also from the military standpoint?

A All four parts of the Wehrmacht were participants in this. And then probably in the factories where it happened, there was the first director, who arranged it.

Q According to your knowledge, did Dr. Krauch have an important part with respect to the Kriegsspiele?

A I think he must have known of this Kriegsspiele. Whether he himself arranged this, I don't know.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

Q How active was professor Krauch in the management of I.G.F. after 1936?

A Not at all. He refrained entirely.

Q Were the reports of Dr. Reithinger made available to Dr. Krauch while he was in charge of the chemical section of the Four Year Plan?

A Surely.

(Page 3 of the original)

Q And did these reports contain statistics on production capacities and production figures for chemical firms outside of Germany?

A Yes. Reithinger made analyses of all big chemical companies in the world.

Q Since what date were such compilations made available to Dr. Krauch would you say?

A I would think always since Krauch assumed his position in the Four Year Plan. Dr. Reithinger was proud of his work. He made no secret of this at all.

Q Were the reports considered to be very thorough and first-class work?

A Yes. The Reich itself had not so good an organization, and these reports were very valuable to all of us.

Q Do you know whether Krauch informed Dr. Bosch, possibly in 1938, that Germany was going to war?

A No. I don't know about that.

Q Are you acquainted with an attempt by Dr. Bosch to see Goering in June or July of 1938, because of his (Bosch's) concern about Germany going to war?

A I have no information at all on this.

Q Prior to the invasion of Russia, did I.G. or the government keep a staff of chemists available to immediately go into Russia to examine its Buna plant?

vS A Yes. I think so. I can't tell all the details. Dr. Ambros could tell you. I know that in Dresden, quite a lot of able chemists were conducting experiments and got together on this, but only after the outbreak of the war, to start at once with the manufacture of the Russian processes for buna. I was informed that for a few hours in one of the Russian factories, they were able to make certain investigations with the result that they were very much impressed with how highly technically developed the Russian processes were.

Q Were those chemists gotten together by the Reich?

(signed) G v Schnitzler

A Yes. By the Reich.

vS Q At that time was Dr. Krauch or Dr. Ambros~~f~~ charged with the responsibility of productive capacity of buna?

vS A Yes. It could be said that Ambros~~f~~ was charged with the direct responsibility.

Q In what capacity?

A He was the head of buna, with ter Meer still over him, but he had
vS no factory to run himself, but Ambros~~f~~ was in charge.

(Page 4 of the original)

vS Q Ambros~~f~~ was an employee of I.G. Farben. Was he acting in some capacity for the Reich at that time? Were the chemists who were convoked, brought together on behalf of I.G. Farben or on behalf of the German government?

A No. On behalf of the German government.

Q If they were brought together on behalf of the government for the further exploitation of rubber or buna in Russia, was that not then under the jurisdiction of Professor Krauch?

A Yes. That must be right.

Q These men were collected at one point and were prepared to go into Russia as soon as it was possible to get to the particular plants involved.

vS A Yes. That is right.

I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers given by me to the questions of Mr. Glaser are true.

(signed) Georg von Schnitzler
Georg von Schnitzler

Vorstandsmitglied I. G. Farben
(Position in I.G.)

Interrogator:

(signed) Bernard Glaser

The statements made in this interrogation still seem to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, except that:

(a) This record of interrogation should be considered along with paragraph 5, above, of this affidavit.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

(b) Answer five, page one, is wrong according to information I have received from my technical colleagues to the effect that Vermittlungsstelle W did not assist the plants or the Sparten in preparing materials for the MOB plans. The principal liaison between the government and private industry concerning the "MOB Fragen" was the Wirtschaftsgruppen. The materials collected for the Wirtschaftsgruppe were made up directly by the plants concerned with a particular type of chemical production. The various plants submitted the information to the appropriate Sparte, and thereafter it was registered with the TEA Buero. The TEA Buero forwarded the material directly to the Wirtschaftsgruppe. The plants often acted directly with the Wirtschaftsgruppe and only informed the TEA Buero of the completed result.

(c) Answer two, page two, is subject to the correction I have
vs made before: I.G. did not make up the MOB plans but only prepared the material for them.

(d) Beginning at the middle of page two, I discuss the "Kriegs-
vs spiele" or war games. The Kriegsspiele involving the Wehrmacht and the I. G. Farben plants at Leuna and Leverkusen were handled secretly between the plant directors and the Wehrmacht. There were no damages, since the Kriegsspiele were conducted on a purely theoretical basis. It was only
vs never brought up in Vorstand meetings and, in my presence, it was never brought up before the TEA Buero.

(e) On page 3, the sixth question and answer may be misleading. Mr. Glaser asked me if I.G. or the government kept a staff of chemists "prior to the invasion of Russia" who were "available to go immediately into Russia to examine its Buna plant." My answer, which begins, "Yes. I think so," is misleading unless one takes from the rest of my answer what I really meant to say, namely, that the assembling of the chemists in Dresden took place after the invasion of Russia. Nothing was prepared by

(signed) Gv Schnitzler

I.G. chemists prior to the invasion of Russia.

11. Concerning plans for industrial and commercial activity in occupied Russia, I can add this. I was a member of a committee of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie which was established to prepare for the sales of chemicals in Russia and for the eventual exploitation of the chemical industry in Russia, but this never materialized and so far as I knew there was not a single session of this committee. Upon the demand of the government, the entire German chemical industry inside the Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie (Economic Group Chemistry) was to deal with eventual problems arising out of the Russian situation. A small "G.m.b.H.", a firm with limited liability, was founded to deal with Russian problems and in this firm all the bigger German Chemical Companies were represented -- I.G., Schering, Heyden, and Ruetgerswerke. It was clear from the very first moment that buna should be reserved to I.G., that nitrogen should be reserved to the Stickstoff Syndicat, and that other requests to produce in Russia should be dealt with jointly by the chemical industry in total under the leadership of Dr. Ungewitter, manager of the Wirtschaftsgruppe vs Chemie. But all those plans never materialized. I.G.'s Boyer Concern created for the pharmaceutical industry an important plant for the manufacture of sera in Lemberg (Lwow), Poland.

12. On 23 July 1945, I wrote up a two page statement entitled "Plans regarding England", the text of which follows :

"To the best of my recollection as far as plans for England are concerned, only preparatory work had been done. Through Terhaar we were told that the Reichswirtschaftsministerium had complaint that in the case of France we had not have had any plans ready at the day of the armistice.

This should not take place a second time, and the necessary material should be prepared, that in the case that England should ask for peace-terms the R.W.H. would have material on hand.

When the question was raised in the U.S., it met strong opposition, I remember that Dr. Mann energetically refused to participate in an endeavour so absolutely premature, and Dr. Krüger joined him. - The others felt more or less the same way. Thus,

(signed) G v Schnitzler

what the different departments had prepared, did not pass the competent authorities inside the I.G., and I am of the opinion, that the R.W.H. never officially got this preparatory material. How far R.W.H. inofficially was informed of it, can only be testified by Terhaar.

I myself have a clear recollection only of the preparatory material of the Verkaufsgemeinschaften Farben and Chemikalien, which had been made up in the Grüneburg, but I think that Stickstoff and Agfa had developed certain ideas too.

The general aims, as far as (dyestuffs) are concerned, were:

- 1.) a greater share in the U.K.,
- 2.) certain restrictions of the British Industry in export markets,
- 3.) replacement of the positions lost in the British Empire.

There was never raised the question of a capital interest in I.C.I., but all parties concerned were of the opinion, that normal business relations to I.C.I. should be reestablished.

Sacrifices of I.C.I. in the dyestuff-domain were being proposed in the following directions :

- 1.) I.G. did not ask for the abolishment of the license-act, but for a new distribution of the market, which meant an argumentation of the I.G.'s share by ca. 50%. I.G. asked for 1/3 of the total market. It was left open, if this additional volume had to be taken partly by curtailing the Swiss importation or had to go entirely at the charge of I.C.I.

(page 2 of original)

- 2.) Restraint in export trade was asked
 - a) for the European Continent) but I can't re-
 - b) for the Far East) member the details.

The propositions in the Chemical Field were of a very varied character and included certain improvements of the I.G.'s position in the British market and certain sacrifices for the British industry in the export-markets.

For the so-called military chemicals a far reaching suppression was aimed at, but I should say, that this question had not yet found its definite solution. As the whole problem very soon lost all actuality, after five years very little of it has remained in my memory.

Frankfort, July 28th, 1945.

gez. G. von Schnitzler."

This statement still appears to me to be entirely true and correct according

(signed) G v Schnitzler

to the best of my knowledge and belief.

13. On 17 July 1945, I signed a two-page record of interrogation, the text of which follows :

"Q. Yesterday we talked about the use of I.G. technicians and I.G. chemicals in the development of poisonous chemicals to be used in warfare.

A. Yes, we spoke shortly about it yesterday.

Q. Tell me what you told Major Tilly the first time when he asked about poisonous gases?

A. To the best of my knowledge at that time I.G. made not itself poisonous gases nor had it been discussed inside I.G. as far as I know in I.G. laboratories they have not worked on it.

Q. But only in the so-called Reichs laboratories with I.G. technicians and I.G. directors and full knowledge of this fact.

A. Yes. But I knew at that time, it was in winter. Dr. Ambros told me only privately that in Dyhrenfurt they produced a poisonous gas from an intermediate of.....coming from Ludwigshafen, and this gas is fabricated in an equipment only consisting of glass and one has to be very cautious that nothing can get out of this equipment because even very slight quantities are very dangerous. All the finished stuff had been removed in time to middle of Germany.

Q. Who is Dr. Ambros?

A. He is one of our first younger technicians. He was in charge of Dyhrenfurt as well as Auschwitz and Gendorf.

Q. Where was this gas manufactured?

A. In Dyhrenfurt.

Q. Who owned the plant?

A. It was owned partly by the Reich and partly I.G. You must hear Direktor Dencker about the details.

Q. How much by I.G. and how much by the Reich?

A. The plant for the gases was owned by the Reich. I think so. But it was run by a company, called Anorgana.

Q. To whom belonged this company?

A. It belonged 50:50 to the Reich and I.G. but Major Tilly told me, it is practically all I.G. The only thing I really knew was what I said to Major Tilly.

Q. The plant was owned by the Reich?

A. Yes.

(signed) G v Schnitzler

- Q. What was owned by I.G.? The company?
- A. Anorgana, which run the plant for the Reich.
- Q. And all production by I.G. of this plant was on behalf of the Reich?
- A. Not entirely.
- Q. What proportion was on behalf of the Reich?
- A. By far the biggest part.
- Q. Who owned Anorgana? Who of I.G. should know that?
- A. Herr Doncker.
- Q. Who was in charge of the chemical sector of I.G.?
- A. That was Mr. Weber-Andren. He died in October 1943.

(page 2 of original)

- Q. Who succeeded him?
- A. I succeeded him as chairman of the chemical committee (commercial committee?).
- Q. And you as head of the commercial field in chemicals did not know the ownership?
- A. No. I don't know. I know of the existence of the Anorgana Company, but I did not know what all was behind it.
- Q. Who of I.G. knew about it?
- A. Schmitz, as chairman, Ambros and von Moor.
- Q. During the last quarter 1944 (you said yesterday) that a Mr. Muller-Cunradi alluded to you that the poisonous gasses and the chemicals manufactured by I.G. were being used for the murder of human beings held in concentration camps?
- A. So I understood him.
- Q. Didn't you question these employees of yours further in regard to the use of these gases?
- A. They said they knew it was being used for this purpose.
- Q. What did you do when he was told you that I.G. chemicals was being used to kill, to murder people held in concentration camps?
- A. I was horrified.
- Q. Did you do anything about it?
- A. I kept it for me because it was too terrible. I was always under the impression that these gases were not manufactured by us. I asked Muller-Cunradi is it known to you and Ambros and an other

(signed) G v Schnitzler

directors in Auschwitz that the gases and chemicals are being used to murder people.

Q. What did he say?

A. Yes, it is known to all I.G. directors in Auschwitz..

G.v. Schnitzler.

I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers therein given by me to the questions of Mr. Weisbrodt and Mr. Devine are true.

G.v. Schnitzler."

The statements I made in this interrogation still appear to me to be entirely true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

14. I have carefully read each of the 39 pages of this declaration and have placed my signature at the bottom of each page. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialled each correction in the margin of the page. I declare herewith under oath that I have stated the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signed) Georg von Schnitzler
GEORG VON SCHNITZLER

Sworn to and signed before me this 27th day of March 1947, at the Palace of Justice in Nurnberg, Germany, by Georg von Schnitzler, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signed) Drexel A. Sprecher
DREXEL A. SPEECHER

U.S. Civilian, Attorney, AGO No. 473307.
Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes.

CERTIFICATION

I, ERNA E. UIBERALL, AGO No. D-150096, hereby certify that the above is a true and correct copy of Document No. NI - 5197, the original of which is in the English language.

ERNA E. UIBERALL
U. S. Civilian
AGO No. D-150096

END

- 40 -

103

Rubber stamp: Top Secret.

IT 1 d vK/gr

Berlin, 20 April 1943.

(Handwritten note:)

6 copies
First copy

Plants of Prime Importance

Situation as of middle/end of 1942

A. Leuna:

Ammonia - N production	41 %	
" - N processing	25 %	
Methanol	87 %	
Mineral oil	8 %	(15% *)
Alkylate contact in conjunction with Ludwigshafen	100 %	
Alumina for alkylate contact in conjunction with Ludwigshafen	100 %	
Alkacide lye in conjunction with Ludwigshafen	100 %	
Methanol contact	100 %	
T - contact	100 %	
Mersol	62 %	
Elementary sulphur	27 %	

B. Ludwigshafen - Oppau:

Synthetic fatty acid	37 %
Ammonia - N production	36 %
" - N processing	25 %
Smoke-screen acid	16 %

*) Of which % of the total capacity of airplane motor fuel.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8595
CONTINUED

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

Buna	21 %
Brown oxide contact	100 %
Alkylate contact in conjunction with Leuna	100 %
Alumina for alkylate contact in conjunction with Leuna	100 %
Alkacide lye in conjunction with Leuna	100 %
Monoethanolamine	100 %
Oppanol	100 %
Kaurit glue	100 %
Urea	100 %
Iron carbonyl - iron powder	100 %
Acryl nitril in conjunction with Leverkusen	100 %

(page 2 of original)

B. Ludwigshafen - Oppau (Cont.):

Vultamol	100 %
S - Z material (S - Z - Stoff)	100 %
Phlegmatization media	50 %
P - H salt	100 %
Pentaerythrite	24 %
Dinitrodiphenylamine	25 %

C. Leverkusen:

Smoke screen acid	16 %
Dinitrobenzol	31 %
Stebrene in conjunction with Elberfeld	100 %

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

Acrynitrl in conjunction with Ludwigshafen	100 %
Vulcanization accelerators in conjunction with Serow	100 %
Tanigans (tanning material)	60 %
Titanium salts	100 %
Sulfigran	60 %

D. Huels:

Buna	34 %
Ethylene oxide	14 %
Dyglycol	25 %

E. Oberhausen - Holten:

Synthetic fatty alcohols	100 %
Fischer Contact in conjunction with Luetskendorf	70 %

F. Hoechst:

Nitric acid - conc.	23 %
Smoke screen acid	(later)
Dinitrobenzol	19 %

(page 3 of original)

G. Schkopau:

Buna	41 %
Diglycol	25 %

H. Welheim:

Mineral oil	2,3 % (3,1 %) *
-------------	-----------------

*) Of this % of the total capacity of aircraft motor fuel.

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

I. Vesseling:

Mineral oil 2,2 % (3,1 %) *)

K. I.G. Uerdingen:

Stabilizers 50 %

L. Poelitz:

Mineral oil 5 % (20 %) *)

M. Gelsenberg:

Mineral oil 5 % (20 %) *)

N. Brabag Zeitz:

Mineral oil 3,7 %

O. Scholven:

Mineral oil 3,4 % (15,6 %) *)

P. Brabag Boehlen:

Mineral oil 2,3 % (10 %) *)

Q. Brabag Magdeburg:

Mineral oil 2,2 %

Motor fuel 3 %

R. Nerae Misburg:

Mineral oil 2,8 %

Aircraft motor oil 29 %

(page 4 of original)

S. Vacuum, Oslebshausen:

Mineral oil 1,1 %

Aircraft motor oil 19 %

*) Of this % of the total capacity of aircraft motor fuel.

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

T. Rhenania, Harburg:

Mineral oil	1,2 %
Special oil	

U. Rhenania, Grasbrock:

Mineral oil	1,9 %
Aircraft motor oil	29 %

6 copies

1. Copy : Prof. Krauch
2. " : Dr. Ritter/ Dr. Ad. Mueller
3. " : Oberstlt. Kirschner
4. " : Dr. Geckl
5. " : v. Kriegstein
6. " : Reserve

(page 5 of original)

Production of Prime Importance
of the Chemical Production Plan.

(In handwriting): As at middle of ~~1941~~ 1942

A. Nitrogen (industrial and fertilizer)

Ammonia N production:

Leuna	41 %
Ludwigshafen-Oppau	36 %

Ammonia N processing:

Leuna	25 %
Ludwigshafen-Oppau	25 %

Nitric acid, conc.:

Hoechst	23 %
Wolfen	14 %
Embsen	15 %

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

Ammonium nitrate:

Wolfen	22 %
Bitterfeld	19 %

Nitrogen of lime:

Plesteritz	23 %
Trostberg	21 %
Koenigshuette	21 %

(page 6 of original)

B. Mineral oil

Plant	Mineral oil in % of total production	Of which % of the total production of aircraft motor fuel	Particu- larly important
Leuna	8.4	14.9	
Erbag Boehlen	2.3	10.0	
Erbag Magdeburg	2.2	--	
Erbag Zeitz	3.7	--	
Hydrierwerk Scholven	3.4	15.6	
Gelsenberg-Benzin	4.6	19.9	
Melheim	2.3	3.1	Marine fuel oil
Wesseling	3.2	2.2	
Poolitz	4.7	19.6	
Holten	0.8	--	Aircraft motor oil
Rositz	2.8	--	Marine fuel oil
Dtsch. Vacuum Oslobshausen	1.1	--	Special oil
Rhenania Ossag Harburg	1.2	--	"

(page 6 of original, cont'd)

Ebenaria Ossag Grasbrook	1.9	-- Special oil
Herag Misburg	2.8	-- "

(page 7 of original)

C. Soko screen acid

Fahlberg-List, Magdeburg	29 %
v. Heyden, Weissig	25 %
I.G. Hoechst (handwritten note:)	(later on)
I.G. Leverkusen	18 %
I.G. Ludwigshafen	18 %
I.G. Wolfen (handwritten note:)	(later on)

D. Buna

Schkopau	41 %
Huels	34 %
Ludwigshafen	21 %

E. Miscellaneous

1. Methanol

Leuna	87 %
Waldenburg	13 %

2. Ethylene oxide

Huels	17 %
Gendorf	20 %
Zweckel b. Gladbeck	14 %

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8595
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

9 July 1947

I, Herbert RODECK, No. B 397944, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8595.

Herbert RODECK
No. B 397944

(Trans. Note):
Stamp: Top Secret

Dr. Pf/gr

Berlin, 20 April 1943

Special List

Share of the Plants in the Military Areas (Wehrkreise) II, III, IV, V, VIa, VIb, VII, IX, XIa, XIb, XII, XIII, to the west of the line Stettin-Berlin-Munich, in the total production, stated in %.

(Trans. Note): Handwritten note: Situation in mid 1942.

Mineral Oils including preliminary and by-products 85%

Nitrogen

a) Primary products (ammonia production)	95%
b) Ammonia-'N'-processing	93%
c) Nitric acid, concentrated	99%
d) Ammonium nitrate	82%

Buna including preliminary products

a) Buna	100%
b) Active carbon black	92%
c) Flash carbon black	81%
d) Acetylene carbon black	100%
e) Acetylene oxide	75%
f) Methanol	77%

Preliminary products for processing powder and explosives (PSV-Pulver- und Sprengstoffverarbeitung?) and for chemical warfare agents

a) Elementary sulphur	85%
b) Pyrites	90%
c) Sodium chloride lye (from electrolysis)	55%
d) Caustic sodium hydrate	15%
e) Soda	72%
f) Diglycol	75%
g) Pentaerythrit	100%
h) Dinitrodiphenylamine	100%
i) Dinitrobenzol	100%
j) Stabilizers	100%
k) Hexamine	100%
l) Nitrous crapo	80%
m) Nitrous cellulose including capacities for synthetic fibre cellulose	86%
n) Refined cellulose, cigarette paper cellulose	100%
o) Sodium tissue-paper for Togo glue film	100%
p) Contact SO ₃	38%

(page 2 of original)

Light Metal (including preliminary products)

a) Aluminium	60%
b) Alumina	79%
c) Silumino	41%
d) Electrodes	56%
e) Magnesium	100%
f) Kryolith	100%
g) Electrode coke	67%
h) Magnesium oxide	100%
i) Boryllium	100%

(page 2 of original cont'd)

Various Preliminary Products

(Trans. Note)	a) Alumina - Gel (for Buna)	57%
	b) Phosphorus (yellow, red)	100%
	c) Barium carbonate	100%
	d) Tetra-ethyl lead	100%
	e) Fluoride (Aluminium)	25%
	f) Special wax for ammunition	100%
	g) Electro-corundum	94%
	h) Handwritten note : Synthetic fatty acid	75%

(Trans. Note):

Handwritten notes:

4 copies

1st Copy Dr. Ad. Höppler

2nd Dr. Oeckl

(page 3 of original)

I T I d vK/gr

Berlin, 20 April 1943

Bottleneck Productions

(Trans. Note): (Handwritten note: Situation in middle and end of 1942)

Plant:	Production:	Percentage of the total German production:
--------	-------------	--

Mineral Oil

Oppau	Brown oxide (Braunoxyd) contact	100%
Leuna)	Alkylate contact	100%
Oppau)		
Leuna)	Alumina for alkyl contact	100%
Ludwigshafen)		
Holtzen)	Fischer-contact	70%
Luetzkendorf)		
Leverkusen	Sulfigran	60%
Leuna)	Alkazide lye	100%
Ludwigshafen)		
Ludwigshafen	Monc-ethanolamine	100%
Tornesch)	Dibromide	100%
Magdeburg)		
Oppau	Oppanol	100%

Organic Chemistry

Oppau	Kaurit glue	100%
Oppau	Urea	100%
Leverkusen)	Atebrin	100%
Elberfeld)		
Oppau	Ferre-carbonyl, granulated iron	100%
Knappsack	Acetone	35%
Ludwigshafen)	Acrylnitril	100%
Leverkusen)		

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8831
CONTINUED

Plant:	(page 4 of original) Production:	Percentage of the total German production:
<u>Organic Chemistry</u>		
Leverkusen } Sarau/Silesia } Leverkusen }	Vulcanisation accelerator Tanigane	100% 80%
<u>Inorganic Chemistry</u>		
Gersthofen } Knapsack } Leverkusen }	Metallic sodium Titan salts	100% 100%
<u>Light Metal</u>		
Toutschenthal Lautawerk Rhoinfeldon Groyenbroich	Magnesium oxide Silumino Beryllium Refined purest aluminum	100% 60% 100% 100%
<u>Preliminary Products</u>		
Ludwigshafen	Vultanol (emulsifying agent for explosive mixtures)	100%
Uerdingen	Stabilis or	50%
Wolfen	"	50%
Leuna	Vitol-contact	100%
Leuna	Mothanol	77%
Bitterfeld	Magnesium powder	100%
Leuna	T-contact	100%
Oppau	S-Z Material (Explosives and Cyclon??)	100%
Oppau	Phlegmatizing agents (Phlegmatisierungsmittel)	100%
<u>Substitute products for natural oils and fats</u>		
Leuna	Mersol	62%
Oberhausen-Holten	Synthetic fatty alcohol	100%
Witten/Ruhr	Synthetic fatty acid	37%
Oppau	" " "	19%
Magdeburg (Kubbe)	" " "	19%

} Trans. Note:
} Handwritten
} Notes.

(page 5 of original)

<u>Powder and Explosives</u>		
Reinsdorf	PnL-powder	55%
Moschwig	Hiperyt-powder	85%
Hessisch-Lichtenau	Picric acid	63%
Elenig	Hexanitrodiphenylamino	71%
Troisdorf	Totranitrometylanilino	83%
Ludwigshafen	PH (phosphorus) (?) salts	100%
<u>Phosphorus</u>		
Piesteritz	Phosphorus	100%
Piesteritz	Yellow phosphorus	100%
Bitterfeld	Red phosphorus	100%

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8831
CONTINUED

Plant:	(page 5 of original cont'd) Production:	Percentage of the total German production:
<u>Tetraethyl Lead (rendering gasoline knock-proof)</u>		
Prose	tetra-lead	75%

5 copies

1st copy:

2nd copy:

3rd copy:

4th copy:

5th copy: v. Kriegstein

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

10 July 1947

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, ETO 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8831.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, ETO 34079.

-4-
"END"

116

I T Ki/gr (Trans. Note):
(Stamp:
Top Secret)

Berlin, 21 April 1943

6 copies
1st copy

Notes for Report

"Danger from the Air for the Plenipotentiary-General Chemistry Plants"

The air attack on Krupp has proved that destruction can be caused on first rank armament plants when adequate forces are used. If the same means are used in air attacks on a large-scale chemical plant the effect will still be greater because of the accumulation of inflammable and explosive material within a small space, and further because of the particularly extensive mechanization, the inter-relationship and mutual dependence of all production processes, moreover in view of the greater requirements in time and material in case the plant has to be shifted. Hence it follows that the effects of a mass attack from the air on a large-scale chemical plant have to be reduced by all possible means.

There are two ways:

a) Passive air defense.

In all chemistry plants essential for war production a most severe check of the means for limiting the effects of explosions, fire and poison gas must once more be carried out. Removal of all combustible building sections, wooden ceilings above the machinery halls etc., of barracks within the compound of the factories. In order to avoid loss of time that could never be made good in connection with this work, the GB (Plenipotentiary) for Building should be informed within 24 hours of the building volume and manpower for all work for improving air raid protection which has been recognized as necessary by the Plenipotentiary General Chemistry in cooperation with the efficiency experts of the Plenipotentiaries for Building.

*General

(Precautionary protection against disasters) (Trans. Note):

Handwritten Note: Duty
Plants!

b) Active air defense.

Above that, the strengthening of the active air defense for a limited number of large-scale chemical plants which are of decisive importance for warfare as a whole and which could not be shifted either immediately or in case of emergency has to be demanded.

In this connection the immediate installation of smoke screen equipment, permanent fighter screen during day and night within the approach area, balloon barrages and reinforcement especially of regular heavy anti-aircraft artillery for defense against high-altitude bombing attacks.

(page 2 of original)

The following chemical plants are of great importance to the war (Figure stated in accordance with the production situation in the middle or by the end of 1942):

(page 2 of original cont'd)

1. Leuna: The total loss of the plant would mean losing:
15 to 20% of the aviation gasoline production
12% of the lubricants production for aircraft engines
40% of the ammonium nitrogen production
27% of the methanol production
6% of the mersol production
- decisive reduction of the production of explosives, thus
the abandonment of programs which are at present considered
to be of war-deciding importance, furthermore by the short-
age of nitrogen fertilizer an unbearable reduction of agri-
cultural production, a decisive curtailment of the mineral
oil program, especially of high-grade aviation gasoline and
of the supply of detergents.

2. Ludwigshafen-Opbau:

The total loss is of similar significance to fertilizer
production (36% of the ammonia production) as Leuna. In
addition to that a considerable curtailment of the fuming
acid, Buna and fatty acids (37%) production and a number of
other extremely important products as for instance Kaurit glue,
Oppanol, high grade motor fuels, etc.

The total breakdown of both plants (1. and 2.) means a
considerable encroachment on the German food situation and
will not fail to have serious effects on many other fields
(explosives, synthetics).

(page 3 of original)

3. and 4. The breakdown of Buna at Muels and Schkopau means practically
the end of the motorization of Wehrmacht and economy.
5. The total breakdown of Poelitz means a considerable curtail-
ment of aviation gasoline production (20%).
6. Gelsenberg same as Poelitz (20%).
7. 8. and 9. Bremen-Oslebshausen, Hamburg-Grasbrook and Harburg.
Total breakdown means decisive curtailment of aviation
lubricants production (60%).
10. 11. Deas, Hositz, Velheim: Total breakdown means decisive
damage to fuel oil production for the Navy.
12. Wesseling: Total breakdown means considerable damage to
aviation gasoline and Diesel fuel production.
13. Scholvern: Total breakdown means a considerable curtailment
(15%) of aviation gasoline production.
14. Oberhausen-Holteln: Total breakdown means a considerable
curtailment of lubricants production.
15. Hochst: Total breakdown means substantial impairment of
powder and explosives production as well as danger to
the smoke-screen program.

(page 3 of original cont'd)

16. Leverkusen: Total breakdown means a heavy inroad ^{to} the supply of pharmaceuticals, endangering the manufacture of Buna (accelerators) and its development. Endangering the production of leather (synthetic tannins) and encroachment on the fuming acid production.

(page 4 of original)

17. Urdingen: Total breakdown means a considerable reduction of the preliminary products for the powder and explosives manufacture (stabilisers, aniline, chlorine).
18. Brabag-Magdeburg: Total breakdown means a considerable impairment of the submarine Diesel fuel.
19. Brabag-Zeitz: Total breakdown means loss of a considerable portion of the paraffin supply for synthetic fatty acid (at present 35%) and of synthetic aviation lubricants, besides motor fuel production.
20. Brabag-Bochlen: Total breakdown means considerable loss in aviation gasoline production (12%).
21. Korag, Misburg: Total breakdown means considerable damage to the capacities for processing raw oil (20%) and to aviation motor oil (15%).

By order:
(Signature) Coekl

6 copies:

- 1st copy: Prof. Krauch
2nd copy: Dr. Ritter/Dr. Ad. Moller
3rd copy: Lieutenant Colonel Kirschner
4th copy: Dr. Coekl
5th copy: v. Kriegstein
6th copy: Reserve.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

10 July 1947

I, DOROTHEA L. GALENSKI, EPO No. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8594.

DOROTHEA L. GALENSKI, EPO No. 34079.

-3-
"END"

119

B) SALES AND GROSS PROFIT ON SALES OF I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE A.G.

(Verkäufe und Bruttogewinn aus Verkäufen der I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.)

	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM
I. Sales of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. (Verkäufe der I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.)	875,827,147	894,275,494	982,990,246	1,092,700,943	1,296,822,096	1,515,420,348	1,647,236,801	1,990,794,484	2,756,026,334	2,539,316,969	2,903,602,018	3,115,535,666	2,565,204,115
II. Gross profit on sales of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. (Bruttogewinn aus Verkäufen der I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.)	71,475,244	122,093,614	125,556,103	153,434,340	250,805,000	295,701,000	274,225,000	376,675,000	374,646,000	477,316,000	571,659,000	549,404,000	322,315,582

AFFIDAVIT.

I, Helmut DEICHFISCHER, Frankfurt (Main), Parliamentsplatz 9, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

By virtue of the offices held by me in I.G. and in the I.G. Control Office I am fully acquainted with "Sales and gross profit on sales of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.".

I have been shown and have carefully examined this chart consisting of 1 page and captioned: "Sales and gross profit on sales of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.". This chart is to my best knowledge and belief a true and faithful representation of the topic.

I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

Helmut Deichfischer
HELMUT DEICHFISCHER

Sworn to and signed before me this .//. day of June 1947 at Frankfurt on the Main by Helmut DEICHFISCHER, known to be the person making the above affidavit.

Otto Heilbrunn
DR. OTTO HEILBRUNN
Civilian, ETO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

AFFIDAVIT

I, Holmut REICHFISCHER, Frankfurt on the Main, Parlamentsplatz 9, employee of the I.G. Central Finance Administration in Berlin since 1936, Deputy Department Chief of the Accounting Department from 1938 to 1940, Chief in this Department from 1940 to 1945, and since then in charge of the Section, "Balance Sheets" in the I.G. Control Office in Frankfurt, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

The figures in the chart captioned "Sales and Gross Profit on Sales of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.", known as Document NI-10002 have been arrived by me in the following way:

I. Sales of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.:

These figures were obtained under my supervision from the Turnover Statistics of I.G. Farben for all the Sales Combines.

They are available in the Central Bookkeeping Department in the I.G. Control Office in Frankfurt on the Main.

II. Gross Profits on Sales of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.:

These figures were taken under my supervision from the balance sheet reports (Abschlussunterlagen) of I.G. for the individual years. These figures are available at the Central Bookkeeping Department in the I.G. Control Office in Frankfurt on the Main.

I have carefully read each of the two pages of this declaration and have signed them personally. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them and I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my know-

ledge and conscience.

gez. Helmut Deichfischer

HELMUT DEICHFISCHER

Sworn to and signed before me this 11 day of June 1947
at Frankfurt/Main by Helmut DEICHFISCHER known to me to
be the person making the above affidavit.

gez. Otto Heilbrunn

DR. OTTO HEILBRUNN
CIVILIAN, ETO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

C) NET PROFIT OF I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE A.G.

(Reingewinn der I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.)

	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM
I. Net profit of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. (before appropriation of profit for reserves etc.) (Reingewinn der I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. (vor der Verwendung des Gewinnes für Reserven etc.))	47,013,427	73,502,461	86,276,071	70,598,517	140,166,474	188,081,489	191,305,441	239,989,734	298,257,375	316,251,116	266,901,793	300,493,995	148,771,707
II. Net profit as per balance sheet of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. (Bilanzgewinn der I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.)	47,013,427	49,143,347	90,981,071	51,438,841	55,434,374	48,053,329	55,780,000	56,071,000	58,756,000	71,080,000	77,263,750	81,700,000	85,007,644

AFFIDAVIT.

I, Helmut DEICHFISCHER, Frankfurt (Main), Parlamentsplatz 9, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

By virtue of the offices held by me in I.G. and in the I.G. Control Office I am fully acquainted with "Net profit of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G."

I have been shown and have carefully examined this chart consisting of 1 page and captioned: "Net profit of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.". This chart is to my best knowledge and belief a true and faithful representation of the topic.

I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

Helmut Deichfischer
HELMUT DEICHFISCHER

Sworn to and signed before me this ... day of June 1947 at Frankfurt on the Main by Helmut DEICHFISCHER, known to be the person making the above affidavit.

Dr. Otto Heilbrunn
DR. OTTO HEILBRUNN
Civilian, ETO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR
WAR CRIMES

AFFIDAVIT

I, Helmut DEICHFISCHER, Frankfurt on the Main, Parlaments-Platz 9, employee of the I.G. Central Finance Administration in Berlin since 1936, Deputy Department Chief of the Accounting Department from 1938 to 1940, Chief in this Department from 1940 to 1945, and since then in charge of the Section, "Balance Sheets" in the I.G. Control Office in Frankfurt, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

The figures in the chart captioned "Net Profit of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G." and known as Document NI-10003 have been taken under my supervision from the balance sheet reports (Abschlussunterlagen) of I.G. for the individual years. These figures are available at the Central Bookkeeping Department at the I.G. Control Office in Frankfurt on the Main.

I have carefully read the one page of this declaration and have signed it personally. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them and I declare herewith under oath, that I have given the full truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

signed: Helmut Deichfischer
HELMUT DEICHFISCHER

CONTINUED

DOCUMENT NO. NI-10015

Sworn to and signed before me this 11 day of June 1947
at Frankfurt/Main by Helmut DEICHFISCHER known to me to be
the person making the above affidavit.

signed: Otto Heilbrunn
Dr. OTTO HEILBRUNN
Civilian ETO, 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

-2-
END

185

Millions RM.
3000

I.G. turnover gross and net profits.

I.G. Gesamtumsätze, Roh- u. Reingewinn.

2500


2000

1500

1000

500

100



turnover
gross profit
net profit

I, Dr. Ernst A. STRUSS, Frankfurt (Main), Bismarckweg 50, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own knowledge, the following:
I am the Chief of the Sales Office of I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of I.G., Manager of Division II (Sparte II) of the Technische Werke AG, and, since 1943, Production Manager of the industry of this firm in the framework of the Economic Group Chemical Industry.

With my full and complete knowledge of the "I.G. turnover gross and net profits", I have been shown and have carefully examined this chart captioned "I.G. turnover gross and net profits". This chart is a true and faithful representation of "I.G. turnover gross and net profits". I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Ernst A. Struss
DR. ERNST A. STRUSS

On the 15th day of July 1947 at Frankfurt (Main) by Dr. Ernst A. STRUSS known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Dieter Heilmann
DR. DIETER HEILMANN

Civilian, ETO 3040 Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes US Air Department

12/6

E) SALES AND GROSS PROFIT ON SALES OF DYNAMIT A.G. AND G.M.B.H. ZUR VERWERTUNG CHEMISCHER ERZEUGNISSE

(Verkäufe und Bruttogewinn aus Verkäufen der Dynamit A.G. und der G.M.B.H. zur Verwertung chemischer Erzeugnisse)

	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM
I. Sales (Verkäufe)													
(a) Dynamit A.G.	34,577,000	42,741,000	61,566,000	97,408,000	146,650,000	187,952,000	210,424,000	248,183,000	314,070,000	356,790,000	406,905,000	467,556,000	420,569,000
(b) G.M.B.H. zur Verwertung chemischer Erzeugnisse	-	-	-	-	2,689,000	12,644,000	33,159,000	75,568,000	186,375,000	314,524,000	452,601,000	631,368,000	?
<u>Total (I)</u>	34,577,000	42,741,000	61,566,000	97,408,000	149,349,000	200,596,000	243,583,000	323,751,000	500,445,000	671,314,000	859,506,000	1,098,924,000	?
II. Gross profit on sales (Bruttogewinn aus Verkäufen)													
(a) Dynamit A.G.	1,655,000	2,388,000	8,708,000	10,766,000	10,355,000	17,701,000	19,640,000	26,094,000	34,731,000	32,514,000	58,885,000	49,808,000	?
(b) G.M.B.H. zur Verwertung chemischer Erzeugnisse	-	-	-	-	159,000	782,000	2,609,000	3,701,000	9,424,000	16,729,000	27,010,000	51,080,000	?
<u>Total (II)</u>	1,655,000	2,388,000	8,708,000	10,766,000	10,514,000	17,883,000	22,249,000	29,795,000	44,155,000	49,243,000	85,895,000	100,888,000	?

AFFIDAVIT.

I, Helmut DEICHFISCHER, Frankfurt (Main), Parlamentplatz 9, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:
By virtue of the offices held by me in I.G. and in the I.G. Control Office I am fully acquainted with "Sales and gross profit on sales of Dynamit A.G. and G.M.B.H. zur Verwertung chemischer Erzeugnisse".
I have been shown and have carefully examined this chart consisting of 1 page and captioned: "Sales and gross profit on sales of Dynamit A.G. and G.M.B.H. zur Verwertung chemischer Erzeugnisse". This chart is to my best knowledge and belief a true and faithful representation of the topic.

I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

Helmut Deichfischer
HELMUT DEICHFISCHER

Sworn to and signed before me this ... day of June 1947 at Frankfurt on the Main by Helmut DEICHFISCHER, known to be the person making the above affidavit.

Otto Heilerunn
DR. OTTO HEILERUNN
Civilian, ETO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR
WAR CRIMES

I, Holmut DEICHFISCHER, Frankfurt on the Main, Parlamentsplatz 9, employee of the I.G. Central Finance Administration in Berlin since 1936, Deputy Department Chief in the Accounting Department from 1938 to 1940, Chief in this Department from 1940 to 1945, and since then in charge of the Section, "Balance Sheets" in the I.G. Control Office in Frankfurt, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

The figures in the chart captioned: "Sales and Gross Profit on Sales of Dynamit A.G. and G.m.b.H. zur Verwertung chemischer Erzeugnisse", known as Document NI-10005 have been arrived by me in the following way:

In March 1947, Mr. Segebarth, Chief of the Bookkeeping Department of the DAG and Mr. Schmitz, employee in the same department, checked under my supervision at the DAG offices in Troisdorf, the balance sheets, the books and the documents of the companies in question, and I and my assistant, Mr. Glatzel from the I.G. Control Office in Frankfurt, also collected information from those gentlemen. On the strength of the information supplied to us, I consider the figures shown in the chart as correct.

I have carefully read the one page of this declaration and have signed it personally. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them and

DOCUMENT NO. NI - 10017 cont'd.

I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

signed: Helmut Deichfischer

HELMUT DEICHFISCHER

Sworn to and signed before me this 11 day of June 1947
at Frankfurt/Main by Helmut DEICHFISCHER known to me to
be the person making the above affidavit.

signed: Otto Heilbrunn



DR. OTTO HEILBRUNN
Civilian ETC, 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

- 2 -
E n d

129

F) NET PROFIT OF DYNAMIT A.G. AND G.M.B.H. ZUR VERWERTUNG CHEMISCHER ERZEUGNISSE

(Netto-Gewinn der Dynamit A.G. und der G.M.B.H. zur Verwertung chemischer Erzeugnisse)

	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	
	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	
I. Net profit (before appropriation for reserves) (Netto-Gewinn (vor der Verwendung des Gewinnes für Reserven))														
(a) Dynamit A.G.	-1,141,000	1,631,000	8,337,000	8,412,000	4,998,000	10,428,000	11,959,000	9,986,000	23,488,000	16,056,000	14,827,000	14,825,000	?	
(b) G.M.B.H. zur Verwertung chemischer Erzeugnisse	-	-	-	-	76,000	359,000	963,000	1,277,000	1,513,000	3,030,000	13,307,000	16,571,000	?	
<u>Total (I)</u>	-1,141,000	1,631,000	8,337,000	8,412,000	5,074,000	10,787,000	12,922,000	11,263,000	25,001,000	19,086,000	28,134,000	31,396,000	?	
II. Net profit as per balance sheet (Netto-Gewinn lt. Bilanz)														
(a) Dynamit A.G.	1,588,000	1,588,000	1,588,000	1,588,000	1,588,000	1,814,000	1,814,000	1,814,000	1,814,000	1,701,000	1,701,000	1,701,000	?	
(b) G.M.B.H. zur Verwertung chemischer Erzeugnisse	-	-	-	-	76,000	359,000	719,000	1,277,000	1,757,000	1,530,000	2,502,000	16,571,000	?	
<u>Total (II)</u>	1,588,000	1,588,000	1,588,000	1,588,000	1,664,000	2,173,000	2,533,000	3,091,000	3,571,000	3,231,000	4,203,000	18,272,000	?	
<u>AFFIDAVIT.</u>														
<p>I, Helmut DEICHFISCHER, Frankfurt (Main), Parlamentsplatz 9, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following: By virtue of the offices held by me in I.G. and in the I.G. Control Office I am fully acquainted with "Net profit of Dynamit A.G. and G.M.B.H. zur Verwertung chemischer Erzeugnisse". I have been shown and have carefully examined this chart consisting of 1 page and captioned: "Net profit of Dynamit A.G. and G.M.B.H. zur Verwertung chemischer Erzeugnisse". This chart is to my best knowledge and belief a true and faithful representation of the topic.</p> <p>I declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.</p>														
 HELMUT DEICHFISCHER														
<p>Sworn to and signed before me this ... day of June 1947 at Frankfurt on the Main by Helmut DEICHFISCHER, known to be the person making the above affidavit.</p>														
 DR. OTTO HEILERUNN Civilian, ETO 30140 Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes U.S. War Department														

AFFIDAVIT

I, Helmut DEICHFISCHER, Frankfurt on the Main, Parlaments-
platz 9 employee of the I.G. Central Finance Administration
in Berlin since 1936, Deputy D epartment Chief of the Account-
ing Department from 1938 to 1940, Chief in this Department
from 1940 to 1945, and since then in charge of the Section,
"Balance SHEETS" in the I.G. Control Office in Frankfurt, after
first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for
making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own
free will and without coercion, the following:

The figures in the chart captioned: "Net Profit of
Dynamit A.G. and G.m.b.H. zur Verwertung chemischer Erzeug-
nisse", known as Document NI-10006 have been arrived by me
in the following way:

In March 1947, Mr. Segebarth, Chief of the Bookkeeping
Department of the DAG and Mr. Schmitz, employee in the same
department, checked under my supervision at the DAG offices
in Troisdorf, the balance sheets, the books and the documents
of the companies in question, and I and my assistant, Mr.
Glatzel from the I.G. Control Office in Frankfurt, also
collected information ^{from} these gentlemen. On the strength of
the information supplied to us, I consider the figures shown
in the chart as correct.

I Have carefully read the one page of this declaration and
have sign-ed it personally. I have made the necessary cor-
rections in my own handwriting and initialed them and I
declare herewith under oath that I have given the pure truth
to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

gez. Helmut DEICHFISCHER

Sworn to and signed before me this 11 day of June 1947 at
Frankfurt/Main by Helmut DEICHFISCHER known to me to be the
person making the above affidavit.

gez. Dr. OTTO HEILBRUNN
Civilian ETO, 30140 Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes
U. S. War Department

- 1 - End

THE UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

Over-all Report

(European War)

September 30, 1945

III

Effects of Attacks On Selected Industrial
Target Systems

THE ATTACK ON OIL

After air superiority had been attained over Germany, the Allied Air Forces proceeded to exploit it in a series of heavy attacks which continued from the spring of 1944 to the end of the war. Measured in terms of results achieved, the two most important objectives were the German synthetic oil industry and the German transportation system. These were, in a sense, contrasting targets. From the beginning of the war oil had been a weak point in the German supply system. As early as 1942, shortages of aviation fuel had compelled the Germans to cut down the training of pilots, and it has been seen that this circumstance, as much as any other, eventually cost Germany control of the air over her own territory. Thus, in attacking Germany's synthetic oil plants, the Allies selected an existing bottleneck and sought to draw it tighter. Transportation, on the other hand, was one of the strong points in the German economy. The importance of this target to the attackers lay in the fact that the maintenance of transportation was vital both to economic life in Germany and to the support of troops and the front. The attacks on oil and transportation contributed heavily to the collapse of the Reich.

In 1938, the last full year of peace, Germany consumed approximately 7,500,000 tons of oil. On a per capita basis Germany used only one-fifteenth as much as the United States. She was never accustomed to using oil on any such lavish scale as her western opponents and she was always dependent upon imports. Her own crude production, centered largely in the area around Hanover, supplied only about 7 percent of peacetime needs; this small crude production, plus the production of synthetic plants, covered about one-third of her own requirements of liquid fuels before the war. The balance was imported. Substantial refining industry, operating largely on Venezuelan crude, had grown up in the Hamburg and Bremen areas. This dependence upon foreign crude was a constant worry to the German planners, and various steps were taken, beginning in 1933, to make Germany more nearly self-sufficient. State subsidies were paid to encourage exploratory drilling within Germany, and crude oil production from German fields increased from 238,000 tons in 1933 to 1,052,000 tons in 1940. In addition, a synthetic oil industry was built which, although a high-cost industry based on normal economic standards, was largely owned and developed by private enterprise. It was directly aided by high tariffs on imported oil. Broadly speaking, the operation of Germany's synthetic plants was based on her extensive deposits of coal, and these plants were concentrated in the Ruhr, in the central German area around

Leipzig, and in Silesia. The synthetic plants were chiefly of two types: those using the Bergius hydrogenation process and those using the Fischer-Tropsch process.

The German plans called for the accumulation of substantial inventories, particularly of aviation gasoline for the German Air Force, and of Diesel fuel for the German Navy. When Poland was invaded, these planned stocks had not been attained. Germany started the war with 492,000 tons of aviation gasoline in reserve as compared with the planned figure of 1,500,000 tons, and 1,118,000 tons of Diesel and fuel oil as against the planned figure of 2,800,000 tons. At the outbreak of war, Germany had less than 6 months supply of all liquid fuels based on wartime requirements.

Prior to October 1939 there had been no civilian

rationing of gasoline, heating oils, and other products, but during the war drastic restrictions for civilian uses were inaugurated and the army, navy, and air force consumed practically all liquid fuels. In 1943 the civilian economy was allowed 300,000 tons of motor gasoline against 3,000,000 tons which had been used by civilians before the war. Once war had started, the synthetic plants were enlarged so that in 1943, cut off as she was from Middle East and Western Hemisphere oil, Germany was operating entirely on her own relatively small production of crude oil, imports from conquered and satellite countries, plus the output of her synthetic industry. Production in Germany itself is shown in the table below, which shows the importance of the synthetic production, particularly for aviation gasoline.

1943 production of oil products in Germany
(Thousands of tons)

	Aviation gasoline	Motor gasol.	Diesol oil	Fuel oil	Lubri-To-cating tal oil	
Hydrogenation	1,745	386	787	135	34	3,088
Crude oil	4	150	429	53	767	1,403
Fischer-Tropsch	254	99	...	15	368
Coal tar distillation	34	94	820	...	948
Alcohol plants	18	18
Benzol plants	320	355
Total	1,784	1,162	1,409	1,008	817	6,180

The early campaigns imposed little burden on Germany's small reserve stocks of oil and, in fact, contributed to the supplies available. After the occupation of Austria, immediate efforts were made under German dominance to increase production there. The early campaigns gave control of Polish crude-oil production and relatively small amounts in Estonia and Alsace. The blitzkrieg campaign against France and the Low Countries in May 1940 used relatively little oil; in fact, stocks of gasoline captured in France were larger than the amount used during the campaign. Hungary's signing of the tri-partite pact in November 1940 made available considerable additional production. Likewise, Rumania was forced to export a larger share of its declining production to Germany until the occupation by the Russians in August 1944. Even before Rumania joined the Axis in November 1940, however, a large percentage of Rumanian oil exports was already going to Germany. In 1943 imports from Hungary and Rumania totaled about 2,000,000 tons, chiefly in the form of motor gasoline and Diesol oils.

Virtually all aviation gasoline production came from the hydrogenation plant, and 10 of the principal 18 hydrogenation plants (including isooctane plants) produced 80 percent of the total aviation gasoline production. The synthetic plants using the Fischer-Tropsch process did not make aviation fuel. After the defeat in front of Moscow in December 1941, when it first became apparent that the blitzkrieg war was turning into a war of attrition and that larger

amounts of aviation fuel would be needed, attempts were made to expand output of existing hydrogenation plants and also to speed up the building of additional plants, particularly at Brux (600,000 tons), in the Sudetenland, and Blochhammer (400,000 tons) in Silesia. Two large plants to produce iso-octane material essential for high-grade aviation gasoline were built at Heydebreck and Auschwitz, also in Silesia. The great plants at Heydebreck and Blochhammer did not come into substantial production because of bombing. The concentration of production in relative few hydrogenation plants, as remarked above, is attested by the following tabulation:

Total production of hydrogenation plants, in 1943, of all products.

Leuna	606,000	tons
Politz.....	558,000	"
Gelsenberg.....	418,000	
Brux.....	335,000	
Bohlen.....	263,000	
Zeitz.....	281,000	
Wessling.....	233,000	
Scholven.....	231,000	
Magdeburg.....	219,000	
Welheim.....	137,000	
Noosbierbaum.....	58,000	
Ludwigshafen.....	55,000	
Litzkendorf.....	37,000	
Heydebreck.....	01	
Blochhammer-North.....	01	
Auschwitz.....	01	

Total..... 3,431,000

Small production in 1944.

The technical integration of both hydrogenation and Fischer-Tropsch synthetic-oil plants with the chemical industry made the synthetic-oil industry a particularly important target, and the bombing of this industry, and particularly Leuna and Luéwischhafen, had more far-reaching effects than the mere loss of oil production. Bombing of the synthetic-oil plants dealt a crippling blow to the munitions and explosives industries and severely affected the synthetic-rubber industry.

The Rumanian oil refineries at Ploesti were attacked in a number of during and costly raids by Allied planes operating from north Africa and Italian bases. A spectacular low-level attack made on August 1, 1943, had only a temporary effect. Deliveries of Rumanian oil to Germany actually increased until April 1944, when the attacks were renewed. The increased imports from this source assisted the Germans to build up their stocks just prior to the Normandy invasion on June 6 to the highest level since May 1941. Starting in April 19., raids on the Rumanian refineries, and the mining of the Danube, materially cut down the flow of oil to Germany, and set the stage for the all-out attacks on the synthetic-oil plants in Germany proper, which commenced in May of 1944. The data on all attacks on Axis oil follows:

Approximate bomb tonnage on all Axis oil targets by the Eight and Fifteenth Air Forces and the RAF

	Tons bombs dropped
1944-January.....	114
February.....	81
March.....	0
April.....	570
May.....	5,146
June.....	17,697
July.....	21,404
August.....	26,320
September.....	10,997
October.....	12,542
November.....	35,023
December.....	13,900
1945-January.....	12,505
February.....	22,635
March.....	30,937
April.....	6,451

When Ploesti was occupied by the Russians on August 22, 1944, Germany's dependence upon her own synthetic plants became even more acute.

While the major attacks were concentrated against the hydrogenation plants, the refineries in the Hamburg-Bremen area and the Fischer-Tropsch plants of the Ruhr were also bombed. The table below shows the distribution of bombs dropped on oil targets in the Year starting May 1, 1944:

Approximate distribution of bombs dropped May 1, 1944
to May 1, 1945

	Percent
Hydrogenation plants.....	47
Fischer Tropsch plants.....	20
Refineries.....	24
All other.....	9

The first attacks against hydrogenation plants were made on Leuna, Behlen, and Gelsenberg on May 12, 1944, followed by raids on Magdeburg, Lutzkendorf, Zeitz, and Leuna on May 28 and a raid on Politz the following day. The Germans quickly realized the seriousness of their position. Every protective means available was utilized, such as decoy plants, camouflage, smoke screens, balloons, blast walls, and air-raid shelters, but chief reliance was based on German fighter plane protection and intense concentration of anti-aircraft guns around the important plants. They took extreme measures to rebuild and repair the plants that were being knocked out. The great danger of attacks on these plants was only recognized by Speer, who stated that the happenings of the 12th of May had been a nightmare to us for over 2 years." Following the raids in May and June, Speer wrote constantly to Hitler impressing upon him the necessity for protecting these vital plants with every recourse possible. One letter from Speer to Hitler, dated June 30, 1944, reflects the desperateness of the German situation:

Our aviation gasoline was badly hit during May and June. The enemy has succeeded in increasing our losses of aviation up to 90 percent by June 22. Only through speedy recovery of damaged plants has it been possible to regain partly some of the terrible losses. In spite of this, however, aviation gasoline production is completely insufficient at this time. The already heavy losses in June and the estimated very low production for July and August, on account of increased air attack, will doubtless make us use up the greater part of our reserves in aviation gasoline as well as in other fuels. If it is not possible for us to protect these plants we will be forced to curtail the flow of supplies to the Army in September, which will mean that from that time on there will be a terrible bottleneck which

may lead to the most tragic consequences. I think it is my duty to call your attention again to the following :

a. The strictest orders will have to be issued to start limited flying. Every flight which is not absolutely necessary either for defensive action or for training has to be stopped.

b. The strictest measures in the consumption of motor and Diesel fuel on the part of the Army will have to be taken.

c. Fighter protection at the plants will have to be increased. The Luftwaffe should realize that with continued successful enemy air attacks only a small percentage of our fighter planes will be able to fly on account of the aviation gasoline shortage.

d. A greatly increased use of smoke screens is necessary, using smoke screens over dummy plants in addition to cover the real plants.

e. More blank protection is necessary, even at the expense of protection of German cities.

I regret having to inform my Fuehrer of these tragic developments and I beg you to issue all the necessary orders for this additional protection of these plants.

As an emergency measure Spoor put Edmund Geilenberg in complete charge of repair, rebuilding, and dispersal of the bombed oil plants and gave him top priority on men and materials for this purpose. As many as 350,000 men worked day and night on this job. Plants that had been knocked out completely were brought back into production in relatively few weeks, thus necessitating renewed attacks. The history of Leuna in this respect is striking. Leuna not only was the largest hydrogenation plant in Germany, but was also of great importance because of its production of nitrogen and other chemicals. It was the most heavily protected plant in Central Europe. The defenses were such that the plant was most difficult to hit. The first large-scale daylight attack came on May 12 by the Eighth Air Force, with 220 bombers with fighter escort, and the famous battle of Leuna began. Before the end of the war, Leuna was raided 22 times, twice by the RAF and 20 times by the Eighth. Due to the urgency of keeping this plant out of production, some of these missions were dispatched in difficult bombing weather. Consequently, the order of bombing accuracy on Leuna was not high as compared with other targets. A total of 6,552 bombers attacked this target with 18,328 tons of bombs. The battle of Leuna was one of the major battles of the war and, in spite of severe losses, the battle was won.

In May 1944 Leuna had a working force of approximately 35,000 men. The first attack on May 12 knocked out production completely. Geilenberg put several thousand additional men into the plant and partial production was resumed 10 days later. The raid of May 28 again knocked out the plant

but production was resumed on June 3 and reached approximately 75 percent of capacity by the early part of July. The July 7 raid once again shut down the plant, but production started 2 days later and reached 50 percent of capacity by July 19. A raid on July 20 again caused a shut-down, but only for 3 days, and by July 27 production was back to 45 percent. Two raids on the 28th and 29th closed down operations once more, and continuing raids on August 24, September 11, 13, 28, and October 7 prevented any production. In spite of the pounding and the accumulation of vast damage, operations were resumed on October 14 and, while interrupted by a minor raid on November 2, production reached 28 percent by November 20. In spite of six additional heavy raids in late November and December (largely ineffective because of adverse weather), production came back to 15 percent in the middle of January 1945 and was maintained at an average of 15 percent capacity during March and early April.

The very rapid rate of recuperation achieved by the Gallenberg organization at Leuna and other synthetic plants was in part accomplished by cannibalizing equipment from badly bombed plants and from new plants under construction to keep other plants going and also in part resulted from taking manpower and materials from other industries of lesser importance.

In general, repeated air attacks, rather than the severity of any single raid, caused the almost complete break-down of German oil production. The Germans were able by quick repairs to get at least partial production out of bombed plants before the next raid.

The over-all picture of production, consumption, and stocks of aviation gasoline, motor gasoline, and Diesel oil from 1940 to 1945 is graphically shown in chart 16.

Production turned sharply downward in May 1945. Although all figures for early 1945 are not available, it is known that in the weeks preceding the closing of hostilities production had been re-

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GERMAN PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND STOCKS
AVIATION GASOLINE, MOTOR GASOLINE, DIESEL OIL.

PHOTOSTAT

duced to practically nothing. The military consequences are reflected in the figures showing the consumption of aviation gasoline by the German Air Force during 1944.

Aviation fuel consumption, 1944

	Tons		Tons
January	122,000	July	156,000
February	135,000	August	115,000
March	156,000	September	60,000
April	164,000	October	53,000
May	195,000	November	41,000
June	182,000	December	44,000

Consumption exceeded production from May 1944 onward. Accumulated stocks were rapidly used up and in 6 months were practically exhausted.

The loss of oil production was also felt in many other ways. In August, 1944, the final run-in time for aircraft engines was cut from 2 hours to 1 hour. For lack of fuel, pilot training, previously cut down, was further curtailed. Through the summer the movement of German Panzer divisions in the field was hampered more and more seriously as a result of losses in combat and mounting transportation difficulties, together with the fall in fuel production. By December, according to Speer, the fuel shortage had reached catastrophic proportions. When the Germans launched their desperate counteroffensive on December 16, 1944, their reserves of fuel were far from sufficient to support the operation. They counted on capturing Allied stocks. Failing in this, many Panzer units were lost when they ran out of gasoline.

General Bradley has described the situation on the western front in the closing months of the war as follows:

With the defeat of the German gamble in the Ardennes, when the Allies were again in a position to resume the war of movement in the East as in the West—lack of oil, which the strategic bombing campaign had enforced upon the enemy, told handsomely. The retreat from the Ardennes was an agonizingly slow and costly affair for the enemy. The withdrawal of SS Panzer Army, begun in daylight on 22 January 1945, was marked mainly by successes of fighter bombers against its tanks and trucks. These successes, however, took place against a background of painfully exigent oil reserves—with supply trucks being drained to fill the tanks of fighting vehicles—and a long pull to the distant loading stations. When the Allied threat shifted north to the Aachen sector, the enemy was unable to sidestep his "mobile" formations to meet it in the measure he sought again for lack of gasoline. When the Allied break-throughs followed west of the Rhine in February, across the Rhine in March, and throughout Germany in April, lack of gasoline in countless local situations was the direct factor behind the destruction or surrender of vast quantities of tanks, guns, trucks, and of thousands upon thousands of enemy troops.

The results of the oil shortage made themselves felt also on the eastern front. The Russian victories in Silesia in February and March 1945 was hastened by the German lack of fuel. At the Branov bridgehead 1,200 tanks, which had been massed by the Germans to hold the line, were immobilized for lack of gasoline and overrun. On the testimony of Marshal Stalin, bombardment of oil played an important part in the sweeping Russian victories.

The German program for the construction of jet-propelled fighter planes offered a ray of hope, since they did not require high-grade aviation fuel, but operated on J-2 fuel of the Diesel oil type, which was more readily available and easier to make. This was a factor in the decision, made in early 1944, to stop construction of additional hydrogenation plants and not to increase production of aviation gasoline in existing plants. In view of the effectiveness of Allied air attacks on these plants, however, it is doubtful that any expansion of facilities by the Germans after the spring of 1944 would have been successful.

The Germans did, however, plan for a substantial increase in the J-2 fuel, but other bottlenecks developed within the chemical industry so that the expansion contemplated did not materialize and the jet-propelled plane played a minor part in the air fighting before VE-day.

Speer and Gailenberg also planned a program of dispersal of small plants and a program of underground installations. They anticipated that 100,000 tons a month of liquid fuel would be available from small dispersed plants and underground installations by the spring of 1945, but the war ended before any appreciable amount of production was obtained from these plants. During the war the German oil industry opposed attempting to put the hydrogenation plants underground and, in view of their size and complexity, it seems clear that any such program on a large scale was impracticable. Even had Gailenberg's plan of dispersal and underground installations been put into operation 6 months before the end of the war, it

Probably would not have prolonged the conflict: first, because of the limited amount of production that would have resulted from the proposed installations; and, secondly, because even though the plants themselves might have been protected against bombing, their transportation facilities were still vulnerable. For example, in the case of the underground plants at Porta, it would only have been necessary to bomb two railroad lines and the Porta River facilities to make this installation inoperative. In general, the same situation applied to other dispersed and underground locations.

A major opportunity in the Allied air offensive against oil was unexploited. Ethyl fluid is an indispensable constituent of high-grade aviation gasoline. The addition of ethyl fluid in very small amounts for gasoline is so beneficial that no modern aircraft is operated without it. Ethyl fluid is made from tetraethyllead and ethylene dibromide. There were only two tetraethyllead plants in Germany; one plant in occupied France and two small plants in Italy as follows:

	Capacity (tons) per month
Capel, near Berlin	100
Frosch, near Heydeburg	300
Fainboeuf, France	120
Nussi, Italy	50
Trient, Italy	15

Production of the Italian plants was never available to Germany and the production of the two German plants and the French plant was barely adequate to supply tetraethyllead for Germany's fuel needs. Plans were made as early as 1942 for the construction of a new 400-ton-per-month unit in Heydebreck. It was planned to enlarge Capel from 100 to 200 tons per month, and to construct a new plant at Drixlegg, Austria. None of these plans ever materialized.

Two ethylene dibromide plants were available for the Germans--a French plant on the Mediterranean coast, which extracted bromine from sea water, and a German plant in Holstein. The French plant was never operated, probably because of its vulnerability, and the German plant was the sole source of ethylene dibromide for ethyl fluid.

Eliminating from consideration the Heydebreck and Drixlegg plants, which were only projects, and the two Italian plants, whose production was unavailable, there were only three plants supplying tetraethyllead and one plant supplying ethylene dibromide. These plants were not bombed, although the equipment and processes used were such as to make them highly vulnerable to air attack.

R u b b e r

Germany entered the war with practically no stocks of rubber on hand. In August 1939 her total inventory of both natural and synthetic rubber was only 24 months

prewar consumption, her stock of reclaimed rubber represented only 2 months supply and finished tire stocks represented only 12 months of peacetime consumption. Small amounts of natural rubber trickled in from time to time through the blockade during the war years but Germany was almost completely dependent upon the production of the synthetic rubber industry to supply all war and civilian needs. The basic raw material for her synthetic rubber was coal of which she had an ample supply. Carbon black--another necessary material for fabricating purposes--while not plentiful never was a real bottleneck in production.

Before the war Germany was the third largest consumer of the world's rubber after the United States and the United Kingdom. Germany's per capita consumption was roughly one-fourth as much as that of the United States. In 1937 and 1938 Germany had an average annual consumption of 92,000 tons of natural rubber as compared with 600,000 tons used by the United States.

As far back as the First World War Germany had developed synthetic rubber on a very small scale. During the prewar period synthetic rubber production increased from 1,100 tons in 1936 to 21,000 tons in 1939. In order to stimulate the development of the synthetic rubber industry, it was given substantial tariff protection. In addition the I.G. Farben synthetic rubber development at Leverkusen was directly subsidized and under the four-year plan the Government authorized the construction of three 25,000-ton synthetic rubber plants at Schkopau, Huels, and Rattwitz. Schkopau commenced operation in 1938 and later the capacity was increased to 72,000 tons a year. Huels was built in 1939 and its capacity was later in-

creased to 48,000 tons. The third plant at Rattwitz was never completed. In September 1940 a new plant at Ludwigshafen, with a capacity of 30,000 tons annually, was started. This plant did not get into operation until March 1943. The last step in the planning for rubber involved the erection of a 36,000-ton plant (as part of a chemical and oil plant) at Maschwitz in Poland which was believed to be safe from air attack. Only a small part of this plant operated before its capture by the Russians. Including the original 6,000-ton pilot plant at Leverkusen, the ultimate planned capacity of these synthetic rubber plants was 192,000 tons a year or about twice Germany's prewar consumption of natural rubber.

In substance, therefore, Germany started the war with practically no stock pile of either natural or synthetic rubber, imports during the war were negligible because of the blockade, and from the start of the war throughout she was dependent upon only three large and one small synthetic plants for her requirements.

The German rubber processing industry consisted of some 278 factories, 53 of which were major fabricators. Of these, 11 were tire factories, 13 made mechanical goods, and 29 manufactured other rubber products. Germany was always a large user of reclaimed rubber and used about 35,000 tons a year chiefly for use in mechanical goods. No new rubber fabricating plants were built after the war broke out but existing capacity was increased by approximately 20 percent partly for new war products and partly to offset production difficulties incident to conversion to synthetic rubber.

Although certain of the synthetic and fabricating plants were attacked sporadically from time to time, the industry as a whole was never subjected to prolonged or concentrated air attack. Ruhr was attacked once on June 22, 1943, and Leverkusen once on December 1, 1943, as priority targets of the Eighth Air Force. Ludwigshafen was reportedly attacked by the RAF and Eighth, but primarily because of its oil production. A total of only 3,723 tons of bombs were dropped on synthetic rubber plants from the start of the war until May 12, 1944, the beginning of the air offensive against oil. From May 12, 1944, to the end of the war an additional 15,736 tons were dropped, making a total tonnage against all synthetic plants of 19,459 tons. Over 70 percent of the tonnage after May 12, 1944, however, was dropped at Ludwigshafen alone and was directed primarily at the oil installations in this plant.

Chart 17 shows planned and actual production of synthetic rubber.

The Eighth Air Force June 22, 1943, attack on Ruhr shut down the plant completely for 1 month. Considerable damage was done but the plant was operating at 30 percent of capacity 2 months later, 72 percent of capacity in 3 months, and 100 percent of capacity in 7 months. The result of this single attack was to reduce rubber stocks, including reclaim, to 6,5000 tons by September 1943. Stocks of finished tires got down to 1 1/2 months supply. The only other raids prior to May 12, 1944, was against Ludwigshafen which nevertheless maintained production at 85 percent of capacity. The entire industry reached an all-time peak production of 12,787 tons monthly in March 1944.

The sharp decline in synthetic rubber production starting in May 1944—the beginning of the great air offensive against oil—parallels the sharp decline in synthetic oil production despite the fact that synthetic rubber was not the primary target, and even though only 4,736 tons of bombs were dropped on all plants other than Ludwigshafen which received 11,000 tons.

Synthetic rubber production nevertheless suffered because of its interrelation with the synthetic oil plants. This is what happened.

1. Schkopau production was hurt and eventually lost completely because Schkopau was dependent on Leuna 5 miles away for its supply of hydrogen. The 22 raids against synthetic oil at Leuna from May 12, 1944 to the end of the war kept the plant down to an average of 9 percent of capacity and as Leuna could not ship hydrogen to Schkopau, Schkopau could not make synthetic rubber.

2. After the first major raid against Huels on June 22, 1943, it was not attacked again but its operations were dependent on gas from the synthetic oil plants at Scholven and Gelsenberg in the Ruhr. These two plants were put out of production by reported air raids and were unable to pipe gas to Huels. This loss was partially offset by bringing in natural gas from Bentheln, but Huels production suffered. Huels, however, was

SYNTHETIC RUBBER

GREASER GREYANT

Total actual production-Monthly

CHART No. 17

See

PHOTOSTAT

German Gasoline and Rubber Index

(see Photostate)

still producing at the annual rate of about 20,000 tons at the end of 1944.

3. Rubber production at Ludwigshafen and Leverkusen was affected by the bombing of oil at the former plant and chemicals at the latter plant. In neither case was rubber the primary target. Production at these plants was largely eliminated.

Just as the major production loss in the important chemical industry resulted from the bombing of synthetic oil installations, the loss of synthetic rubber production was the byproduct of the bombing of synthetic oil. Chart 18 shows the decline in rubber production parallels the decline in aviation gasoline.

The rubber fabricating industry and particularly the tire plants in central Germany were subject to some direct bombing attack. Although only 500 tons of bombs were sent directly against these plants, considerable additional damage was done as the result of spill-overs from area raids on adjoining large cities. The fabricating plants were not the vulnerable part of the German rubber industry. There were a large number of plants widely scattered throughout Germany and there was at all times ample fabricating capacity. The real bottleneck in rubber was the few synthetic plants and these were never made the object of a concentrated series of attacks.

As the war progressed, rubber became increasingly tight and the army took a larger and larger proportion of the available supply. This is shown by the following table:

Distribution of all finished products excluding exports
(based on rubber content)

	Army	Civilian economy
	Percent	Percent
1939.....	52,4	47,6
1940.....	60,5	39,5
1941.....	65,0	35,0
1942.....	61,4	38,6
1943.....	65,1	34,9
1944.....	70,9	29,1

In tires, however, the army received 75 percent of all production until the latter part of the war when the army took as high as 85 percent. At the end of 1944, airplane, truck, and automobile tire stocks were reduced to a few days' requirements.

In June 1944, the Germans determined to disperse part of the rubber industry and put it under ground but it was not until the beginning of 1945 that plans for the construction of a large underground plant were started at Muchldorf. This synthetic rubber plant was to have a capacity of 12,000 tons per year with

the possibility of later expansion to 24,000 tons per year. It was to operate on raw materials brought in from nearby plants and a tire factory was also planned in the same underground location. Construction was started in March 1945 but excavation was not completed and no equipment had been installed when it was captured by the American Army. An attempt was also made to put some tire-fabrication equipment underground at Tharandt near Dresden. Several of the bombed rubber fabricating plants had dismantled equipment for shipment to this underground location but were unable to move it because of the general transportation tie-up.

When the war ended, German rubber plants had not been damaged sufficiently to be a major factor in the defeat. Rubber production had declined from over 12,000 tons a month at the peak to a low of 2,000 tons in December 1944, but production in February 1945 was 3,500 tons which was higher than synthetic production at the start of the war in 1939. Lack of rubber did not affect military operations. Inventories of raw rubber and tires at times reached dangerously low levels. The Germans were always able, however, to squeeze civilian consumption enough to keep the military supplied.

There is considerable evidence that concentration on the few synthetic rubber plants as a primary bombing target early in the war would have proven profitable.

C h e m i c a l s

For at least the last century Germans have been leaders in most important fields of chemical progress. Due to a lack of important raw materials within her own boundaries German chemists developed synthetic processes for making many essential products. From the point of view of waging war and withstanding a blockade synthetic oil, rubber, and nitrogen were among the most important products intensively developed before

1939. Chemical products were the leading export, amounting to perhaps 20 percent of total exports and Germany was the leading factor in world chemical markets.

Synthetic oil, rubber, nitrogen, and other important chemicals depend primarily on coal, air, and limestone of which Germany had ample supplies and these simple raw materials were the foundation of a complex chemical industry. While dependent upon imports to a minor extent for certain materials, Germany's chemical industry as a whole was reasonably self-sufficient for war needs in 1939.

The story of the industry is primarily the story of the I.G. Farben Company which controlled perhaps 85 percent of the entire industry. The I.G. Farben plants at Leuna, Ludwigshafen, and Leverkusen were among the largest plants in the world and in addition, this one company controlled many other smaller plants. Secondary companies or combines of importance were Degussa of Frankfurt, Henkel of Duesseldorf, and Winterhall A.G.

Chemical production was centered in the Rhine Valley particularly in the Ruhr and along the northern Swiss and Austrian frontiers and in the central German Leipzig area. Much of the wartime expansion of the industry was further east in Upper Silesia.

Hundreds of different chemicals were essential to Germany's war economy. Some of these entered directly into powder and explosives and others, used by many different industries, were equally essential in the production of items of armament.

Ten particular chemicals, however, because of the amounts required or because of their basic nature, can be considered the most vital to Germany and are listed below in order of their wartime importance, as the Germans considered them:

- | | |
|--------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Nitrogen | 6. Tetraethyllead |
| 2. Methanol | 7. Sulphuric acid |
| 3. Calcium carbide | 8. Caustic soda |
| 4. Sodium cyanide | 9. Chlorine |
| 5. Ethylene | 10. Sodium carbonate |

Germany's peacetime chemical industry had considerable excess capacity. With export markets closed, the production that normally was sold abroad also became available for increased war needs at home. With few exceptions there were no attempts before the war to stock-pile chemicals. The 4-year plan did, nevertheless, provide for enlarging certain plants. Even so, after 1939 it became necessary to construct new plants to meet the war demands. Serious difficulties arose in the construction of the new plants, particularly in obtaining structural steel and heavy process equipment. Much of the contemplated expansion of the new plants never materialized.

The chemical industry, by itself, was never selected as a primary bombing target. By far the greater part of the losses of German chemical production due to Allied bombing came as a result of bombing of synthetic oil plants. Some damage also resulted from area bombing. Many chemicals, and particularly synthetic nitrogen and methanol, were made in the huge complex plants which produced synthetic oil, and these were attacked primarily for their oil production.

All the large units producing nitrogen and 90 percent of methanol production were located in the synthetic oil plants. Leuna and Ludwigshafen-Oppau were the two most important plants accounting for 60 percent of nitrogen and 40 percent of methanol. These two plants also produced 76 percent of the country's ethyl chloride for tetraethyllead.

The many other chemical plants - not part of the oil complex - produced much larger tonnages of chemicals (other than nitrogen and methanol) than did the oil-chemical plants.

Total capacity of chemicals,	Tons per month, Percent	
Chemical plants, no oil production	576,000	83
Oil-chemical plants	115,000	17
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	691,000	100

The production of these non-oil-chemical plants was of great importance but they were bombed very little. From May 1, 1944, to the end of the war 62,915 tons were dropped on all chemical plants. Of this, 58,202 tons, or 92 percent, were dropped on the oil-chemical plants and only 4,713 tons, or 8 percent, on the other chemical plants from which the larger production came.

It was fortuitous that production of the two most important chemicals-nitrogen and methanol - was heavily concentrated in synthetic oil plants. The consequent shortages in powder and

(Page 14 of original)

explosives were of significant importance in reducing the ability of the German Wehrmacht to oppose the Allied advance and the Russian offensive. Both of these campaigns involved enormous consumption of explosives at a time when production were being rapidly exhausted.

There was a precipitous drop in the production of Germany's more important chemicals beginning after May 1944 when the Allies began the heavy bombing of synthetic oil plants. This is illustrated by chart 19 which shows the production of the nine important chemicals with an index of the six most important. The loss of this chemical production, and particularly nitrogen and methanol, was a serious blow to Germany's war-making capabilities. The principal chemical products will now be briefly reviewed. (See p. 45 for tetraethyllead.)

Nitrogen is the most important war chemical. Almost without exception, military powders and explosives require nitrogen in the form of nitric acid for their production. Fixed nitrogen is also vitally necessary for fertilizers, rocket propellants, dyes, lacquers, plastics, rayon, film, and drugs.

No stocks of nitrogen were built up before the war. Even in 1940, 1941, and 1942 nitrogen supplies were tight and in the latter stages of the war, the shortages were crucial.

Total nitrogen requirements (agriculture plus powder and explosives plus other chemicals) increased rapidly during the entire war period. Production was relatively constant, however, until the decline started in 1943. In order to produce enough explosives and powder, nitrogen for agriculture was cut down steadily as the war progressed. Allocation for 1943-44 crop year was 54 percent of the total supply; allocation for 1944-45 was first planned at 25 percent and later eliminated altogether.

Nitrogen production dropped from an average of 75,000 tons in the early months of 1944 before the bombing of oil began, to only 20,000 tons in December. This loss occurred despite desperate efforts to maintain production by giving nitrogen priorities even above synthetic oil at Leuna and Ludwigshafen-Oppau.

The sharp drop in nitrogen production in May 1944 was reflected within 2 months by shortages of nitric acid for explosives and from then on to the end of the war, Germany was forced to take drastic action to meet the situation. Allocations for fertilizer were cut down and finally eliminated, and as the shortages continued, so that shells and mines and bombs could not be fully filled with explosives, rock salt was often used as an extender and filler. At first only 40 percent salt was used but by early 1945 shell powder and explosives were being diluted by as much as 70 percent salt with serious effects on the power and the effectiveness of shells. The situation steadily deteriorated and many German military officers reported a general ammunition shortage on all fronts in the closing months of the war.

There was always ample capacity for making nitric acid and for the nitrating of various chemicals to make explosives and ample facilities for the actual filling of shells. It was the destruction of the primary nitrogen-fixation facilities that knocked out Germany's production of ammunition.

(Page 14 of original, cont'd)

Germany's nitrogen industry possessed all the qualifications to have been a primary bombing target. Nitrogen production was directly used in and was essential to Germany's military effort. There were no possible substitutes and the major production was unusually concentrated in a few plants. These plants were vulnerable to air attack and the damage was difficult to repair. Bombing of the nitrogen industry was effective and decisive. It was a byproduct of the bombing of synthetic oil.

Methanol was second in importance only to nitrogen in Germany's war chemicals. It was needed to make TNT, hexogen, and other high explosives. From May 1941 to April 1945, 32,000 tons of bombs were dropped on the two plants at Leuna and Ludwigshafen-Oppau, the largest producers. This resulted in a loss of 163,000 tons, or 42 percent of the planned production for 1944. The plants at Auschwitz and Heydebreck, starting into production in the fall of 1943, had come to the rescue of the collapsing methanol production at Leuna and Oppau. Auschwitz and Heydebreck were bombed primarily because of their oil and iso-octane production. From July 1, 1944, to the end of December 4,800 tons of bombs were dropped on these two plants, resulting in the inci-

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BASIC CHEMICALS Production Indices

(see Photostate)

cental loss of 62,000 tons of methanol, or 30 percent of production.

As a result of these severe losses, revisions of allocations to the principal users of methanol were necessary. The major reductions in allocations were naturally in those industries only indirectly affecting the war effort, but even some high priority industries suffered severely. Allocations to high explosives and chemical warfare materials were cut substantially. The rubber industry which was already suffering from a shortage in other raw materials was also cut.

The other principal chemicals were not attacked as specific targets although some of the plants were hit. The declines in their curves of production were much less than in the case of nitrogen and methanol and were the result mainly of the general deterioration of German industry.

There were no shortages of calcium carbide at any time during the war. About 90 percent of production was in 10 of 21 producing plants. Sodium cyanide was important in making plexiglass, a transparent plastic for airplanes. Production was 75 percent in the I.G. plant at Ludwigshafen and the Degussa plant at Frankfurt. Ethylene went almost entirely into war materials and production was concentrated in relatively few plants. Sulfuric acid production was widely scattered and the largest proportion of output went into only moderately critical uses. Caustic soda production was widely dispersed in over 40 plants. Chlorine production came from 37 plants. Sodium carbonate production came from 14 plants, of which the largest had 23 percent and the 4 largest 58 percent of total capacity.

Although these chemicals were basically important, production losses would not have been felt as quickly or severely as losses of nitrogen or methanol.

No serious consideration was given to putting the important German chemical plants underground or to a wide-scale dispersal of the industry until the vital damage had been done. It was then too late. The predominant opinion in the industry always had been that a large scale underground dispersal of heavy chemical plants was out of the question because of the size of the process equipment used in most plants. However, after the middle of 1944 the severity of the bombing attacks made it evident that even minimum production could only be maintained by resorting to underground installations. War planning began in the early summer of 1944. By the third quarter change to nitrogen and methanol production was so severe that underground dispersal of these important chemicals was awarded the same high priority as the oil dispersal program.

During the last quarter of 1944 the planning finally crystallized for the underground production of 4,000 tons of nitrogen monthly. This project was scheduled to start operation on July 1, 1945, but the war was over before it

was ever in operation. Nine other small dispersed nitrogen-fixation plants with a total capacity of about 15,000 tons per month had been planned, but this program never went beyond the starting point. Four dispersed methanol plants were planned to utilize small scattered above-surface units of about 2,000 tons a month capacity. None of these materialized. Even had all these plants been in operation by the end of 1944 the deficiency of nitrogen and methanol created by the air war could not have been met. The total nitrogen capacity in the proposed dispersal and underground plants was but 19,000 tons monthly, or only 25 percent of Germany's capacity before the bombing began. Similarly, the production from the proposed methanol projects was 8,000 tons per month, or only 32 percent of the pre-bombing capacity. A minor amount of dispersal was planned for other chemical products, but either did not materialize or was incomplete at the end of the war.

Powder and Explosive

A large planned expansion in the military explosives and propellants industries began secretly in 1934. Many plants were built and the expansion and dispersal plans were well worked out. A state-owned corporation - Montan - acted as a cloak for these secret expansion plans. The Government provided the money and determined the policies. Montan built the plants and leased them to the private explosives companies.

Chart 20 shows the production capacity of important explosives in each of the years from 1934 to 1945. The expansion in capacities up to 1939

POWDER AND EXPLOSIVES
PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY

Photostat.

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POTDER PRODUCTION
AND CONSUMPTION BY ARMED FORCES

Photostat

EXPLOSIVES PRODUCTION
AND CONSUMPTION BY ARMED FORCES

Photostat

TOTAL EXPLOSIVES PRODUCTION
BY TYPE

Photostat

was roughly threefold. During the war years capacities again tripled or quadrupled over what they were in 1939. There was excess capacity for finished products all during the war.

In 1939 the Germans had built up a large stock pile of powder, 187,000 tons. Consumption averaged only 3,000 tons per month in 1940 and 5,000 tons per month in 1941.

The Germans seriously underestimated their raw-material requirements for a long war. They built few additional raw-materials plants and also failed to build up adequate stock piles. During 1941-1943 their average reserve stock of nitric acid was only a 10-day supply. The toluene reserve was less than a month's supply and there was no reserve at all of stabilizers.

Several important technical improvements helped the Germans to compensate for the raw-materials shortages. Among these were the development of a substitute for nitroglycerin, a synthetic process for making toluene, a new process for making hexogen, and a new process for the synthesis of glycerin.

Charts 21 and 22 show production and consumption of powders and explosives monthly for the period 1940-44. These figures do not take into account Allied ammunition captured by the Germans or German losses by capture concerning which there is no reliable information. Germany is known to have captured large stocks of nitrocellulose in France. The production facilities acquired in occupied countries were negligible.

In 1943 and until the middle of 1944, explosives and powder production was close to capacity, rising to peaks in May-June 1944. After Stalingrad and later reserves in Russia, explosives were given top priority along with oil in the middle of 1943.

The most strenuous efforts to expand production and the large stocks on hand were not sufficient to offset the crisis starting in mid 1944. This resulted from the huge increase in munitions requirements after D-day and from the Allied bombing of oil-chemical plants which were the principal suppliers of raw materials. The repeated bombing of three large oil plants, Leuna, Ludwigshafen-Oppau, and Heydebreck, from mid May 1944 onward brought the explosives industry to almost a complete standstill. After nitrogen and methanol production was knocked out in the oil-chemical plants, explosives and powder production declined precipitously.

Chart 23 shows production curves for the principal explosives and also the curve for nitrogen - the most important raw material. By February 1945, German explosives production, exclusive of extenders, had been reduced drastically to 8,500 tons per month. This decline came at a time when the Germans were fighting on two fronts and consumption was at a peak. Stocks which were ample in mid 1944 evaporated. Thousands of finished shell casings remained unfilled and the Germans were forced on occasion to use as high as 70 percent rock salt to stretch the small supply of explosives. Supplies of flak ammunition were so short that battery commanders were ordered not to fire at enemy aircraft unless the airplanes were attacking the target the battery was supposed to protect and the commander was sure he could hit the airplanes. The Germans had to give up entirely the manufacture of the powerful explosive hexogen.

The powder and explosives industry was never selected as a specific target for systematic attack. There were 55 large explosives and propellant plants, seven of which made 70 percent of the total production. There were a few scattered raids in the course of which a few plants were hit prior to January 1945 which had no effect on the Germans ability to meet requirements. There was enough unused capacity to absorb the mild

shock of this early bombing. This crisis in powder and explosives arose from the shortage of basic materials - notably nitrogen and methanol which had been cut off by the attacks on the synthetic oil plants - rather than by bombing of the industry itself. During the last 5 weeks of the war some of the plants were attacked more heavily but the Germans were then so nearly out of nitrogen that these plants were rapidly reaching the point where they would be unable to operate anyway.

Investigation of these plants showed that they were vulnerable to air attack. Recuperation would have been slow, taking from 6 to 9 months to restore a badly damaged plant to its original capacity.

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S. G. Parbur

MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO. ?

CASE NO. *41*

Prosecution Document Book No. *XXXVIII*

English



INDEX

TO DOC. BOOK XXXVIII

FARBEN PARTICIPATED IN CREATING AND EQUIPPING
THE NAZI MILITARY MACHINE FOR AGGRESSIVE WAR

Exhibit No.	Document No.	DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT	PAGE IN DOC. BOOK
30	NI-6767	Signed and sworn interrogation of the defendant Carl Krauch concerning the development of the production of synthetic gasoline by I.G. Dated 16 April 1947.	1
	NI-6630	Article by H. Koppenberg: "Mineral Oil Production from Coal", in "Der Vierjahresplan", 1937, 1 Year, No. 5, p.271 seq.	13
	NI-9088	Top Secret memorandum on a meeting between I.G., the Army Ordnance Office and Reich Economic Ministry on 20 Aug. 1934, on the planned development of Leuna and other plants for the production of aircraft fuel.	28
	NI-5931	Two letters and Minutes of a conference between I.G., Army Ordnance Branch and the Reich Air Ministry on the development of special fuel and lubricants by I.G. Dated June and July 1935.	36
233	NI-7208	Secret original mimeographed letter from V/W to various IG plants on the subject of providing the armament industry with fuel in case of war. 12 July 1939.	42
95	NI-8326	Affidavit by Struss incorporating Document NI-306, re: summary of reports of discussion, also correspondence, regarding rubber production. Dated 30 May 1947.	44
	NI-7562	Expose by Dr. Eberhard Neukirch in the Office of the GEBECKEM on "The development of the light metals industry within the Four Year Plan". Date 5 June 1943.	54
	NI-9548	Secret inter-office memorandum from Dr. Schlecht of the Nitrogen Dept. of IG, Ludwigshafen, to Dr. Simmier of Sparte I, regarding a nickel plant to be constructed at Nachterstall/Frose, dated 14 Jan. 41. Memorandum encloses official confirmation from Amt fuer deutsche Roh- und Werkstoffe to I.G., dated 19 August 1937.	83



Exhibit No.	Document No.	Description of Document	Page in Doc. Book
NI-8840		Secret letter from the defendant Karl Krauch addressed to the "Staatssekretar" stating that the development and manufacture of gunpowder, explosives and chemical warfare agents is the concern of private industry. Dated 22 July 1938.	87
EC-128		Report of Ministry of Economics on progress of the economic mobilization situation as of 30 September 1934, stating that IG moved partially from "the danger area" to Central Germany the production of ferro-Tungsten; also that IG stockpiled pyrites.	94

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6767
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIME

INTERROGATION of Carl KRAUCH, on 16 April 1947
by Mr. CHAMBLITZ, in the afternoon.
Others present: Annelie WIGNER, German Court
Reporter

- Q.: You are aware of the fact that you are making your statements under oath, Herr KRAUCH ?
- A.: Yes.
- Q.: First one question: Some time ago I read - I can't quite remember where it was - that BOSCH recommended you to GOERING in 1936.
- A.: I can't say that. In 1942, on the occasion of a meeting of the Aufsichtsrat of the Kontinentale-Oel-Gesellschaft FUNK approached me and told me that VOEGLER at that time had mentioned my name for the first time, naming me as the man who would know about matters of research and would therefore be the right one for the position in the Four Years Plan. BOSCH did not speak with GOERING, I believe.
- Q.: But it is possible that in this indirect way BOSCH did recommend you via VOEGLER.
- A.: VOEGLER was good friends with BOSCH and he knew me too from his various visits at Ludwigshafen, where he was usually shown the laboratories and places of research and at which occasion I had to give a lecture.
- Q.: If I may ask you again: If BOSCH recommended you to GOERING, how could you explain that ?
- A.: There is only an indirect possibility of BOSCH having talked to VOEGLER and my name having been mentioned on that occasion. That's what I conclude from FUNK's remark. May I add that BOSCH was not in the least astonished when I told him about Berlin. He must have known something, but he did not tell me anything.
- Q.: Something else: You told me that you got that call from LOEB at that time, during May. What did you think when that call came ?
- A.: I may have assumed that it was because of benzine, because I had sort of a name in connection with the synthesis of benzine and I concluded that he wanted to ask me some questions concerning its development.

(Page 1 of original, cont'd)

- Q.: Did the name of LOEB mean anything at all at that time ?
- A.: Not so much.
- Q.: How could you then assume, that LOEB was going to ask you something in connection with benzine ?
- A.: This was always the usual question when I was called to Berlin during those years.

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- Q.: Was SCHUCHT interested in those things at that time, during the first three months of 1936 ?
- A.: Yes, through the Erabag. After all, he was the founder of the Erabag and had called me into the Erabag. He knew BOSCH.
- Q.: You said, to the Ministries.
- A.: The Ministry of Finance, because they had to fix the prices.
- Q.: And who else ?
- A.: The Department of Weapons (Waffenamt), General LIEBE. He was interested whether the benzine would satisfy their requirements.
- Q.: Any other Ministry or state office ?
- A.: I don't think so.
- Q.: Did you ever have anything to do with the Ministry of Air (Luftfahrtministerium), where LOEB was a functionary ?
- A.: Once I was invited by VOEGLER; MILCH was present too.
- Q.: When was that ?
- A.: In 1934/35.
- Q.: Did you personally have a lot to do with MILCH ?
- A.: With regard to these questions. He often approached me personally.

(Page 2 of original, cont'd)

Q.: In connection with the Brabag: what was the impression you and SCHUCHT, too, had of KEPPLER in 1934 ?

A.: I had the feeling that KEPPLER wanted to build up a party economy, a state economy, that he wanted to bring the State into the industry. I was under the impression that he wanted to found a sort of a State concern, in order to build up a new National Socialist economy on a different basis.

Q.: I can't remember very well, but I don't think that KEPPLER, if we should ever talk to him about that, will say that he wanted to build up a State or Party economy. KEPPLER, as you know, was an idealist in a fanatical way. What he wanted first of all, was to develop German raw materials. This was his idea. But I did not have the impression that KEPPLER was a supporter of State economy or of a State economy directed by the Party.

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A.: You will have to consider the situation of the economy at that time. We all were under that impression. It is quite possible to imagine that later on KEPPLER saw this right. But at that time, when theories were still important, he certainly thought that way.

Q.: At that time you were not so much interested in the technical problem, that KEPPLER really wanted to make synthetic raw materials; at that time you were thinking first of all of political and financial economic factors. You mentioned the Ministry of Finance. You know, that with regard to benzine, protective tariffs have always played an important part. How did this whole tariff policy develop ? Can you give me a survey on that ?

A.: The price at which we produced at Leuna, was much higher than the price on the world market.

Q.: Was there a tariff at that time, in 1930 ?

A.: There were some low tariffs.

Q.: In 1930 ?

A.: Yes.

(Page 3 of original, cont'd)

- Q.: This was a purely financial tariff ?
- A.: Yes.
- Q.: Could you give me an approximate idea concerning the imported benzine ?
- A.: The way you said it. It is about 10:12, then the costs of production.
- Q.: How high were your costs of production at Louna at that time, in 1930 ?
- A.: 40 - 50 Pfennig.
- Q.: How high was your sales price ?
- A.: 30 - 35 Pfennig.
- Q.: What happened after 1930 ? You produced at 40 Pfennig.
- A.: We knew that these costs of production were too high. The amount of the entire amortization and interest had to be carried by the small production. At that time we already realized that we would not reach the world market for quite some time.
- Q.: What did the Government do to make the synthetic production of benzine possible ?
- A.: They increased the tariff.
- Q.: When was that ?

(page 4 of original)

A.: 1929 or 1930

Q.: At the time, when you started to produce for the market, did the Government increase to how much?

A.: To 4 Pfennig .

Q.: That did not help you very much.

A.: No, that was not sufficient. Thereupon we submitted more requests.

Q.: To whom?

A.: To the Minister of Finance DIETRICH.

Q.: How did it go on?

A.: Step by step, up to an increase of 10 Pfennig.

Q.: So that the import duty at that time was 12 Pfennig?

A.: Yes.

Q.: When was that?

A.: 1932.

Q.: Was that still the BRUENING-Government, or the PAPEN-Government?

A.: That was the BRUENING-Government.

Q.: What happened then?

A.: Then came the one HITLER - FEDER.

Q.: And what about PAPEN?

A.: You did not talk to PAPEN, DIETRICH did that.

Q.: From when till when did actually nothing happen?

A.: 1932 - 1934 nothing else happened. At that time things were even.

Q.: And in 1934?

A.: The Ministry of Economy requested an increased production. The I.G. refused that, because they were afraid of the risk of an increased production.

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

Q.: What do you mean by that?

A.: It was to be assumed that damages would occur, which would have considerable repercussions, in consequence of which the usual amortization could not be covered.

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Q.: Were the I.G. at that time approached to build new works, or to make better use of the existing ones?

A.: Yes, of course, to make better use of the existing ones.

Q.: In what proportion would an increased utilization have been possible?

A.: 100 - 200 000.

Q.: Therefore in the ratio 1:2.
When were the I.G. approached in this respect?

A.: In summer of 1934.

Q.: What was the reason for this?

A.: A certain Herr LA ROCHE and Professor UHELOHDE asked HUETEFISCH and PIER, whether it would be possible to increase the production.

Q.: Which legitimation did these gentlemen have?

A.: The legitimation from FEDER.

Q.: Were they voluntary collaborators of FEDER?

A.: Yes.

Q.: Did the Ministry of Economy have voluntary collaborators?

A.: They were Party Members.

Q.: Were they working in this office of FEDER's in the Reich directorate (Reichsleitung)?

A.: I don't know that, anyhow, they were close collaborators of FEDER.

Q.: What did SCHMIDT say about that? Who was the originator, FEDER or SCHMIDT?

A.: Probably FEDER.

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

Q.: Then these 2 gentlemen appeared in the I.G.?

A.: I believe, that UHELONDE knew PIER.

Q.: How did these people get there? UHELONDE on one hand had purely egoistical interests on the other hand he was the representative of FEDER.

A.: He was looked at as a Party representative.

A.: And what happened then?

Q.: Pretty soon I was asked by BUETEFISCH and PIER, to take part in a conference.

(Page 6 of original)

Q.: And what resulted from this?

A.: We could state, that the UBELOHDE method was not ready yet.

Q.: That was a distilling method?

A.: Yes.

Q.: And what did the gentlemen remark in regard to the method?

A.: FEDEL proposed the mixed price on the basis of a price control. He said, we cannot increase the tariff to an unlimited extent, we cannot keep on increasing the tariff. Therefore let us leave the tariff and guarantee a price as purchasing price to the factory. However, that can only be guaranteed, if the Ministry of Finances has insight into this calculation and on this basis a contract was concluded, which was signed by FEDEL and BOSCH. Subsequently I.G. decided to proceed with the production.

Q.: Now you said, that the tariff was not increased and before, I believe, you said the tariff was increased.

A.: No. It was increased in the period during 1930 - 32.

Q.: Then, not anymore at all?

A.: No.

Q.: You stated, this contract between FEDEL and BOSCH was concluded in 1934. But as far as I know, the so-called gasoline-contract was concluded in December 1933.

A.: I cannot positively say that. The first meeting with FEDEL took place in the Summer of 1933, and this affair was settled in the winter.

Q.: HITLER also was greatly interested in this contract. What do you know about it?

A.: I know nothing about that. I only spoke with FEDEL.

Q.: Didn't FEDEL ever made a remark, this initiative did not stem from him?

A.: They never admitted that.

Q.: Then in November 1932, GATTINAU and BUSTEFISCH went to Munich to see HITLER. Is that not so? What do you know about it?

A.: The winning over of the press was at stake. Strong attacks against synthetic gasoline were made in the press, which probably in some way was guided by the automobile industry, and now utilized all kinds of newspapers, including the "Frankfurter Zeitung".

Q.: Was that such a concentrated attack? I cannot imagine

(Page 6 of original)

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the Frankfurter Zeitung echoing the others.

A: Still, that was the case. Of course, they also contributed corresponding editorials.

Q: But what has all this to do with HITLER?

A: The National-Socialist press rose at that time in the same manner, and HITLER had very strongly supported the auto industry, so that attacks resulted from there too, and attention was being drawn to cheap fuels. GATTINAU and BUSTEFISCH discussed that with HITLER and HITLER agreed and then gave directions accordingly to the press.

Q: Why was HITLER consulted right away and not WEISS or ROSENBERG, the editors in chief.

A: It was commonly known, that HITLER managed the whole works. There was absolutism already then.

Q: But he couldn't know of all those attacks from everybody?

A: Still, it was like that. Even the "Volksische Beobachter" wrote only what was submitted to it and what it represented.

Q: One thing doesn't quite fit in: That the "Volksische Beobachter" followed the same line as the "Frankfurter Zeitung".

A: But it was like that.

Q: That can be determined historically. Then you stated you had knowledge of it, as soon as GATTINAU and BUSTEFISCH reported to you.

A: They came to me while I was in Berlin and told me.

Q: What was the reason to send those two, and not you?

A: The I.G. did not want any of its prominent people to confer with the National Socialists. I was more or less official.

Q: And wasn't BUSTEFISCH official?

A: No he was not on the Vorstand.

Q: And on the other hand, did BOSCH give the order?

A: I do not believe that BOSCH knew about it.

Q: If BOSCH had definitely not liked HITLER as you say of now 2 people from the I.G. - I emphasize now I.G., because the I.G. always valued its reputation, if two men from my firm go to a man, I don't care for, have a conference there and the danger exists

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it is being published; I would fire those 2 people were I in BOSCH's place. And they also had to count on this. BURTEFISCH and GASTINAU, did not assume such a risk without BOSCH knowing about it.

A: BOSCH finally put up with something then. At the moment, when the gentlemen reported to him, that HITLER gave directives to his press, he was also satisfied. I had that feeling.

Q: In one interrogation you mentioned, and we already talked about it, that the Party program demanded the dissolution of I.G. But nothing was said about it in "Mein Kampf"?

A: No. I cannot confirm that as I never read it completely.

Q: We spoke about the synthetic gasoline program before and you said FEDEL had been the driving power. I asked you then whether HITLER wasn't the initiator, the stronger personality. The reason I asked you was, because BOSCH was with HITLER in March or April and reported to HITLER on the economy. During this conference the entire hydration program was also discussed. I have thought it over why BOSCH did not say that of FUNK.

FUNK was Reich press chief at that time and attended the conference in this capacity, not officially, however. As to FUNK's description this conference between BOSCH and HITLER also revolved about the entire synthetic program.

A: I also thought it over, why BOSCH did not tell me this about FUNK. It is possible, BOSCH regarded FUNK as a sort of recorder of the minutes.

Q: At any rate it is also a fact, that HITLER had the gasoline contract submitted to him.

A: I cannot say that, of course.

Q: Is it known to you, what BOSCH reported to HITLER beside the general report on the economy?

A: He gave the hydration as an example for an international cooperation, international trade and economic relations.

Q: And what did he say, what did HITLER remark to it?

A: BOSCH felt as if he had spoken to a wall, since HITLER did not react.

Q: What did BOSCH want?

A: BOSCH wanted the assurance, that the economy retained its independence. That was his basis.

Q: But there was no interference into private economy, till at least 1936.

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A.: This was feared though.

Q.: Now let's talk purely psychologically. In the course of these discussions in March and April, when all these difficulties already existed and now that HITLER is Chancellor and they had already attempted to protect and nurse along this gasoline process in 1932, BOSCH goes to HITLER to call his attention to it. That is something I do not understand. Perhaps we can talk about it another time. When did BOSCH die?

A.: In May 1940.

Q.: That is when you became a member of the Aufsichtsrat.

A.: Yes, shortly after that I became a member of the Aufsichtsrat.

Q.: Herr KBRUCH, you remember that I saw you here once many months ago. At that time I asked you about the GOERING speech of 14 October 1938. Who was present during this speech?

A.: There were quite a few people present.

Q.: Was the speech held in the Preussenhaus?

A.: No, in the Luftfahrt Ministry.

Q.: Who was present there?

A.: There were at least 50 people. Just by chance I remember the notorious HEYDRICH, HALDER was there too, also men from the Navy and Army.

Q.: What kind of a speech was that? For the industries or for the Ministries?

A.: For the Ministries, there wasn't anybody present from the industry.

Q.: You know that at that time in September the Four Years Plan was started. When did Goering explain and comment on this Four Years Plan anyway?

A.: As far as I know GOERING spoke about the Four Years Plan for the first time during his speech in the Sportpalast.

Q.: Do you know the date?

A.: That must have been in October.

Q.: In October. And his official appointment was being published in the Reich Law Gazette in October, too. What was this speech like?

(page 9 of original, cont'd)

A.: All the Ministers were sitting up there, LOEB, of course, was there and then he spoke freely about his program.

Q.: After the Four Years Plan officially became the Four Years Plan, were there

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any changes in the internal organization or aims with regard to the economic policy?

A.: I did not have this impression.
Recently you asked me when I had heard the word Four Years Plan for the first time, I meditated on that. I think this was in LOEB'S office.

Affidavit.

I have carefully read and signed with my own signature each of the 10 pages of this record of my interrogation of 16 April, have made the necessary corrections by hand and initialed them, and I herewith declare under oath that this record is a true statement of my interrogation.

Nuernberg,.....

signature: J. P. CFARWATZ
(Interrogator)

(signature) Earl KRAUCH

signature: Annelie AIGNER
(Court Reporter)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

23 June 1947

I, E. ROSENBERG, Civ.No. 20 076, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8767.

E. ROSENBERG
Civ.No. 20 076.

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Production of Mineral Oil from Coal.

by H. Koppenberg.

The fact that the world's first drilling tower for mineral oil was erected near Danover, that both the gasoline and the Diesel engines were constructed by Germans and that, therefore, the motorization dominating the whole world today had its first origin in German work, has rightfully been, time and again, opposed to the disastrous fate that the most serious difficulties resulted for Germany's position as a big power due to the lack of its own adequate oil occurrences and thus the advantages of technical progress had to be paid with new questionable dependancies.

The few colonial territories producing raw materials which we were still able to acquire after a belated urge for colonial activity were lost after the first world war. Therefore, the poverty of Germany in vital raw materials was, to the conscientious observer of these circumstances, always a reason of deepest concern with regard to the future of his nation. If today a wise government has searched and found the means of removing a fundamental evil of our national existence, namely the shortage of raw materials, with the means given us, this is a historical achievement for which our children and our children's children will be grateful to our generation.

Fortunately this want in raw materials of our mother country is not a general one. We possess in our soil certain treasures which will make us rich if we only know to use them correctly: in the first place there is coal, of which we have more than most other countries. As long as the generation of power and energy was based solely on the direct exploitation of coal we were, therefore, equal to the richest nation on the earth as regards the possibilities given us. This applies to the end of the last and to the beginning of this century. But now a new raw material has won greater and greater importance for the generation of power within the last fifty years, a raw material which we have in our ground only in small quantities which by no means are equal to our demand, petroleum. The development of petroleum into a raw material of the first order of our technical era is parallel to the development and the increasing utilization of the gasoline and oil engine, the main consumer of mineral oil products. It is quite obvious to everybody that the automobile, the tractor, the aeroplane, the stationary oil-engine and similar machinery using petroleum products

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for fuel cannot be eliminated any more from the technology of a modern nation. This fact means an unmistakable dependency of the development of our technology on an assured petroleum supply. For this reason the problem of opening up new sources for the obtainment of mineral oils is of prime importance for our nation in connection with the total problem of making our economic system independent of the supply of raw materials from abroad.

Therefore, the first step on the way to procure for Germany its own raw material basis for mineral oils had to be a systematic investigation throughout our country as to whether mineral oils could not be found in the German soil in the same manner as in other countries rich in mineral oils. Although certain results were obtained it seems to be a clear fact today already, according to borings made in our own soil thus far, that it does not seem possible to cover the total mineral oil requirements of our economy in this way. Therefore the situation would be unsatisfactory if our chemical research had not succeeded in making coal, that raw material for the generation of energy in which our country is richest, the basic material for the obtainment of mineral oil.

The way to this great achievement of chemical science, which will be so decisive for the future well-being of our nation, was not a simple and quite obvious one. To be sure, this way is based on a primitive idea, the putting of which into practice, however, required the cooperation of our best chemists and the total utilization of our chemical industry. This simple idea is the following:

If you split up mineral oils into their ultimate components they consist principally of carbon and hydrogen and contain these chemical elements in a certain quantitative proportion and a certain arrangement with respect to each other. But the same elements carbon and hydrogen are contained in our coal too: e.g., the first of these two constitutes the fundamental element of coal and also derives its name from it. As far as larger quantities of the element hydrogen are required one can fall back on water, abundant everywhere, in which hydrogen is contained as a building block and from which it derived its name, too. It was not difficult now to conceive the idea of taking the elements carbon and hydrogen from the raw materials at our disposal and to synthesize them in the same manner as is the case in mineral oil. But it is a long way from this idea to practical success. The German nation is indebted to those men who tackled the problem of the transformation of coal into oils at a time already when, from the economic point of view the idea of a large-scale industrial realization of this problem was still unthinkable. In retrospect it must be stated to-day that a good deal of idealism was necessary to begin the liquefaction of coal at a time when, in other countries, wells had only to be sunk into the ground in order to get the same valuable product in the cheapest manner. But we have the same esteem for the far-sightedness of the leading men of our chemical major industry, who for long years strove for the realization on a large industrial scale of the coal-liquefaction method, without a near prospect of being able to start a large-scale production under economic conditions. The fact that besides the chemical major industry other branches of industry also have a share in the development and realization of the methods for the production of oil from coal may be seen from the statements which were made two years ago by the well-known Privy Councillor BOSCH of I.G. Farben at the plenary session of the Association of German Iron Workers (Veroin deutscher Eisenhuettenleute) "It is necessary to obtain experience from every corner in order to find new ways. Not only physics and chemistry must be taken into consideration but one must also become acquainted with the border regions. In these very border regions lies the future." But in the same address Privy Councillor BOSCH justly drew the attention of the whole audience also to the fact that the steel industry had earned the major share of the credit in connection with the arising of the large chemical installations, for this new industry requires large apparatuses and after the scientific knowledge had once grown ripe for an industrial exploitation, the forges were faced with tasks of an unprecedented greatness. Thus Privy Councillor BOSCH said: "I always held the view that we are deeply indebted to the steel industry, that it was this industry which, at the time when we were faced with difficult tasks, supported us in the most vigorous manner, in the beginning especially the KRUPP plant, but later all other plants too".

Now it will certainly be interesting to gain an insight into those circumstances and means of procedure which enable us to put into practice the simple theoretical experiment already described.

The high-pressure hydrogenation method developed by I.G. Farben in their Oppau plant and carried out on a large industrial scale in their Leuna plant starts from the described fact that coal has the same components that are contained in mineral oil. Only the quantitative proportion differs in coal in such a manner that hydrogen in it takes second place behind carbon. There are likewise contained in coal certain impurities, oxygen and sulphur, which must be removed in order to obtain high grade mineral oil. The I.G. method is based on the fundamental experiments of Professor BERGIUS, who was the first to find out that at increased temperature hydrogen can be forced under high pressure to combine with coal, forming products similar to mineral oils. The required pressures are, to be sure, enormous and were without precedent for any technical realization of such a method on a large scale at the time when BERGIUS carried through his experiments (during the last years before the beginning of the world war). They are in the order of magnitude of 300 atmospheres. First starting with small apparatuses the I.G. Farben managed, by tedious detailed work, to master these enormous pressures in always larger apparatuses, so that reaction chambers are customary to-day which for a length of 18 meters have more than one meter of diameter and a wall-thickness up to 15 centimeters. It is a matter of course that the production of such reaction chambers constitutes a special problem in itself, which could only be solved after many failures and by making use of all means and experience available. Another important difficulty in transforming coal into oil was to make this process continuous. While the experiments were carried through on small quantities in vessels, an economic success with large-scale industrial application was conceivable only if one succeeded in subjecting the raw material to the different phases of procedure in an uninterrupted flow. Whereas it is possible without particular difficulties to carry through such procedures with liquid raw-materials, the utilization of solid coal caused considerable difficulties. Already BERGIUS conceived, for this purpose, the happy idea, still applied to-day, of approximating solid coal to a liquid to such an extent that it can be pumped and transported like a liquid. Coal is ground to powder and mixed with a part of its liquefaction products, so that it forms a fluid-like paste. Also another way was used in order to avoid these difficulties with solid coal, namely, to separate those components of coal which can easily be liquified and to transform only these to mineral oils. For when coal is heated (smouldered) one component separates itself from the coal which at increased temperature can be kept liquid, namely tar. Individual kinds of coal are especially rich in tar, so that in their case it pays to produce this substance by smouldering. But in this case provision must be made so that the residue from the low temperature distillation, coke can be utilized otherwise.

The further work for the improvement of the existing method at the I.G. dealt with sufficiently speeding up the reaction between coal and hydrogen and to direct them toward specially desired mineral oil qualities. The means for this purpose is the utilization of catalysts; these are substances which are added in small

quantities to the raw material, producing the described effect. For the discovery of the catalysts best suited in this case the I.G. was able to fall back on great experience in the control of other reactions.

Using some photos made in high pressure hydrogenation plants which are already in operation, the operation of this process will be described herein after in a simple manner:

I.G. Process

1. Pea coal freight car
2. Winkler Generators
3. Compressors
4. Reaction Chambers
5. Tar tank car
6. Distillation
7. Gasoline tank car

The tar extracted from coal by a low temperature distillation process is brought in from the distillation plant by means of tank cars. This tar is at first freed from water and solid impurities and then it is transmitted to a distillation plant, where the small amounts of gasoline contained in the tar are distilled off. The tar free of gasoline is taken up by pumps and is pressed into reaction chambers with a pressure of 300 atmospheres, after first having been heated up to about 450 degrees. Pea-coal is brought in in other tank cars from the distillation plant; it serves, in a special generator plant, the Winkler generators, to decompose the water vapor and to free its hydrogen. The hydrogen is purified of sulphur compounds, compressed to the required pressure and, after having been heated up, is also pressed into the reaction chambers. Here it unites with the tar to form benzine, or other mineral oils, respectively. At the same time the hydrogen fixes the impurities oxygen and sulphur contained in the tar and thus they can be extracted separately in the form of gas. The product of the reaction is again distilled in order to separate it into its components. A part of this product of reaction, which has not yet absorbed a sufficient amount of hydrogen, is returned to the reaction chamber. The parts usable as mineral oils are purified after having left the distillation, cut down to commercial requirements and are finally taken from the plant to the commercial organization by means of special tank cars. The method just described for obtaining mineral oils from coal is varied for the various fields of application according to the special nature of the raw material and is adapted to local conditions. This adaptability of the method and the perfection which it attained in its development over a period of now twenty years, are the reason for the fact that the majority of the new efforts for obtaining mineral oils within the framework of the Four Year Plan are directed towards utilization of this method.

We must consider it as a stroke of great luck that, at the moment when we see ourselves forced to use great quantities of our coal for the production of mineral oils, we have at our disposal not only the method of high pressure hydrogenation, but also a whole series of other possibilities, of which I want to mention the power fuel synthesis according to FISCHER-TROPSCH, the POTT-BROCHE method, the UNDE method, the low-temperature distillation and tar cracking. The power fuel synthesis according to FISCHER-TROPSCH, is, next to the I.G. high pressure hydrogenation, the most important one at the present time; compared with that latter method it is relatively young. It originated in the Coal Research Institute at Muehlheim on the Ruhr, where it was developed, from 1926 on, by Privy Councillor Franz FISCHER and his assistant Hans TROPSCH after certain preliminary experiments. The industrial application of the method on a large scale is closely connected with the name of the Ruhrchemie A.G. in Holten and its technical leaders.

The FISCHER-TROPSCH method takes a basically different course than the high pressure hydrogenation and, in a certain sense, can be regarded as its counterpart. Its basic idea is to obtain at first, in as simple and pure a form as is possible, from our raw materials coal and water, the basic materials carbon and hydrogen, which are necessary for the composition of mineral oil, in order to compose from

(page 274 of original, cont'd)

these simple building blocks the more complicated ones of mineral oil. These simple building blocks of carbon and hydrogen are obtained by gasification of the coal by means of water vapor. By passing the synthetic gas developed through this gasification over certain finely distributed materials at normal pressure and at a slightly elevated temperature, mineral-oil-like chemical compounds arise therefrom. This method seems very simple if we look at it the way we just did. The way from the conception of the thought to a successful experiment and finally to results satisfactory for industrial application on a large scale was full of obstacles, and often not very hopeful looking. As far as the experimental part was concerned, the main difficulty was to find enough effective contact substances, i.e., those materials which cause the transformation in the synthetic gas to mineral oil products, which make possible the commercial application of the method. Many hundreds of differently composed substances have been tested for their effectiveness in the described way at the Coal Research Institute in Duehlheim; in the end it was found out that the most effective contact is obtained by distributing cobalt metal with small additions of other metals very finely into kieselgur (infusorial silicate). For the industrial application of this method on a large scale two difficulties proved to be especially adverse: In the formation of mineral oils from synthetic gas a large amount of heat is liberated. However, the process can only be carried through if the temperature of the gas is kept constant at a very definite level. Means had to be found, therefore, to make sure that the heat freed by the reaction is eliminated with certainty. The contact furnaces used at present represent a means for safe control of the temperature. -- The other difficulty was the fact that the synthetic gas may be brought into contact with cobalt metal only when it is completely free of sulphur. Synthetic gas, however, obtains from the coal substantial amounts of sulphur, which is partly fixed to carbon. Today one has succeeded in eliminating this sulphur in a simple way from the synthetic gas before it is passed over the contact. Of the FISCHER-TROPSCH method, as well as of the high pressure hydrogenation method it can be said today that its industrial applicability on a large scale is assured, so that it is at the disposal of the Four Year Plan, as far as the raw material and other local basic conditions are favorable to its applicability.

There are already several plants in operation which work according to the FISCHER-TROPSCH method. Some pictures taken at one of these plants will serve in the following to further illustrate the working method (see the accompanying plate):

In the motor fuel plant which we are using here as our model, synthetic gas is, for example, manufactured from lignite briquets. The synthetic gas goes from the gas producing plant to the sulphur purification plant. At first the sulphur bound to hydrogen is extracted at normal temperature by means of bog iron-ore and then the sulphur bound to carbon is extracted at a slightly higher temperature by means of a special working substance. The synthetic gas thus purified goes to the contact furnaces of which a great number (at this plant well over one hundred) are needed to cope with the great quantities of gas. In these contact furnaces, filled with the above-

(page 274 of original, cont'd)

mentioned finely distributed cobalt metal, the formation of mineral oil products from synthetic gas takes place. The mineral oils are contained in the form of vapor in the gas leaving the contact furnaces. The parts boiling at a higher temperature are eliminated by injecting water into the gas stream and by the cooling of the gas stream resulting from this treatment. The parts boiling at a lower temperature are precipitated in activated coal. In this activated coal plant the effective component is an especially prepared coal which, by virtue of its large surface, has the quality of holding gaseous bodies. By heating these gases afterwards they can again be freed. The fractions of mineral oil boiling at high and low temperatures obtained in this manner are either decomposed in a distillation to diesel oil, gasoline, and by-products, or, if the result to be achieved is only gasoline, they are further processed in a cracking plant. In such cracking plants higher boiling mineral oils, which cannot be used as gasoline, are decomposed to lower boiling gasolines through the effects of increased temperature; the raw gasoline is, in special washing and purifying machines, finally brought to the characteristics necessary for commercial gasoline and leaves the plant in tank trucks.

FISCHER - TROPSCH - PROCESS

1. Coal train.
2. Synthetic Gas Production Plant.
3. Sulphur purification.
4. Contact Furnaces.
5. Condensation and Activated Coal Plant.
6. Distillation and Cracking Plant.
7. Storage Tanks.
8. Tank Cars.

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THE FOUR YEAR PLAN

Issue 5

In comparison with the foregoing description of a high pressure hydrogenation plant, it is striking with regard to this synthetic plant, that all processes occur under usual pressure, so that, to be sure, all the mobile quantities of gas and the pipe cross sections are very large, but on the other hand the mechanical part (compressors, pumps, etc.) recedes. In this respect a plant operating according to the Fischer-Tropsch process is related in type to a gas plant or coking plant, and it has developed that such a gasoline plant can be advantageously annexed to gas or coking plants. For the production of the synthetic gas is not limited to lignite and lignite briquetts, but it can also be produced by a particularly simple method from coal coke. With regard to coking and gas plants (particularly the former) the question of an assured coke market is decisive for the practicability of the plant, so that, in order to attain this, a gasoline plant can form the organic supplement to a coking and gas plant.

High pressure hydrogenation and Fischer synthesis are the basic great possibilities at our disposal for obtaining mineral oil from coal. To carry out this process it was necessary to develop and test for operational readiness a series of auxiliary processes, without which to a certain extent the carrying out of mineral oil extraction from coal would not have been possible at all, or its practicability would have been very doubtful. Consider in this connection, the development of the distillation process, the gasification of various types of coal, the production of hydrogenation hydrogen, etc. At present all these auxiliary processes have reached a certain maturity, which justifies the establishing of such plants on a large scale.

As is known, our consumption of mineral oil includes various types which can generally be grouped under gasoline, diesel fuel, illuminating oil, lubricants, fuel oil, etc. Now it is an important question, whether the processes at our disposal for obtaining mineral oil from coal, are likewise suitable for the production of all these various mineral oil products. This question can definitely be affirmed. There is no basic difference between the various mineral oil products mentioned above; they are all related allied products of the vast group of hydrocarbon compounds, which for the most part differ only in the proportionate quantities of carbon and hydrogen, and in the arrangement of these two building blocks. Therefore it is basically possible to produce all mineral oil products mentioned above by the methods previously described; only the amount to be expended varies with the different products. To give an example: in general it is so much the more expensive to produce a mineral oil product from coal the greater the hydrogen content is, since coal is relatively lacking in hydrogen and the latter must be specially produced, and introduced into the coal.

(page 276 of original, cont,d)

As gasoline contains about 14.5 percent by weight of hydrogen, but diesel oil 13% by weight and less, the production of diesel oil will therefore be cheaper than that of gasoline. As compared to the natural mineral oils we are in the fortunate position that the best motor fuels and other mineral oil qualities which can be produced from them (natural mineral oils) can be attained offhand and surpassed without difficulty by our synthetic processes. We are able to produce the best aviation gasoline as well as the highest quality lubricating oils from coal.

The following doubts with regard to our efforts to completely adjust Germany's mineral oil basis on the raw material coal could be expressed:

1. Is Germany's wealth in coal so great that no ruthless exploitation is carried on in this way?
2. Are we in the position to produce motor fuels so cheaply from coal that the selling price presents no hindrance to the maintaining and extension of our motor transportation system?

Both objections can be contradicted with statistical material, the validity of which is proved by the operation of our large plants, which in part have been working for years. For instance, to produce a ton of gasoline, there are needed according to the type of process being used about 22 tons of raw lignite or 4.5 tons of coal or 1.25 tons of tar obtained by distilling lignite. On the other hand, Germany's demonstrated lignite reserves consist of about 50 billion tons and of coal of more than 100 billion tons, and the annual production figures for lignite are about 137 million tons, and for coal, about 140 million tons. The juxtaposition of these figures indicates that these quantities of coal required for the production of the entire German mineral oil needs, which up till now was approximately 4.0 million tons annually, constitute only a fraction of the present coal production and are relatively slight in comparison to the reserves. The price question is disposed of in a similarly unmistakable way in that arising from the production costs of gasoline from coal, no changes according to orders of magnitude in the present price level of mineral oils need occur. Naturally gasoline and other mineral oils cannot be produced as cheaply from coal as from petroleum.

As very large quantities of capital are required for the establishing of plants for the production of mineral oil from coal, great urging was necessary in the case of a few construction projects of recent years in order to stimulate private industry in this respect. In times of weak government leadership the fact that foreign oil was obtainable on the other side of our customs boundaries, at a far lower price than it could have been produced from coal by us,

(page 276 of original, cont'd)

must have had a very crippling effect on the initiative of our industry in this direction. As is known, the Fuehrer, shortly after coming to power already gave the impulse for the motorization of Germany and the establishing of our own mineral oil basis at the Automobile Exhibition in 1933. The conversion of this impulse into actual fact is first of all closely linked with the name of the Reich Minister for Economics, Dr. SCHACHT. The way in which the new knowledge was converted into actual fact is characteristic for the impetus given to our economy by National Socialism. KEFFLER, the plenipotentiary of the N.S.D.A.P. for economic questions, deserves particular credit for his efforts to carry out the plan. Whoever compares the economic history of National Socialist Germany with that of foreign nations, will realize with great admiration with what surprising speed and simplicity events of the greatest extent took place once they were recognized by the leaders as being essential and right; no consultations and debates lasting for months, no energy-consuming struggles with the opposition. The Reich Minister for Economics invited all authoritative leaders of the lignite industry to a meeting in the fall of 1934. Details of the subject to be discussed were not known; but already after 40 minutes every participant knew it, and after another 10 minutes the decision had been made: the entire German lignite industry will begin immediately with the construction of motor fuel plants, which must have the capacity of producing at least half a million (tons) of motor fuel annually, a few modest objections here and there suffocated in the realization of the overwhelming facts: complete application of all possibilities offered by the wealth of coal in German soil, for the achievement of self-sufficiency in motor fuels! That was the hour of birth of the Braunkohle-Benzin (Lignite-Gasoline) A.G. which immediately began construction of three motor fuel plants. In the fall of 1936 all three plants were already in operation and since then offer new employment to thousands of fellow citizens. In 1937 already these plants will be in the vanguard with respect to coverage of our motor fuel requirements.

(page 277 of original)

Parallel to the foundation of the Braubach ran the I.G. Farben-industry's initiative which further extended the Leuna-Werk, where gasoline was manufactured from coal for years already. The construction of gasoline factories in the West (Ruhrchemie, Hibernia, Kloeckner-Intershall and others) also occurs in this building period.

To owe it to the construction of these plants that today one realizes more distinctly the methods to be applied in obtaining mineral oils from coal than was the case in 1933/34, so that today, without taking special risks, a development of the German fuel industry on the largest possible scale can be tackled. At the end of this first building-up period of the German fuel industry it must be noted with special recognition that the I.G. Farben-industrie has a great share in the meritorious work of speeding up this construction program. At all times we regarded ourselves very lucky that the staff of expert engineers of this large plant was at our disposal in an advisory and actively assisting manner. Since the experiences with mineral oil and especially the obtaining of the same from coal were principally with the I.G. Farbenindustrie at the time the construction of the new plants was started, the present construction program could hardly have been completed during the period which was at our disposal without its energetic assistance.

Now the Four Year Plan will start and complete the construction of new mineral oil plants on such a scale that, more than ever, the cooperation and full employment of the entire German economy will be required, so that the bringing under one head and guiding of all people entrusted with these tasks up till now and those from the state, party, and economy that will be newly engaged with them, will be one of the most indispensable prerequisites for the success of this great plan. The Prime Minister, Generaloberst GOERING, entrusted with this task by the Fuehrer, and all offices set up by him have called upon the same men who constructed the plants producing mineral oil which are already in operation, to assure the continuation of all measures to be taken. For this reason the Mineraloelbau-gesellschaft was founded a short time ago, which, in cooperation with the Office for German Raw Materials and Plastics, will plan and carry out the major part of the new construction plans, and which appears to be a suitable instrument to guarantee the Four Year Plan as far as mineral oil is concerned by employing the best knowledge and experience already known.

The announcement of the Four Year Plan brought forth a tremendous echo in foreign countries also. The interest for our new plan attaches, on a still greater scale, to the new technical possibilities created by us, which have no equal in the whole world. Just as the invention and development of the processes

(page 277 of original, cont'd)

for obtaining mineral oils from coal alone are a triumph of German science and technology, so also the conversion of the whole motor fuel economy of a people on the basis given to it, as we are now beginning it, is unique and without precedent in the whole world. Though the results of our planning will, above all, be for the benefit of our national economy and the strength and independence of our nation, there is however no doubt that we thereby will also be rendering a good turn to the whole world. Therefore the author was also able to close his report to the third World Power Conference held in Washington in September 1936 concerning the German industry for obtaining motor fuels from coal with the following words: "With the obtaining of motor fuel from coal we hope to make a contribution to the world and to guarantee its supply of energy into the most distant future. Even though the extent of the petroleum deposits of the world cannot yet be fully estimated, there is however the assurance that, in any event, the extent of the coal deposits of the world, expressed in heat units, is many times as big. If one assumes that new discoveries of petroleum deposits worth mentioning will not be added anymore to those already known then, especially with regard to the steadily growing consumption of liquid motor fuels, the generation which is being born during these years will yet live to see a scarcity of the world's oil reserves. At this period the obtaining of motor fuel from coal will be one of the most important industries of our circle of civilization."

Even in the present aims and backgrounds of the political events of the world the present processes of obtaining fuel from coal are destined to start a radical change which should contribute a great deal to the peace of the world. Up till now the guaranteed possession of oil fields was one of the main prerequisites for making a nation a great power. Therefore the acquisition of oil fields and making them secure and accessible was a factor of prime importance in world politics. Our processes put the possibilities of oil supply on a much broader basis than hitherto, which should to a certain extent, enable every nation to become independent in the supply of oil. These facts are already beginning to become noticeable even politically. Some day they will be recognized as another contribution of Germany to the assurance of world peace.

The Four Year Plan is nothing more than the endeavor of our people to break out of too confining a space into a greater opportunity to work. It is significant not only with respect to political economy, but, it will revolutionize our whole way of thinking.

Hermann GOERING at the opening
of the Reich exhibition "Schaffendes
Volk" (Working People) in Duesseldorf.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

24 June 1947

I, Herbert RODECK, No. B 397 944, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6630.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. III-9088
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Reich Ministry of Aviation

Berlin W 8, 4th Sept. 1934
Bahrenstr. 68-70
Telephone: A 2 Flora 0047
Telegraphic address:
Reichsluft Berlin

L.C. No. 5391/34 III 5a Top Secret

Stamp: TOP SECRET

illegible initial, 6 September

Received 6 Sept. 1934 (various initials)
II X

B 6 Sept.

Stamp: 6 September 1934

To:
The Army Ordnance Office
For the attention of Major BECHT
B e r l i n .

Subject: Fuel for Aircraft Engines.

Enclosed please find the Memorandum (Copy No. 5) on the conference dealing with the above matter, held in the premises of the Chief of Office, C on 20 August of this year.

Ms. 12 September 1934 By order

signature: HEYDENRICH

Ms. Va 71
(Army Ordnance Office -
Military Economy Branch)

U.P. Production and Examination Group 6 of Army Ordnance Office
(For perusal and return to
Army Ordnance Office, Production
and Examination Group 6)

for perusal and early return

12 Sept. By order
signature: BECHT

24 November 1934

1 Enclosure:

Stamp:
Production and Examination Group 6 of Army
Ordnance Office Registry No. 687/34 P TS
in: 12 Sept. 1934 out: 23 Nov. 1934

Ms. X) The plans of the Ministry of Aviation must be incorporated in the Mineral Oil Plan.

Ms. VIII 23 November Initial K
VI B 27 November

It must be clearly understood by the Reich Ministry of Aviation and I.G. Farben that for all important decisions, the cooperation of the Army Ordnance Office (Economics Branch), and the authority of the same are required.

illegible
marginal
note

Please file with lecture by Office Chief of Office C.G.

No. 1714/34 Top Secret Economics Branch of Army Ordnance
Office. 67 b

Initials: Eter

7 Sept.

(page 2 of original)

L.G. III 51

27th August 1934

8 copies
Copy No. 5

Stamp: Top SECRET

Memorandum.

Subject: Fuel for Aircraft Engines.

During a conference held in the Premises of the Chief of Office LC on 20 August 1934, attended by: "The Chief Engineer, representatives of Departments LC I, LC II, LC III, D.V.L. (Deutsche Versuchsanstalt fuer Luftfahrt - German Institute for Aviation Research), Army Ordnance Office (Major E GHT), Reich Ministry of Economics (Ministerialrat UML RT), I.G. Farben (Dr. Mueller-Conradi) it transpired that the following was the situation as far as the aviation fuel problem in Germany was concerned:

A. Leuna Gasoline.

According to present research data, when the expansion of the Leuna Works to its final capacity of 350,000 tons a year, had been completed by the middle of 1935, two kinds of fuel probably suitable for aircraft engines, could be produced.

Ms. Marginal

can use be made of
it right now?
initial: W

1.) Leuna II, aviation spirit (approximately 52,000 tons per year - approximately 1/7 of the total production after the completion of the expansion of Leuna on 1 July 1935), with an octane number of approximately 70 to 72, if the raw materials lignite and coal tar continued to be available, in the same quantities as hitherto, to be improved by lead tetra ethyl to an octane number of approximately 87, and

2.) Leuna III, aviation spirit (approximately 52,000 tons per year) with an octane number of approximately 65, if the raw material lignite alone were available, to be improved by mono methyl aniline to an octane number of approx. 73 and further improved by lead tetra ethyl to an octane number of approximately 87.

Ms. Marginal

Why not?
Initial: W
Fuel oil

Leuna II of the quality so far required, could only be produced if the raw materials lignite and coal tar continued to be available in the same quantities as hitherto. If lignite were the only raw material available, only Leuna III could be produced in greater quantities.

(page 2 of original cont'd)

At the time Leuna III could be produced only in small quantities and by the application of special measures, as the hydrogenation process, which in its various phases formed a complete circuit at the time used. 65% of the raw materials lignite and coal tar and only approximately 35% of the raw material lignite, rendering separation in the gaseous state impossible at that time.

EE. L.C. 5391. 34 Top Secret
cross ref.

Cross ref.

No. 1711/34 Top Secret Economics Department
of Army Ordnance Office.

(page 3 of original)

Only the installation of special equipment, for which a construction period of 4 to 5 months was required, would admit of regular production of Leuna III on a fairly large scale within the framework of Leuna production.

The discussion revealed that the expansion of Leuna, even after its completion, would depend on the use of considerable quantities of the raw materials lignite and coal tar. Should a shortage of these materials occur, the projected maximum capacity would decrease considerably. (Estimate based on prevailing production conditions, approximately 70,000 tons).

A complete change-over to lignite would thus be required only after a further enlargement of the plant for the preparation of lignite and the erection of additional new contact-furnaces for the sump phase which differs in lignite preparation from that used for tars.

The J.C. representative could give no satisfactory information on the subject and was therefore asked to furnish without delay a definite reply, ^{to the question} "WHAT WILL BE THE MAXIMUM CAPACITY OF LEUNA WORKS IN THE MIDDLE OF 1935 AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE EXPANSION, IF THE RAW MATERIALS LIGNITE AND COAL TAR CEASE TO BE AVAILABLE."

For the same reason, the acceleration of tests to ascertain the suitability for aircraft engines of Leuna III, appears to be even more important than the tests on Leuna VI, as, in the event of war, such a situation must be reckoned with.

In addition to Leuna II and Leuna III yet a third Leuna gasoline is to be tested. Of the total production of this, approximately 40% occurs as aviation spirit. In the opinion of the J.C. representative, this quality would involve a deviation from present requirements with respect to the boiling point curve, in accordance with which 95% must reach boiling point at 150° C. By raising

(page 3 of original cont'd)

boiling point to 180° C, it will probably be possible to obtain a yield of as much as approximately 90% of the total output in aviation spirit.

L.C. II stated that a final judgment on the results of the Leuna II tests could be expected in three months.

The I.G. representative set the period for which Leuna gasoline could be stored at approximately 1 year. Experimental data on the subject, however, were not as yet available.

I.G. would supply sufficient quantities of Leuna III for tests on a limited scale in as short a time as approximately 4 weeks.

Leuna believed that it could still observe 1 July 1935 as the final date for the completion of the expansion. No reply could be given by the I.G. representative to the question as to whether the expansion could be still further accelerated.

(page 4 of original)

B. Mono methyl aniline.

For the improvement of Leuna III from 65 octane to approximately 73 octane, an admixture of about 1% monomethyl aniline is required, but at present this is manufactured only in the I.G. plant at Uerdingen on Rhine.

Suitable plants in I.D. (?) might be built in about 3 to 4 months. For example, such a plant might be added to the Leuna Works or to the I.G. Works at Solfen.

What are the present production and sales figures?

The I.G. is instructed as soon as possible to submit proposals and cost estimates, for a plant producing 750 tons a year of mono methyl aniline at the same time stating the construction time required. L.C. agrees to, the first plant of this kind being built as an addition to the Leuna Works.

C. Lead tetra-ethyl.

I.G. is asked to conduct negotiations as quickly as possible for a license for the production of lead tetra-ethyl. If at all possible an attempt should be made to obtain a general license permitting production of unlimited quantities.

No production plant available in Germany! Only if this is impossible should a license for a limited quantity be accepted, i.e. for the production of 1 ton per day. It is intended either to build this plant with a considerably greater potential capacity, and only to produce 360 tons a year for the time being, or alternatively to build one or two more plants and keep them operational.

(page 4 of original cont'd)

D. Methanol.

"extended" ?
converted !
The highest present output is approximately 25 to 30,000 tons a year (in the nitrogen branch of the Leuna Works and in Waldenburg). It would be possible without much difficulty to meet even larger demands by converting idle nitrogen plants. This would not take long (about 3 months). If all nitrogen plants which are at present idle were to be converted, an output potential of 300,000 tons a year would be available.

misunderstand-
ing ! ?
The Army Ordnance Office is asked to find out as quickly as possible to what extent such nitrogen plants are available for the production of methanol (have provided reply within 8 days). In the 4-Fall a proportion of the nitrogen plants would probably remain available for this purpose as nitrogen fertilizers would in that case presumably no longer be produced.

Though methanol possesses fewer heat units than ordinary propellants, its anti-knock quality - 110 to 120 octane - is very good (alcohol - 96 octane).

(page 5 of original)

I.G. is at present experimenting with the admixture of spirit to motor-fuels in the form of 85% ethyl alcohol and 15% methanol. Up to now this has led to no complaints and difficulties.

motor-cars
altogether,
partly air-
craft as
well
Considering the ease with which large quantities of methanol could be produced, it is of the utmost urgency that tests be carried out with the employment of methanol in the vehicles of the Army (Wehrmacht).

E. Isooctane (and Dodecane).

The manufacture of Isooctane is based on water gas, which hitherto had been produced from pit-coal coke and also, employing a newer technique, exclusively from lignite (if necessary, from lignite coke as well.) The new technique presents no difficulty. For the contacts zinc and chromium are required, which are, however, not subject to any appreciable consumption (1/10000 of the quantity of raw material processed).

The use of Iso-octane as propellant was hitherto prevented primarily on account of its production cost of RM 8.-- to RM 9.--. I.G. is now working on a process based on iso-butyl alcohol in which the experimental manufacturing costs are only to RM 2.-- to RM 3.--. In large-scale manufacture (from about 10,000 tons a year on) these production costs can probably be lowered to about 60 to 70 Pfennigs.

The construction costs of a plant for about 10,000 tons a year which would be added to the Leuna Works, where a considerable proportion of the equipment necessary for production is already available in the nitrogen section, are estimated at about 3 to 4,000,000.- RM, and the time of construction at about 4 to 5 months.

I.G. is asked as quickly as possible to submit a plan, including cost estimates and statement of the construction time needed, for a plant of 100,000 tons a year (as an independent plant, not attached to an already existing works).

In the production of Iso-octane approximately double the quantity of methanol is obtained as by-product. Here also, an investigation of its usefulness as fuel for civilian industrial purposes and vehicles of the army (Reichswehr) is of particular importance.

L.C. II is of the opinion that Iso-octane cannot be used as a fuel in gasoline engines but only in engines provided with fuel injection devices. Two BMW (Bayerische Motoren-Werke) IV engines with a fuel injection device are to be tested at BMW's in September 1934.

Laboratory experiments with Iso-octane are successfully being carried out at DLV (Deutsche Versuchsanstalt fuer Luftfahrt, German Aviation Research Bureau) and in the very near future tests will be made with it with one-cylinder engine.

(page 6 of original)

C.II sets the time for the development of an engine for Iso-octane at $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 years. C.II is to carry out this test as rapidly as possible.

The I.G. representative believes, contrary to the opinion held by C.II, that Iso-octane can also be employed in gasoline engines by means of an admixture of Hexene and Heptylene or similar chemicals. I.G. will submit suitable proposals and samples to C.II in the near future.

Dodecane is produced from the same raw materials as Iso-octane, could however at the same time be called a safety fuel on account of its high flash point. Its employment, however, requires that a tested engine with a fuel injection device be available.

Both substances are also said to possess perfect keeping qualities.
F. Lubricants.

The work on the synthetic production of high grade aero engine lubricants, as well as from German raw materials in general, has made very little progress as yet. The experiments have hardly gone beyond the laboratory stage.

(page 6 of original cont'd)

I.G., according to their own statements, have experimentally been using a lubricant in their own plants which is manufactured from about 70% machine oil and 30% synthetic oils. Paraffin is being used as a raw material in the production of synthetic oils.

Only insufficient quantities of paraffin are available in Germany. Even now, approximately 50% of the demand is imported. In the A-Fall the quantity of paraffin available will be insufficient as it is needed as the sole raw material for the manufacture of candles.

For the production of synthetic lubricants paraffin is the best and most promising raw material. I.G. believes that with a very precise hydration method, lubricants might be obtained from lignite, as paraffin is produced as by-product at the same time. The quantities which might be obtained through this cannot, however, be estimated as yet.

In these circumstances an improvement of the lubricants situation cannot be expected as a result of these experiments. On account of their extreme importance further tests must be carried out without delay.

(page 7 of original)

I.G. also hopes to be able to produce 70% of very good oils and about 30% of still fair quality oils from German mineral oil. These experiments, however, are still in their very earliest stage and one must on no account expect results from them for some time.

In the opinion of I.G. perhaps 100,000 tons of lubricants can be produced from the present German crude oil output of 300,000 tons a year (in the opinion of other experts only about 70,000 tons a year). Of this, however, only the comparatively small proportion of at most about 10 to 12,000 tons a year of high grade engine lubricants would be obtained. It is still very doubtful whether they would be at all suitable for aviation engines.

Experiments in the distillation of mineral oil can be speeded up and I.G. promises to supply within 4 to 6 weeks, possibly still earlier, a quantity of 50 litres of lubricants which had been obtained in this way.

Hey. 27 August 1934
(Heydenreich) (?)

Distribution list:

1st copy to
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3rd " "
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8th " "

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9088
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

9 September 1947

I, Arthur MACNAMARA, AGO No. 20 191, hereby certify that I am a duly appointed translator for the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-9088.

.....
Arthur MACNAMARA
AGO No. 20 191

35

file
R.L.M.

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT LUDWIGSHAFEN/RHEIN
Department for Nitrogen

Herrn Krauch

Confidential

TO:
Reich Air Ministry
Attention of Dipl. Ing. Muecklich,
Berlin W 8,
Behrenstrasse 68/70.

MC/Op.190

3 July 1935/Kl.

With reference to today's telephone conversation between you and the undersigned (signature on the right) we inform you that we have manufactured a sample quantity of the new lubricating oil which we are holding for you ready for dispatch. We can deliver to you 10 liters or more at once. It is also in our interest, in order to carry on with our work, that you test this oil soon.

With regard to your memorandum of 24 June 1935 we would like to inform you, as already mentioned by telephone that the price for Methanol was fixed at RM 0,25 per kilogram ex works and furthermore that it was assumed that the resultant quantities of Isohexane and Isoheptane as well as Isooctane were to be taken over at the same price.

Regarding the American price of RM 0,19 per liter for Isooctane we feel inclined to think that you based your calculations on the present rate of exchange of RM 2,50 to the dollar. That is of course correct if one considers the price from the buyer's point of view. It is, however, not correct if one makes the comparison according to producer's costs. After the devaluation of the dollar no in any way considerable

(page 2 of original)

change in production costs (raw materials, wages etc.) has taken place in America. If one converts these costs at the rate of RM 2,50 - 1 \$ the production costs show an apparent decrease of 40%. A correct comparison of production costs can therefore only be made if one works on the previous exchange rate of RM 4,20 - 1\$. In the case in question 1 liter of Isooctane would then not cost RM 0,19 but RM 0,32. We have already mentioned before that the original product Isobutylene is contained in the waste gas of the

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5931
CONTINUED

Copy

The Reich Air Minister

Berlin W 8, 27 June 1935.71
Behrenstr. 68/70

LC II 2 e
LC II No. 9351/35

Registered letter (Wertbrief)
Strictly confidential

To

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Department for oils,

Attention: Mr. KRASTEL,

BERLIN NW 7
Unter den Linden 78

Subject: Dr. MUELLER-CUNRADI

Enclosed please find record of conference in Ludwigshafen-Oppau
on 21 June 1935 with the request to forward it to Dr. MUELLER-CUNRADI.

It is pointed out particularly that this record should be treated
as strictly confidential.

On behalf of

signed: MUECKLICH

Enclosure

1 Record

LC II 2 c

Berlin, 24 June 1935 5

Strictly confidential 1

7 copies
7th copy

Record

Subject: Development of special fuels and lubricants by I.G.
Conference with I.G. on 21 June 1935 in Ludwigshafen-Oppau
followed by inspection of the experimental installations.

Present: Dr. MUELLER-CUNRADI, I.G.
Dr. HAGEMANN, Army Ordnance Branch (No PrMf 6)
Dipl.Ing. MUECKLICH, Reich Air Ministry (LC II 2 c)

I. Iso-Octane production (Op.105/3).

The experimental installation for the production of 1000 liters of Iso-Octane per day was started at the end of May 1935 as planned and is working satisfactorily. On the basis of experience gained in the works up to now the I.G. will probably be able to dispense with further stages of development and be able to submit exact proposals to the Reich Air Ministry for the large installation planned at Waldenburg by 10 July 1935.

According to non-obligatory information from the I.G. a price of RM. 0,60 to 0,70 per liter of iso-Octane is to be expected for the time being, if a price of RM. 0,25 per liter for the resultant Methanol can be obtained. Under more favorable production conditions in America a price of RM. 0,19 per liter of iso-Octane is quoted. The I.G. will make every effort to make the process more economical.

The experimental installation will shortly be able to increase production to 2000 liters per day and is accumulating stocks in order to have sufficient quantities available for the tests of the Reich Air Ministry. (Up to now 10 cubic meters in stock).

The tests of the I.G. and the Army Ordnance Branch concerning the use of the Methanol for automobile motors which is produced in the proportion of $2\frac{1}{2}$ to one had favorable results. Apart from mixing with normal automobile fuel (up to 10%) the use of pure Methanol is being tried out which, according to information from the I.G., can be carried out without much difficulty by using an additional device for the carburettor (partial combustion through sparking plug).

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

In a conference planned for 10 July 1935 between the Reich Air Ministry and I.G. the decisions of the Reich Air Ministry are to be facilitated by giving the following particulars:

- 1) I.G. makes known its proposals in regard to large-scale production of Octane in Waldenburg.
- 2) I.G. reports on its experiments about the utilization of Methanol.
- 3) Army Ordnance Branch (Wa Pruef.6) states in connection with the Military Economic Office (Wehrwirtschaftsst) to what extent Methanol can be taken over for use in motor vehicles.

On the basis of this information the Reich Air Ministry will decide in what quantities production of iso-Octane will be considered for their purposes.

(page 2 of original)

II. Development of lubricants.

The I.G. is engaged in the development of

- 1) Lubricant auxiliaries (Opanol)
- 2) Refining process (with selective solvents)
- 3) Pure synthetic lubricants (from Olefin gases)

The I.G. provides an experimental installation at Oppau which will be ready to operate by the end of August 1935 in order to be able to test all possibilities.

In order to meet the special demands of lubricating aeroplane motors, it is desirable that the I.G. should again take up the relevant work in the fields of the Voltol process and pressure hydrogenation. Rejection of these processes due to the fact that they are uneconomical cannot be a primary consideration for the purposes of the Reich Air Ministry if production of extremely high-quality materials for a limited sphere of utilization can be achieved with their help.

The I.G. will comply with this suggestion by submitting definite proposals as soon as possible.

The Reich Air Ministry agrees to carry out motor tests on experimental oils in its own experimental stations until the I.G. has set up its own installations suitable for carrying out such tests. Lubricants made from German mineral oil (Baden, Nienhagen) and purely synthetic ones will be made available by the I.G. as early as July 1935.

Particularly promising seems the synthesis from Olefin-gases which has produced oils with excellent qualities by laboratory methods and utilizes Leuna waste gas.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5931
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

III. Regulating the collaboration between the Reich Air Ministry and I.G.

The wishes of the Reich Air Ministry relating to developmental work will in future be conveyed to the I.G. orders to carry out developmental work for reasons of expediency, in order to obtain clarification of obligations on both sides.

The I.G. will comply with this proposal by submitting tenders for developmental work to the Reich Air Ministry as soon as possible.

IV. Ensuring secrecy of developmental work.

The I.G. is bound by contract to an extensive exchange of experience with Standard. This position seems untenable as far as developmental work which is being carried out for the Reich Air Ministry is concerned.

Therefore the Reich Air Ministry will soon conduct an extensive examination of applications for patents of the I.G.

Furthermore, the I.G. will suggest the necessary security measures to the Reich Air Ministry under special consideration of the situation.

Signed: MUECKLICH

25 June.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

22 May 1947

I, Arthur MACMERA, Civ. No. 20191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-5931.

Arthur MACMERA
Civ. No. 20191

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7208
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Stamp: SECRET !

1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

Stamp: Received
14 July 1939

S
819
Check mark

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W

BERLIN NW 7, 12 July 1939
Unter den Linden 82

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft

Dir. Dept. T, Attention: Herr Dr. MOLL
" " Attention: Herr Dir. Dr. Kraenzlein
" " Attention: Herr Dir. Dr. Haberland
" " Attention: Herr Dr. Warnecke
Vermittlungsstelle T, Sparte III, Department A
Attn: Herr Dr. Meyer

Ludwigshafen
Hoechst
Verdingen
Leverkusen

Wofi

Ammoniakwerke Merseburg GmbH
Dir. Dept.

Leunawerke

Subject: Supply of the Armament Industry with Fuel in "Mob-Fall".

We have received for some of our plants the letter quoted below, dated 5th of this month, from the High Command of the Army, Wa J Rue 9 VII. Since this matter is of general interest, we are bringing it to your notice, with the request kindly to inform the offices commissioned with the planning and the building of new plants, especially for those plants important to the war economy.

The following principles will be applicable to mob-preparations in regard to built-in armament industry plants, operated with liquid fuels:

Built-in plants which are operated with liquid fuels are as far as possible to be converted for operation with gas or solid fuels, plants operated with fuel oil are to be converted for other fuels. The necessary measures have to be taken already in peace time.

Industry cannot rely with certainty on the allotment of Diesel fuel to built-in plants and of fuel oil in war time.

(page 2 of original)

In this connection attention is drawn to Regulation No. 19 of the Control Office for Mineral Oil (Ueberwachungsstelle fuer Mineraloel), according to which the use of mineral oil for firing purposes is only permissible with approval of the Control Office for Mineral Oil.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7208
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

It is requested that the following questions be answered concerning plants owned by the firms and those set up by Reich money, whether they be plants in operation or completed ones, or plants which are at present in the course of being built; bearing in mind that for each plant the information is to be given individually:

- 1) Name of the works in which there are built-in plants driven by liquid fuels or for which such plants have been planned.
- 2) Purpose for which used.
- 3) Indication of their capacity.
- 4) Type and quantity of the fuel necessary.
- 5) Information as to how far it is possible to convert these built-in plants, requiring liquid fuel and fuel oil, for other types of drive or firing.
- 6) Indicate reasons if conversion is impossible because of operating conditions.

Your attention is called to the fact that in so far as it is at all possible, new plants are to be designed for other than liquid fuel and fuel oil.

Due to the urgency of the matter it is requested that this letter be answered not later than 20 July."

VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W
Signature: WAGNER

- / I.G., Dir. Office, Sparte I, Oppau
- / I.G., Office of the Technical Committee, Frankfurt o/Main
- / I.G., Technical Central Office (Technische Zentrale), Hoochst

Stamp: REGISTERED!

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

30 July 1947

I, Victoria ORTON, No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7208.

Victoria ORTON
No. 20129

Document No. NI-8326

A F F I D A V I T

I, Dr. Ernst STRUSS, Director of I. G. Farben, chief of the Office of the Technical Committee of the I.G., Secretary of the Technical Committee of the Vorstand of the I.G., chief of Sparte II of the Vermittlungestelle W, and since 1943 production chief of the whole German dyestuffs industry within the Economic Group for Chemical Industry, having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for a false statement, hereby declare under oath voluntarily and without coercion:

The reports made in the document marked NI-306 were made by my former employee, Mr. Holmuth ROHDEMANN, in 1945. ROHDEMANN collaborated closely with me in this compilation and I have continually supervised the progress of his work. The content of Document NI-306 and the history of its origin are therefore known to me to the fullest extent, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it corresponds in all details to the whole truth. I have carefully checked document NI-306 which was submitted to me. This document, together with this affidavit, forms a single document and is herewith declared part of this affidavit. In appending my signature to this affidavit I, at the same time, have signed each of the eleven pages of this document NI-306.

I have carefully read through each of the eleven pages of Document NI-306 as well as this page of my affidavit and personally marked them, have made the necessary corrections in my own hand, and marked them with my initials and declare herewith under oath that I have to the best of my knowledge and belief spoken the absolute truth in this declaration.

(signed) Dr. ERNST A. STRUSS
/t/ Dr. Ernst Struss

Sworn and signed before me this 30 day of May 1947 at Frankfurt Main by Dr. Ernst Struss known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signed) OTTO HEILBRUNN
/t/ Dr. Otto Heilbrunn
Civilian, ETO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

Discussions about Buna with government offices

Detailed version August 1945 for Mr. Weissbrodt
Extract from original file

1933. In reply to personal query by a representative of the Army Ordnance Office (Heereswaffenamt) to Dr. Mueller-Gunradi, followed:

15 Aug. Letter Ludwigshafen (Mueller-Gunradi) to Heereswaffenamt HWA (Army Ordnance Office) Berlin-Charlottenburg.

Information on the work of I.G. Farben in the field of synthetic rubber 1910 to 1914 and after 1918.
Present situation of work and readiness of I.G. for again taking up the production of synthetic rubber on a large scale with the support of the Reich Government and with the collaboration of an efficient rubber factory (Production of 1000-2000 tires which are to be tested on vehicles of government authorities).

1934

6 Jul. Exposé Leverkusen (Dr. Konrad) to HWA (General Liese).

Information about the work in the field of synthetic rubber.

- I. Methylenerubber (1910-1918)
- II. Butadienerubber (from 1926 on)
- III. Mixed polymerisates.
- IV. Oil and gasoline-proof rubber
- V. Duprene (U.S.A.)
- VI. Present state of work.
- VII. Program of experiments for the near future.

11 Jul. Conference report (Dr. Konrad Leverkusen) on meeting in HWA (Major Philip, Dr. Hagemann) later on in presence of Dr. Weber and Dr. Naumann, Conti.

I. Without representative of Conti

Present state of work

- a) Butadieno-Basis (Buna)
- b) " Mixed polymerisates
- c) " - alloyed with softeners.

Mass production of 5,000 tons a year (time for construction 1 year) can only begin after the tire experiments. Duprene (license negotiations I.G./Dupont).

(Page 2 of original)

1934 II. Together with representatives of Conti:

A greater production of tires will only be possible after the conclusion of the tests with the individual experimental tires. The production of solid rubber tires has to be examined. Conference about general economic expectations for synthetic rubber.

45

- 24 Report on conference (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) with the Reich
Jul. Plenipotentiary for Rubber. Herr Harnesfahr of Hamburg, in
Leverkusen.

Conference about development and state of work in the field of synthetic rubber of I.G.
Extension of the experimental installations from 10 to 25-50 tons of butadiene per month.
Harnesfahr refers to the special urgency of the rubber problem.
Present yearly consumption: about 70,000 tons, of which 60 % is for tires (soon: about 80 %). He emphasizes that the project must not fail on account of the financial question.

General discussion about the difficulties of the process. Superiority of synthetic material over natural rubber, part replacement of the cotton by Vistra. Extension of the production experiments to other purely German rubber factories apart from Conti. Examination of the question of replacing rubber by synthetic materials of I.G. in order to reduce rubber consumption. Conference about Duprene and possible taking-over of this process by I.G. Discussion of the price question for synthetic rubber.

Miscellaneous

Buna: Replacement of the American product by I.G. products.
Trinidad asphalt: Examination of production possibilities by I.G.
Information on German sulphur production.
Regeneration: Extension of the existing regeneration plants with the collaboration of I.G.; improvement of the processes.
Information on the raw rubber requirements of I.G.

- 7 Conference report (Dr. Struss Frankfurt/M.) on Conference in Control
Nov. office for Rubber and Asbestos, held on 31 October with Herr
Harnesfahr.

Also present: The economic Plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer: Koppler
Army Ordnance Office: Marock, of Reich Economic
Ministry, the Firm Metzeler, Munich and I.G.

(Page 3 of original)

1934 (Cont'd)

Report about use of Buna in the tire industry. Harnesfahr draws attention to the very special urgency; I.G. to examine construction of a plant for 1000 ton per month. After thorough discussion, I.G.'s suggestion for a plant for 200 ton per month is accepted. Slight price increase for the tires is bearable if durability is also increased.

- 7 Conference report (Dr. Struss Frankfurt/M) on conference in
Nov. Control office for rubber and Asbestos, held on 31 October with
Herr Harnesfahr.

Discussion on our possible agreement with Dupont, re: Duprene.
Discussion of the plant with a monthly capacity 200 tons, which can go into production in late 1935 at the earliest. The financial question will be finally settled later on.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8326 and
NI-306 (Cont'd)

Document No. NI-306 (Cont'd)

- 8 Report Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen, about the visit of the Reich
Nov. Plenipotentiary for Rubber, Herrn Harnesfahr, to Leverkusen.

Inspection of the existing installations for the production of synthetic rubber and general non-obligatory discussions on the future development of the field.

- 22 Report Dr. Ebert, Ludwigshafen, on the visit of the Reich
Nov. Plenipotentiary for Rubber, Herr Harnesfahr on 20 Nov. in Ludwigshafen.

General discussion on release of rubber experiment material for other purposes than tires.
Question of financing a large-scale plant.
Easing of the rubber situation through synthetic products of I.G.
I.G. to speed up submission of detailed information and suggestions for large-scale plant.

- 1 Conference report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/M) on a conference in HWA
Dec. (Army Ordnance Office) on 29 Nov. with State Secretary, Dr. Posso.

General orientation on the situation in the field of synthetic rubber.

- 1 Conference report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/M) on a conference in HWA
Dec. on 30 Nov. with General Lieso.

Same discussions as in conference with HWA of 29 November.

- 17 Conference report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/M.) on a conference with
Dec. the Plenipotentiary for Economic Problems, of the Fuehrer Koppler, hold in Berlin on 10 Dec. in the presence of Herr Harnesfahr.

(Page 4 of original)

1934 (Cont'd)

General discussion of the technical execution of the process for making carbide via Butylene/glykol.
Planning of a large-scale plant, when experiments in Lu (Ludwigshafen) and Le (Leverkusen) have been concluded.
Detailed discussion of the price question for synthetic rubber.

1935

- 7 Report (Dr. Ebert, Ludwigshafen) on the visit of Herr Harnesfahr
Jan. in Ludwigshafen on 5 November.

Discussions on I.G.'s various experiments for the promotion of the synthetic rubber problem.

- 10 Report (Dr. Ludwig, Leverkusen) on the visit of Dr. Hagemann to
Jan. HWA, Leverkusen.

State of the rubber work in Leverkusen.
General Lieso to ask the tire plants to speed up their production in order to get a decision about the fitness for use of synthetic rubber.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8326 and
NI-306 (Cont'd)

Document No. 206 (Cont'd)

20 Conference report on Meeting (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) in HWA
Feb. in the morning with Major Philipp and Dr. Hagenann.

Establishment of tire test program. General survey of I.G. work and experimental expenses in the field of rubber. Discussions about questions of location for a rubber factory.

In the afternoon: With Dr. Hagenann and Dr. Ing. Kracht, of HWA as well as representatives of Conti.

Establishment of a further tire test program for production.

22 Conference report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/M) in HWA of 20 February.
Feb.

Army requests direction in the rubber question. Total peacetime requirements of the Army about 150-250 tons per month.

22 Conference report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/M) on meeting with
Feb. Herr Koppler on 20 February in presence of Herr Hambsfahr, as well as representatives of HWA, Conti and on the firm Metzeler.

Discussion about the work of the tire manufacturers. Further conferences about large scale production of synthetic rubber will be held in early March.

(Page 5 of original)

1935 (Cont'd)

18 Conference report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/M) on a meeting with
Mar. Herrn Koppler on 14 March.

Dr. ter Meer explains the present state of work. The main point for the measures to be taken lies with the producing industry, which regularly has to supply the experimental plants with large quantities of rubber. Discussion about the price for synthetic rubber and cost of large scale plant for producing 2500 tons a year.

29 Conference report (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) on the visit of
Mar. Dr. Hagenann and Dr. Exner of HWA in Leverkusen.

General discussion on road tests with tires of both natural and synthetic rubber.

2 Conference report (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) on a meeting in HWA
May with Dr. Hagenann and Dr. Exner

Discussion about the Armed Forces total requirements for synthetic rubber. Start of special test work especially for the Armed Forces.

7. Sept.
13 Correspondence of the Fuehrer's Plenipotentiary for Economic
Aug. Problems, Keppler, with Dr. ter Meer, re: Conference to be held in September about the present state as regards synthetic rubber.

- 20 Conference report (Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt/M) on a meeting in the
Sep. Reich Chancellery with Herrn. Keppler and Fleiger.

State of rubber production.

The construction of the large-scale plant to be speeded up,
Conference about further procedure in the question of mass
production.

Possible sales guarantee by the Armed Forces at fixed prices.
Discussion about conference with Dupont about licenses for
German patents concerning Monovinylacetylene and Chloroprene.

- 23 Conference report (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) on visit of
Oct. Lt. Col. Philipps, Dr. Hagenann, Dr. Exner of HWA, Leverkusen.

Inspection of production and testing installations for synthetic
rubber.

(Page 6 of original)

1935 (Cont'd)

General discussion about disposal of increased future buna
production (requirements of Armed Forces not 150-250 ton per
month as previously stated, but about 50 ton per month).
Discussion of location of the rubber factory.

- 12 Correspondence of the Plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer for Economic
15 questions Keppler and Dr. Struss re: construction of a large-scale
19 plant for manufacture of synthetic rubber. Questions on
Nov. financing. Sales guarantee. Price guarantee. Questions of
location.
- 30 Expose of HWA (Dr. Hagenann) on state of the tests with synthetic
Nov. rubber for use in army material and suggestions for the distrib-
ution of the planned production.

1936

- 21 Letters (Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt/M) to the Fuehrer's Pleni-
Jan. potentiary for Economic Problems, Keppler, Berlin.
- 4
Feb. Draft for a contract between the Reich Economic Ministry and
I.G. concerning the construction of a plant with a capacity of
200 ton of synthetic rubber per month.
- 13 Conference report (Dr. Dehn-Rothfelsen; Leuna) on a meeting in
Feb. the Reich Economic Ministry, Gdh. Rat. Kuegler.

General discussion about the development of the Buna production
up to date with respect to the "Project Schkopau".

1936 (Cont'd)

25./27 Feb. Correspondence of the Fuehrer's Plenipotentiary for Economic problems, Keppler, Berlin and Dr. Struss, concerning the draft for a contract and further promotion of the preliminary work.

5 June Conference report (Dr. von Bruening, Berlin) on a meeting in the Reich Economic Ministry with Geh.Rat.Kuegler and other officials.

Report on the latest stand of the production of synthetic rubber.

Utmost speeding up of the further development and avoidance of useless investigations.

17 June Conference report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/AM) on a conference of the Staff for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange, under the chairmanship of Dr. Krauch, with officials of Reich War Ministry, HWA and Keppler Bureau.

Conference about possible extension of the Buna Factory Schkopau, which is under construction, from a capacity of 800 to 1000 tons a month.

(Page 7 of original)

1936

16./29 June., 1./2./10 July. Correspondence between Staff for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange (Lt.Col.Loeb) and I.G., concerning the extension of the Buna Factory Schkopau to a capacity of 1000 tons a month and the possible construction of a second plant for 1000 tons a month.

28 July Conference report (Dr. Hasenclover, Frankfurt/AM) on a meeting with Dr. Hagemann of HWA, Berlin, 22 July.

General discussion concerning the second plant for producing 1000 tons of Buna per month.

Report Dr. ter Meer on negotiations with Dupont.

Report Dr. Hagemann about market possibilities for the extended Buna production.

31 July, 4 Aug. Correspondence between the Fuehrer's Plenipotentiary for Economic Problems, Keppler and the Finance Ministry and I.G. Farben concerning the draft of a contract for the Schkopau Buna factory for producing 1000 tons per month.

29 Sept., 2 June, 13 Oct. Correspondence between the Fuehrer's for Plenipotentiary Economic Problems, Keppler and Dr. ter Meer, re.: the extension of the Schkopau Buna plant to 2000 tons per month and the problems connected with this.

13 Oct. File note Dr. Struss on a phone call with Staff for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange concerning the prospective Buna production 1937-1939.

5 Nov. Letter: Office for German Raw & Synthetic Material (Lt.Col. Loeb) to I.G. concerning the dispatch of the draft contracts for the Schkopau Buna production of 2000 tons per month.

Document No. NI-306 (Cont'd)

1936(Cont'd)

- 23 Nov. Letter (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/M) to Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials (Dr. Eckell).
- Transmission of contract principles for the construction of a Buna factory.
Financing suggestions.
(Reference conference with Dr. Eckell of 19 Nov., of which handwritten notes of Dr. Struss are available).
- 7 Dec. Note Dr. Struss re: telephone call of Dr. Eckell re immediate construction of a second Buna factory for 1000 tons per month.
- 7 Dec. File note (Dr. Buhl) about a conference with Dr. Eckell in Berlin on 4 Dec.
- Discussion of the contract principles (without mention of the financial questions) for the construction of a Buna plant.
- (Page 8 of original)
- 9 Dec. Letter (Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt/M) to Dr. Eckell, Office for German Raw & Synthetic Materials, Berlin.
- Confirmation of the telephone conversation re various technical details re the Buna plant Schkopau.
Willingness of I.G. to collaborate in the construction and management of Buna plant II.
- 9 Dec. Conference report (Dr. Frenzel, Frankfurt/M) about a meeting in the Reich Finance Ministry with officials of the Reich Finance Ministry and the Reich Economic Ministry, under consultation of Dr. Eckell of Office for Raw Materials.
- Detailed conference re: easing of and release from taxation for the Buna GmbH, Schkopau, which will be established.
- 17 Dec. Letter (Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt/M) to Dr. Eckell, Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials, Berlin.
- Transmission of the draft contracts (directives for the settlement of accounts) omitting the agreements which have to be made for the financing.
- 17 Dec. Letter (Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt/M) to Dr. Eckell, Office for German Raw and synthetic materials, Berlin.
- Handing over an expose re the financing of Buna plants according to the meeting in the Reich Economic Ministry on 16 Dec. (Handwritten notes of Dr. Struss are available about this meeting).
- 22 Dec. Letter (Dr. ter Meer, Frankfurt/M) to Dr. Eckell, Office for German Raw & Synthetic Materials, Berlin.
- Request for detailed information from the Commissioner for Price Control about the construction costs and the production price of the types of Buna, to be produced in the 2000-ton-plant at Schkopau.

Document No. NI-306 (Cont'd)

1936(Cont'd)

31 Dec. Letter (Dr. Ambros, Ludwigshafen) to Dr. Eckell, Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials, Berlin.

Question of location of Buna plant II.

(Page 9 of original)

1937

5 Jan. Letter: Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials, Berlin to I.G. (Dr. ter Meer).

Increase of Buna output to 3000 tons per month by January 1948 (2000 in Schkopau and 1000 as the first development phase in Fuerstenberg).

7 Jan. File note (Dr. Konrad, Leverkusen) on a conference in the Office for German Raw & Synthetic Materials of 22.12.36 in the presence of Representatives of the German tire industry.

General discussion about the exclusive utilization of Buna S instead of Buna N for tire production.

14 Jan. File note (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/a.) on a conference in the Office for German Raw & Synthetic Materials, Berlin.

State of Buna plant I and II.

Start of production of the 200 tons per month installation on 1 March and increase up to 2000 tons per month by about the beginning of 1938.

Discussion of the location question for Buna plant II (project Zweckel).

21 Jan. Letter of Reich Finance Minister to I.G. re: release from taxation and easing of taxation for Buna GmbH.

29 Jan. and 6 Feb. Correspondence between Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials and I.G., re: Buna contract.

12 Feb. Conference report (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/a.) about the meeting in the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials of 11 Feb. in the presence of representatives of Conti.

Rejection of the request made by Conti in the name of the entire German rubber industry for I.G. to roll and soften Buna (Vormastizierung).

17 Feb. Expose Dr. ter Meer about basic points for the establishment of the Schkopau works and for the Buna contract (10 copies were sent to the Office for German Raw & Synthetic Materials on 19 Feb.)

23 Feb. and 3.3. Correspondence with Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials concerning terms of payment of the Reich for the loan for the construction of Buna plant Schkopau.

23 Feb. and 25.2. Letter I.G. to Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials.

Transmission of the Buna draft contracts and information on the cost of the Buna experiments 1928-1936.

(Page 10 of original)

1937 (Cont'd)

4., 19., 22., 30 March and 14 April Correspondence of Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials with I.G., concerning Buna plant Schkopau.

Inspection of the plant, questions of power supply, raw materials, housing.

13., 20., 23 April -- 7., 13., 15., 18., 24., 29 May -- 5., 18 June -- 5., 7., 9., 16 July -- 10., 16., 20 August -- 20., 25 September -- 15., 29 November

Correspondence Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials-I.G.

29.4 2 File notes (Dr. Struss, Frankfurt/M) about conference in Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials.

10., 17., 25., 26., 31 Aug. Correspondence: Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials-I.G. and various other firms.

Supply of raw material and terms for the construction of Buna plant Schkopau.

13. and 22 Sept. -- 1, 9, 11 and 21 Dec. Correspondence Reich Commissioner for Price Establishment, the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials and I.G.

1938.

4 Jan and 10 March. Buna contract with the Reich

24 Jan. Report (Dr. Albers, Frankfurt/M) on a conference with the Control Office for Rubber in Berlin.

General questions of sale, allocation of Buna, consumption of I.G. itself, waste material.

(Page 11 of original)

1938.

2 Feb. Price establishment for Buna.

Correspondence Reich Commissioner for Price Establishment, the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials and I.G.

Frankfurt/M.,
11 April 1947.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEJSKI, ETO #34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Documents No. 8326 and NI-306.

DOROTHEA L. GALEJSKI,
ETO #34079.

END

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The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
The General Plenipotentiary for Special Questions of
Chemical Production

Dr. BERNHARD KUNIKER

The Development of the Increased Production of Light
Metals
in the
Four Year Plan
with special reference to the time
of Greater German's War for Liberation from 1939 onwards.

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Dedicated
in grateful devotion
to the General Plenipotentiary

Herr Professor Dr. C. KRAUSE

on the occasion of the awarding
of the Ritterkreuz to the Kriegsvordienstkreuz.

Berlin, 5 June 1943.

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P r e f a c e

As the "Military Economy Production Plan" drawn up by the General Plenipotentiary for Chemistry in the course of the Four Year Plan is now approaching completion as far as the main features of the Light Metals Sector is concerned, the desire for a compilation which sets out the various stages in chronological order and serves as a guide through the voluminous files, thus enabling an overall survey to be made later on, appears to be justified.

When dealing with the expansion of an industry, which has been in existence for some time, its historical development, especially during the last world war, is of particular significance.

In an introduction of any length the history of its development should in each instance precede the individual metals if the history of its expansion is to be coherent.

Even at an early stage, the desire to make use of the experiences resulting from this earlier development was an impetus for making comparative studies, either for individual cases or for comprehensive lectures, which could be referred to for this work. It was therefore possible to take these separate reports and compile the present overall survey without prejudice to current work important for the war effort. It is not claimed that this is complete, for a more thorough treatment of the matter, however desirable it may be, must not stand in the way of the urgent tasks connected with the war. And again it is the war, which dictates that this work should appear in the simplest form.

It is intended to produce in a similar form on account of the research work conducted in the field of light metals within the framework of the Four Year Plan

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and of the problems resulting from the present state of technical knowledge and its development, thus using the research work carried out under the Four Year Plan as a contribution to a new German technology of light metal production.

Berlin, 1945.

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2. The Growth of the Aluminium Industry
during the World War 1914 - 1918.

At the beginning of the World War Germany was in a very unfavorable position as regards her war potential for the raw material aluminum. This was approximately as follows:

Aluminum capacity of the Central Powers
including Switzerland appr. 15,000 tons per year

Aluminum capacity of Allies
including USA and Canada appr. 70,000 tons per year

In July and October 1915, because of their developmental work accomplished since 1905, the firms Chemische Fabrik Griesheim-Elektron and Metallbank-Frankfurt/Main were commissioned by the German Reich to set up three aluminum plants which were to commence production within six months. Already on 6 December 1915 an electrolytic aluminum plant for 3,600 tons per year, which was run with current from the Berlin power plants, could be put into operation in Rummelsburg near Berlin. This was followed in January 1916 by the plant in Horren near Cologne for 2,400 tons per year, and during the second quarter of the same year one more aluminum smelting plant for 3,000 tons per year was able to start operation in Bitterfeld.

After these plants had been completed, the following amounts of aluminum were available per year:

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<u>Inland production:</u> Rheinfelden (water)	700 tons per year
Rummelsburg (steam)	3,600 tons per year
Horrem (steam)	2,400 tons per year
Bitterfeld (steam)	3,000 tons per year

Total approximately	10,000 tons per year

In this connection right from the start Rummelsburg had only been conceived as war plant; the current cost 5,6 Pfennigs per kw per hour and the

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transformers had been borrowed from the city of Berlin for the duration of the war.

The extremely difficult situation as regards Germany's copper supply caused the War Raw Material Department of the War Ministry 1) to search for means to substitute copper by other metals.

Prior to the World War, Germany used approximately 300,000 tons of copper per year, of which 90 % was imported from abroad, 80 % coming from the USA. The allied powers considered just this copper shortage to be a clear indication of Germany's weakness and endeavored to prevent the copper supply. Even after the Serbian copper mine of Bor was taken over, imports from the Balkans did not even make up for the quantities which were delivered by Germany to the Balkan in form of war material. Until about 1915 only part of the requirements could be covered by the substituting of copper, iron, tinned and zinced, zinc and lead were used as substitutes. Supplies of other metals were limited, and even aluminum was among the metals which had to be saved. Soon after the outbreak of war the technical side of the Army Administration began experiments on the use of the aforementioned substitutes. It was not until 1916 that any real results were shown. The saving was estimated to be 15 % to 20 % of the original quantity of copper used.

Compare Memorandum of the War Ministry, War Raw Material Department, No. 107/16 Secret MRA of March 1916.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT NY-7592
CONTINUED

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As the measures to substitute copper by iron, zinc and lead were only partly successful, from now on special attention was devoted to the substitution by aluminum. Aluminum hitherto was considered one of the rarest metals. Proof of this is the fact that shortly after the outbreak of the World War it was prohibited to make cooking utensils, field flasks and beakers for the troops from aluminum, and a large quantity of finished aluminum utensils was withdrawn.

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First of all, the memorandum of the War Ministry brings the question up for discussion, as to how far aluminum can be used as a substitute. In this connection copper and aluminum or brass and magnalium (Al Mg-alloy) are compared. This comparison shows that aluminum as regards its processing qualities and strength, as well as its electric qualities, constitutes from a technical aspect a promising substitute for copper. The production of shell cases, detonators and possibly of projectile bands, is given as a use to which it can be put in war time. Furthermore, fittings for vehicles and ships, telephone and telegraph cables, electric high tension cables, apparatuses and machinery of every sort, tanks and containers for chemical plants are mentioned. It is estimated that approximately 90,000 tons of copper per year could be substituted by aluminum, which would correspond to an aluminum requirement of approximately 36,000 tons per year. The total consumption during war is estimated at 46,000 tons per year, in peace time estimated in the same way, approximately 75,000 tons per year.

Secondly the question is put as to whether plants can be set up within the shortest possible time, and independently of foreign countries, to produce sufficient aluminum to meet requirements, without the price of the product exceeding the permissible limit. Before the World War bauxite was almost exclusively obtained in Southern France; however, this supply was interrupted at the beginning of the war, and new sources had to be found. Several bauxite mines had been opened in June 1915 in Eastern Hungary and in

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT MI-7562
CONTINUED

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the surroundings of Fiume and, owing to the active support of the Austrian-Hungarian Army Administration, already in 1916 those were supplying approximately 20,000 tons per month of a sufficiently good bauxite. While the world war lasted these sources offered sufficient

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security for the setting-up of an aluminum industry. Apart from that, the memorandum already deals with the use of clay for the production of aluminum; several important firms in Germany had already declared themselves willing to establish plants for the production of alumina from domestic clay. The memorandum also mentions the question of securing the necessary electric power. Approximately half the power necessary was to be supplied by hydraulic power, the other half by warm current produced by hard coal. Including the coal requirements for the alumina itself, it was calculated that 2 million tons of hard coal per year - that is 3 million tons of soft coal per year - would be required, and as one per cent of the yearly hard coal production would cover this, it was not expected that there would be any difficulties.

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The Memorandum did not fall short in the attainment of its object. In September 1916, the Reich founded the Aluminium-Industrie und Elektrizitätsfabrik Luftwerk A.G. Großenhain as a mutually-economic undertaking, in conjunction with the firm Gebr. GIEBEL G.m.b.H., which already before the war was running an important alumina factory in Ludwigschafen, and the Rheinisch-Westfälische Elektrizitätsgesellschaft A.G. (Stinnes), Essen. Gebr. GIEBEL took over the alumina supply and the Rheinisch-Westfälische Elektrizitätsgesellschaft A.G. the electricity supply. The Luftwerk took up production in December 1917 at 12,000 tons a year. On 31 April 1917, the Vereinigte Aluminium-Werke A.G. was founded, in conjunction with the Reichsregierung and with the participation of Griesheim and the Metal Bank, and it built the Lautawerk as principal aluminium foundry and alumina factory, where the electric energy was produced on a lignite basis in its own central power stations. The works were finished within one year, under the direction of Dr. W. RISTLER, Griesheim, and in October 1918 was able to take up the production of 12,000 tons a year.

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3. The Growth of the Aluminium Industry after the World War until the Assumption of Power (Machtuebernahme) 1918 - 1932.

For some time after the World War, the capacity of the German Aluminium foundries exceeded the demand. This resulted in the less productive foundries, Runkelsburg with 3,600 tons a year and Herborn with 2,400 tons a year, being again closed down. On the other hand, a new aluminium construction project had been planned during the World War, on the basis of water power, and for this purpose the Innwerk A.G. was founded, with the participation of the Reich and in conjunction with the Bavarian Government, A.S.G., S.S.W., and Gebr. GIEBEL. As a works on the basis of water power appeared to offer profitable prospects, the building was continued in spite of the falling market. During the stresses of the revolution and the inflation, the completion of the work was delayed and the waterpower works were not finished until July, 1924, and the aluminium industry until 1925, with a yearly capacity of 11,000 tons. After a temporary boom, however, the foundries could only be put into partial operation.

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During the period under review, a considerable reorganization occurred in the German aluminum industry. In March 1923 a holding company under the name of "Ver einigte Industrie-Unternehmen A.G. (V.I.U.)" was created as a link between the companies still working in the form of private enterprises and the Reich as owner. The firms of Giulini, A.G., Siemens and A.G. left the IAWerk A.G. and the Luftwerk respectively, after having been compensated for the development work carried out by them. These developments led to various differences between the Giulini and the Reich, which were only settled after having been taken before the International Court of Arbitration at the Hague. After the reorganization, there remained in existence in Germany

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as producers of aluminum only VAW and Aluminiumwerk G.m.b.H., besides the foundry Rheinelden belonging to the A.I.A.G.

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4. The development of the Aluminum Industry after the assumption of power up to the beginning of the four-year Plan 1933 - 1935.

After the assumption of power, there began in the German Reich an economic revival in all fields. This increase of economic strength could only be maintained permanently by a free people. In order to achieve and to safeguard their freedom, the Fuehrer, after many repeated proposals for disarmament, gave orders for German rearmament and the building of a new Luftwaffe. A modern Luftwaffe needs aluminum. The first step must therefore be the restoration to full height of the aluminum production, which during the depression period had dropped to approximately half-, and, over and above this, to increase its capacity. The charge of the extension of the aluminum industry was at that time in the hands of Raw-Materials Commissioner (Rohstoff-Kommissar) FUEHRER, the Reich Ministry of Economy and the Raw Material and Foreign Exchange Staff (Rohstoff- und Devisenstab) in the Reich Air Ministry. Detailed data from this period are not available.

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The capacity developed during this short time as follows: -

Firm	Location	Capacity 1932	in yearly tons end of 1935
Aluminiumwerk G.m.b.H.	Bitterfeld	8,400	17,000
VAW	Leutewerk	12,000	32,000
VAW	Teeging	11,000	10,000
VAW	Leutewerk	12,000	24,000
A.I.A.G.	Reinfelden	700	14,000
A.I.A.G.	Leut.	2,600	2,600
	Total	46,700	99,600

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MAGNESIUM

1. The Development of the Magnesium-Industry up to the
World War : 1835 - 1913.

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In 1836, the Chemische Fabrik Grischheim-Elektron started the technical production of magnesium by electrolysis. By the leasing of Bitterfeld-Werke, the former Rothemann'sche Werke, the magnesium-electrolysis works there also came, in 1900, into the hands of Grischheim-Elektron.

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The process of production consisted in first draining Cornallit in boilers, as is done in caustic soda smelting furnaces and then subjecting it in long forged-iron containers to the molten electrolysis. This produced magnesium and chlorine. Potassium remained as solid residue and was removed by

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cutting out. The capacity of the plant was about 40 tons a year. It was enlarged in 1905 to about 80 tons a year, in order to satisfy the Russian export requirements necessitated by the Russo-Japanese War. After the end of the Russo-Japanese War, the magnesium production plants were for the most part closed down.

The magnesium produced was used almost exclusively for the production of magnesium powder of various grades of fineness, and the small remainder was manufactured into strips and wire.

In order to find new fields of usefulness for magnesium, experiments were carried out, at the instance of Dr. G. PISTON, by the Chemische Fabrik Grishain-Elektron. As a first step, the use of magnesium for the de-oxydation of metal, especially of iron, was investigated. In pursuit of this work, an experimental foundry was erected in Grishain in 1907. The de-oxydation experiments carried out in this foundry did not have the desired result. Dr. PISTON then set the task of investigating whether it would not be possible to use magnesium or its alloys as construction material, whether in the form of castings, or of pressed, rolled or otherwise treated material. The first attempt in the use of magnesium as construction material, took the form of a key, made from a magnesium alloy containing about 8% aluminium, which has proved satisfactory for nearly 20 years. The experimental foundry in Grishain was equipped with testing machinery for the examination of durability and other qualities of the experimental castings and experimental objects produced. At the same time, experiments were begun to find out to what extent magnesium alloys produced in other metal factories where cylinders and presses are available were mouldable. For the first time the experiment was made of using as construction material a metal that had hitherto been used only in the making of fireworks. 1).

- 1) The first patent on the new "Elektron" metal is the U.S.A.-P. No. 953455 of 12 April 1909. The German Patent Office refused to grant a patent, as it did not consider the use of magnesium as a manufacturing material an invention, but a discovery.

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The low specific weight of 1.8 of the alloy produced was the particular inducement for this attempt. The chief difficulties lay in the fact that when slightly over the melting point the magnesium burned, so that, when melting, it was not possible to get a clean separation of the metal from the liquefying agent carnallite, used as protection.

The development of the Elektron metal cost about 10 million marks. The new light metal alloy, Elektron 80, was shown publicly for the first time on the occasion of the International Aviation Exhibition in Frankfurt am Main in 1908, and aroused the liveliest interest, especially in the aviation industry.

The invention by Dr. LÖCK of a sving method which, by addition of sulphur and aluminium secured a pure oxide and salt-free casting, brought about considerable progress in the elimination of the difficulties of the processing of magnesium.

Apart from Elektronmetal, Dr. LÖCK directed his attention already in 1910 to an alloy of about 80% aluminium and about 20% magnesium, invented by Weych and called Magnalium. Weych obtained his magnesium from Griesheim. Magnalium soon disappeared from the market, but after the World War of 1914-1918, Griessheim again took up the magnesium experiments and this led to the discovery of Hydronalium (see the chapter on aluminium).

The factory in Sam Linen, which produced magnesium and manufactured powder from it by a similar method to that used in Bitterfeld, and the Bitterfeld factory, were the only magnesium producers in the world, so that the products made from it were good export articles, especially to the United States. The war between Austria and

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Japan in 1907 brought in Russia as a new customer, so that the Bitterfeld plants had to be increased from 40 to 60 tons a year. When the Russo-Japanese war finished, the plants for the most part became idle.

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2. The Development of the Magnesium-Industry in the World War 1914 - 1918.

In view of the increase of metal requirements at the end of 1914,¹⁾ the Department for Research and New Materials (Frischere Stoffabteilung) of the War Ministry approached the Griesheim-Elektron with the enquiry whether they were prepared to undertake a large-scale production of magnesium, a commodity entirely independent of raw material import.

1) cf. chapter on aluminium.

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In the meantime, a new process had been worked out in the Griesheim laboratories, namely, the production of anhydrous magnesium chloride in a hydrochloric acid stream and electrolysis of the anhydrous magnesium chloride in a molten state. The process served its purpose during the war, however, although it was a great improvement on the old process of Carnallite electrolysis used hitherto, it was not yet a final solution. In pursuit of the task set to the Griesheim-Elektron, a plant for the production and processing of 5,000 annual tons of anhydrous was set up in the Bitterfeld-Sued works and put into operation in the middle of 1915, the necessary enlargement of the power plant having been effected at the same time.

The magnesium was especially intended as raw material for the manufacture of fuses. The military authorities therefore instructed Griesheim to take over at the same time the production of unfinished fuses. Griesheim had to produce the unfinished fuses by pressing from bars. The production of strike pins was also later added to the production of fuses. In this manufacture, the chemist was the best teacher. With fuses, it was learned how important above all was the question of corrosion. The remedy of the fault of magnesium and copper coming into contact with damp gunpowder inside the fuse was completely successful.

Another project, in which the best use was made of the pyrotechnic qualities originally obtained from the magnesium, was the incendiary bomb.

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Dr. SIGMUND, of the Ordnance Works of the Fabrik Griesheim-Elektron, suggested using magnesium pipes filled with thermite. **Unfinished pipes with thick walls** were pressed out of electroalloy and processed into incendiary bombs at other factories.

In the last year of the war there was developed in collaboration with A. Schenck of the Leichtmetallgießerei Solingen, the basis for the later use of automobiles and aircraft castings out of magnesium alloy. In 1917, the larger firms also, such as Junkers, Dornier and Schrenk, began seriously to occupy themselves with the use of magnesium. The Fabrik-Unternehmen Flugzeugwerke built a small aircraft almost entirely out of electroalloy, that weighed only 300 kilo and, with a wing breadth of 9.3 meters, could carry a cargo of 400 kilo.

The following German magnesium capacity has existed since 1915:

Griesheim-Elektron, Bitterfeld 5,000 tons annually.
Production in the years 1915 - 1918 was an average of about 5,500 tons a year.

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4. The Growth of the Magnesium Industry after the Occupation of Pomer (Nachtuebernahme) until the Beginning of the Four Year Plan: 1933 - 1935.

Despite successful efforts to establish magnesium as an industrial material, it was not possible to keep the Bitterfeld plant working constantly at full production. The re-arrangement after the change of government, however, brought far-reaching changes. Growing Wehrmacht requirements, particularly for the vehicle and plane industry, considerably increased the use of magnesium in the fields which had been developed until then. There was a marked increase in demand owing to the production of the incendiary bomb, which had already been suggested in 1917 by Dr. LINDNER. The bomb had already reached the finished stage towards the end of the first world war and had been tested by a series of experiments; however, it was not used on a large scale in 1918 by the Army High Command. In 1936, it was possible to revert-back to the stage reached in the development of the incendiary-bomb. The first departure from the previous stage of development was the use of the incendiary charge (Heizsatz). It was developed by Dynamit A.G. after the pattern of the filling of the Wehrmacht-thermite detonator. It was a compound charge consisting of a mixture of permanganate iron and aluminium powder - ferric oxide - perchlorate with black powder primer. However, when these chemicals came in contact with magnesium metal, corrosion very soon set in which greatly reduced the igniting quality of the primers. Furthermore, as a result of its oxygen content, the primer was vulnerable to small-arms fire and exploded easily when over-heated. Corrosion, which set in even when the bombs were well-packed, prevented the storing of large amounts of finished incendiary bombs. This made it necessary to change the incendiary charge; however, it was

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not proposed to revert to the magnesium powder ferric oxide-thermite charge as used previously. An aluminium-thermite charge was not found to have any particularly good incendiary qualities. An incendiary charge with an aluminium-magnesium alloy¹, completely proof against corrosion and small-arms fire, was developed. The built-in inoxide percussion cap with a sheet-metal plate and blocking ring of hydronalium, and the use of a very fine-grain aluminium-thermite primer charge actually made it possible to store the incendiary bomb indefinitely and guaranteed their functioning even from great heights with a minimum of failures. The change-over and equipping of the filling shops and in some cases, the finishing plants, as well as the supervision of the filling chemicals was carried out by Dr. LINDNER.

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As a result of these developments the demand for magnesium grew by leaps and bounds so that the Ministry of Aviation requested I.G. Bitterfeld to expand its plants. Work was begun in 1934 on the Aken plant on the Elbe for the production of 6,000 tons magnesium per year. After a building period of 6 1/2 months it was possible to produce magnesium metal in this plant.

Whereas Bitterfeld was still mostly working on a magnesite basis, Aken produced magnesium on a basis of dolomite/final liquor (ind-
lauge). To this end, a magnesia factory, utilizing Pruegershall final liquor and Rhenish dolomite, with production facilities for 24,000 tons per year was built, simultaneously with Aken, in the idle Teutschenthal plant of I.G. Bitterfeld. Following upon Aken, at the request of the Ministry of Aviation, the Staadfurt plant, with facilities to produce 4,200 tons per year, including 12,000 tons magnesia per year on a final liquor basis was built by I.G. Bitterfeld for Preussag. This factory served as a stand-by plant and was not operated until some time after its completion.

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5. The growth of the magnesium industry under the Four Year Plan:
1936 - 1939.

When the Four Year Plan was announced its object was to utilize fully all German raw materials. One of the raw materials, in the very difficult field of non-ferrous metals was magnesium; production facilities available for magnesium were not being used. The aim, therefore, was to use these facilities as soon as possible, i.e. to create new fields of application for the production. The problem was rendered more difficult by the fact that after certain stocks of the special product for incendiary bombs had been built up existing and operating plants would be heading for a sales crisis, if magnesium metal could not be used on the broadest possible basis. Magnesium as an alloy has a lesser degree of hardness than aluminum. This limited its use in construction as compared with an aluminum finished part of an equal weight. One advantage of magnesium was its low elasticity modulus. Whereas aluminum in the cold stage has more plasticity and better stretching qualities, magnesium requires to be shaped in the warm stage owing to the hexagonal structure of its crystals. The fact that magnesium has poor alloying qualities, limited the number of technically useful alloys. Although magnesium could to a large extent be protected against corrosion by surface treatment with chromate and suitable lacquering, it did not equal the good aluminum alloys, which moreover can be anodized. For the time being, therefore, magnesium could not be used for fittings, outer constructions and ship building. Furthermore, aluminum castings could be made more easily than magnesium castings. The various difficulties encountered in processing magnesium and its use less economic than was the case with aluminum.

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This was all the more true in view of the fact that just at the beginning of the Four Year Plan the market was crowded with cheap aluminum-scrap alloys.

All these difficulties had to be overcome by systematic work.

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Efforts to utilize magnesium were first made when the airplane industry began to adopt metal construction. Magnesium was used extensively in monocoque construction because, compared with aluminum alloys of equal strength, it represented a saving in weight of 10-30%, depending on the part of the construction. Well-known examples are wing, steering gear, under-carriage and rotor casings which were made with the easily welded alloys J. 503 and 537. When anti-knock fuel was introduced, however, magnesium could no longer be used for fuel containers, since magnesium did not have sufficient resistance to corrosion by lead tetra ethyl. In order to overcome this defect a protective lining consisting of

1) with 0,4% Cor mixed metal added.

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potassium and sodium fluoride was developed and tested, since the incentive for making fuel containers of magnesium was still there on account of the 10-30% saving in weight. The building materials used for monocoque construction are about 70% sheet metal, the rest are mostly thin profiles drawn out of sheet metal strips. Since 1933 efforts have been made to construct planes in such a way as to make mass-production possible. This greatly increased the use of light metal castings, since magnesium castings have about the same strength as aluminum castings, a not constantly growing field opened up which meant a saving of working hours. These castings were used for instance for steering gear, pilot seats, passenger compartments equipment, pillow blocks for rotors, brake mechanism, but above all it was in the field of airplane wheels that magnesium showed excellent results, thanks to its low modulus of elasticity. Further development was started to find new uses for pressed magnesium parts. Excellent results were obtained with cylinder supports which justified all attempts to utilize pressed magnesium parts in whole wing gears, central pieces etc. As the use of magnesium increased, great forging presses were later on set up in Litterfeld at the request of the

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Ministry of Aviation for the production of forged pieces. The development of large forged pieces led to experiments in the use of magnesium for propellers, in which connection, through the increasing power of the motors and the increasing diameter of the propellers difficulties had already been encountered because of the too great centrifugal force for the specific weight of the aluminum alloys. The development of heat-resisting magnesium alloys in connection with aircraft engine construction very soon led to the use of this metal for the crankcase as well as for lower and upper parts, for instance in the DB.6-engine. In the field of bomb-release equipment of airplanes important experiments were carried out, some of which were very successful.

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Hydronalium alloys containing magnesium began to be used more and more in the construction of planes; in particular, hydronalium floats on naval airplanes showed excellent results. Mass production of hydronalium castings was also achieved, especially for naval airplanes. In the field of development of Dr. von BRAUN, hydronalium castings were tested in a special furnace and proved to be adequate. In the field of ammunition, particularly for production of other than electro-metal fuses, the use of hydronalium has been encouraged as a special preliminary and automatic alloy in place of Dur in order to save copper.

As the vehicle industry promised great increases in the utilization of magnesium, the most important vehicle factories were visited by the Raw Materials Office together with representatives of I.G. Bitterfeld, and a check was made of the possibility of using magnesium; 67% of the passenger vehicle production, 43% of the truck production and 34% of the motorcycle production.¹⁾ The possibilities of utilization were divided into three groups: group 1 comprising irremediably interchangeable building parts, group 2 parts which could be interchanged later after short tests, while group 3 comprised such parts as would need constructional changes and consequently would require longer testing periods. Under group 1 were such parts as cylinder head covers, covers of all types, gear boxes, oil sumps and oil pumps, adapters of all types, bases for accessories, air-intake tube, parts of ventilators and belt wheels, rear-axle covers, signal rings etc.; parts which came under group 2 were (hydraulic) jack blocks, parts of bearings, blocks for brake bars etc.

¹⁾The Berlin International automobile and motorcycle exhibition of 1939 demonstrated how the utilization of magnesium alloys had advanced in a short time.

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For these parts, zinc spray casting was also being considered. Under group 3 were crankcases, covers for crankshaft bearings, cylinder heads, clutch and gear boxes, blowers, engine supports, steering wheel crosses, etc. The introduction of the parts under group 3 made it necessary to produce heavy spray castings in order to get an advantage in price as compared with other types of castings; it was further desired to develop superstructures for omnibusses and trucks. The investigation further disclosed that the use of magnesium in the field of accessories realized good results. In spite of careful studies, the problem of making the use of magnesium, particularly in place of aluminum pieces from scrap, an economic proposition in the foundries could not be overcome. On the basis of this investigation, and bearing in mind the economic aspect, it was deemed possible to use magnesium to the extent of 2,000 tons per year in the vehicle industry.

In the electrical industry, the use of magnesium for conductor rails was encouraged. Conductor rails had been used for years in the Bitterfeld Graphite Factory with good results. These efforts in connection with the production of electric-motors were greatly aided by new developments. For instance, the die-cast electron motor case developed by Dr. CHAM in conjunction with the firm of Leher-Russdorf. A large field in this branch of industry was the use of parts of accessories, particularly for portable sets like vacuum cleaners, motor saws, etc. It was estimated that the whole electrical industry could use about 1,500 to 2,000 tons per year.

In the general machine industry and the metal goods industry, the use of magnesium was preferred for all movable parts. Such parts are, in textile machines, jacquard rollers etc. *) made of sand and chilled castings. For machine tools the parts involved were gear boxes and covers, driving plates, cams etc. In the making of tools and attachments there were milling heads for wood-processing machines, bodies for knife heads, handles for limit gage standards, arms for diameter gages and micrometers; movable parts of attachments, particularly in the construction of attachments, as well as dies for sheet-metal shaping, which showed less wear and tear than other industrial materials and were considerably easier to change. In the optical industry and the precision instruments industry, cameras and field glass casings, as well as compass casings came into question. In agriculture machinery the following were introduced and, in some cases tested: binders (motor), knife blocks, covers of all types, gears and oil-bath casings, bearings, protecting covers, supports and screen blocks etc. In the general metal-goods industry my suggestions for the use of magnesium, too numerous to mention, were made. I will only mention sewing machine parts, supports, carriers and blocks of all types, medical articles etc.

*) Translators note: Here follows a series of highly specialized textile machine parts,

(page 86 of document, cont'd)

Engraving plates of magnesium showed certain advantages over zinc plates, and despite many set-backs it was estimated that for this purpose an additional 200 tons magnesium per year would probably be required.

A field not to be underestimated was the manufacture of badges, for which no less than 400 tons of magnesium per year could be used as a substitute for other metals.

Its large scale use by the Wehrmacht was especially encouraged on the orders of General BUCKER on behalf of the Army Ordnance Office. Besides the construction of vehicles of all types, special attention was paid to the use, not only of magnesium, but particularly of automatic alloys of magnesium.

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Furthermore, magnesium was being used for machine gun supports, plates for grenade throwers, mine cases etc. etc.

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At the suggestion of the Office, the use of magnesium was definitely encouraged by the state authorities, particularly by the Supervisory Office for metals. The cooperation of the Office and the Supervisory Office for metals resulted in a decree issued at the end of 1937 by the Reich Ministry of Economics which for the first time ordered the use of magnesium, instead of prohibiting it.

Special attention was given to exploratory work for the employment of magnesium²⁾. The problem of vehicle super-structures of magnesium has already been mentioned. In connection with this type of construction, the Office brought out the loud-speaker car of the travelling exhibition "Schaffendes Volk", as well as the Hitler Youth Train. Inducement and encouragement was given to work carried out by the Berliner Verkehrsgesellschaft, on omnibus and street-car constructional parts and by the Reichsbahn on constructional parts for diesel trains etc., as well as work carried out by the whole vehicle industry. On the basis of this work, an additional requirement of 4,000 tons magnesium per year did not seem too much. A special field of development in the vehicle industry was offered by the Volkswagen, for the construction of which Dr. FOLLMER went all out for the use of magnesium, particularly for motor and supercharger parts etc. The quantities of magnesium required for the mass production of the Volkswagen, including the small tractor which was also envisaged, was estimated as follows by the Volkswagen works:

1) Reich Law Casotto 1927/38

2) Compare Dr. FOLLMER "Magnesium, the German Non-Ferrous Metal", Four Year Plan 1938.

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1939	400 tons
1940	4,000 "
1941	11,000 "

The Volkswagen works even planned their own foundry to produce these large quantities and were also considering the production of their own magnesium. The work in the field of fittings aimed at making magnesium resistant to corrosion by spraying on a coating of hydronalium. In particular, treatment of the sprayed part by heat had quite successful results. In 1938, for instance, door handles were made which after being in daily use for years did not show the least sign of corrosion.

The many efforts which have been described proved successful. By 1938, in spite of the fact that the many large aircraft orders were nearing completion, particularly for the incendiary bomb, production was not only kept up but, over and above that, the Stassfurt plant, until now idle, with production facilities for 4,200 tons per year, was put into operation at the end of 1938.

Included in the development of magnesium production for 1933 to 1935 was the planning of the expansion in case of mobilization. The plants built in Aken, Stassfurt and Heringen were therefore planned in such a way that they could be expanded at any time.

 TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. ML-7552
 CONTINUED

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The investigation in regard to the mobilization requirements, which was conducted at the beginning of 1938 simultaneously with that of the mobilization requirement for the raw material aluminum, established a mobilization requirement of 26 000 tons per year. This requirement was in strict conformity with the Four Year Plan. Through the planned exchange of 15 000 tons per year of aluminum for 10 000 tons per year of magnesium this mobilization requirement increased to 36 000 tons per year. This requirement was met through the new military economic production plan dated 12 July 1938 according to the following diagram:

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During the period under review the German production capacities were as follows:

Plant	Beginning	Beginning	Beginning	Beginning
	1936	1937	1938	1939
	(tons per year)			
I.G. Farben, Bitterfeld	3 600	3 600	3 600	3 600 ¹⁾
I.G. Farben, Alzen	8 000	6 000	8 000	8 000 ¹⁾
I.G. Farben, Stassfurt	4 200	4 200	4 200	4 200
Wartmarshall, Heringen	2 000	2 000	2 000	2 000
Total	17 800	17 800	17 800	19 100

In addition, the production capacity was being increased to 2 500 tons per year at Heringen, to 12 000 at Alzen and to 5 000 at Stassfurt. Further, approx. 3 600 tons of salvaged scrap iron per year were also being processed, but this was done exclusively by the production plants to avoid impurities in the metal which would endanger its anti-corrosive qualities.

1) Increase through improved utilization of the existing plants.

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5. The Growth of the Magnesium Industry since the outbreak
of war on 1 September 1939.

Although Germany showed a much higher magnesium producing potential and production when war broke out than the rest of the world put together, an expansion of magnesium production was initiated in conformity with the Reich Marshal's request for additional light metal production in order to meet the requirement, particularly of the Air Force. At the outbreak of war the magnesium production capacity was as follows:

Firm	Plant	Capacity (tons per year)
I.G. Farben	Bitterfeld	3 900
I.G. Farben	Aken	9 000
I.G. Farben	Stassfurt	4 200
Wintershall	Horingen	2 000

Total 19 100

I.G. Farben	Experimental plant thermic	700
-------------	-------------------------------	-----

In the stage of expansion were:

Aken	from 9 000 to 13 000 by	3 000
Stassfurt	from 4 200 to 6 000 by	1 800
Horingen	from 2000 to 2 500 by	500

Total 5 300

These expansions which could not be carried out very quickly during the 3rd quarter owing to a shortage of iron quotas, especially structural iron, were at first speeded up considerably. In order to safeguard this accelerated program, the Reich Air Ministry commissioned SPER's Building Staff with the control of the constructional part of the building projects, and in pursuance of this measure the Reich Air Ministry authorized and allocated the structural iron necessary for these expansions.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. HI-7558
CONTINUED

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At the end of 1939 the Reich Air Ministry again demanded an increase of the magnesium production capacity and asked I.G. Farbenindustrie Bitterfeld to propose a site. Preliminary work had already been started on the planned X-plant before the outbreak of war at the instigation of the General Plenipotentiary for Chemistry. As further enlargement of the Aken and Stassfurt plants, which were already in the stage of expansion, was not expedient, I.G. Farbenindustrie Bitterfeld suggested Gersthofen as a site in view of the fact that an I.G. plant was already located there. The expanded river Lech power plant and the steam power plant Gersthofen was to serve as power source for Gersthofen.

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To begin with the silico-thermic process was to be employed at the magnesium plant at Gersthofen. By which process an experimental plant with an output of 700 tons per year had been approved. But even during the preliminary work, I.G. Farbenindustrie Bitterfeld declared that they were not yet in a position to guarantee the desired production of 6 000 tons per year, if only one plant employing the silico-thermic process with a capacity of 6 000 tons per year were set up. But to save larger investments and, in connection herewith, materials, I.G. Farbenindustrie Bitterfeld re-adapted the plans for Gersthofen to the electrolytic process, the preliminary production stage of which was to be in Central Germany. If the Aken and Stassfurt plants were run at full pressure and if they were fitted out with some additional apparatus, then there was a possibility of increasing production by 10 000 tons per year in each plant. The Reich Air Ministry had also asked the Wintershall A.G. for proposals for an enlargement of their plant. This resulted in the following projects: The Heringen plant increases its expansion which is already under construction by another 2 000 tons per year, i.e. from 3 100 to 5 900 tons per year, so that it reaches a production capacity of 8 400 tons per year instead of 5 500 tons. According to this the plan is as follows:

Existing plants	19 100 tons per year
being enlarged	16 900 " " "
additional plans:	
Expansion of Stassfurt II	from 8 500
	to 9 500 by 1 000
	tons per year
Expansion of Aken	by 1 000 tons per year
Heringen II	2 800 " " "
Gersthofen	6 000 " " "

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The conquest of Norway meant further supplies of magnesium. As difficulties had arisen at Gersthofen in the negotiations for electric current, the Reich Air Ministry intervened in these negotiations to prevent a postponement of the lead-line, if possible. In view of the alumina situation in Norway, the alumina factory at Heroen, which uses Labradorite as raw material, has in the meantime been added to the plan and is to be included in the secondary nitrogen production scheme. As the negotiations for the supply of power at Gersthofen had not yet been concluded, Generalingenieur TSCHERSICH suggested the transfer of the magnesium project Gersthofen to Norway. In consideration of the rapid schedules demanded by the Reich Air Ministry, the easiest way of fulfilling these short term demands at Heroen lay in making use of existing factory grounds as well as magazines, installations and work-shops, the more so, since in Norway seawater was to be used as the basic material. The Norsk Hydro went to extend the power plant Maar, for which complete projects were available, so that here too it was possible to refer to existing plans. To overcome the difference in regard to the building time caused through the transfer from Heroen to Maar, the reservoir at Iboesvann was enlarged by 4 m from 700 to 1 000 million cbr by increasing the height of the sluice (see also the special chapter Norway).

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Third Section

Light Metal Plan Norway

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2. Origin and Development of the Program.

On the occasion of his journey to Norway, from 16 to 21 May 1940, and in the course of his investigations into the possibilities of overcapacity in the aluminium industry in Norway of 50,000 tons of alumina per year, Dr. MEUMERONH ascertained that Norsk Hydro had a process for solubilizing Labradorit through nitric acid, which could be installed with good results into the Secondary-Nitrogen-Plant Heroccon. As no expansion in Norway was yet contemplated by Gebecken, negotiations were not, for the time being, undertaken with the Norsk Hydro, but the process was subjected to a thorough technical test. In view of the favorable results of these tests, Professor KILUCH instructed Dr. MEUMERONH at the end of September to take up negotiations with Dr. Aubert of the Norsk Hydro. On this occasion, an inspection was made of Heroccon, which fully confirmed its favorable location from a technical point of view. In the course of the conferences with Dr. AUBERT, Dr. MEUMERONH learned of his discussions with Dr. KOEHLING, which likewise aimed at the expansion of the Norwegian aluminium industry, although the projected expansion centered in other plants. In connection with this, the water power works Tyin were mentioned, the suitability of their utilization in the case of aluminium expansion becoming obvious at a subsequent inspection. In discussions in the Reichskommissariat, Dr. MEUMERONH learned that Dr. KOEHLING had greater plans for the expansion of the aluminium industry in Norway, which, amounted at first to 65,000 tons per year, and for which alumina was to be produced in Sauda. In discussions with MEHLER, Dr. KOEHLING's deputy, projects in Glomsfjord and Sauda were confirmed. As no further details on projects could be obtained in Norway, Dr. MEUMERONH returned to Berlin.

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Subsequent to Dr. MEUMERONH's trip to Norsk Hydro, technicians of Norsk Hydro visited German alumina plants. At the same time, Erikson of Norsk Hydro called on Professor KILUCH and asked for his opinion on a production expansion of light metal in Norway. In connection therewith, he stated that German agencies in Norway had also said to him that after all an end of the war was to be anticipated and therefore an overcapacity in light metals was to be feared. Professor KILUCH replied that nothing could be said here as to the end of the war, but that, even if the war ended, light metal would still remain of the utmost importance, in view

(page 176 of document , cont'd.)

Tyin about 30,000 tons of aluminium per year
" 60,000 tons of alumina per year

in addition the power plants Glomfjord, Sauda III,
Osna and Tyin.

(page 177 of document, cont'd.)

On that occasion, Dr. KOPPELBERG stated that he had already discussed the above plans with Reich Commissar TERBOVEN and Generaloberst UDET, of the Reich Ministry for Aviation, and that both parties had, in principle, agreed to the realization of these plans. General von HILSENER had also been notified by Dr. KOPPELBERG. Generaloberst UDET had already undertaken to notify the Reich Marshal. On the same day, Dr. KOPPELBERG submitted the entire plan to Generaloberst UDET in writing, mentioning the discussion with Professor KRAUCH and again stressing the approval of Reich Commissar TERBOVEN. The dates were fixed as follows:

30,000 tons aluminium per year, capacity up to date
60,000 tons aluminium per year by the end of 1941
120,000 tons aluminium per year by the end of 1942
150,000 tons aluminium per year by the end of 1943
180,000 tons aluminium per year by the end of 1944.

Dr. KOPPELBERG promised that, in the event of this project being approved, he would be responsible for its execution as quickly as possible and with the best final results in technical and economical respects. This letter was returned from the Reich Marshal's headquarters to Generaloberst UDET as early as 14 October 1940. The following handwritten note of the Reich Marshal appears on the letter itself:

" I approve of these plans and expect them to go into effect as promptly as possible. GOERING."

In the discussion on 11 October 1940, Professor KRAUCH promised his cooperation and examination of this project, offered the services of I.G. specialists and agreed to the commissioning of Celbau, with the carrying out of the plans and the construction. Although the question of finance was not settled in any way, the initial investigation work for the project and the planning work were begun at once.

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In view of the fact that the Reich Marshal insisted on prompt realization of the project, the first contingents were fixed for as early as the fourth quarter of 1940. At the end of October, the Reich Marshal gave Dr. KOPPELBERG a general power of attorney for the Expansion Plan Norway. In pursuance of this letter of attorney given to Dr. KOPPELBERG, Professor KRAUCH, in a letter dated 14 November 1940, informed the Reich Marshal on the measures carried out by him in the meantime with Dr. KOPPELBERG, which he had started immediately he was notified by Dr. KOPPELBERG of the order to expand the light metal production in Norway. Professor KRAUCH then endeavored to solve the financing problem. The VAW, having emphasized in a letter to the Reich Ministry of Economics, dated 9 September 1940, its strong interest in the expansion of the Norwegian aluminium industry, Gebochen contemplated putting the financing of this Reich-directed Norwegian expansion in the hands mainly of those German agencies which, hitherto, had taken a leading and successful part in the expansion of the aluminium industry in Germany. On the 7 November 1940, a meeting took place between OLSCHER/VLG and Professor KRAUCH, in which the following was discussed: The expansion of the alumina and aluminium production was to be undertaken by a new company, in which the Norwegians were to be permitted to participate up to 24%. The remaining 76% were to be concentrated in a German group in accordance with the prevailing quotas, i.e. approximately 70% VAW and 30% I.G./M.G. If the Reich Ministry for Aviation were to desire its own participation, the aim should be to retain the Reich Ministry for Aviation as a partner only for the duration, whereas for the post-war period VAW and I.G./M.G. were to have an option right in the ratio of 70:30 of the Reich Aviation Ministry's quota. The management of the expansion was to be carried out by personnel made available by VAW, VLG, and I.G./M.G. in conjunction with the Mineraloel-Baugesellschaft.

(page 179 of document)

As the Reich Ministry for Aviation desired a decisive financing participation, Professor KRAUCH, at a conference with the Reich Minister for Finance on 25 November 1940, proposed a partnership on approximately the following basis:

51% Reich Ministry for Aviation / LF.,
49% German group and I.G./M.G. 70 : 30 .

At this conference, Professor KRAUCH emphasized that it would not only promote technical operation, if exports of the VAW were made use of to a larger extent, but would also guarantee a reasonable expansion of the company and its economic and commercial management. In opposition to Professor KRAUCH's proposal, Generalmajor FLOCH stated that the Reich Ministry for Aviation / LF. had been ordered to finance the Norway expansion 100%, whereas Dr. KOPPELBERG had the power of attorney to carry out the project. As opposed to this, Professor KRAUCH stressed once more that the technically appropriate and swiftest

(page 179 of document, cont'd.)

realization of the project could be guaranteed only by using the services of those German experts who had up till then been engaged in the production of aluminium. It was decided that Dr. JESERICH should again take up negotiations with Dr. KOPFERBERG. These negotiations failed completely within a short time. What actually happened was that the Bank for Luftfahrt financed to 100% the establishment of the Hense Leichtmetall A.G. as a holding company, which on its part undertook the financing of the A/S Nordag. The order for the construction of the Nordag was given to the Mineralool-Bruggesellschaft. For the construction work in Morocco the Nordisk Lottmetall was created, the following firms participating:

- 1/3 Hense or Nordag respectively
- 1/3 Norsk Hydro,
- 1/3 I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.

The I.G. Baubureau Oslo, specially created for this purpose, was given the order for Morocco.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

8 September 1947

I, Julius J. STEINER, AGO, A 442 654, hereby certify that I am a duly appointed translator for the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpts from document No. NI - 7562 .

Julius J. Steiner

AGO A 442 654

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-9548
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. LUDWIGSHAFEN
Nitrogen Department

Stamp: SECRET

Handwritten : Frose

TO : Office of the Directorate, Sparte I, Op 51
Attention : Dr. Simmler

Your reference	Your communication of	Our reference	Date
		Nickelfabrik Dr.IS/He. 0280	14 January 1941

SUBJECT : Nickel plant in Central Germany.

Enclosed herewith please find a photographic copy of the letter of the Office for German Raw and Basic Materials, Berlin, of 19 August 1937 (Diary # 56 734 / 37 -6609- IV/1 Cr./Wa.) and a copy of the letter of 7 December 1937 (Diary # 1591 / 37 IV/1 - H./Sch.), from which it can be seen that the establishment of our nickel plant at Nachterstedt/Frose was initiated by the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials, taking into consideration the interests of military policy.

Enclosures) Original forwarded to Factory Bookkeeping Dept. (Main)

15 January '41

(Initials) SI

(page 2 of original)

Minister President Colonel General Goering
Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
Office for German Raw Synthetic Materials
and

Diary # 56 734 37-6609- IV/1 Cr./Wa Stamp:

File Ref. J I 5 b

(Initials) FS III/2

1 0 ?

Must be quoted
in further inquiries

Berlin, 19 August 1937
Dehnenstrasse 68 - 70
Telephone: 12 00 48

Received 24 August 1937
Vermittlungsstelle W
Out.....

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9548

CONTINUED

(page 2 of original cont'd)

REFERENCE : Your letter of 13 August 1937 Dr. Di/Fr.

SUBJECT : Nickel Plant Central Germany (Initials) Di

handwritten notes :

Firm

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Vermittlungsstelle W

Director

Dr. Mueller-Conradi
M

Dr. Schlecht

Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 82

(initials) hpt

Director Brendel was furnished a copy
7 September 1937 hpt

In consideration of the interests of military policy a nickel plant with a capacity of a minimum of 2,000 tons per year is to be set-up in Central Germany. You are therefore requested to plan the plant at Nachterstedt for a production of 2,000 tons of nickel per year.

Heil Hitler !

By order :

(signature) Paul Fleiger

(page 3 of original)

Minister President Colonel General Goering Berlin, 19 August 1937
Commissioner for the Four Year Plan Dehnenstrasse 68-70
Office for German Law and Synthetic Materials Telephone : 12 00 48

Diary # 56 734 37-6609- IV/1 Cr/We Stamp: Received 24 August 1937
Vermittlungsstelle W
File Ref. J I 5 b Out.....

C o p y

REFERENCE : Your letter of 13 August 1937 Dr. Di/Fr.

SUBJECT : Nickel Plant Central Germany

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9548
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original cont'd)

Firm
I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Vermittlungsstelle W

Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 82

In consideration of the interests of military policy a nickel plant with a capacity of a minimum of 2,000 tons per year is to be set-up in Central Germany. You are therefore requested to plan the plant at Nachterstedt for a production of 2,000 tons of nickel per year.

Heil Hitler !

By order :

(Signature :) Paul Fleiger

(page 4 of original)

Copy / Ho.

Minister President Colonel General Goering Berlin, 7 December 1937
Commissioner for the Four Year Plan Behrenstrasse 68-70
Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials Telephone : 12 00 48

Diary # 1591 / 37 IV/1 - H./Sch

File Ref:

Must be quoted in further inquiries.

REFERENCE : Letter of 30 November 1937 Dr. Di/Sch.

SUBJECT : Nickel Plant in Central Germany

Stamp : SECRET

Firm
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W

Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 82

The requested certificate is herewith sent to you as enclosure.

By order :
signed: Rheinlaender

1 Enclosure : Certificate

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9548
CONTINUED

(page 5 of original)

Minister President Colonel General Goering Berlin, 7 December 1937
Commissioner for the Four Year Plan Behrenstrasse 68-70
Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials Telephone: 12 00 48

Diary # 1591/37 IV/1 H./Sch.

Stamp: SECRET

C e r t i f i c a t e

This is to certify to the I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft that the establishment of a plant for the purpose of producing nickel at Nachterstedt was initiated by the Office for German Raw and Basic Materials. This is a priority construction project for the Four Year Plan.

By order :

signed : Rheinlaender

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

28 August 1947

I, Arthur MACNAMARA, Civ. No. 20 191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-9548.

.....
Arthur MACNAMARA
Civ. No. 20 191

- 4 -
"END"

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8540
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(ES.:) Dr. C. Krauch

(MS.:) Version as despatched

Berlin W 9,
Saarlandstr. 123, 22 July 1938

(Rubber Stamp:) TOP SECRET

Dear Under Secretary,

In connection with the points set out by General Becker in his letter of the 21 July, 1938, I would comment as follows:

Ad 1) Gunpowder, explosives and chemical warfare agents can be considered practically the sole concern of the Wehrmacht only from the point of view of the consumer. From the point of view of the manufacturer, however, they represent an inextricable part of the productions of the chemical industry, which are strongly interwoven one with another, so far as processes are concerned.

Ad 2) Any decision regarding the utility of gunpowder, explosives etc. is of course entirely a matter for the Wehrmacht, as is also the processing of gunpowder and explosives to produce finished munitions, as well as their disposal and storing. The idea of allowing the testing and delivery conditions to be prescribed by the industry has never been contemplated, nor indeed of detaching from the province of the Army Ordnance Office (H.W.A.) anything belonging to the sphere of the testing and finishing of munitions. On the other hand, the development of the processing and creation of these materials is the concern of the industry.

Ad 3) Even although apparently a proportion of the preliminary products for the Mob. production of gunpowder, explosives etc. can find no direct utilization in peacetime conditions and therefore can only be supplied by standby plant, nevertheless the source of these products is, after all, in the normal productions of the chemical industry. The fertiliser nitrogen basis becomes at once, by its export decline in the case of mobilization, the backbone of the whole of the nitric acids and of ammonium nitrate. The latter again will be produced by the conversion of plant manufacturing, in peacetime, special kinds of fertilisers. This applies particularly to the whole of the ethylene chemistry, which is inextricably bound up through di-glycol for gunpowder and the chemical warfare agents with the entire industry of the coking plants and mineral oil syntheses. The more recent developments in plastics especially show possibilities of the greatest scope for ethylene chemistry also in peacetime economy. Only the closest coupling of peace economy production with products of military importance can ensure the highest utilization of military-economic energies, which result, however, is not to be achieved by the construction of standby plants which are detached from their parent industry

(page 2 of original)

and can never be put into production for peace time industry. These reasons especially make it essential to deal with the problem of chemical production as a whole in order to seek out ways of finding peace time utilization for those preliminary products for which at present none exists. Only a complete survey of the whole requirements of the chemical industry can make this possible.

The comparison made by General Becker with armament manufacture does not correspond with the conditions of chemical production. Armament manufacture can be compared with the manufacture of munitions, since both entail a purely mechanical process. The production and refinement of steel corresponds with the manufacture of chemical products. The Army Ordnance Office (H.W.A.) does not however claim the supervising of steel production and refining.

The Army Ordnance Office represents for Munitions and implements, - its own peculiar sphere of work - the sound principle of having every possible ironworking industry in case of mobilization engaged in the manufacture of implements and ammunition.

I follow the same principle in the sphere of military-economy as applied to chemical industry. The interwoven processes of production that have to be used there, however, require a precise knowledge of the interrelation of chemical processes. The productions important for military purposes, especially gunpowder, explosives and chemical warfare agents, cannot without injury be torn from their connection, as Army Ordnance Office (H.W.A.) wishes.

The collaboration of forces within the chemical industry does not signify any breaking away from the Wehrmacht, but rather does it denote the application of the best available energies of Chemistry as a whole, not merely of the explosives section of the industry, to the realization of the target of requirements set by the military.

Ad 5) The former Office for German Raw Materials and Synthetics has, at my request, as far back as the end of 1936, repeatedly directed the attention of the Wehrmacht to the urgent necessity of stockpiling. Already at that time, for example, I requested that considerable quantities of Toluene be stocked up for existing explosives factories. Measures taken to increase the production of Toluene had then for result that the producers could not dispose of their products to the explosives factories, as the latter had no orders for manufacture, and finally the increased production had again to be cancelled, because their warehouses were over-full, as arrangements had not been made at the right time to provide tanks for stockpiling. The same is true of Diglycol and Oxol (as preliminary product for mustard gas), where the few plants that existed were only put to work for stockpiling on my insistence in March/April 1937, or, indeed, were partly only then made capable of producing (Lamendorf, Wolfen).

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-1040
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original, con'd)

I also subsequently repeatedly pointed out, as advisory technical expert, the possibilities of technical and raw materials extension.

(page 3 of original)

Ad 6) The Army Ordnance Office (H.W.A.) has always evinced great interest in the possibilities of increase as emphasised by me.

The insufficient results actually obtained seem to me to be attributable to the lack of push on the part of the agencies hitherto concerned.

The fact is that the following manufacturing possibilities exist for gunpowder and explosives:

<u>Gunpowder</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Production possibility in tons per month</u>
Plants ready for production	8	5,700 by Autumn 1938
New constructions or extensions	9	6,400 by Autumn 1940
	17	12,100 against a requirement of 17,900 (Hindenburg-program)

Explosives

Plants ready for production	11	7,600 by Autumn 1938
New constructions or extensions	3	500 by middle of 1939
	14	8,100 against a requirement of 17,100 (Hindenburg-program)

I have laid down the Hindenburg program as a basis for comparison of the results reached, because in the major campaigns of 1918 the peak consumption in one month almost reached the actual quantities required under the program.

In my view, the Hindenburg program only represents the lowest limit of requirements, since in the World War neither flak nor bombs played anything like the role which they have today.

Furthermore, it is known to me that countries abroad, especially England and America, have been working intensively for the last two years on the extension of their chemical warfare agents basis.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8840
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

U.S.A. provided for a production of 100,000 tons p.a. in 1919 of Chemical warfare agents, chiefly mustard gas. Against these figures, we have a production today of about 10,000 tons p.a., i.e. one-tenth.

In this time we have not approached during the last two years the measures necessary for utilizing for these purposes the available home possibilities in raw materials.

The countries abroad are mostly providing for requirements far in excess of the quantities in manufacture at the end of the war.

(page 4 of original)

With regard to the reproach that the Four Year Plan has postponed the construction of the plants for preliminary products, it is to be stated that, for example, the Office for German Raw Materials and Synthetics in the middle of 1937, urgently took up the construction of 4 Pentaerythrite plants, without the necessary means having been first placed at their disposal. Up to today, no "RV" means have been made available for the erection of these Reich-owned plants. How far the granting of these funds by the Finance Ministry may possibly have been prevented from other quarters cannot be ascertained. The taking over of these preliminary-products factories by the Army Ordnance Office (H.W.A.) was effected, because the building firms had to be paid the sums advanced at long last and the H.W.A. placed at their disposal the necessary means.

Further with reference to the Plants producing chemical warfare agents mentioned, it is to be stated that the Thiodiglycol plant in Trostberg was not started, because there were no means made available and because, moreover, a process was about to be completed which would reduce the cost of the plant by about 25 millions and would also greatly simplify the working (Acet. ^{aldehyde} -Hydrogenation instead of the Acetaldehyde ethylalcohol method hitherto employed).

This simplification of the process will at the same time effect a considerable saving in building time, which will almost cancel out the delay mentioned by General Becker.

Ad 7) The discussions which have recently been held with the responsible persons of the branches of the industry concerned in the extension have revealed that the method proposed by me will be particularly effective in achieving an acceleration of the production increase and that the delays that have occurred hitherto have been entirely due to red-tape and not by any means to the excessive demands made on these firms. The firms concerned are willingly prepared to assume the responsibility themselves for the quickest possible rush execution, in which of course they must be accorded the State assistance I have proposed.

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

I cannot therefore share the fear expressed by General Becker that my intervention might cause a delay in the extensions and new constructions already started by the Army Ordnance Office (H.W.A.). On the contrary, my negotiations with the authoritative representatives of the industry up to date have confirmed that a similar acceleration can be effected in the building program initiated by the H.W.A. which will of course be continued. The industry has already undertaken to devote its best abilities to the carrying out of the task I should set them. The more strongly initiative is restricted by official interference, the less will the interest taken in it fade out. It will not do to doubt from the very beginning the enthusiasm of the honest men to be found in industry no less than elsewhere,

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doubts which commonly serve as justification for such interference.

Ad 8) As already stated, the production of gunpowder, explosives and chemical warfare agents are chemical processes. They cannot therefore be treated as distinct from the rest of the chemical industry.

I should of course act in the closest cooperation with the HWA.

Ad 9) The training of the service personnel has of recent years, since the existence of the first stand-by plants, been undertaken by the firms themselves and they have always had to complain of lack of sympathy on the part of the military authorities for their technical and material demands.

As a matter of policy, stand-by plants which must be erected should, wherever possible, be linked with factories engaged on peacetime production whether already in existence or about to be built. The questions of supplying the necessary personnel and of constant preparedness in case of mobilization will then be much more easily and safely solved. It is precisely that overgrowing shortage of suitable man-power which forces us to adopt such measures.

In principle, I should like to add in comment on the statements made by General Becker that in the National Socialist State the responsibility of the individual producer must be raised to the highest level. Neither the chemical industry nor the equally important gunpowder and explosives industry are undertakings which set up production installations to order, in accordance with Scheme F: they endeavour, on the contrary, from a sense of responsibility fulfil the tasks set to the best of their ability. If it is demanded that these works carry on production only under constant supervision and in accordance with detailed directions, almost the whole of the chemical industry, together with its supplier firms, must be placed under the same control.

This is bound to give rise to a constraint which has in fact been observed adversely to affect development in latter decades, particularly in the explosives industry. The new processes for the production

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

of explosives, as well as the solution of problems of raw materials in the gunpowder and explosives industry, spring almost exclusively from the resources of the rest of the chemical industry. The explosives and gunpowder industry must therefore not be hermetically sealed off, as has hitherto been done by the military authorities, but they must be incorporated in the framework of the chemical production of Germany, as a whole.

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The method hitherto used and which General Becker wishes to maintain has not led to its goal and can not be retained, because it takes away responsibility from the industry and cripples its initiative. The aim, on the contrary, must be to arouse initiative, to give scope to the industry for self-development and to encourage responsible and independent action.

It is the task of the military authorities to make their requirements as to quantity and quality; it is the task of the industry to fulfil these requirements in the shortest possible time by the processes of manufacture and by the utilization of all the technical possibilities. It is not the task of the industry to determine how many guns will be required by the Wehrmacht and how much gunpowder and explosives will be necessary for them, and it is just as little the task of the officers to proscribe in detail the processes of the method by which this purely chemico-technical aim is to be attained.

It is not necessary to create a special organization for the realization of the extension plans, as General Becker believes. This already exists in a German industry ready for action and in my staff in the Reich Office for Economic Extension.

As the result of my verbal instructions the industry has already begun with the work.

There results therefore a clear division of duties between the Army Ordnance Office and my province of work:

The military-economy for the chemical industry delivers to the Wehrmacht the products required, i.e. gunpowder, explosives and chemical warfare agents and in the course of their production plans erects the necessary plants.

The Army Ordnance Office (HWA) tests, controls and procures, as hitherto, but without concerning itself with the erection of manufacturing plant for chemical products. The whole question of the processing of ammunition, explosives and chemical warfare agents, as well as all questions concerning the manufacture and stockpiling of munitions is exclusively the task of the HWA.

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It should be considered whether, for the fulfilment of special tasks, the chief of the Army Ordnance Office should not be accorded special authority for the procurement of munitions and implements.

The clear division of tasks seems to me to offer more than anything else the guarantee for a fruitful collaboration with the Army Ordnance Office.

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The soldier will indicate to the technician what military requirements demand of the German economy and the technician will do his best by adaptation of the technical possibilities to achieve this aim.

In the extension plan approved by the General Field Marshal and ordered to be carried out, the aim is already prescribed. The best technical way for realization is only to be found in thorough collaboration with and confidence in the industry concerned.

The ideas of private enterprise feared by General Becker are bound to be eliminated by the fact that the necessary means are always available to prevent abuses. For this reason, I have selected my staff principally from the industry concerned and for eighteen months have trained their minds to these tasks in order to anchor in the industries concerned the principles of national-economy here represented.

The conversation between General Becker and myself showed that there was full accord between us so far as the material aim was concerned. The measures instituted by me received his practical approval and it was arranged that a specially qualified officer of the Army Ordnance Office should be appointed as liaison officer.

Heil Hitler !
Yours faithfully,

signed C. KRAUCH

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

17 July 1947

I, Leonard LAWRENCE, No. 20136, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8840.

Leonard LAWRENCE
No. 20 136

(Translator's Note: Handwritten
10 Copies.
Second Copy.)

P a r t A.

R E P O R T
- - - - -

on the progress of work for economic mobilization on 30 September 1934,
including short explanation of attached compilation of regulations,
- - - - -

S E C R E T.

1. This is secret matter according to the law of 8 June 1914 against the betrayal of military secrets.
2. To be passed on to a personal address only.
3. To be forwarded by trusted person or courier only.
4. Duplication of any kind or reproduction of extracts prohibited.
5. Recipient is responsible for safe keeping.

(Translator's Note: Stamp across): T O P S E C R E T.

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Berlin, 30 September 1934.

Section I:

Introduction: The Problem and Methods for its solution

1) The Problem

Importance
of the task

With the foundation of the Reich Defense Council and of its permanent committee, the Reich Ministry of Economics has been charged with the job of economic preparation for war.* The tremendous importance of this task really ought not to require any further explanation. The terrible consequences of the lack of any economic war preparations in the World War are still vividly remembered. During the World War itself we suffered grave and irretrievable losses through the initial policy of unscrupulous waste. These losses were increased by the, in many cases belated start of a policy of conservation. All these measures were of necessity of an improvised nature. At first a uniform conception of the whole economic political situation was lacking; this only emerged gradually. Only then could the multifarious measures be coordinated and the effects taken into account which any one measure would be liable to have in another sphere. But even after this stage of war economy

had been reached - approximately in the autumn of 1916 -

*) For limitations of its departmental responsibility
see page 5.

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(Trans. Note: Handwritten Marginal note: Very good! Initial: W?)

the lack of a thoroughly considered plan for preparing the war economy made itself felt in a detrimental way. There are natural limitations to war economy, even if it is prepared in the best possible way in all its aspects as to organization, law and economic policy. These limitations result from the amount of raw materials available either from our own production or from imports and from the production capacity of the factories. These limits cannot be exceeded successfully by any attempt at too ambitious plans, for every such attempt to stretch the basis of raw materials ad infinitum will find its limits by causing a lack of raw materials and production facilities needed for other urgent purposes, in the same way as, on the other hand, the extension of production plants, transport facilities etc. depends on the availability of indispensable raw materials. The so-called "Hindenburg-Program" of autumn 1916 made such an attempt. This led to grave reverses in many spheres, and probably there is some justification for the opinion that it was owing to this program that our economic power did not reach its peak efficiency (the optimum).

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Increase of importance of this since end of the war.

During the period since the World War several factors have arisen which have increased the need for economic preparation for war for Germany.

1.) Since then the importance of all technical matters for warfare has increased even more, and with it the importance of industrial reinforcements. By the end of the World War, technical weapons of the utmost importance like the air force and tanks were still in their infancy in comparison with the present time or the near future. These weapons especially require particularly high quality precision work in modern industrial plants as well as large quantities of valuable raw materials for their production and maintenance.

(Trans. Note: Handwritten Marginal note: This will not be avoidable. Illegible Initials)

2.) The requirements of the civilian population for industrially mass-produced consumer goods have undoubtedly risen since the end of the war; their sudden restriction today would have more serious psychological repercussions than ever.

3.) Because of the progress of rationalization and the substitution of machinery for man-power, everywhere in industry, including transport (motorization), the technical requirements of industry have increased substantially in the meantime.

4.) The geopolitical and military-political situation probably for a considerable time to come is very

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much less favorable than in 1914 - 1918. At that time we were in a position to extend our raw material- and production-basis to the West (Longwy, Erie, Tourcoing, Roubaix, Antwerp (textiles)), to the East (Lodz) and to the Southeast (ore-mines in Serbia and Turkey, mineral oils in Rumania); today we must reckon with being pushed back and limited to our own country, and even with the possibility of thereby losing the most valuable industrial regions (Trans. Note: Handwritten: and bases of raw materials) in the East and in the West.

Such an economic situation appears so desperate that it might be argued that an adjustment of war economic preparations to these conditions would be futile. This argument, however, cannot be considered as justified. We must certainly remain aware of the fact that in such a situation, without import possibilities, economic reasons alone would make it impossible to wage war for longer than a few months; from the recognition of these facts our foreign policy and our alliance policy should draw their conclusions. But just as nobody would, from this point of view, reject limited military armament as futile, for the same reason it must not prejudice our economic armament. And even if we only succeed in prolonging that period for some weeks by strict organization aimed at coordinating all our economic forces and by an instantly applied rigorous policy of conserving our

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economic resources, then the economic armament will at least not have been lagging behind the limited military armament.

Departmental
Responsibility of
the Reich Ministry
of Economics

(Trans. Note:
Handwritten:
Limitation?
Illegible
Initial)

(Trans. Note:
Handwritten: Not
the semi-
finished products.
Raw materials
only in bulk. W.

(Trans. Note:
Handwritten:
Navy?)

The Reich Ministry of Economics is in charge of industrial Economy with the exception of the production of ~~army~~ (Trans. Note: Crossed out, Handwritten: Wehrmacht-) equipment proper, for which the Wehrmacht authorities are responsible. In case of emergency (Ernstfall) this production naturally takes up the major part of the manufacture of finished industrial products; but as it is the task of the Reich Minister of Economics to make available all raw materials and semi-finished products, including the raw materials etc. necessary for the production of army equipment, and as he is, moreover, responsible for the production of all technical and civilian requirements, this task remains large and important enough. This division of tasks, because of the close connection between them, requires the closest personal and material collaboration between the responsible authorities on either side (Reich Ministry of Economics, Army Ordnance Office, Army Administration Office, Reich Air Ministry). To have brought about this collaboration was an important result of the work done during the first year. Its importance with regard to the smooth functioning of the measures

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prepared in case of emergency (Ernstfall) cannot easily be over-estimated. The technical and personal collaboration between the Reich Ministry of Economics and the Army Ordnance Office was

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particularly close, especially as the excellent preparatory work of the Army Ordnance Office, in the sphere of raw materials particularly, was the only available source on which the Reich Ministry of Economics could base its work in its initial stages. The earnest desire of both parties to require the same close collaboration from their branch offices outside Berlin too, now and in the future, (some of them are already in existence, while others will be established within the next few days), gives reason for hoping that out in the country too the indispensable mutual understanding is being prepared even now in peacetime.

Theoretical and Practical Work. The task of the Reich Ministry of Economics can be divided into two parts, a theoretical one and a practical one for day-to-day requirements. The theoretical part consists of the preparation of war economy by legislation and organization. This includes the drafting of all laws, regulations, ordinances and decrees intended to introduce the policy of conserving economic resources, by which requisition, consumption restrictions, regulations about de-requisition are promulgated. As to organization, plans are drawn up on paper first,

(Trans. Note: Legible Handwritten Marginal Notes)

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then follows further preparation by appointing the persons in charge and by making the necessary staff and offices available. Thus the organizations are set up for the rationing of the various materials which are to be conserved and for a unified central direction of the entire war economy

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As a first step the intolerable state of unpreparedness existing when the work was started had to be brought to an end as soon as possible by setting up a framework and small initial organizations for a start. This was the immediate aim. Apart from establishing numerous organizations and installing their executives, which still remains to be done, this objective can be considered as having been reached.*) But this immediate objective needs a final objective in order to be complete. Soon after the work started, and since then in increasing measure, it became increasingly evident that the attainment of the immediate aim would be no more than an emergency solution. Indeed, all the various interferences in economic life as laid down in the ordinances under discussion offer the possibility of instantly taking precautions against a wasteful policy and of introducing as instantly a conservation policy. Certainly, much is gained by this. But saving and preventing are measures which are but repressive or, in terms of the development of economic potentialities, negative. A self-sufficient economy as we have to envisage it in the case of war (A-Fall) is positively directed only then when the enterprises are not merely informed of what they are permitted or not permitted to do, but what they must do.

*) see page 72 on this subject.

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(Trans. Note: A Central authority therefore has to issue precise instructions to
Handwritten each individual industrial enterprise. Only this could be called a
Marginal Note: truly positive economic mobilization. This is, of course, a plan
and a task the magnitude of which can hardly even be imagined at
Initials: present; not only and not so much in view of the huge number of
enterprises - apart from the smaller ones about 200,000 industrial
whole community enterprises are involved - but mainly on account of the immense
variety of the branches of industry and their complete interlocking
which can hardly be. Any individual order to achieve a certain
production necessitates 10, 30, 50 or 100 simultaneous orders to
sub-suppliers and sub-contractors for the numerous kinds of raw
materials and partly finished goods of which a finished product is
composed - besides specific directions for transport, loading and
re-loading facilities. Years will be required to prepare for such
a thorough economic mobilization. Today some of the basic pre-
requisites for this project are still lacking, although in the
first year one of the most important initial steps had already been
started by setting up a card-index of enterprises and a compre-
hensive statistical system of a new kind. These statistics will
provide a basic picture of the interlocking and interdependence of
the various branches of industry in figures for the first time.

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In addition this statistical material will prove to be of the
greatest value for restrictions and economizing. This statistical
system was started at the beginning of 1934 thanks to the Reich
Minister of Finance who had so generously and speedily made RM
1,200,000 available from budget funds. Thus it became possible to
attain one of the basic requirements for the work towards reaching
the final objective in the early stages of the preliminary work for
the immediate objective without any loss of time. The appointment
in several districts of 14 "special plenipotentiaries" (Sonder-
beauftragte) of the Reich Ministry of Economics which is being
carried out at present also forms an indispensable part of the
basis for future work. These offices are intended to be the nucleus
for future decentralization which will also facilitate the
preparatory planning to be done by the central authority at an
intermediate level.

Special
Difficulties

The execution of the work was hampered and made difficult by
several facts:

(Trans. Note: 1) The task is different from others insofar as it has to be
Handwritten solved without reference to "precedents". The study of the war
Notes: Being economy during 1914-18, the data of which have so far unfortunately
continuously only been utilized to small extent, certainly offers valuable
supplemented suggestions. But the mere copying and imitation of the measures
with the co-
operation of
the Reich
Ministry of
Economics.
Initials:)

1) The task is different from others insofar as it has to be
solved without reference to "precedents". The study of the war
economy during 1914-18, the data of which have so far unfortunately
only been utilized to small extent, certainly offers valuable
suggestions. But the mere copying and imitation of the measures

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adopted at that time is out of question in view of the above-mentioned
difference between the situation then and now. Therefore these
ordinances submitted are in every respect new and original drafts.
The experience gained by the Control Offices (Ueberwachungsstellen)
for raw materials and goods of all types which were set up during

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(Trans. Note: Handwritten Note: On the contrary, for this very reason we must not repeat the bad experiences, but explore the good ones and develop the results.
Illegible Initials)

the past six months and considerably increased recently are more important for serving as examples, particularly in regard to organizational questions. The Sub-Section (Referat) therefore remains in continuous close touch with all of them and has partly participated in their establishment. Proper care will be taken that the experience gained by the Boards will not be lost to our war-economic preparation in case of any sudden dissolution of the offices. But even these examples and experiences can only be used to a limited extent. Generally we find ourselves covering new territory in our preliminary work.

2) This peculiarity had the result that the first grant of budgetary means which had been found indispensable for the practical part of the measures adopted was delayed beyond the start of the fiscal year (1 April) 1934. Not until then was the road clear for the final planning and the starting of several practical measures. They were now executed with great energy*.

*) Note: Details of these measures are given in the reports of the committees (see sect'n II).

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This task claimed most of the time of the Referenten (Specialists) so that the theoretical work was temporarily forced somewhat into the background. It was possible to meet the increase of work on hand by the expansion of the office, formerly administered by only one fulltime higher-ranking official, to a special Referat divided into departments with 8 fulltime Referenten under the direction of a Ministerialrat. This department is immediately subordinate to the Minister and Under-Secretary of State (Staatssekretär) of the Reich Ministry of Economics.

(Trans. Note: Handwritten Note: Not a bad achievement, considering that, 16 months ago, we started with 1 part-time official.
Illegible Initials)

3) The growing deterioration of the foreign currency position made it impossible to execute all those plans which required immediate expenditure of foreign currency, for example, the additional stockpiling of nickel, metals for steel-tampering, rubber and other foreign raw materials. At present it is difficult even to make available the raw materials - or the foreign currency to buy them - which are required for the execution of the present increase of armament program; this problem frequently causes considerable anxiety. Under the prevailing conditions, additional raw materials can only be stockpiled in exceptional cases.

(Trans. Note: Handwritten Note: Already impossible, according to discussions held.
Illegible Initials)

4) Further complications arose out of the necessity for taking very urgent top-priority measures on several occasions because of the critical state of our foreign affairs, notably after Germany had left the League of Nations.

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Consequently we had to deviate twice from the schedule of work which was based on 1 October, 1934.

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5) Finally, the compelling necessity of camouflaging the entire work tends to render this work considerably more difficult, especially in its initial stages. Explicit instructions in writing have to be replaced by lengthy verbal discussions, and special precautions and reserve are frequently necessary when persons have to be selected for confidential employment of when members of the business world lend us their assistance.

The fact has been stressed that this enumeration of the difficulties encountered is not an attempt to shirk responsibility in any way or to make excuses for the responsible authorities. The former does not apply in any case because these difficulties have their origin in the matter itself and because it has to be appreciated gratefully that the Reich Ministry of Economics, when dealing with the other departments concerned, has in general met with an increasing amount of understanding for its frequently extensive demands. Any specific justification appears to be entirely unnecessary, however, as the offices responsible are convinced of having done their utmost to make good the omissions of the past 15 years, within barely 18 months.

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They are, in addition, quite conscious of the imperfection of what has been accomplished so far and are always comparing it with the greatness of the task before them.

Work Methods:
Committees and
their Tasks.

(Trans. Note:
Handwritten
Note: A.A.
(Auswaertiges
Amt-Foreign
Office)

The external organization was as follows: At the suggestion of the Reich Defense Ministry, 5 committees were formed; and a sixth was created later. Under the chairmanship of the respective senior officials concerned of the Reich Ministry of Economics the outlines for the work and the working plans were fixed by means of discussions held jointly with almost all the Referenten of the Reich Ministry of Economics, and the other departments (Resorts) concerned (such as the Reich Defense Ministry, Reich Air Ministry, Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Reich Ministry of Labor and Reich Ministry of Transport). This way of working which was very brisk in the beginning, had the advantage of bringing all the responsible section leaders (Referatsleiter) of the Reich Ministry of Economics into contact with problems of war economy, which at that time were still of less immediate concern to them. This also had an effect on the work of the economic-political experts at the time. As the work progressed - and especially since the work of preparing practical peace-time measures, which was often extremely difficult from the legal point of view and took a very long time (stockpiling for, and construction of new plants

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at the expense of or subsidized by the Reich) began to take a more prominent place, the simultaneous overstraining of the Reich Ministry of Economics, caused by the unprecedented increase in routine work, made it necessary to transfer the extensive executive and detail work to Referenten appointed expressly to attend to it.

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First it was necessary to obtain a survey of the probable requirements and the possibilities for covering them. In the initial stages of the work the applications which the Reich Ministry of Defense made for the materials it needed were available - although they have in the meantime been superseded by newer and exact requirement registrations

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because of the extraordinary increase of requirements. Furthermore estimates of civilian requirements necessary for the maintenance of economic life in general were submitted. These estimates were first checked and as far as possible corrected on the basis of the available statistics. They should be improved and refined continuously. The results of the extensive statistics of production and its inter-relationship for 1933/34 mentioned on the top of page 10 will be of considerable use in this work. These requirement estimates were compared with the possibilities of supply in various fields, i.e., at first for the German territory. These investigations have been carried out in connection with iron-ores and iron production (as far as blooms), non-ferrous metals (such as copper, zinc, tin, etc.) and their ores, chemical raw material, textile raw material, rubber and asbestos, with hides, furs and leather, with the groups of minerals and soils vital to the war effort and finally with cellulose - even though this so far has only been roughly estimated. Besides, a special investigation was developed in the course of last winter by means of detailed questionnaires in order to ascertain accurately the requirements for materials of the so-called great public consumers (Reichsbahn, Reichspost,

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Reich Traffic Administration (Reichsverkehrsverwaltung) and Reich Finance Administration) for these different raw materials. The results are not to hand yet. The municipal requirements also still have to be ascertained and this task will have to be handled with particular caution because of the necessity for secrecy.

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Furthermore it was necessary to ascertain as exactly as possible the potentialities of production and especially also the local distribution of production. This was done successfully with regard to the most important fields, namely of iron and iron-ores, non-ferrous metals and their ores, chemical production and rubber production with the support of the associations which, taken into our confidence, readily offered much more ample material than for other economic-political purposes. As to the branches of production vital to the war effort and public life, the statistical investigations of the Reich Office for Statistics (Statistisches Reichsamt) on plants and productions have clarified the question of location.

Based on the knowledge of critical danger-points and obtained by these methods and on claims by the Reich Ministry of Defense made on similar

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lines, a number of measures have been introduced to overcome the most urgent difficulties:

1) The possibility of making a sufficient quantity of highly concentrated nitric acid available is a prerequisite for the production of explosives and ammunition. By far the largest number of plants suitable for peace-time requirements are concentrated along the Rhine. It was imperative to set up another plant with an annual output capacity of 30,000 t in the safe zone of Central Germany. After several months of planning the construction of such a plant requiring approximately 2.7 million RM, it was possible to start in June of this year at Döberitz near Rathenow. The construction is scheduled to be finished by next spring.

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4) Special attention has been paid to the ferrous alloys (ferrous chromium, ferrous wolfram, ferrous molybdenum, ferrous vanadium) necessary for the production of high grade steels. We have succeeded in persuading Wacker-Chemie to produce ferrous chromium with low carbon content and in securing a market for the production in spite of the higher prices as compared with those for similar goods hitherto exclusively imported from abroad. The production capacity for ferrous chromium with high carbon content has also been considerably expanded.

Influence brought to bear on I.G. Farbenindustrie secured the transfer of part of the production of ferrous wolfram, hitherto exclusively located in the danger zone (near Aix-la-Chapelle), to Central Germany as from 1 January 1935. This concern is at the same time building a reserve plant of considerable size so that the production capacity demanded for the year 1935 will almost be attained.

The same concern is extending its installations for the production of ferrous molybdenum so that the required production capacity for this product too can be expected to be reached at the beginning of 1935.

The necessary procurement of ore for all these products is, however, somewhat difficult because of the foreign

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currency situation.

5) Besides rubber, soot is an indispensable raw-material for the manufacture of tyres for motor-vehicles. As suggested by the Referat, the "Hing" (Holzverkohlungsindustrie A.G.) has been occupied for more than a year with exploring the technical possibilities of replacing the American soot - of which up till now all has had to be imported for these purposes - by home production. As these efforts have, in the meantime, lead to a technical success, and as the foreign currency situation is at present critical, the construction of a large plant is now being

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started. As soon as this plant is finished, the erection of other plants is going to start with consideration of the experience gained in the first plant. The sites for these plants are being chosen with regard to military policies. Complete independence of the whole of Germany from imported soot can be expected by the end of 1935.

6) In order to assure the production of trinitrotoluol the storing of 2500 tons of pure toluol at Dresden was requested. The requested quantity has already been stored at the site chosen.

7) In order to assist the production of glycerine in view of the growing fat shortage, an agreement has been made with

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some explosives factories to re-distill the spent lyes resultant in the smaller and medium-sized soap-factories.

8) For the production of aluminum, the making available of arc-electrodes (anodes) for the electrolytic process is indispensable. These electrodes were up till now exclusively produced close to the borders. Recently, after the Reichrat had conducted lengthy negotiations, production in Berlin has been made possible.

9) Pyrites are the basic raw-material of sulphuric acid, which is an indispensable chemical intermediate product. In Germany it can only be produced in the danger zone (Westphalia). The I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. has been induced to complete the stockpiling of an additional amount of pyrites during this winter. Furthermore the conversion of a large plant of this concern to the production of sulphuric acid from gypsum is going to bring considerable relief in this respect.

Since the appointment of a Commissioner in charge of Raw Materials at the Reich Ministry of Economics, the work of the Raw Materials Committee is being conducted in a close collaboration with him. The investigations made and the measures taken by the Commissioner for Raw Materials in order to increase the supply of our raw materials by home production, as well as to promote the manufacture of substitutes and synthetic materials, are of direct

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benefit to our war-economic preparations. His research work, done under the pressure of the present emergency, will for a long time to come prove to be a rich source of most valuable information, in any case for the purposes of war economy.

The raw material situation is being watched from day to day. The results obtained from inquiries made by the control offices (Ueberwachungsstellen) do not, for the time being, call for any special anxiety as to a deterioration of the raw material situation, except for wool, rubber and asbestos. Nevertheless the serious danger exists that because of the increased restriction on imports and the impossibility of reducing the consumption of

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raw materials for reasons of labor market policy, the German raw material manufacturing industry is forced to use the existing stocks to an ever increasing extent. This would result in a serious diminution of our stocks of raw materials, which, in the case of an emergency, would suffice on an average only for 3-5 months, if used in the most economical way. This development must and will be closely watched in the future.....

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The extraordinary significance of motor fuel supplies is a result of the increasing motorization of the Wehrmacht, the growing importance of the German Air Force, almost unlimited in its future development, and finally of the ever-increasing motorization of the whole civilian transport system which would be endangered most seriously by a motor-fuel shortage. Among all the raw materials under consideration, motor-fuel furthermore holds a distinctive position, because it needs to be immediately available for the conduct of war. The same applies to bituminous coal while other raw materials have to go through a manufacturing process often lasting many months, prior to being put at the disposal of the Wehrmacht as a completed item of army equipment.

The gap between demand and supply of motor-fuel particularly is terribly great.

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Requirements for 1935 amount to 1750 000 tons and can only partly be met for one year by stocks and home production totalling about 1 million tons. The supply of special gasoline for airplanes can at present only be guaranteed by accumulating stores, but so far this has met with only negligible success.

The Committee for Power has kept itself continually informed about the progress of the negotiations concerning the further development of the German production of gasoline from lignite and bituminous coal. So far the increase in production at Leuna from hitherto 100,000 tons to a total of 300,000 tons in future has actually been realized.

Serious efforts were made to stockpile motor-fuel from abroad. At the turn of 1933/34 the idea of creating an obligation by law for foreign importers to keep a certain quantity in store was being put into practice by drafting a law to that effect. When the draft of this law was rejected by the Reich Cabinet, negotiations were started with the large foreign oil-combines with the aim of bringing about this fuel storage. In this connection it was planned that the expenses for interests and for amortization of the tanks built and of the fuel stocked should be borne by the Reich.

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The provision of storage tanks, to be financed from the Reich budget, was now energetically started. The selection of the storage sites and the entirely new projection work could be advanced so far that it was possible, only four weeks later, to start work on the installation of fuel storage tanks of approximately 200,000 tons capacity, in a potassium mine in Central Germany (Stassfurt-

Leopoldshall). These storage tanks are to be ready for filling in spring 1935. From the point of view of air raid protection they will provide an ideal and unique means of storage. Two more underground storage tanks of 75,000 tons capacity each were planned in addition. The construction of one of those will be started in the near future. It is also to be available for filling in spring 1935. The Reich Minister of Finance has promised in principle to release the sum of 25 million RM for these purposes.

(Page 39 of original)

Requirements:

Present
Industries)

The production available to cover economic and civilian requirements may, in case of war, not only be considerably reduced by the loss of factories, most of which are located within the danger zone, but also - as will undoubtedly happen - by the demands made by the armed forces on production plants.

By means of an investigation initiated by the Army Ordnance Office at the end of 1933, the armed forces checked and reserved

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rans. Note: approximately 2800 industrial plants with 750,000 workers in case
 ndwritten of war. The industrial census of 1933 showed approximately
 te: Accord- 1,000,000 industrial enterprises with 5,000,000 workers
 g to the old representing the whole of German industry. If the number of
 P. (Industry workers is taken as a basis, at least 15% of the industrial
 oduction), production is reserved by the armed forces. In certain branches,
 is is relat- however, this percentage is considerably exceeded, as, for instance,
 only to in the following cases:

last stages
 manufactur-
 Initial:

(Page 41 of original)

increase in
capacity.

In addition, steps will have to be taken to increase the production capacity at least of the vital industries and those essential to the conduct of the war, as they are at present inadequate in - D (Inneres Deutschland - Inner Germany).

rans. Note:
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 e: Wi In
 case give
 calls.
 itial W.

For this purpose the Reich Commissioner for Land Settlement (Reichsiedlungskommissar) was contacted, so that influence would be exerted on industry in the interests of war economy on the basis of the law concerning temporary measures for the regulation of land settlement. This law provides for compulsory registration and the possibility of prohibiting the extension or building of new premises for industrial plants.

ndwritten
 te:
 legible)

(Page 42 of original)

Furthermore, in agreement with the Reich Coordination Board (Reichsausgleichsstelle) of the Reich Ministry of Economics, endeavors are being made to strengthen the productive capacity of the vital industries in I-D (Inner Germany) and those essential for the conduct of the war by placing Government orders of major importance to the war economy as far as possible in Inner-Germany, and those of less importance to the war economy in A-D (Aeußeres Deutschland - Outer-Germany).

In case of war (A-Fall) the utilization of the production capacity available depends largely on the existence of a sufficient number of skilled workers.

In agreement with the Reich Defense Ministry, and pending a final settlement at a later date, this manpower supply in case of war (A-Fall) first of all to be secured by exemption from military service of the entire staffs of the armaments industry and the essential war industries and vital industries, with the sole exception of those people who were discharged from the Wehrmacht during the past five years after receiving military training.

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In order to prepare the final settlement, the Reich Ministry of Labor, at the suggestion of the Reich Ministry of Economics, will furthermore determine the categories of skilled workers who are technically indispensable for the maintenance of production for almost every field of industry. As far as possible these categories should later on be exempt from military service everywhere. In armament factories and in war essential and other vital concerns too, from which during the first weeks of war (A-Fall) as already mentioned, no labor is to be called up, only these categories will be reserved later on;

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the remaining persons liable to military service will be released for the Army when suitable substitutes have been found for them.

..... In view of the indefinite duration of a war (A-Fall) these stocks have to be saved most carefully right from the beginning. The consumption of vital commodities by the civilian population therefore should be severely restricted right from the beginning of a war (A-Fall).

In preparation for this control of consumption a "Regulation to Guarantee the Vital Requirements of the Civilian Population" has been drafted (See section V No. ..). The regulation provides that in the case of war bread, fat, potatoes, meat, pulses, woven and knitted goods, footwear, soap, soap powder and other cleansing materials containing fat, as well as household coal, may only be distributed to the population against a ration card or a special license. Such ration cards, which will contain appropriate coupons for the various commodities, are in case of war to be distributed immediately by the competent police authorities.

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Price
Policy.

The control of production, distribution and consumption also entails the regulation of prices. This question has been considered in a memorandum on "The Price Problem in War Economy". As a result of this it has been established that a rise in prices in case of war (A-Fall) due to scarcity of commodities and increased require-

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ments for war purposes cannot in itself be prevented, but that the development of prices beginning with the raw material, including the different stages of production and trade and ending with the final consumer, can be kept firmly under control by a Price Control Board.

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Part B

Section V.

26. Decrees and Directives for the Control of the Industrial War Economy

(Page 1 of original)
(77th Page of original)

No. 1

Decrees for the Establishment of an Administrative Organization for the Industrial War Economy

dated.....

Based on Article 2 of the Reich Defense Law of.....
(Reich Law Gazette, Part I, Page...) and the Decree of Procedure for this Law of..... it is decreed:

Section V. District (Bezirks) Economic Offices

Article 1.

Establishment

For the execution of the decrees for the regulation of Industrial War Economy, issued by the Reich Minister of Economics or the Departments authorized by him, 14 District Economic Offices are to be established. Their seats of office are to be at Koenigsberg/Pr., Stettin, Berlin, Breslau, Magdeburg, Kassel, Hannover, Muenster, Bochum, Hamburg, Dresden, Weimar, Munich and Stuttgart.

Article 2.

Jurisdiction

1. The regional limit within which each District Economic Office is authorized to act can be seen from Appendix 1.
3. The Presidents of the District Economic Offices will be appointed by the Reich Minister of Economics. The employment of the staff and supply of the equipment required is the duty of those supreme administration

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(78th page of original)

authorities of the "Land" in the place where the District Economic Office is located.

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Article 3.

Branch Offices.

1. In all cases where the capital of the "Land" is situated within the districts mapped out in Appendix 1, the Land Government, in agreement with the President of the District Economic Office, will establish a branch office at its seat for the parts of the Land within the District. Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 2 will be applied accordingly.
2. Other branch offices may be established, with the approval of the Reich Minister of Economics, by the President of the District Economic Office.

Article 4.

Duties.

The District Economic Offices will superintend and support, in accordance with the directions issued by the Reich Minister of Economics and at the request of the Reich Office (Reichsstellen) established on his orders, the execution of decrees and ordinances issued by them.

(Trans. Note: Handwritten Marginal Note: The duties, divided between two authorities at the highest level, are, therefore, combined within the jurisdiction of one authority at the medium level. Initials Illegible.)

Article 5.

Powers.

1. Within the scope of the tasks allotted to them by Article 3 (Trans. Note: Handwritten 4 over 3), the District Economic Offices may issue all necessary directives. On their request, the general administration authorities are to lend their official assistance.
2. The District Economic Offices are especially entitled to wartime requisitioning under the provisions

(Page 3 of original)
(79th page of original)

of Article 3, number 6e of the Decree of Procedure of the Wartime Requisitioning Law.

Section II. War Economy Offices of Municipal Administrations.

Article 6.

Establishment and Duties.

The towns outside the jurisdiction of the Kreis (Kreisfreie Staedte) and the Kreise will establish War Economy Offices. Their duty is to execute the decrees and directives issued

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT
NO. EC-128
Cont'd

by the Reich Minister of Economics for the regulation of War Economy, by the Reich Offices (Reichsstellen) for the regulation of industrial war economy, and by the District Economic Offices.

Section III. General Regulations.

Article 7.

The legal and administrative regulations necessary to carry out this decree are issued by the Reich Minister of Economics.

Article 8.

This decree is effective as of.....

Berlin, date.....

• The Reich Minister of Economics
.....

The Reich Minister of the Interior
.....

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P. NO. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. EC-128.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M.P. NO. 34079

END

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S. S. Jordan
MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO.
CASE NO. *41*
Prosecution Document Book No. *XXXIX* 39

English



INDEX TO DOC. BOOK XXXIX

FARBEN PARTICIPATED IN CREATING AND EQUIPPING
THE NAZI MILITARY MACHINE FOR AGGRESSIVE WAR

Exhibit Document No.	No.	Description of Document	Page in Doc. Book
NI-7823		Secret Command Matter. Letter from Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials to the Minister of War re production program and stockpiling of gun powder, explosives, chemical warfare agents and intermediates therefor. Dated 29 December 1936.	1
NI-7848		Secret Command Matter. Mobilization Plan on assuring of mobilization provisioning by stockpiling (increased imports). Dated 8/9 April 1938.	3
EC -258		Top Secret report on the preparations for the economic mobilization for war by the Plenipotentiary for War Economy. Status at the end of Dec. 1937.	10
NI-7563		Draft of Strictly Confidential report regarding discussions between IG and Military Economic Staff in connection with the advisability of discontinuing to furnish the Mond Nickel Co. with reports of nickel sales. Dated 29 March 1938.	33
NI-4921		Strictly Confidential letter from the defendant Knieriem to V/W dated 2 September 1936, on the problem of supplying Germany with nickel, stating that IG, because of her friendly relations with the International Nickel Co., might probably be able to attain certain further advantages for Germany's nickel supply.	35
NI-10389		Supplemental Agreement between the Mond Nickel Co. Ltd. and IG (Supplemental to agreement dated 1 Jan. 1936), enabling IG to import increased quantities of nickel. Dated 4 May 1937.	42
NI-7564		Minutes of the IG conference at Ludwigs-hafen on 5 April 1939 in the presence of the defendant Hasfliger, on IG's foreign exchange arrangements for the procurement of nickel, molybdenum and tungsten.	45



Exhibit No.	Document No.	Description of Document	Page in Doc. Book
NI-9636		Original carbon copy of memorandum, signed by the defendant Haeffliger and dated 19 October 1939, on IG inducing International Nickel Co. of Canada to stockpile nickel in Germany at their expense and at the disposal of IG.	47
NI-9638		Original mimeographed letter from V/W to Dr. Schlecht at IG, Ludwigshafen on IG supplying Wifo with nickel, which is described as "outright war stocks". Dated 17 January 1940.	51
NI-9639		Carbon copy of Confidential letter from Dr. L. Schlecht of IG, Ludwigshafen, to defendant Haeffliger, on same topic as before. Dated 22 January 1940.	54
NI-10388		Typewritten memorandum entitled "Extract from a report by Dir. Meyer-Kuester on a discussion with Dr. Gahn on 10 May 1939 in Berlin", which reveals I.G.'s collaboration with the Reich Economic Ministry regarding the procuring and stockpiling of molybdenum in Germany.	57
NI-9640		Original carbon copy of letter from IG to Gesellschaft fuer Elektrometallurgie Dr. Paul Gruenfeld, dated 27 May 1940, with enclosure, namely: Original carbon copy of joint letter from I.G. Farben and Gesellschaft fuer Elektrometallurgie Dr. Paul Gruenfeld, to Goering as Reichskommissar for Price Fixing, indicating that they had stockpiled molybdenum in view of its importance to military economy and in addition, had imported a further quantity in June 1939 in agreement with the Reich Economic Ministry and Reich Office for Iron & Steel. Dated 28 May 1940.	59
NI-9775		Excerpt from publication "DAS ARCHIV", year 1935/36, p.499, para. entitled "TAGUNG DER BUNSENGESELLSCHAFT". This report deals with the question of foreign exchange provided Germany through the chemical industry. Dated 5 June 1935.	65

Exhibit No.	Document No.	Description of Document	Page in Doc. Book
	NI-8084	Affidavit by Dr. Lothar Mischke regarding IG's privileged foreign exchange position, also indicating that IG placed its economic facilities at the disposal of the Nazis, particular reference being made to the part played by the defendants Krauch and Ilgner. Dated 13 June 1947.	67
✓	NI-10679	Affidavit by Dr. Guenther Frank-Fahle on the part played by IG in procuring strategic raw materials and foreign currency for the Nazi Government. Dated 9 September 1947.	69
	NI-5882	Minutes of meeting of the IG Vorstand and Technical Board of Directors held at Frankfurt-on-Main/Hoechst on 25 May 1936, in the presence of the defendants Lautenschlaeger and Jaehne, regarding IG's privileged foreign exchange position in the procurement of foreign raw materials.	72
267	NI-7136	Secret original carbon copy of report of resolutions from Minutes of the Meeting of the Arbeitsstab "Chemie" held on 15 September 1939 under the Chairmanship of Dr. Ungewitter. Paragraph XV states that IG was charged with procuring arsenic for urgent Wehrmacht requirements, through her foreign connections.	74
	NI-4690	Interrogation of the defendant von Knieriem Mr. B. Glaser regarding the purchase in 1936/1937 by IG of \$ 20,000,000 worth of gasoline for stockpiling from the Standard Oil Co. at the instigation of the German authorities. The defendants Krauch and Schmitz participated in the transaction. Dated 25 August 1945.	79
	NI-4922	A series of letters and memoranda covering the transaction between IG and the Ethyl Lead Export Corporation by which IG "borrowed" 500 tons of tetraethyl lead from that Corporation on the understanding that the merchandise was to be returned by end of 1939. IG gave 1 million dollars collateral security which was subsequently forfeited. Dated July 1938 - September 1939.	93

Exhibit No.	Document No.	Description of Document	Page in Doc. Book
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NI-4831		Affidavit by Helmuth Henze regarding the aforementioned tetra-ethyl lead transaction. Dated 17 March 1947.	113
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NI-9549		Original mimeographed report on a discussion at IG, Oppau, on 16 August 1935 regarding the nickel plant at Oppau, from the point of view of increasing imports, stockpiling, etc. Dated 11 September 1935.	115
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Stamp: Top Secret

Ministerpräsident Generaloberst Goering
Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
Office for German Raw Materials and Synthetics

Journal No. 14087 36 Dr. B/U. I/III

Berlin, 29 December 1936
Behrenstrasse 68 - 70
Telephone: A2 Flora 0048

It is absolutely necessary
to quote this/when making enquiries
/reference/

Ms.: 5 January
Ms.: 31 December
Ms.: Ro (GO)
initials

Stamp: Very urgent

Reference:

Subject: Production program and stockpiling of gun-powder, explosives, chemical warfare agents and their preliminary products.

Stamp: Office of Military Economy,

Raw Materials Department

Ms.: III

31 December 1936 597

No. 4914/36 Top Secret

Ms.: GO

Ms.: Urgent C 31 December

To the
Reich War Minister
Military Economy Staff (Wehrwirtschaftsstab)
High Command of the Army (Staff of the Army Ordnance Office, Departments B3 and B4, Production and Examination Groups 1 and 9; and Inspectorates 4 and 9 of the Army Ordnance Office) (Wa.Stb., Wa B3, Wa B4, Wa Pruef. 1, Wa Pruef. 9, In.4, In.9.)

Reich Air Ministry, Department L A 5
High Command of the Navy
(Naval Ordnance Office)
Berlin

A conference will take place on Wednesday, 6 January 1937, at 1500 hrs., in the large conference room at the Office for German Raw Materials and Synthetics (Amt fuer deutsche Roh- und Werkstoffe), for the discussion of the following topics:

- 1) Determination of the plants to be set up for the production of gun-powder and explosives according to type and quantity.
- 2) Decision on stockpiling of finished gun-powder and explosives (requirements for 6 months).
- 3) Decision on stockpiling of preliminary products and organic basic materials, such as nitration paper, diglycol, etc. (requirements for one year).
- 4) Determination of the plants to be set up for the production of chemical warfare agents, the type of which has been decided already.
- 5) Determination of the types and quantities of chemical warfare agents and production plants, which have not yet been decided.
- 6) Decision on stockpiling of chemical warfare agents (di-chloro-diethylsulphide, requirements for three months).

Ms. marginal:

All questions not yet clarified! And the majority of these cannot be decided by the Office for Raw Materials and Synthetics.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7823
CONTINUED

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Armament (Ruestung) W

(page 2 of original)

- 7) Decision on stockpiling of organic preliminary products for chemical warfare agents (requirements for six months).
- 8) Decision on stockpiling of calcium hypochlorite or Losantin.
- 9) Decision on production plants for calcium hypochlorite (stand-by plants).
- 10) Choice of the sites for chemical warfare agent filling plants.
- 11) Final selection of the sites for storage dumps for the stock-piling of diglycol ammonia (for ammonia-combustion plants and nitric acid (HNO₃)-concentration plants), paraformaldehyde for E-Hexogen, formaldehyde or Methanol for V-Hexogen, acetic acid, etc.
- 12) Final selection of the sites for storage dumps for the stock-piling of tri-glycol and dichlorodiethylsulphide.

It is requested that a representative, duly informed of your wishes, be sent to this conference.

By order:
(signature) Hursuther
Lieut. Commander (Korvettenkapitaen) (E)
and Deputy Department Chief

Ms.:

Cancelled verbally

Major Gimatis (Major)
Lt. Col. With (Oberstleutnant)
Lieut. Commander Trigg (Korvettenkapitaen)
Captain Lochr (Hauptmann)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

22 August 1947

I, Beryl C. HESWICK, No. D 427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly
* with the English and German languages and that the above is
a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7823.

* conversant

BERYL C. HESWICK, No. D 427459.

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7848
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

No. 73
entered 28 September 1938

6 copies: 1 Dr. Ritter No. 6
 5 Major Czimatis
 of which
 1 State Secretary Brink
 2 State Secretary Koerner
 Nos. 3, 4 and 5 with Major Czimatis

6 additional copies: of which
Copy 3 1 Dr. Dittelerand handed over 3 May 1938
Copy 5 1 Dr. Krauch
Copy 6 1 Harle
Copy 4 1 Czimatis for Loeb
 1
 1

ASSURING OF MOBILIZATION PROVISIONING BY
STOCKPILING

(INCREASED IMPORTS)

(Stamp:) TOP SECRET

(Page 2 of original)

Reich Office for Economic Development

8/9 April 1938

TOP SECRET

Div. F
" P
6 copies
6th copy

Assuring of Mobilization Provisioning by Stockpiling

(Increased imports)

Contents:

- I. Basic Ideas
- II. Individual surveys of the raw material fields (*)
 - 1. Steel refining (alloying) metals
 - 2. Non-ferrous metals
 - 3. Iron pyrites, raw phosphate
 - 4. Stones and earths
 - 5. Rubber

(*) Iron ores and mineral oil were not investigated

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7848
(Cont'd)

6. Industrial oils and fats, resins
7. Leather (skins and tanning materials)
8. Textiles.

III. Summary of the proposals

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1. Basic Ideas.

Assuming that additional means of payment in the form of foreign exchange can be made ready, it was to be investigated what measures are to be taken in order to assure the mobilization provisioning by additional imports and stockpiling of vital raw materials, which must be imported.

In order to determine the conditions of mobilization requirements, it was assumed that the requirements of a coming mobilization year must be covered beginning today.

This mobilization requirement is covered by domestic production and by the supplies already on hand. The deficit after deduction of production and stocks on hand ("mobilization gap") represents the additional stockpiling necessary to cover the first mobilization year.

Since in the individual sectors the stocks already on hand vary greatly in quantity -- in part sizeable supplies are on hand, in part as good as no supplies are on hand in very important fields -- in order to make the position more clear the investigation was extended also to the second mobilization year, in which the supplies on hand are already used up. In the second mobilization year the gap in the coverage will be greater if in the individual case in the sector in question the increase of domestic production which is being developed does not make itself noticeable to a corresponding degree (for instance rubber).

In the following presentation there has been placed side by side in each case:

- A. additional stockpiling for assuring the 1st mobilization Year, taking into account the stocks already on hand.
- B. additional stockpiling for assuring the 2nd mobilization year, (supplies on hand have already been used up in the first mobilization year, a possible increase of domestic production has been taken into account).

The presentation also shows the funds necessary in both cases in order to obtain the additional stockpiling of the raw material in question.

A decrease of production, which must be feared particularly in connection with mining because of difficulties in the matter of specialized workers in case of mobilization, has not been taken account of in the considerations. In general, it is assumed that the domestic production will be carried out in accordance with the existing plan of development and that in case of mobilization

(Page 4 of original)

it will be put into operation according to plan.

The amounts in the metal foundries which must necessarily be considered as plant reserves, are not listed as palpable supplies.

In general, care must be taken in connection with the additional obtaining of the raw materials that no disturbance of the market occurs as a result of the purchases, which might lead to price increases. The materials must therefore be obtained with greatest caution, and it is to be recommended that for this the offices be used which otherwise also make the purchases and have at their disposal the best connections and knowledge of markets. It will therefore be advisable to work through the well-known companies or associations. The raw materials which have been obtained should then be transferred to the Reich and stored in the same way as the goods obtained from the foreign market. The goods should be stored with the later processors in the proper proportions, in order to save costs of transportation in case of mobilization.

As a matter of principle raw materials should not be stockpiled in a made-up form, for instance, fittings, etc., since all of these methods increase the work load in case of mobilization, whether because of requisitioning, processing or replacing the finished products which have been called in. There may, of course, be special cases, and to meet these it is proposed to issue supplementary instructions regarding the shaping of the storage policy. In the case of rubber, for instance, the stockpiling will be in the form of tires with Wehrmacht profiles and of cross-country tires, in which case it will be necessary to adjust the storage conditions in such a way that the intake and outgo works smoothly.

The additional mobilization requirements because of the Anschluss of Austria have not been taken particularly into account. Since they will be about 10 %, they are about equal to the margin of error of the total statements regarding the mobilization requirements.

The effects on domestic production because of the inclusion of the Austrian economic area have been taken into account in connection with the considerations.

In the raw material sectors which have not been particularly mentioned, stockpiling measures by means of imports are not necessary.

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II. Individual surveys of the raw material sectors.

The position of the individual sectors is summarized in the following charts. For all vital raw materials which have to be imported, the following information is given in a special expose:

<u>For the</u> <u>first mobilization year</u>	<u>For the</u> <u>second mobilization year</u>
additional stockpiling for this first year (mobilization gap)	additional stockpiling for this second year (mobilization gap)
supplies on hand domestic production	----- domestic production

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7848
(Cont'd)

In each case it also shows the price of the raw material in RM per ton. The costs of the stockpiling in millions of RM are also calculated for the first and for the second year of mobilization.

In each case there is also a note concerning the presumable method of payment (foreign currency or through the clearing) or particulars concerning the form of the raw material to be imported (for instance, as metal, or in the form of preliminary materials or ores). These particulars are only to serve as a guide, as it is not possible to give a detailed survey from here in each individual case.

The following shows the raw material sectors arranged approximately according to their importance and irreplaceability.

The raw materials of the following sectors are clearly not replaceable, not even by economizing or exchanging beyond the measure which is at present industrially safe:

steel refining (alloying) metals and non-ferrous metals.
iron pyrites and raw phosphate.
stone and earths (asbestos, mica, sillimanite and a few special graphites)
rubber

Then come the industrial oils and fats as well as resins, leather (skins and tanning materials) and finally textiles.

(Page 6 - original)

With regard to the sectors it should be pointed out:

1. Steel refining (alloying) metals. These should be considered as completely indispensable and as key products for the refined steel industry. Since reliable figures of mobilization requirements were not available, the requirements of the at present intensively increased steel industry have been taken as a basis for the mobilization requirements.

The substitution measures in the steel alloying metals which are under way, in particular the intensified transition to vanadium steels and the coming vanadium production in Germany has been taken into account. For molybdenum the decreasing requirements for catalyzers, in the case of cobalt the single need for these (Fischer plants) has been reckoned.

2. Non-ferrous metals. Here the data of the W-Department of the Reich Ministry of Economics for the restricted industrial requirements and the direct Wehrmacht requirements have been used. The presumable industrial development, particularly with reference to the substitution measures, has been taken into account.

3. Iron pyrites (raw material for sulphuric acid) and raw phosphate. The mobilization requirement is here based on the industrial requirement, which is at present greatly increased. It is assumed that the increased demand for certain productions will be equalized by the increased demand in other sectors in case of mobilization. The systematic increased use of Magdon pyrites has been taken into account. To maintain the crop yields, the fertilizer requirements for raw phosphate in agriculture are taken as unchanged. In case of necessity it is thought that a diminished fertilization with phosphate for one to two years would not cause any considerable damage to crops.

(page 6 of original-cont'd)

4. Stone and earths. Here the shortages occur in the case of only a few but at the same time indispensable materials. Bauxite for aluminium and other purposes is stockpiled adequately, and in case of mobilization it is presumed that Hungary will be a source of supply.

5. Rubber. Here the latest mobilization requirement of 65,000 tons per year has been taken into account. The requirement of approximately 102,000 tons per year, which was mentioned recently, has now been abandoned. Starting with the second year of mobilization, calculated from today, the production of buna will come very much into the picture. Stockpiling could be suitably reduced later on.

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6. Industrial oils and fats. In this particular case the figures represent the absolute minimum required for the soap industry, despite all systematically planned measures for saving. When stockpiling, one should choose oils and fats as widely different as possible, in order to be able to select and substitute them in the various fields of application. These are:

Glutinous fat (cocoanut, palm kernel fat)	about 15 %
Pernal fat (tallow or animal fat)	" 45 %
hardened fats (fish oils)	" 20 %
fluid oils	" 20 %

Resins. These are put in at about 13,000 tons per year, as representing an inexpensive soap basis. For paper sizing 30,000 tons per year have been reckoned. For use in paints resins are probably highly desirable, but can be dispensed with in case of necessity, since they can be replaced by German resins or exchanged for them.

7. Leather. In the chart the particular conditions ruling in this sector have been taken into account, in that, in order to cover increased mobilization requirements, there must be additional imports of the skins of large animals, which will not be reflected in the leather supply until next year.

The tanning-material requirements have been fixed accordingly.

8. Textiles. It should be pointed out that in this sector, perhaps more than in any of the above-mentioned sectors, we shall have to be content with greater shortages or smaller stocks. This point is of particular significance, in view of the extraordinarily high amounts of foreign exchange which must be used for stockpiling in accordance with the full requirements of the calculation.

It is expressly pointed out that in the case of the estimated prices in RM parities we are dealing with prices which are approximately those ruling recently and that because of market fluctuations the price structure and consequently the amounts of foreign exchange which must be provided for the individual sectors of raw materials may be subject to corresponding fluctuations.

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III. Summary of the proposals.

The summarization by means of a chart shows, at the left for the first year of mobilization, at the right side for the second year of mobilization, the necessary amount of stockpiling in

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thousands of tons per year (additional imports) of raw materials and the amounts of foreign exchange required for this in millions of RM.

The quantities of raw materials for all sectors are set side by side in the form of columns to the same scale, whereas the amounts of foreign exchange are shown, set one on top of the other, also in the form of a column, the amounts required for the various sectors being marked in the same color.

If one considers the conditions for the assuring of the mobilization provisioning, taking into account the stocks on hand, the following amounts must be expended for the first year of mobilization :

<u>sector 1</u> (alloying metals)	
to	
<u>sector 2</u> (rubber) inclusive	248,4 million RM
<u>sector 3</u> (oils and fats as well as resins)	8,2 " "
also for	
<u>sector 7</u> (leather) and	
<u>sector 8</u> (textiles)	609,9 " "
total	866,5 million RM

For assuring the provisioning of the second year of mobilization, bearing in mind that the stocks on hand have already been used up in the first year of mobilization, and taking into account the increase of the domestic production, we require the following amounts:

<u>sector 1 to 5</u> incl.	309,4 million RM
<u>sector 6</u>	30,7 " "
<u>sector 7 and 8</u>	895,7 " "
total	1,235,8 million RM

With the help of the above statements and the individual figures shown on the chart, it is possible, when the additional disposable means of paying in foreign exchange are available, to arrive at detailed measures for a balanced overall proposal.

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As a basic principle when arranging the distribution of the means of payment, it is proposed, in view of the varying degrees of importance of the raw materials, to carry out some such stockpiling plan as the following :

Raw Material Sector	expenditure		for stockpiling	millions of RM
	1st mob year	2nd mob year	total	
1. Steel refining metals	full 68,0	full 76,6	144,6	
2. Non-ferrous metals	full 117,9	1/2 73,0	190,9	
3. Iron pyrites, raw phosphate	full 32,0	full 43,0	75,0	
4. Stone and earths *	full 5,7	full 7,1	12,8	
5. Rubber	full 24,8	full 36,0	60,8	
6. Oils and fats, resins	full 8,2	full 30,7	38,9	
7. Leather	1/2 113,0	---	113,0	
8. Textiles	1/4 96,0	1/4 ---	96,0	
Total	465,6	266,4	732,0	

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Depending on the amount of the funds available, the proposal would have to be adapted accordingly:

In conclusion the position can be summarized as follows: with a view to assuring supplies in case of mobilization, those vital raw materials which have to be imported have been studied, and definite proposals, given in figures, have been made for the stockpiling. Although the figures of mobilization requirements available thus far, cannot, generally speaking, be taken as absolutely correct, it is nevertheless felt that the order of importance of the required supplies was correctly estimated and that an evaluation according to the urgency of the stockpiling was made in the correct manner in accordance with the requirements of the German raw materials economy. - In intensifying the mobilization gaps, the most unfavorable case was assumed, namely, that Germany, in case of mobilization, has no imports whatever and is dependent only on its own production and on the supplies on hand.

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This assumption always holds good for the steel refining alloys, rubber, raw phosphate, cotton, in part also for non-ferrous metals and leather. In case the southeastern Europe is also available for imports in addition to the northern Europe area, a certain amount of relief is possible in the other fields, the exact determination of which must be reserved for a special investigation.

The iron ores and mineral oil sectors were not taken into account in this investigation.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

August 8, 1947

I, Victoria Orton, BTO 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No NI-7848.

Victoria Orton
No. BTO 20129

"END"

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D. 10/21

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC- 258
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

THE PREPARATION
OF THE ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION

BY

THE PLENIPOTENTIARY FOR WAR ECONOMY

STATUS AT THE END OF DECEMBER 1937

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III.

I.

The TaskIn Wartime

The Plenipotentiary for War Economy (G.B.) pursuant to the non-published Reichs Defense Law of May 21, 1935, has the task to make available in case of mobilization all economic forces to the conduct of war and to secure the life of the German people economically.

The reasons for the law emphasize that the experiences of the great war proved the necessity to concentrate during a war the total economy and the whole system of financing of the conduct of the war under one uniform direction. According to the will of the Führer and Reichs-Chancellor, the G. B. is to be in charge of this responsible direction and thus, together with the Reichsminister of War, who holds the executive power, be independent and responsible for the scope of his activities under the Führer and Reichs Chancellor.

In Peace Time

The Plenipotentiary (G. B.) appointed by the Führer and Reichs Chancellor for the case of mobilization has, pursuant to the resolution of the Reich Government of May 21, 1935, to begin his work already in peace time. According to the direction by the Führer and Reichs Chancellor, in his capacity as Chairman of the Reich Defence Council, he has to direct the economic preparations for the case of war as far as they are not within the jurisdiction relative to the armament industry of the Reich War Minister. G. B. and Reich War Minister have to make their preparations for mobilization in close mutual understanding.

II.

The OrganizationThe Leading Staff as Superministerial Agency.

For the uniform planning coordination and performance of all fundamental war economic preparations the G. B. has established a leading staff consisting of specialists of the following ministries and Reich authorities which are subject to it in war time and bound by its directions in peace time:

Reich Ministry for Economy	
Reich Ministry for Food	
Reich Ministry for Forest-Economy	
Reich Ministry for Labor	
Reich Ministry for Finance	} for financing the conduct of the War.
Reich Directory	

The Reich Ministry for Transportation which, contrary to the request of the G. B. has not been brought into the sphere of the G.B. has, upon the desire of the G.B.,

put specialists at his disposal to work on questions of war economic transportation.

The War Economic Departments at Ministry Level

The Offices within the G. B. in order to carry out the directions given to them by the G. B. and its leading staff, have appointed a Reich Defence Division Chief who is immediately under the Secretary of State (Staatssekretär) or, as to the Reichsbank placed immediately under the President of the Reichsbank. The Reich Defence Division Chief are responsible that the war economic preparations within the Divisions are carried out uniformly. While as a rule the Reich Defence Division Chief make use for this purpose of the peacetime economy sections of the GB Divisions, there has been formed in the Reichs Ministry for Economy under the direction of the Reich Defence Division Chief an independent Economic Division for Armament which in collaboration with the other sections of this division shall take the measures necessary for the preparation of industrial war economy.

Central authorities below the ministry level.

The divisions placed under the GB, for the purpose of carrying out the individual war economic tasks, have assigned mobilization tasks to the following central agencies.

The Reichs Ministry for Economy:

- The Reichs Office for Statistics to assemble statistical figures for war economic production;
- The Control Offices to prepare the management of materials;
- The Reichswirtschaftskammer (Reich Chamber for Economy) to limit economic publications;
- The Wirtschaftsgruppen (Economic Groups) to prepare plans for war economic foreign trade;
- The WIFO (Economic Research Corporation with Limited Liability) to construct fuel depots and places for alertness and for the storage of raw materials and fuels important for war;

The Reichs Ministry for Food:

- The Reich Research Institute for Food Economy for drawing war food plans;
- The Reichs Offices to prepare the war food economy;
- The Reichsmehrstand (Reich Food Estate) to prepare the war food economy;

The Reich Office of Forestry

- The Control Office for wood to prepare the war wood economy

The Reichs Ministry for Labor

- The Reich Office for procurement of employment and unemployment insurance, to make preparations for the procurement of labor in case of war.

The field offices of the GB divisions at intermediate level.

The Reich Ministry for Economy, The Reich Ministry for Food, The Reich Office for Forestry and The Reich Ministry for Labor, for the purpose of carrying out district and local tasks, have created branch offices with 7 Prussian Chief

Presidents, 2 Prussian District Presidents, 1 Bavarian District President and 4 Non-Prussian Lander Governments which are at the seat of a Military District Command (Wehrkreis-kommando). With regard to the close cooperation with the military offices of the Wehrkreis-kommando the areas of the field offices are not to be coordinated with the areas of the offices of the general and interior administration to which they are attached, but with the Military Districts (Wehrkreisen). An exception is made as to the areas of the field offices Dusseldorf and Munster which together correspond to Wehrkreis VI.

To guarantee the uniform collaboration within the sphere of GB also on the intermediate level, GB has since 1 1/2 years requested that the field offices of GB be combined at the same seat of the office into economic section for armament under the direction of a Regierungsdirektor (Government Director) to be appointed by him in agreement with the GB departments. The Reich Minister of Interior has not met this demand yet but advocates in a draft for the Preparation of the War Administration (KFG), which at present is with the Führer and Reichskanzler, the formation of general RV division comprising all mobilization preparations in the civilian sector under a Director to be appointed by him.

In wartime the field offices of the GB divisions form the Gau economic office (Gauwirtschaftsämter) to be formed within the offices of the general and interior administration with the following divisions:

- Industrial War Economy
- War Food Economy
- War Forestry and Wood Economy
- War Labor Economy.

The Reich Finance Ministry and the Reichsbank for the purpose of carrying out their tasks within their field districts make use of their following subordinated offices: The Landesfinanzämter (Finance Offices for the Provinces), Finanzämter (Local Finance Offices), Main custom offices etc., and the Reichsbank Main Branches, Reichsbank offices and Reichsbank subordinate offices,

Special deputies of GB on the staff of the chief of civil administration with the Army High Commands.

In wartime the executive power in the field of operations passes over to the Army Chief Commanders who exercise their authority in the civil administration through the Chiefs of Civil Administration (CCZ) assigned to them by the Reichsminister of Interior. The GB sends an own special deputy to the staff of each CCZ who has to carry out all war economic orders issued by the Army Chief Commander to the CCZ. If there are no directions to the contrary by the Army Chief Commander, the Special Deputy of the GB on the staff of the CCZ has to take care that all orders of the GB and the divisions belonging to the jurisdiction of the GB are carried out uniformly in the field of operations. For this purpose the Gau economic offices (Gauwirtschaftsämter) within the offices of the general and interior administration are subordinated to him. The GB has selected the Special Deputies in agreement with the Reichsminister of Interior, the GB must now appoint and instruct them.

Subordinate offices of the field offices of the GB departments as agencies on a lower level.

The following offices are subordinated to the field offices of the Divisions under the authority of the GB, for carrying out district and local preparations:

- The Regierungs Presidents and corresponding non-Prussian authorities;
- The Landrate, Chief Mayors and corresponding authorities for preparation of ration certificates and the preparation of industrial evacuation and salvaging;
- The Industry Supervising Offices for examining the procurement of labor forces in the industrial KL plants;
- The Chambers for Economy (Wirtschaftskammern) for general war economic preparations in the economic districts and for limitations on economic publications;
- The Chambers of Industry and Commerce for securing the productive capacity of the industrial KL plants;
- The Foregoing Trade Offices for securing the capacity of the industrial KL plants as to export production.

To the field offices of the Reichs Food Ministry:

- The Land farmers organizations with the especially created offices for making the food situation secure, for the preparation within their districts of the war food economy.
- The Kreis farmers organization (Kreisbauerschaften) for the local preparation of the War Food Economy.

To the field offices of the Reich Forestry Offices:

- The Land Forest Masters and Land Forestry Administrations for general district questions referring to war forest and wood economy;
- The Forestry Offices for local questions of the war forest economy;

To the field offices of the Reich Labor Ministry:

- The Land Labor Offices (Landesarbeitsämter) for general preparation of wartime use of labor in their districts;
- The Labor Offices (Arbeitsämter) for securing the labor forces in the KL plants of the total war economy and other plants in labor outside of the Wehrmacht.

A general survey of the total organization for the preparation of the war economy is shown in the attached chart.

III .

The Measures.

1. Industrial War Economy.

A. Zentral Regulation.

The preparation of industrial war economy is divided into:

- 1) a central regulation of the production and consumption of industrial products.
- 2) a local securing of production in the industrial KL plants and of consumption of the civil population.

Statistics of War Economy.

For the purpose of securing basic information for the central general regulation of production, and consumption, the Reichs office for Statistics has collected comprehensive war economic statistical figures of the whole German industry in 1936, just as it was done in 1933.

These statistics comprising 300 branches of industry with 180,000 industrial plants, pertains to the composition of the labor force as to sex, age and training, the consumption of raw and auxiliary material, fuels, powers, the productive capacity, the domestic and foreign trade as well as the supply of material and products in the beginning and at the end of the year.

The information received from the individual plants has been collected in a factory card index and will when photostated be put at the disposal of the field offices of the Reich Ministry for Economy as basis for locally securing of the industrial KL factories.

The reports of the individual enterprises will also be put together for the district of each foreign field office and for the Reich classified as to branches of industry and will be used in the central and intermediate agency as basis to judge on the significance of the individual enterprises within the Reich and foreign districts.

The results of branches of industry of a coherent industry group supplementing each other are the purpose of showing the mutual dependence with respect to various materials and product combined into industrial family trees. Equally the flow of materials into the various branches of industry and over the various grades of processing is shown by material family trees.

Economy Plans

On the basis of these statistics collected by the Reichs Office for Statistics economic plans are drafted in the division for war economy of the Reich Ministry for Economy in cooperation with the control offices and industry experts for about 200 materials, half of which have already been worked out. In these plans the needs of the Armed Forces and the civilian minimum needs in wartime are compared with the covering thereof by supplies and production. A deficit will be reported to the office for German raw and working materials and be considered in the execution of the Four Years Plan. In addition it will be registered as import needs in the foreign trade plans which are worked out by the war economy division of the Reichs Ministry for Economy in cooperation with the economic groups of the organization of the industrial economy. The export needs set up in these plans for the purpose of compensating with the import needs, as far as raw materials for manufacturing purposes are concerned, again find consideration in the economic plans mentioned before. For East Russia special economic plans are being worked out.

Preparations for carrying out the economic plans

The economic plans serve as basis for the legal and organizational preparations. According to the unpublished War Contribution Law (RLG) of May 21, 1935, in case of war contractual agreements are replaced by the contribution duty of the individual. Based upon this law (RLG) a decree on the creation of Reichs offices; orders the establishment of State economic offices authorities, which are set up by converting the control offices into Reich offices with increased authority (the right to earmark, seize and assign). The supervisory boards already drawing up their plans for distribution of war contracts are preparing their orders for the regulation of war contracts and fees, they are securing for themselves their indispensable personnel by collaboration with the replacement offices of the Wehrmacht and the field offices of the Reich Office for the Procurement of work and Unemployment Insurance, and they are working out, on the basis of the economic plans submitted to them, a system of management within the framework of their authority. They are preparing the orders which are necessary to carry out this economy in case of mobilization.

Special regulations.

For the handling of coal motor fuels and power farther-going regulations have been prepared in view of the great importance of these materials.

Coal economy.

In case of mobilization the authority to supervise the coal production and to distribute the coal be transferred to the Reich Coal Commissar. He will also be in charge of the immediate distribution to the large consumers and armament factories. The Gau economic offices (Gauwirtschaftsamt), in whose "individual economy" division Gau coal offices (Gaukohlenstellen) are set up, are further charged with distribution of the contingents allotted to them by the Reichs Coal Commissar for the other war important and vital points and for domestic consumption. Special local coal offices serve this purpose which will be incorporated into contemplated economic offices in the offices of the Landrate, Chief mayors and corresponding authorities. To improve the coal stock situation in the protected territory the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate maintains a mobilization stock of 500,000 tons near Magdeburg. For the same purpose the Reichsbahn has increased its supplies by 500,000 tons. To ease the situation of the Reichsbahn which in case of a mobilization will be heavily burdened by the deployment of and replacement for the Wehrmacht, the industrial plants with a annual consumption of more than 3000 tons have been requested to store a coal supply of 3-4 months.

Motor fuel economy.

For the preparation of the fuel management investigations have been carried out in order to find out the needs for fixed and movable motors, and in order to find out the capacity of the storage facilities an investigation regarding the top and gasoline stations has been carried out. On the basis of the results of these investigations and the needs of the Wehrmacht

and the existing possibilities to cover the demands, the Control Office for Mineral Oils as Reich Office will allot to the Gau Mineral Oil offices (Gau Mineralstellen) which are to be established in the divisions for industrial war economy of the Gau economy office (Gauwirtschaftsamt) group contingents for the distribution to large consumers, such as railroads, post, shipping. In addition the Gau Mineral Oil offices will allot subcontingents to the Kreis Mineral Oil Offices, to be created in the planned economic offices of the Landrate, Chief Mayors and corresponding authorities, of which their and KL plants and other k and l important consumers can dispose by ration cards which have been prepared already. Besides now definite gasoline stations and gasoline stores have been designated to the Wehrmacht for the first equipment of the troops in case of mobilization, and which are needed only for the first days after mobilization. A report on the construction of Reich owned large gasoline storage places and intermediate gasoline storage places as well as on the storage of national fuel reserves in these for purposes of the Wehrmacht will be rendered in another place in connection with the work of the Economic Research Corporation.

Power economy.

In the field of energy economy the Law Concerning Power Economy furnishes effective means to prohibit war economically undesirable construction plans and to promote construction plans necessary for the war economy. In the center of the military energy policy is at present the extension of the German compound economy by combining the individual lines into a Reich collecting line, the German Ring. The already appointed Reichs Burden Distributor (Reichslastverteiler) and ten district burden distributors (Bezirkslastverteiler) will have to decide on power supply in the case of mobilization. By instructing these burden distributors about the needs of the R-industry and the war economy to be covered under any circumstances, care will be taken that in case of energy saving which might become necessary, in the first time the need unimportant for war be throttled or cut off. It is practiced by manoeuvres (Planspiele) what measures have to be taken in case places of power generation should be eliminated.

Construction of supply rooms and readiness arrangements supplies.

The Reichsminister of Economy, to overcome bottlenecks in the war economical situation founded in into fall of 1934, the Economic Research Corporation n b h (Wife). The Wife which at present employs 1300 employees and workers including guards has, for the finishing of constructions and storage, invested up to now 248 million Reichsmarks.

The constructions of Wife are as follows:

- 1) Large storage facilities:
 - a) total of 9 with a capacity of 150,000 tons,
 - a) ready 3
 - b) under construction 6
- 2) Facilities for supplement: a total of 30 with a capacity of 150,000 tons,
 - a) ready 7
 - b) under construction 6
 - c) planned 17
- 3) Readiness constructions for the production of nitric

acid, Oleum, carbide alcohol and alumina: a total of ten, of which are

- | | |
|---|---|
| a) finished and taken into operation according to the provisions of the Four Years Plan | 3 |
| b) finished | 4 |
| c) under constructions | 3 |

In all these readiness constructions can be produced;

183,000 tons per year of nitric acid
118,000 tons per year of oleum
20,000 tons per year of carbide alcohol
50,000 tons per year of alumina.

The supplies furnished by Wigo comprise, according to the status of December 1, 1937:

266,000 tons carbomotor fuel
94,000 tons Diesel fuel
43,000 tons of lubricating oil
40,000 tons of manganese ore
4000 tons of ferro nickel
1000 tons of copper
800 tons of magnesium
400 tons of antimony
75 kilograms of platinum

Evacuation and salvage.

In cooperation with the 6th Division of the General Staff of the Reich War Ministry directions on the preparation and execution of the economic evacuation have been worked out. According to an emergency list for evacuation goods and an evacuation list for skilled workers, the supplies and skilled workers in the evacuation zones are registered, earmarked for transportation into certain salvage areas and registered with the Wehrkreiskommandos by the field offices of evacuation and salvaging plans. The Wehrkreiskommandos following these evacuation and salvaging plans issue their evacuation plans, the execution of which is prepared with special regard for transportation under the supervision of the District President (Regierungspresidenten), the Landrate and corresponding authorities with the support of special evacuation commissars. The supplies secured by evacuation will find consideration as supplementary reserves in the central economic plans.

Regulation of consumption

The management of production is supplemented by a regulation of the consumption of the civil population. The Reich Minister of Economy in cooperation with the Reich Food Minister and the Reich Minister of Interior has worked out a decree for securing the vital needs of the German people with four execution decrees (for food, coal, soap and cleansing agents, textiles and shoes.) For purposes of economy and in order to prevent covering of needs which is not uniform (hoarding) these orders introduced a system of ration cards which will be effective immediately in case of mobilization. The 80 million ration cards necessary for this purpose have already been printed and deposited with the Landrate, Chief Mayors and corresponding authorities. The further distribution of the ration cards to the individual households is prepared by these authorities to take place within 24 hours after mobilization has been ordered.

The ration cards are valid for the first four weeks after mobilization. Subsequently a more detailed separate system of rationing will become effective for the industrial war economy and the war food economy which is being prepared at present.

B. Local Securing.

The central regulation of the production and consumption of industrial products is supplemented by a local securing of the production by the field offices of the Reich Ministry for Economy.

Distinction between R - and KL - Enterprises.

The aforementioned resolution of the Reich Government dated 21 May 1935 confers the direction of the economic preparations for the event of war on the Plenipotentiary (GB) only insofar as these preparations are not within the jurisdiction of the Reich War Minister relative to the armament industry. The Reich War Minister has combined the war requirements of the three parts of the Wehrmacht with regard to first equipment and replacement (Nachschub) in a programme for finished goods (Fertigungsprogramm). According to this plan for finished goods military agencies will place with certain suitable industrial enterprises mobilization contracts providing for the delivery of finished implements of war and war contracts providing for the delivery of finished implements of a kind customary in commerce. Industrial enterprises which obtain an order for finished implements of war will be designated by the Reich War Minister as armament enterprises (R-enterprises). Thereby they pass under the special jurisdiction of the Reich War Minister; at the present time there exist approximately 2800 R-enterprises. Within the scope of his jurisdiction as Plenipotentiary (GB) the Reich Minister for Economic Responsibility for maintaining the KL production and the production for exportation which is within the capacity of the R-enterprises not absorbed by mobilization contracts. However, he must report to the military authorities which have jurisdiction over those R-enterprises which measures are necessary to secure the aforementioned maintenance of production and the military authorities shall first ascertain that these measures do not impair the performance of the mobilization contracts and shall then include them in the mobilization calendar. Only after the inclusion in the mobilization calendar may be taken the measures relative to the part of the R-enterprises not used for mobilization contracts.

As to all measures outside of direct production (ausserbetrieblich), e.g. providing with material, fuel and motor fuel, energy and manpower, the Plenipotentiary has jurisdiction also with regard to R-enterprises. Through the Reich Ministry for Economy and its field offices he supervises also those industrial enterprises with which the military authorities (Bedarfsstellen) which are necessary for maintaining of exportation and the supplying of the civilian economy and population with vital necessities are designated by the Reich Minister for Economy as KL-enterprises. Wholesale and craftsman enterprises which are important to the war economy can also be designated as KL-enterprises. The field offices report to the Command of Military Regions (Wehrkreiscommandos) all of the KL-enterprises (approximately 25,000). The Command in turn will see to it that the KL-enterprises are covered by the

Local Police Protection. (Ortsschutz der Polizei) and the Airprotection of the District Confidence Agencies (Bereichsvertrauensstellen) of the Reich Group Industry which are placed under the authority of the Reich Air Minister. Besides the most important KL-enterprises will be reported by the field offices to the Regional Military Commands (Wehrkreiscommandos) in order to insure to them Active Air Protection (Flaks, fighter squads).

Security of KL-enterprises.

The field offices of the Reich Ministry for Economy appoints in each KL-enterprise a trusted person whose reliability has been investigated by the Secret State Police. In accordance with the directives of the field offices of the Reich Ministry for Economy these trusted persons shall carry out the measures which guarantee the maintenance of the production of their enterprises in event of mobilization. In particular they shall report to the competent Labor Offices for exemptions from military service and draft for civilian service all of their workers and employees who are indispensable to their enterprise. In the same manner they shall report to the field offices of the Reich Ministry for Economy for exemption from military and civilian draft requirements all of the motor trucks on which their enterprises depend. The field offices of the Reich Ministry for Economy apply with the competent Military Replacement Inspections (Wehrersatz-inspektionen) for exemption of the trucks and secure for the KL-enterprises the trucks exempted and not required by the Wehrmacht. For those KL-enterprises as to which in the extent of mobilization there must be expected with certainty a maximum use of their capacity (e.g. mining iron industry) as a transformation of their production (e.g. chemical industry, etc.) production plans will be made by the Reich Ministry of Economy. These Plans will be transmitted by the field offices to the trusted persons of these KL-enterprises. The trusted persons of these enterprises shall have all protective measures on these plans of production. The trusted persons shall list all the protective measures taken by them in a mobilization calendar. For this purpose the trusted persons have been furnished with special instructions.

2.) War Food Economy

In order to obtain an exact survey of the possibilities of supplying Germany in the event of a mobilization, which takes into account various cases, such as a blockade or a war on two fronts, the Reich Food Ministry has caused the Research Agency for Food Economy to draw up annual food plans beginning 1 April 1934.

Preparation of the Execution of the War Food Plan

In order to execute the War Food Plan the Reich Food Minister has completed drafts of a skeleton decree relative to the organization of the War Food Economy and of several decrees relating to the public management of the various agricultural products. The provisions thereof have been drafted in such a manner that they can be adapted at any time to the changes based on the peacetime economic measures. On this legal basis the competent Central Associations of the Reich Food Estate (Hauptvereinigungen des Reichsnährstandes) and the Reich agencies (Reichsstellen) of the Reich Food Ministry prepare plans concerning the management of the individual kinds of victuals.

In order to carry out the Food Economy Plan the Reich Food Estate is placed under the authority of the Reich Food Ministry in the event of mobilization. With the District Economy Office (Gauwirtschaftsaemter) which will function in the event of mobilization as an intermediate government agency of the general administration. There will be established a branch for War Food Economy. The external agencies of the Reich Food Ministry are the gercells from which that branch will develop. The branch will be divided into two subdivisions, one of which will deal with the regulation of the production and its control (Erfassung) by the competent Country Peasantry (Landesbauernschaft) while the other will handle the regulation of distribution and of consumption by the competent agencies established with the planned Economic Offices (Wirtschaftsstellen) of the Landraete, Chief Mayors, (Oberbuergermeister) and of similar governmental agencies. The related agencies of the Kreis Peasantries (Kreisbauernschaften) shall be merged into those divisions for war food economy.

Storage

Owing to the serious food situation it has not been possible to store food to the extent necessary in case of mobilization. At the present time there exists only the following national reserve in case of war:

19000 tons of oats, 2000 tons of legumes, 1500 tons of butter and considerable quantities of fruit pulp for the making of marmelade.

Evacuation and Salvaging

Within the framework of the directives agreed upon by the Plenipotentiary (G.B.) and the Reich War Ministry relative to the preparation and execution of the evacuating and salvaging of agricultural products and of animals has also been regulated. Excepting certain deviations, that regulation follow generally the same lines as the procedure prescribed for the removal and salvaging of industrial products (see page 12). The provisions salvaged by removal will constitute an additional reserve for the war food economy in the protected zone.

Rationing of Supplies for Civilian Population.

As was stated above in the section on industrial war economy, in the event of mobilization all vitally important food stuffs will be covered by a system of rationing certificates (Bezugschein) pursuant to a Decree on the Safeguarding of the Vital Necessities of the German People and regulations thereunder. Drafts of both the decree and the appertaining regulations have been completed. It has already been stated that rations certificates have already been printed and have been distributed to the lower administration agencies and that preparations have been made to issue them to the individual households within 24 hours.

A special regulation made in accord with the Reich War Ministry regulates the supplying of the members of the Army, or the Police etc. who live in common lodgings in Germany and are fed in messes.

Supplying of Wehrmacht.

Pursuant to the Principles regarding Supply agreed upon with the Reich War Ministry productive (leistungsfahige) enterprises have been ascertained which have

been directed to furnish the food replacement warehouses with certain quantities in the event of mobilization. The collection of oats, roughage and potatoes for the Wehrmacht has been prepared by fixing the shares of the intermediate and lower agencies of the Reich Food Estate. Similarly the supplying of the Wehrmacht in the zones of operation will be regulated.

Agricultural Card Index

In order to ascertain the kind and efficiency of the agricultural establishments the Reich Office for Statistics is preparing a card index of altogether 1,6 millions of establishments. Under the supervision of the Reich Food Ministry and its field offices (Aussenstellen) this card-index is being distributed among the Kreis-Peasantries (Kreisbauernschaften) and managed by them. From year to year it will be kept up to date by means of a farm card (Hof Karte).

Card-Index of Food Industry

Within the framework of the Inquiry into Military Economic Production of the German Industry made by the Reich Office for Statistics the establishments of the food industry have also been checked and the material has been collected in a factory card-index. This factory card-index system is being managed by the field offices of the Reich Food Ministry, which on the basis of that index, investigate the ever-important establishment of the food industry and declare them to be KL-establishments.

Protection of KL Establishments.

KL-establishments of the food economy are protected similarly to KL-establishments of the industrial economy. Thus, in particular, the field offices of the Reich Food Ministry will notify the Commands of the Military Districts (WehrkreisKommandos) of the KL-establishments which may have to be the subject of local police action and active and passive air protection. The material needed by agricultural enterprises has been ascertained for each district (Kreis) on the basis of thorough investigations by the Reich Food Estate. The field offices of the Reich Food Ministry will notify the field offices of the Reich Ministry for Economy of that material needed and the latter field offices shall see to it that these needs will be satisfied. The field offices of the Reich Labor Ministry, the State Labor Offices (Landesarbeitsaemter) and the Labor Offices (Arbeitsaemter) will cooperate in preparing the securing of the indispensable farm hands and of the skilled workers necessary for the food industry. In the same manner as it is done in the case of the industrial economy the trucks necessary for agricultural enterprises and enterprises of the food economy will be ascertained and secured. It is planned to collect all protective measures in mobilization calendars.

3.) War Forests and Wood Economy

Wood Economy Plan

In order to establish a Plan for Wood Economy the Reich Forest Master has initiated a thorough investigation of the existing wood supply and the requirements of wood. On the basis of the existing material related to the peace time requirements the civilian minimum requirements in the

event of war can be estimated with a fair degree of accuracy. However, in spite of several requests made, it was not yet possible to obtain from the Reich War Ministry information on the requirements of the Armed Forces. For this reason the Wood Economy Plan could not yet be completed.

System of Management

Independently from this not yet completed work, the Reich Forest Master has made legal and administrative preparations to carry out the management of wood (Holzwirtschaftung) in the event of war. As was done in the field of industrial economy, it has been provided to transform, in the event of mobilization, the Supervisory Office for Wood (Ueberwachungsstelle fuer Holz) in a Reich Office with enlarged authority (power to investigate, seize and allot). To carry out regional tasks there will be established a Division for Forest and Wood Economy with the Gau Economy Offices in the intermediate branch of the general administration. This division will be composed of the field office of the Reich Forest Master, of the State Forest Office or the State Forest Administration at the seat of a command of a military district (Wehrkreis Kommando) and of the competent marketing association and will be headed by a State Forest Master (Landforstmeister).

Ascertaining of KL Enterprises

On the basis of the factory card-index established by the Reich Office for Statistics the field offices of the Reich Forest Master have ascertained the KL enterprises of the wood economy situated within their respective precincts, especially the saw-mills.

Protection of the KL-Enterprises

In view of their requirements of material and fuel, of indispensable labor and of absolutely essential trucks, these KL enterprises are protected in the same manner as the KL enterprises of the industrial and food economy. This is being done in cooperation with the field offices of the Reich Ministry for Economy, the State Labor Offices and the Labor Offices and with the competent agencies of the forces (Wehrmacht).

4.) Foreign Trade in Times of War

Plans for Import and Export

On the basis of material which will be gathered by the departments of the Plenipotentiary (GB), the Plenipotentiary (GB), will draw up plans for importation and exportation which will take into consideration the probable war situation. The plans shall show which requirements of importation must be met during the war, what amount of exportation can still be maintained and what will be the probable tons of foreign currency (Devisen) and of clearing possibilities.

Preparation of the Carrying out of the Plans for Importation and Exportation.

A draft of a decree has been completed, which shall become effective in the event of mobilization. It provides that for the direction and regulation of the foreign trade during the war there shall be appointed a Reich Commissioner for Foreign Trade (Reichs Kommissar des Aussenhandels) who shall be placed under the authority of the Plenipotentiary. With the Reich Commissioner these will

be established a Working Committee for the Foreign Trade (Arbeitsausschuss fuer den Aussenhandel) consisting of representatives of all Ministries which have jurisdiction over foreign trade. It is incumbent upon the competent Ministries in the event of War to carry out their tasks in the field of foreign trade.

For the purpose of regulating importation and managing the foreign currency needed in the traffic with goods, the Reich agencies of the GB-Department shall be required to cooperate in case of War. In order to direct exportation, particularly in the field of industrial economy. Export Offices (Ausfuhrstellen) will be established with those Groups of the Economy (Wirtschaftsgruppen) which relate to branches of the economy which, even during a war, may engage in exportation. These Export Offices will take over the tasks and powers of the now existing Investigating Offices (Pruefungsstellen).

As to foreign trade and the transfer of currency, which are already at present to a large extent subject to regulation by law, regulations are being prepared relative to the carrying out and supplementary of the existing provisions. Mainly involved are: the issuing of prohibitions of importation and exportation made necessary by the War, the introduction of custom decreases or exceptions from customs duties with respect to war essential goods, the supplementing of existing currency laws and provisions under which trade treaties and economic agreements with foreign countries become ineffective.

Ascertaining and Protection of KL-Export-Enterprises

As mentioned already in the section on industrial war economy the field offices ascertain all of the enterprises the exports of which, according to the value of 500,000 Reichsmark annually. Those enterprises will be designated as KL enterprises (export) and their production will be protected in accordance with the procedure applicable to KL enterprises.

In order to obtain more detailed material the Economy Groups have been directed to collect with respect to enterprises engaged in export certain data on the export turnover and the direction of the export and to combine the data in a card-index. This card-index will be made known to the competent field offices so that they may supplement their factory card-index. The field offices shall then use these statements as a basis for the protection of production.

5.) Transportation in the War Economy

Ascertaining of Transportation Requirements

In order to ascertain the transportation requirements of the War economy, classified separately as to means of transportation and kinds of goods, the following has been done:

1.) With the aid of the Reich Office for Statistics the traffic statistics have been evaluated and the results have been combined in Verfleck-Sungs-cards.

2.) The Groups of the Economy have furnished coherent reports on the individual kinds of goods.

Consideration of Transportation Requirements of Military Economy and Wehrmacht.

The transportation requirements of the military economy will be coordinated with the military transportation requirements of the Wehrmacht centrally by the Plenipotentiary in the War Transportation Committee (KTA). A similar coordination shall be effected in the precincts of the field offices of the GE departments together with the military agencies of the Regional Transportation Committees (Bezirkstransportausschuesse (BTA)). Deroutings, which are to be expected during war because of changes in the domestic and foreign traffic, will be taken into account.

Transport Situation in the Rhenish-Westphalian Industrial Regions

The General Staff has stated that the examination of the transport situation in the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial regions is of prime importance. Hence, a special investigation has been initiated in order to secure, in spite of the military use of the railways, the supplying of the population, particularly the supplying with food, of which no stores can be maintained in view of the present food situation, by transportation of supplies into the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial region in the event of mobilization. Corresponding investigations have been initiated to keep up the necessary business travel.

Ascertaining and Securing of Trucks of KL Enterprises.

The Plenipotentiary, in cooperation with the Reich War Minister, has prepared directives for the securing of the requirements of the KL enterprises relative to motor trucks. As mentioned above, the trucks of the KL enterprises are ascertained by the field offices of the Reich Ministry for Economy, of the Reich Food Ministry and of the Reich Forest Office. They request the District Military Commands (Wehr Kreis Kommandos) to release these vehicles. With a few exceptions to the contrary, the Commands of the Military Districts have not granted the requests to a sufficient extent, particularly as far as trucks with a net loading capacity exceeding one ton are concerned. The Plenipotentiary has taken up negotiations with the Reich War Ministry regarding a change of the distribution of trucks.

6.) Conscription of Manpower in WarLegal Basis

The basis for the wartime conscription of manpower is the hitherto unpublished conscription of the people (Volksdienstpflicht) for all nationals of the 15th until the completion of the 65th year of life, insofar as they are not called to the colors or expressly exempted from the people's service. It is incumbent upon the Reich Minister of Labor to direct the people's service. For the carrying out of his directions he may use the agencies of the Reich Office for the Procurement of Work and Unemployment Insurance.

Preparation of Labor Conscription

In order to prepare the wartime conscription of labor, the Reich Minister of Labor and the Reich Office

for the Procurement of Work and Unemployment Insurance, pursuant to directives issued by the Plenipotentiary as certain the available amount of manpower, the wartime requirements of manpower and measures for the covering of the wartime needs.

Ascertaining the Available Amount of Manpower

Pursuant to the Law on the Introduction of Labor Passports (Gesetz ueber die Einfuehrung eines Arbeitsbuches) the Labor Offices maintain card-registries relative to 22 millions of workers and employees, i.e. more than 2/3 of the working population. The card-registries, which are kept up to date on the basis of information received from the enterprises, contain exact data as to the professional training, the occupation of the individual up to the present time and the existing skills. The material is supplemented by a card-registry relative to 16 millions of independent craftsmen who in wartimes constitute a valuable reserve of skilled labor. Similar investigations have been initiated as to leaders of enterprises (Betriebsfuehrer) and managers and as to farmers and members of their families who help on the farms. Hence, the entire population, classified according to professions, is surveyed by the Labor Offices, excepting only officials (Beaunte) and professional men (freie Berufe).

The card-registries of the Labor Offices are checked against the Military Conscription Lists of the Military Regional Commands (Wehrstammbucher der Wehr Bezirks Kommandos) and the holders of Military passports (Wehrpass) in the event of War are called to the colors and are especially marked. Furthermore, the amount of manpower employed in peacetime in R-enterprises, KL enterprises and War-essential government agencies is especially indicated. Hence, in the district of each Labor Office and for each profession there is apparent the following:

- 1) the number of existing workers,
- 2) the number of holders of military passports,
- 3) the number of men already employed (festgelegt) in the war economy or other war-important jobs.

The difference shown constitutes the number of workers employed in enterprises of lesser importance and of other reserves, which eventually can be used elsewhere.

Ascertaining of War Requirements of Manpower

Under the supervision of the field offices of the competent GB-departments, the KL-enterprises of the industrial economy, of the food economy and agriculture and of the forest and wood economy compute their probable labor requirements in the event of war. Insofar as the mobilization-production of a KL enterprise is not yet known exactly, its peace time production is taken as a basis for the time being. The manpower requirement in the event of mobilization thus computed is compared with the peacetime amount of manpower used in the enterprise, from which must first be deducted, however, the number of the holders of military passports. The Labor Office is notified of the result of the computation.

Covering of War Time Requirements

In principle, the manpower employed in peace time in KL enterprises and KL agencies shall remain intact. The need for replacing the holders of military passports and for the increased production in the event of mobilization will be

covered by using reserve manpower (manpower therefore used in nonessential enterprises, women etc.). As reserve manpower will be used also the skilled workers who, within the framework of the economic evacuation, have been brought back from the evacuated zones - a process in which the Labor Offices play a part and who are used in salvage zones with a great need for skilled labor. For workers who are irreplaceable for the enterprise (defense workers-Wehrarbeiter) the KL enterprises file with the Labor Offices applications for exceptions from the military service (Indispensability Applications-Unabkömmlichkeitsanträge). The lists of defense workers made by the Reich Labor Ministry serve as directives for the selection of those forces. The Labor Offices examine the applications and transmit them to the Military Replacement Agencies (Wehrersatzdienststellen). The decision is made by the Commander of the Military Region (Wehrbezirks Kommandeur) and, upon appeal, by the Military Replacement Inspector (Wehrersatz Kommandeur).

The procedure established for the scope of the Office of the Plenipotentiary has been accepted - with insignificant deviations - by the Reich War Minister for the R - enterprises and the civilian personnel requirements of the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht), by the Deputy of the Fuehrer for the mobilization of the personnel of the German National Socialist Workers Party (NSDAP), its formations and affiliated associations, the Reich Minister for Propaganda and Enlightenment for the agencies and enterprises within his jurisdiction, the Reich Traffic Minister for local traffic and inland shipping and the Reich Minister of Finance for the monopoly enterprises. Similar negotiations have been initiated with the Reich Post Department and the Reich Railway (Reichsbahn).

The agencies of the air protection, of reinforced police protection and of road construction have been directed by the competent departments to notify the Labor Office of their requirements as to replacements of, and increases in personnel - insofar as the requirements relate to persons who hitherto were within the scope of the activities of the Labor Offices.

Negotiations are being conducted with the other agencies needing manpower (Bedarfsstellen). (Department of the Interior, Reinforced Border Supervision Service). Their purpose is to concentrate in the civilian sector all preparations for the wartime use of manpower in one place, namely at the Labor Office, which closely collaborates with the Military Regional Command (Wehrbezirks-Kommando) that has jurisdiction over the military sector.

Abolition of Right to Choose Domicile in the Event of War

The planned preparation of the use of manpower in the event of War necessitates measures against the freedoms of workers to choose their domicile. Therefore, a completed draft of a Law on the Use of Labor and the Conditions of Labor in Times of War (Gesetz ueber den Arbeitseinsatz und die Arbeitsbedingungen im Kriege) makes every change of the working place and every hiring of workers dependent upon the consent of the Labor Office. The law also provides that, in the event of war, wages and salaries may not be increased: thereby it shall be prevented that higher wages and salaries cause changes of the place of labor. At the same time it is intended to stabilize the price level by freezing (festhalten) wages and salaries.

Relaxation of Provisions on the Working Hours and of the Prohibitions to Employ Certain Persons

In view of the labor shortage which must be expected with certainty in the event of war, a completed draft of a decree relaxes, in the event of war, the existing limitations on working hours and renders ineffective the prohibition to employ women and juveniles insofar as this can be justified in contemplating the nation in its entirety (Volksganze).

Local Protection

A decree in the Housing of Individuals and Families regulates the transfer (raeumliche Umschichtung) of manpower which is inevitable in war in connection with the planned direction of labor. For the same reason there have been enlarged for the case of war, the provisions relative to the granting of travel expenses, work equipment and family allowances for double households, which shall facilitate the employment of workers coming from other places.

7.) War Finance and Money EconomyWar Finance Requirements

The Reich Finance Minister estimates that the financial war requirements for the first year of war will amount to approximately 50 billions of Reichsmark.

Covering of War Finance Requirements

The covering of the war finance requirements must be effected by taxation and loans, as far as the war economy cannot be limited to self-financing (Eigenfinanzierung).

Self-Financing of War Economy

Enterprises which have to perform mobilization-contracts and contracts for delivery of war goods shall cover their financial needs primarily out of their own resources or by way of regular private loans. Wherever this is not possible the leaders of the enterprises will be afforded the possibility to obtain credits for operating and investing purposes by the issuance of Army Bonds (Wehrmachtverpflichtungsscheine) (Securities payable to the bearer which may be lombarded). Through these securities the Reich assumes the role of a surety.

War Taxes

Insofar as the war economy cannot be requested to rely on self-financing it is attempted to cover the financial war needs primarily by means of war taxes. A completed draft of a law provides for the following war taxes:

Additions of	50 percent	to the	Income and Wage Tax,
"	" 62	"	" " Cooperation Tax
"	" 8	"	" " Increased Wage Income,
"	" 30 to 100 percent	to other	Increased Income
"	" 200 percent	to the	Property Tax.

The entire revenue to be derived from these war taxes, it is estimated, will amount to approximately 5 billions annually.

War Loans

Since the planned war taxes will cover only a fraction of the financial war requirements it is provided that they will be supplemented by war loans, the issue terms and price of issue of which even in case of war will depend on the economic and political situation existing at the time, Hence it is probable that large demands will be made upon the Reichsbank for the discontinuance of Treasury Notes (Schatzwechsel). Preparations have been made to make possible the enlargement of the credit volume by amending the Banking Law.

Restrictions on Traffic with Money.

In order to secure the credit economy and to prevent withdrawals caused by fear in one of war regulations have been prepared providing for restrictions: on withdrawals (Auszahlungs Beschaenkungen) and for bank holidays.

Securing of War-Important Money Requirements

Since most war expenses are made without the use of cash (bargeldlos), the increase in the quantity of cash is only a fraction of the entire financial war requirements. This increased need for money tokens (Geldzeichen) amounts for the first three war months according to an investigation relating to 1937/1938 to the following:

Need of Wehrmacht (reported)	approx 3 billions RM		
" " Civilian Administration (reported)	approx 0,4 Bill. RM		
" " Economy (estimated)	approx 1,5 " "		
So called panic Needs (estimate)	" 0,7 " "		
		Total	approx 5,6 " RM

To satisfy those needs there is at our disposal, in addition to the usual amount of current legal tender which at present exceeds 7 Billions of Reichsmark the reserve of money tokens in the amount of 13,5 billions of Reichsmark which is in the custody of the main office of the Reichsbank and of the Reichsbank Offices at the places where it is needed (Bedarfsortan)

IV. Final Remarks

Since its establishment in 1935, the agency of the Plenipotentiary for the war Economy, just as the Reich Defense Council as a supra-ministerial office directing the preparations for mobilization has been treated as a secret. Since all of the great powers have created similar forms of organization during the last years, secrecy is at present no longer of the same importance as in 1935. It should be considered whether, on some suitable political occasion, the Fuehrer should announce the existence of these forms of organization, which the foreign governments naturally assume to exist after, in addition to the Plenipotentiary, the Reich War Minister and the Reich Foreign Minister have furnished opinions relative to the effects of such an action.

(signed) WOHLTHAT

DOCUMENT No. EC - 258

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT EC 258

21 November

I, OSCAR KOPPEL, Civilian, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document EC - 258.

OSCAR KOPPEL

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7563
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Draft -- Strictly confidential
Dr. Is/No. Note 29 March 1930

Re: Nickel sales returns to England.

Last week Herr Euler and Herr Meyer-Kuester succeeded in convincing the gentlemen of the Military Economy Staff that the practice of sending to the Mond Nickel Company or to the firm Gardner in London returns showing detailed figures of sales of nickel to Krupp, D.E.W., Schwerte, Altena, etc. must be continued in order ^{not} to endanger supplies of nickel-ore concentrates to Germany.

We have been informed via the Vermittlungsstelle W in Berlin that, according to a communication from Fregattenkapitän Eicholz, the Military Economy Staff had only agreed to this arrangement, in order not to endanger the supply of nickel raw material to Germany at the moment, but that in their opinion the idea of continuing these returns indefinitely could not be entertained.

Seen from a purely German point of view a different attitude cannot be expected of the Military Economy Staff. For that reason we are convinced that the W. Stab (Military Economy Staff) will do everything in their power to procure from other sources nickel raw material for Germany the supply of which is not subject to such difficult conditions. We know from various notes in the press that considerable quantities of nickel ore have already been shipped to Germany from Celebes and that Krupp is processing these ores. These ores are of a silicate nature and are in our opinion particularly suited for the Krupp-Renn Process, whereas it is doubtful whether they can be processed economically by any other method.

A similar deposit, which according to the latest news is very extensive, exists in Brazil. Large samples from this deposit also

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have already been shipped to Germany according to newspaper reports and are being worked on by Krupp. Both deposits mentioned are unsuitable for the processes used by Inco/Mond and for the equipment available there. This is in our opinion one of the reasons why Inco-Mond has not shown an interest in these deposits so far.

As the settlement of payments between Brazil, Dutch East India and Germany offers less difficulties than that with England, Canada, and U.S. America, the government is bound to be interested for that reason alone, quite apart from other considerations, in assisting Krupp in its efforts to import nickel ore from the deposits mentioned. This interest is bound to increase the more difficult it becomes to procure Canadian nickel-ore concentrate on account of the returns mentioned above, objectionable as they are from the point of view of defense policy.

For these reasons, we still consider it necessary to induce Mond/Inco to dispense with these returns. We are inclined to believe that Inco/Mond would rather dispense with these returns than with a drop in sales of I.G. nickel in Germany in favor of an increase in nickel production from nickel ore deposits not belonging to Inco. Apart from that we

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7563
CONTINUED

believe that the Inco-Mond would understand the reasons of defense policy forcing them to do without returns. We do not believe that the British Government would be prepared in a similar situation to permit Mond Nickel Company to transmit to Germany detailed figures showing the amount of nickel supplied to British Arms Manufacturers (e.g. Armstrong Vickers).

signed: L. Schlocht

Copy to Dir. Dr. Krauch, Oppau
Dir. Brendel, Ludwigshafen
Dir. Dr. Hueller/Cunradi, Oppau
Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

8 September 1947

I, LEONARD LAWRENCE, ETO No. 20130, hereby certify that I am a duly appointed translator for the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7563.

LEONARD LAWRENCE, ETO No. 20130.

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

Copies to: Director Dr. Gaus Ludwigshafen,
Director Weber-Andreas Frankfurt/M.,
Director Haefliger Frankfurt/M.,
Director Meyer-Kuester Frankfurt/M.,
REGISTERED Director Fahrenhorst/Dr. Mueller-Conradi, Oppau,
Dr. Schlecht Oppau

To:
Vermittlungsstelle W

Stamp:
Strictly confidential

Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 73.

Stamp:
Department I of the Directorate
Chemicals
in: 5 September 1936
reply:

Ludwigshafen/Rhine,
2 September 1936

Legal Department E/G.

Germany's Nickel Supplies.

As arranged at the meeting on 31 August 1936 in Berlin, we enclose eight copies of the exposé "The Problem of supplying Germany with Nickel". Will you please submit the necessary number of copies to the Reich War Ministry. The remaining copies are intended for you and Dr. Krauch.

We request you to notify us of the date for an interview with the Government authorities, if possible by return of post. We should like to stress that at this interview not only the technicians should be present but also the officials entitled to decide whether and to what extent the Government is able to promise the refund of the expenses to be incurred.

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

signed: v. Knieriem signed: Brendel

8 enclosures.

REGISTERED

(page 2 of original)

Frankfurt on Main,
1 September 1936.

The problem
of
supplying Germany with nickel

I. Problems of supplying ore.

A. Deposits in Germany.

Deposits of nickel ore in Germany are negligible.

B. Deposits abroad.

The world's biggest deposits are either owned by, or under option in favor of, the Inco/Mond combine; therefore, only a few non-combine ore deposits are known in the world, and these are worked either by independent companies or are prepared for working to such a small degree that very considerable expenses, amounting to more than 500 000 dollars in any individual case, would be necessary to get the mines into a workable condition, and even then it is extremely doubtful whether the mines could compete with the Inco/Mond combine. Such ore deposits are found in Brazil far from the main roads, in British Columbia in a district with very unfavorable climatic conditions, in New Zealand with extremely bad shipping connections and in Alaska within the Arctic Circle. The deposits outside the Inco/Mond combine which are worth working and which are being worked, are either owned by foreign nickel producing companies, e.g. Falconbridge mines-Christiansund, or by firms which are collaborating with German manufacturers (Greek deposits Euboea - Krupp Frankenstein), or are suppliers of German manufacturers (Burma-mines - Saechsische Blaufarbenwerke, Oberschlama). The newly discovered deposits in Finland are also under option to the Inco/Mond combine.

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II. The importance of the Inco/Mond combine.

By comparison with the production capacity of the Inco/Mond combine, all others are of minor importance. The superiority of the Inco/Mond combine in the production of world nickel can be shown by the following figures on world supplies:

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	<u>World consumption</u> short tons	<u>Inco sales</u> short tons		
1929	68 000	62 790	=	92 %
1930	44 000	37 642	=	85 %
1931	36 500	27 870	=	76 %
1932	28 500	17 203	=	60 %
1933	48 000	37 178	=	77 %
1934	61 000	45 730	=	75 %
1935	80 000	62 500	=	78 %

III. Ore preparation processes in use.

The composition of the ores plays a decisive role in the choice of processes to be employed. The nickel carbonyl process of the I.G. for the manufacture of metallic nickel needs sulphidic ores, the constituent parts of which must be well balanced in a certain proportion and which should preferably be rich in copper content. The Renn process can be used only for the manufacture of nickel iron, but not of pure metallic nickel. The "top and bottom" process used by the Inco/Mond combine is only practicable with cuprous ores. Other processes, e.g. the one used by the French company "Le Caledonickel", are based on silicates.

IV. Result of the superiority of the Inco/Mond combine on world supplies of nickel.

Since the places where nickel ores are found are very far from Germany, and since the ores contain only a small percentage of nickel (the nickel ore deposits in the Sudbury district contain only 2 - 3 % Ni) the shipment of the ores in their original state is impossible.

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It is imperative to concentrate the ores before they are shipped (Nickel ore has to be processed into an intermediate with 40% Nickel content); it is, therefore, impossible to dispense with concentrating plants in the ore districts. In addition to the costs of developing the mines, the expenses for these concentrating plants would be very considerable. This leads to the conclusion that a German nickel producer can not possibly enter into competition on the nickel market unless he amalgamates with one of the big mining enterprises.

These facts have already compelled the big British firm of Brunner Mond to surrender its independence. They have forced the French firm "Le Caledonickel" to sacrifice its independence and to become a subsidiary of the International Nickel Co.. They have caused the I.G. to combine with the big leading firm of International Nickel Co. This

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

combination has borne abundant fruit as far as the supply to German nickel consumers is concerned. However, it imposes obligations upon the I.G. which I.G. cannot violate without risking the loss of the most important, and at the present moment the only available, source of nickel ore.

V. Importance of I.G. to Germany's nickel supplies.

I.G.'s participation in nickel products marketed by the International Nickel Co. outside America amounts to a share of 10 %.

I.G. can produce this 10 % share in its own plants.

At present I.G. is operating a plant in Oppau with a production capacity of 3,000 tons per year, and, because of her friendly relations with the International Nickel Co., might probably be able to attain certain further advantages for Germany's nickel supply. To achieve that, however, I.G. needs not only the consent of International Nickel Co. and of the other firms within the combine, but also the support of the Reich War Ministry.

(page 5 of original)

In order to understand Germany's supply situation and its development it is necessary to analyse the source of the nickel consumed in the years 1933 to 1936. Consumers in Germany were supplied with:

a) from German production:

	<u>1933</u>	<u>1934</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1936</u>
I.G.	110	450	1470	3000 tons
Krupp	1250	1200	1200	1200
Oberschlema	850	1000	1200	1200
N.A.	250	250	250	250
Altena	1000	1000	1000	1000
Miscellaneous others	<u>150</u>	<u>150</u>	<u>180</u>	<u>180</u>
	3610	4050	5300	6830 tons

b) from scrap: 1000 1000 1000 1000 tons

c) from imports of finished nickel:

Christiansand	260	850	720	850 tons
Inco/Mond	<u>1430</u>	<u>1100</u>	<u>3501</u>	<u>1500</u> tons
	1690	1950	4221	2350 tons
<u>total</u>	6300	7000	10521	10180 tons
	====	====	=====	=====

The analysis of this development shows that imports of finished nickel have increased from 1690 tons initially in 1933 to 4220 tons

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

in 1936 and will decrease to 2350 tons in 1936 because of I.G.'s increased production. Of these 2350 tons, approximately 850 tons of finished nickel were imported and paid for through the clearing accounts with Norway. In fact, only a remaining of 1500 tons of nickel have to be imported from abroad as finished products, for which foreign currency amounting to approximately £ 300 000 per year has to be paid. If it is intended to reduce the amount of foreign currency to be expended to about half by producing finished nickel from imported intermediates by means of the I.G. process, the only source available at the moment for supplying this intermediate is the International Nickel Co.

(page 6 of original)

VI. Results of the discussions hitherto held with
Inco/Mond on the extension of I.G. production.

In the discussions held on 28 April 1936, I.G. explained to the International Nickel Co. the special difficulties of supplying Germany and stressed the necessity of accumulating bigger stocks than hitherto. The International Nickel Co. showed full understanding of I.G.'s wishes and proposed that during the next five years a stock of 5000 tons of nickel be established in Germany and administered according to the contract obligations to be paid for in accordance with the regulations of the contract. Here the I.G. has done some preparatory work along the lines of the Reich War Ministry's wishes. The accumulation of these stocks imposes a major burden on International Nickel Co., which is all the heavier for the fact that International Nickel Co. has at present not only no ore stocks at its disposal but has also to increase the size of its plants, which can be kept working only as long as the present maximum demand continues. It must not be forgotten that the increase of German requirements is much smaller than the increase in other countries because of the restrictions on the use of nickel imposed by the Supervisory Board for basic metals. The sales of Inco/Mond in 1935 compared to 1934 have increased

in England:	by 17%
in Russia:	" 114%
in Japan:	" 112%
in Italy:	" 107%
in Austria:	" 50%

whereas during the same period the German requirements have increased by only 9%, as far as the Inco/Mond combine is concerned. It goes without saying that the willingness shown by the International Nickel Co. to assist in the supply of German requirements entails a great sacrifice and that I.G. must therefore not demand too much from this company.

(page 7 of original)

VII. Stand-by plant Central Germany.

The Oppau plant, with its present capacity of 3000 tons per year, is under normal conditions perfectly sufficient to produce and deliver our contractual delivery quota of 10%. We had to expect orders for much smaller quantities at the time of the conclusion of the agreement. Because the demand in the whole world has increased by leaps and bounds, the quota will temporarily entail for us a production share of approximately 3 800 tons. It would, however, be most uneconomical to build another plant just because of a most uncertain increase of 800 tons, since it is to be expected that the present abnormal state of affairs, caused in part by the efforts of other countries to accumulate stocks, will undergo considerable reduction. We must therefore state that the plant to be constructed in Central Germany can only be considered a stand-by plant for armaments purposes, which would of course offer an opportunity of processing the temporary increase in excess of the Oppau capacity.

For technical reasons, this plant would have to have a production capacity of approximately 1500 tons per year. We estimate the expenditure necessary for erecting such a plant to amount to approx. 3,3 Million Reichsmarks. The time needed for building it will probably be at least one year because of the long delay in the delivery of machinery. If, therefore, the Reich Ministry for War orders the erection of such a plant in Central Germany for the purpose of accumulating stocks in Germany, it could not commence production before 1 January 1938.

The stock of 5000 tons of nickel offered by the Inco-Mond, which is to be delivered from 1937 onwards and over a period of approx. five years, would be processed within a period of approx. four years and would guarantee a workload of approx. 1250 tons per year for the new plant.

(page 8 of original)

It is, therefore, useless at the present time to carry the negotiations with Inco/Mond beyond the deliberations now under way; prematurely to touch the problem of supplying Germany to the detriment of Inco/Mond plants outside Germany would provoke repercussions which might influence unfavorably the promises already given by Inco/Mond. In order to bring the negotiations with Inco/Mond to a conclusion on the basis hitherto used for the discussions, it is imperative to arrive at a decision regarding the construction of the stand-by plant. On their part, Inco/Mond will have to invest certain sums in order to procure the stocks for Germany.

I.G. is expecting the vice-chairman of the International Nickel Corporation, Dr. Thompson, at the end of September, and it is necessary for the continuation of the discussions to know now, in how far the Government is prepared to offer suitable assistance for the reali-

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4921
CONTINUED

(page 8 of original, cont'd)

zation of their wishes, in order to enable us to conduct the negotiations with Dr. Thompson in accordance with their plans.

I.G., therefore, requests an early appointment for a discussion which should take place, in I.G.'s opinion, during the first fortnight in September. It will be possible to supplement the exposé given above on this occasion. Moreover, I.G. is going to give details on the financial outlay which the erection of a new plant and the projected manufacture of 5 000 tons of nickel would involve.

I.G. FERRENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

Translator's note: One page of the document, headed "Note on a talk with Dr. Thompson on 28 September 1936 in the Hotel "Frankfurter Hof" has been left untranslated because it is not part of the exposé dated 1 September 1936 and is not complete in itself.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

18 July 1947

I, Arthur MICHAMARA, No. 20191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-4921.

Arthur MICHAMARA
No. 20 191

- 7 -
"END"

41

SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT made as of the First day of January 1937 between THE MOND NICKEL COMPANY LIMITED, a Company organized and existing under the Laws of England (hereinafter referred to as "Mond" of the one part and I.G.FARBENINDUSTRIE ANTIENGESELLSCHAFT, a Company organized and existing under the laws of Germany (hereinafter referred to as "I.G.") of the other part.

WHEREAS : -

- (i) There exists between the parties hereto an Agreement dated as of January 1, 1934 and known as the "Main Agreement";
- (ii) I.G. is desirous of augmenting its capacity for refining nickel by erecting a new refinery in Germany in addition to its existing plant at Oppau;
- (iii) I.G. and Mond on January 15, 1937 mutually agreed upon certain modifications to the Main Agreement, which modifications provided, inter alia, that, subject to ratification by the appropriate Authorities, such changes should in due course be put into more definitive form; and whereas
- (iv) Such ratification has now been obtained.

NOW IT IS HEREBY AGREED AS FOLLOWS :-

1. New Refinery.

In pursuance of I.G.'s decision to erect forthwith a new nickel refinery in Germany having a capacity of about 2,000 tons of refined nickel per annum, I.G. undertakes :-

- (a) That when such new refinery is brought into production (it being I.G.'s intention to do so not later than December 31, 1937), the combined capacity of such refinery and that of Oppau will be approximately 4,500 tons of refined nickel per annum; and
- (b) That the nickel produced at such new refinery will be of good commercial marketable quality and

(page 2 of original)

that the said refinery will be operated in such a way as not to deprive Mond and its controlled companies of the benefits intended to be secured to them by the Main Agreement.

Restrictions on use of nickel

One of the principal points of the Main Agreement being to open and develop new fields for the application of nickel, I.G. undertakes in close co-operation with the Nickel Informationsbuero G.m.b.H. and Mond to implement the letter written to I.G. on December 22, 1936 by the office of Ministerpraesident Generaloberst Goering-Beauftragter fuer den Vierjahresplan Amt fuer deutsche Roh- und Werkstoffe (Tgb.Nr.13 541 36 IV/i Dr.O./G) by exploring with the Ueberwachungsstelle fuer unedle Metalle whether and to what extent it is possible to remove, in whole or in part, the existing regulations restricting the use of nickel in Germany. Mond on its part agrees to co-operate in this connection and to place at the disposal of the German Authorities all such

information and data as may help and assist them in deciding where and how nickel can be used technically and economically to the best advantage.

Quantity

Subject as hereinafter provided, the quantity of nickel in nickel bearing materials which Mond and its controlled companies undertook by Clause 2 of the Main Agreement to deliver or procure to be delivered to I.G. shall be modified in the manner following:-

(a) Normal commercial production

Subject to sub-clause (b) hereof regarding stock, in lieu of an annual quota varying with the total allied deliveries in each year, as provided in the Main Agreement, I.G. shall have the right - and Mond agrees to be bound for itself and its controlled companies accordingly - to call upon Mond to deliver or to procure the delivery during each of the calendar years 1937-43, both (page 3 of original)

years inclusive, of such a tonnage of nickel in nickel bearing materials as will enable I.G. and or its controlled companies to produce therefrom during each such respective year for normal commercial purposes (including that needed for its own use) an amount of refined nickel up to but not exceeding the following maximum tonnages: -

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total tons</u>
1937	3,000
1938/43	4,500

Any part of the above mentioned maximum tonnages which is not produced as commercial nickel during any year may not be carried forward and added to the quantity I.G. is entitled to produce in any subsequent year.

(b) Stock

In addition to the afore mentioned quantities of nickel bearing materials required by I.G. for the normal production of commercial nickel, I.G. shall be entitled to call upon Mond to deliver or to procure the delivery to I.G. during the calendar year 1937 of further nickel in the form of nickel bearing materials to be carried by I.G. as stock for its own account up to but not exceeding the equivalent of 2,000 tons of matte of the composition being currently delivered, such nickel content being calculated for the purposes hereof as 900 tons, regard being had to the quantity of matte and the composition thereof which I.G. had on hand on January 1, 1937.

I.G. shall be entitled to call upon Mond to deliver or to procure the delivery to I.G. during the calendar Years 1938/43, both years inclusive, of such further quantities of nickel in the form of nickel bearing materials (delivery thereof to be at a reasonable rate and as far as possible in approximate monthly or quarterly instalments as I.G.

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shall desire to hold as stock for its own account provided that the total quantity of such stock at any one time at oppau

EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT No. NI-10389
(Cont'd)

and/or at the new refinery (including any refined therefrom as hereinafter provided and stored elsewhere) shall not exceed the equivalent of 5,000 tons of matte of the composition being currently delivered, such nickel content being calculated for the purposes hereof as 2,250 tons.

If and when that maximum figure of stock is reached, Mond will regulate subsequent shipments of nickel bearing materials in step with I.G.'s then current production.

Should I.G. intend to refine the whole or any part of such stock, it shall forthwith notify Mond to that effect giving full particulars and I.G. shall thereupon be entitled to refine such material in addition to the quantity required for normal commercial production (including that needed for its own use) up to but not exceeding the maximum amounts herein before mentioned. The disposition of any material thus refined shall form the subject of special arrangements to be discussed between I.G. and Mond but in any event such material shall not be put on the market without the consent of Mond.

.....
(Page 13 of original)
.....

IN WITNESS WHEREOF these presents have been entered into on the fourth day of May, 1937.

Signed by Robert Crooks Stanley }
and David Owen Evans for and on }
behalf of THE MOND NICKEL COMPANY }
LIMITED, in the presence of:- }

(signed) F. B. Howard White

For and on behalf of
THE MOND NICKEL COMPANY, LIMITED

(signature) STANLEY
(signature) EVANS

Signed by : Weber-Andreas }
and }
Dr. Leo Schlecht }
for and on behalf of I.G. FARBEN }
INDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT in }
the presence of:- }

(signed) Clemens Brendel

For and on behalf of
I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

(signed) Weber-Andreas
(signed) Leo Schlecht

CERTIFICATION

I, JOHN J. BOLL, AGO No. A-444412, hereby certify that the above is a true and correct copy of Extracts of Document No. NI-10389, the original of which is in the English language.

JOHN J. BOLL
AGO No. A-444412
U. S. Civilian

Dr. IS/No 6 April 1938

M i n u t e s

of the conference at Ludwigshafen

on 5 April 1939

Present:

I.G. Frankfurt/Main: Direktor Haefliger
 Direktor Meyer-Kuester

I.G. Ludwigshafen/Ch.: Direktor BRENDL
 Dr. HEINTZELER

I.G. Oppau: Dr. L. Schlecht

1) Monthly report to the Inco/Mond. regarding the quantities of nickel sold to the individual German consumers of nickel.

Although it seems that, for the time being, the Military Economic Staff (Wehrwirtschaftsstab) agrees that, on the basis of the discussion with Herr EULER and Herr MEYER-KUESTER, the consumption of nickel of the individual German purchasers of nickel (Krupp, D.E.W., etc.) be passed on monthly to Inco/Mond. or to Gardner in England; it should be discussed as soon as possible - it would be convenient on the occasion of the visit of Messrs. WHITE and HAGUE to Frankfurt/Main on 7 April 1938 - that these reports to England should no longer be made in the hitherto detailed form. It is to be pointed out at the same time that Berlin is very much against such reports, and that for this reason - from a long term point of view - there must be the tendency in Berlin to import into Germany, at the expense of the import of Inco-ore (Inco-Matte), nickel raw materials from another source, the import of which is not linked up with such suspicious conditions from a military economic point of view.

Such a development would finally also be entirely against the interests of the Inco itself. Herr MEYER-KUESTER will also inform Herr EULER to this effect. Contact with the Military Economic Staff (Wehrwirtschaftsstab) on this question is to be resumed only after the discussion of the subject with Mond.

2) Stocks of I.G. nickel.

Apart from the steps already taken by the Control Office (Ueberwachungsstelle), nothing is to be done for the moment as it is to be presumed that the Austrian market, which took up 2000-3000 tons of nickel per year in the last few years, can presumably again be supplied with I.G. nickel.

3) Procurement of foreign exchange for the payment of imported nickel (Nickel-Lotto)

It is pointed out that the reduction of the I.G. production of nickel now desired by the Central

(Page 2 of original document)

Finance Department (Zefi), in view of the investment for the new plant can absolutely not come into question. According to information from Dr. KRUEGER, this idea has also again been dropped, and the payment of the nickel-copper-ore (Nickelkupfermatte) will be possible, also in the future, within the framework of the I.G. Special Regulations for Foreign Exchange.

Whilst, within the framework of these special regulations, about 5 million Marks are spent yearly for nickel, the procurment of molybdenum and wolfram raw materials requires well over 10 million Marks per year

It also appears advisable to Herr HAEBLIGER, in the event of the amount of foreign exchange placed at disposal by the I.G. special regulations for foreign exchange, becoming still smaller, to take the payment of wolfram and molybdenum raw materials for the time being out of the Special Arrangement, and not that of the nickel, particularly as with the latter, there is the danger, that, in the case of a direct allocation of foreign exchange by the Reich, the nickel ore for Krupp, recently imported from Celebes and Brazil could be given preference to the Canadian nickel-copper ore (Nickel-Kupfer-Matte).

4) Situation of contracts in view of Austria.

The effect of the union of Austria with Germany on the Inco-Contract was briefly mentioned.

However, it was agreed not to undertake anything in this direction with Inco/Mond. for the time being.

5) Visit of the President of the Inco, Mr. Robert C. STANLEY.

Mr. STANLEY will arrive in England from New York in the middle of or at the end of April.

It is planned, that he will also again visit Frankfurt/Main during this time, where a conference with I.G. is proposed.

6) Plates of Sintered Nickel (Nickelsinterplatten) for accumulators in America.

The letter of Mr. STRINGFELLOW of the Edison Co., which arrived a few days ago, was discussed. Since Mr. STRINGFELLOW also in this letter now for the third time - has not expressed his opinion regarding our request not to use the documents and know-how we left with him, against the interests of I.G. in the event of a license agreement not materializing; Mr. MERICA in New York is to be cabled, that this last letter from Mr. STRINGFELLOW has given us little satisfaction, and that we want to discuss this matter within

(Page 3 of original)

during his visit to Frankfurt/Main which will take place soon.

As, in his last letter, Mr. STRINGFELLOW further makes clearly known his intention to use the process for carbonyl nickel powder for the production of positive plates for accumulators which we imparted to him, also for other, kinds of nickel powder which are not made of carbonyl, the application, which was made by Oppau some months ago regarding the production of plates of sintered nickel (Nickelsinterplatten) which does not only refer to carbonyl-nickel powder but also to other kinds of nickel powder, is to be completed as soon as possible by other applications, so that our

possession of patents in America will become as extensive as possible.

(TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Print:) sgd. Schlecht
sgd. Mueller-Cunradi

Copy to: Direktor Weber-Andreas/Direktor Haefliger, Ffm.
Direktor Meyer-Kuester, Ffm
Direktor Brendel, Ludwigshafen
Direktor Dr. Mueller-Cunradi, Oppau/Dr. Goldberg
Patentdepartment, Ludwigshafen
Direktor Weiss, Purchasing Dept. Ludwigshafen
Central Finance Dept. (ZEFI), Berlin,
Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin NW7.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Esther GLASMAN, No. 2353, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-7564.

ESTHER GLASMAN
No. 2353

(E N D)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-9636
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR THE CRIMES

(handwritten) Herr Reichsbankrat Ludwig, Reich Ministry of Economics
Herr Berlin (illegible)

Dir. H./Ed

Berlin, 19 October 1939

(handwritten) Discussed in Berlin on 19 October 39

(handwritten) for Finland, trip

MEMORANDUM.

SUBJECT: Nickel/Finland.

1.) Policy of the Nickel Trust.

The International Nickel Company (Inco) controls approximately 85% of the world's production. Its far-seeing policy aims at preventing the development of serious competition by a stable and low price for metallic nickel. It is based on the idea that it will never be possible to unite the world's nickel resources under one management, that the aim can however also be attained by a technological superiority in overcoming the difficulties involved in converting nickel ore into nickel. The Inco therefore, generally supplies only finished products but not ore and keeps the price of the former so low that enterprises which confine themselves to nickel ore mining and the production of the ore concentrate (Matte) can constitute no threat to it in normal conditions.

This policy demands that the trust must at all times be in a position to meet fluctuations in demand no matter how violent in order to maintain a low price as the general standard. But it demands furthermore, that the trust should think along truly international lines and should not permit itself to be guided by political principles in supplying the markets. It is obvious that it must try to prevent this basic attitude from reaching the public. Its attitude when for instance this spring questions were asked in Ottawa as well as in the British houses of Parliament with the purpose of at least limiting export to Germany was typical. Even at that critical time the trust succeeded behind the scenes in foiling and frustrating such intentions by giving misleading information. Deliveries to Germany were continued strictly, in accordance with the obligations undertaken.

2.) Collaboration between the Trust and IG.

When in 1933 the nickel production process employing nickel carbonyl developed by IG, made its appearance, the trust found itself in a predicament. By means of the IG-process nickel metal can economically be produced from sulphidic cuprous-nickel-ore, and, that in the novel form of an extremely pure and fine powder, which

(page 2 of original)

promises new technical uses. This new process was bound to appear even more dangerous to the trust when Germany began to develop economic firms, against which no counter-measures could be taken by the usual method of competition, at least in Germany herself. In this case the far-seeing policy of the trust did not, therefore, offer any positive guarantee of success, the more so, since the trust realized, of course, that IG, being a major Konzern, was perfectly capable of procuring nickel resources independently of the trust.

It should perhaps be pointed out in this connexion that the suspicion, it might have been that very threat which induced the trust, amongst other considerations, to acquire, at any price, the large deposit at PETSAM, thus ^{securing} important foothold in Europe, *seeing that it conducted negotiations simultaneously with IG and the Finnish State.

*is by
no means
baseless

And when IG proceeded to look for nickel deposits in Canada and elsewhere, the trust saw fit to enter into negotiations with IG and to carry them to an early conclusion.

This 8-year-contract which was concluded in 1934 has had very favorable effects upon German economy. It was the first time that the trust had been compelled to break with the principle of supplying nickel metal only and to put sufficient quantities of Canadian nickel concentrate (Matte) at the disposal of IG to meet more than half of the German requirements while saving 50% foreign currency. Beyond that, IG succeeded in persuading the trust to store a very considerable supply of nickel concentrate (Matte) in Germany at its own expense, for the benefit of IG.

Up to the last days before the outbreak of war the attitude of the trust was decidedly loyal. No attempts were, for instance, made, nor steps taken to eliminate the risk, to the tune of several million marks, involved in storing such quantities.

I have examined the events mentioned above in order to show that it would seem to be the policy of the trust to refrain as far as possible from doing anything which might prejudice future collaboration in the termination of hostilities.

IG is of the opinion that a similar attitude could in this case well be taken up by them, in their own interest as well as that of German national economy, but they are of course prepared to subordinate their interests to those of the German national economy should the latter demand different measures.

(page 3 of original)

3.) Petsam.

The concession for the exploitation of this large deposit located on the Murmansk coastline was granted to the trust by the Finnish Government in 1934. German competitors were turned down at the time.

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

It may be assumed with certainty that Finland wanted this concession to English-Canadian-American financial interests, in order to increase its hold on the Murmansk territory which had only been acquired after the World War. The Finnish Government thought it would not obtain this additional protection by satisfying the competitors.

But today, the political situation having changed completely, the Finnish Government itself is in my opinion bound to be very much interested in compelling Petsam by government decree if necessary to reserve at least part of the ore concentrate production for exportation in the near future, for Germany, so as to establish a German interest in Petsam as well.

Furthermore I am convinced, knowing as I do the persons concerned, and the fundamental attitude of the Nickel Trust outlined above, that such an order would result in a formal protest of the trust if only because of the "Energy Act", but would in reality be secretly applauded by the trust, because from its own point of view it would see in supplies to Germany a welcome defence against possible seizure by Russia.

There is thus no reason why the Finnish Government should hesitate in fulfilling Germany's wishes.

4.) Nivala.

IG is greatly interested in the Nivala deposit, and would be even more interested if it should prove impossible to obtain sufficient supplies from Petsam to meet their requirements. They are not however specially interested in participation in the deposit itself, but would be content with a contract safeguarding supplies for several years; provided the terms were such as to enable them to continue competing on the world market.

It can be seen from the above that IG is not interested in granting to Finland a license for their nickel-process. The reason why such an application by the Outokumpu was not flatly refused is to be found solely in tactical considerations. Actually, the IG intends to convince this company in the near future verbally in the spirit that the pre-requisites for the erection of a carbonyl-nickel plant are completely lacking in Finland.

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From the economic point of view, anything, but the following is out of the question for Finland:

- a) the setting-up of a preparatory plant at Nivala for the production of copper-nickel ore concentrate (Matte)
- b) Delivery of this ore concentrate for the purpose of nickel production to IG being the sole proprietor of an economical process for the separation of nickel and nickel-copper ore,
- c) Return of the cuprous residue,
- d) perhaps promise to meet Finland's own requirements of metallic nickel from the ore concentrate delivered by fixing a maximum percentage. (Probably/cf 25% of the nickel produced therefrom).
/a maximum/

(page 4 of original cont'd)

Id c): The IG had hitherto supposed that there were no objections on the part of Germany to the return of the residue to Outokumpu.

From today's conference with Herr Reichsbank Director Ludwig we take note of the fact that it is demanded that at least half of the residue be transmitted to the Norddeutsche Affinerie, which is only to be welcomed in the interests of Germany. We shall therefore, as requested, get in touch with the Affinerie.

(MS) signed: Haefliger

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

4 September 1947

I, LEONARD J. LAWRENCE, ETC No. 20138, hereby certify that I am a duly appointed translator for the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-9636.

LEONARD J. LAWRENCE
ETC No. 20138

(page 2 of original)

V. G. FARBENINDUSTRIE A. G.
VEREINIGUNG DER
METALLWERKE

page 2 Berlin, 17 Jan. 1940.
Dr. Die./B./s.

V. G. Farbenindustrie A. G.,
for the attention of Dr. Schlecht.

regard to the arranging of the nickel-agreement between I.G. and INCO as well as their rights to sell all nickel connected with this agreement. The Metall-Gesellschaft has more or less made an offer to the Vifo to the effect that they would cause I.G. to reduce their processing charge sufficiently, with the result that the expenses incurred by the Vifo would be met by this reduction. Mr. Jakob stated that, since he is looking after the Reich's interests, he could not have rejected such a favorable offer from the Metallgesellschaft to obtain for the Reich better conditions by way of private negotiations among the firms concerned than those offered in our agreements of 28 December 1939. That is why he has left it to the Metall-Gesellschaft, in agreement with the management of the Vifo Baurat Ohll, to negotiate with I.G. to the effect mentioned above.

On the other hand Mr. Jakob emphasized that he still adheres to our agreements of 28 December 1939 and that the Vifo should I.G. desire so, would write to the Metall-Gesellschaft to the effect that the arrangement, according to which the Vifo-nickel would be sold by the Vifo in conformity with the arrangements made with I.G., would remain in force.

As a result of your letter dated 15 January 1940, and your agreements with the Metall-Gesellschaft, we have asked Mr. Jakob for the time being to refrain from a categorical refusal to the Metall-Gesellschaft. We intended to let the Vifo have further information as soon as we have settled matters with the Metallgesellschaft.

We should be glad if you would let us know, under consideration of the above mentioned facts, whether our agreements of 28 December 1939 with the Vifo will remain in force, or whether you want to adhere to the agreements of 15 January 1940 with Director Muler of the Metall-Gesellschaft, which are financialy more unfavorable to I.G.

VEREINIGUNG DER METALLWERKE

signature: Dickmann

Copy to Director Dr. Mueller-Cunrad, Oppau
Legal Department Dr. Heintzeler, Ludwigshafen
Class Metal-Department Berlin
L. . Department of the Directorate (part 1,
Oppau

in pencil: Director Macfliger, Berlin

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9638

CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

12 September 1947

I, ERIGITTE TURK, ETO No. 35130, hereby certify that I am a duly appointed translator for the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-9638.

ERIGITTE TURK, ETO No. 35130.

Nickel

Indwighshafen/Rh., 22 January 1940/Hc.

To
Director Haefliger
I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Kochstr. 73
Berlin SW 68

Confidential
Personal

Registered

Dear Sir,

Re.: Sale of Wifo-Nickel

Enclosed please find a photostatic copy of a letter from Dr. Dickmann dated 17th inst. which shows that Wifo had no intention at first of claiming from I.G. the expenses amounting to approx. RM 95,000.—, incurred in buying in stocks of special nickel-ore concentrate but that this wish on the part of Wifo did not arise until the representative of the Metallgesellschaft (Herr Hadenfeldt) pointing out "services rendered" in bringing about the I.G./Inco contract announced that the Metallgesellschaft would induce I.G. to deduct so much from the conversion allowance demanded, that the entire expenses incurred by Wifo, could be covered from the deduction. By means of this offer of which I.G. knew nothing at all, Metallgesellschaft tried to secure for itself the sale of the Wifo nickel at the expense of I.G..

The Metallgesellschaft has not therefore been very helpful in this case, seeing it was responsible for creating all the confusion during the negotiations with Wifo. Since the Metallgesellschaft boasted in its dealings with the authorities of services rendered in the nickel sector I may perhaps be permitted in this connection to remind you that the Inco-I.G. contract would certainly not have taken such a satisfactory form had not I.G. itself against the advice of Metallgesellschaft emphatically insisted on its demands to Inco. I feel certain you remember that

(page 2 of original)

the quota offered to us at that time by Inco on the advice of Metallgesellschaft amounted to 300 tons of nickel per annum. Furthermore, allow me to refer to the conference in Paris at which the price for nickel ore*) was fixed and in the course of which Herr E. emphatically advised you again and again to scale down the demands of I.G. as otherwise the gentlemen of Inco would depart. Finally, we ought to remember that in a preliminary conference, shortly before the conclusion of the "Supplemental Agreement", Herr E. urgently advised us not to ask for such a high and fixed quota as 4500 tons of nickel per annum. In spite of this "recommendation" we asked the Americans half an hour later for this quota and got it immediately.

Far be it from me to detract from the qualities of Mr. E as a clever mediator and from his services in establishing good, friendly and personal relations between the gentlemen of Inco-Bond and the gentlemen of I.G., but it is not in the interests of the prestige of I.G. in the eyes of the authorities if representatives of the Metallgesellschaft speak of their great services in the nickel sector, as enormous efforts

(page 2 of original cont'd)

of I.G. in this field are minimized thereby.

To return to the Wifo business, I wish to let you know the following about the latest developments in the negotiations: In view of the fact that one-third of the Wifo's nickel has already been sold by the Metallgesellschaft thus rendering impracticable the establishment of a special sales organization at Wifo for the remainder, we agree that Metallgesellschaft should sell the remainder of the Wifo's nickel as well with out discount, in the name and in favor of Wifo. Generally speaking I.G. cannot, however, take over the expenses of Wifo for this special stock as it is purely a matter of war reserves. I.G., however, agrees to the discount released in nickel sales in accordance with the above (estimated at approx. RM 30,000.--) being left to Wifo (in any case I.G. could not retain the

(page 3 of original)

discount released without the special permission of the Price Control Commissioner).

The one remaining question is, what is to become in this settlement of the 1% sales commission which has been deducted by the Metallgesellschaft. I.G. might adopt the attitude that this 1% (abt. RM 32,000.--) ought to be left to I.G. as in spite of the fact that its own costs are higher it waives its claim to above discounts in order to cover the expenses of Wifo. Considering especially that the Metallgesellschaft does not now remit this one per cent to Gardner as in the past, one should not place it again at its disposal, even if it is not left directly to Wifo. But I may leave it to you to decide this question.

According to Dr. Diekmann a conference at the Wifo does not now appear to be necessary. In case you still want such a conference, I should like to suggest that you should only negotiate with the top man of the Wifo and that not about the details mentioned above but on the fundamental problem that Wifo should not debit private enterprise with financial obligations incurred in the piling up of war stocks. In the case of nickel, this question, too, has been solved.

In compliance with your wish Herr Cluss has/kept informed of the progress of the whole as well as of intermediate phases of the negotiations. Should another discussion on questions of detail be desired by Wifo, I shall ask him to come along with me.

Yours faithfully:

Heil Hitler

Yours

signed: L. Schlecht

Encl.

Copy to Dir. Dr. Burster

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-9639
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

3 September 1947

I, LEONARD LAWRENCE, ETO No. 2013G, hereby certify that I am a duly appointed translator for the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-9639.

LEONARD LAWRENCE, ETO No. 2013G.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT G. 51-10303
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Extract from the Memorandum by Dir. MEYER-KUESTER
concerning his Discussion with Dr. GEH.
on 10 May 1939

The Vereinigte Stahlwerke received an offer from Herbert Greenblom concerning the taking over of the production of its Molybdenum ore mine. In the interests of the Association, Dr. GEH., in the name of the Deutsche Edelstahlwerke, entered into negotiations with Greenblom and, in consultation with the Reich Ministry of Economy, has made the following agreement:

- a) Taking over of the production of the mine for 5 years
- b) Guaranteed yearly delivery of 600 tons of molybdenic sulphide
- c) Promised a further annual delivery of 600 tons of molybdenic sulphide
- d) Prospective production of 3,000 tons of molybdenic sulphide yearly after expiration of 1940.
- e) Guaranteed monthly quantities:
 - October 1939. . . . 20 tons molybdenic sulphide
 - November 1939. . . . 30 tons molybdenic sulphide
 - December 1939. . . . 40 tons molybdenic sulphide
 - January 1940. . . . 50 tons molybdenic sulphide
 - from Spring 1940. . . 100 tons molybdenic sulphide monthly

Price RM. 4.20 per kg. Molybdenum fob southern Finnish port
Payment in advance 4 million Finnmarks- 2 million Reich-
mark which will be repaid in the form of a 10% rebate.

Dr. GEH. rejected this last demand, the basis for which was that Greenblom needed money for the extension of his mine and that the transfers from clearing would take a very long time. Instead of this, Dr. GEH. has chosen the method of prepayment and has already paid in RM. 166,000 to the Finnish clearing house via the Deutsche Edelstahlwerke. Dr. GEH. hopes in this way to be able to pay for the single ore deliveries at the due time.

Dr. GEH. is meeting President SCOTT of the Climax, and Dr. LOEWEN-
SIEB in London already next week. He will have with him Herr.
C. STANGE. He hopes that the latter, having sold Molybdenum
to the German steel industry via banks such as an impression on Schott,
that he will not be able to get the other part of those quantities
through the bank of London.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-10388
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

obtain a reduction of price for the remaining requirements from Climax.

Dr. GEM. has moreover also taken up negotiations with KNABENGRUBER, and would like to persuade JOHNSON to deliver the molybdenum concentrate from KNABENGRUBER to Germany within the Clearing, whereas JOHNSON, on the other hand, wants American ore.

We have been informed, in a confidential conversation at the Reich Ministry of Economy, that it is not desired that the I.G. take any more Climax ores, and that we should find ways and means either of freeing ourselves entirely from the Climax, or in future of taking our deliveries of Climax ores through an intermediary. We have advised Dr. GEM. of this conversation and have suggested to him that SEARON perhaps should act instead of us and take the ores via Holland and from there, after roasting, deliver them to us either through the Dutch or the Swedish clearing.

As you know, Climax wishes to have a precise statement of the German stocks in molybdenum ores. We have refused to issue this statement.

Dr. GEM. is of course prepared at any time to bring the Greenblau contract into the Association. He subsequently asked for recognition of the transaction carried out by him, which he had been requested by the Reich Ministry of Economy to perform and which had had to be completed in a short time. He succeeded, as a matter of fact, in twice prolonging the option period, but he was only able to conclude the contract in Finland itself.

12 September 1947

I, Anne LARSEN, ETO No. 20144, hereby certify that I am a duly appointed translator for the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI-10388.

Anne LARSEN
ETO No. 20144

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. MI-9640
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNCIL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. FERNINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, BERLIN-HALENSEE 1
Sales Combine Chemicals

(Handwritten)
Herrn Dr. Meyer

(Handwritten)
received 30 May 1940

Secret!

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover if sent by post, to be returned.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

Registered!

Gesellschaft fuer Elektrometallurgie
Dr. Paul Gruenfeld,

Berlin - Charlottenburg 2
Hardenbergstrasse 3

M/H

27 May 1940

Application for approval of an increase of raw materials costs for Ferro-Molybdenum, Molybdenum Metal technical and Calcium Molybdat from Molybdenum-Ore stocks originally intended for chemical purposes.

We refer to the telephone conversation of today with your Herr BOSCH made in connection with our letter of 24 May. In view of BOSCH's suggestion, we agree not to indicate to the Price Commissioner a price for the former climax molybdenum ore for metallurgical purposes a price based on the average of the second half of 1939, but to fix it at the same level, including losses on yield as that given in the data submitted by the Association, to the price Commissioner on 27 December 1939 i.e. RM 4.56 per kilo molybdenum i/Ferro molybdenum (and also, molybdenum metal technical).

We have also noted that you cannot count on a yield of 93% at the Weisweiler plant but, for ferro molybdenum, on a yield of about 94%, which amounts to a loss of about 6%, or, in the case of calcium molybdat on about 96%, which equals a loss of about 4%.

To avoid having to submit to the price commissioner for his approval two different sales prices for the quantities to be produced at Weisweiler and Bitterfeld, we want to adjust the proposed increase for Bitterfeld to the level of your yield.

We cannot expect the same increase for raw material costs for calcium molybdat as for ferro-molybdenum/molybdenum metal technical, since the yield of the latter is higher.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT "L. 1-9640"
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

A/H 27 May 1940

Already on 17 May we asked our Frankfurt department which deals with the matter for their opinion concerning the increased turnover tax and export promotion contribution which will have to be paid on the increased sales prices. When we called up today concerning this matter, we were told that the approval of the Price Commissioner can hardly be expected, unless it can be proven that there is a profit at all.

Frankfurt referred us to circular decree 2038. At any rate, we were recommended, for reasons of fairness, to investigate whether there was justification for the passing on of this additional tax burden, without inseparably linking the application for it with the application for the approval of the increase for actual raw material costs.

In accordance with Herr BOSCH's suggestion we have changed the date of validity named to us by the Association (24.3.37) for the sales prices of RM 6.50 for molybdenum i/ferro molybdenum or RM 6.10 for molybdenum i/calcium molybdenum, to an earlier date, i.e. 1.3.1936.

We are enclosing a new application to the Price Commissioner, taking into consideration the various changes mentioned above, and request that you sign and forward it.

With German salute.

I.G.FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

Enclosure: _____

(Initials)
illegible

To: Dir. Kraus, Frankfurt/Main
Statistical Accounting, Chemistry, Frankfurt/Main
Special Bookkeeping Department, Frankfurt/Main
Legal Department, Chemistry, Frankfurt/Main

(page 3 of original)

I.G. FERRENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT BERLIN-HALENSEE 1
Sales Combine Chemicals

1/H 28 May 1940.

To Ministerpräsident
Generalfeldmarschal Goering,
Plenipotentiary for the
Four-Year-Plan,
Reich Commissioner for Price Control

Berlin W.S.

Leipziger Platz 7

Secret!

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted, if under cover; if not by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

Subject : Application for approval of an increase of raw material costs for Ferro-Molybdenum, Molybdenum Metal technical and calcium Molybdat from Molybdenum-Ore stocks originally intended for chemical purposes.

Until the beginning of the war, the undersigned firms of

Gesellschaft fuer Elektrometallurgie Dr. Paul Gruenfeld,
Berlin-Charlottenburg, 2, Hardenbergstrasse 3, and

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft,
Frankfurt/Main 20, Gruebnburgplatz,

obtained the whole of their requirements of molybdenum Ore for metallurgical purposes, i.e. for production of ferro molybdenum, molybdenum metal technical and calcium molybdat exclusively from the Climax Molybdenum Corporation, New York, on the basis of a long-term delivery contract. The price of this molybdenum ore for metallurgical purposes was very stable and amounted to RM 4.56 per kilo Mo i/Fe Mo, including loss on yield, as already mentioned in the Mansfelder Oerzsaenen calculation submitted on 27.12.39 by the Vereinigung der Deutschen Hersteller von Stahlveredelungsmetallen (Association of German Producers of Steel Refining Metals), Berlin-Halensee 1, Kurfuerstendamm 142/43. The same applies to molybdenum metal technical.

The above-mentioned stable price of the raw material made it possible already as early as 1.3.1936 to keep equally stable sales prices for the steel alloys produced from the ore in question, i.e. RM 6.50 per kilo Mo-Content for ferro molybdenum and molybdenum metal technical.

In view of the great importance of these steel-refining metals to

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L/H 28.5.1940

the military economy, care was constantly taken not only to keep a fairly large stock of molybdenum ore, but ever and above that, about 2,200 tons molybdenum ore was brought in during June 1939 with the agreement of the Reich Ministry of Economics, or rather the Reich Office for Iron and Steel, thus securing the supply of steel alloys up until a short while ago.

When the molybdenum ore stocks for metallurgical purposes at the WEISWEILER and Bitterfeld plants were exhausted, production had to be stopped for the time being. For some years, however, there had been stored at Bitterfeld about 1,000 tons molybdenum, which was originally intended for chemical purposes. On orders of the Reich Ministry of Economics a total of 425 tons molybdenum ore from this stock was allocated by the Reichsstelle für Iron and Steel to the Weisweiler and Bitterfeld processing plants to enable the production of important steel-refining agents to continue.

As already stated this ore, from chemical stocks, does not cost RM 4.56 per kilo $\frac{1}{2}$ finished product - as does the ore obtained for metallurgical purposes, - but RM 5.49 per kilo $\frac{1}{2}$ con., in accordance with the price approved until 31.3.1940 by the Reich Office for Iron and Steel, including storage costs; in addition, 6% interest from 1.4.1940 until the day of payment (i.e. end of May 1940), also approved by the Reich Office for Iron and Steel, which amounts to 1% of RM 5.49 for 2 1/2 months = RM-.055, making RM 5.545 per kilo $\frac{1}{2}$ con., in other words, after taking into account loss on yield of about 6%, the price will be RM 5.90 per kilo $\frac{1}{2}$ Fe $\frac{1}{2}$ molybdenum metal technical. As against the price of RM 4.56 ruling until now the additional costs of ore come to RM 1.34 per kilo $\frac{1}{2}$ Fe $\frac{1}{2}$ molybdenum metal technical.

In view of the fact that this highly expensive ore was used on orders from the Reich Office for Iron and Steel at the instance of the Reich Ministry of Economics, we are forced to apply for an increase in the sales price of ferric molybdenum/ molybdenum metal technical corresponding to the increase of raw material costs, in accordance with the Metal Price Decree of 8.10.1939.

(page 5 of original)

The increase is to be handled in this manner: the invoices for the consumers should clearly show the increase of RM 1.34 per kilo molybdenum content, in addition to the former price of RM 6.50 per kilo molybdenum content. The sales price of both these steel-refining products would therefore amount to RM 7.84 for all quantities which were produced from the above-mentioned molybdenum ore stocks originally intended for chemical purposes.

It is possible that calcium molybdat will have to be produced from these ore stocks. In that event, the sales price amounting normally to RM 6.10 per kilo molybdenum content, also be increased to include additional costs of RM 1.31 per kilo molybdat, with a loss on yield of about 4% only. This results in the difference between RM 4.47 and RM 5.78, i.e. RM 1.31 per kilo molybdenum in/calcium molybdenum.

The calcium-molybdat price of RM 6.10 per kilo molybdenum content, in force up till now, with the ore-cost increase of RM 1.31 clearly shown, would now come to RM 7.41.

Finally, it should be pointed out that ferre molybdenum and calcium molybdat are subject to turn-over tax and export promotion contribution. The higher sales price resulting from the increase of raw-material costs will naturally mean a correspondingly higher assessment for these two taxes. For both ferre molybdenum and calcium molybdat 4.5% of RM 7.84, as against RM 6.50 in force until now, or RM 7.41 as against RM 6.10 in force until now, respectively, the tax increase amounts to RM 0.06 per kg molybdenum i/final product. In all fairness, therefore, we ask permission to pass on these extra costs which we cannot bear, that is to say, that we be allowed to charge the customer for:

ferre molybdenum = RM 6.50 + 1.34 + 0.06 = RM 7.90 per kilo molybdenum/content
calcium molybdat = RM 6.10 + 1.31 + 0.06 = RM 7.47 per kilo molybdenum/content

Molybdenum metal technical is exempt from turn-over taxes and, consequently, exempt from export promotion contribution. The price for this is RM 6.50 + RM 1.34 = RM 7.84.

Since, during the current month, a large part of the

(page 6 of original)

originally chemical stocks of molybdenum ore now available for metallurgical purposes has already been processed to steel-refining metals such as ferre-molybdenum, molybdenum metal.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9640
CONTINUED

(page 6 of original cont'd)

technical and calcium molybdat and has probably been allocated to the steel plants by the Reich Office for Iron and Steel, we hope to receive in the near future your approval of the application for an increase of raw material costs.

Heil Hitler !

GESELLSCHAFT FÜR ELEKTROMETALLURGIE

Dr. Paul Grienfeldt

I.G.F. REICHSINDUSTRIE, TRIEBWERK

(to: Statistical Accounting, Chemistry, Ffm.
factory Bookkeeping, Bitterfeld
Dir. Kraus Ffm
Special Bookkeeping Branch, Ffm
Legal Department, Chemistry, Ffm.)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

8 September 1947

I, Samuel S. HORN, GO No. 443 113, hereby certify that I am a duly appointed translator for the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-9640.

.....
Samuel S. HORN
GO No. 443 113

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT No. VI-9775
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

THE ARCHIVE (Des Archiv)

Reference book for

POLITICS * ECONOMICS * CULTURE

Published by
DR. KURT JAHNKE

Ministerialrat
in the Reich Propaganda Ministry

Edited by
ERNST JAEWICKE

Head of the Greater-Berlin
Gen. Press Office of the
NSDAP

"The NSDAP has no objections to the publication
of this work."

The Chairman of the Party
Supervisory Office.
Berlin, 30 June 1935

June 1935

Otto Stollberg, Publishing House, Berlin SW 11

(page 2 of original)

Conference of the Bunsengesellschaft.

5.6.
Vwa 35

At the 40th General Meeting of the Bunsengesellschaft, Prof. GRIMM, Ludwigshafen, talked about the importance of chemistry to the German economy and Dr. KFAENZLEIN, Hoechst, talked about the importance to the German Economy of research in the textile chemistry.

Prof. GRIMM underscored the fact that the German chemical industry brings in 50% of our foreign exchange, although it only produces 5 to 6% of Germany's goods. In view of the generally unfavourable German trade balance, it is the task of chemistry to help overcome this unfavourable balance by substituting domestic products for essential imported raw materials like motor fuels, textiles, metals and rubber and by creating high-grade new export goods. - Dr. KFAENZLEIN termed it the task of the chemical industry to replace imported wool and cotton by creating synthetic fibres. In successful experiments, high-grade fibres have already been obtained which far exceed any artificial silk, produced so far.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

9 September 1947

I, Samuel S. HORN, AGO No. 443 113, hereby certify that I am a duly appointed translator for the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-9775.

.....
Samuel S. HORN
AGO No. 443 113

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Lothar MISCHKE, Berlin-Zehlendorff, Otmachauer Steig 32, after having been warned that I make myself liable to punishment for any false statements, hereby declare under oath, voluntarily and without duress the following:

I worked from 1935 - 1945 in the Supervisory Office Chemistry (Prüfungsstelle Chemische Industrie) and had many opportunities of getting to know the behaviour of I.G. Farben and its personnel.

- 1) My principal work consisted of statistical export returns, export analyses etc. I was also authorized to approve certain export transactions. In this Supervisory Office (Prüfungsstelle), from 1935 - 1940, I had to deal with the I.G. Farben Konzern.
- 2) I have always regarded the I.G. Farben Konzern as the attempt of a certain circle of persons to acquire its own economic sovereign power and with its aid to exercise also political influence. For this reason, after 1933, the I.G. Farben Konzern placed its economic facilities in the most generous manner at the disposal of the Nazis. For example: Any difficulty in currency exchange experienced by a German foreign representative could, with very little difficulty, be overcome through the currently competent I.G. Farben-Representatives. A further example is the German South-East-Europe policy, which was decisively laid down by the I.G. Farben Industrie. It was not for nothing that Herr ILSNER was the Chairman of the South-East-Europe Committee. It was equally a matter of course that all the reports submitted to the offices of I.G. Farben regarding economic and political events in foreign countries were communicated to the competent German authorities.

In reply to the question as to when this close collaboration began and also became evident to outsiders, I can, on the basis of my observations, reply as follows: On the declaration of the program of the Four Year Plan and the institution of the Four Year Plan Board, Professor KRAUCH of the Headquarters of the I.G. Farben Konzern became the most influential advisor of GOEBLING. KRAUCH, from his post on the Four Years Plan Board, directed practically the whole construction of the supplementary German economic authorities and remained in this position until the collapse.

- 3) I am personally convinced that the influential people of the I.G. Farben raised no objections to the imperialistic aims of the Nazi policy and that they all took advantage of the business opportunities offered to them. This applied even in such cases where influential representatives of the I.G. Farben Konzern occasionally had strong doubts about the Nazi policy. They always brushed these doubts aside as soon as they saw the possibility of a further increase in power for the Konzern. The danger of the developments leading to an outbreak of war was, in my opinion, already seen in the I.G. Farben Industrie in the September crisis of 1938. In the

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8084
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(page 1 of original, cont'd)

moment, however, when HITLER succeeded, advantage was taken of every chance that presented itself, even when no necessity existed for it in the way of business.

A proof of this is the annexation of the Aussiger Verein fuer chemische und metallurgische Industrie of the I.G. Farben in the spring of 1939.

(page 2 of original)

- 4) I met Dr. ILGNER twice; once at a meeting of the Economic Group Chemie-Industrie, at which the export situation in South-East-Europe was discussed and once in the VOWI (Economics) Department. On the first occasion, ILGNER showed himself as a pronounced representative of the Nazi policy. He stated, inter alia, that in agreement with Dr. GOEBBELS, he had, already in 1933, become a member of the Rotary Club, in order to act as observer there. I think that it was in 1941 that he made this statement.

I have carefully read through the 2 pages of this statement and signed it with my own hand, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and countersigned them with my initials and hereby declare, under oath, that in this affidavit I have to the best of my knowledge and belief stated the absolute truth.

(signed) Dr. Lothar MISCHKE

Sworn to and signed before me this 18th day of April 1947 at OCCWC, Berlin, Dahlem, Kronprinzen Allee 138, by Dr. Lothar MISCHKE, Berlin-Zehlendorf, Ottenheuer Steig 32, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signed) Norbert HEILPERN
U.S. Civilian, AGO X046 343

Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

13 June 1947

I, John FOSBERRY, No. 20179, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8084.

John FOSBERRY
No. 20179

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Guenther ~~Frank-Fahle~~, employee of the I.G. Farben Industrie in Berlin NW 7 from 1933 until 1935 and manager (Direktor) of the I.G. Farben Industrie from 1935-1945 and in the management of the I.G. Berlin NW 7, at present residing in Oberursel, Hohemarktstrasse 123, having been warned that I render myself liable to punishment for any false statement, hereby declare of my own free will and without coercion as follows: -

- 1.) According to my recollection, the participation of the I.G. in the whole of Germany's export trade from about 1932 was on the average about 10%. Although the export figures of the other great German export firms are not at present available to me, I can say from my recollection that the I.G. was, in the long run, the biggest foreign exchange contributor to Germany.
- 2.) By reason of the strong foreign exchange position which the I.G. had in foreign business and the international connections which it possessed, it was a matter of course that the I.G. should be asked by the Government for assistance in the most varied cases, as there was no other firm in Germany which possessed such far-reaching international connections and sources of foreign exchange.
- 3.) In the years succeeding 1933, the I.G. imported a number of products from abroad, which in accordance with the Four Year Plan in the following period were manufactured synthetically. It concerned principally natural rubber and oil. Besides this, they imported molybdenum and chromium ore, as well as phosphates and tungsten.

I assume that the I.G. imported these products at the request of the Reich Ministry of Economy and other official quarters, as the I.G. themselves could have had no interest in the import of rubber and oil.
- 4.) At the instance of the Reichsbank and other Government offices, the I.G. used its position in the international credit system in order to obtain foreign loans for Reich aims.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-10679
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(page 2 of original)

- a) In 1935, the I.G. was asked by the Economic Ministry to place foreign exchange at their disposal, in order, by the purchase of blocked marks (Sperrmark) or dollarbonds, to obtain Reichsmarks for a firm named BRICKMANN, which wanted to manufacture small, dirigible airships. The credit was arranged, though I do not know the amount.
- b) About 1937 or 38, Dr. SCHLITZ was conducting negotiations with Japan for a new Commercial treaty. The Reichsbank had in its clearing account with the Bank of Japan a debit balance in Yen. The I.G. took up a corresponding sterling credit in London, which they used to obtain Yen and so wipe off this debit balance. What this sum in Yen amounted to, I can no longer remember.
- c) In various cases, foreign banks which had Stillstand credits in Germany, were doubtful about the ability of the German debtors to repay their foreign credits and therefore required that the Reichsbank should assume the responsibility for the repayments of these credits. In many of these cases, the Reichsbank turned to the I.G., with the request that they should take over these credits. The Reichsbank permitted the I.G., on taking over an old foreign exchange obligation, to enter into a new foreign exchange credit, usually in the same amount as the old Stillstand credit.
- 5.) In a number of cases, business in the export markets was undertaken at a loss, in close contact with the consultants of the Reich Ministry of Economy, in order to raise the foreign exchange resources of the Reich. I remember particularly such losses in the field of dyes and heavy chemicals. I do not remember the total amount of such losses by the I.G. in such transactions.
- 6.) The measures necessary to raise the exports were pursued intensively by all the Sales Combes. For the import of war-essential products, the intermediary services of the Buying Departments of the Works, the Central Buying Office and the Department for the Import of Foreign Exchange and Goods were used. The foreign credits were dealt with by Dr. KRUEGER and myself and by the Credit Department and the Finance Secretariat.

TRANSLATION OF DOCU ENT No. NI-10679
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original)

I have carefully read through the 3 (three) sheets of this statement and countersigned them with my own hand, have made the necessary corrections and initialled them in my own handwriting and I hereby declare under oath that in this statement I have told the absolute truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Dr. Guenther FRANK-PAHLE

Sworn to and signed before me this 9th day of September 1947 at the Palace of Justice, Saarburg, Germany, by Dr. Guenther FRANK-PAHLE, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

Dr. Otto HILLERUPP
ETO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
US War Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

12 September 1947

I, Anno MARTIN, ETO No. 20 144, hereby certify that I am a duly appointed translator for the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI-10679.

Anno MARTIN
ETO No. 20 144

(oval stamp
illegible)

Minutes

of the meeting of the Vorstand and the Technical Board
of Directors,

held at Frankfurt on Main - Hoechst on 25 May 1936.

Gentlemen present: HERMANN
L. UTENSCHLAEGER
JACOBI
JAEHNE
KREUZLEIN
PFAFFENDORF
ROTH
FEHLE
HAGENBOECKER
HILCKEN
LANDENS
STAIB
TAMPEKE
HIRSCHEL
KURTZ (Temporary)
SCHWABORN "

Herr HERMANN expresses his gratitude for the honours conferred upon him on the occasion of his anniversary (Jubilaeum).

He announces furthermore, that Dr. PISTOR was awarded the BUNSEN-Medal.

Twelve to fifteen chemists of the Hoechst plant are to be sent to the Reich meeting of chemists to be held in Munich, from July 7 - 11. Section chiefs are asked to submit their proposals.

A specialist sub-section (Fachgruppe) for synthetic materials is to be established within the Verein Deutscher Chemiker (Union of German Chemists.)

Oberingenieur EINST will be granted leave for private business reasons, and he expects to be pensioned off soon.

KURTZ gives a report on the outcome of the last buyers' meeting. It will no longer be possible to maintain I.G.'s special position in the procurement of foreign raw materials. Owing to the tense situation concerning foreign exchange, we are to-day no longer able to buy Benzol from foreign countries, especially since a prohibition against imports in general was issued at the beginning of this year. An increase in Benzol prices is therefore to be

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

9 July 1947

I, Ephraim LEVIN, D-153 535, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-5882.

.....
Ephraim LEVIN
D-153 535

5 copies
2nd copy

SECRET

Extract of resolutions from the minutes concerning the session
of the Work Staff "Chemistry" on 15 September 1939.

Chairman: Dr. Ungewitter

Present: Dr. Kraft - Reich Ministry of Economics

Oberregierungsrat Dr. Lureck }
Dr. Angerer } - High Command of the Armed Forces
Dr. Zweyer }

Dr. Ehrmann }
Dr. Dietrich }
Dr. Hagert } - "Chemistry"
Dr. Heyl }

The minutes of resolutions of the session of 12 September 1939
were read and adopted with slight changes.

I.

Sulphur.

The High Command of the Armed Forces advises that ~~an~~ increased
demand for chemical warfare agents actually exist.

II.

Sulphuric acid.

After looking through the balance once more it is found that a
shortage in requirements of 700,000 tons per year of SO_3 remains open,
of which 100,000 tons per year of SO_3 can be covered from Polish
pyrites. This shortage arises in the second year of the war without
coverage, whereas in the first year of the war the stocks of foreign
sulphur-containing material are available for coverage, but will then
be completely used up. Decreases are conceivable to any extent worth
mentioning only in connection with the fiber materials program.

III.

Raw phosphate.

In connection with the raw materials situation in Poland there is

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

mentioned, in addition to iron pyrites, that some phosphate is present, but in small and poor occurrences.

(page 2 of original)

IV.

Camphor.

It is decided substantially to reduce the mobilization task for the production of celluloid.

V.

Calcium Hypochlorite.

The High Command of the Armed Forces declares that the necessary steps were taken for requisitioning calcium hypochlorite for civilian protection from air raids. As a matter of principle the neutrals are not to be put in a difficult position because of the exports of calcium hypochlorite, but if other countries, for instance Russia, can undertake delivery, one should allow them to do it. The I.G. export to Holland also shall not be approved.

VI.

Colors for Blackout.

In the matter of the Reichsbahn blackout measures "Chemistry" feels, to be sure, that the alkydals are much too good to be used for such varnishes in large quantities. But since the Reichsbahn matter is very urgent "Chemistry" does not believe that it ought to interfere.

VII.

War Delivery Contracts.

It is agreed that war delivery contracts must, under certain circumstances, be changed in order to avoid companies being designated as W-plants because of a few deliveries, whereas others have not been used to full capacity.

VIII.

Waste Acid.

"Chemistry" advises that Mr. Krauch's attention was called to the waste acid problem. The Wasap should introduce as complete a circulatory process as possible. Otherwise the opinion is that the firms should try first of all to regulate the matter among themselves.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

IX.

Pyrolignite of Lime.

The importation of pyrolignite of lime and raw acetone from the Balkan countries is declared to be extremely urgent.

(page 3 of original)

X.

Casein.

Dr. Kraft declares that with reference to casein there has been no decision as yet as to whether fiber casein should also be produced.

XI.

Speyer Celluloid Factory and Rhenish Celluloid Factory.

It is resolved: The Rheinische Celluloid Fabrik will not be given a task: the Speyer Celluloid Fabrik will get an order for Ikarit (a cellone-like substance of acetyl cellulose), 20 tons per month for celluloid. The camphor supplies of both factories are to be taken away, with the exception of 20 tons with Speyer.

XII.

Mobilization Task Ludwigshafen.

In this connection the High Command of the Armed Forces states that:

- 1) there has been a conference between the chief of staff of Mr. Krauch and Col. Becht,
- 2) the High Command of the Armed Forces has sent a communication to Krauch, in which the High Command of the Armed Forces demands the dismantling of various apparatuses and their transportation to the East,
- 3) a communication was sent to the Reich Ministry of Economics, with a copy to "Chemistry", according to which Ludwigshafen is not to receive any greater task than the one assigned thus far.

Thus it is decided that the task already assigned to the I.G. for Ludwigshafen shall stand, with slight changes for really war-important products from the Hurster program. In case demands for specialists are made to the I.G. at Ludwigshafen, the I.G. must meet them, reducing the program to the level of the mobilization task. Supplies of

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

iron pyrites are not to be laid in, except for a stock to cover the requirements for 8 days. The High Command of the Armed Forces advises that Mr. Krauch was asked to submit proposals for the removal of products vital for the war and the transportation from Ludwigshafen to the East of the apparatuses required for them.

(page 4 of original)

Assignment of Iron for Repair Purposes of the Chemical Industry.

"Chemistry" reports out the state of the plants, some of which are very much in need of repair, and demands a Z-contingent of 39,000 tons of iron.

XIV.

Workers required by the Chemical Industry for Mobilization Production.

The High Command of the Armed Forces raises this question. "Chemistry" is at present not in a position to make statements with regard to this. Dr. U. estimates that about 100,000 workers will be released in the plants which are to be shut down, but remarks that in other branches of industry substantially greater numbers of workers would have to be released; in his opinion there could even be temporary unemployment. The High Command of the Armed Forces wants to put the offices in question off till later on, since there is now no time for work of that kind concerning statistics on workers.

XV.

Arsenic.

The urgent Wehrmacht requirements for arsenic should in part be covered from foreign purchases. "Chemistry" requested the I.G., to attempt to get some arsenic through its foreign connections, for instance, from Balcium. The necessary currency limit was not forthcoming for Sweden; at present only 100,000 RM. Dr. Kraft undertakes again to attempt to get the Reich Ministry of Economics to release considerable amounts. The High Command of the Armed Forces will again write to the Reich Ministry of Economics.

XVI.

Chromium.

"Chemistry" will demand a chromium quota for iron and steel. For impregnation purposes as far as possible chromium should not be used; one should attempt to get along with fluorine salts. The chromium situation is definitely bad. It will only be possible to import small quantities. It is to be investigated whether chromium supplies are on hand in Ludwigshafen for removal. Dr. Kraft will get in touch with the Metals Division in the Reich Ministry of Economics with regard to the assignment of a chromium quota.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7136
CONTINUED

(page 5 of original)

XVII.

Uniformity of Arrangements in the Reich Offices.

This uniformity is so far lacking. The Reich Offices must get general directions with regard to the presumable duration of the war for which the planning is to be made.

XVIII.

Vulcanized Fiber.

It is decided to shut down the trunk factories, except for those engaged on export and those producing vulcanized fiber corners in the usual sizes.

XIX.

Enlargement of the scope of Order No. 13.

The High Command of the Armed Forces requests inclusion of PCU and PC, also of Oppanol, in the order. But "Chemistry" is of the opinion that, since the I.G. is the sole producer, a letter to the I.G. is sufficient; but one should first hear what Mr. Eckel has to say.

20 Sept. 1939
Dr.Hy/Br

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

13 August 1947

I, Victoria ORTON, No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7136.

Victoria ORTON
No. 20129

- 5 -
"END"

78

Review

DOCUMENT NO. N I - 4690
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES
"THIS IS AN UNOFFICIAL COPY"

Interrogation
of von Knieriem
by Mr. E. Glaser.

3.00 to 4.00 PM Saturday

25 August 1945.

Q.: What are the facts concerning the 20 million dollars aviation-gasoline purchase that was made by I.G. on behalf of the German Government?

A.: I made an explicit statement to this effect to Major Tilley and he has all that information in detail. The government approached us asking us to try to procure for them a rather great stock of oil and to try to purchase it from Standard Oil.

Q.: What year was that in?

A.: Well, in that statement which I made here, I cannot fix quite accurately the year. It must have been about 1936 to 1937. The government at that time through the Reichswirtschaftsministerium approached Mr. Krauch.

Mr. Krauch was going to Ludwigshafen to tell it to us. Then Krauch, Schmitz, myself, and Mr. Fischer went over to London. The explanation made by the government officials was as far as I remember that the Government wanted to get Germany independent as far as possible from the oil supplies from abroad, and in fact we were to build up a lot of hydrogenation plants. But these hydrogenation plants took a long time to build, and to bridge over this time, they wanted to have a stock of supplies. Then we approached Standard Oil in London about this question. The amount was about 20 million dollars, but afterwards I think only an amount like 14 or 15 million dollars was expended in the

execution of the option concerned. When we approached Standard Oil, they said: "Well, in principle, we will agree, but after our general understanding with the Royal Dutch Shell group, we would have to communicate with Sir Henry Detorling. Then the Royal Dutch joined the discussion and they said that the Anglo-Persian, which was owned 50 percent by the British government, should be made a party. Then in the evening joint conversations were held between I.G. and Standard Oil and Royal Dutch and Anglo-Persian. We talked about procuring foreign currencies. My business in this matter was to draw up the contract and this contract on the face being merely just the selling of oil against cash, was a difficult thing, for the reason that we wanted some specific brands of oil, high grade brands, and the Standard Oil people said that they could not give us that because their apparatus was not sufficient to produce all this stuff so quickly. They would have to put up new apparatus but afterwards, when the oil had been delivered, this apparatus would be superfluous, so that the amount of money which had to be paid was not only the market price for that oil, but also an additional amount for a very quick amortization, and this to figure out was not quite easy. Now, in which way the transportation was handled, that was the usual way, I believe. We did it in this way. I.G. handled the business and paid cash and got the cash back from the government without any profits or losses.

Q.: Did I.G. have that much cash on hand to handle it?

A.: Certainly not. This cash was procured for us by the government. Nobody could get any currency at that time without the permis-

ion of the government. Now, as to the details in which way this was handled, and who made transfer of the money, I couldn't tell you. This is just a routine business with us. Somebody in Germany had to pay this millions of dollars. I.G. got the foreign currency from the government and paid these companies.

Q.: Did I.G. tell the parties to the negotiations that it was acting in a representative capacity for the German Reich?

A.: We didn't go to Standard Oil and tell them that we ask them to do our government a favor. We didn't tell them that. But you see, something must have leaked out. It is quite unusual for I.G. to purchase oil to the amount of 20 million dollars. Our business is to make oil after the hydrogenation process and not to purchase gasoline.

Q.: Were the specialized plants actually constructed?

A.: Plants then running were located e.g. in Bayway in New Jersey and maybe one in Louisiana and with the Shell Oil Company may be in Curacao. Some little things regarding specialized apparatus, especially for the purpose of making this highgrade stuff, had to be put into these places.

Q.: Was the contract itself between I.G. and Standard Oil, Royal Dutch Shell and Anglo-Persian Oil?

A.: Yes, I think the contract was between Standard Oil itself and a contract was made with Asiatic which is one of the three big subsidiaries of Royal Dutch. The other parties divided our requirements between themselves, so that is suited them, but Anglo-Persian stepped out. There was no contract with Anglo-Persian, and the reason was, in my opinion, that Anglo-Persian

said this quality did not suit Anglo-Persian to fabricate for us now. The contract was made with Standard Oil as far as I can remember, and it was made with the big subsidiary of Royal Shell, Asiatic Petroleum Company.

Q.: How did it happen that when the German government wanted to buy these products it asked you to do it for them rather than directly?

A.: Well, the German government was certainly acquainted with our very friendly relations with Standard Oil. We had made with Standard Oil, as you probably know, a very big deal. And we had shown this agreement to our government. So that the government knew that we were having very friendly relationships with Standard Oil and the government probably thought that it would go more smoothly if we did it. Also there was no one in the government able to do this.

Q.: Who in the government approached I.G.?

A.: Well, in my remembrance, President Schacht. He was Minister of Economics, at that time, I don't quite recall the date exactly. At that time he was Minister of Economics, or the above given years must be wrong.

Q.: When did Schacht approach in I.G.?

A.: I can tell you from second-hand knowledge only. We heard to the best of my remembrance about this from Kruech that he was approached by the government. He told us that he was approached by Blomberg, who was Minister for War and by Schacht, who was then Minister for Economics.

Q.: Was Krauch plenipotentiary for the synthetic products division of the four years plan at that time?

A.: Well, I cannot tell you that quite correctly. You should certainly be able to find out the date from the other sections and from Krauch himself. I can't tell you, but in my opinion he was at that time having his domicile in Berlin.

Q.: And that would mean that he was probably doing governmental work?

A.: Yes. The thing would work in this way, that somebody in Berlin wanted to make this bridge-over, and then probably they approached Krauch and said: "Well, you are in the I.G. and you are friendly with Standard Oil, and now would you not try to fix that up for us?"

Q.: Now, if he was plenipotentiary, was he in a position at that time to direct I.G. to do this for the government?

A.: Yes, I think so.

Q.: In what capacity?

A.: The chairman of the company was the old Mr. Duisberg, and the president was Mr. Bosch and then at a certain time, Mr. Duisberg died, and then Mr. Bosch was chairman and Schmitz was president and at that time Krauch was a member of the board and then Mr. Bosch died, and then Krauch was made chairman, Schmitz remaining president. So that in all probability Krauch was member of the board of I.G. having charge of oil things and hydrogenation.

Q.: He remained a member of the board when he was plenipotentiary?

A.: Yes. He remained chairman of the board afterwards.

Q.: Did Schecht or von Blomberg make this request of Krauch?

A.: To the best of my knowledge I feel pretty sure that he told us that he was approached by them.

Q.: Then who was consulted in I.G.?

A.: Schmitz probably. He would have been then president.

Q.: Did you participate in any conversation between Krauch and Schmitz on this question?

A.: I don't remember a specific conversation, but we surely have talked about the question on the trip. They took me with them to draft the contract. Krauch and Schmitz, Mr. Fischer and myself were in on the negotiations. Mr. Fischer at that time, did the selling questions with regard to oil.

Q.: But as far as Krauch was concerned, he went as a representative of I.G. and not as a representative of the government. Is that correct?

A.: Yes, that is correct.

Q.: Now, was it customary for I.G. to perform missions of this type for the government?

A.: I don't remember any other cases.

Q.: This was a successful venture was it not and I.G. did accomplish what the government requested of them in this case?

A.: Yes. I think so.

Q.: Did the government ask you to try to do similar things for it later on?

A.: I don't remember.

Q.: I.G. obtained no profit on this transaction?

A.: No, none.

Q.: Was it simply regarded as a patriotic gesture?

A.: I should think I.G. would not take any profit on this.

Q.: Didn't I.G. take profit on other transactions with the government?

A.: This was not the kind of usual deal. It is not the business of I.G. to purchase oil from Standard Oil, and to give it to somebody else. That would be a strange situation to take profit and I don't know whether the question has come up at all.

Q.: You didn't consider it a commercial matter at all, only a patriotic duty on your part?

A.: I don't remember. I just drafted the agreement and in drafting the agreement with the oil firms, this question did not come up at all. It was a question of fixing the prices and making provisions for transportation, and then it was a very difficult question. We had an option to take the whole amount or less. But in my opinion, we had some obligations to take some amount. I don't think that we were in a position not to take anything.

Q.: Didn't it strike you at the time that this was an out-of-the-ordinary transaction?

A.: Yes, it was a kind of irregular transaction. But you must look at it in this way, I.G. in exploiting the hydrogenation plants had a certain responsibility in trying to purchase so much gasoline as necessary to meet the demands of Germany, since the plants could not be built so quickly. And so in picking the I.G. organization to effect the purchase of oil, it was just the same in effect as if we would have been in a position to build quicker.

Q.: You felt obligated to supply the needs of the German government?

A.: Well, all the people thought that our hydrogenation process would make Germany at least to a certain extent self-sustaining. It was a moral obligation, but it was part of our business, and we tried to, and now if the plants take a long time, the idea probably was that by this way we could reach the same effect as if we would have been in a position to build quicker.

Q.: Would it be fair to say that I am correct in quoting you that the German government gave financial help in this development?

A.: No, not in this way. We had developed this process quite out of our own means and this was a thing which, when we were telling this to Standard Oil to show them how much costs we had, they hardly believed that we had spent some hundreds of million marks in developing the process which was at that time not so very secret because we saw that there might be a lot of criticism. It went very far to the extent where it would have been nearly nonsense to do it, that is to say, to spend hundreds of millions of marks to develop a process for making the stuff for 25 pfennigs, when the costs "CIF" Hamburg without duty were about 8 - 12 pfennigs.

Q.: Why was it done? To make Germany self-sufficient?

A.: No, not at all at that time. This is difficult to explain. To understand this you would have to know how I.G. divided its real profits in a year. There was a very small amount which I.G. gave to the shareholders in comparison with the total profits, and all the other profits were put into the business again to develop the new things. When we developed these synthetic indigos we had made rather high profits, and these profits were put into another field of experimental work in the nitrogen field which was expensive. We developed the Haber-Bosch process. We had very great revenues out of that, and then we put that back into the hydrogenation of coal because we took the position that there is a chemical process which only I.G. can develop, nobody else. And it is our duty to touch on this problem.

Q.: Do you think the reputation of the company would be improved by making 25 pfennigs oil to sell in competition with other priced oils?

A.: Yes. Because in developing such a process, you have a lot of sidelines and issues where you are learning a lot and making new things. One thing comes out of the other. It was a development of the high pressure process with catalysts. This process might be necessary for future things. You must touch such a thing. You cannot leave it to somebody else. It was one of the big problems which had to be handled.

Q.: Then when you did get into this process and had developed it to a point for commercial exploitation, and the German government became interested in it, then you somehow began to feel an obligation to supply the government and to help it bridge-over the

the period concerned. What was the nature of that obligation, in your mind?

A.: We considered it to be our business and to our own interests, with regard to the standing of the company, not to be a failure, and to develop it quickly, and this might have been in our minds, to bridge it over to a certain extent, I told you that the government did not give one farthing (pfennig) to develop this process, but afterwards when we built some hydrogenation plants, we got, in some cases, a kind of guarantee that in selling the stuff, if the actual cost would surpass the amount which we could charge to the customers, then the government would take over the difference, that is, indemnify us.

Q.: Did you not have the duty and obligation to so complete your process that it would be available to the government and the Wehrmacht?

A.: No. The government did not use the process. This process was used by ourselves and by licensees who were the other German companies. In some cases they were companies with which we were not participants at all, and in some cases it was with companies in which we had some participations.

Q.: If you were not able to meet the commercial prices, how did you meet the competitive conditions?

A.: Germany had a very heavy duty on imported oil. This tariff was made a financial tax. We had always this tariff, and it was a big revenue for the government. It was designed to procure money and not for protection of oil production. But afterwards, it was a protection for us. At one time, when the oil

companies were fighting very hard the cost of gasoline "CIF" Hamburg was three pfennigs per litre, whilst the usual price was eight and up, and then came the duty, amounting to about 15 pfennigs per litre. When we started, our cost price was about thirty and then went down to something like twenty-two, so that it was not so bad, if you count the duty. The fact was that using gasoline which was home-made, the government lost the duty income but saved foreign currency.

Q.: The government did not mind that, did it?

A.: But this development was started rather early. Our process was completed, I should say at that time, when we made the first big transaction with Standard Oil. This was in 1927 and 1929.

Q.: Wasn't it true that Ruotefisch went to Hitler in 1932 to find out whether or not it was desirable for I.G. to continue with synthetic gasoline and hydrogenation?

A.: The only remembrance I have, and this is not sure, is that he was one together with Hitler, but I can't find out in which year that was, and I don't know anything about the conversations between them.

Q.: Isn't it true that I.G. considered the desirability of dropping experiments in hydrogenation because of the terrific losses sustained by the company, without government support?

A.: Well, it might. I remember that I myself with some other gentleman figured out whether it would be bearable to go ahead with these things. I remember at that time that I figured out with an associate of mine and I admit that at that time, in my opinion it was absolutely ripe for discussion whether it would not be

the right thing to drop the whole thing altogether.

Q.: May be with that in mind, you obtained the indemnity from the government in reference to these particular plants?

A.: Well, it might be.

(handwritten) cont'd

"I have read the record of this interrogation and swear that the answers given by me to the questions of Mr. Glaser, are true."

Interrogated by:

.....
(signature)

.....
(position in I.G.)

.....
Mr. Bernard Glaser

Seite 13 des Originals

(7 handschriftliche Positionen)

ist unleserlich.

(Seite 14 des Originals)

handschriftlich

upon further questions: 7.

I seem to remember now, that the actual contracts on our behalf were formally signed not by I.G. but by Ammoniakwerk Merseburg GmbH., a 100 % subsidiary of I.G. I do not remember which persons signed for I.G., because the question by whom the actual execution of a contract took place is not considered as being of any importance; however is just at hand, and has the right of a signature may sign in this case Fischer probably signed and the second necessary signature may possibly I have given. I do not know, where the contracts are at present; they must be on one of those places I have indicated to Major Tilley; most likely they are in Heidelberg at the office of the legal department Klincksentor. Fischer certainly has a copy, since he was the one, who was working on that deal.

I cannot give any detailed statement on the time of the option or the delivery, but the option will have certainly been limited by

a period of time.

As far as I remember each party (Standard Oil and Asiatic) signed an individual contract. The kind of payment probably was: "Cash against documents" which would have been the usual way. I do not know any thing about I.G. getting a long term credit and I do not believe that was the case.

The development of the hydrogenation process took place without any help of the government. The bulk of the gasoline demands during the war was, if one does not count the exports from Roumania, probably derived from the hydrogenation process. But since I am not acquainted with the exact figures, you had better ask Ductofisch, who at that time was in charge of the oil business of I.G.

This interrogation took place without my having an opportunity to refresh my memory by looking into my files. A long time has gone since the events in question took place, I may therefore have been incorrect as to details. I have read the record of this interrogation and swear, that the answers given by me to the questions of Mr. Gleser are to the best of my present knowledge.

(signed) A. v. KNIERIM

member of board of I. G.

ERRATA SHEET

Page 5 of original, paragraph 1 should read:

- A. No, not in this way. We had developed this process quite out of our own means and this was a thing which, when we were telling this to Standard Oil to show them how much costs we had, they hardly believed that we had spent some hundreds of million marks in developing the process which was at that time not so very certain to be a success. And we kept this figure very secret because we saw that there might be a lot of criticism.

Page 5 of original, paragraph 3 should read:

- A. No, not at all at that time. This is difficult to explain. To understand this you would have to know how I.G. decided its real profits in a year. There was a very small amount which I.G. gave to the shareholders in comparison with the total profits, and all the other profits were put into the business again to develop the new things. When we developed these synthetic dyes we had spent a lot of money for the time and we had made rather high profits, and these profits were put into another field of experimental work in the nitrogen field which was expensive.

Errata Sheet prepared by:

JOHN J. HOLL
U.S. Civilian
AGO No. A-444412.

- END -

JLH

(Copy of Document)

ETHYL EXPORT CORPORATION
Thames House, Millbank,
London, S.W.1., 6th July 1936.

Copy/Mz

Dr. MUELLER-CUNRADI,
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Ludwigshafen am Rhein,
Germany.

Dear Dr. MUELLER-CUNRADI,

As mentioned above to you over the telephone this morning Ethyl Export Corporation would be prepared to supply 500 tons of Tetraethyl lead on loan to Ethyl G.m.b.H. for an agreed period of time, on the following terms:

1. Ethyl G.m.b.H. to deposit in a London Bank a guarantee bond for the sum of money involved, payable in either sterling or U.S. dollars.
2. Ethyl G.m.b.H. to pay Ethyl Export Corporation interest on the amount of the guarantee bond referred to in 1. above at the Bank of England rate (at present 2% per annum).
3. Ethyl G.m.b.H. to reimburse Ethyl Export Corporation for all charges for freight, insurance etc. incurred in delivering the 500 tons of Tetraethyl lead in question.
4. Ethyl G.m.b.H. to return the 500 tons of Tetraethyl lead, on the expiration of the loan period, to Ethyl Export Corporation free of all charges.

Delivery

Ethyl Export Corporation could arrange to ship the 500 tons of Tetraethyl lead in question to Ethyl G.m.b.H. at the rate of 200 tons a month for the first two months and 100 tons for the third month. The first delivery to be made at the earliest opportunity after receipt of instructions from you.

The above arrangement would avoid the necessity of Ethyl G.m.b.H. having to pay cash to Ethyl Export Corporation for the 500 tons of Tetraethyl lead in question but would at

the

(Page 2 of original)

the same time ensure that Ethyl Export Corporation is adequately protected.

As regards freight charges relative to the delivery of this 500 tons of Tetraethyl lead referred to in 3. above, we would endeavour to ship by German steamers, freight collect, in order to reduce to a minimum the amount of foreign currency payable by Ethyl G.m.b.H.

I shall be glad to hear from you at your early convenience, whether the proposition outlined herewith is acceptable to you and would ask you at the same time to advise us on the following points.

1. For what period of time would Ethyl G.m.b.H. require this loan of 500 tons of Tetraethyl lead.
2. When would you require the first shipment to be made from the U.S.A.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Ray Bevan.

(Translator's Note: Document Continues
in German)

Dr. MUELLER-CUNRADI.

Ludwigshafen (Rhine) 8 July 1939

Registered Letter!

Reich Air Ministry

LC III (5)

Berlin W. G.
Leipzigerstr. 7

With reference to the repeated discussions which the undersigned has had with Oberst (Colonel) BLOCH and Fliegeroberstabsingenieur HEYDENREICH, I am able to inform you that it has been possible to settle the affair of storing 500 tons of tetraethyl lead in Germany. The Ethyl Export Corporation is ready, to loan the quantity of 500 tons of tetraethyl lead to the Ethyl G.m.b.H.; that is, against return of the goods. The first delivery, amounting to 200 tons is to be effected in August, then in September 200 tons and in October 100 tons. A direct payment in foreign currency is not necessary; it is sufficient if the guarantee of a London bank for the amount required in each case is procured. I have requested Assessor DUDEN from the I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, Ludwigshafen (Rhine), to settle this question of financing. In case the RLM (Reich Air Ministry) should want to do this in another way - perhaps bringing in the Reichsbank - I beg you to inform Assessor DUDEN of it. Ethyl G.m.b.H. bears all cost of freight, insurance etc. for the Ethyl Export Corporation, and in addition to this pays interest on the borrowed quantities at the rate of interest of the Bank of England, at the present time 2% per annum. In addition, the Ethyl G.m.b.H. bears all charges

(Page 2 of original)

8 July 1939

which arise through the return of the goods. Through this certain demands for freight exchange result, which will however, be decreased by the fact that it is planned to use German ships for the transport.

The Ethyl Export Corporation has asked me the following further questions:

At what time Ethyl G.m.b.H. needs the goods, which I answered that for us, the earliest date possible would be desirable.

The subject of the second question was when the goods can be returned. I have answered that at the present time I could not tell, but that I supposed that the return can be effected at the end of 1939. This is not a definite date. I intentionally did not indicate a later date, however, in order not to make the affair more difficult. Besides, we may suppose that by that time all difficulties will be overcome through the start of operations in the second plant.

I considered it right to settle the affair with the Ethyl Export Corporation today, because I presume that although some points should still have been settled, the Reich Air Ministry wants an immediate decision.

Now the technical question of storing the 500 tons is still to be settled. The goods become property of the Ethyl G.m.b.H. which must therefore shoulder

the responsibility for perfect storage of the product. Because at the plant
Gapel, which would be considered

(Page 3 of original)

8 July 1938

there are no facilities for storing such large quantities, other storage places
must be arranged, for instance fuel stores could be considered. If the Reich Air
Ministry should want to influence the site of the depots, I beg to consider if
the Reich Air Ministry will appear itself which would, perhaps, not be quite
suitable, because until now we treated the whole affair merely from a standpoint
of private economy, in the interest of the business interests of Ethyl G.m.b.H.
Towards our foreign partners we maintained the standpoint that the addition of
tetraethyl lead into automobile gasoline depends on a sufficient stock of
tetraethyl lead in Germany. At any rate, Herr R. MORGENTHALER of Ethyl G.m.b.H.
Berlin NW 7, Unter den Linden 24, is available for the discussion of all the
questions of storage and is also already informed that he will have to take all
the steps to promote this affair.

For the Ethyl G.m.b.H., a series of tasks result from this affair. However,
it seems inexpedient to me already to arrange today in what way the expenses will
be paid back to Ethyl G.m.b.H. The reason for this is that we have carried on
the negotiations with the foreign partners from a quite different point of view
as mentioned above. For that reason it seems expedient to me to postpone the
matter for the time being.

Heil Hitler!

(Signed (Typed) MUELLER-CUNRADI

(Translator's Note: Handwritten number: 594)

ETHYL G.M.B.H., Berlin NW 7, Unter den Linden 24

T.R.A. BEVAN, Esq.
Ethyl Export Corporation
Thames House, Millbank,
London, SW 1.

SC/Mz

8 July 1938

Dear Mr. BEVAN,

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of 6 July and I am glad that as I
see from the contents, the affair evidently can be settled satisfactorily in the
interest of Ethyl G.m.b.H.

I should like to answer as follows, the various points which are still
unsettled:

- 1.) We shall take immediate steps to get the guarantee of a London bank either
in pounds sterling or in U.S. dollars. I shall ask Herr DUDEN to take
this matter up.
- 2.) Provided you consent Ethyl G.m.b.H. agrees, to pay to the Ethyl Export
Corporation compensation at the rate of interest of the Bank of London (at

the present time 2% per annum) for that sum which is guaranteed, according to par. 1), by the London Bank,

- 3.) Provided you consent Ethyl G.m.b.H. is willing to pay all expenses for freight, insurance etc. which arise in connection with the delivery of the

(Page 2 of original)

of the 500 tons of tetraethyl lead.

(Translator's Note: Carbon Copy)

(Letterhead:)

ETHYL G.M.B.H., Berlin NW 7, Unter den Linden 24

- 4.) The Ethyl G.m.b.H. pledges to return the 500 tons of tetraethyl lead free of all charges to the Ethyl Export Corporation after the end of the period for which the loan was made

I am especially glad that it was possible for you to avoid a direct payment between the two companies.

The use of the German steamers planned by you, is also of great help to us, because we do not have to spend foreign currency for this.

Naturally it is difficult for me to answer your question on approximately how long the time of loan will last, because, as you know from our previous correspondence, this depends on our production at Gopel and on our deliveries. But I suppose that we will be able to return the quantity at the latest by the end of 1939.

Your question on when the first shipment is to take place I should like to answer by saying that the quickest possible delivery is desirable, because as I wrote you, in my opinion the introduction of tetraethyl lead into automobile gasoline is to a great extent dependent on the carrying out of the stockpiling.

I shall charge Herr MORGENTHALER with making inquiries at what places the storage of the stock is expedient, so that we can give directions for delivery in good time at the arrival of the first delivery at the German seaport.

As you know, I go on leave tomorrow, and I am glad that it was possible for you to come to a decision in this affair before leaving.

With best regards,

Yours,
(Signed (Typed) MUELLER-CUNRADI

(Translator's Note: Carbon Copy)

(Translator's Note: Document Continues
in English)

Abschrift

TRAB/EH

Dr. MUELLER-CUNRADI,
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft,
Ludwigshafen a. Rhein
GERMANY.

11th July 1939.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-4922
Cont'd

Dear Dr. MUELLER-CUNRADI,

Many thanks for your letter of July 8th in answer to mine of the 6th July.

On receipt of advice from you that the necessary guarantee has been deposited in a London bank, we will arrange to ship 200 tons^{x)} of T. E. L. immediately from the U.S.A.

In the meantime we will advise our people in New York so that they can make the necessary arrangements thereby avoiding any delay. It will take us some two to three weeks undoubtedly to arrange this shipment and I sincerely hope that by that time Mr. DUDEN will have obtained the necessary permission to deposit the agreed guarantee in London.

In this connection I would like to know where it is proposed to store this 500 tons of T.E.L. since to the best of my knowledge there is not at the present time sufficient storage space available complying with our regulations of storage, to store even a small part of this quantity.

I sincerely hope that you are enjoying your vacation.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,
sign. A. BEVAN

x) the first month's consignment.

Copy to Mr. MORGENTHAUER.

(Translator's Note: Document Continues
in German)

E T H Y L G.m.b.H.

(Translator's Note: Handwritten
Notation: 3631?)

Telephone 12 37 44
Telegraphic Address Ethylgas Berlin

Account:
Deutsche Laenderbank A.G. Berlin NW 7
Postal Checking Account:
Berlin No. 104515

To
Herr HENZE
Zentralfinanzverwaltung I.G.
(Central Financial Administration of I.G.)

B e r l i n .

Your Reference Your Letter of Our Reference Berlin NW 7, Unter den Linden 24

13 July 1936

By request of Assessor DUDEN we transmit enclosed for your information a copy of a letter from the Ethyl Export Corporation, London, dated 11 July which we

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received today.

Heil Hitler.

ETHYL G.m.b.H.

(Signature: MORGENTHAUER)

(Translator's Note: Handwritten Note:)

- 1) Enter
- 2) File

1 Enclosure:-

ZENTRAL-FINANZVERWALTUNG
(Central Finance Department)

(Translator's Note: Illegible
Handwritten Note.)

File Memorandum

Re:	Our Reference:	Berlin NW 7
Ethyl Export Corporation	Dept. Finance-	Unter den Linden 70
	Secretariat/3631	
	Hg/R	14 July 1939

The Reich Air Ministry has the desire to store in Germany 500 tons of tetraethyl lead until such time as the plant which is to be built in Germany is able to cover the demand. Tetraethyl lead is added to aviation fuel in order to increase the efficiency of the engines.

(Trans. Note:
Handwritten
Notes in
Margin: Ethyl
Gasoline Corp-
oration.
50% Standard
50% Dupont)

At the request of the Reich Air Ministry Ludwigschafen started negotiations with Ethyl Export Corporation, with the result that this company is willing to lend Ethyl GmbH the amount of 500 tons of tetraethyl lead. The borrowed amount is to be returned by the end of 1939. We based our request to Ethyl Export Corp. on the fact that the addition of tetraethyl lead to automobile gasoline depends on a sufficient reserve of tetraethyl lead in Germany.

The Ethyl Export Corp. asks from us:

- 1. The Guaranty of an English bank for the value of the merchandise amounting to \$300,000.--,
- 2. Interest for this amount at the same rate as the rate of the Bank of England, which is 2% at this time,
- 3. Payment of freight and all other expenses for the transport forth and back.

Mr. DUDEN asks us to find out if we are able to get such a guaranty from an English or American bank. The necessary Devisen permission can easily be obtained, if necessary with

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the help of the RLM (Luftfahrtministerium).

(Signature) HENZE

(Translator's Note: Handwritten Note:)
File

For Dr. STURZENEGGER

is: Counter-Guarantee for \$900,000.-

Ke/Ksch
9 August 1930

The Ethyl G.m.b.H., Berlin, in which I.G. participates to the extent of 50%, is at the present time constructing a plant for the production of tetraethyl lead, which is used in gasoline as anti-knock. The basic patents for tetraethyl belong to Ethyl Gasoline Corp., Wilmington, U.S.A., and at the present time this Company still takes care of the German needs through the Ethyl Export Corp., London. The plant which is in construction will be producing by the end of 1933 approximately.

Ethyl G.m.b.H. has the desire to increase the present small reserves in Germany by 500 tons tetraethyl lead in order to be able to tide them over any possible temporary import difficulties. Ethyl Export Corp., London, is willing to loan these 500 tons to Ethyl G.m.b.H. under the condition that the transport, insurance etc. is paid by Ethyl G.m.b.H., and that interest is to be paid for the value of the merchandise amounting to about \$900,000.-; the interest rate to be the same as that of the Bank of England. Furthermore, Ethyl Export Corp. asks for a guarantee by I.G. for the proper return of the 500 tons. This guarantee should be protected by counter-guarantee of a foreign bank.

The delivery of the 500 tons should be made in 3 monthly deliveries of 200 tons, 200 tons and 100 tons each. The first delivery should be made as fast as possible.

(Page 2 of original)

I.G. will obtain permission from the German Devisen officials to assume the guarantee for Ethyl Export Corp. in returning the 500 tons of tetraethyl lead or to pay the corresponding amount of approximately \$900,000.-. At the same time a binding promise to comply with any obligations resulting from the acceptance of the guarantee is included in this permission.

It would be desirable if Grentert & Cie. would accept the counter-guarantee for this amount of approximately \$ 900,000.-.

(Signed) KERSTEN

Copy to: von MEISTER
Credit Dept.
Finance Secretariat

(Translator's Note: Handwritten Note:
1) authorization for Devisen
2) transfer of Devisen
3) authorization of guarantee

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NL-4922
Cont'd

Translator's Note: (Translator's Note: Semi- I.G. Berlin NW 7
Stamp) Illegible Receipt: Stamp) Central Finance Department
Received: 26 August 1936 No.
92/7/26

ED. GREUTERT & Cie.
Telegram address: GRUTEDERUS
Telephone: 41 620
Giro Account: Swiss National Bank
Postal Checking Account: V 3512

Answer: No.
In charge of:

Basle 2, 24 August 1936
Post Office Box

St/Sch

To:
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft,
Central Finance Department,
Berlin

Re: Collateral Security in favor of Ethyl Export Corporation, London.

With reference to the negotiations conducted in the above matter, we take the liberty of transmitting enclosed for your information a copy of the letter we sent to Ethyl Export Corporation, Thames House, Millbank, London, by Air Mail today.

As agreed by telephone we have withdrawn \$2,000 as an interim, that is, the approximate equivalent of the guarantee obligation assumed, from your account and have transferred this amount as collateral for the obligation assumed to the L disposition account (L Bereitschaftskonto).

As soon as we receive the \$400,000.— you promised us, we shall credit your L disposition-account with the aforementioned amount and shall regard your \$ credit as collateral for our collateral security.

Yours very truly:

(Translator's Note: Stamp:
1 Enclosure.
Refer to: HENZE)

ED. GREUTERT & Cie.

(Translator's Note: Two Illegible Signatures)

Ge/Sch

(Translator's Note: Stamp:)
26 August 1936

24 August 1936

Ethyl Export Corporation,
Thames House,
Millbank
London.

We have been informed that you are going to lend Ethyl G.m.b.H. in Berlin

200 tons of tetraethyl lead

at the equivalent value of

approximately \$400,000.—

with the stipulation that Ethyl G.m.b.H. in Berlin assumes the obligation of returning to you the commodity in natura or, in case of failure to fulfill this

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-4922
Cont'd

this obligation, to pay the equivalent value in effective foreign exchange in London whilst Ethyl G.m.b.H. is to defray the transportation and insurance costs and the interest on the value of the goods at the discount rate of the Bank of England. For this obligation of Ethyl G.m.b.H. I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktien-gesellschaft has taken over guarantee of payment.

For this obligation of Ethyl G.m.b.H. and I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. respectively, we herewith take over the unrevocable collateral security up to the amount of \$400,000.-- plus the above-mentioned expenses in connection herewith and declare expressly that this, our guarantee obligation is valid also in case Ethyl G.m.b.H. or I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., for any reason, including force majeure or similar circumstances, should not be able to fulfill their obligations towards you.

Yours very truly,
ED. GREUTERT & CIE.

Via Air Mail
Express.

(Translator's Note: Document Continues
in English)

Abschrift/Mz.

ETHYL G.m.b.H.

Confidential

London, 26th August, 1936

Dr. MUELLER-CUNRADI,
I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Ludwigshafen am Rhein,
Germany.

Dear Dr. MUELLER-CUNRADI,

This is to advise you that we have received from Ed. Greutert & Cie. a letter of guarantee covering 200 tons of T.E.L. to be delivered on loan to Ethyl G.m.b.H.

We have therefore cabled our New York office, requesting them to arrange to forward 1,000 drums of I-T Aviation Fluid on the first available German steamer sailing for the port of Hamburg.

We will advise you shipping details as soon as these are available.

Sincerely yours,
(Signed) Ray DEVAN.

(Translator's Note: Document Continues
in German)

ETHYL G.m.b.H. BERLIN NW 7, Unter den Linden 24

T.R.A. DEWAN, Esq.
Ethyl Export Corporation
Thames House,
Millbank,
London, S.W. 1

MC/Mz

29 August 1936

Dear Mr. DEWAN,

I have received your letter from 26 August and I am glad that the matter could be steered satisfactorily. May I request you to let me know the name of the steamer and the date of its departure as soon as possible so that we can make arrangements necessary for the unloading.

For September the shipment of a further 200 tons was planned and I shall initiate the necessary measures to get the bank guarantee for this too as soon as possible. We are very much interested in having the supply here as soon as possible, as the oil companies have already begun to set up the mixing-installations for automobile gasoline and because the approval of the government agencies is partly dependent on the presence of the supply.

Maybe you can also check if the 100 tons the delivery of which was planned for October could not already be delivered in September.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) MUELLER-CUNRADI

C O P Y

(Document Continues in English)

Translator's Note; Stamp: (Translator's Note: Handwritten
Abl F.S. Notations: Abl.

Cablegrams
Ethylport, London

Telegram
Ethylport, Sowest

ETHYL EXPORT CORPORATION
Incorporated in the State of Delaware, U.S.A.
with Limited Liability.

THAMES HOUSE, MILLBANK
London, S.W. 1

Telephone
Victoria
1441

(Translator's Note: Stamp:
I.G. Berlin NW 7
Zentral-Finanzverwaltung
(Central Finance Administration)
Eingeg: 29 Aug. 1936 No. 99/11
(Received)
Beantwortet No.....
(Answered)
Bearbeiter.....
(Processor)
Erl.am.....Mappe 3631
(Translator's Note: Erledigt - Acted
Upon)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-4922
Cont'd

Telephone
Victoria
1441

Our Reference
TRAB/HME.
Your Reference.

Head Office
405 Lexington Avenue,
New York, U.S.A.

25th August, 1936.

Dr. KERSTEN,
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft,
Laenderbank,
Unter den Linden,
BERLIN NW 7.

Dear Dr. KERSTEN,

I am enclosing herewith, for your information, copy of a letter we have today written to Ed. Greutert & Cie. of Basel.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) H.W. Edwards

Secretary to Mr. Bevan.

(Translator's Note: Stamp
Abl FS

Ethyl Export Corporation

Thames House, Millbank, London, S.W.

(Translator's Note: Stamp:
I.G. Berlin N.W. 7
Zentral-Finanzverwaltung
(Central Finance Administration)
Binger 29 Aug. 1936 No.....
(Received)
Beantwortet.....No.....
(Answered)
Bearbeiter.....
(Processor)
Erl.Am.....Mappe.....
(Erledigt - Acted (Folder)
Upon

TRAB/HME

Ge/Sch.

25th August, 1936

Ed. Greutert & Cie.,
Postfach,
BASEL 2.

Dear Sirs,

We thank you for your letter of the 24th August with reference to the guarantee which you have undertaken on behalf of Ethyl G.m.b.H. and I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft in connection with the loan of 200 tons of

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-4923
Cont'd

Tetraethyl lead being made by Ethyl Export Corporation to Ethyl G.m.b.H.

The terms of the guarantee are satisfactory to us.

Yours truly,

(Signed) T.R.A. BEVAN
T.R.A. BEVAN.

cc. Dr. KERSTEN.

C O I Y

Cablegrams
Ethylport London

Telegrams
Ethylport, Sowest

ETHYL EXPORT CORPORATION
Incorporated in the State of Delaware, U.S.A.
with Limited Liability

THAMES HOUSE, MILLBANK
London, S.W. 1

(Translator's Note: Stamp:
I.G. Berlin NW 7
Zentral-Finanzverwaltung
(Central Finance Administration)
Eingeg. 10 October 1938 No. 123/4
(Received)
Beantwortet.....No.....
(Answered)
Bearbeiter.....
(Processor)
Erl.am.....Mappe.3631..
(Erledigt - Acted (Folder)
Upon)

Telephone
Victoria
1441

Our Reference
TRAB/HME
Your Reference

Head Office
405 Lexington Avenue,
New York, U.S.A.

7th October, 1938.

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft,
Zentral-Finanzverwaltung,
Unter den Linden 62,
BERLIN NW. 7.

For the attention of Dr. KERSTEN.

Dear Sirs,

Please find enclosed herewith one copy of the Agreement between I.G. Farbenindustrie, Ethyl G.m.b.H. and Ethyl Export Corporation, duly signed by all the parties concerned.

You will note that we have dated this Agreement the 23rd day of

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August, 1938. Our reason for selecting this date is due to the fact that in the first guarantee received from Ed. Grauert & Cie. they referred to an arrangement between I.G., Ethyl G.m.b.H. and Ethyl Export. It seemed to us, therefore, that the enclosed document should pre-date the guarantee in question. We hope that this meets with your approval and would appreciate your acknowledgment of this document.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) R. BEVAN

cc. Dr. MUELLE & CUNRADI.

AGREEMENT made the 23rd day of August, 1938 between Ethyl Export Corporation a Corporation of the State of Delaware, United States of America, hereinafter referred to as Ethyl Export, Ethyl G.m.b.H. hereinafter referred to as Ethyl, and I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft hereinafter referred to as I.G.

ARTICLE I.

Ethyl Export will furnish Ethyl with 2,400 drums of aviation Ethyl Fluid brand of anti-knock compound (each drum having a tetraethyl lead content of 130,000 cubic centimetres) on the terms set out hereunder

- (a) The said Ethyl Fluid will be delivered to Ethyl at Deepwater, New Jersey, United States of America, and Ethyl Export undertakes to arrange for shipment of said Ethyl Fluid to Capel Uber Rathenow, Germany, all charges for freight insurance and other costs in connection with the delivery of this Ethyl Fluid will be the responsibility of and at the expense of Ethyl.
- (b) An equivalent quantity and quality of Ethyl Fluid to that delivered by Ethyl Export above will be re-delivered by Ethyl to Ethyl Export at Deepwater, New Jersey, United States of America, or at any other point designated by Ethyl Export provided the costs of delivery do not exceed those to Deepwater, New Jersey, United States of America. This re-delivery by Ethyl to Ethyl Export will be made on or before 31st December, 1939. All charges for freight insurance and other costs in connection with the re-delivery of this Ethyl Fluid to Ethyl Export will be the responsibility of and at the expense of Ethyl.
(Page 2 of original)
- (c) The value of the said 2,400 drums of Ethyl Fluid to be delivered by Ethyl Export hereunder is agreed to be United States dollars \$11,200 and the value of the containers in which this Ethyl Fluid will be delivered is agreed to be United States dollars 24,000, making a total value of United States dollars \$35,200, and in the event Ethyl fails for any reason whatsoever including force majeure to carry out its obligations under (b) above, Ethyl will pay to Ethyl Export on or before the 15th January, 1940 the said sum of United States dollars \$35,200 in U.S.A. currency in New York.
- (d) Ethyl will pay Ethyl Export in respect of the period from the date of shipment of the Ethyl Fluid by Ethyl Export until the date of re-delivery of the equivalent quantity of Ethyl Fluid to Ethyl Export a sum calculated by applying the Bank of England official bank rate to the value of the Ethyl Fluid and containers shipped as mentioned in (c) above, the first payment to be made on the 1st July, 1939 in respect of the period from the date of shipment until the 1st July, 1939 in U.S.A. currency in New

York, the said bank rate to be taken as that ruling on the 30th June, 1939, and the second payment to be made on 31st December, 1939 or on such earlier date as Ethyl shall re-deliver the Ethyl Fluid to Ethyl Export upon the same conditions as the first payment except that the bank rate will be taken as that ruling on the day immediately preceding the date of payment.

(Page 3 of original)

ARTICLE II.

In order to implement the obligations of Ethyl under this agreement I.G. guarantees that in the event Ethyl makes default in fulfilling any or all of its obligations under this agreement, I.G. will itself fulfill promptly all the obligations of Ethyl to the extent that Ethyl is in default.

ARTICLE III.

This Agreement is made in New York and is governed by the laws of the United States of America.

IN WITNESS Whereof, the parties hereto have caused this Agreement to be executed by their proper officers thereunto duly authorized the day and year first above written:-

ETHYL EXPORT CORPORATION

Attent:

/s/ J.C. GONZALEZ
Secretary

By: E.W. WEBB
President

ETHYL G.m.b.H.

/s/ T.R.A. PEVAN /s/ MUELLER-CUNRADI

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

/s/ DR. RONG /s/ MUELLER-CUNRADI

(Translator's Note: Document Continues
in German)

CENTRAL FINANCE DEPARTMENT

File Memorandum

Re:	Our File #	Berlin NW 7
Import of Tetraethyl Lead	Dept. Finance	Unter den Linden 62
	Secretariat/3631	
	Hg/R.	12 June 1939

Greutert has assumed the guarantee for the return of the imported tetraethyl lead to the Ethyl Export Corp. We deposited \$ 1 Million. with Greutert, thus guaranteeing the surety. This sum is deposited in 4 parts with 4 U.S.A. banks.

Dr. STURZENEGGER brought up the question whether the war risk he herewith eliminated. He proposed that both Greutert and Ethyl Gasoline Corp. should have the power of disposition of the respective accounts.

This proposal creates a doubt, in as far as it would be noted that two different people would have the power of disposition of one account. This would lead to the conclusion that it must be an account for a certain purpose. If Ethyl Gasoline Corp. should be questioned in regard to this, no doubt the connections will become clear. Furthermore, we would be in the hands of Ethyl Gasoline Corp. through such a step at the time when the tetraethyl lead is returned again and the release of the account will only be made after we are no longer in possession of the merchandise.

It has to be examined whether Dr. STURZENEGGER's doubts cannot be eliminated through a transfer of the money by Greutert to other banks in order to avoid the uncovering of the connections. If necessary one could consider that Greutert should transfer the money to the account of another Swiss bank - possibly by way of a third bank - without names connected with the account. Through such an action a claim by Greutert against this bank (the Swiss bank) amounting to \$ 1 Mill. would be made reasonable.

(Page 2 of original)

If this is not sufficient, it would have to be considered, whether Greutert should transfer the \$ 1 Mill. to an account in Holland or Switzerland. Permission of the devisa officials is necessary for such an action, and, naturally, the rate of exchange risk would then have to be taken by us.

These possibilities seem to represent a safer solution than Dr. STURZENEGGER's proposal.

(Translator's Note: Illegible Initial)

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
Central Finance Department

To: Control Office, Chemicals (Ueberwachungsstelle Chemie)

Berlin
Gross-Admiral Prinz Heinrich Str. 6 - 1. Floor.

Attention: Herr BUENGER.

Z1/Bay. Z1/Schn.

23 & 31.8.38

3 August 1939

Finance-Secretariat/3631
v.Bue/R 2264

Import of Tetraethyl lead.

In your letters of 23 and 31 August, 1938, you granted us permission to obtain a total of U.S. \$ 1 Mill. on the understanding that this money was to be deposited with the banking firm Ed. Greutert & Cie. as a basis for a bank guarantee. At that time Greutert gave the guarantee and deposited the money with American banks. The deposit in America was necessary because Greutert can only have a U.S. \$ account in the States.

Greutert is of the opinion that in case of a war between Germany and the U.S.A., the money deposited by him in connection with the tetraethyl lead deal is threatened by danger of confiscation. This is based on the fact that with special regard to the known and close connections between us and Greutert, in case of war the accounts kept by Greutert in the countries involved will undergo a particular careful examination. For this reason, Greutert proposes in our interest to dissolve the American accounts and transfer the money (\$ 1 Mill.) to Switzerland. In such case an exchange into Swiss Francs has to be made.

(Page 2 of original)

Since the devisaen amount will not suffer through such an exchange we ask you to grant us permission:

to agree to the planned transaction proposed by Greutert.

In view of the foreign political tension we would be grateful if you should decide at your earliest possible convenience.

Heil Hitler!

I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

(Signed) SCHERER v. MEISTER

Der Oberfinanzpraesident Berlin
(Office for Foreign Exchange)
(Devisenstelle)

(Translator's Note: Handwritten:
15)

Reference No: 256r/31 C:
Stat.: C G, II, Enrland :
File: Lo. J 4 -yellow- :

Berlin C 2, 11 September 1939
Neue Koenigsstrasse 61-64
Telephone: 52 00 14 Pa.
Office Hours: 9:00 until 12:00 hours

It is absolutely necessary that these :
references are given in the reply. :

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Central Finance Department

Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 62

(Translator's Note: Stamp:)

1. This is a State secret in the sense of paragraph 88 RStGB (Reich Penal Code), version of the law of 24 April 1934 (RStGB 1 S. 341 ff)(Reich Penal Code, Part 1, Page 341 ff).
2. Transmittal only in closed envelopes, in case of postal dispatch as "Registered Letter."
3. Receiver is responsible for safe keeping.

(Translator's Note: Receipt Stamp:)

I.G. Berlin NW 7
Central Finance Department
Received: 15 September 1939 No. 164/3v.
Answered:..... No.....
Processing: official.....
Dispatched on:.....Folder 353/.....

NOTICE OF APPROVAL

according to foreign exchange law of 12 December 1938.

The application of 5 September 1939 - Dept. Finance Secretariat/3631 Hs./R.2563 -

108

to the Reich Minister of Economics -

for the disposal of foreign currency, and demands in foreign currency amounting to \$ 638,262.40 -----
(literally: Dollars eight hundred and thirty-eight thousand two hundred and sixty-two 40/100)-----)

plus 4% interests from 1 September 1939 until date of payment.
to debit of your security deposit, deposited with the Bank Eduard Greutert & Cie. Basel, in favor of Ethyl Company, Ltd., London.

Purpose of use: Fulfillment of a contract obligation, taken over on 23 August 1939, for delivery of tetraethyl lead.,

with the permission of the Reich Minister of Economics. -----

as well as bringing and sending this currency is approved *)
under the following conditions:

The approval for the disposal of foreign exchange is only valid in connection with the certificate of release of the Reichsbank - belonging to it. The release is not necessary for foreign exchange which was acquired on the basis of this approval.

Approval for sending and transmitting currency, securities, gold or precious metals do not entitle the sending or bringing of these valuables in checked luggage or by goods transport of the railway or other overland freight as well as by sea and air freight into foreign countries or from inland to the customs-duty-exempt territory in Lادن, unless otherwise expressly indicated in the notice of approval and the forwarding is done in such means as have been sealed by a customs office after examination by customs officials.

This permit is not transferable. It becomes void one month after it has been given. It becomes void earlier at that moment at which the states purpose of use is superseded. Un-used permits for the acquisition of foreign exchange are to be returned immediately.

Enclosed I am returning the original references which were submitted.

*) with the provision that the rest of the amount of the security deposit be removed to Germany.

By order of
(Illegible handwritten signature)

(Translator's Note: Official Stamp):
Der Oberfinanzpraesident Berlin
Office of Foreign Exchange)

(Translator's Note: Handwritten number: 560)

(Page 2 of original)

(Translator's Note: Handwritten Note: Farben file Ethyl Lh.)

(Print): REGISTERED LETTER)

(Translator's Note: Receipt Date and Time Stamp)

by
Finance Secretariat

109

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NL-4922
Cont'd

Notations for executing bank:
The amounts of which use was made of are to be noted on the Notice.

Amount Used:					
Date:	Amount of currency	Equivalent in Reichsmarks RM	Equivalent in Epf	Certificate of the bank for foreign exchange	If Necessary, Release by Reichsbank
30 Sept. 1939	\$35,200.-	2,062,153.60) Translator's Note:	
	5011.20	12,492.92) Stamp:	
				RELEASED:	
					Department for foreign exchange of the Reichshauptbank Control of Delivery (Ablieferungs Kontrolle)
				(Translator's Note: Illegible Signature)	

Translator's Note: Stamp:
FS)

14
LH

(Handwritten Note: IV 9)

Basel 2, 16 September 1939
Post-Office Box

ED. GREUTERT & Cie.

Telegrams: Grutederus
Telephone: 4 16 20

Giro Account: Swiss National Bank
Postal Checking account V 3512
St/D

(Translator's Note: Receipt Stamp)
I.G. Berlin NW 7
Central Finance Department
Received 17 September 1939 No. 165/4v
Answered..... No.....
Processing Official.....
Dispatched on..... Folier. 3631

(Translator's Note: Date & Time Receipt Stamp)

Finance-Secretariat)

B e r l i n N W 7

Dept. Finance Secretariat/3631 Hg/Ss 3599

Subject: Collateral security in favor of Ethyl Export Corp.
and/or Ethyl Gasoline Corp., New York.

With reference to your letter of 6 September, as well as to the discussions
on this affair which were carried on personally and by telephone with Herr HENZEL

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NL-4922
Cont'd

and Rechtsanwalt (Lawyer) GIERLICH, we ask you to take notice of the fact that in the meantime we have applied by telegram to the Ethyl Gasoline Corp., New York, with a winding-up proposal which is in accordance with what you suggested.

We shall again contact you after the receipt of a reply and remain

Yours very respectfully,

ED. GREUTERT & Cie.

(Translator's Note: Handwritten Note:
lbl - File
Illegible Initial Stamp:
Processing Official:
HENZE)

(Document Continued in English)
A B S C H R I F T .

Ethyl Gasoline Corporation.

New York, September 21, 1939.

Brown Brothers Harriman & Co.
New York, N.Y.

Gentlemen:

We hereby confirm that on receipt of the amount of \$835,200.00 plus \$5,011.20 for accrued interest, all obligations of the party who received approximately 500 tons of fluid, as well as of Ed. Greutert & Cie., Basle, and the other guarantors, are fulfilled and that all parties involved in this transaction are released from all liability in connection with it.

Very truly yours,

Grohan EDGARD (S)
Vice President

Unterschrift unleserlich
Assistant Treasurer

(Translator's Note: Document Continues
in German)

ED. GREUTERT & Cie.

Telegrams: Grutederus
Telephone: 4 16 20

Transfer Account: Swiss National Bank
Postal Checking Account V 3512
St/Z

Basel 2, 27 September 1939
Post-Office Box

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-4922
Cont'd

(Translator's Note: Semi-Illegible Receipt Stamp
and the figures:

I.G. Berlin NW 7
Central Finance Department
176/6 v
3631)

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Central Finance Department,

Berlin.

Department: Finance Secretariat.

Re: Guarantee: Ethyl Gasoline Corporation.

We ask you to note that on 25 inst. we received the following
acknowledgment for the payment by cable concerned by the Ethyl Gasoline
Corp.:

(Translator's Note: The following quotation is in English in
Original)

"remittance referred your cable twentieth received
and acknowledge with thanks
Ethyl Gasoline Corp."

Respectfully,

(Print): ED. GREUTERT & Cie.
(Two illegible signatures)

Translator's Note: Handwritten
remark: Abl (File)).

(Translator's Note:
Illegible Initial)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P. NO. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a
true and correct translation of Document No. NI-4922.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M.P. NO. 34079

END

A F F I D A V I T

I, HELMUTH HENZE, Prokurist, (Translator's Note: Prokurist is struck out and replaced by "Syndikur"- syndic - which correction bears Henze's initial) in I.G. Farben and Dr. Gierlich's (Translator's Note: Dr. Gierlich's name eliminated by Henze. Correction bears initial of Henze) Legal consultant in the Central Finance Administration, Berlin, after having first been warned that I will be liable for punishment for making a false statement, state herewith under oath, of my own free will and without coercion, the following:

1. At the request of the Air Ministry and on direct order of GOERING, I.G. FARBEI procured in 1938, 500 tons of tetraethyl lead from the DEHYL EXPORT CORPORATION, of the United States. The Air Ministry needed this lead because it is indispensable to the manufacture of high octane aviation gasoline and because they wanted to store up the lead in Germany to tie the Air Ministry over until such time as the plant in Germany could manufacture sufficient quantities. We were producing sufficient quantities of tetraethyl lead for ordinary purposes but the storage of the 500 tons of tetra-ethyl lead was undertaken because in case of war Germany did not have enough tetra-ethyl lead to wage war for which reason the German Reich pursued a stockpiling policy.

2. At first the Air Ministry represented by Oberstabsingenieur HEYDENREICH got in touch with the WIFO (Translator's Note: WIFO stands for Wirtschaftliche Forschungs - economics research - G.m.b.H.) which got in touch with the people at Ludwigshafen namely with Herr MUELLER-CULLADI who is now dead. The Ludwigshafen people called me in to handle all of the financial arrangements incidental to the procurement of the tetraethyl lead. When I came there all of the officials were very excited because whenever GOERING demanded something, everybody just grew excited. I was told to handle the matter as speedily as possible. I was asked to suggest the way in which the foreign currency problem would be handled.

(Page 2 of original)

Finally, it was decided to procure the tetraethyl lead on a loan basis. All the gentlemen were very bewildered as GOERING demanded a report by noon the next day. It was commonly known that tetraethyl lead was needed as the German production in tetraethyl lead while sufficient for peacetime purposes, was not sufficient to wage war, and we had to obtain it immediately for aviation gasoline.

I have carefully read each of the two pages of this declaration and have signed them personally. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed them and I declare herewith under oath that I have spoken the pure truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

(signature) HELMUTH HENZE

Sworn to and signed before me this 17th day of March 1947, at Frankfurt/Main by HELMUTH HENZE, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signed) Peter H. MILLER
U.S. Civilian
AGO No. D-145338

Title and Position: Interrogator
Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes - U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the Document No. NI-4831.

HERTHA C. KNUTH
U.S. Civilian
AGO No. x-046.355

(E N D)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Stamp : File Reference
File : 317 Page 40
11 September 1935

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Ludwigshafen / Rhine
Nickel Factory Oppau

I n s p e c t i o n R e p o r t .

Date : 16 August 1935
Place of Meeting : Oppau.

Present were : Reichsbahnrat Otto, Reich and Prussian Ministry of
Economics, Berlin W 3, Behrenstrasse 43

Regierungs- und Baurat Schumacher, Reich and
Prussian Ministry of Economics, Field of Special
Economic Questions, Stuttgart.

Dipl.-Ing. Ernst Wuertth, Wuerttemberg, Land Trade
Office, Stuttgart.

From I.G. Director Dr. Fahrenhorst (temporarily),
Dr. Schlecht.

SUBJECT : Nickel Factory Oppau.

To begin with we informed Reichsbahnrat Otto and his collaborators
Regierungs- and Baurat Schumacher and Dipl.-Ing. Ernst Wuertth
thoroughly by means of a sketch as to the phases of work employed
in the process of gaining metallic nickel through nickel carbonyl,
as carried out at Oppau.

In response to the inquiries of the gentlemen from the Reich Ministry
of Economics we informed them that we are drawing all of our raw
material for our nickel production from International Nickel Company
in Canada in form of nickel-copper-ore, and that the nickel quota
which was granted the I.G. on the basis of lengthy negotiations with
the International Nickel Company will be approximately 2,000 tons for
next year.

Herr Otto informed us that the Ministry of Economics deemed it
desirable,

- 1.) to transfer the plant, working according to the I.G.-
process for the production of metallic nickel, from
Oppau to some other place, for instance to Central
Germany,
- 2.) to produce, if at all possible, a still larger quantity
than approximately 2,000 tons of nickel per year and
- 3.) to stockpile as large a supply of nickel-copper-ore in
Germany as possible.

(page 2 of original)

We replied to point 1) that our Oppau nickel plant had not been newly set-up, but that, to a great extent, it consisted of old, already existing buildings and apparatuses from the manufacturing plants for the production of iron carbonyl and nitrogen, whereas a new plant, for instance in Central Germany, would be considerably more expensive (one would have to expect an investment of roughly 5 to 7 Million Marks). Furthermore, that the carbonyl -high pressure-process required pure carbon monoxide, nitrogen and, apart from that, extensive high-pressure plants, so that this process, considering the relatively small output in our case, could really only be carried out in combination with, and in the neighborhood of, a nitrogen factory.

To point 2) we replied, particularly stressing the monopoly position of the Inco on the nickel raw material market, that the nickel quota which the I.G. was granted by the Inco was the absolute maximum obtainable, since the Inco had originally intended to grant I.G. an output of approximately 300 tons of nickel per year altogether.

To point 3) we informed them that we will try everything in order to obtain from Inco a larger supply of nickel-copper-ore for stockpiling, we emphasized however, that, according to the contract, we are not authorized to hold a stock which is larger than is required by our production conditions. On this occasion we pointed out - and Herr Otto was in full agreement with this - that it would be far more practical to maintain in Germany a considerable stock of nickel in metallic form (for instance 5 to 8,000 tons of nickel as in France) in form of coins and other pure nickel objects which can easily be withdrawn. For even when stockpiling a raw material supply for an annual production corresponding to our quota, though the nickel plant be situated in Central Germany, it would still be uncertain as to whether this stored raw material could be converted into metallic nickel, and whether further supplies of nickel raw material to this plant would be possible.

(page 3 of original)

During the subsequent inspection of the Oppau nickel factory the gentlemen were convinced that these plants had mostly been in existence for some time and were only being converted, and that the construction of a new plant such as this would require much money. As a result of the further inspection of the nitrogen factory (in which Herr Dr. Kraze was acting as guide) the gentlemen furthermore realized the advantages to the nickel process constituted by the compulsory occurrence of carbon-monoxide in nitrogen-hydrogen-production and by the large-scale and expensive high-pressure plant available for the ammonia synthesis.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9549
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original cont'd)

In conclusion, the gentlemen expressed their great satisfaction about the rapid development of the Oppau nickel production and about its considerable extent which had already had a favorable effect on the foreign currency situation.

(signature) Schlecht

Carbon copy : Director Dr. Gaun
Director Dr. Krauch
Director Brendel
Director Haefliger/Director Meyer-Kuester, Frankfurt/
Main
Director Weiss, Buying Dept.
Patent Department, Ludwigshafen
Projects Bureau, Oppau
Herr Dr. Frank-Fahle, Central Finance Administration,
Berlin
Herr Dr. Gattineau, Political Economic Office,
Berlin
Director W. Stpfahl, Buying Dept., Berlin SO 36
Director Dr. Pistor / Director Dr. Suchy, Pi.
Dr. Mueller - Cunradi, Oppau

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

28 August 1948

I, Arthur MACNAMARA, Civ. No. 20 191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the Document No. NI-9549.

.....
Arthur MACNAMARA
Civ. No. 20 191

J.G. FARBEN
MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO.
CASE NO. VI.
Prosecution Document Book No. XXXX.

40

ENGLISH



INDEX TO DOC. BOOK XXXX

FARBEN PARTICIPATED IN CREATING AND EQUIPPING
THE NAZI MILITARY MACHINE FOR AGGRESSIVE WAR

Exhibit No.	Document No.	Description of Document	Page in Doc. Book
	NI-9637	Original carbon copy of report on a discussion at the Foreign Office, Berlin, on 28 March 1940, in the presence of the defendant Haefflinger, regarding providing Germany with nickel. Dated 3 April 1940.	1
	NI-8979	Affidavit by Dr. Hans Wagner regarding the part played by I.G. in stockpiling war essential materials both on its own initiative and on orders from the Wehrmacht. Dated 16 June 1947.	8
	NI-10538	Affidavit by Dr. Heinrich Dickmann regarding stockpiling of war important products. Dated 4 September 1947.	13
	NI-8364	Secret letter from V/W to Dir. Dr. Kraenzlein, IG Hoechst, regarding maintenance of stocks of raw and auxiliary materials for carrying out the mobilization task. Dated 12 August 1939. Letter enclosure mimeographed secret letter from Dr. Ungewitter, Reich Plenipotentiary for Chemistry, to Dr. Kayser at V/W, outlining basic principles to be applied in this connection. Dated 2 August 1939.	21
	NI-8363	Secret letter from V/W to Dr. Hirschel of IG Hoechst, regarding stockpiling measures to be taken in compliance with request from the Reich Economic Ministry. Dated 2 November 1938.	27
	NI-8367	Original carbon copy of secret circular letter from Direktionsabteilung T of IG Hoechst, to Dir. Dr. Roth, Dr. Hilcken, Dr. Bachran, Dr. Stecher, Dr. Fehrle, of IG, regarding stockpiling measures to be taken in compliance with request from the Reich Economic Ministry. Dated 5 November 1938.	30
	NI-8365	Secret letter from V/W to Dr. Hirschel of IG Hoechst, regarding stockpiling measures to be taken in compliance with request from the Reich Economic Ministry. Dated 10 November 1938.	




Exhibit No.	Document No.	Description of Document	Page in Doc. Book
	NI-8368	Memo from Stecher of the Nitrogen Department of IG Hoechst, to Dr. Hirschel of IG, regarding stockpiling of ammonia and concentrated nitric acid. Dated 10 November 1938.	36
	NI-8366	Original carbon copy of memorandum from Direktionsabteilung T of IG Hoechst, to V/W, with charts of products for which a three weeks supply could not be stocked. Dated 25 November 1938.	37
	NI-4832	Affidavit by Struss regarding stockpiling of magnesium and centralite. Dated 14 March 1947.	42
	NI-1148	3 confidential reports by Neukirch of IG on visits to the Reich Air Ministry and Army Ordnance Office, regarding the development, production and stockpiling of a new incendiary shell (B E1). Dated December 1936 and January 1937.	46
	NI-8152	Affidavit by Karl von Heider regarding stockpiling of aluminium, phosphorus and cyanides. Dated 14 March 1947.	49
118	NI-4492	Memorandum on a discussion in Berlin on 20 January 1937 between Dr. Zahn of the Army Ordnance Office and Dr. Buhl, Dr. Pistor and Dr. Virck of IG at which the question of storage facilities for Diglycol and other chemical products was discussed. Dated 23 January 1937.	51
	NI-7566	Letter from Ammoniakwerke Morsburg to the Reich War Minister and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, regarding the installation of a bombproof gasoline storage tank, enclosing details of the project as outlined by Dr. Ritter of V/W. Dated 31 October 1935.	53
231	NI-7125	Secret letter from V/W to the Reich Ministry of Economics, regarding transfer of products of military importance from Ludwigshafen and Oppau. Dated 5 July 1939.	60

Exhibit No.	Document No.	Description of Document	Page in Doc. Book
230	NI-7121	Secret letter from the Reich Ministry of Economics to Dr. Gorr of IG, regarding transfer of products of military importance from Ludwigshafen and Oppau. Dated 5 July 1939.	71
232	NI-7124	Secret letter from V/W to the Reich Ministry of Economics, regarding transfer of products of military importance from Ludwigshafen and Oppau. Dated 7 July 1939.	75
	NI-7129	Letter from the Reich Minister for Economic Affairs to the High Command of the Army, regarding transfer of products of military importance from Ludwigshafen and Oppau. Dated 18 July 1940.	82
	NI-8843	Correspondence between IG and Major Becht, Army Ordnance Office, Reich Minister of Economics and Reich Minister of War to the defendant Wurster, regarding stockpiling of pyrites by IG. Dated 1935-1938.	85
	NI-6728	Minutes of "Monday Meeting" held at the offices of IG Technical Committee on 13 Feb. 1939, at which the question of stockpiling of "M" dyestuffs was discussed. Dated 15 February 1939.	94
	NI-7211	Secret circular letter from Chamber of Industry and Commerce for the Rhine-Main Economic Region (Industrie- und Handelskammer fuer das Rhein-Mainische Wirtschaftsgebiet) to IG Hoechst, requesting that prompt measures be taken to put in a three-months supply of coal for the plant. Dated 1 February 1939.	97
257	NI-7210	Original mimeographed secret letter from V/W to Dir. Dr. Kraenzlein, IG Hoechst, regarding measures to be taken to provide the plant with food supplies for "A-Fall". Dated 22 June 1939.	99
	NI-7209	Original mimeographed secret circular letter from V/W to IG plants, regarding measures to be taken to provide the plants with food supplies for "A-Fall". Dated 10 July 1939.	103
	NI-8596	Affidavit by Dr. Hans Wagner regarding activities of WIFO. Dated 7 June 1947.	108

I.G. BARREN DUSSELDORF ANNIEMIS LUISSE LPP D. WIGSWAFER/Ch.

Nitrogen-Department.

SECRET :

r.36/ae.

3 April 1940

Report on a Conference in the Office for Foreign
Affairs, held on 28 March 1940, at Berlin, Wilhelmstrasse.

Present: Legationsrat von SCHERBENBERG,
(Office for Foreign Affairs, Berlin)
Legation Secretary KREIBER
(German embassy in Helsinki)
Herr I. G. BLISSNER
(Reich Ministry of Economics, Berlin)
Director WALFLIGER (I.G. Department I)
Dr. WILHELM (I.G. Department II)
Dr. L. SCHUBERT (I.G., Oppau Nickel Factory)

Subject: Germany's Nickel Supply from Finland.

The officials of the Office of Foreign Affairs informed the meeting that the Russians have not yet left the Petsamo mines but that on 1 April 1940 the mines and installations would be returned to the Finns. Also, at the beginning of April a British delegation is due to arrive there to consult with the Finns about the future of the nickel mines and the technical installations for the extraction of nickel-matte which were built there by the British.

Legationsrat von SCHERBENBERG requested a short statement about our relations with Mond/Inco; further, he asked for data about the production facilities of the I.G. nickel plants, as well as information as to whether I.G. intends doing anything in Finland, and if so, what. He further asked whether I.G. can take measures against Mond/Inco in Finland on the strength of its contract with Mond/Inco and whether I.G. still has any obligations toward Mond/Inco.

(carbon copy)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-9637
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

In answer to this we stated the following:

I. Contractual relations between I.G. and International Nickel Co. of Canada (Lond/Inco).

In 1932, I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, Frankfurt/., developed a new process for the extraction of nickel metal from sulphide copper-nickel ores. The patents registered for this and the nickel products marketed by I.G. caused the Lond Nickel Co. London, that is to say, the International Nickel Company of Canada Ltd., New York (hereinafter referred to as "Lond Inco") to approach I.G. in order to conclude an agreement concerning nickel. These negotiations resulted on 28 April 1934 in a ten-year contract, valid as from 1 January 1934. The essential provisions of this contract are:

Lond Inco will secure I.G.'s supply of nickel raw materials to an extent which will enable I.G. to produce 10 % of Lond Inco's world sale of nickel outside of the American market. Through an additional contract dated 4 May 1937, the I.G. production from Canadian raw materials of Lond Inco was fixed at 4,500 tons nickel per year for the remainder of the duration of the contract until 1943, and I.G. were given favourable purchasing conditions for nickel raw material and a sales guaranty for finished nickel metal. This additional agreement also contained a provision to the effect that, upon request of I.G., Lond Inco should furnish up to 2,250 tons nickel in raw material form as a special stock. This stock was delivered in 1938 and 1939. In return for this concession, which gives Germany special preference by delivering nickel raw material in place of nickel metal, I.G. agreed,

- 1.) to license its processes in the field of nickel only to Lond Inco and not to third parties ;
- 2.) not to upset the nickel market and
- 3.) moreover, not to participate in any new deposits.

Lond Inco, in turn, pledged itself to notify I.G. immediately of any purchase of new nickel-ore deposits subsequent to the conclusion of the

(carbon copy)

(page 3 of original)

contract in order to enable I.C. to state its attitude.

Lond Inco did not carry out these obligations, as we learned afterwards. When shortly after our contract had been concluded, the purchase of Petsamo by Lond Inco was made public we were forced to assume that this purchase had already been completed prior to the date when our contract came into force. It was only in November 1933 that we saw the following excerpt from an announcement which came to our notice and which appeared in the Finnish paper Svenska Pressan on 25 June 1934.

"On 22 June 1934, in the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Helsinki, a contract concerning the nickel ore deposits in Petsamo was signed between the Finnish State and the British firm, the Lond Nickel Company Ltd., which ratifies the resolution of the State Council of 7 June 1934."

If this newspaper report is true, Lond Inco has violated the agreements entered into with I.C.

II. Finnish Nickel Deposits.

The nickel-ore deposit in Petsamo mentioned in I -there is a deposit near Iivola, not yet opened up and apparently insignificant- is the largest deposit in Finland and presumably, the second largest in the world. So far, a deposit of 5 billion tons sulphide nickel ore with an average content of 4 % nickel and 1,5 % copper is supposed to have been located as a result of soundings and tests carried out at first by the Finnish state, then by Lond Nickel Co. or rather by its Finnish company, Petsamo Nikkeli OY, which it founded for Petsamo. To mine the ore, a shaft was driven to a depth of 204 meters near the superficial open lode of Kaalatunturi. Mining is to proceed at 5 levels at 34 meters distant from each other. As far as we know, only level 3 was in operation and there, an adit about 300 meters long is supposed to have been driven, which goes through ore for about 70 meters. To begin with, a supply of 40,000 tons of ore with 5 % nickel content was to be piled up at the exit of the adit,

(carbon copy)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9537
CONTINUED

(page 4 of original)

to be used for smelting upon completion. We presume, that a large part of this supply was accumulated before the war, since the smelting plant in which the ore was to be enriched to nickel-matte was to start operation by the summer of 1940. It was planned to ship the extracted melting product (matte) to England for refining to nickel metal via the Uina Lamari port about 50 km distant, which is ice-free the whole year.

The extracting and smelting plants were planned for a production of 10,000 tons nickel per year in about 30,000 tons matte per year from about 250,000 tons ore per year.

The mining company (Pötsamo Rikkeli OY) is a Finnish corporation with a predominantly Finnish directorate; however, all shares are probably owned by the English-Canadian Mond Inco. The concession is said to be for 50 years. According to its own statements in business reports, The International Nickel Co. invested 5 1/2 Million Dollars up to the end of 1938 and was planning to spend a further 4 1/2 Million Dollars in 1939 for new installations, including a settlement for the staff, planned on generous lines, as well as a power plant.

Work on the electric power plant on the Paatsjoki, more than 100 km from the mine, was started. From there, electric power with a tension of 100,000 volts was to be transmitted to the mine.

The concession contract between Mond Inco and the Finnish government stipulates that sounding tests have to start on 31 May 1935, at the latest. The testing period is 3 years, which may be extended for another 2 years. Mond Inco pledged itself to spend at least £ 10,000.- (Pounds) for testing work during the actual testing period of 3 years.

(carbon copy)

(page 5 of original)

When sufficient quantities of nickel ore have been discovered all work required for the mines must be carried out within 4 years. The quantities of ore broken yearly are to be such as to permit a production in the first year equal to 1,000 tons, in the second and third year,

(page 5 of original, cont'd)

equal to 1,500 tons and afterwards, equal to at least 2,000 tons per year.

Information available shows that Mond Inco not only kept to the provisions of the contract in every way, but planned or actually began work over and above that called for.

Press reports about the destruction during the Russo-Finnish war are quite contradictory, and can only be checked on the spot. Presumably, the power plant and the smelting plant are more damaged than the extracting plant, which is less vulnerable to enemy action, so that extracting can be expected to start again in a comparatively short while whereas the enriching of ore to matte will require considerable reconstruction work.

III. Facilities of I.G. for Processing Petsamo Nickel Ore.

In its Oppau and Central Germany plants, I.G. has the facilities for producing about 7,000 tons nickel from nickel-copper matte with about 40% nickel. However, if, for the time being, no nickel matte is delivered from the Petsamo area, but merely ore with about 5% nickel, the ore could be prepared for the I.G. nickel plants in the existing plants of the Duisburger Kupferhütte and the Norddeutsche Affinerie, Hamburg. The iron and sulphur also contained in the ore besides copper and fine metals, can presumably be utilized during this process.

IV. Suggestions as to further procedure in the matter of obtaining nickel from Finland.

Apart from Russian nickel-

(carbon copy)

(page 6 of original)

ore deposits already opened up the mining of which is at present still insufficient to meet Russia's own requirements, the said Petsamo deposits are the only ones from which Germany can obtain adequate quality nickel raw material in sufficient quantities. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that strong pressure be brought to bear on the Finnish Government to ensure that the nickel ore extracted and to be extracted in Petsamo

(page 6 of original, cont'd)

be held exclusively at the disposal of the Finnish government, so that the latter will be able to supply Germany with nickel raw material. (Analogous case: Jugoslavia, Mines de Bor; Copper, Trepoa Mines Ltd.; Lead, zinc.)

The fact that the Petsamo Nikkeli OY is a Finnish corporation with a predominantly Finnish directorate, as mentioned in II, should facilitate the execution of such measures.

During the negotiations to be conducted by the German side it could be claimed (see I, last paragraph) that we and therefore the German Reich, would have been able to secure considerable quantities of Petsamo nickel ore for processing if Mond Inco had kept to its contractual obligations.

Negotiations with the president of International Nickel Co., Mr. STANLEY, New York, an American citizen, concerning Petsamo would only be fruitful if the Finnish government were willing to bring the necessary pressure to bear on Mond Inco. These negotiations could be held by way of a joint conference in a neutral country, for instance, Italy or also in New York. We believe that if such pressure were brought to bear by the Finnish government, as the contractual partner of International Nickel, there would be a chance of arriving at an agreement about Petsamo, in view of Mr. STANLEY's attitude, well known to us, that Germany should be supplied with adequate quantities of nickel ore.

(carbon copy)

(page 7 of original)

However, I.G. desires to make it quite clear that its present contractual relations with International Nickel must on no account stand in the way of measures which may be deemed expedient for the safeguarding of the German nickel ore supply from Petsamo ore.

These statements were written down in the above form as an exposé immediately following the conference. It was agreed that this exposé should

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9637
SCHEINOLD

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

be sent at once to the above mentioned officials of the Office of Foreign Affairs especially to the ambassador, Dr. RITTER, and to the envoy, Dr. SCHURR. Dr. RITTER and Dr. SCHURR will go to Helsingfors in a few days to discuss in detail with the Finnish government the question of supplying Germany with Petsamo nickel raw materials.

(Rubber stamp)
signed: SCHEINOLD

To:
Dir. Dr. Krauch
Dir. Dr. Lurster
Dir. Dr. Miller-Conradi
Dir. Brendel
Dir. Weiss
Dr. Diekmann.

(carbon copy)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION.

12 September 1947.

I, Samuel S. Horn, ACO No. 443113, hereby certify that I am a duly appointed translator for the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI-9637.

Samuel S. HORN
ACO No. 443113.

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Hans Wagner, born 9 July 1903 in Frankfurt/Main, chemist of the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. from 1928 - 1945, member of the Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin NW 7, at present residing in Stierstadt am Taunus, Untergasse 10, having been warned that I render myself liable to punishment for any false statement, hereby declare voluntarily, under oath and without coercion as follows:

1. In 1928, I entered the Hoechst Works as research-chemist and remained there until the middle of February, 1938, when I was transferred to the Vermittlungsstelle W in Berlin. My personal files were, however, at the request of Dr. ter Meer, kept from then on in Frankfurt. In the Vermittlungsstelle W, I took over work on the Patent questions, principally for Sparte II and partially for Spartes I and III; also work on the development and deliveries to the Wehrmacht in the province of Sparte II.

2. The bulk of the orders for stockpiling was given first through Dr. Ewan of Mun 6, then through the Luftwaffe and through the Navy. Orders for stockpiling were issued through the Reich Office (Reichsstelle) and the Economic Group Chemistry (Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie).

I make the distinction between Orders and Stockpiling for the following reasons. Under "Stockpiling orders" I understand the storing of such products as to the supply of which a formal order was issued to the I.G. and as to which, after delivery, payment was made by the order-issuing office.

Under "Directions for Stockpiling", I understand the establishment ^{of} emergency or intermediate depots, the goods stored therein remaining the property of the I.G.

(page 2 of original)

3. The principal products stored were those which it was no longer easy to obtain on the open market or which were war-essentials.

Whenever the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. undertook stockpiling for the Wehrmacht, the latter at the beginning always required that the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. charge up these goods themselves and only charge them to the Wehrmacht on demand. The I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., however, successfully declined to do this and the final result was as follows:

The goods were first charged up to the Wehrmacht and were then stored. The I.G. Farbenindustrie even went so far as to send into the Wehrmacht accounts for the storage of these goods in warehouses. (Rent for storage)

4. I acquired my knowledge of Stockpiling Orders to the I.G. Farbenindustrie through the fact that these orders generally went to Vermittlungsstelle W and from there were forwarded to the business offices in Frankfurt; also that the Vermittlungsstelle W then again transmitted the detailed offer from Frankfurt to the Wehrmacht office concerned.

(page 2 of original cont'd)

Besides this, I often knew in the Vermittlungsstelle W of the Wehrmacht instructions for despatch of the products to be delivered, frequently because the Wehrmacht often availed themselves of the I.G. Telescope for transmitting these instructions to the business men or supply works.

I generally knew of the directions of the Reich Offices (Reichsstellen) especially of the Reich Office Chemistry (Reichsstelle Chemie) for the storing up of products which remained the property of the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. through discussions with the other members of the Vermittlungsstelle W.

*(page 3 of original)

The purely I.G. storages, particularly in the so-called "Emergency depots" I learnt of incidentally through the specialists of the "Chemicals" sales or again through discussions with colleagues of Sparte I inside Vermittlungsstelle W, or also - as in the case of Dyestuffs Stocks - in the Monday Discussions of the Technical Committee (TEI-Buero).

5. For the sake of clarity, I should like to divide the stockpiling into three groups, v.z.,

- 1.) Stockpiling carried out by the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. of its own accord,
- 2.) Stockpiling carried out by the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. on instructions of the Reich Office and Economic Group Chemistry (Reichsstelle und Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie),
- 3.) Stockpiling based on the Stockpiling Orders of the Army, the Luftwaffe and the Navy.

Ad 1.) Stockpiling carried out by the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. of its own accord

- a) When I came to the Vermittlungsstelle W in February, 1938, I learned that a Dyestuffs warehouse was maintained at Luebeck. This Dyestuffs storage was supposed to represent an iron reserve of the most important dyestuffs manufactured by the I.G..
- b) Shortly before the outbreak of war, large quantities of Nickel-Matte were drawn by I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. from Canada and put into store.
- c) Bleaching-chlorine and nitro respectively were laid in by the I.G. Farbenindustrie before the outbreak of war in a factory provision store (Pufferlager) in Leverkusen.

(page 4 of original)

Ad 2.) Stockpiling carried out by the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. on instructions from the Reich Office Economic Group Chemistry (Reichsstelle und Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemie)

- a) Iron Pyrites were laid in by instructions of the Reich Group Chemistry (Reichsstelle Chemie) in 1939 for about 1 year.
- b) The I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., shortly before the beginning of the war, or in 1940 respectively, built up some reserve stocks for Plastics, over which they could only dispose with the approval of the Reich Office Chemistry (Reichsstelle Chemie) who had ordered the stockpiling. These Plastics also included i.a., Polystyrol, which was used

(page 4 of original cont'd)

for the production of varnishes and also for fuse parts in gray moulding. Polystyrol varnishes are very weather-resisting and for this reason were demanded by the Navy and the Luftwaffe. The Navy itself, however, remained for the most part in the background and passed its orders to the varnish firms by way of the Reich Office Chemistry.

c) Stabilisers were, to my knowledge, laid up already before the war with the Explosives manufacturers, especially with the DYNAMIT NOBEL A.G. I do not know anything about the extent of the stockpiling, as the firm of DYNAMIT NOBEL A.G. did not distinguish in its orders to the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. between current requirements and stockpiling.

d) Tetraethyl-lead, which belonged to Sparte I, was, so far as I know, bought in by I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. before the war and laid up with the ETHYL GMBH.

e) Aluminum was likewise sold to the Wehrmacht and stored up for them.

(page 5 of original)

Ad 3.) Stockpiling based on Stockpiling Orders of the Army, the Luftwaffe and the Navy:

a) Calcium hypochlorite and Losantine, which were intended for use in the Luftwaffe as poison antidotes were already ordered by the Army before the war and stored in Army Ordnance depots.

b) Gas-detector powder, used for the tracing of the use of chemical warfare agents, particularly mustard gas, in the fields, was also delivered to the Army already before the war and stored in Army depots.

c) Aniline was also, at the instigation of the Army, stored before the war in Wolfen-Works to the extent of about 1,000 tons; it was intended primarily as raw material for the manufacture of stabilizers.

d) Stabilizers, which were manufactured in Urdingen Works chiefly for export and for delivery to Explosives firms, were, as from the end of 1938, also manufactured in the Army's own Z-Plant in Wolfen. This factory stood on Reich-owned lands, about 300 meters distant from the Dyestuffs factory Wolfen. We were commissioned to administer this factory and also to be responsible for the running of the works. The factory remained, however, the property of the Reich and was only a plant leased by us. Dr. Biergin was the competent member of the Vorstand for this matter.

The products of this factory went for the most part to the Explosives firms, who, on the command of the Wehrmacht, stored the goods, and to a smaller extent, into one of the reserve storerooms erected by the Wehrmacht, which, as far as I know, was in Neuhof, near Fulda. During the course of the war there was assembled in this storeroom a stock of about 2,000 tons, which was used up, however, by the end of the war.

*(page 6 of original)

Furthermore, the I.G. Farbenindustrie was commissioned to re-adapt in Urdingen goods originating from two French Stabilizer factories, of which St. Denis was one, so as to make them correspond with the technical conditions of delivery of the German Army. These goods were also delivered to the Army for stockpiling.

(page 6 of original cont'd)

- e) Diglycol, which was used for the manufacture of anti-aircraft gun powder, was stored in the above-mentioned Army-owned Z-plant in Wolfen, besides the current deliveries to the gunpowder-producing firms of the Explosives industry.
- f) Triglycol was likewise stored in the Army-owned storage at Wolfen, but this storage was gradually taken over for the manufacture of (?) oil-brake and steam-bath-fluid (Brems- und Kochbad Flüssigkeit).
- g) Fog-producing acids were stored in large Navy warehouses in Kiel and Wilhelmshaven. Deliveries took place continuously from 1939 onwards in tank wagons.
- h) Anti-poison weapon cleanser, a product developed at the instigation of the Army Ordnance Office for the removal of liquid warfare agents from weapons and other metal implements were manufactured to the order of the Army in the dyestuff factory Wolfen and stored in the Army ordnance depots. This production was in progress before the war.
- i) Red Phosphorus was manufactured in Bitterfeld Works and delivered to the Explosives firms in the form of the phosphorus-paraffin mixture used for the smoke base of shells; and these firms, on their part, stockpiled it to a certain extent, in addition to the current production in this article.

(page 7 of original)

- k) It was not until the year 1942 that I knew about the storing up of Yellow Phosphorus. The stockpiling, so far as I knew, began in the Wehrmacht Warehouse and was later carried out in Dyhernfurth itself, but the business side of it always took place in Frankfurt.
- l) Chloro-acetophenone (Omegasalz) was delivered to the Army from 1936 to 1942 and stored by them in Munitions depots.
- m) Adamsite (azine) was manufactured from 1939 to the end of 1944 in Herdingen, delivered to the Army and stored by them.
- n) Phosgene was manufactured to the order of the Luftwaffe in the Z-Plant Wolfen in considerable quantities since about 1940 and stored by the Luftwaffe in Kuenster in the Luenburger Heide on their own lands.
- o) Oxol-Mustard gas was manufactured by the firms of LOMAL and ORGACITM since about 1937. It was stored by the Army and partly also by the Luftwaffe.
- p) C₆ Salt (Nitrogen-Mustardgas-Chlorohydrate) was manufactured in Ludwigshafen since about 1939 and delivered to the Army either for storage or for further processing.

I have carefully read through each of the 7 (seven) pages of this Affidavit and signed it with my own hand, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and countersigned them with my initials and I hereby declare under oath that I have told the absolute truth in this declaration,

(page 8 of original)

to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signature: DR. HANS RAGER.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8979
CONTINUED

(page 8 of original cont'd)

Sworn to and signed before me this 16th day of June 1947 at Nuremberg
by Dr. Heis Wagner, known to me to be the person making the above
affidavit.

(Signature) PETER H. MILLER
PETER H. MILLER
U.S. Civilian ACO D 145338
Office of the Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

27 August 1947

I, A. MARTIN, No. ETO-20144, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8979.

A. MARTIN, No. ETO-20144.

- 5 -
"END"

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-10538
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNCIL FOR WAR CRIMES

Affidavit

I, Dr. Heinrich Diekmann, born on 15 March 1901, from 1926 till 1945 chemist of the I.G. Farben Industry, A.G., leader of the section Sparte I in the Vermittlungsstelle (Military Liaison Office) W, Berlin, from 1936, from 1937/38 counter intelligence officer for the Vermittlungsstelle W Berlin, deputy chief counter intelligence officer for technical matters for the plants of the I.G. FARBEIN INDUSTRY A.G. from 1940, GB chemical representative in the Armament Ministry for the working committee of the Special Committee V (preliminary products in the main committee Powder and Explosives) from 1942 till 1945, from 1941 Prokurist of I.G. FARBEIN INDUSTRY AG and now deputy section chief of B.A.S.F. in Ludwigshafen, after having been duly warned that a false statement ~~will~~ make me liable to punishment, hereby make the following sworn statement voluntarily and without being exposed to duress:

1.) In the year 1926 I entered the ANILINE and SODA FACTORY of BADEN as a chemist. I remained there as nitrogen expert until 1934. In this year I was transferred to the Sparte office of Sparte I and worked there until 1936. In this year I was commissioned to go to Berlin to Vermittlungsstelle W and there to take over the management of this office for Sparte I. In this position it was my task to handle and to supervise all matters concerning Sparte I.

2. As regards storing of chemicals of importance for defensive purposes it was a matter of my concern, on one hand in my capacity as representative of Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin, to which wishes and requests of such authorities as the Reich Ministry of Economics, the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, or the WIFO were forwarded, on the other hand as

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

representative of the office of Sparte I in Oppau, which had to attend to the interests of private enterprises as far as nitrogen, gasoline, etc. were concerned.

(page 2 of original)

3. I became acquainted with three different types of storage:

I.) Commodities for immediate military use such as powder, explosives, but also their preliminary products such as diglycol and toluol, methanol for hexogen, pentaerythrite, aniline for stabilizers, etc. were bought and paid for by the Wehrmacht and as Wehrmacht property also mostly stored in depots owned by the Wehrmacht.

This storing had already started at an early time, e.g. approximately during the years 1936-1938 underground store-rooms for toluol were built for the WIFO in connection with the building of preparatory defense installations in Embesen and Langelsheim. When these preparatory defense works were taken over by the I.G., we had to obligate ourselves to guard and to look after these toluol depots also.

Red phosphorus for ammunition purposes had also already been procured in limited quantities by the I.G./Bitterfeld an early time, perhaps in the years 1937/38, and stored by the Wehrmacht. Later on, about 1939/40, larger quantities of yellow phosphorus were stored by I.G. Piesteritz in Dyhernfurt for the planned manufacturing of tabun and sarine. For the same purpose larger quantities of sodium cyanide were procured from Ludwigshafen.

Whether any storing of arsenic did take place,

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

I do not know. The only thing I recollect is that in the course of conversations in offices of authorities or of I.G. I heard that it would be advantageous to secure the utilization of the large stores of arsenic reportedly to be found in Sweden for the German supply economy concerned with substances of importance for military purposes.

(page 3 of original)

II. The storing of commodities and materials serving more the civilian economy or only indirectly the production of military commodities, was requested mainly by the Ministry of Economics, partly also by the military economy staff of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht. These substances were stored in I.G. depots and remained property of the I.G. The costs were then also defrayed by the said Reich offices; in some cases the total storage costs were borne e.g. by the WFO, in other cases only the so-called "additional costs". By this term are meant costs caused by the maintenance of the stores as far as it exceeds what would be common practice within the framework of a private business enterprise. The government offices frequently had long arguments with I.G. concerning the interpretation of the expression: maintenance of stores according to the needs of a private business enterprise; e.g. we wanted to have the additional costs refunded not only for the larger quantities which we had to keep in store, but also the costs caused by the requested storing in different impractical locations within the Reich (dislocation instead of the uniform and cheaper silo-storing, e.g. in Oppau).

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

This second group of commodities the storing of which was urged more strongly by the Reich Ministry of Economics, as far as I remember, from 1939, comprised e.g. uric acid the element indispensable for the entire glue and wood industry as well as for numerous important synthetic products. As far as my memory goes, about 20 to 25,000 tons of uric acid were intended for storing, as Oppau was the only manufacturing place and was considered to be particularly exposed. The storing took place in various depots such as Gerthe near Bochum in Westphalia, Doeberitz, etc.

As regards uric acid the I.G. complied with the requests for storing received from the authorities with particular readiness for the reason that the establishment of a second plant for manufacturingⁿ of uric acid in a secure place was repeatedly requested by the authorities in addition to the storing.

(page 4 of original)

Because of the large productive capacity of the Oppau uric acid plant and the large amounts invested, the I.G. tried as far as possible to ward off this request.

Another substance belonging to this second group of commodities to be stored was ammonium chloride, since this technical nitrogen product was also manufactured only in Oppau, and was of considerable importance as used for various military purposes e.g. for the manufacturing of flash-light batteries and similar products, for the soldering and galvanizing industry, etc.

Also the so-called contact-substances indispensable for the synthetic manufacturing of nitrogen, methanol, and gasoline, and produced only in Ludwigshafen/Oppau, had to be manufactured in larger quantities as immediately needed and stored away within the so-called secured Reich territory, at the request of the authorities. Also in this case the above mentioned additional costs were settled through negotiation with the VIFO or the Reich Ministry of Economics, and the I.G. was reimbursed accordingly.

III.) The storing of raw materials needed for the undisturbed operation of the I.G. plants themselves, such as coal, pyrites, etc. was, as the economic re-armament program was realized, increasingly considered an internal concern of the I.G. In the year 1938/39, as measures preparing the economic mobilization made the drafting of mobilization plans imperative also for the so-called K.L.-plants (military supply plants) which were subject to the Ministry of Economics, it was requested from many sides, e.g. from the provincial economic

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

offices, though violently opposed by many I.G. plants, that the plants concerned should provide increasing stores of coal and other raw materials; and to a large extent it was undoubtedly also really done.

(page 5 of original)

E.g. it was demanded by Regierungsdirektor EINSCH, Berlin, that various plants in Central Germany should keep supplies sufficient for several months, instead of the usual practice of having supplies in stock for several weeks.

As regards pyrites the largest stores were set up by the IFCO at the expense of the Reich, but in spite of this also the I.G. plants had to procure additional stores for their production of sulphuric acid exceeding ordinary business proportions, but which none the less had to be maintained by their own financial means.

The storing of nickel had already been initiated, as far as I know, some time before the outbreak of the war, perhaps 1937/38. The substance stored was nickel ore as raw material for the production of pure nickel by use of the carbonyl-process of the I.G. As far as I participated in the negotiations, I remember that on the part of the I.G. it was always openly pointed out even towards the foreign (Canadian) partners (moon-nickel) that it was a question of establishing a nickel reserve required by German authorities for reasons of strategical security. I don't know whether the storing of nickel came under the above mentioned category III, i.e. whether the I.G. alone had to bear the storing costs or whether certain refunds of costs were made on the part of the Reich.

(page 5 of original)

4. As regards storing of gasoline and oils of all kinds I was never employed either as Vermittlungsstelle representative or as representative of the Sparte office Oppau. In my opinion this was due to the fact that the gentlemen in charge of this matter in the I.G., Dr. BUSTEFISCH and Dr. E. R. FISCHER, made very little use of the Vermittlungsstelle in their work,

(page 6 of original)

but negotiated with the authorities mostly alone and independently. The same applies to lead tetra-ethyl which was a concern of Dr. MUELLER-CUNRADI.

5. I have carefully read each of the 6 (six) pages of this sworn affidavit and signed it with my own hand, have made the necessary corrections in my own hand-writing and signed them with my own initials, declaring hereby under oath that in this affidavit I have told the whole truth to the best of my knowledge and conscience.

(Signature) Dr. Heinrich Diekmann
(Signature)

Sworn to and signed before me this 4th day of September 1947 at Nuremberg by Dr. Heinrich DIEKMANN, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(Signature) Peter F. Miller
PETER F. MILLER

U.S. Civilian APO D 145338
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

15 September 1947

I, Thyra THYSSEN, Civ.No. 00638, hereby certify that I am a duly appointed translator for the German and English languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. MI-10538.

Thyra THYSSEN
Civ.No. 00638

- 7a -
"END"

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8364
CONTINUED

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

stocks of Raw Materials in the I.G.,

(Trans. note:)
(Underlining by hand. Handwritten
marginal note: "Then not of
auxiliary materials")

giving at the same time an explanation of the difficulties in the way of the further storage, such as limited warehouse capacity at the works, limited delivery facilities of our suppliers of raw materials, limited transport facilities etc.

We would therefore request you to complete the enclosed form concerning the amount of stocks and storage facilities (this means warehouse capacity) of the articles listed in approximate figures and return it to us in the shortest possible time.

Under "Remarks", please state in key words the obstacles to further stockpiling. If it should seem important to you to include statements about other raw materials not listed, please add these.

(page 2 of original)

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W.

Berlin, 12 August 1939

In this connection, we would refer you to the official enquiry in November last year. (See our circular of 2 November 39 re Stockpiling).

VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W

(Signature) KAYSER

Enclosures

REGISTERED!

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8364
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original)
I.G. HOECHST

Management Department T

SECRET!

RECEIPT

1 letter in original with enclosures
in-copy

from Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin

to Dir. Dr. KRAENZLEIN for Griesheim Works

of 12 August 1939 Reference: Dr. K/Wr.

Re: Stocking Raw and Auxiliary materials for the
carrying out of the Mobilization Program.

received on 14 August 39

(Signature) JACOBY

Signature

Dir. Dr. ENCELBERTZ

Please return immediately!

- - - - -

I.G. HOECHST

Management Department T

SECRET!

RECEIPT

1 letter in original with enclosures
in-copy

from Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin

to Dir. Dr. KRAENZLEIN for Meinkur Works

of 12 August 39 Reference Dr. K./Tr.

Re: Stocking Raw and Auxiliary materials for the
carrying out of the Mobilization Program.

received on 14/8/39

(signature) Dr. C. KRAUSS

Signature

Please return immediately!

(4th page of original)
(page 1 of original)
C o p y .

The Reich Plenipotentiary
for Chemistry

Berlin W. 35, 2 August
1939
Sigismundstr. 6,
Dr. Hy/Br.
No. 2731/39 E

2 copies
1 copy.

Registered!

S E C R E T !

Dr. KAYSER
c/o. I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.,
Vermittlungsstelle W,

B e r l i n N W 7

Unter den Linden 82.

Re: Maintenance of Stockpiles of Raw and Auxiliary
Materials for carrying out of the Mobilization
Instructions for all your Works.

The basic principle should be that the raw and auxiliary
materials necessary for the execution of the Mobiliza-
tion orders issued to you as indicated by you on
pages 2 and 3 of the printed forms will be held
in stock by you for a certain period.

In agreement with the Reich Ministry of Economics I
accordingly direct you to storepile that amount
of the raw and auxiliary materials indicated by you
as necessary for the execution of the Mob. order,
which would cover the requirements for 3 months
according to this Mobilization order.

Such raw and auxiliary materials as cannot be stored
on account of their lack of durability are exempted
from this obligation. It is however incumbent upon
you to register as Priority Transports the quantities
of these materials required for the first four weeks
from the beginning of mobilization on with the Military-
Economic Department concerned. If in your opinion any
other reason should exist why the procurement of
three-months' requirements of one or other of the
auxiliary materials

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8364
CONTINUED

(5th page of original)

(page 2 of original)

would be impracticable, please inform me of this without delay. I would expressly call to your attention that no mention whatever must be made to your suppliers regarding the fact that the procurement is necessary for the carrying out of the Mobilization order. For rationed raw and auxiliary materials, i.e. for such as can only be obtained on presentation of certificates or other permits issued by Control Office, the application for procurement for the purpose stated in the above heading must be channelled through me. The forms must likewise contain no reference to the Mobilization order as the reason for the request, nor must they show your position as a Military Plant (W-Betrieb).

For goods which can only be obtained from abroad, and which you yourselves import in the normal course of business, similar applications must also be directed to me personally. In this case too the application form must omit any indication of the purpose of the requirement. With regard to imports which you obtain from importers, the required quantities and other particulars of quality necessary for the ordering of the goods, together with the name of the importer, must likewise be reported to me personally. In these cases I will as far as possible arrange that the importer can obtain the goods for you.

Please inform me as soon as possible that the directions issued to you for the stockpiling of supplies have been carried out. Should you already have sufficient stocks for the execution of the order issued to you, please let me know this as well.

Reich Plenipotentiary for
Chemistry

(signed) UNGEWITTER

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8364
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

9 July 1947

I, Dorothea L. GALEWSKI, ETO - 34 079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8364.

Dorothea L. GALEWSKI,
ETO - 34 079

- 6 -
"END"

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8363
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W

(Rubber stamp:)
Received
4 Nov. 1938

Dr. HIRSCHL
I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.

Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 82
120021

Frankfurt (Main) - Hoechst

(Rubber stamp:)
Secret!

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. Only to be handed over in sealed cover, if dispatched by post, "registered".
3. To be kept, at responsibility of addressee, under lock and key.

Our reference (to be quoted in reply)
N./Sch.

Berlin,
2 November 1938

Subject: Stock reserves.

The Reich Ministry for Economic Affairs requested us to submit a list of raw materials and preliminary products on the one hand, and of those final products on the other, of which stock reserves can not be held for 3 weeks, or of which the manufactured items themselves can not be stored for 3 weeks. This list shall also indicate warehouse and storage facilities available in each individual case.

We therefore request you to complete the attached forms, and to return them to us as soon as possible. (Single copy).

(Hand
written
note:)
Correct.

For this return you will be able to use the data on which you based your Registration for Transportation Requirements During the First 30 Days of Mobilization. In the present return please indicate only those raw materials and preliminary or final products, which, with the storage facilities then at your disposal, could not be stored or warehoused for a period of three weeks after 1 January 1939.

We draw your attention to the various regulations which prescribe maintenance of reserve stocks sufficient for 3 to 4 weeks in all cases, in which such storage is possible.

(page 2 of original)

Previous experience has shown that the Military Economy Authorities abstain from enforcing the order to store the prescribed quantity of stocks only in cases where technical reasons prevent such storage or when storage expenses are so high that I.G. cannot reasonably be expected to bear them.

VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W
Signature: Neumann

Enclosures
(Rubber stamp:)
Registered!

I.G. HOECHST
Management Department T

Secret !

RECEIPT

1 letter, original, with enclosures
from Vermittlungsstelle V, I.G. Berlin
to Herr Dr. Hirschel, I.G. Hoechst
for plant Griesheim

dated 2 Nov. 1938

Reference N./Sch.

Subject: Stock reserves:

received 4 Nov. 1938

Signature: Engelbertz

I.G. HOECHST
Management Department T,

Secret !

RECEIPT

1 letter, original, with enclosures
from Vermittlungsstelle W, I.G. Berlin
to Herr Dr. Hirschel, I.G. Hoechst
for plant Mainkur

dated 2 Nov. 1938

Reference N./Sch.

Subject: Stock reserves

received 4 Nov. 1938

Signature: Dr. C. Krauss

I.G. HOECHST
Management Department T

Secret !

RECEIPT

1 letter, original, with enclosures
from Vermittlungsstelle W, I.G. Berlin
to Herr Dr. Hirschel, I.G. Hoechst
for plant Offenbach

dated 2 Nov. 1938

Reference N./Sch.

Subject: Stock reserves

received 4 Nov. 1938

Signature: Teigmann

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

7 July 1947

I, Arthur MACNAMARA, No. 20191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8363.

Arthur MACNAMARA
No. 20191

- 3 -
"END"

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8367
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Dir. Dr. ROTH
Dr. HILCKEN
Dr. BACHMAN
via Dr. WINNACKER
Dr. STECHER
via Dr. WINNACKER

5 November 1938. Bo/H.

Trans. note: Stamp:

SECRET!

(Trans. note,
in handwriting)

Dr. FEHRLE

1. This is a State secret within the meaning of Section 88 of the Reich Penal Code
2. Transmission only under sealed cover. If sent by mail, to be registered.
3. Addressee is responsible for safe keeping under lock and key.

Re: STOCKPILING.

Within the framework of our Mobilization Preparation, we have to furnish the Reich Ministry of Economy with a list of those raw materials and preliminary products on the one hand and those manufactured products on the other hand of which it is not possible to store a 3-weeks' supply and/or an output of 3 weeks.

We have already received some of the data required from various departments, but not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Reich Ministry of Economics. We are therefore enclosing a questionnaire herewith and request you to compile the necessary information for us as soon as possible.

We would particularly point out that up to 1 April 39 any warehouse extensions which are planned must also be taken into account. The military-economic authorities require in principle that stockpiling for 3-4 weeks, both for raw materials and preliminary products, as well as for manufactured goods, should be arranged and, according to experience available, they will only grant exemption from this requirement when its execution is not possible for technical reasons, or if the stockpiling would involve expenditure which could not reasonably be demanded from the I.G. Should you, therefore, in one or the other case, not be able to comply with this demand of the Military (W-) authorities, please give the reason under the heading "Remarks" against the product or raw material concerned.

We are herewith sending you once again your Mobilization instructions, which kindly return to us together with the completed questionnaire.

Enclosures
REGISTERED

MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT T
(signature) HIRSCHEL

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8367
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

I.G. HOECHST
Management Department T

RECEIPT

SECRET!

1 letter in original with enclosures: Forms and
in-copy Mobilization
Instructions

from Management Department T
to Dr. STECHER via Dr. WINNACKER

of 5 Nov. 38 Reference: Bo/H.

Re: Stockpiling

received on: 8 Nov. 38

.....
(Signature)

(Trans. note
Initial: W)

(page 3 of original)

I.G. HOECHST
Management Department T

SECRET!

RECEIPT

1 letter in original -Ø with enclosures: Forms and
in-copy- Mobilization
Instructions

from Management Department T,

to: Dr. BACHRAN via Dr. WINNACKER

of: 5 Nov. 38 Reference: Bo/H.

re: Stockpiling

received on: 8 Nov. 38

(signature) BACHRAN
.....
Signature

(page 4 of original)

I.G. HOECHST

Management Department T

SECRET!

RECEIPT

1 letter in original -/ with enclosures: Forms and
in-copy Mobilization
Instructions

from: Management Department T

to: Dir. Dr. ROTH

of: 5 Nov. 38

Reference: Bo/H.

Re: Stockpiling

received on: 8 Nov. 38

(Trans. note:)
Stamp:

Office Dr. ROTH
Rec. 8 Nov. 1938
Forwarded.....

(Signature:) illegible

(page 5 of original)

I.G. HOECHST

Management Department T

SECRET!

RECEIPT

1 letter in original -/ with enclosures: Forms and
in-copy Mobilization
Instructions

from Management Department T

to: Dr. HILCKEN

of: 5 Nov. 38

Reference Bo/H.

Re: Stockpiling

received on: 8 Nov. 38

(initial:) O.
.....
Signature

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8367
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

8 July 1947

I, Dorothea L. GALEWSKI, ETO - 34 079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8367.

Dorothea L. GALEWSKI,
ETO - 34 079

- 4 -
"END"

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NY-3365
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W

(Stamp):
In: 12 Nov. 1938
(initial)

Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 82
12 00 21

To
Dr. Hirschel
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
for the Hoechst Works
Frankfort on Main - Hoechst

(Stamp)
Secret!

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only in sealed envelope; if mailed, to be "registered".
3. To be kept at responsibility of addressee under lock and key.

Your reference: Your letter of: Our reference: Berlin,
(to be quoted in your reply):N/R. 10 November 1938

Re: Our circular letter of 2 November 1938 (Accumulation of stocks).

In the drafting of our circular letter of 2 November 1938 an error occurred in the note on the appendix

"Facts concerning products which cannot be stored for 3 weeks",

"storage" being confused with "storage facilities". Thus the note should read as follows:

*1939

"Should the provision of storage facilities sufficient for three weeks' supply prove impossible by 1 April, or have to be abandoned entirely in the case of individual products, we request that reasons for this be stated on a separate sheet of paper."

is: We take this opportunity to draw attention to the following:
concerns Whereas from the point of view of Military Economy the facilities for
only pro- building up stocks of those goods which can be stored only for 3 weeks
ducts. or less, are to be made use of whenever possible, the storage facilities
for those products for which only limited storage facilities are available,
should be used as little as possible. Provided no important reasons con-
nected with the operation of the plant oppose it, an effort should be
made to keep the normal stocks of products at such a low level or to
increase

Registered

(page 2 of original)

is: so that in the event of mobilization production can be continued as a result of accumulation of stocks. the storage facilities to such an extent that in the event of mobilization, three weeks' output can be stored up in addition to normal stocks. The situation at which we aim is demonstrated in the appendix by the fact that between the quantities as stated in columns 4 and 6 or those in columns 5 and 7 there are differences which correspond to three weeks' production.

Vermittlungsstelle W.
Signature: Nour...

(page 3 of original)

I.G. Hoechst
Department of the Directorate T

Secret!

Receipt

1 letter in original
from Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin
to Dr. Hirschel, I.G. Hoechst
for the Offenbach Works
dated: 10 November 1938 Reference: N/R.
Re: Circular letter of Vermittlungsstelle W dated 2 November 1938
(Accumulation of Stocks)

Received on: 14 November 1938

Signature: Weigmann
Signature

.....
(page 4 of original)

I.G. Hoechst
Department of the Directorate T

Secret!

Receipt

1 letter in original
from Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin
to Dr. Hirschel, I.G. Hoechst
for the Griesheim Works
dated: 10 November 1938 Reference: N/R.
Re: Circular Letter of Vermittlungsstelle W dated 2 November 1938
(Accumulation Stocks)

Received on 14 November 1938

Signature: Engelbert
Signature

.....
(page 5 of original)

I.G. Hoechst
Department of the Directorate T

Secret!

Receipt

1 letter in original
from Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin
to Dr. Hirschel, I.G. Hoechst
for the Mainkur Works
dated: 10 November 1938 Reference: N/R.
Re: Circular letter of Vermittlungsstelle W dated 2 November 1938
(Accumulation of Stocks)

Received on 14 November 1938

Signature: Dr. C. Krauss
Signature

.....
CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

2 July 1947

I, BERYL C. BESWICK, No. D 427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8365.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8368
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

I.G. Hoechst
Nitrogen Division

To
I.G.
Dr. Hirschol

Your ref. Bo/H.	Your communication of 5.11.38	Our ref. Eax./I	Date 10 November 1938
--------------------	----------------------------------	--------------------	--------------------------

Subject: Stockpiling.

Attached hereto we return the forms which were sent to us, properly filled out. As may be seen from the entries, we cannot store the ammonia requirements and the production of concentrated nitric acid for 3 weeks; in order to store the quantities of ammonia and concentrated nitric acid in question, a considerable enlargement of the present storage space would be necessary, which would, in the case of ammonia, require an expenditure of 500,000 marks, and in the case of nitric acid an expenditure of 700,000 marks.

At the same time, we would point out that on the form "Raw Material Requirements" we have also added 300 tons per month of white marble hydrate of lime.

(handwriting)
for sodium nitrate
(initials)

Nitrogen Department

/s/ Stecher

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

27 June 1947

I, VICTORIA ORTON, No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8368.

VICTORIA ORTON, No. NI-8368.

-1-
"END"

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8386
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Secret.

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article # 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only in sealed envelope, mailed, to be "registered".
3. To be kept at addressee's responsibility under lock and key.

I.G. Berlin NW 7
Vermittlungsstelle W.

N./Sch.

2 Instant

Do/R

25 November 1938

Stock Files

We return herewith one copy, duly filled out, of the forms, sent to us, concerning those raw materials, preliminary products and products of which we cannot build up stocks amounting to 3 weeks' supply or store three weeks' output.

Department of the Directorate
Signed: DORMANN

2 Enclosures

Registered

I.G. Hoechst
Department of the Directorate T

Secret 1

(Stamp)

In: 26 November 1938
Vermittlungsstelle W.
Out:

Receipt

¹
.....Letter in the original with 2 Enclosures
from: I.G. Hoechst, Department of the Directorate T
to: Vermittlungsstelle W, I.G. Berlin

dated: 25 November 1938
.....

Reference Ho/H
.....

Subject Stock Files

received on: 26 November 1938
.....

Signature illegible
.....
(Signature)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8366
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original)

Plant: Hoechst

Data on Raw Materials and Preliminary Products of which stocks do not amount to 3 Weeks' Supply.

Serial No.	Raw Material or Preliminary Product	Requirements for the 1st Month of Mobilization tons per month	Maximum storage facilities		Stock Piles			Remarks...	
			on 1.1.39	on 1.4.39	on 1.1.39	on 1.4.39	planned for future near		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	Salt	4.400	2.250	2.250	2.250	2.250	2.950	1.7.39	
2	Ammonia in N ₂	3.070	1.100	1.100	1.100	1.100	1.100	-	In order to be able to store 3 weeks' supply, 5 spherical ammonia liquor tanks would be needed. This would involve an outlay of 1/2 Million M.
3.	Acetaldehyde	2.547	720	880	720	880	880	-	The expansion of the storage space to hold 3 weeks' supply would be extremely costly and would require large quantities of iron.
4	Formaldehyde	406	48	48	48	48	48		As in 3
5	Suprarenals bodies	0,3	-	-	-	-	-		these raw materials do not keep and fresh supplies must be available
6	Blood	2,1	-	-	-	-	-		
7	Glands	9,7	-	-	-	-	-		
8	Intestinal mucous	1,4	-	-	-	-	-		
9	Testicles	3,1	-	-	-	-	-		
10	Pig's liver	0,7	-	-	-	-	-		

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8366
CONTINUED

(page 4 of original)

Plant Hoechst

Data on Final Products which cannot be stored for 3 Weeks.

Serial No.	Product	Output in the 1st Month of Mobilization Tons per month	Maximum Storage Facilities		Stock Piles				Remarks
			on 1.1.39 t	on 1.4.39 t	on 1.1.39 t	on 1.4.39 t	Planned for near future t	Until when?	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1.	Nitric Acid in HNO ₃ - Own consumption	6750 - 200 6550	1.000	1.000	500	200			The expansion of the storage space to hold 3-weeks' output would cost RM700,000-
2.	Hydrochloric Acid - Own consumption	2,900 - 620 2.280	150	200	150	200			It would be very expensive to erect additional containers for hydrochloric acid
3.	Chlorine, liquid	952	108	108	94	94			It is too dangerous to store a larger quantity of chlorine
4.	Caustic Soda solution - Own consumption	2.108 - 760 1.348	500	500	500	500			As in 2- (If necessary, production of caustic soda solution can be included in the sodium nitrate production instead of soda.)
5.	Acid smoke	375	120	120	--	--			As in 2

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI - 8366
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

17 July 1947

I, Beryl BESWICK, Civ. No. D - 427 459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI - 8366.

Beryl BESWICK
Civ. No. D - 427 459.

AFFIDAVIT.

I, Ernst STRUSS, Director of the Office of the Technical Committee, I.G. Farben, Secretary of the Technical Committee of the Vorstand of the I.G. Farben, Manager of the Liaison Office W (Vermittlungsstelle W), concerning subsection II, and since 1943 production manager of the entire German dye industry, within the economic group "Chemical Industry", after having it called to my attention, that I am liable to punishment for false testimony, declare herewith of my own free will, and without duress, the following:

1. I lived at Frankfurt, Germany at the time the American Forces occupied this territory in March 1945. From May until late in the fall of 1945 I was interrogated by American and Allied investigators, principally by the American investigators, Messrs. RUTKIN, WISSEROTH and DEVINE. I was requested to give information about the history, the organization and the technical aspects of I.G. Farben, also about other matters related hereto. The information was given either through interrogation, or by me writing or dictating several statements about subjects submitted by one or several investigators. I have always told the allied investigators the truth to the best of my knowledge and belief. I have never wilfully given any false information whatsoever.

2. In particular I made statements on 13 and 15 August 1945 and on 3 September 1945 concerning stock piles built up by the I.G. before the war, especially regarding the manner in which magnesium was stored for and on orders of the Air Force (Luftwaffe). I desire to repeat the statements, I made on 13 and 15 August 1945 and on 3 September 1945, in order to clarify certain matters, and to add certain facts about which,

(Page 2 of original)

In Frankfurt on 25 February 1947, I informed Mr. Peter MILLER from the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes Muernberg.

3. On order of the Air Force (Luftwaffe) a new large Magnesium plant was planned at Aken on the Elbe, probably as early as the end of 1933, shortly thereafter a second one at Stassfurt. Shortly after start of production in Aken, probably in the summer of 1935, I visited Aken as well as Ditterfeld and noticed that without doubt practically the entire production was stored there in the form of tubes and packed into cases. These tubes had a diameter of 8 cm, a 1 cm wall and a length of 20 cm. Without doubt these tubes were parts for incendiary bombs. These tubes were packed into standardized boxes and were called "Textile Shells" (Textilhuelson). Everybody laughed, whenever somebody spoke about, or mentioned,

(Page 2 of original cont'd)

"Textile Shells" (Textilhuelsen). The meaning was common knowledge, and therefore everybody grinned whenever "Textile Shells" (Textilhuelsen) were transported through the plant.

4. Aken as well as Stassfurt had been built with loans made by the Air Force (Luftwaffe); and the I.G. Farben was given five years for the repayment of the loans and special amortization privileges. The Airforce (Luftwaffe) also paid much more than the cost price for magnesium and took the entire production of the plants. During the first two years' existence of Aken at least 90% of the magnesium produced in Aken and Bitterfeld were made into these tubes and shipped out. This stock pile is in my opinion the reason for buying magnesium from the DOW Corporation. We intended to peacefully develop magnesium, and not store it; we intended to develop motor hoods etc., and not bombs. We had, however, no magnesium left for peaceable progress, as the major share of our production went to the Air Force (Luftwaffe), and therefore no raw material.

(Page 3 of original)

was available to us. The quantities, we bought from the DOW Chemical Company were, however, only very small compared to the production of the I.G. Farben.

5. The Technical Committee of the Vorstand handled the construction of the factories at Aken and Stassfurt, also their financing, by the Air Force (Luftwaffe) and the planned production. In the event that the Air Force (Luftwaffe) should one day withdraw, a peacetime use for such large amounts of magnesium was, in Dr. PISTOR's opinion assured.

On 13 and 15 August 1945 and on 3 September 1945 I also made statements concerning the accumulation of stabilizers especially "Centralite" (Zentralit) to the above named representatives of the U.S. Military Government. I wish to repeat my statements concerning this subject in order to clarify certain things I said, and also to include certain details I submitted to Mr. Peter MILLER on 25 February 1947.

6. In 1935 the army made plans for a stabilizer plant at our Wolfen works. A production of 5 - 6000 tons per year was slated for this plant. Yearly capacity at Uerdingen was at that time 3000 tons, as far as I can remember; its output was raised to the same amount as Wolfen's. The expansion of the stabilizer plant at Uerdingen did not cause an especially high outlay.

(Page 3 of original cont'd)

7. Since 1936 we had orders from the Wehrmacht to store stabilizers for it, especially to build up stores of Centralite (Zentralit); this was the best stabilizer produced and therefore the one used most extensively. In comparison to consumption during the war the quantities in storage were insignificant; and I do not know whether the storing was done at the I.G. or by the Wehrmacht. I do not know whether I.G. stored the stabilizers, produced in 1936, 1937 and 1938

(Page 4 of original)

in their original form or in the form of finished powder. During those 3 years approximately 5000 tons of stabilizers were placed in storage, however, I do not know the exact quantities.

8. In the year 1937 the above mentioned new stabilizer plant at Wolfen started its real production but only much later full production was achieved, which finally equaled Uerdingen's. During the war the Army's requirement for stabilizers was estimated at approximately 9 - 10000 tons annually, therefore both plants had to produce at full capacity to satisfy this demand. Due to the real danger of air attacks on Uerdingen a third plant with equal capacity was planned, at first for Moosbierbaum, later for Auschwitz. This third one was never started.

I have carefully perused the four pages of this affidavit and have signed them with my own hand. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting, initialed these, and declare herewith under oath, that I have told the absolute truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

signature: Dr. Ernst A. Struss

Sworn to and signed before me this 11th day of March 1947 at Frankfurt/Main by Dr. Ernst A. Struss known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

signature: Peter H. Killen
US Civilian ACO D-145338
Title & position: Interrogator
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
US War Department

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI - 4832
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

8 July 1947

I, Hanne GLEICHMANN, A 443029, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI - 4832.

Hanne GLEICHMANN
A 443029

- 4 -
"END"

(Handwritten Note:
Receipt of Mr. Koch
... illegible)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No NI-1148
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR
WAR CRIMES

CONFIDENTIAL!

Report on the visit

to the RLM and RWA Wa Prw 1 IV on 26 Jan. 1937

Regarding: B El.

The expose "Contributions to the technical development of the modern Electron Thermite Incendiary Bomb" was given to Staff Engineer (Stabsing.) Koch by way of preliminary confidential information and he was asked to see whether such a report was of any interest to the RLM.

After this we called together an engineer Gasng, PaPrw 1 IV, who is the competent expert for artillery ammunition in order to discuss the possible new development of an incendiary projectile based on Electronics. G. informed us that such experiments had already been made, with a projectile containing one large electron-body filled with Thermite which is ejected from the casing. This projectile and the quantity of Thermite used in it are, however, protected by secret patents of a third party. The results had not been bad, for instance humid heath had caught fire from such a projectile. I replied that we, contrary to the above explanation, had thought of combining an artillery incendiary projectile with the mass effect caused by dropping shells from airplanes, since just the creation of numerous small fires had proved to be effective. Therefore, we were thinking of a projectile from which several E-metal incendiary bodies (Brander) would be ejected when it hit the target. G. remarked that, in addition to several other difficulties which existed in this case, according to his experience a sufficient strength of the E-metal would be the preliminary condition needed in order to prevent the E-metal bodies from being torn apart when the shell split. I reminded of the firing tests in K'dorf during which 80 mm thick, partly armored concrete plates had been pierced without a change in the E-metal bodies.

G. believes that some interests exists for such a projectile, although there have not yet been any requests for incendiary artillery ammunition. Koch suggested that B o, 2 El, B 1 El and B 4 El be shown to G. who dit not know them so far, and will send for this purpose several pieces from Rechlin to the Unterlues proving grounds where from 9 to 12 February other experiments will take place in the presence of both gentlemen. I asked G. to use our experience gained during the development of B El by allowing us to take part in further experiments. Thus was supported by Koch. G. anticipated a further discussion.

/s/ NEUKIRCH

Bitterfeld, January 27, 1937.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, JOHN J. BOLL, AGO No A-444412, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No NI- 1148.

JOHN J. BOLL
U. S. Civilian
AGO No A-444412

Strictly confidential !

Report

on the visit to the RLM on 21 December 1936.

Regarding: B El.

Present: Military architect (Mil. Baumstr. Spoerl LC III 7c
Staff engineer (Stabsing.) Koch LC II 5b
Dr. Neukirch 1G B1

I first thanked the gentlemen for having given us samples of the first production of B1 IV from Government stocks and told them about their excellent quality. Koch asked that if possible a few specimen be put aside for his inspection as he intends to come to Bitterfeld in the middle of January. I promised to let him know about it upon request. Regarding the new construction, Koch did not go into details. However, he showed great interest in our expose. He is still willing to recommend to HWA Wa. Prf. I 4 (Major Hesse), Tauentzienstr. 19 a, a discussion on the application of our experience in the new construction of an incendiary shell for artillery, according to the proposals which we intend to make and which I mentioned confidentially. In reply to my remark that such a procedure would only make sense if the RLM released E/metal to the HWA Spoerl said that - also for "case A" - 500 "Moto" for HWA had been released.

I then touched upon the question of new orders of B 1 El, whereupon Spoerl stated that, after all, the present stock piling would be sufficient for the beginning, also for "Case-A". It had, therefore, been decided to order only three additional million B 1 El for 1937. In "Case-A", the existing capacity for shell filling would be just sufficient for supply if fully used. As there were only 500 "Moto" left for the RLM after releasing E-metal to HWA, the construction of another Electrolysis (Elektrolyse) in case A had been discussed for which a construction period of from 9 to 12 months had been anticipated. For the meantime the stockpiling of tubes and rods is intended; the arrangements made so far should be sufficient, too. No definite decision has been taken, however, in this respect. Regarding B o., El authority for orders is still lacking.

(signed) NEUKIRCH

Bitterfeld, 22 December 1936

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, JOHN J. BOLL, AGO No A-444412, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No NI-1148

JOHN J. BOLL,
U.S. Civilian
A-444412

Strictly confidential!

Report

about a visit to the RLM on 18 January 1937

Resardine: R EL.

Present: Army architect (Militaerbaumeister) Spoerl } LC III 7 c
Major Maraun }
Dr. E. Neukirch I.G. Bitterfeld.

Referring to the conversation of 21 December 1936, the question of stock piling of chemicals for the filling of K B1 was discussed. I told the gentlemen that our maximum productive capacity (including work on Sundays, three shifts), was only sufficient for a monthly average of 1,5 million fillings. Should greater quantities of supplies be taken into account provisions for the A-case would have to be included in the program, and chemicals would have to be stock piled during the transition period in the same way as rods and tubes are stock piled. ¹⁾ Spoerl, who welcomed this suggestion very much, informed us that the supply figures which had been given some time ago were not definite. He intended, however, to study the question of stockpiling of chemical which he had so far not considered.

(signed) Neukirch

(Handwritten Note:
1) this mainly because of obligations
for deliveries)

Bitterfeld, 20 January 1937
Dr. Nk./Ke.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, JOHN J. BOLL, AGO No D-150096, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No NI - 1148

JOHN J. BOLL
U.S. Civilian
AGO No D-150096

AFFIDAVIT

I, Karl von HEIDER, a Director of the I.G. Farben, Chief of the Inorganic Chemicals Department of the Chemical Sales Combine and a member of the Commercial Committee of the Vorstand of I.G. Farben, after having been warned that I make myself liable to punishment by any false statement, hereby declare under oath, voluntarily and without duress, the following:

1. When the American combat forces occupied Frankfurt, Germany, in March, 1945, I resided in this territory. Since May, 1945, I have been questioned by Allied and American Interrogation Officers, especially by the Interrogation officers, Messrs. WEISSBROTH and DEVINE. I have been requested to give information on the history, construction and technical side of I.G. Farben and on other matters connected therewith, either under interrogation or by various statements written or dictated by me on subjects given to me by one or more of the Interrogation officers. I have always, to the best of my knowledge and belief, told the truth to the Interrogation officers. I have never willingly given any false information.

2. On the 13th August 1945, I made a statement to Messrs. WEISSBROTH and DEVINE about the storing of Aluminium, Phosphorus and Cyanides undertaken by I.G. Farben before the war. I should like to withdraw this statement that I made on the 13th August, 1945, in order to explain and expand it and to add certain facts which I communicated to Mr. Peter MILLER of the Office of the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, Nuremberg, on the 25th February, 1947, in Frankfurt.

3. According to my knowledge, the International Aluminium Union laid up stocks. I do not know what quantities of aluminium were stored nor in what years this stock-piling took place, but it was before the war. HAEPLIGER must know more about this. He worked through the Metallgesellschaft AG., Frankfurt a.M., which acted as

(page 2 of original)

exclusive sales agent for the aluminium production of the Bitterfeld Aluminiumwerke (50% I.G.). I presume that the Bitterfeld Aluminiumwerk received orders to stock-pile aluminium. I am not sure whether these orders came from the Reichsstelle Chemie or from the Ministry of Economics.

4. I know that the Wehrmacht had given orders to I.G. Farben to store large stocks of Phosphorus and Cyanides. When Dyhernfurth was built, the stocks of Phosphorus and Cyanides were transferred there for storage. For all the stocks of Phosphorus and Cyanides, we always sent the accounts to Anorgana Ludwigshafen, who in turn sent the accounts to the Wehrmacht.

5. What we commercial people, and consequently I myself, knew about these stockpiles was accidental, because all orders as well as the actual accumulation of stores were carried out in strictest secrecy and were dealt with by the technicians. Some time between 1939 and 1941, I asked Dr. WURSTER about it and he answered me very sharply that it was a secret and had

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8152
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

nothing to do with the commercial people of I.G. It was, however, very, very difficult to keep this stockpile secret as the quantities produced were known and the products were not sold and must of course be somewhere.

6. I remember that Dr. ABEROS once told me that the storing of Phosphorus and Cyanides was a strict secret, as all kinds of poison gases could be made from these chemicals. But he said the Anorgana Dyhernfurth only produced the intermediates from which gases could be manufactured. KLOTZ of Leverkusen must know all about this accumulation of stocks, for he was chief of Department 2, which handled all the secret deliveries of organic intermediates to the Wehrmacht. Besides him, Dr. ULLRICH and Dr. PALM of Ludwigshafen and Dr. WURSTER know all the details and also Dr. EHMANN of Production and Examination Group VI of Army Ordnance Office (Munitions- und Waffenprodukt VI).

I have carefully read through each of the two pages of this declaration and signed it personally. - I have made the

(page 3 of original)

necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialled them and I hereby declare, under oath, that I have stated the absolute truth, to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signed) Karl v. HEIDER

Sworn to and signed before me this 14th day of March 1947 at Frankfurt/Germany by Karl von HEIDER, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signed) Peter H. MILLER
US Civilian A.G.O. 145338
Title & Position: Interrogator

Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes
US War Department

- - - - -
CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

13 June 1947

I, John FOSBERRY, No. 20179, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8152.

John FOSBERRY
No. 20179

- 2 -
"END"

File - Note

on a conference in Berlin on 20 January 1937.

PRESENT: Ministerialrat Dr. ZAHN of the H.W.A. (Heeres-Waffenamt)

Dr. BUHL)
Dr. PISTOR) of the I.G. FARBEW
Dr. WIRCK)

- 1) The Power and Steam-supply contracts, have been slightly changed in text by the Heeres-Waffenamt, but have otherwise been essentially accepted without any change. Dr. ZAHN will send the contracts to the I.G. for signature in the form now agreed on.
- 2) The lease-contract for the Diglycol production plant, drawn up by Dr. BUHL, was discussed. Dr. ZAHN agreed to the draft with the provision that the contract department of the Heeres-Waffen Amt examine it. Regarding the details of the apparatus, machines, etc. listed in Annex I, the Inventory lists which are yet to be drawn up should be referred to.
- 3) The estimates submitted to the Heeres Waffen Amt regarding the supplementation of the diglycol-plant to an increased production of 400 tons per month and the Phosgene plant to 600 tons per month, are at the Office for Price Control (Preisprüfung).
- 4) There is a lack of storage facilities for diglycol. Dr. AMBROS has been asked by the Heeres-Waffen Amt to ascertain the demand of the Masag (Westfaelische-Anhaltische Sprengstoff A.G.) and the D.A.G. (Dynamit A.G.) as well as the storage facilities.

(TRANSLATOR'S NOTE:
Pencil Note: Initial B
To Dr. BUHL)

(Page 2 of original)

- 5) Dr. ZAHN agreed that orders for the erection of line storage-facilities in Wolfen should be issued immediately. Written orders to this effect will reach us in the near future.
- 6) Storage of Aniline and Mono-Ethyl-Aniline. Dr. ZAHN asked us to find out whether it would still be possible for the I.G. to supply about 100 tons of Mono-Ethyl-Aniline per month in February and March, for storage in Wolfen.
- 7) Dr. ZAHN expressed the desire that the I.G. might transfer to the Heeres-Waffen Amt a capable, energetic engineer with allround machine-technical and also chemical knowledge. This man's task would be: Centralized agreement, supervision of orders, acting as advisor to the men of the chemical department of the Heeres-Waffen Amt. Tenure of his activity at the Heeres-Waffenamt: 3 - 4 years.

Dr. PISTOR agreed to consider this question, but pointed out the difficulty of finding a suitable person, especially as the I.G. itself has vital tasks to accomplish in the framework of the Four Year Plan.

- 8) Dr. ZAHN informed us on the contents of a letter from the Monopolverwaltung (Monopoly Administration) according to which they will

agree to the Wolfen request for the procurement of undenatured alcohol at cheaper rate under the condition that consumption is normally supervised by the Customs authorities.

Dr. ZAHN will request the Customs authorities to have the storage containers gauged by the Customs Commissioner in charge.
(Page 3 of original)

- 9) In connection with the Acetophenone project, Dr. ZAHN said that on the previous day he had conferred with Dr. von BRUENING about special questions which would have to be cleared up further yet. The manner as well as extent of production No. 3 depend on the result of this clarification.
- 10) In reply to our question, Dr. ZAHN stated that he still had the responsibility for the establishment of Hypo-Chloride and Chloride of Lime plants as before, but that the procurement rested in the hands of Captain BODE.

He urged us to submit to him a final estimate of costs

- 1) regarding procurement and storage of only the most important machinery and apparatus in the framework of the intended increase of Losantine manufacture.
- 2) for the effective extension of the present Losantine manufacture.

Wolfen, 23 January 1937

(Translator's Note: Pencil
initial : V (for Virck))

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, MP. No. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-4492.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
U.K. Civilian
M.P. No. 34079

(E N D)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7566
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Ammoniakwerk Merseburg
G.m.b.H.
Gypsum Works Niedersachswerfen

Telegrams:	Telephone:	Account:	Consignments by rail
Ammoniakgipswerk	Nordhausen	Commerz- und	to: Station Nieder-
Niedersachswerfen	1375, 1376	Privatbank AG,	sachswerfen, Gov.
		Branch Office	Railway side-track,
			Nordhausen

To the
Reich War Minister and Supreme
Commander of the Wehrmacht,
for the attention of
Lieutenant Colonel WARLIMONT
or deputy.

Received: 2 Nov. 1935
Vermittlungsstelle W
Outgoing correspondence

Your file numbers	Your letter of	Our file	Niedersachswerfen
	(state in reply)	numbers	(Southern Harz)
			31 October 1935

With reference to the letter of the Reich and Prussian
Minister of Economics addressed to us on 23 October
1935, file numbers: A.K. 3/5243/35 - 5, we beg to hand
you through Dr. RITTER of Vermittlungsstelle W of I.G.
Farbenindustrie further documented details for the
scheme of a gasoline depot.

Heil Hitler !

Ammoniakwerk Merseburg
G.m.b.H.

per proxy. Dr. GUILLEAUME I.V. ?

Enclosures.

Enclosure locked up in safe.

Ammoniakwerk Merseburg
G.m.b.H.
Gypsum Works Niedersachswerfen

To the
Reich and Prussian Minister of Economics

for the attention of Reichsbahnoberrat VOGELER
(Senior Government Railway Councillor)

or deputy

Berlin W. 8., Behrenstrasse 43

31 October 1935

File Number: A.K. 3/5243/35 - z.

We beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 23 October 1935 and thank you for your willingness to have our project for a gasoline depot thoroughly discussed.

Through Dr. RITTER of Vermittlungsstelle W of I.G. Farbenindustrie we beg to hand you (enclosure 1) a further solution for our project. The advantage of this new solution chiefly consists in quite a considerable shortening of the construction time for this plant resulting from the fact that for the construction of this scheme an already existing adit III (refer to enclosure 1) will be used. By so doing it will be possible to have not only 2, but 4 dredgers working at once. As is shown by the working plan of plant 2, reckoning a five-day week, to complete all 48 chambers, would take 92 weeks as against 193 weeks as calculated in our first project. Taking as basis, a six-day week the period will be reduced to 73 weeks. It is true that 412 men will be employed instead of 231 men, so that it will be necessary to engage about 180 more men. At the same time, the cost of this new plan is on the whole the same as for the one that has been submitted already, except for the purchase of two more dredgers. The method of construction may be easily seen from enclosures 1 and 2, but it might be advisable to await our oral report in this connection.

Copy for:
Duplicate

Copy

(page 2 of original)

Ammoniakwerk Merseburg
G.m.b.H.
Gypsum Works Niedersachswerfen

To the
Reich and Prussian Minister of Economics, 31 October 1935

This project, as well as the one already presented, could also be constructed alternatively with 3 containers for each chamber.

Your apprehensions about the loading and unloading facilities being too much exposed to attack and destruction by enemy airplanes, can be overcome by shifting the loading and unloading of trains, at least during the time of actual danger, to adits 1 and 2. The trains would be pushed by the engine into the adits and coupled there to a spilling system, so that the engine does not enter the adit. Details of this can be given in a verbal discussion.

The storing of the containers in rows of compartments necessarily leads to the idea of having the containers moved underground and arranged in rows, provided there are no mountains. In enclosure 3 we have shown a sketch of different types of these plants in the open terrain and it will be seen that the containers are always arranged in rows. In sketch 3 the rows run parallel to each other, in sketch 2 they have been arranged in the form of a star and in sketch 1 irregularly. Alternatives 2 and 1 were devised because parallel rows facilitate the approach of enemy airplanes and thus increase the possibilities of precise aiming and hitting the target. We have carefully calculated the putting-up of the containers in open terrain in order to find out whether such an arrangement would cost less than storage in rock-chambers. We assumed that the containers arranged in rows will be placed in ditches 14 m deep and 11 m wide at the bottom. A gradient of 1 : 1,5 has been allowed for sandy soil and 1 : 1 for loamy soil. The containers are then placed in the excavated ditches. As the containers in the rock-chambers can be reinforced by supports, in rocks iron sheeting of a minimum thickness can be used. On the other hand, if the containers are in heaped up soil they require reinforcing. This can be done either by using almost double the thickness of iron sheeting with cross-supports inside, or

(page 3 of original)

Ammoniakwerk Merseburg
Limited Company
Gypsum Plant Niedersachswerfen

To the
Reich and Prussian Minister of Economics. 31 October 1935

by a sufficiently strong concrete casing. We based our calculation on the cheapest method i.e. ferro-concrete casing. Of course, this casing has to be added to the cost of construction when comparing the plant in rock chambers with the plant on ordinary loose soil. The comparison of cost is contained in enclosures 4. We should prefer to give further details in a verbal discussion. Although the costs for the plant in open terrain have been calculated on the lowest basis, the rock chambers turn out to be cheaper.

Enclosure 5, also contains a draft for the calculation of the pipe-line for storage on ordinary soil, and enclosure 6 is a plan for the railroad track and ventilation for the rock chamber project as mentioned at the beginning.

As you will perceive, we have carefully gone into the scheme of gasoline storage, only on paper, it is true. Of course, as regards plants that have been actually constructed, we have not yet so much experience as you have. We would state however, firstly that the cost of our rock chamber project has not only been calculated, but also tried out by actual working in trial-adits, so that the question of miscalculation does not arise so long as the nature of the rock layers holds no surprises. That there is no cause for apprehension is proven by the detailed survey furnished by the Provincial Geological Institute (Geologische Landesanstalt). Secondly, when compiling the comparative figures for the project "Storage in open terrain" we relied upon figures based upon experience in our open lignite workings, so that our costings might represent a minimum. It may be assumed that when the work is actually carried out there will be additional expenses, so that the standard price for 1 ton of stored gasoline will in reality probably be higher than what we have figured out in our project that serves for comparison.

(page 4 of original)

Ammoniakwerk Merseburg G.m.b.H.
Gyosum Werke Niedersachswerfen

To the
Reich and Prussian Minister of Economics, 31 October 1935

In the comparative cost estimates we not only figured out the expenditure which we shall incur if we ourselves construct the rock chambers, but we also ascertained what the cost would be if a contractor were entrusted with the building of the rock chambers. It is quite evident that in the latter case the cost will be considerably higher than the cost of the work carried out by us, as no contractor has any experience about Anhydrit. Another reason why the cost of the contracted out work will come out considerably higher is because first of all the contractor has to obtain all working equipment, whereas if we do the building all this is available on the spot except for a few things, so that work could be started without delay.

It stands to reason that rock chambers in rock of which there is a natural layer of rocks of 45 to 50 m. cannot be excelled in regard to safety. Even if both entrances to the tunnels, which could in any way desired be reinforced by concrete and armored workings, were blocked by bomb action, it is simply impossible, on account of the situation to block tunnel III which already exists and the entrance to which is situated in a vertical rocky wall 55 m high, so that a safe emergency exit will always remain. The possibility of constantly controlling the imperviousness of the containers in the rock-chambers is an advantage not to be underrated, whereas nothing can be done about leakages of containers buried in sand and soil as it is impossible to repair these.

As is shown by the comparison of cost, even when conditions are otherwise the same, the financial advantage, which we assert is offered by the rock chamber scheme, can be proved.

We ask you to leave all the rest to our verbal discussion, in which our experts will furnish comprehensive informations also on the basic details, and this is the reason why we are refraining from adding here a detailed description of the project.

(page 5 of original)

Ammoniakwerk Merseburg G.m.b.H.
Gypsum Works Niedersachswerfen

To the
Reich and Prussian Minister of Economics.

31 October 1935

We would, however, like to ask for one more thing:

From depots that have already been constructed, your competent gentlemen were able to get a clear and definite idea about the various kinds of construction apart from the rock chambers, as suggested by us here for Niedersachswerfen. We, therefore, think it would be extremely useful if, possibly before the conference, an inspection of our trial-bund could be carried out. It would make it much easier to form an opinion on our plan.

Upon receipt of your telephone call our Fr. GUILLEAUME together with his experts will be at your disposal by the middle of next week.

In compliance with your request a copy of this letter, together with enclosures, were sent to:

- 1) Reich War Minister and Supreme Commander
of the Wehrmacht
for the attention of Lieutenant Colonel WELLMONT
or deputy
- 2) Reich Air Minister
for the attention of Mr. HEYDENREICH, consultant,
or deputy
- 3) Wirtschaftliche Forschungsgesellschaft m.b.H.
for the attention of Mr. WELING, retired Beirat.

Heil Hitler!

Ammoniakwerk Merseburg
G.m.b.H.

per proxy, Dr. GUILLEAUME i.V. ?

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7566
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

8 August 1947

I, Victoria ORTON, Civ.No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7566.

Victoria ORTON
Civ.No. 20 129.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7125
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Rubber Stamp: Secret !

1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W

Reich Ministry of Economics
Attention: Min. Dirigent MULERT

B e r l i n - W 8
Behrenstr. 43

Rubber Stamp:

WStb
7 July 1939
Az.
Nr. 2955/39 f. Append...1

Dr.Di./Sch.

5 July 1939

Removal of important military products from Ludwigsshafen
and Oppau to another place.

Having talked the matter over with the specialists of our plants, we want to tell you the following concerning the various Oppau products, which were discussed from a military view at our conference on 22 June 1939 at the Reich Ministry of Economics:

- 1) Urea. The urea factory at Oppau is idle at present, for lack of a market, but can start operating at any time. Urea requirements for feeding are estimated at 4-5,000 tons N per year for the current year and urea requirements for technical purposes are estimated at 3-4,000 tons N per year, while the urea requirement for fertilizing purposes need not be taken into account since urea can be substituted by other nitrogen fertilizers without disadvantage.

For a judgment of the military importance of urea for technical purposes we refer you to our letter of 1.9.1938 to Supervisory Office 'Chemistry' (Appendix 1), copies of which were sent to Ob.Reg.Rat Dr. Lenz and Ob.Reg.Rat Dr. Murek and which contains a list of the 15 or 20 most important consumers subdivided into firms or plants and purposes for which the product is used.

About 4,000 tons Nitrogen of the urea supply of the last production period at present being stocked at Oppau can be freed immediately for feeding and technical purposes;

(page 2 of original)

If additional quantities are to be stocked the following amounts would be available, in accordance with the Oppau production schedule:

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

by December 1939, a further 1,500 tons Nitrogen
by March 1940, a further 1,500 tons Nitrogen
by June 1940, a further 3,000 tons Nitrogen.

I.G. is not planning the construction of another urea plant because the production facilities at Oppau are not utilized to the full. Concerning the construction of a stand-by plant, we refer you to our letters of 2 February 1937 to the Reich War Ministry and 7 February 1938 to the Reich War Ministry (appendices 2 + 3).

In case of war (Ersatzfall) the best way of starting up production of urea would be by transferring certain machines and apparatus units from Oppau to Merseburg and joining them to the local nitrogen and carbonic acid production.

The urea supply stocked at Gertha, Döberitz, Hamburg etc. a year ago had to be almost completely turned over for consumption. Because of the expected scarcity of nitrogen a urea stockpiling of 5-10,000 tons of nitrogen per year, which would have to be withdrawn from current consumption, would have to be discussed with the Reich Food Estate.

- 2) Kaurit-glue. Present production amounts to about 600 tons per month, of which about 100 tons per month can be diverted for stockpiling. The immediately available supply at Oppau, which might have to be transferred elsewhere, amounts to 300 tons. Since it is possible, in the opinion of the Oppau specialists, to build the facilities for production of Kaurit-glue from urea stocks on hand at any industrialized site in about 3 months, efforts should be made to obtain a stockpile of about 1,500 tons of Kaurit-glue powder, which keeps well.

(page 3 of original)

Whether it is necessary to stockpile other urea products, such as Plastopal for resin and lacquer production, Isorka as a cork substitute and others, can only be judged according to the military importance of the use to which they will be put, i.e. by questioning the customers concerning the products.

- 3) Ammonium chloride. Of present requirements for technical purposes amounting to about 4,000 tons Nitrogen per year, half is sent abroad and is mostly supplied by Oppau. In addition, Solvay/Bernburg as well as Dattgen/Bochum (sublimated NH_4Cl) can produce considerable quantities of ammonium chloride; further, Aussig, with a very small production for the present, it is true, as well as the firm of Blumberg + Rindskopf, Zuckmantel/Sudetengau (about 100 tons of nitrogen per year) could be employed.

As ammonium chloride lyes are plentiful in the soda factories and are mostly disintegrated, sizable productive facilities for ammonium chloride could be constructed pretty quickly in an emergency

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

by assembling additional crystallizing and evaporating sets, if necessary, from Oppau installations. Besides, an auxiliary production of pure ammonium chloride could be started by chemical reaction of hydrochloric acid and ammonia used in the chlorine factories. At present there are no supplies of ammonium chloride on hand in our depots; if necessary, however, production at Oppau could be pushed still more in order to free certain quantities for stockpiling, or else, impure ammonium chloride fertilizer could be stocked.

- 4) Ammonium carbonate (Hartshorn salt). Requirements, mainly for baking purposes, amount to about 1,000 tons N per year. The experiences of the Ruhr occupation in 1922 have shown that this production can be transferred in a short time (4-5 weeks) to another plant which has pure carbonic acid, such as is the case at Leuna.

(page 4 of original)

The stockpiles stored with the consumers themselves should be adequate for this conversion period, in case of war (Ernstfall), so that additional stockpiling or other stand-by measures seem unnecessary.

- 5) Brown Oxide Contacts, which, besides ferric oxide, contain manganese and bismuth oxide or chrome oxide, are produced in our Wolfen-Farben plant, in addition to the Oppau plant. Owing to the platinum scarcity expected within I.G. in the event of war (Ernstfall) ammonia combustion is not to be completely changed over to the more effective platinum-rhodium contacts; Oppau and Wolfen/Bitterfeld are continuing to use brown oxide contacts in a certain number of ammonia combustion furnaces. The contact manufacturers in the plants themselves can easily meet their own requirements; if it becomes necessary in case of war (Ernstfall) to change over furnaces until now using platinum contacts to brown oxide contacts, the necessary conversion or rebuilding of furnaces would take longer than the construction of new facilities for the production of the required quantities of contacts.

Where brown oxide contacts for the production of water gas is concerned, the hydrogenation works to be constructed mean a considerably increased consumption. The stocks on hand at Gerthe and Wolfen (300 tons) as well as Oppau (200 tons) are sufficient to cover consumption for the coming 6 months. If the Oppau contact plant worked at full production (capacity 200-300 tons per month) it would be possible, in spite of starting operations and a first filling of new hydrogenation plants like Pöchlitz, Scholven and Rheinbenzin, to increase this 6-month supply still further.

If Oppau production is lost in case of war (Ernstfall) it would be best to increase production at Wolfen; besides, there is a possibility of starting a new production in Frose near Aschersleben, for

(page 4 of original, cont'd)

which eventually Oppau has already taken certain preparatory measures.

(page 5 of original)

- 6) Carbonyl Iron. Operation is dependent on the presence of large quantities of purified carbonic acid. Besides Oppau, Leuna comes closest to meeting this prerequisite; if considerably more were spent from additional investments (pure CO production) carbonyl iron production facilities, for instance for stand-by purposes, could also be constructed in Doberitz. In that case, carbonic oxide would have to be drawn from the generators of the Hoko (high concentration) plant at Doberitz-Ost while comparatively favorable conditions for the manufacture of carbonyl in high pressure apparatuses and for the thermic disintegration would have to be created in the adjoining Gabel-Mord plant with regard to apparatuses and personnel.

In the case of war (Ernstfall), carbonyl iron could be produced in Leuna on an auxiliary basis, and if necessary, thermic splitting to obtain pure iron could be done in disintegration furnaces to be constructed for that purpose at another site.

Owing to the continued great demand, supplies of any size for stockpiling unfortunately cannot be provided by Oppau until the end of the year. In view of the precarious situation of most non-ferrous metals, as seen from the military-economic point of view, the above-mentioned conditions, together with the modest supplies held by the main consumers of carbonyl iron (electrical firms) should sufficiently insure the continuance of supply and the possibility of substituting.

Concerning carbonyl nickel, our specialists have so far discovered no customer who absolutely depends on carbonyl nickel in powder form, as it can only be produced at Oppau. As far as we know today, the electrolyte nickel to be produced at our ^{new} plant in Frose/Aschersleben can be used for all important military purposes without any disadvantage. Stockpiling of nickel can only be started after the completion of the new plant at Frose, i.e. at about the end of the year.

(page 6 of original)

- 7) Oppanol. At present, Oppau is occupied with testing the process for producing Oppanol, which has until now been developed in a small, temporary installation, in the large experimental plant which has been built in the meantime. It is hoped to reach a production of 300 tons per month.

The necessary large production plant is planned in connection with a large plant for the production of iso-octene projected by the Reich Air Ministry, since both processes are based on the same pro-

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT, No. NI-7125
CONTINUED

(page 6 of original, cont'd)

liminary and intermediate products (CO + H₂ - gas and isobutyl oil). The site for these plants has not yet been determined. The neighbourhood of Bruex/Sudetenland is being considered; at any rate it can only be a site to which there are no objections from the military viewpoint. In view of the disproportion between supply and demand stockpiling is out of the question for the time being.

We request your opinion as soon as possible as to which of the methods for securing the above mentioned products for the military economy should be followed up in our Oppau plant. Our inquiries about storage possibilities have shown that the aim can probably be reached without building additional depots, as several depots in Central Germany, as well as our own idle Gathe plant, can accommodate large additional quantities. Since the loading and transporting of the production to be stored, mentioned during the discussion of 22 June 1939, would take several months, it is very urgent that decisions concerning stockpiling are made soon.

For the actual carrying out of the stockpiling we assure, that, in the same way as was done last year with the removal work undertaken with the Wifo, the extra costs incurred by transfer to, or storage in a place, which while suitable from the military economic viewpoint, is unsuitable as a place of storage and disadvantageous as regards freight, will be refunded to us, while the goods themselves remain the property of I.G. and are at its disposal. Should

(page 7 of original)

large funds of I.G. have to be tied up by the demand for regular maintenance of the stocks by replenishing them from current production in case of deliveries to consumers, for instance, should the suggested urea stockpile of 10,000 tons Nitrogen require about 6,000,000.- RM, a compensation would have to be made for impairing the liquid assets of I.G., and interest paid on this capital.

For the moment, we have tried to answer those questions with regard to Oppau products which were not adequately clarified at the discussion mentioned. For the Ludwigshafen products to be considered we shall submit the relevant data as soon as possible. Should the carrying out of the measures to be taken by you require the following up of individual questions concerning the requirements of the various projects in the way of personnel, materials, finance and time, or a detailed break-down of the consumers of the products listed, we shall be glad to help you.

Heil Hitler !

VERMITTLUNGSTELLE W

(Rubber stamp)
signed: DIEMANN

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

3 Appendices

Ø Oberreg.-Rat Dr. Mureck, W-Stab,
Regierungsrat Dr. Lenz, Reich Ministry of Economics,
Dr. Ungewitter, U.S.-Chemistry,
Management Office, Sparte I, Oppau,
Direktor Dr. Mueller-Gunradi, Oppau.

REGISTERED !

(page 8 of original)

Rubber Stamp:
Secret !

1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

Supervisory Office Chemistry
Attention: Dr. UNGEWITTER

Berlin W 35,
Sigismundstr. 5

Dr.E./No. 24 Aug. 1938 Dr.Di./Sch. 1 September 1938

Oppau Urea Depot

With reference to your letter of 24 August 1938 we enclose the following appendices:

- 1) Copy of our letter of 7.2.1938 to the W-Stab of the Reich War Ministry, Reg.-Rat Dr. Mureck;
- 2) photostatic copy of the letter dated 9.2.1938 from our Oppau plant to the Nitrogen-Syndicate;
- 3) photostatic copy of the letter of 9.8.38 addressed to us by R. Hanser.

We further inform you that, at our suggestion, the Nitrogen Syndicate, to safeguard the urea supply, is at present stockpiling large quantities of urea with the main consumers as well as with I.G. depots.

(page 8 of original, cont'd)

The size of the stockpiles should ensure sufficient supplies for the technical requirements for 6-10 months. The action should be finished by the end of next week.

We have brought about a similar stockpiling to secure the requirements of sal-ammoniac and hartshorn salt, which nitrogen products are also produced almost exclusively at Oppau. The urea factory in Oppau has a productive capacity of 35,000 tons N per year. Since present requirements amount to about 4,000 tons per year for technical purposes and about 4,000 tons per year for fertilizers, altogether 8,000 tons N per year, the urea factory in Oppau is only operating with a small part of its facilities or operating fully only periodically for a few months. The following are the main purchasers of urea for technical purposes:

(page 9 of original)

1) Syndicate customers:

Schering A.G., Berlin	550 tons per year	Dealer
A.G. for chemical products Scheidemantel, Berlin	50 " " "	Own consumption
Feldmühle, Stettin	40 " " "	Sheet gelatine
Nachtigall, Schkeelen	20 " " "	glue manufacture
Anh. Salzwerte, Strossfurt- Leopoldshall	20 " " "	" " "
Theod. Rotta, Zwickau	50 " " "	sizing purposes in the textile industry
E. Merck, Darmstadt	65 " " "	pharmaceutical pre- parations
Knoll, Ludwigshafen	20 " " "	" " "
Carl Dicke, W.-Barmen	20 " " "	dealer
Pfennig-Schumacher, W.-Barmen	60 " " "	production of artifi- cial horn

2) Works affiliated with I.G.:

D.A.G., Troisdorf	750 " " "	production of pressed articles
Wolff & Co., Walsrode	110 " " "	production of cello- phane
Kalle & Co., Wiesbaden	350 " " "	production of cello- phane, ozalid and soap diluents

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. MI-7125
CONTINUED

(page 9 of original, cont'd)

3) I.G.'s own consumption:

Aectn, Berlin	20 tons per year	production of textile raw materials
Elberfeld	25 " " "	production of pharmaceutical preparations
Hochst	45 " " "	production of tanigans and fire extinguishing agents
Ludw. shafon	40 " " "	mainly for Knurit glue and
Oppau	2,900 " " "	plastopal production
Urdingen	300 " " "	for Four Year Plan products

As a result of the above-mentioned intermittent production the size of urea stockpiles varies very considerably. At present, about 1,000 tons urea are freely available at the Oppau depot. Current production amounts on an average to 60 tons per day. About 200 tons per day can be stored or transferred elsewhere.

Ø o.A. to Re. Ret. Dr. Murock,
W-Stab of Armed Forces High
Command,
Ø o.A. to Ob. Ret. Dr. Lenz
Reich Ministry of Economics

Heil Hitler !

VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W

(Rubber stamp)
(signed) DIEKMANN

Appendices

5x

REGISTERED !

(page 10 of original)

Rubber Stamp:

Secret !

1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of Article 28 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

Reich War Ministry
W-Stab
Attention: Reg. Rat Dr. MUECK

B e r l i n - W 35,

Tirnitzerstr 72/76

Dr. Di./Sch.

7 February 1938

Urea Supply.

On the question of securing the urea supply if the present production is lost we would like to say the following:

In our opinion the best way to secure the urea requirements for important military purposes is to keep stocks in a safe place. With regard to space and rail connection the Doberitz-Ost plant seems to be well suited for the construction of such a stand-by depot, while there is no suitable place within the "high concentration" plant at Lenselshelm. The construction of a simple wooden warehouse with a surface of 20 x 60 m, an interior height of 4 - 5 m, corresponding to a capacity of about 5,000 tons urea, costs about 100,000.- RM. roughly estimated. To keep down costs, mechanical installations for loading and unloading are not included; however, in case of war (Ermstfall) unloading by hand can be aided by a few moving conveyor belts.

An economically advantageous solution for the setting-up of a urea depot presents itself in our former nitrogen plant at Horne in Westphalia. A few concrete containers have remained from former salt-silos, which would merely have to be completed again. With an outlay of about RM. 120,000.- for construction of low side-walls and a flat roof with supports in between, for a surface of 30 x 80 m, suitable storage premises could be created here to hold about 10,000 tons urea.

The depots thus provided could be filled with urea salt

(page 11 of original)

in a short time, if necessary, because the large production facilities of the Copau urea plant are not fully utilized. An estimate of the

TRANSMISSION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7125
CONTINUED

(page 11 of original, cont'd)

cost would have to be obtained directly from the Nitrogen Syndicate, department "Nitrogen for Industrial Purposes".

Concerning the construction of a plant for urea production (see your letter of 22 January 1937, Ref.66 b 2161/IV W Stb, Dept. W Ro (III b) 81/37 -) it can be said in principle that a urea plant would only be practicable in a plant in which a sufficient amount of carbonic acid (CO₂) of relatively high concentration or degree of purity is a by-product of whatever is being produced. Consequently, the existing nitrogen stand-by plants, as well as an ammonia plant producing on a basis of electrolysis, are not suitable for building a plant for urea production. However, a urea factory could be included in one of the large new plants, for instance in the Sueddeutschland nitrogen plant planned by the Office for German Raw and Industrial Materials.

Please inform us, as to which of the above-mentioned methods for securing the urea supply is to be followed up in case of war (Ernstfall).

Heil Hitler !

VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W

(Rubber stamp)
signed: DIECKMANN

Ø Res.Ret Dr. Lenz, Reich Ministry of Economics
Ø Management Office of Sparte I, Oppau
Ø Dir. Hanser, Berlin NW 7
Ø Dr. Ungewitter, Berlin W 35
on 1.9.1936

REGISTERED !

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7125
CONTINUED

(page 12 of original)

CONFIDENTIAL

Reich War Ministry
Military-Economic Staff (Wehrwirtschafts-Stab)
Attention: Dr. Mureck

B e r l i n - 7 3 5

Bendlerstr. 27

Dr.Di./Sch.

2 February 1937

Urea plant.

We have forwarded your enquiry for a stand-by plant for urea to our technical office. However, we would like to say briefly already now that we think it would be much more economic¹ to stockpile the required amounts in the safety zone than to build an installation for only 5,000 tons of urea per year.

Since the urea factory at Copau has been semi-idle for a long time, the desired securing of the urea supply in case of war (Ernstfall) could be achieved in a far shorter time and at less cost to the national economy by stock-piling, than by creating a suitable production site.

Heil Hitler !

(Rubber stamp:) VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W
SPARTE I
signed: DIECKMANN

Dr. Krauch
Berlin - W 8

REGISTERED !

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

7 August 1947

I, Samuel S. HORN, No. A.G.O. 443113, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7125.

Samuel S. HORN
A.G.O.-443113

Copy

The Reich Minister of Economics
II Chem. 3637/39 G
You are requested to quote this reference
and the subject in future correspondence.

Berlin W 8, 5 July 1939
Behrenstrasse 43
Telephone: General No. 16 43
(Hs): 10/106

(Stamp): Secret!

To I.G. Farbenindustrie,
for the attention of Dr. Gorr
- or his deputy -
Berlin W 8
Unter den Linden 82.

Subject: IG-Farben, Ludwigshafen/Oppau Works.

The situation in your Ludwigshafen/Oppau Works which, from the point of view of military economy, must be considered most perilous, and which has often been discussed with the officials of Vermittlungsstelle I already, has led to the discussion of the problems arising from it in a Reich Ministry of Economics' conference in conjunction with representatives of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht and the Reich Commissioners for Chemistry. This discussion took place on 26 June under the MS marginal 22 June chairmanship of Ministerialdirigent Malert in the presence of representatives of I.G. Farbenindustrie.

Firstly, it was explained that all the main building projects in Ludwigshafen/Oppau, except the Oppanel plant, the fatty acid plant and the nitrogen extension are practically completed. The plant for the production of polysuperamide has only just been started.

In order to ensure that further additions to the Ludwigshafen/Oppau Works shall in no circumstances be made if considerations of military economy make this soon inadvisable, I request that in future the Reich Ministry of Economics be informed of all new plans for expansion in sufficiently good time for objections to be made to the execution of these plans and for the extension to be held up, in so far as this is necessary for reasons of military economy. Letters on the subject are to be sent direct to the Reich Ministry of Economics for the attention of Ministerialdirigent Dr. Malert, quoting the subject heading, "Examination of Building Projects, from the point of view of Military Economy."

In the discussion of individual products produced in the plant, which are 100% or almost 100% produced in Ludwigshafen/Oppau,

(page 2 of original)

it became apparent that an improvement of this situation which, from the point of view of mobilization is extremely grave, is possible only in part. In connection with this, the following courses are to be differentiated:

- I. Products, the production of which can be transferred by I.G. Farben to other works in peaco time.

(page 2 of original cont'd)

- II. Products, the production of which can be instituted without much difficulty in other I.G. works in the event of mobilization.
- III. Products, the production of which cannot be transferred at short notice, but of which it is possible by means of increased production in the plants at present not fully exploited, to make supplies available for stock-piling.

Independently of the possibilities already discussed for individual materials, I should like to examine rapidly what measures you would consider and suggest it expedient and possible to take in connection with the products concerned. In view of the fact that the appended list, compiled from the data available here is incomplete,

I request you to supplement available information wherever necessary. With regard to the materials which definitely come into question for stock-piling, I repeat that the quantity of urea to be stored is to be estimated at 10,000 tons and of ethylene glycol probably 1,000 tons.

As resolved during the conference, the relatively large share taken by the Ludwigshafen/Oppau works as late as 1933 in the production of

dinitro diphenyl amine
betanaphthol
dimethylaniline
pure nickel and
brown oxide

should have been considerably reduced in the meantime by the extensions and stand-by plants. I request detailed confirmation of this.

In view of the urgency of the situation I should be grateful for immediate action.

By order
(signed): Dr. Lenz

Berlin

(page 3 of original)

(Stamp): Secret!

Berlin, 5 July 1939

To
the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht
for the attention of Colonel Becht
-or deputy -

Berlin W 62
Kurfuerststrasse 125

(Illegible initials)
(Date 10 July)

(Wehrmacht staff Pw-III
7 July 1939
Number 2968739 G

Subject: I.G. Farben Works Ludwigshafen and Oppau

Urgent!

I enclose for your kind attention a copy of my letter
to I.G. Farbenindustrie dated 5 July.

(page 3 of original cont'd)

By order
(signed): Dr. Lenz.

Stamp:
Reich Ministry of Economics

Certified
Signature: Fell
Clerk

(page 4 of original)

To II Chem. 3637/39 R. (Stamp): Secret Berlin 5 July 1939

List of the products which are wholly or principally produced
in the I.G. works Ludwigshafen and Oppau.

Initial a

Urea
Kaurit glue
Sodium hydrosulphite
Sodium sulphite
Zinc chloride
Carbonyl iron
Carbonyl nickel (without Frose)
Ammonium chloride
Ammonium carbonate
(Hartshorn salt)
Vanadic contacts
Brown oxide for ammonia oxidation
Ethylene glycol
Butyl alcohol
Cyclohexanol
Cyclohexanone
Palatinole (A.H.C.)
Maleic acid
Betanaphthol
Phenyl betanaphthylamine
Nekalo (crulsifier 1000)
Dinitro diphenylamine
Acrylic acid ester
Dimethylaniline
Igelit LP
Oppanol
Polystyrene
Ramsite (for the water-proofing of fabrics)
o.- and p.-toluene sulfenide

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7121
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

15 July 1947

I, BERYL C. BESNICK, No. D 427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7121.

BERYL C. BESNICK, No. D 427459.

-4-
"END"

74

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W

(Stamp)
WStb. Po III
10 July 1939
Ref.No. 65
No. 3029/39 secret Encl.

(Stamp):

Secret!

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

Reich Ministry for Economic Affairs
for the attention of Ministerialdirigent Dr. Hulert
Berlin W 8
Behrenstr. 43

Dr.G/S

7 July 1939

Transfer of stores of products essential to military economy
from Ludwigshafen and Oppau.

In pencil;
a ?
inform.
about
individual
products
initial;
R?

With reference to the conference at the Reich Ministry for Economic Affairs on 22 June of this year, and further to our letter of the 5th of this month, we send you additional information with regard to the transfer of products essential to military economy from Ludwigshafen.

Unfortunately we have been unable up to date to make more detailed estimates of prospective mobilization requirements with respect to individual products. We have therefore restricted ourselves to taking as a basis for our stockpiling considerations the mobilization production plans, which we submitted some time ago to the Plenipotentiary for Chemistry, Dr. Ungewitter. We ask you therefore to regard the following points as our first suggestions. As for the rest, we consider it most expedient, to store the products concerned, as far as possible, since such a procedure will cost least and is the quickest way of achieving the object. The establishment of new plant by transfer of installations set up elsewhere or by construction of new factories is only recommended by us in those cases in which stockpiling cannot be effected quickly enough or where it cannot be effected at all. In general it would in any case seem irresponsible to build new factories at the moment owing to the existing shortage of materials and skilled labor.

(page 2 of original)

If a stockpiling policy is adopted, we intend to store the reserves at Gerthe, where sufficient storage space is available. But even stockpiling can only be carried out, if the necessary packing materials (Jute bags, wooden or iron casks) or the raw materials for them are allocated to us. In some cases the production for reserve stocks will only be possible, if additional labor will be made available to us to cope with the additional work involved. How much importance we must ascribe to this point, can be seen from the fact, that today we are short of 700 workers already without taking into consideration production for reserve stocks in our Ludwigshafen and Oxyu plants which might become necessary.

Our attitude to various projects under discussion is as follows:

(in pencil): 1a) Polystyrene

Conference

on 16 July

1939 with

Lenz, Kraft,

Gorr,

Hu and Zw.

The only producer is Ludwigshafen. A further place of production for monomeric styrene is Schkopau with 700 tons per month. Beyond that the extension of production capacity to 1500 tons per month of monomeric styrene is being carried out. Furthermore, from the middle of 1940 onward, Huels will have attained an equal production capacity of monomeric styrene. We shall report to you shortly about the possibility of setting up a polystyrene plant at Schkopau or Huels. It can be assumed that the necessary quantity of monomeric styrene can be made available from the large productions at Schkopau and Huels.

to
follow

In the near future stockpiling of styrene only can be considered, which will, however, not be possible before January 1940, with approx. 150 tons per month.

(page 3 of original)

For this 1200 wooden casks with tin-lining per month are required.

Furthermore, 18 workers should be made available to us in order to increase the production accordingly.

1b) Polystyrene EF.

Ludwigshafen is the sole producer of this product also, but even now it can be produced at Schkopau in small quantities at any time for the production of

2) Igelit LP.

(in pencil):

stockpiling

150 t incl.

packing

material

At present the only place of production is Ludwigshafen. The setting-up of a new plant would involve extremely large expenses and would require a construction period of many years. We have therefore refrained from estimating the costs for the materials required, all the more, since stockpiling of approx. 100 tons per month will be possible from October of this year onward.

(page 3 of original, cont'd)

For this 3000 lined jute bags per month would be required. Furthermore four workers would have to be assigned to us.

3) Synthetic Resin AE 2.

For most purposes this product can be replaced by the allydals produced in our Uerdingen plant, so that we do not consider it absolutely necessary to secure supplies of this product for the event of mobilization. Besides, a possibility for stockpiling is not possible at present, owing to the lack of appropriate facilities.

4) Ramasit.

A second plant for the production of ramasit apart from Ludwigshafen is not available.

(page 4 of original)

(in pencil): Because of the short life of the product storing of ramasit is out of the question. The setting up of a mobilization plant in Schkopau is being worked on by us. We shall report to you on the project shortly.

(in pencil): 5.) Nekale.

Reich Ministry of Economics Schkopau according to illegible

Meant is mainly the brand EKS which is required for the production of the fire-extinguishing agent " Tutogen ". As Schkopau is in a position to produce at any time the necessary quantities of nekale EKS in already existing plants, all measures to secure production should be unnecessary.

6.) Palatinols.

Although Ludwigshafen is at present the sole producer, the possibility exists, if necessary, to substitute other softening agents for palatinols, such as tricresyl phosphate. Furthermore, stockpiling of this product up to 50 tons per month is feasible, for which 100 iron drums per month would be required.

7.) Tanigans.

As the products from Ludwigshafen represent only so-called additional tannins, which are used first of all as admixtures to natural tannins to obtain first rate leather, we do not consider it absolutely necessary to take special measures to secure production. In any case stockpiling of 70 tons per month is possible. For this 675 and 400 beech casks per month are required. We also need 12 workers.

(page 5 of original)

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W

7.7.1939

8.) Phthalic Acid Anhydride.

At the present time there is already considerable production capacity in Schkopau (about 225 tons per month). Beyond this an expansion of the plant in Schkopau to produce further 150 tons per month has been planned. Stockpiling of the above product is not possible at the present time.

(Pencil:) (just like the ethyl chlorine plant!)

9.) Glycol.

Stockpiling of this product cannot be carried out at the present time. On the other hand, it does seem possible to produce an additional 100 tons per month of glycol, in addition to the amounts of diglycol envisaged, in the stand-by plants Wolfen (in operation), Schkopau (ready for operation at the beginning of 1940) and Huels (ready for operation by the middle of 1940.) The additional amounts of ethylene oxide required for this are available from Zweckol and Holten.

10.) Butanol.

In addition to Hoechst and Wacker, butanol is also being produced by Schkopau and, beginning with the middle of 1940, by Huels. We consider the position to be so secure that no particular measures are required, particularly since the total production capacity of the plants mentioned is several times as large as that of Ludwigshafen.

11. Anole

12. Anone (cyclohexanone)

Ludwigshafen is not the sole producer. Anole is also being produced by the Dohde, and by Aussig. Aussig also produces anone. In addition it is at present possible already to produce about 200 tons of anole per month in Louna.

(page 6 of original)

Particular measures for guaranteeing production therefore do not seem necessary to us.

(page 6 of original, cont'd)

13.) Dinitrodiphenylamine.

The situation here no longer seems critical, since the stand-by plant which is planned in Wolfen will be ready for operation this fall yet, with a monthly capacity of 125 tons. A further stand-by plant will be available beginning in the spring of next year in Doberitz. Capacity also 125 tons per month. If so desired, stockpiling of about 30 tons per month would be possible today already. For this 300 lined jute bags per month would be required. In addition 10 workers would have to be assigned to us.

14. Dimethyl Aniline.

As far as we know, dimethyl aniline is no longer required for the production of explosives. Besides, Uerdingen can produce about 45 tons of this product per month. Stockpiling with about 40 tons per month is also possible, for which 80 iron drums per month would be required and 3 workers would have to be assigned.

15. Orthotoluenculfonide.

In addition to Ludwigshafen, there are also production plants at Heyden and Fahlberg-List. If this should soon necessary, about 25 tons per month could be stored. For this 250 lined jute bags per month would be required. In addition 16 workers would have to be assigned to us.

16. Phenylbetanaphthylamine.

At the present time a further plant for the production of the

(page 7 of original)

above product is planned in Muels. We have already stored 600 tons of phenylbetanaphthylamine. Further stockpiling is projected. Concerning the amount of this we shall communicate with you further.

17. Betanaphthol.

Betanaphthol is being produced at Hoechst, as well as at Ludwigshafen. Both have about equally large production capacity. In our judgment, Hoechst is in a position to cover the total mobilization requirements of the above product.

18.) Maleic Acid.

Ludwigshafen is the sole producer. Stockpiling can be carried out comparatively rapidly. 30 tons can be stored per month, for which 200 wooden casks per month would be required. Further measures for guaranteeing production do not seem necessary at the present time.

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

19. Hydrosulphite.

(Pencil):
Hruschau out
of question
since too
close to
border

Ludwigshafen is the principal producer. In addition Englert and Doeker, Prague, have a capacity of about 25 tons per month and in Hruschau (Protectorate) of about 200 tons per month. In addition, in our opinion, Brueggemann, Heilbronn, could change over to hydrosulphite. The costs of erecting a plant, including starting material, at another location, will be estimated by us and communicated to you shortly.

As of 1.1.1940, moreover, stockpiling of about 300 tons per month is possible, for which 4000 corrugated iron drums per month would be required. In addition about 20 workers would have to be assigned to us.

(page 8 of original)

Incidentally, at present we have at our disposal 1500 tons of the product.

20. Sodium Sulphite.

(Pencil):
1.No expansion
of
Hoechst
2. Stock
piling of
1000 tons
3. illogible

In addition to one at Ludwigshafen, there is a production center at Heyden (about 90 tons per month), at Suhr (presumably 60 tons per month), in Aussig (about 40 tons per month) and Fiesing (about 20 tons per month). In case of need there is the possibility of producing at our plants at Hoechst, Leverkusen and Welfen anhydrous sulphite from material containing water (150 - 200 tons per month). Moreover, beginning immediately stockpiling at the rate of 300 tons per month is possible, for which 1500 corrugated iron drums per month and the assignment of 6 workers would be required.

21.) Zinc chloride.

In addition to Ludwigshafen there are the following producers:
Goldschmidt (presumably 500 tons per month) (pencil :)
Kerning
Hof tasks
Harquardt (presumably 40 tons per month)
Aussig (about 300 tons per month in the form of lye.)

In case of need zinc chloride could also be produced in Leverkusen, Hoechst and Welfen (together about 220 tons per month).

(Pencil:)
Stores
1800 tons

We propose stockpiling at the rate of 100 tons per month up to a total stockpile of 3000 tons. For this about 500 drums per month would be required, and 10 workers would have to be assigned to us.

22.) Carbon Black.

Since carbon black is being produced at various places outside of Ludwigshafen with presumably more than 2000 tons, we believe

(page 9 of original)

(Pencil;)
nil

that particular guarantees of production are not required. Stockpiling would also be impossible at the moment, due to lack of facilities.

23.) Vanadium Contact.

(Pencil;)
Hruschau drops
out. Find out
how much.....
Dependent there-
on no stock-
piling only....

In addition to Ludwigshafen, vanadium contact is also being produced in Aussig and Hruschau (together about 16 cubic meters per month). 90 cubic meters are already stockpiled at other I.G. plants. We propose further stockpiling at the rate of about 30 cubic meters per month to a total of 240 cubic meters. For this 150 corrugated iron drums would be required. Moreover, the assignment of two workers would be necessary.

Concerning further products, for which there is, in addition to Ludwigshafen, no additional I.G. production point, we shall make a report to you later on.

As already mentioned, we request that you consider the above statements as being an initial statement of opinion on our part.

(Pencil;)
I.G. to make
offers accordingly
including price
and packing
materials, showing
requirements
of iron

We repeat our proposal that we be informed in sufficient time with regard to which of the above products you feel that it is necessary to take special measures to guarantee production, on the basis of our statements, in order that we may then, preferably in personal interviews, discuss the details of procedure, particularly the regulation of the matter of costs and the questions of obtaining containers and workers.

Znr 18/7

Heil Hitler!

Vermittlungsstelle W
signed Gorr

- Ø Oberregierungsrat Dr. Hureck, W Staff,
- Ø Dr. Ungegger, Control Office Chemistry (U.St.Chemie)
- Ø Oberreg. Rat Dr. Lenz, Reich Ministry of Economics.

(Translator's note : the original has numerous marginal notes in handwriting, most of them illegible.)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

24 July 1947

I, Leonard LAWRENCE, No. 20 138, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7124.

Leonard LAWRENCE
No. 20 138

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NJ-7127
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

THE REICH MINISTER FOR ECONOMY

Berlin 7 8, 18 July 1940
Ehrenstrasse 43
Telephone: Collective No.
164351

II Chem. 24724/40

It is requested that in further
correspondence this file reference
and the subject be quoted

To
the High Command of the Army
Attention: Oberst (Colonel) Becht or his representative in the
office,

Berlin 7 35
September 75/76

Dispatcher Stamp:

(Handwritten note:)

III

Specials Armament Office/No. 1
19 July 1940

27/7

File Reference

No. / apl

Subject: Re-storage of militarily important products
from Ludwigshafen/Opau.

During the conference of 15 March at the Wehr a program for
the re-storage of militarily important products from Ludwigshafen/
Opau was laid down. The Wehr has submitted to me the draft copy
of a contract with the U.S. concerning the execution of this re-
storage program. Due to the changed military situation in the West
it is necessary to examine how far the program as laid down at pre-
sent is to be carried out. I invite you to a conference concerning
this subject on

(Hand-
written
note:)

Thursday, 25 July 1940, 10:00 hrs

Ehrenstr. 43, Room 1; 5th floor.

By order:

(signed) Dr. Ianz

Certified
signature: Koch
Chancery employee

Initials illegible.

Rubber stamp: Reich Ministry for Economy

(Handwritten note:)

To be postponed until 26th,
since on 25th, 1000 hrs
there is already a big conference.

(Translators note:

This remark is deleted on the photostatic copy).

Illegible initials 22 July

NR 20 2666

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7129
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

In connection with the storing of supplies from the Ludwigshafen and Oppau plants the following products were suggested by I.G. on 21 June 1939:

	Urea	3,000 tons	at present immediately available	
	Kaurit glue powder	600-800 tons	monthly available	100 tons
	Plastopal	40-60 tons	" "	20 tons
			immediately "	10 tons
	(Hand-written notes) Iron powder		only from 7 Nov. 1939 on	
C	-0- Chloride	250 tons	immediately available	60 tons
			monthly available	80 tons
	-0- Aluminum chloride	500 tons	immediately available	250 tons
	No stock-piling		monthly available	120 tons
	-0- Vanadic contact	200 cubic meters	immediately available	60) cub.
			monthly available	60) mtr.
	-0- Arsenic acid	150 tons	monthly available	65 tons
	Will not be taken out, must be kept	Sodium sulphite 400 tons (?)	monthly available	300 tons
		Benzoic acid sublimated 50 tons	immediately available	40 tons
			monthly available	10 tons
	-0- Dimethylaniline	150 tons (?)	immediately available	120 tons
			monthly available	40 tons
	-0- Dinitrophenylamine	200 tons (?)	immediately available	150 tons
			monthly available	25 tons
	-0- Palatinol C	100 tons	immediately available	30 tons
			monthly available	25 tons

(Handwritten notes:)

in NO₂ No storage

NH₄ Cl (?)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7129
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original)

Re III e

Berlin, 24 April 1939

To

III a

Subject: Chemische Werke, Lorraine.

In the depots Gerthe and Herne of the Chemische Werke Lorraine on 15 September 1938 the following products were stored:

1. Urea (technical)	1,200 tons	(Handwritten note: For synthetic materials)
2. Sodium nitrite	305 tons	
3. Urea for feeding purposes	600 tons	Handwritten: Check mark
4. Brown oxide (catalyst for water gas)	350 tons	
5. Aluminum chloride	200 tons	
6. Ferric carbonate	200 tons	
7. Nickel matting (?) (Nickelmatte)	3,000 tons	
8. Kaurit glue powder	200 tons	

(Handwritten note:
Az 24 April

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

31 July 1947

I, Victoria ORTON, No. 20219, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7129.

Victoria ORTON
No. 20219

3 -
END"

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8843
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

RUDOLF E. WESTPFAHL
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
OF THE
I. G. FARBENINDUSTRIE A.G.
BERLIN

BERLIN SO 36, 14 January 1935
LOHMUEHLENSTRASSE 65 - 67
Ad.

Strictly confidential!

Major BECHT
Army Ordnance Office

Berlin-Charlottenburg
Jobenstr. 1

Subject: Storage of iron pyrites.

Dear Major:

In connection with my communication of the 27th of last month I report that we now have in storage:

in Doeberitz	5,012,930 kg	Orkla fine pyrites
in Kruezmel	19,895,773 kg	Rio Tinto coarse pyrites.

This concludes the storage operation.

With German greetings
(signed) WESTPFAHL

RUDOLF B. WESTFAHL
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
OF THE
I.G.FARBENINDUSTRIE A.G.,
BERLIN

BERLIN SO 36, 27 December 1934
LOHMUEHLENSTRASSE 65 - 67
We/Ld.

Strictly confidential!

Major BECHT
Army Ordnance Office,
Berlin-Charlottenburg 2
Jebonstr. 1

Subject: Storage of iron pyrites.

Dear Major:

I report as follows concerning the present situation
with regard to the storage of iron pyrites:

Stored in Doeberitz:	5,012,930 kg Orkla fine pyrites
Stored in Kruemmel:	14,625,137 kg Rio Tinto coarse pyrites

For Kruemmel there will then be received in Hamburg shortly

5,312,170 kg Rio Tinto
coarse pyrites.

with German greetings
(signed) WESTFAHL

(in handwriting) according to this first quota
filled 25,000 tons

M.W. 4.1.35

RUDOLF E. WESTFFAHL
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
OF THE
I.G. FARBEINDUSTRIE A.G.,
BERLIN

BERLIN SO 36, 30 November 1934
LOHMUEHLENSTRASSE 65 - 67
Ad.

Strictly confidential!

Major BECHT
Army Ordnance Office,
Berlin-Charlottenburg 2
Jebenstr. 1

Subject: Storage of iron pyrites.

Dear Major:

I report as follows concerning the present situation
with regard to the storage of iron pyrites:

Stored in Leoboritz: 5,012,930 kg Orkla fino
pyrites

Stored in Kruckmel: 9,309,851 kg Rio Tinto coarse
pyrites

For Kruckmel there will then be received in Hamburg

about 3.12. 5,300,000 kg) Rio Tinto
about 18.12. 5,200,000 kg) coarse pyrites

With German greetings
(signed) WESTFFAHL

Major Dipl.-Wirtsch. BECHT,

23 October 1934.

Registered mail

Strictly confidential!

Director Rudolf E. WESTPFAHL

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.-G.

BERLIN S.O.36

Lohmühlenstr. 65/67

Dear Director:

Thank you very much for your communication of 16.10. concerning the situation with regard to the storage of iron pyrites. Since a decision will have to be made shortly as to whether an additional 25,000 tons are to be stored or not, I respectfully request information as to how far the preliminary work for the partial conversion of Wolfen to calcium sulphate has progressed.

With German greetings

b

RUDOLF E. WESTPFAHL
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
OF THE
I.G. FARBEINDUSTRIE A.G.,
BERLIN

BERLIN SO 36, 16 October 1934
LOHMUEHLENSTRASSE 65 - 67
Wo/Ld.

Strictly confidential!

Army Ordnance Office
Attention Major BECHT,

Berlin-Charlottenburg 2

Jebenstr. 1

Subject: Storage of iron pyrites.

Dear Major:

I report as follows concerning the present situation
with regard to the storage of iron pyrites:

Stored in Doberitz	5,012,930 kg	Orkla fine pyrites
stored in Kruemmel	2,052,852 kg	Rio Tinto coarse pyrites

Arrived in Hamburg for
Kruemmel and in process
of transfer

3,400,000 kg Rio Tinto coarse
pyrites

Leaving Spain the end of

October for Kruemmel 2,500,000 kg Rio Tinto coarse
pyrites.

Following this up, one steamer will leave for KRUEMEL
with 6,000 tons Rio Tinto coarse pyrites in each of the
months of November and December.

With German greetings
(signed) WESTPFAHL

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8845
CONTINUED

Reich Minister of Economics
and Prussian Minister
for Industry and Labor

Berlin W 8, 22 January 1935
Behrenstrasse 43
Tel.: Sammel-Nr. A 6 Markur 4351

AK 124/35 secret

It is requested that this
reference and the subject
be indicated in further
correspondence.

SECRET.

1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only to person named in address.
3. To be transmitted only by confidential agent or courier.
4. Reproduction of every kind and preparation of extracts is forbidden.
5. The recipient is responsible for safekeeping.

Reich Minister of War,
attention Major WAILMONT or representative,
- Military Economy and Armaments -

Berlin-Charlottenburg.

Subject: Storage of iron pyrites.

The I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Berlin, advises me under date of 14 January 1935 that there have now been stored

in Doberitz ... 5,012,930 kg Orkla fine pyrites,

in Kruemmel 19,895,773 kg Rio Tinto coarse pyrites.

I.G. Farben states further that this storage was made in addition to the usual stockpiling of iron pyrites.

As per direction

(signed) Dr. BARTH

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8843
CONTINUED

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Vermittlungsstelle W
BERLIN NW 7
Unter den Linden 78
A 2 Flora 0021

BERLIN NW 7 14 October 1935
UNTER DEN LINDEN 78

Dipl. Ing. WISSMANN
Military Economy Office
Berlin S.
Benderstr. 27.

Subject: Supplies of iron pyrites.

In accordance with your request we give you below
the supplies of iron pyrites which were on hand in the
individual I.G. plants on 1 October of this year:

Ludwigshafen	37,184 tons	
Leverkusen	61,810 tons	
Dornagen	6,444 tons	
Uerdingen	8,607 tons	
Hochst	28,656 tons	
✓ Wölfen	5,913 tons	
✓ " in addition	500 tons	lignite pyrites
✓ Gosberitz	11,378 tons	
(in handwriting)	160,492	

Heil HITLER!

Vermittlungsstelle W

General

(signed) RITTER

TRANSMISSION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT No. MI-8843
CONTINUED

Copy

Berlin W 35, 21 December 1937

Tirpitzufer 72 - 76
Telephone: 218191

(Rubber stamp)

SECRET.

1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Director Dr. WURSTER,

LUDWIGSHAFEN (Rhein)

via

Vermittlungsstelle W,

BERLIN W 8,

Unter den Linden 78.

Reference to: Communication Anorg. Div. of 29.11.1937 W/S.

Subject: Storage of iron pyrites.

The order of the Control Office Chemistry (Ueberwachungsstelle Chemie), according to which the supplies of iron pyrites in Ludwigshafen are to be diminished, originated here. Since Ludwigshafen is located in an endangered border region, it is not feasible for reasons of military economy that iron pyrites should be stored there in quantities which exceed the normal storage quantities. The order of the Control Office Chemistry did not aim at and

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT No. NI-8843
CONTINUED

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

arrange a removal of the pyrites in Ludwigshafen, but only a gradual reduction of the storage to the amount which was necessary there before the beginning of the increased storage for the maintenance of operations. But above all a further increase of the quantities in storage is to be prevented.

It is the opinion of this office that the attempt at storage which you have begun could just as well be undertaken at another I.G. plant. But the Reich War Ministry has no misgivings with regard to carrying out the experiments in question.

(page 2 of original)

in amounts above the normal storage not exceeding 10,000 tons in Ludwigshafen.

As per direction

(signed) KU.....?

Regierungsrat und Gruppenleiter

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

23 July 1947

I, Herbert RCDECK, Civ., D-297 499, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Excerpts of Document No. NI-8843.

Herbert RCDECK
Civ., D-297 499

-9-
"END"

(Handwritten note:)
For Dr. Dr. Jacobi, Mainkur

(Rubber stamp:)
Hoechst Management Dept.
15 Feb. 39-8-9

No. 117

Minutes

of the "Monday Meeting", 13 February 1939, in the
Office of the Technical Committee, Frankfurt

Persons present: Struss, Hirschel, Hagge, Gorr, Dobmaier, von Nagel,
Eisfeld, Krolkowski, Lochr, Giesler, Koenig, Schnell.

v. Nagel

made a survey of the development and the present output of inorganic products by I.G. Numerous graphs were used to demonstrate the importance of inorganic products, as shown by their production figures and total expenditure involved. The production figures for inorganic products of Main Group 2 (Hauptgruppe 2), including metals and inorganic products produced at Knapsack, amounted to 200 Million Reichsmark, this representing approximately 50% of the entire Main Group. Similar figures applied to total expenditure. In Sparte one the figures for nitrogen were also similar.

As regards the disposal of inorganic products it was ascertained that 2/3 of the output was sold, and 1/3 used for the firm's own requirements.

In addition, it was shown how the expenses of the inorganic products sector in Main Group 2 had been distributed amongst the individual works combines and plants, as well as amongst the chief production items which are chlorine, and alkalis, metals, sulphur products, chromium products, mineral colors and various other items.

A survey of the manufacture of sulphur products led to the conclusion that I.G. had not increased its production of SO₂ (Sulphur trioxide) on the same scale as have the other manufacturers in Germany and in the rest of the world, showing that the investments by I.G. on this development were kept as low as possible. Another interesting comparison could be drawn from the production figures for sulphur and nitrogen: Only in Germany, and particularly at I.G. did the production of nitrogen exceed the production of SO₂ (included in the figures for sulphur).

Finally, sales turnover and expenses were compared with expenditure for new construction and research.

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

Eisfeld

reported on the first meeting of the Plastics and Rubber Committee on 4 January 1939. Figures were quoted on investments in the field of plastics and on the amount of

(page 2 of original)

money spent on research. Details were published of further extension and production plans on which work had already been started.

Furthermore, Eisfeld furnished information from the last meeting of the Plastics Scientific Committee on the remarkable progress made in scientific work on plastics: Progress was achieved mainly with composite polymerisation products rich in vinyl-ether, furthermore with water resistant vinyl-acetate compositions, with softening methods by means of co-polymerisation of suitable components, and in the development of new condensation products from acetaldehyde plus formaldehyde in the presence of ammonium sulfate.

Struss

then reported on the scientific rubber conference on 31 January 1939. Advances were made mainly in the fields of manufacturing and application technic, particularly in regard to continuous methods of working in the production of polymers, and in breaking-down processes, furthermore in the manufacture of numbered Buna. Noteworthy are also the recent research results concerning deterioration of Buna when subjected to long storage, as well as the favorable test results of 100% Buna tires.

Krolikowski

(Handwritten note:)
Dealt with initialled: Be.

brought up the problem of storage of M dye-stuffs (dye-stuffs contracted for under the Mobilization Project?). As a result of the discussion it was decided that the storage was to take place in accordance with the rules laid down by Vermittlungsstelle W whenever supply of M dye-stuffs had been asked for; other ways and means however were to be sought in those instances, in which M requirements rose far above our present turnover, thus possibly causing storage difficulties. Beyond that, storage is to take place in accordance with turnover.

Koenig

reported on new dye-stuffs and FH products (auxiliary dyes) in 1938. Additional products:

72 new items, of which 55 are dye-stuffs and 17 FH products,

352 new mixtures and derivatives, of which 39 are FH products.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6728
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original)

On the other hand, 628 items were cancelled.

The entire assortment today consists of:

7711 general trade items,

2674 type number items (Typnummern-Marken),

2104 cancelled items, stocks of which are held;
therefore a total of

12489 trade items as against 12740 in 1937. These are composed of approximately 2650 types of products, subdivided into 2400 dye-stuff products and 250 FH products. All further details, can be obtained from the original compilations kept by the Office of the Technical Committee.

In conclusion, Struss announced that the January turnover had been excellent.

The date of the next Monday Meeting will be announced.

Signature: SCHNELL

Office of the Technical Committee A
? Feb. 39 Dr. Schn./Z.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

7 July 1947

I, Arthur MACNAMARA, No. 20191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-6728.

Arthur MACNAMARA
No. 20191.

- 3 -
"END"

96

Chamber of Industry and Commerce
for the Rhine-Main Sector
Place : Frankfurt/Main

Frankfurt/Main
Post Office Box No. 219

Secret 1

Registered

Postcheck Account:
Frankfurt/Main No. 12629

Telephone : 20361

Chamber of Industry and Commerce Frankfurt/Main, Stock Exchange

I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.
Hoechst Plant
for the attention of Dr. Otto Hirschel,

Frankfurt/Main - Hoechst
Bruneningsstr. 60

Replies to be sent to :
Chamber of Industry and
Commerce
for the Rhine-Main Sector
for the attention of
Dr. H. Savolkoala or deputy
Frankfurt/Main
Stock Exchange

Your reference Your letter of Our reference 1 February 1939
III/H3/258/39 secret/1/C

Circular Letter 4/39 secret V.P.

Subject : Coal Reserves.

This letter is in reference to our inquiry of the 10th of last month regarding coal reserves, which you answered by filling in the questionnaires sent to you. We conclude from your statement that your plant does not hold the necessary stock which it should have, i.e. a quantity which would cover the average coal consumption of 3 months. The events of the last few months have, however, shown how important an appropriate coal reserve is for a large plant. Blocking of the waterways and overburdening of the Reichsbahn may prevent the supply for a number of weeks at any time. For this period the continuation of production must be guaranteed by the coal reserve.

Since the Reichsbahn has assured us that the situation as regards availability of freightcars for coal transports is improving steadily and also that the waterways are open again, we request you speedily to increase the coal reserves of your plant so as to cover three months consumption. Should you have difficulties as regards storage space we are prepared to carry out a technical inspection of the plant. Should you find that the coal stockpiling is a heavy financial burden to you, the following possibilities exist for financing the one additional stockpiling:

(page 1 of original, cont'd)

1. Postponement of payment for freight on the part of the Reichsbahn is in principle being granted only to those firms which are unable to pay for freight without assistance.

(page 2 of original)

The basis for this is a certificate by the military-economy department for each individual firm about the quantity of coal to be additionally stored.

2. The Rheinisch-Westfälische Kohlensyndikat and subsequently the other coal syndicates have declared their willingness to accept from all coal and coke consumers who have been advised by the military-economy departments to buy an additional coal reserve, payment in discountable bills for the one additional quantity to be stored. The syndicates will pay the discount charges and tax on the bills of exchange for 9 months of their validity.

Instead of the payment by bills of exchange, a price reduction in cash can be made in individual cases, which would equal the discount charges and the tax on the bills. The basis for this favorable financial condition is also a certificate by the military-economy department to the plants concerned, regarding the quantities of coal to be stored additionally.

If you want to make use of these possibilities an appropriate application has to be made, through us, to the military-economy department of the Oberpräsident, attention of Oberregierungsrat Kropf or deputy, Kassel, which has to contain :

- a) Amount of your annual coal consumption
- b) The quantity to be ordered for stockpiling
- c) Types of coal
- d) Coal suppliers.

We request you to let us know by 15 February 1939 whether and in which form you will carry out the three months coal stockpiling.

By order

(signature) W. Linnenkohl

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

29 July 1947

I, Brigitte TURK, ETO 35130, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7211.

Brigitte TURK
ETO 35130

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI - 7210
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

I.G. HOECHST

Management Department T

SECRET!

Certificate of Receipt

1 letter in original

from Vermittlungsstelle W Berlin

to: Dir. Dr. KRAENZLEIN, Hoechst, for Offenbach Works

dated 22 June 1939

Reference: Dr. K/B1.

re Supply of food to our Works in A-Fall

received on: 26 June 1939

To Dipl. Ing. KOCH

Signature: KOCH

To be returned immediately!

I.G. HOECHST

Management Department T

SECRET!

Certificate of Receipt

1 letter in original

from Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin

to Dir. Dr. KRAENZLEIN, Hoechst, for Mainkur Works

dated 22 June 1939

Reference: Dr. K/B1.

re Supply of Food to our Works in A-Fall

received on: 26 June 1939

To Dr. KRAUSS

Signature: HESCHER

To be returned immediately!

(page 3 of original)

I.G. FARBEINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
Vermittlungsstelle W

sheet 3

Berlin, 22 June 1939

The supplementary food requirement arising in places closer to the Works whose members of the staff removed from further outlying districts have been quartered, must likewise be notified. The "Industrial Economy" Group of the Military-Economic Department of the Oberprasidenten (Gruppe "Gewerbliche Wirtschaft" der Wehrwirtschaftlichen Abteilung beim Ober-Prasidenten) will pass on the requirements to the "Food and Agriculture" Group (Gruppe "Ernahrung und Landwirtschaft").

We inform you now of these details we have received from the Reich Ministry of Food, as a precaution, in order that you may already get into touch with the abovesaid two Groups of your competent Military-Economic Department concerning the ensuring of Foodstuffs. We will send you particulars of the regulations with regard to the carrying out of these instructions as soon as we receive them.

VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W.
Signature: KAYSER

(HS.): In the course of our enquiries for the Mob Year 1939/40. We will also make these preliminary arrangements in collaboration with Mr. POEHL.

(Initialed) Bc

REGISTERED!

(page 4 of original)

I.G. HOECHST

Management Direction T

SECRET!

Certificate of Receipt

1 letter in original

from Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin

to Dir. Dr. KHAENZLEIN for Griesheim Works

dated 22 June 39

Reference Dr. K/B1.

Re: Supply of Food to our Works in A-Fall.

To Dir. Dr. KHAENZLEIN

Signature: KHAENZLEIN

To be returned immediately!

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI - 7210
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

8 August 1947

I, Anne MARTIN, Civ.No. G E 00 848, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI - 7210.

Anne MARTIN,
Civ.No. GE 00848.

(Rubber stamp:) Received
10 July 1939

I.G. FARBEINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

Vermittlungsstelle W

Secret!

1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

Berlin NW 7, 7 July 1939
Unter den Linden 82

DISTRIBUTION

regarding Circular of 7 July 1939 (Dr. K/31), concerning Supply of food to our Works in A-Fall.

Dr. Vorlaender, Bitterfeld,	for Bitterfeld Works for Wolfen-Parben Works for Teutschenthal Works
Dir. Prof. Dr. Hoerlein, Elberfeld, Dir. Dr. Kraenzlein, Hoechst	for Elberfeld Works for Hoechst Works for Griesheim Works for Mankur Works for Offenbach/M. Works
Dr. Warnecke, Leverkusen, Dir. Dr. Heberland, Uerdingen, Dr. Weber, Gersthofen, Dr. Schneider, Doeberitz, v. Dehn-Rotfeller, Mersoburg, Dir. Dr. Henner, Ludwigshafen, Dr. Steinig, Ludwigshafen, Dir. Dr. Hueller-Cunradi, Oppau, Dr. Liebich, Rheinfelden, Dr. Meyer, Woff, Dr. Wulff, Schkopau, Dr. Hagels, A.G. f. Stickstoffduenger, Koeln,	for Leverkusen Works for Uerdingen Works for Gersthofen Works for Doeberitz-West Works for Mersoburg Works for Ludwigshafen Works for Zweckel Works for Oppau Works for Rheinfelden Works for Sparte III Works for Schkopau Works
Dir. Dr. H. Wolf, Duisburger Kupferhuetten, Duisburg,	for Knappeck Works for Duisb. Kupferhuetten Works
Dr. Duellberg, Hoechst, Dr. Kraegeloh, Gapel, Dr. Bauer, Aken, Dr. Schmid, Stassfurt, Dr. Weissbach, Ebsen, Dr. Dennitz, Harburg, Abt. Behring-Works	for Langelsheim Works for Gapel Works for Aken Works for Stassfurt Works for Ebsen Works for Harburg Works
Dr. Friedbert Ritter, Piesteritz, Dr. Ohall, Erse, Dir. Dr. Struss, Tez-officc, Ffm. Dir. v. Heider, Ffm. Dir. Dr. Goldberg, Oppau,	for Piesteritz Works for Erse Works for information for information for information

(page 2 of original)

I.G. FARBEINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

Vermittlungsstelle W

Dr. K/Pl.

Berlin NW 7, 7 July 1939
Unter den Linden 82

SECRET!

1. This is a secret matter within the meaning of Article 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover; if sent by post, to be registered.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the addressee, under lock and key.

CIRCULAR :

Re: Supply of food to our Works in A-Fall -
Our Circular of 22 June 1939

With reference to our circular concerning the supply of food in the A-Fall, we would inform you that the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (Min.-Pres Dr. DREYER) has requested to be informed of the number of workers who, in the X-Fall,

- | | |
|---|---|
| | its marginal notes: |
| 1) will be additionally fed by the Works for the whole day | 500 |
| 2) will receive additionally only <u>one</u> warm meal | 2 000 |
| 3) will be evacuated from an outlying district of the Works and lodged in a place nearer to the Works giving the name of the new place of lodgment), | Gorman-wheat porridge (Gruenkern) 500 |
| 4) in shadow factories coming into work; it should be stated whether the individuals will be fed by the Works in canteens or whether they will be lodged in private quarters, i.e. will provide for themselves. | a) Works hostel for single people (500)
b) Domestic Science School
c) Mess Halls & Schools. |

In all cases, the place and date of assignment (1., 2., 3. Job-date) must be stated.

The Ministry of Food (Reichsernährungsministerium) requires this information in order to give the necessary directions to its subsidiary offices, so that by depositing of the corresponding identification cards in the different places, either the obtaining of the necessary food can be assured, or, by allotting suitable supply bases, the required quantities of provisions can be directed to the new quarters of demand.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI - 7209
CONTINUED

(page 3 of original)

I.G. HOECHST

Management Department T

SECRET!

Certificate of Receipt.

1 letter in original
from Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin
to Dir. Dr. KRAEMZLEIN, I.G. Hoechst for HAINKUR Works
dated 7 July 1939 Reference: Dr. K/Bl.
Re: Supply of food to our Works in A-Fall
received on 11 July 1939
To Dr. KRAUSS, Hainkur Signature: Dr. PAUL SCHIEK

To be returned immediately!

I.G. HOECHST

Management Department T

SECRET!

Certificate of Receipt

1 letter in original
from Vermittlungsstelle W, Berlin
to Dir. Dr. KRAEMZLEIN, Hoechst, for HAGENBACH Works
dated 7 July 1939 Reference Dr. K/Bl.
Re: Supply of food to our Works in A-Fall
Received on 11 July 1939
To Dr. HAGENBOECKER Signature: HAGENBOECKER

To be returned immediately!

(page 4 of original)

Page 2 of Circular of 7 July 1939, concerning Supply of Food
to our Works in A-Fall.

We were again reminded that, in view of the difficulties expected
to arise in transport and procurement, it was urgently desired
that a sufficient stock of provisions for 3 - 4 weeks should be held,
taking into consideration the extent of personnel in the Mob-Fall.
The Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture (Reichsministerium fuer
Ernaehrung und Landwirtschaft) promised to instruct its subsidiary
offices to give us every assistance in the stockpiling.

Please let us have the necessary information, in order that we
can pass this on to the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture.

VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W.

-Signature: KAYSER

(page 5 of original)

I.G. HOECHST

Management Department T

SECRET!

Certificate of Receipt

1 letter in original
from I.G. Berlin, Vermittlungsstelle W
to Dir. Dr. KRAENZLEIN, Hoechst, for Griesheim Works
dated 7 July 1939 Reference Dr. K/B1.
re: Supply of Food to our Works in A-Fall
received on 11 July 1939

Signature: ENGELBERTZ

To Dir. Dr. ENGELBERTZ

To be returned immediately!

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI - 7209
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

9 August 1947

I, Anne MARTIN, Civ.No. GE CC 848, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI - 7209.

Anne MARTIN,
Civ.No. GE CC 848.

AFFIDAVIT.

I, Dr. Hans Wagner, Stierstadt/Taunus, Untergasse 10, after having been warned that I shall be liable to punishment for making a false statement, herewith declare the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion:

The Wifo was founded about 1934. The cause of its founding was the fact that the I.G. considered the nitric acid production capacities available at that time sufficient to cover German peace-time requirements. Therefore, when the Luftwaffe and the OKW approached the I.G. with the request to build new plants, the I.G. was not prepared to make available their own funds for this project. Therefore public funds were made available via the Wifo, and the I.G. built the nitric acid plants for the Wifo, with moneys put at their disposal.

The purpose of the Wifo was, apart from the construction and the operation of nitric acid plants, to maintain a stock of methanol, aviation gasoline and highly concentrated hydrogen peroxide.

The I.G. was a partner in the founding of the Wifo and paid their share through the provision of a site at Doeberitz. Later on a nitric acid plant was built by the I.G. at this site.

I have carefully read each of the 2 (two) pages of this affidavit and countersigned it with my own hand, have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialled them, and I herewith declare under oath that I have stated the full truth in this affidavit to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(page 2 of original)

(signature) Dr. Hans Wagner

(Dr. Hans WAGNER)

Sworn to and signed before me this 7 June 1947 at Murenborg by Dr. Hans WAGNER, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(signature) Otto Heilbrunn

(Dr. Otto HEILBRUNN)
Civilian AGO number 30 P.O.
Office of Chief of Counsel
for War Crimes
U.S. War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

29 July 1947

I, Brigitte TURK, ETO 35130, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-8596.

Brigitte TURK
ETO 35130

J.G. - Farber

MILITARY TRIBUNAL NO. 7

CASE NO. *II*

Prosecution Document Book No. *XXXX*

41

Englisch



INDEX TO DOC. BOOK XXXXI

FARBEN PARTICIPATED IN CREATING AND EQUIPPING
THE NAZI MILITARY MACHINE FOR AGGRESSIVE WAR

Exhibit No.	Document No.	Description of Document	Page in Doc. Book
	EC-25	Partnership Agreement of WIFO dated 24 August 1934; supplement thereto dated 1 January 1939.	1
	EC-24	Letter from Reich Economic Ministry to Col. Becht, High Command of the Armed Forces, enclosing rules of procedure of the Aufsichtsrat of WIFO, dated July 1939.	5
	NI-6347	Contract between IG. and Deutsche Bau- und Bodenkreditbank A.G., transferring IG's participation of RM 4000 in WIFO to the Deutsche Bau- und Bodenkreditbank. Dated 26 November 1935.	8
	NI-7131	File-note concerning a conference and inspection at WIFO Langelsheim plant on 29 July 1938, in connection with storage facilities for ethyl chloride, ammonia etc. Dated 30 July 1938.	10
	NI-9478	Affidavit by Dr. Botho Mulert regarding activities of WIFO - stockpiling of motor fuel, sulfuric acid and hydrochloric acid. Dated 11 August 1947.	12
	NI-7120	Correspondence between IG, the Economic Armament Office and WIFO; also memorandum on a discussion at WIFO. Subject: stockpiling of urea and other products. Dated February-March 1940.	13
	NI-708	Letter from Hjalmar Schacht to the defendant von Schnitzler, thanking him, on behalf of the Aufsichtsrat and Vorstand of the German Golddiskontbank, for having willingly placed at the disposal of the bank his special knowledge on questions concerning German export matters. Dated 4 January 1939.	25



Exhibit No.	Document No.	Description of Document	Page in Doc. Book
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NI-1570		Memorandum by the defendant Max Ilgner on "The Promotion of Exports within the framework of the Four Year Plan, based on experiences derived from export promotion practice and on observations in foreign markets". Letter from the defendant Max Ilgner to Under-Secretary of State Dr. Lammers, dated 15 April 1937, submitting the memorandum.	26
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NI-5728		Minutes of IG Mail Discussion Meeting No. 74 on 17 August 1937 attended by the defendants Ilgner and Gattineau. Report on item 4 of the agenda records that the Foreign Trade Branch of the Office of the Four Year Plan had urged IG to suggest further possible measures for increasing exports in order to alleviate the German raw material and food situation.	57
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NI-653		Letter from the defendant von Schnitzler to Geheimrat Professor Dr. C. Bosch at IG Ludwigshafen, with copy to the defendant Schmitz, regarding the establishment of the IG Commercial Committee. The letter emphasizes the importance of export promotion to aid in the execution of the Four Year Plan. Dated 12 August 1937.	62
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NI-4927		Minutes of the first meeting of the Commercial Committee, held in Berlin on 20 August 1937, attended by the defendants von Schnitzler, Macfliger, Ilgner and Mann. Item 3 reports on a discussion regarding export promotion and what measures could be taken to increase exports (in view of the foreign exchange situation), to comply with request from the Foreign Trade Branch of the Office of the Four Year Plan.	65
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Exhibit No.	Document No.	Description of Document	Page in Doc. Book
	NI-5726	Minutes of IG Mail Discussion Meeting No.72, held on 3 August 1937, attended by the defendants Ilgner and Gattineau. Subject of item III, para.2 deals with the question of additional exports against grain. Proposals were to be drawn up, the defendant Gattineau to participate therein.	69
	NI-5742	Minutes of IG Mail Discussion Meeting No.82 held on 26 October 1937, attended by the defendant Gattineau. Item IV, para.1, reports that at the request of the German Delegation, IG was examining what further goods could be exported to Argentina to counter-balance bigger German imports from that country.	75
	NI-4930	Affidavit By Dr. Felix Ehrmann regarding IG's privileged foreign exchange position. Dated 13 March 1947.	79
	NI-10546	Affidavit by Dr. Guenther Frank-Fahle with chart attached, showing IG 1) amounts due from transactions abroad, 2) foreign exchange receipts, 3) foreign exchange delivered to the Reichsbank; covering the period 1932 through 1939.	87
	NI-4453	Report entitled "Examples of the furtherance of exports on the part of IG in recent times to permit an increased acquisition of foreign exchange and a direct supply of vital raw materials for Germany", from file of Waibel of the Commercial Committee.	84

Copy.

No. 436 of the Notary's office register for 1934.
Agreement
Berlin, 24 August 1934.

There appeared today before the undersigned notary in the district of the Supreme Court,

Dr. Ernst BIER of Behrenstrasse 24, Berlin,

1. for the Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer oeffentliche Arbeiten Aktiengesellschaft in Berlin

- a) Their Vorstand member Bank director Soerhard WILDENRUTH,
- b) Their Prokurist Dr. Karl SCHREIDER,

2. For the IG Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft in Frankfurt am Main

- a) Director Rudolf HANSER of Berlin,
- b) Assessor Herdin DUDEK of Mannheim.

The persons who appeared are known to the Notary personally. The persons who appeared under 2 submitted the authority of their date of the IG Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, of which a copy is appended to this agreement, which does not yet bear a Prussian stamp, and declared that in the under-mentioned matter they are acting for and representing the IG Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft on the strength of this authority.

All those present then declared that the Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer oeffentliche Arbeiten Aktiengesellschaft in Berlin and the IG Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft in Frankfurt am Main which they represent wished to form a Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, and laid down the partnership contract as follows:

Article 1

(1) The Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer oeffentliche Arbeiten Aktiengesellschaft in Berlin and the IG Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft in Frankfurt am Main form a Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung under the style

"Wissenschaftliche Forschungsgesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung".

(2) The company has its trade office in Berlin.

Article 2

(page 2 of original)

Article 2

The object of the undertaking is to set up and maintain industrial works, commercial enterprises and workshops, to set up and maintain experimental and research plants for the furtherance of the above-named branches of industry.

Article 3

The share capital of the company amounts to 20 000 Reichmarks. Of this capital the Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer oeffentliche Arbeiten Aktiengesellschaft will subscribe 16 000 Reichmarks and the IG Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft 4 000 Reichmarks.

Article 4

(1) The contribution of the Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer oeffentliche Arbeiten Aktiengesellschaft is to be made in cash.

(2) The IG Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft shall bring into the company from its landed property in Doeberitz, entered in the land-register of the county court Rathenow of Doeberitz volume 9, page 284, the area outlined in red on the attached plan of the site, measuring 70,000 square meters, and free of all charges and restrictions. The value of this plot of land will be fixed at 4 000 Reichmarks, which sum shall be placed against the contribution of the IG Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, so that the contribution is thereby covered. The ownership of the plot of land will be transferred to the Company, free of all charges and restrictions, immediately upon the registration of the Company in the trade register.

Article 5

The company's financial year runs from 1 April of one year to 31 March of the next. The first financial year starts from the registration of the company in the trade register and ends on the 31 March 1935.

Article 6

(1) The company will be represented by one or more business managers. If several business managers are appointed, the company will be represented by two of them or by one business manager together with one prokurist.

(2) The Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer oeffentliche Arbeiten Aktiengesellschaft or its legal successor shall appoint or dismiss business managers.

(page 3 of original)

Article 7

(1) An Aufsichtsrat can be appointed at any time by a resolution of the partners.

(2) In this case the partners will by a resolution determine the number of members of the Aufsichtsrat and their term of office. The regulations contained in Articles 243, Paragraphs 1 and 2, 244, 245, 247, and 248 of the Code of Commercial Law do not apply to the Aufsichtsrat.

Article 8

For the sale of the whole or part of its shares, and in fact wherever a sale to other companies affiliated with their Konzern is involved, the IG Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft requires the consent of the Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer oeffentliche Arbeiten Aktiengesellschaft or its legal successor as a partner.

Article 9

The announcements of the company shall be made only through the Deutsche Reichsanzeiger.

After the partnership contract had thus been settled, the persons who were present under 1 made the following declaration.

In the name of the Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer oeffentliche Arbeiten Aktiengesellschaft which we represent, we appoint herewith according to Article 6, Para. 2 of the partnership contract Ministerialrat Paul NIEBETZ of Berlin as business manager of the Company.

In conclusion, those present proposed that each of the two partners and the Company itself be given a copy of this agreement.

The text was read in the presence of the notary, approved by the parties concerned and signed by them in their own hand as follows:

Eberhard WILHELMUTH
Dr. Karl SCHNEIDER
Rudolf HANSEN
Herdin DUDEN
Dr. Ernst BEER

Supplement to the partnership contract.

With effect from 1 January 1939 an Aufsichtsrat of the Wirtschaftlichen Forschungsgesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung will be set up in Berlin.

The Aufsichtsrat consists of a chairman, a deputy chairman and six other members, who are appointed and recalled by the Reich Minister of Economics.

The Aufsichtsrat exercise the following rights on behalf of the Company:

- a) The establishing of the annual balance sheet.
- b) The splitting up and calling in of company shares,
- c) The appointment and recall of business managers,
- d) The approval of the business managers' reports.
- e) The appointment of Prokuristen and Handlungsbevollmächtigten. The Aufsichtsrat is empowered to rule that the Company may conclude certain kinds of contracts only with the consent of the Aufsichtsrat.

Within the Aufsichtsrat one committee each will be formed for Mineral Oil and one for the sphere of chemistry. The chairman of the Aufsichtsrat will appoint and recall the members of the committees.

The Aufsichtsrat decides upon its own rules of procedure.

In place of the statutory regulations laid down in Article 7 of the partnership contract of 24 August 1934, Articles 86, Paragraphs 1 and 3, Articles 90, 91, 97 and 98 of the Company Law (Gesetz über Aktiengesellschaften und Kommandit-Gesellschaften auf Aktien (Aktien-Gesetz of 30 January 1937)), now stand.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

13 June 1947

I, Victoria ORTON, No. 20 129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. EC-25.

Victoria ORTON
No. 20 129.

Vol. 2-4

III A 6 b

Reich Ministry of Economics
H.B. 2412/39

Berlin W 8, 15 July 1939
Böhrenstrasse 43
Telephone: 16 43 51

Please quote this ref. No. and
subject in further correspondence

24

Rubber stamp:
Wstb. Be. Department Head
17 July 1939
Az. 66
No. 2270/39 Encl. 3 18/7

8/8

To Colonel Becht,
High Command of the Wehrmacht,
Berlin W 35
Tirpitzufer 72-76

With reference to my letter of 29 June 1939 - H.B. 2212/39.

I send you enclosed the rules of procedure of the Aufsichtsrat of the Economic Research Association (Wirtschaftliche Forschungsgesellschaft) m.b.H., Berlin, in its final form.

At the same time I send you a copy of the articles of partnership. The participation of the I.G. Farbenindustrie has been transferred to the German Construction and Land Bank (Deutsche Bau- und Bodenbank), so that the sole partners are:

1. The German Company for Public Works (Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer oeffentliche Arbeiten) A.-G., in process of winding up in Berlin, represented through the liquidator, the Deutsche Bau- und Bodenbank A.G..
2. The Deutsche Bau- und Bodenbank A.G. in Berlin.

According to a special agreement, the rights involved in the partnership agreement will only be used in agreement with the Reich Minister of Economics.

(page 2 of original)

I also send you a copy of the Supplement to the Partnership Agreement concluded by notarial protocol of 25 April 1939. The Supplement is entered in the Commercial Register.

The Chairman of the Aufsichtsrat
(signed) Illgner.
Ministerial Director

Stamp:
Reichswirtschafts-
ministerium

Certified:
(Sd) Franke
Chief Secretary of the
Ministerial Chancellery

(page 1 of original)

Rules of Procedure
for the Aufsichtsrat of the Economic
Research Association
(Wirtschaftliche Forschungsgesellschaft)
m.b.H., Berlin

- - - - -
1. The Aufsichtsrat consists of a chairman, a deputy chairman and six other members, who are appointed and recalled by the Reich Minister of Economics.
 2. A majority of the members of the Aufsichtsrat must be present to pass binding resolutions. The members have an equal voting right. The chairman has the casting vote.
 3. The summoning of the Aufsichtsrat takes place through the Chairman. Minutes are to be kept of the discussions and resolutions.
 4. The Aufsichtsrat is entrusted with the task of determining the measures (Buildings and stockpiling) to be carried out by the Economic Research Association and to decide on the distribution of the means at disposal for this purpose. It must in this respect observe the regulations of the Reich Budgetary Regulations.
 5. The Aufsichtsrat may at any time demand from the Vorstand of the Association a report on the affairs of the Association. It can at any time examine and check the books and papers, as well as the assets, particularly the association's cash and the securities and goods on hand.
 6. The Aufsichtsrat also exercises the following rights:
 - a. The establishing of the annual balance sheet
 - b. The splitting up and calling in of participating shares
 - c. The appointment and recall of business managers
 - d. The approval of business managers' reports
 - e. The appointment of Prokuristen and Handlungsbevollmächtigten.

(page 2 of original)

7. The current business of the Aufsichtsrat is conducted in its name by the deputy chairman.
8. The Aufsichtsrat forms under the chairmanship of the deputy chairman a committee each for the Mineraloil and Chemicals fields. The chairman appoints as members of the committees: the competent departmental chief in the Reich Ministry of Economics, as well as the representative of the High Command of the Wehrmacht in the Aufsichtsrat or its duly empowered representatives. The committees may summon experts to their consultations.
9. The Association may conclude contracts exceeding 100,000 RM, only with the sanction of the Chairman of the Aufsichtsrat. The chairman of the Aufsichtsrat may delegate this right of sanction to the

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. EC-24
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original cont'd)

deputy chairman,

Berlin, 14 July 1939

The Chairman of the Aufsichtsrat

(signed) Illgner

Ministerial Director

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

12 June 1947

I, HERBERT RODECK, No. B-397499, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. EC-24.

.....
HERBERT RODECK, No. B-397499.

7

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6347
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Copy.

(handwritten:) We 24

Need not be stamped as it is the first copy.
Three Mark stamp was used for the original.

Berlin, 29 November 1935

The Notary public:
signed: Dr. Ernst BEER,

First copy.

No. 437 of the notary public registry of 1935.

Negotiated

Berlin, 26 November 1935.

Before the undersigned notary public in the district of the Prussian Supreme Court, (Kammergericht) Dr. Ernst BEER, Berlin W 8 Behrenstrasse 24, the following persons, known to me personally; appeared today:

- 1) For the Deutsche Bau- und Bodenbank Aktiengesellschaft, Berlin W 8,
 - a) a member of its Vorstand Herr Bankdirektor Dr. Alfred OHMER,
 - b) its Procurist, Herr Dr. Kurt HIEGGEMKE;
- 2) for I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt a.M., Herr Direktor Rudolf HANSEN, Berlin NW 7, Dorotheenstrasse 54.

The party of the second part presented the original power-of-attorney of 22 November 1935 by the I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, which is appended to this document and for which a Prussian stamp of RM 1 was used, and declared that by reason of this power-of-attorney he is representing and acting for the I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft.

On this premise the following contract is drawn up between the Deutsche Bau- und Bodenbank Aktiengesellschaft, Berlin, hereinafter referred to as "Bank", and the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Frankfurt a.M., hereinafter referred to as "I.G. Farben":

(page 2 of original)

Contract

I.G. Farben has a Business share of RM 4,000.- (in words: Four thousand Reichsmark) in the Wirtschaftliche Forschungsgesellschaft m.b.H. (Economic Research, Company.)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-6347
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original cont'd)

This share corresponds to the original investment of the I.G. Farben in the Wirtschaftliche Forschungsgesellschaft at the time when this company was founded. This investment was in the form of real estate at the agreed value of 4000 marks.

I.G. Farben shall sell this interest to the Bank. The price shall be RM 4,000 (in words: Reichsmark four thousand) payable in cash at the conclusion of this contract.

Therefore, I.G. Farben herewith relinquishes its share of RM 4,000- to the Bank. The Bank accepts the share. The consent of the Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer oeffentliche Arbeiten Aktiengesellschaft (German association for Public Works) required by the company contract for the sale of the share, has been granted.

Costs of this contract, including exchange turnover tax, shall be borne by the Bank.

It is requested that two copies of this contract shall be made, one for each of the parties.

The record was read in the presence of the notary public, approved by all participants and signed, as follows:

signed: Dr. Alfred OHMER

Dr. Kurt HIEGELKE

Rudolf HANSEN
Dr. Ernst BEER, Notary public

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

13 June 1947

I, Arthur MACNAMARA, Civ.No. 20 191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the original document No. NI-6347.

Arthur MACNAMARA
Civ.No. 20 191.

Ro III b

Berlin, 30 July 1938

File Reference 66 b 6621

(Handwritten note:) Ma 1 Aug.

File Notice

concerning a conference and inspection in Langelsheim
on 29 July 1938.

Present: Lagerungsbaumeister Frankl)
Berg-Assessor Hartung)
Baumeister Neu) Wifo
" Krause)
Dr. Kienstaedt)

Dr. Zweyer W Ro

Subject: Plant Langelsheim.

1) Toluol depot (Map of Location see Inclosure)

The toluol depot which is separated from the potassium nitrate and sulphuric acid plant by the railroad line Goslar-Kreiensen, comprises 12 containers of 600 cubic meters each and is finished except for the ventilation caps. Prior to the filling, the tanks will be cleaned again. Remaining assembly work in the pump house and at the cable distributor station are in process. Emptying pipes and emptying pits have been completed.

The depot will be ready for filling purposes at about the end of August. The capacity of the pumps will facilitate the filling of almost two tank cars of 15 tons each per hour.

Illegible
initials
(deleted)

A possible interim storage of approximately 300 tons of ethyl chloride cannot be recommended, since there is only one line of pipes leading from the emptying pits to the pump house. Through the solubility of ethyl chloride in toluol impurities may occur. Besides, during transfer to other depots as well as during storage under normal conditions, considerable losses through evaporation would occur, since ethyl chloride has a high steam pressure and a boiling point of 13° centigrade..

2) Ammonia depot.

The ammonia depot with 6 tanks would be sufficient to keep the combustion plant working for approximately six days. It would be desirable to increase the stock to double the amount. The corresponding enlargement of the ammonia depot adjacent to the one already in existence is possible without difficulties as far as space is concerned.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7131
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

- 3) At the present time the "Marienhuetten" of the I.G. located in the adjacent territory and not in operation, is being broken up. According to information received, in keeping with the Four Year Plan, a plant is being established there by the I.G. Leverkusen for which the construction orders are supposed to be issued already at the beginning of August. No intelligence could be obtained as to which plant is involved.
- (Handwritten note) what for? find out Illegible initial
- Z7

Handwritten notes:

According to information from I.G. (Dr. Gorr) on 1 August a stand-by plant for A-coal will be set up. For the purpose of particular work it would be advisable to contact Wa and Rue 9. It would be possible to set up a power plant to be used by both plants.

Zw 1 August

(Translator's remark: Here follows lay-out plant for T-depot)

— — - indicates distributor station

— — - Pump house

One line only!

— — - Emptying pits

Goslar ————— Kreiensen

—————
—————

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

30 July 1947

I, Victoria ORTON, No. 20129, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7131.

Victoria ORTON
No. 20129

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-9478
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Botho Mulert, Regierungsrat in the Reich Ministry of Economics from 1922 until 1925, Oberregierungsrat there from 1925 until 1930, Ministerialrat in the same Ministry from 1930 until 1938 and Ministerialdirigent there from 1938 until 1944, now domiciled at Minden Westphalia, Bachstr. 44, after having been warned that I shall be liable to punishment for making a false statement, herewith declare the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion:

1) From 1922 until the end of 1933 or 1934, when I took charge of sub-division Mineral Oil, I was consultant for Chemistry in the Reich Ministry of Economics. I kept this department until 1938; from that time onward I was again in charge of sub-division Chemistry.

2) The Wifo was created with the participation of the Reich Ministry of Economics. One of its tasks was to store motor fuel and to construct factories for the production of sulphuric acid and hydrochloric acid. With the creation of these new facilities the peace time requirements for these products were in my opinion exceeded. As far as I know all these plants were run by I.G..

I have carefully read this one page of this affidavit and countersigned it with my own hand, I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialled them with the first letters of my name and I herewith declare under oath that I have told the pure truth in this declaration to the best of my knowledge and belief.

signature: DR. BOTHO MULERT
DR. BOTHO MULERT

Sworn to and signed before me this 11th day of August 1947 at the Palace of Justice, Nurnberg, Germany, by Dr. Botho Mulert, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

signature: DR. OTTO HEILBRUNN
DR. OTTO HEILBRUNN
ETO 30140
Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes
US War Department

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

26 August 1947

I, LEONARD LAWRENCE, ETO-20138, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-9478.

LEONARD LAWRENCE, ETO-20138.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-7120
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR THE CREWS

DRAFT

High Command of the Armed Forces

19 March 1940

A 11 k 20 W1 Bus Amt/Rc (I/IIa)
No. 1432/40 g

SECRET

To
the I.G.-Farbenindustrie A.G.,
Vermittlungsstelle W,
att. Dr. DIEKMANN,
Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 82.

Ref.: Your letter Dr.Die./Bk./7
of 27 Feb. 1940

Subject: Urea stockpiling.

(Illegible
handwrit-
ten mar-
ginal note)

The question of further stockpiling of urea brought up in the above-mentioned communication was clarified in the conference at the Wifo on 15 March 1940, in which Dr. Diekmann and Dr. Hartmann participated as your representatives.

As discussed, the Wifo will give you a written order covering the blocked storage depots for urea which are to be erected and the other products which are under discussion.

For and behalf of (Im Auftrage)
THE CHIEF OF THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES
C 19/3

To be filed

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7120
CONTINUED

(page 2 of original)

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W

Berlin N^o 7
Unter den Linden 82
Local Tel.: 120021
Long distance Tel.:
126401

(Rubber Stamp:)

SECRET !

(Illegible
handwritten
note)

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Art. 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover; as "registered" when sent by mail.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the recipient, under lock and key.

High Command of the Armed Forces
Wi Rue Amt
att. Oberregierungsrat Dr. Kureck,
Berlin W. 35,
Tirpitzufer 72-76.

(Rubber Stamp:)

Wi Rue Amt/Pw III
29 Feb. 1940
No. 1432/40g Encl.1

Our ref:
Dr.Dia./Bk./7.

Berlin, 27 Feb.1940

Subject: Urea stockpiling. Production plan.

From the attached compilation regarding the urea stockpiling as of 1 January 1940 it may be seen that through our joint efforts there had been put into storage at the beginning of this year a supply of

9,990 tons N = ca. 22,000 tons urea.

The production during the months of January and February probably increased this quantity in the meantime by an additional 3000 tons N so that at present it probably amounts to about

29,000 tons of material.

With continued full production of our Oppau plant in the amount of approximately 2,500 tons per month of N and constant requirements of about 900 tons per month of N the stored supply will, in April 1940 already, attain an amount which corresponds to requirements of approximately 1-1/2 years. Heroby the goal of supply for the military economy which was established at the time would be attained and we should like to propose that about 11,000 tons of N of the stored quantities, i.e., about a full year's requirements, be taken over into the so-called iron ration of the Wifo, whereas the I.G. can freely dispose of the remaining stock to cover the current needs.

(page 2 of original, cont'd)

(Hand-written note:)
yes.

The I.G. intends to take back the production of urea in April of this year. Thus the decrease of the production of primary nitrogen which occurs in the warmer months (decreased suction efficiency) is to be equalized, in order to maintain, as far as possible, the full nitrogen allotment, particularly to agriculture. Since the production of urea is very much independent of raw material supplies such as gypsum, limestone

(page 3 of original)

and similar materials, the production of this product is also the most suitable reserve in order to avoid, in the case of transportation difficulties which may arise, a decrease of the production of primary nitrogen due to a lack of processing possibilities. In the case of too large supplies of urea one would, however, want to draw on this reserve only to a limited extent.

We assume that for the reasons mentioned above you agree with our production plan for urea, outlined above, and would thank you for confirmation of this.

We shall shortly submit proposals to you with regard to the taking over of the so-called iron rations of urea by the Wifo and the regulation of the storage costs, etc.

Heil Hitler !
VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W

(signed) DIEKMAN

♠ R.Wi.Min. Ob.Reg.Rat Dr. Lenz, W.8
♠ Reichsstelle Chemie, Dr. Ungewitter, W.35
♠ Prof. Dr. Krauch, Berlin W.9
♠ Dir. Bureau Sparte I, Oppau.

REGISTERED MAIL

(page 4 of original)

Urea Stockpiling. Situation as of 1 January 1940.

<u>Storage Depot</u>	<u>Urea for feed</u>	<u>Urea for industrial purposes</u>	<u>Total urea in tons of materials</u>
Doberitz	1,357 tons	143 tons	1,500 tons
Gerthe	5,740 "	2,500 "	8,240 "
Hamburg-Zollstadt			
Lexsau	159 "	-	159 "
Hamburg-Zollstadt			
Gunther	494 "	-	494 "
dto. Voigt & Wullenweber	588 "	-	588 "
dto. Wifo-Lager	-	2,142 "	2,142 "
Hamburg-Freihafen (Slomen & Schoer)	2,006 "	-	2,006 "
Hamburg-Freihafen	-	508 "	508 "
Hamburg-Neuss (C.B. Michael)	338 "	-	338 "
Ploetzensee	-	89 "	89 "
Rummelsburg	-	25 "	25 "
	<hr/> 10,682 tons of materials	<hr/> 5,407 tons of materials	<hr/> 16,089 tons of materials
	= 4,910 tons N	2,490 tons N	7,400 tons N
In storage in Oppau	<hr/> 1,935 " "	<hr/> 655 " "	<hr/> 2,590 " "
Total on hand 1 Jan. 1940	6,845 tons N	3,145 tons N	9,990 tons N
		= ca 22,000 tons of materials	

(Rubber Stamp:)

SECRET !

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Art. 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
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REGISTERED MAIL

(page 5 of original)

Ro III a

Berlin, 16 March 1940

File Memorandum

(Illegible handwritten
note)

concerning

a conference at the Wifo on 15 March 1940.

Subject: Stockpiling of militarily important
products from Ludwigshafen/Oppeu.

(Various
illegible
initials and
dates)

Present: Ob.Reg.Rat Dr. Murock)
 Chem. Techn. Will) Ro III

 Ob.Reg.Rat Dr. Lenz) R Wi Min

 Reg.Baumeister Frankel)
 Mr. Schiefer) Wifo

 Dr. Dickmann)
 Dr. Hertschmann) I.G.

There was a detailed discussion as to the method of accounting to be used in connection with the additional costs arising in the course of the stockpiling. During the first stockpiling undertaking in 1938 the costs which had actually arisen were settled between the I.G. and Wifo. It is a very detailed and complicated procedure, which puts quite a load on Wifo and the I.G. Blocked storage depots are therefore to be arranged, from which withdrawals will not be made normally. In addition the Reich Ministry of Economics and Wifo will determine whether average costs per ton of goods can be calculated, which can be used in the form of a lump rate as the basis of further stockpiling. With reference to capital service the I.G. will make no demands for the time being.

In detail it was determined:

1) Urea.

A blocked storage depot for 15,000 tons is to be arranged; in addition to this the I.G. will maintain an available storage supply for covering current requirements. As long as the blocked storage depot has not yet acquired the 15,000 tons, the available quantities are to be removed from the endangered area as much as possible.

(page 6 of original)

2) Sal-Ammoniac

Blocked storage depot for 3,000 tons (1/4 of annual requirements).

(page 6 of original, cont'd)

In case Ludwigshafen is eliminated, manufacture can be arranged in 1/4 year in Bernburg, also using equipment which can be removed from Ludwigshafen.

3) Contacts

Blocked storage depot for 1,200 tons (1/2^{of} annual requirements). Kinds according to plans in the gasoline field.

4) Kaurit Glus

Blocked storage depot for 2,000 tons. At present the demand is very great, so that it is very difficult to do any stockpiling. It would therefore be desirable to have quotas.

5) Sodium Nitrite

Blocked storage depot for 200 tons (1/4 of annual requirements). Manufacture is being arranged in Wolfen and Merseburg.

6) Hartshorn salt

Blocked storage depot for 200 tons (1/4 of annual requirements).

7) Iron Powder

Blocked storage depot for 300 tons (1/4 of annual requirements). The consumers (producers of communications equipment) are also stockpiling.

(Hand-written note:) T 5/4. c Wifo will give the I.G. a written order concerning the arrangement of blocked storage depots in accordance with 1) to 7).

Dr. Diekmann will submit a proposal concerning the stockpiling of propyl alcohol, corresponding to the amounts becoming available in Ludwigshafen.

With regard to iron carbonyl I.G. proposes that the quantities which Wifo has in storage be returned to the I.G. for conversion to iron powder, as soon as the lead tetra situation allows it. I.G. will write the Reich Ministry of Economics and the High Command of the Armed Forces with reference to this.

(signed) Uru

(page 7 of original)

I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft
Vermittlungsstelle W

(Rubber Stamp:)
Secret !

1. This is a state secret within the meaning of Art. 88 of the Reich Penal Code.
2. To be transmitted only under cover; as "registered" when sent by mail.
3. To be kept, at the responsibility of the recipient, under lock and key.

(Rubber Stamp:)
Hi Rus Amt/Ro III
2 March 1940
No. 1592/40 g Encl.1

Economic Research Association G.m.b.H.,
att. Director PRANKEL,
Berlin W. 8
Mohrenstr. 36/37

Dr.Die./Ra./9

4 March 1940

Re-storage of militarily important products from Ludwigshafen/Oppau

(Illegible
handwritten
marginal
note)

In accordance with repeated verbal discussions with the High Command of the Armed Forces and the Reich Ministry of Economics we have, as per orders on the basis of an understanding with you, been carrying out since the middle of last year a re-storage of militarily important products from our West Works Oppau and Ludwigshafen into the secured area of the Reich.

In comparison with the re-storage undertaking of the year 1938 the new re-storage which is still under way is considerably more extensive. In addition it was officially desired in connection with the new contract that in the case of various militarily important products a certain permanent supply should be put into storage, which should not be decreased by withdrawals for current needs and which is thus withdrawn from direct disposal by the I.G. offices.

Because of the general development of production and sales we were able, despite all efforts, to attain this desired permanent storage supply in the full amount in only a few cases, as is evident from the following table:

(page 7 of original, cont'd)

Desired Permanent Supply

Designation of the material:	Requirements for:	Amount stored up to the end of January:	Remarks:
1) Urea	1 year	15,000 tons = requirements for 3/4 year	only for militarily important, industrial and feed purposes
2) Sal-Ammoniac	1/4 year	2,200 tons = requirements for 2 months	

(page 8 of original)

3) Contacts for gasoline, nitrogen and methanol	1/2 year	640 tons = requirements for 1/4 year	Brown oxide contact... 360 Hydrogenation contact 5058 50 " " 6034 200 splitting contact 30
4) Kaurit Glue	1/2 year	300 tons = requirements for 1/2 month	
5) Sodium nitrite	1/4 year	150 tons = requirements for 2 months	
6) Hartshorn salt	1/4 year	125 tons = requirements for 1-1/2 months	
7) Iron powder	1/2 year	requirements for 1/4 year will be stored by consumers themselves.	

8) For a series of products of the chemical and plastics Sparte that are militarily important, such as:

(Handwritten marginal note:) Hydrosulphite, sodium sulphite, maleic acid, zinc chloride, glycol, vanadium contact, Iselit, Palatinole and others
Inform position 1.3.40 possibly Reich Ministry for Economics
..... requested
11/3/40 Will

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7120
CONTINUED

(page 8 of original, cont'd)

(Handwritten note:) Give brands
a permanent supply was not demanded thus far; as far as excess production could be achieved it was also re-stored.

(Handwritten note:) Get IG to extend this to Propyl-
alcohol.

The value of the products stored by us thus far in connection with the above orders has probably attained the amount of ca. 10 million Reichsmark; of this the storage of urea constitutes the major share. It ought now to be determined which of the above quantities is to be considered as a permanent supply.

The costs arising from the re-storage will, for the time being, be booked for settlement in special accounts kept at the individual storage depots.

The attached compilation gives you a sort of survey of the re-storage costs accruing to the end of November 1939, to the amount of 303,142 RM, which may, in the meantime, have risen to about double that amount.

(page 9 of original)

The cost accounting of this re-storage should, in accordance with agreement, take place via the Wifo in the same manner as was the case for the re-storage campaign in the year 1938, i.e., the I.G. is to be reimbursed for the excess costs arising in comparison with normal storage in Ludwigshafen/Oppau and the normal disposal of the products directly from the plant stores to the consumers.

These excess costs of re-storage cannot, for reasons known to you in connection with the corresponding accounting of the previous year, be determined exactly and in some cases can only be estimated, i.e. in cases where they arise only at a later date, when the goods are disposed of. For this reason certain parts of expenditures were estimated in advance and accounted for in a lump sum, in connection with the accounting of the previous year. According to our experiences the average rate of excess costs per ton of re-stored products in the fall of 1938 was around 24 RM and due to more difficult transportation conditions (demurrage, etc.) may reach 30 RM per ton for the present re-storage.

In order to save the complicated cost accounting and estimation of excess costs and the great amount of extra work connected therewith, we propose that the Wifo reimburse the I.G., dispensing with the individual accounting per ton of re-stored product customary hitherto, in a lump sum of between 20 and 30 RM per ton of re-stored material. This average rate includes only the actual costs (excess costs) which can be substantiated, for instance, no interest for the amounts of capital, which are determined by the production and storage of the militarily important products, without the I.G. having for this, as, for instance in connection with the sale of the product, corresponding receipts from proceeds.

(page 9 of original, cont'd)

For these fixed amounts of capital the I.G. ought, in accordance with verbal agreement, either to be reimbursed for the interest, or an advance payment in the amount of, for instance, 60 to 80% of the selling

(page 10 of original)

value of the stored goods, ought to be made available to the I.G. through the Wifo.

The whole re-storage undertaking is based on the idea that in comparison with the obtaining and stockpiling of militarily important goods of the same amount by Reich offices (Construction of Wifo storage depots, purchase of the goods, erection of stand-by plants, etc.), the most suitable and least expensive stockpiling is achieved by the above re-storage and stockpiling measures of the I.G.

Agreement would still have to be reached with the gentlemen concerned with these matters in the High Command of the Armed Forces and the Reich Ministry of Economics as to the extent to which the re-storage is to be continued and for what products, particularly since in the case of various products one must count on the possibility that they can be stored for only a limited time, thus necessitating additions and withdrawals.

We request the earliest possible expression of your attitude on these matters, particularly with reference to our proposals for the simplification of the accounting.

Heil Hitler !

VERMITTLUNGSSTELLE W.

(signed) DIECKMANN

1 compilation !

- Ø 1) Ob.Reg.-Rat Dr. Mureck, OKW.
- 2) Ob.Reg.-Rat Dr. Lenz, RWilMin.
- 3) Dir. Buero Sparte I Oppau.
- 4) Mr. Lederle, Fabrik-Buchhaltung, Lu.
- 5) Prof. Dr. Krauch, Berlin W.9.
- 6) Dir. Dr. Baetefisch, Louna.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7120
CONTINUED

(page 11 of original)

Berlin, 4 March 1940
Dr. Dic./Ra./9

Cost Accounting from July to November 1939

concerning the re-storage of products in various external storage depots.

Storage Depot	Total amount of re-stored products	Intra-plant shipping costs	Freight charges Lu/Op storage depot	Trans-shipment Insurance	Pack- ing Material	Storage costs	Total costs
	kg	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM	RM
Gorthe	6,478,930.6	13,177.-	43,242.-	150.-	25,353.-	44,757.-	126,679.-
Doerberitz	1,456,000	3,735.-	16,302.-	--	10,530.-	9,738.-	40,305.-
Hamburg- Loschace	200,000	507.-	2,244.-	--	1,440.-	--	4,191.-
Hamburg- Wifo	4,656,000	4,729.-	63,453.-	--	--	--	68,182.-
Heilbronn	41,444	54.-	477.-	--	1,875.-	--	2,406.-
Mainkur	204,325	495.-	1,629.-	470.-	13,078.-	--	15,672.-
Ploetzensee	500,150	2,116.-	9,483.-	--	13,034.-	--	24,633.-
Rasmolsburg	50,000	298.-	831.-	--	1,200.-	--	2,329.-
Welfen	251,824	4,715.-	4,491.-	68.-	9,471.-	--	18,745.-
	<u>13,838,674</u>	<u>29,826.-</u>	<u>142,152.-</u>	<u>688.-</u>	<u>75,981.-</u>	<u>54,495.-</u>	<u>303,142.-</u>

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-7120
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

28 July 1947

I, Herbert RODECK, No. B 397944, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-7120.

Herbert RODECK
No. B 397944

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NI-700
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR
CRIMES

Reichsbank President
Dr. Hjalmar SCHACHT

(Translator's Note: Handwritten Note:
Processed 7 January 1939 Q)
Berlin, 4 January 1939

(Translator's Note: Handwritten Notes:
HOYER, HAAS, BUHL
Please Cross out
in the lists under my titles. Initial S (for SCHNITZLER)
7 January)

Dear Dr. v. SCHNITZLER,

The establishment of a Beirat (Advisory Council) as an organization of our bank, which was created on account of a decree of the Reich President for Security of Economy and Finance, dated 1 December 1930 (Part 6, Chapter II, Article 1, Section 4), is no longer provided for in the Third Executory Order for the Joint Stock Law, of 21 December 1930 (Reich Law Gazette (Reichsgesetzblatt) Part I, No. 221, Page 1840), which has been issued for the re-arrangement of the legal bases of our institution.

As member of this Gremium (Committee) you have put at the disposal of our bank your special knowledge on questions concerning German export matters. On behalf of the Aufsichtsrat and the Vorstand of the German Golddiskontbank, I wish to express my heartiest thanks to you for this.

Heil Hitler
The Chairman of the Aufsichtsrat
of the German Golddiskontbank

(Signed) Dr. HJALMAR SCHACHT

To
Dr. Georg v. SCHNITZLER
I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, M.P. NO. 34079, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-700.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI
M.P. NO. 34079

END

-1-

Der Staatssekretär und Chef
der Reichskanzlei
(The under-Secretary of State and
Chief of the Reich Chancellery)

Berlin 19 November 1936

The Personal Technical Expert (Referent)

1./

To
Dr. W. von TIRPITZ
BERLIN NW 7
Unter den Linden 78

Dear Herr von Tirpitz,

The Under-Secretary of State and Chief of the Reich Chancellery acknowledges the receipt of two copies of the third volume of Dr. ILGNER's East-Asia report (Ost-Asien Bericht) which you were kind enough to transmit to us with your letter of 27 October. He asks you to convey his sincerest thanks to Dr. ILGNER and to inform him that one copy was submitted to the Fuehrer.

Heil Hitler!
Yours very devotedly:

(Name of Ministerial Rat v. Stutterheim)
Ministerialrat

(TRANSLATOR's Note: Stamp:)
Typed by: By
Read by: "
Mailed: 19 Nov. (initial) Fs

2./ Respectfully submitted to
the Under-Secretary of State for the
purpose of removal of the two volumes. 19 Nov. S

3.) To be filed.

(Second Page of Document)

Dr. MAX ILGNER
Member of the Vorstand of
I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.

BERLIN NW 7
Unter den Linden 82
at present Kissingen,
Hotel Buedel, 15 April 1937

(Stamp:) See matter of 28 April

W. No. 4

Personal.

To Under-Secretary of State Dr. Hans-Heinrich Lammers,
Reich Chancellery

BERLIN W 8
Wilhelmstrasse 78

Very esteemed Under-Secretary of State Lammers,

Because some time ago you showed a special interest for my East-Asia Report, I am taking the liberty of transmitting to you enclosed a written

presentation of facts (Denkschrift) on the promotion of exports within the framework of the Four Year Plan. I have prepared this presentation in pursuance of thorough discussions with the chairman of the Commercial Policy Committee (Handelspolitischer Ausschuss) of the Reichswirtschaftskammer (National economic Chamber), Under-Secretary of State Dr. TRENDLENBURG (retired). This was prompted by his suggestion to make a presentation as to how the experiences and energies of private economy could be more effectively used for a methodical cooperation in the efforts of strengthening Germany's foreign trade position.

As agreed upon with Under-Secretary of State TRENDLENBURG I have, for the time being, made this presentation available only to you, to President SCHECHT, to Under-Secretary of State POSSE, to Herr BRINEMANN, to Ministerial Director RITTER, to Colonel LOEB, to Colonel THOMAS and to President PIETZSCH.

I, of course, fully realize that the proposals I am making can in no way claim to be complete or perfect. Nevertheless I considered it in order for me to condense in writing the

(Third Page of Document)
(Page 2 of original)

observations which I could personally make in recent years in almost all of the more important export markets.

In as much as I have also covered organizations of the Party (Economic experts - Wirtschaftreferenten) in my presentation, and having also referred to things which the Landes (regional groups) and Ortsgruppen (local groups) in the various countries are especially interested as I know, (German Schools and German newspapers appearing abroad) I should be very much obliged to you, very esteemed Under-Secretary of State, if you would let me know whether you believe that I should transmit this presentation also to Reich Minister Rudolf HESS, that is whether you believe he might be interested in it.

If your time should permit your taking note of my presentation in greater detail, I should very much appreciate your informing me at your convenience what your opinion on the proposals is which I have made.

With my best regards and Heil Hitler
I am devotedly yours,

(signature) MAX ILGNER

(Fourth Page of Document)

Dr. W. von Tirpitz

BERLIN NW 7, 27 October 1936
Unter den Linden 78

To Under-Secretary of State Hans Heinrich LAMMERS,
Reich Chancellery
BERLIN W 8
Wilhelmstrasse 78

(TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: (Stamp) Previous matters to be attached)
(Handwritten notation:) enclosed as instructed)

11 Nov. Bg

Very esteemed Under-Secretary of State Lammers,

Upon Dr. Ilgner's instructions and as he is at present away on a trip to South America, I am transmitting to you enclosed - in pursuance of Dr. Ilgner's letter of 30 June 1936 with which he sent volume I and II of his East-Asia Report to you - the third volume which now has been completed.

At the same time, and as instructed by Dr. Ilgner, I am transmitting to you the copy for the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor in which the most important passages are marked in red, same as in the first two volumes.

Please accept my compliments and Heil Hitler!

(Signature) W. TIRPITZ

(Fifth Page of Document)

The Under-Secretary of State
and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Berchtesgaden, 31 August 1936

1./ To
Dr. Max ILGNER,
member of the Vorstand of I.G. Farbenindustrie
Aktiengesellschaft
BERLIN NW 7
Unter den Linden 78

Dear Dr. Ilgner,

(marginal stamp:)
Written: Bg
Read: " " Reich Chancellor. I have been instructed to convey
Initialed: 1 Sept. sincerest thanks to you for the courtesy shown to him.
Bg

Heil Hitler!
Yours very devotedly,
(Name of the Under-Secretary of State)

2./ To be filed (Lammers' initial:) L.

(Sixth Page of document)
Page 2 of original)

- 1.) Today I have handed over the 2 volumes to the Fuehrer
- 2.) To: Personal technical Expert (Referent) devotedly
Please send letter of thanks to Dr. Ilgner

Berchtesgaden, 24 August 1936

(Lammers' initial) L

Dr. Max ILGNER
Member of the Vorstand of
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft

(TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Notes in
handwriting:)
Frl. Buk processed
(initial) R 17 August, Bg

BERLIN NW 7
Unter den Linden
3 August 1936
W.v. 19 May Bg
(to be brought up
again, on 19 May)

(initial - for Lammers) L 13 August 2 volumes

To Under-Secretary of State Hans Heinrich LAMMERS
Reich Chancellery
BERLIN W 8
Wilhelmstrasse 78

Very esteemed Under-Secretary of State Lammers,

Please accept my sincerest thanks for the comments you made on my East-Asia Report. I immediately set about to make ready the two copies for the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, and I am transmitting them to you enclosed. I have endeavored to limit the passages marked in red to a minimum but as I already brought out in my letter to you of 30 June, the same fact applies here also, namely that it is, of course, very difficult to condense such a comprehensive subject without sacrificing clarity.

In as much as I shall leave already 10 days from now for a 4 1/2 months' trip to the Latin-American countries - the objectives being mainly the same as those of the East-Asia trip - the third volume which is now being printed (Indo-China and the rest of South-East Asia), will unfortunately be finished only after my departure. Instructions have already been given, however, as to the most important passages which are to be marked in red for the Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich also in this volume. I have seen to it that the same will be done also in the volume intended for you.

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

Yours very devotedly,

(signature) Max Ilgner

see next page

(Eighth Page of document)

Confidential and Personal

Copy No. 2

THE PROMOTION OF EXPORTS
WITHIN THE FRAME OF THE FOUR YEAR PLAN

based on experiences
derived from export promotion practice
and on observation
in foreign markets

and prepared by :

Dr. MAX ILGNER

(Ninth page of document)

I.

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PROMOTION OF EXPORTS
=====

I. Basic remarks on the question of export promotion within the frame of the Four Year Plan.

1.) Definition of export promotion

It seems important to me to state from the outset that export promotion is an economy which operates according to plan and which can only be carried out purposefully and with real success within the frame of the Four Year Plan for the achievement of which it is a condition sine qua non, if all available forces and possibilities are being systematically encompassed and, as it were, tuned to one general denominator.

Export promotion is not a short-term provision but in my opinion it is to be continued until the re-establishment of normal inter-state trade relations between the individual countries has been achieved and the simultaneous re-assimilation of currencies. Until then it will always be necessary to bridge over by compensating methods the advantage which the devaluated currencies have over Germany because apart from many other reasons which here need not be dealt with a devaluation of the Reichsmark would in my opinion be useless and possibly even detrimental viewed from the standpoint of export promotion. Furthermore, Germany has gone through so many experiences, crises and other upheavals in the last twenty years in the application and putting into effect of economic measures applied according to plan - experiences which other countries do not have - that this in itself constitutes an essential compensation which perhaps even means having a head start. But also for the future development of the form of economy the German methods and

(Thirteenth Page of Document)
Page 2 of original)

measures are doubtless instructive because, in my opinion, they bear in embryo the germ-cell for the future form of economy.

2.) Reasons for particular intensification of export promotion.

a) Providing the foreign exchange needed for carrying the Four Year Plan into effect

The decisive importance which makes a particularly intensive promotion of exports a necessity arises at the present time from the fact that it has the task of providing the foreign exchange needed for carrying the Four Year Plan into effect. Export promotion, Four Plan, armaments and food can, however, only be considered within a total frame and - as the Four Year Plan bears out logically - must each be brought into perfect accord with the other under a masterly control of the entire scheme. In line with the directives given, it is at the present decisive that the proceeds of foreign exchange from exports be increased sufficiently to permit importing of all raw materials which are necessary for carrying the Four Year Plan into effect, fully and successfully and, moreover - until the positive effects of the Four Year Plan begin to affect our own creation of raw materials favorably - to import these raw materials which must be imported for simultaneously carrying on increased rearmament irrespective of the foreign exchange needed for food.

Aside from the fact that every German export from the raw materials which it requires creates a multiple of foreign exchange by reason of its character which predominantly involves products obtained through finishing processes, this is borne out as entirely within the scope of the present situation in export markets by the following explanations which at the same time offer an added argument for the reason why exports must be promoted speedily and intensively at the present time and under all circumstances.

(Fourteenth Page of document)
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b) The difficulties which arise from the necessity for shifting the foreign trade.

The necessity for purchasing raw materials only from those countries which are at the same time prepared and in a position to take German products in lieu of payment for them, which was already inherent in the new plan but arises more specifically now within the frame of carrying the Four Year Plan into effect, has resulted in a far-reaching shifting of the German foreign trade from markets with which active trade relations existed for years and which were not in a position to adjust themselves to the above mentioned points of view, to such new markets which by reason of their structure offered the prerequisites for this. It is psychologically plain why in the light of their subjective position the new countries to which Germany has turned regard Germany as their new partner with a certain mistrust because they ask themselves how long Germany will be disposed to do business with them since she abandoned just those who were trade relations partners of old standing. Even though this attitude is thoroughly subjective it is nevertheless important to realize that such difficulties exist and have to be overcome under all circumstances. For this very reason, however, it is necessary to augment efforts especially to win these markets and this, apart from such energy, tenacity and system falls for a comprehensive knowledge of these markets and, first of all, a good flair for things.

c) Necessity for taking part in the industrial development of the world.

In the light of the dynamically strong development of new markets which can be observed all over the world, it seems to me to be an imperative duty for the German export trade to join in this development unless Germany would risk losing her position in the world market. One might speak of a new and modern epoch of the colonial problem or of a colonization problem rather, in the era of nationalization and industrialization tendencies.

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It is evident that, seen at long range, all countries and colonies are striving for independence and that the relationship as yet still existing between mother-country and colony will more and more follow the direction of developments on the relationship between England and her Dominions i.e. that the mother country must be an ally and not an exploiter. Appropriately applied to those independent young countries which today manifest strong dynamics in every respect this would mean that from the long-range point of view, the establishment of a lasting political and economic influence will be possible mostly to that one among the highly developed countries which actively participated as an ally in the development of the existing possibilities. With her well trained human material and with more than 30 million Germans living abroad Germany - provided she joins in opportune time and is cooperating actively and with the right concept - in my opinion has a chance as but few other countries. Though methods and objectives cannot apply here as they belong to the past, I nevertheless believe that for Germany, and thereby for the German economy, a possibility is presenting itself to catch up in many things which - contrary to England which then already existed as a unified entity - could not be carried into effect in an equal measure in past centuries.

Within the frame of a lecture dealing in particular with Latin America which I held before the International Chamber of Commerce early in March this year, I discussed the basic importance of the question of developing the purchasing power of the new markets and the need for cooperation by the highly industrialized countries. The text of this lecture is attached as an enclosure, from page 31 on). The instinct of self-preservation demands that in supporting the industrialization of the young countries, the highly industrialized countries make it a point to support only such developments actively which in themselves are economically reasonable and which in the course of an organic

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development cannot be stopped anyway. Actively engaging in the industrialization of other countries will in the last analysis always be done only as a means to the end: to bolster own exports and to secure a proportionate share in the purchasing power additionally created or that which will be created.

In my opinion one cannot afford to overlook that the rest of the world which is interested in the new markets will not stand by idly while we are carrying through the Four Year Plan; especially England and America make great efforts to participate in the industrial development of the new countries and thus to secure for the future a corresponding share in the newly created purchasing power of these countries for their export trade.

In this connection, it is for Germany especially important to know that this quick striving upwards by the young countries is a development long held in check and which will be unique in the world for a long time, and the nation which fails to come in at the right time will later on find it difficult to make up for what it neglected to do. Unfortunately it is not possible to export and to try and find new markets only when this just coincides with one's own wishes, but these export possibilities must be seized and made use of at the moment when they present themselves within the frame of actual conditions; apart from this it is, of course, very difficult altogether to mobilize or stop at will the complicated machinery of export promotion because apart from the quite considerable loss of time which would occur in each case, most of the enterprises could not afford to engage in the considerable expenditure necessary for the intensification of exports unless there be sufficient certainty to assume that chances for a continuous and economic exploitation of the measures initiated do exist.

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Since England - because of Ottawa's favored Dominion position with regard to the purchase of agricultural products - is not in a position to offer much to the new countries while at the same time she is using to a far-reaching degree the whole capacity of her industry for her heavy rearmament which prevents adequate exports - something which because of her greater involvement in the world market is for England even more detrimental than for Germany. German exports are thereby benefited in a measure, provided corresponding measures for an increase of our activity in the new countries are being applied promptly and carried through systematically. Also the U.S.A. are at a certain disadvantage compared with us because many of the products of the new countries - copper, oil, cotton - are at the same time being produced in the U.S.A., so that here, too, the possibility of greater purchases by the U.S.A. is not always given.

- d) Establishment of export possibilities for such productions as have been newly brought about by reason of the Four Year Plan.

For a series of productions which are now being newly created under the Four Year Plan, it will be difficult permanently to secure full-scale employment of the total capacity in normal times; for this reason too it is especially necessary to unlock and to secure at an opportune time new export possibilities for these productions while developing export markets in order thus to create a compensating valve, so to speak, and incidentally to contribute our share in influencing favorably the total cost price of these manufactures.

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II. Shortcomings observed with regard to the handling of export promotion and their effects.

1.) Shortcomings as they developed in applying the various processes.

a) Procedure for additional exports.

In carrying into effect the procedure for additional exports, two tendencies face each other: on the one hand the export industry's wish for an application as simple as possible and unimpeded by bureaucratic

handicaps, on the other hand the need for the farthest possible control so as to avoid abusive use of the procedure.

Of the two types of procedure applied - normal rates and maximum rates - the promotion at normal rates gives to the exporting firms for the individual case ample relief from the submission of calculations and other data enabling the export organization to strike with more punch. For the establishment of normal rates, it is necessary however that calculations be submitted which break down to the greatest extent possible the various kinds of costs; this involves the disadvantage that in addition to the calculation data the personnel employed in the central offices also obtain an insight into the factory secrets of the various firms.

The promotion at maximum rates leaves open the undesirable possibility that in contrast to the economically working establishments those which operate uneconomically can prove and be compensated for higher losses, thereby detrimentally affecting and burdening the export trade of the enterprises which operate efficiently. The maximum rate procedure also leaves a possibility that because of lack of uniform calculation data - possibly even as a result of non-comprehensible or manipulated

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calculations the export promotion may be applied in a varying degree in the case of the same products and at approximately equal costs. This also explains, in part, the possibility for German exporters abroad to outbid each other in price, with the help of the Z. A. procedure.

Application of the maximum rate procedure as against the normal rate procedure is technically rendered still more difficult because of the requirement for the submission of a greater number of calculations.

b) Compensation Transactions.

In carrying through compensation transactions it frequently developed that in order to facilitate the consummation of the compensation the foreign exporter has paid a premium to the foreign importer. The German purchaser being charged with the premium, as a rule, the price of the imported commodity was thus made more expensive for Germany or its quality was made inferior. Another abuse which developed in connection with the compensation procedure is that German business enterprises engaged in export as well as in import underbid each other to the detriment of the nation as a whole in that they offset higher export losses by proportionably higher profits in the import business. A further result of this procedure as a rule is that thereby the price level of German commodities abroad is being unnecessarily pushed down in a measure equal to the lower-price purchasing possibilities which the foreign importer through acceptance of the premium can create for himself by way of the compensation. Another foreign importer, however, for whom this low-price purchasing possibility remains beyond reach is at a disadvantage as regards his competitor and, naturally, is vexed; this vexation on the part of foreign customers which often leads to their giving up purchasing German goods is a psychological factor which should not be underestimated.

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The commodities admitted into Germany by way of compensation are in many cases undesirable because the foreign exporter wants to supply such goods only as Germany would normally not buy in sufficient volume

as they are not urgently required whilst for raw materials in which Germany is especially interested, payment is demanded in free foreign exchange; the result of this is an encroachment on foreign exchange.

c) Aski (Special blocked accounts of foreigners, for payments in Germany)

Aski accounts when still being maintained in any of the "clearing" countries in exceptional cases caused in the long run scattering of payments. Apart from this the creation of Aski offers undesirable preference as regards certain owners of accounts who can quicker dispose of their sales proceeds than is possible in accounting by way of the official clearing office. From this result in the individual cases resentment by those of Germany's customers who do not have an Aski account even though it should be considered that there is a certain justification for this preference, because the owner of Aski is at the same time also a buyer of German goods on a larger scale.

Whenever Aski do not run parallel with official clearing they constitute compensation deals and show the same disadvantages as these, in that the disagio (discount) analogous to the addition of a premium, leads to a price increase or a lowering of the quality of the goods to be imported by Germany.

In countries where it is possible in addition to Aski Marks also to obtain payment in actual foreign exchange the German exporters as a means of competition with the other German exporters, have frequently sold against Aski Marks in order to accord to the foreign buyer a price advantage

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instead of trying to obtain free foreign exchange. Thereby the price level was unnecessarily and uneconomically forced down so much that the firms which tried to obtain free foreign exchange no longer were able to compete. The arbitrary price stipulation here too resulted in resentment on the part of buyers of German goods and in the case of products coming under conventional agreement also on the part of foreign convention partners

d) Sperrmark (Blocked Reichmarks)

A distinction should be made between accepting blocked Reichmarks which had been in the possession of a foreign purchaser of German goods for some time and accepting blocked Reichmarks which were acquired. While with the former kind the advantages predominate, a foreign buyer's payment for German exports with acquired blocked Reichmarks, seems not advisable for psychological reasons; the feeling will arise in Germany's foreign creditors that German exports are now being financed by the losses which they suffered in Germany as a result of the freezing of their accounts which - subjectively viewed - they opened in good faith years ago. Though this is not for us a new or unknown point of view it should nevertheless be considered whether the importance of the blocked Reichmarks procedure - which today is exceedingly insignificant within the frame of export promotion as a whole - makes it worth while to continue exposing one's self to such a psychological burden which, of course, has also a detrimental effect on other export promotion measures.

e) Special arrangements

A special chapter which in my opinion will call for particular attention in the future are the so-called special arrangements. It is

easy to understand why in special cases where raw materials or agricultural products (copper, wool, corn, wheat) are being paid for

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in terms of airplanes, ships, etc. supplied in return - one handles such transactions by way of special "firm constructions" (Firmenkonstruktionen) and the like; as long as such special arrangements are a means to an end and do not become the end in itself no harm arises for other normal-type German sales organizations in a foreign market. As soon, however, as such special arrangements form their own objective this, on the other hand, must by necessity lead to contraction for the well-established commercial firms which, though they may not always be 100 % efficient, because their knowledge of the market covers a long period of time and because of the respect which they enjoy in the respective country serve as reliable vehicles for the German export industry; by the artificial cultivation of such special arrangements the smaller ones among these business firms will possibly have to close down; a weakening of their position will result for others, and again others will finally resort to buying foreign merchandise, especially those of American and Japanese make. Some day after the situation will once again be normal - after the reestablishment of normal trade relations and assimilation of currencies - we shall face the fact that the position of business firms which formerly were well established and which had taken care of German interests has become weakened all around and will then make it necessary to build anew at great expense in time and money that which will be necessary in order successfully to carry on German exports under normal circumstances.

2.) Shortcomings generally observed in Germany

a) Slackening of eagerness to export.

It is a generally known but a very deplorable condition and in no way devoid of danger that - without consideration for other obstacles - wide circles in the export trade today no longer manifest eagerness to export which is even reasonably commensurate with what should be expected due to the scope of export

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possibilities which actually exist; many firms prefer to utilize fully the high and low tides of business at home which involves no risk rather than to engage in export business which involves risks such as the rate of exchange and numerous other inconveniences. It is a known fact that the many complicated foreign exchange regulations which are not easily comprehensible to the small exporter cause considerable anxiety in addition. It is also a fact, however, that in complete misinterpretation of the Four Year Plan it is frequently being referred to as a justification for reverting increasingly to the inland business and to neglect the export business.

b) Clinging to views which are out of date.

Some export firms today still continue to believe that the German quality is so superior that it beats customers' price arguments. While this occurrence is not frequent, it nevertheless is important to point out that especially with regard to the quality which is in demand by the new markets also the so-called second quality of Japan is quite adequate, this

quite aside from the fact that meantime most of the other exporting countries have altogether remedied their former shortcomings in quality to a far-reaching degree.

- c) Allocations of raw materials which are too small and delivery dates which are too long.

Apart from the point referred to at the outset: "Providing of foreign exchange necessary for carrying the Four Year Plan into effect" this is the decisive point. I am convinced that if it were possible to go further than in the past in allocating raw materials for export purposes many export orders of large-scale scope which now fall through because delivery dates are too long, because allocations of materials are too small, and because plants are overburdened working for other purposes, could be secured which would then make it possible to procure in a relatively short time the foreign exchange

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which in turn, as already mentioned in the beginning, is necessary to import the raw materials required for carrying the Four Year Plan into effect. In the reverse case, however, exports are dwindling and will by necessity continue to shrink and with it also the supply of foreign exchange, thereby in equal measure also curtailing the possibility to procure raw materials which under all circumstances must as yet be imported, with all the consequences I have already described and which result therefrom of necessity.

With regard to delivery dates it must be pointed out especially that because of its geographical position the U. S. A. enjoys a natural freight advantage as regards Latin America just like Japan does as regards East Asia.

- d) Inadequate knowledge of the markets.

I pointed out repeatedly in reports - especially in my East-Asia Report - and in oral discussions how urgently necessary it is that leading economists go abroad personally and become acquainted with the development of the new markets right on the spot so as to acquire the right feeling for things as a result of their contacts with people and conditions. Finally, of what avail is the best and most intelligent report of the best and most intelligent representative abroad if the man at home who is directing is not in a position in his turn to read the report and make best use of it thanks to his own knowledge of things.

This inability to appraise the situation on the basis of own knowledge leads, as can often be observed, to misinterpretation of changes in the structure of new markets which are taken to be manifestations of seasonal business fluctuations. It is self-evident that with such elementary errors in market appraisal it is not possible to take the right measures.

- e) Representatives' insufficient contact with their Home Country.

The fact that at the present time and by reason of their contracts overseas representatives as a rule come home only every three to four years seems to me in the light of the rapid development of overseas market a superannuated arrangement. The fact that from the social point of view this leave-arrangement now as before is in order and well devised for the psychological and physical recreation of employees of overseas firms

is a matter not at issue. However, the man in charge of an overseas organization should preferably come home on business every year, but at least every other year, both to inform the management at home of latest developments in his country and for his own information, as well so as to become acquainted with the most recent phase of things at home. It is an old fact that however good reports from overseas may be and however precise the instructions sent out, they can never replace the oral exchange of ideas.

f) Slowness in adjusting

Even with a correct appraisal of the market situation it happens often that - if they do so at all - export firms are not fast enough in adapting their production and their other methods to the changed market situation. In this respect the Americans, with their methods which constantly and over and over again are being adapted to the modified market situations have an advantage over us; this applies in the first place to objects which are for daily use.

3.) Shortcomings generally observed in export markets.

a) German firms competing among each other.

It is a repeatedly observed fact - and this applies for markets all over the world that once German firms know that foreign competition has been eliminated for an order because with the help of export equalization measures they are in the lead for price quotation, they then start to contend with each other for the export business by continued underbidding. It is an intolerable situation that German firms who participate in the export promotion procedure

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use the export subsidies to indulge in undercutting of prices which in the last analysis goes on at the expense of the whole nation; export promotion measures, on the other hand, should serve exclusively for the application of just enough means as necessary in order to secure the order for Germany. Another unpleasant consequence which merely renders our position more difficult is the fact that as a result of this costly cutting of price and the resultant low price level resentment with foreign competitors will also be around who, should they too land an order again will likewise have to resort to that price level which has been pressed to an unnatural low.

I have already set forth the various manners in which such mutual underbidding of prices to the detriment of the whole nation is coming about (refer to Page 7, II.1.a Additional exports, and Page 8, II.1.b, Compensation transactions). It has furthermore also been established that business firms were in a position to offer products of industrial firms at essentially lower prices than the representatives of those industrial firms themselves were able to do.

b) Resentment on the part of foreign customers caused because of lack of uniformity in price quotations.

As already repeatedly stated unequal price quotations by German export firms carrying on their exports by export promotion means cause considerable resentment with foreign customers. Particularly disturbing and unpleasant cases are those in which a foreign buyer has covered his requirements at fixed prices while at the same time and because of some

special transaction - blocked Reichsmarks, Aski or compensation - a competitor firm is buying during that same period at essentially cheaper prices. These very considerations, especially also the psychological one should not be underestimated because they often result in a shift away from German goods compare

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page 8, II.1.b, Compensation transactions and Page 9, II.1.c, Aski).

c) Special interests of foreign representatives

The firms of foreign representatives, suggest products in the exchange of goods in which Germany is less interested but which are more profitable for the representative (for instance, Venezuela coffee instead of oil).

d) Inadequate financial support.

The principal support for the financing of German foreign trade in export markets is or should come from the German banks which, unfortunately suffered severely by the war. As the means of German banks overseas are very limited, German firms turn predominantly to foreign banks which in this way gain considerable insight into the German export business while, aside from their banking business German banks are at the same time also deprived of possibilities for information with the help of which they otherwise can be of considerable use to the German export economy objective advisers. On the other hand many transactions fail to come about because of lack of financing possibilities.

III. Proposals to remedy these shortcomings.

1.) Unification of export promotion measures.

a) Procedures for Additional Exports.

If at all possible one should endeavor to transform the maximum rates which still exist into normal rates so that as is customary for the procedure which uses normal rates for uniform treatment for all applicants may be applied in largest measure, and particularly in order to make it impossible for uneconomically working enterprises to receive aid which the plan does not propose, thereby burdening the firms which work economically.

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The drawback that - directly or indirectly - the procedure for additional export made up to now mutual underbidding in prices possible among German exporters can be basically remedied only by more relentless disciplinary measures against the exporting firms (compare III.2.b Measures against German firms which underbid each other with the aid of export promotion).

b) Compensation transactions

Restricting of compensation transactions as already initiated by official measures seems basically correct and in my opinion should be

amplified; this automatically also eliminates the possibility for mutual underbidding by individual business firms, with the variety of resultant detrimental effects already dealt with. Probably one should make sure however that in cases in which - as called for by the import regulations of the buying country - an allocation of import quotas can be obtained only if at the same time products of the respective country are being bought, the necessary exceptions would be granted in the future. Foreign customers, particularly those from overseas, who by reason of their dual character as purveyors of Germany for a long time already have had the possibility to sell their products in Germany by way of compensation will if the compensation deals are further restricted be able to continue or extend their purchases from Germany only if they continue to have the opportunity for exporting their own products to Germany at the same time. To achieve this while avoiding the detrimental effects of the premium system, the German exporter should be enabled to procure foreign exchange certificates for his foreign buyers' own deliveries to Germany, in that connection the wishes of the foreign customer as to the selection of the German importer could be complied with insofar as the necessity for even distribution of the imported goods does not suffer therefrom.

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c) Aski.

On principle, one can dispense with Aski as long as there is provision for official clearing.

Aski which are being traded with an officially approved discount (Disagio) should in the future be eliminated as a matter of principle or if they should continue to remain in existence they should be subject to state agreements which can be strictly controlled - such as they came about for Central and South America - in such cases the Aski discount should be fixed and the procedure for additional exports modified, taking conditions into account as they may prevail for the respective competition; for instance, in countries in which free exchange can also be obtained, by reducing the Z.A.V. (Procedure for additional exports) equalization rate by the discount on the Aski Mark. Under certain circumstances - in case a uniform arrangement and control cannot be obtained because of the fact that several banks are participating - this may be only possible if the Aski accounts are being concentrated in a single bank which is established in the respective country and is in constant contact with the competent German authorities, which bank prevents undesirable Aski Mark arbitrations and which pledges itself to safeguard the Aski Mark rate of exchange. Because of the advantages accruing from such an arrangement, the disadvantages inherent in such a bank monopoly must be accepted, if necessary; incidentally, practical experiences are already on record.

Where the fixation of the Aski Mark rate of exchange has not yet been introduced the attempt should be made to fix the loss equalization under Z.A.V. proportionate to the Aski rate of exchange fluctuations at that particular time.

d) Blocked Reichsmarks.

The authorization to pay for German goods, in part, out of blocked mark funds personally owned by the foreign purchaser for some time affords the possibility that due to his dual capacity as Germany's creditor he may gradually turn his frozen assets into money, thus constituting

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a considerable incentive for buying German goods; as the psychological disadvantages attendant upon payment in Blocked Reichsmarks which were purchased do not occur for this method in equal manner one should authorize this procedure also in the future. The payment by means of blocked Reichsmarks purchased should in my opinion, however, be prohibited, for the reasons mentioned (except U. S. A., where there are special conditions).

2.) How to prevent competition among German firms.

a) Control of export proceeds.

In my opinion, it will commend itself to make in special cases of export promotion test checks as to the export proceeds actually obtained. These test checks should be made in the respective country by a German "Central Confidential Office for the Carrying into Effect of Export Promotion" which I am yet to discuss in a special chapter, IV.2.b. on Page 27.

b) Measures against German export firms which underbid each other with the help of export promotion.

If, with the help of Z.A.V. compensation, a German firm underbids another German firm, it is the duty of the firm which has to meet underbidding to inform the Central Confidential Office in the respective country and it will examine the case. The Z.A.V. subsidy accorded to the firm which engaged in underbidding is to be reduced by the amount of its underbidding the other German firm, unless in especially unambiguous cases the whole compensation be cancelled. In a similar way one should proceed in the case of all underbiddings in which other export promotion means-of the direct or indirect kind - are being applied. Because it will often be difficult correctly to interfere, one should in cases where business practices give clear evidence of disregard for the requirements of political economy use more drastic measures similar to those applied in the case of violation of the price stop decree ;

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the result of such drastic measures applied in a few individual cases will have the result that infringements will occur in rare exceptional cases only.

c) Far-reaching cooperation among the representatives

In order to eliminate the temptation for representatives abroad to underbid each other for reasons connected with commissions it would be desirable in instances involving export transactions particularly suitable in that respect - but always proceeding only from case to case so as to keep such agreements as flexible as possible - for representatives to pool the sales commission; in the last analysis this means that an export volume kept constant in quantity as a result of avoiding underbidding in prices constitutes an increased export volume in terms of value and incidental thereto an increased income from commissions for each representative individually. This measure appears necessary to me especially because of the fact that many agency firms sell at the same time foreign products so as to keep a hold on the agencies and, above all, to achieve real market discipline.

3.) Placement of orders within the frame of the Four Year Plan only where efficient export achievements can be proven.

Enterprises which are expecting that orders will be placed with them by the State - provided they come into question for exports at all - should be given orders only if within the scope of what is possible they have done everything to promote exports and above all if they justifiably endeavored to cooperate in the procurement of the necessary raw materials from abroad.

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IV. Proposals for the intensification of exports and of export promoting measures, respectively.

1.) Measures to be taken in Germany

a) Creation of an Exports Promotion Committee of Industrial Economy within the frame of the Four Year Plan.

In establishing an Exports Promotion Committee of Industrial Economy the most important point of view it seems to me is that all the experiences, suggestions and concrete proposals which of necessity arise from the activity of the German export industry are being systematically gathered and channeled to an export promoting committee (Gremium) of industrial economy for practical application; in the form of information which was made the subject of systematic study and in the form of concrete proposals this material should then be made available to the agencies which are responsible to the government for carrying the export promotion by the state into effect.

The actual carrying into effect I view somewhat like this:

The organization of industrial economy comprises fifty Economics Groups (Wirtschaftsgruppen) in round figures the affiliated enterprises of perhaps forty of these Economics Groups having some connection with foreign trade.

Roughly estimated, approximately fifty enterprises of German economy constitute approximately two-thirds of the whole German export volume.

The above mentioned forty Economics Groups - including the six Reich Groups and the seven Main Groups of the Reich Group Industry - and the fifty enterprises which in some form or another have something to do with exports should be requested to make known by name their respective best exports in the field of the exports

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industry of the exports promotion technique (corroborated at the same time by as comprehensive a personal knowledge of export markets as possible. In that respect, the principle should be to name in the case of export business firms the first man and for industrial enterprises, banks, transportation companies and insurance companies the first man competent for questions pertaining to foreign countries and export, i.e. the best expert; this should apply for those personalities who are being directly nominated by the Reich and Economics Groups, respectively, as well as for

those who are being nominated by the approximately fifty enterprises referred to.

So as not to have too big a committee when establishing it, it would be advisable for the management of the National Chamber of Economics (Reichswirtschaftskammer) which I believe should, for expediency's sake also take over the chairmanship to pick from these approximately one hundred nominally mentioned personalities and some additional experts nominally announced by the national Chamber of Economics, those who are the best of the total, thirty in round figures.

Under the chairmanship of the management of the National Chamber of Economics, these 30 personalities would constitute the Export Promotion Committee of Industrial Economy; current business matters would have to be taken care of by a full-time general secretary.

The possible establishment of committees of a specialized nature (fachlich orientierte Gremien) in the individual Economics Groups which would handle the exports promotion - preferably within the frame of the specialty committees already existing in the Economics Groups and dealing with commercial policy - is not affected hereby.

In order to facilitate and make more comprehensible the work which this committee is to do in the field of exports promotion six sub-committees (compare the map attached as enclosure II

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"Division of the Continents", Page 44, could be established, i. e.:

Eastern Europe and the Near East (OE/VA)
Latin America (LA),
East Asia (OA)
Africa (Af)
Western Europe (WE)
North America (NA)

I chose this order according to what I believe to be the present importance of the various continents from the point of view of Germany's export promotion possibilities (as regards Africa a long range proposition).

Each sub-committee, under the chairmanship of the best expert for the respective continent - who, however, would also at the same time have to have the best possible knowledge of export markets all over the world, would then consist of an average of five persons.

The current business matters for each individual sub-committee would again be taken care of by a full-time secretary so that the qualified personnel of the Export Promotion Committee would altogether consist of a general secretary and six secretaries who, of course, should all have the most thorough knowledge of the respective markets from own observations.

The six chairmen of the sub-committees and the general secretary form a working committee under the chairmanship of the National Chamber of Economics.

Because it will happen very often that the questions dealt with by the working committee and the greater Exports Promotion Committee, respectively, overlap considerably into the sphere of general commercial policy

this working committee should be tied in with a Foreign Trade Council.

All enterprises of industrial economy which in some way participate in exporting should be requested by their competent Economics Group

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regularly to report once a month - broken down according to the six Laender Groups - on their latest experiences in the field of export promotion and such information they received from abroad as might be useful in that connection and, if possible, to add at the same time concrete proposals for the promotion of exports. The simplest way would be if all these enterprises would receive from the competent Economics Groups a report blank or a questionnaire, on the basis of which the regular reports would have to be prepared; moreover, it would be in order for every enterprise to make additional reports available if it desires.

It might then prove expedient for this information and the information received from all of the governmental party and other agencies which receive such information from abroad, currently or from case to case - to be examined by the various Economics Groups and compiled according to Laender Groups, thereupon to be passed on to the competent secretary of the various sub-committees.

The secretaries would then have to process this information from the factual point of view and pass it on to the members of the various sub-committees, and to the chairmen of the sub-committees which are not concerned with the subject matter.

Moreover as far as this information is of general value it might be made available to all government and Party agencies which in any way at all might have something to do with foreign trade.

The prerequisite for future participation in the export promotion procedure of each individual enterprise of industrial economy should henceforth be the active cooperation in this information service.

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The practical suggestions for the promotion of exports with which the six sub-committees have been dealing should then be submitted to the official competent offices - by way of the working committee if they are basic in nature or otherwise directly - as the Export Promotion Committee of Industrial Economy is altogether thought to be of service to the official offices.

The proposals as made above do not claim perfection; they could, however if further supplemented in matters of organization be broadened and buttressed.

In summing up, the following angles seem to me to be the decisive ones

Centralized embracing of all knowledge and experiences gained and intensified use of existing possibilities for carrying export promotion as much into effect and the practical tasks arising therefrom for the committee. None of the shortcomings, nor the suggestions are in any way exhaustive; much rather will it be a primary task for the new Export Promotion Committee to do systematic and exhaustive work along that line.

The definite tying-in of export promotion into the framework of the Four Year Plan and its integral importance thereby brought out for carrying the latter into effect.

In the case of all of these considerations one largely proceeded from the idea that it is up to the big enterprises, with the help of their organizations and of the qualified personnel which they have at their disposal to do pioneer work also benefiting the smaller export enterprises.

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b) Market investigations and informative trips.

This has already been referred to in various preceding pages. It seems essential to me that over and above this, and apart from the material which is being systematically gathered by the sub-committees of the Export Promotion Committee and by the official offices, the Economic Groups and the big export enterprises also compile at the same time exact knowledge on foreign markets - that is: material strictly brought up to date in each case - this knowledge must become the common property of all organizations in any way participating in exports.

2) Measures to be taken with German agencies abroad.

a) Reich Agencies and industrial economy agencies abroad.

Staffing of English and American embassies, legations and consulates when compared with ours shows that up to now we have not attached equal importance to the assignment of first-class officers for the posts of commercial attaches - from the view point of personality nor on principle - which is primarily explained by considerably higher means which England and America are spending for this purpose. In the case of England the commercial attache is of equal rank with a councillor of an embassy, as a result of which he, of course, enjoys an altogether different prestige in the respective country. The English commercial attache, by the way, also gives up his diplomatic career and develops a special type of career.

Similar considerations apply for the Syndic and for the rest of the personnel of German commercial chambers abroad.

Steps for bringing about a change of conditions in the German diplomatic service in that respect are already under way.

b) Central Confidential agencies for carrying export promotion measures into effect.

It might be opportune to consider if under the leadership of the respective commercial attache in each of the countries such a central

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confidential agency should not be established to which would also belong: the president and the Syndic of the German Chamber of Commerce, the economic expert (Wirtschafts-Referent) of the NSDAP, the head or the heads of German banks abroad, and some outstanding representatives of the German exports interests in the respective country; as far as the latter are concerned, however, one should be sure that by reason of their personality as well as due to the structure of their business, they are in a position

to express objective and comprehensive opinions. This body (Gremium) should, so to speak, be the counterpart to the official offices and the sub-committees of the Export Promotion Committee, respectively, here in Germany, acting not only in regard to the questions previously already mentioned but also in regard to other questions such as a decision on compensation rate levels and above all on the transmission of proposals and suggestions of all kinds concerning the way in which German exports to the respective country could be promoted.

c) Adding new elements to foreign personnel.

One should make it a practice more than heretofore to send men abroad who are specialists in particular fields of technique as well as also economy (export promotion technique, specialists for industrial developments, etc.) to whom firms can permanently turn for consultation, always limiting these assignments for a period of several years so that the respective experts always reach their posts equipped with as up-to-date knowledge as possible; this would also have the additional advantage that the experts who return home by way of exchange could furnish the home organization with fresher and better knowledge of the special conditions abroad.

In regard to these assignments as well as in selecting the general type of personnel for service abroad one should be guided by the principle that only the best ones are just good enough. In contrast with at home the man abroad, and the specialist in particular, has largely to rely on his own resourcefulness and a bad man abroad

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- and this holds true in every respect - does more harm than 99 good men can remedy. Therefore, the slogan should be: good men into the front line.

d) National training for the younger generation of German descent.

As an element in the nationalization movements individual countries make it increasingly a requirement for the firms in the respective country that the personnel even when working exclusively for foreign interests be employees having the nationality of that respective country. In view of this development which is dictated by necessity it is important that - in conjunction with the German Reich and Party agencies abroad - German economy takes up right now - and in many cases this has already been done - the training of young nationals of the respective country who are of German descent and who have acquired the citizenship of the new country, moreover this should be done not only by the firms in the respective country which work for German economy but also here in Germany itself so that while here with German firms and in the midst of German employees they may by force of circumstances acquire knowledge as well as experience and, above all, a loyal attitude towards Germany and serve later as a reliable stock for the representation of German interests abroad.

e) Concentration and intensification of German banks abroad.

On this subject I have already made concrete proposals to the competent authorities after my return from the East Asia trip. It seems to me essential that German banks abroad especially in overseas, be supported by all German export firms so as to enable them again to do justice to their tasks as regards the German export industry in a way

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which would be fully equal to actual requirements; this calls for the support by export firms at home as well by organizations abroad on that they would refer to them a large portion of the current banking business and as well as other measures. On the other hand it will be necessary for the banks to do justice to increased requirements by modernizing and concentrating their machinery.

f) Support to German Chambers of Commerce abroad.

It is superfluous to point to the necessity that every German firm abroad must become a member of the German Chamber of Commerce in the respective country; firms which do not comply with this self-evident duty should not be allowed to participate in the export promotion procedure.

g) Support to German cultural institutions abroad.

The recognition that, after all, supporting German cultural institutions is a matter which concerns economy as well has more and more asserted itself. Cultivation of the German language, exchange of young merchants and students as well as Germany's prestige altogether which it acquires in the respective country through its cultural institutions (German school, hospital, German university, etc.) benefit, after all, also the export merchant.

h) Support to German newspapers abroad.

The higher the standard of German newspapers abroad the more justified is the expectation that the number of readers will increase, the easier will be the work of enlightenment as regards Germany, and the easier will it, at the same time be to cope with propaganda directed against our exporting methods and against our successful penetration of the new markets.

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On the other hand, the advertisements which German firms should place with German newspapers - and this is an indispensable necessity for a profitable foundation of German newspapers abroad - gain increased value because they are being read by a wider circle of readers.

One possibility to increase the demand for and the prestige of German newspapers in overseas would be for German newspapers to bring from time to time editorials written by leading German personalities who have established a name for themselves abroad as altogether any interest shown by the mother country in ideas or material things signifies an addition to the prestige of German newspapers abroad, and with it to the German cause.

Dr. I/Duc
6 April 1937

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Enclosure I

Lecture
by

Dr. MAX MILLNER

deputy member of the Vorstand of
I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft

Member of the
Beirat of the German Group of the
International Chamber of Commerce, Paris

on Friday, 5 March 1937

before the Board of Administration of the
International Chamber of Commerce
in Paris.

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Herr President, Gentlemen,

I have been requested to give my lecture directly in the English language so as to obviate the need of interpretation and, should there be lack of clarity in my way of expressing myself, kindly be indulgent.

Subject

The subject on which I am to speak is one of the most widely discussed and one which is most gratifying, for two reasons, firstly, because it involves the industrialization of new countries within the frame of the industrialization and nationalization trends manifesting themselves everywhere and, secondly, because of all overseas export markets Latin America is at the present time undoubtedly the one which develops most rapidly

Unfounded
apprehensions

I know that most of the industrialists of the highly industrialized countries have considerable apprehensions that by helping in the industrialization of those new countries to become industrialized they might lose their own markets. It seems to me essential to go into this basic question at the very beginning of my lecture because upon the correct answer to it, it naturally depends whether the strong dynamics of Latin-America's economy can be exploited for the benefit of an increased turnover of world trade. The answer is not difficult if we consider in retrospect the industrial development of the world and if we remember that at one time industrialized England felt the same apprehensions with regard to the industrialization of the continental European countries, and later on England and the European

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countries together at the time of the industrialization of the United States and finally, all of them together at the time of the industrialization of Japan. The world is round and that which can be done in one part of the globe one some day will also be able to do in the other part of the globe. The question is

only: will this development be an organic and economically reasonable one? It is particularly up to the highly developed industrial countries to answer this question positively. We know that through further developing a country with predominantly agricultural resources and raw materials into a country with agricultural industry, an essential percentage of the newly created purchasing power is being absorbed by the newly created domestic production, but additional purchasing power over and above that will at the same time be released by reason of the higher standard of living for the importation of products of higher value, which will benefit the export business of countries which already are more highly industrialized. Even though this is a truism in political economy I nevertheless think that it is right for an economist to give thought to this recognition and to make his arrangements accordingly.

Real
Dangers

It would be deplorable, however, if because one failed to assist technically and financially one were to force the new countries to carry through at their own responsibility and without the support of countries which already had to pay dearly for their wisdom a development which as it did come into existence already can for many reasons no more be inhibited. The danger of wrong investments would naturally result, thereby bringing about a weakening of the purchasing power of the respective new countries which indirectly would in turn detrimentally affect all the industrial countries which export to that country.

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dare to establish an order of sequence for the Latin American countries as regards possibilities for the development of purchasing power or the possibility of exports' increase for the industrialized states.

Argentina's leading position rests essentially in her long tradition of dealings with overseas, with the resultant experience for its human material available for an organic intensification of industry. Unlike other Latin American countries especially Brazil, Argentina does not have rich mineral deposits; she therefore is endeavoring to make up for this disadvantage by concentrated efforts, such as improvement of agricultural methods, a vigorous tendency towards industrialization and reorganization of the banking system. A disposition to combine with foreign groups on a national basis, of course, is more pronounced in Argentina than in any other Latin American country.

Brazil and Mexico follow taking the second place both mainly for the same reason, i.e. because of the abundance of mineral resources. Brazil especially also because of her big population which, however, does not have the same purchasing power as that of Argentina, and because of her having abandoned the exclusive cultivation (mono culture) of coffee, in favor of large cotton plantations, which gives the country greater resistance from the point of view of economy.

Mexico's favorable geographic position is of added special importance, though, in Mexico, possibilities for the

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natural development of the country

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are concomitant with the exploitation of the mineral resources and their industrial utilization in the country itself, the problem of the intensification of agriculture which presently suffered a setback because of certain settlement experiments, is nevertheless important. The Mexican worker and farmer is as a rule diligent and intelligent and otherwise, of healthy stock.

It is, of course, difficult to establish an exact order of sequence for the remaining countries, all the more so as the only country on the West coast whose trade with the world was important already before the war - Chile - longer holds this privileged position today.

Through the intensification of agriculture - in the first place cotton - and of mining Peru's development was especially favorable and fast. At present the general economic situation in Peru is quite favorable but the disposition to utilize the reaped profits for the development of the country itself, is still relatively insignificant.

Development by
air plane
service

At this point a study of the fundamentals in the development of the Latin American countries, by air plane service, especially of those situated on the West Coast is particularly interesting. One can say that because of the fast development of from 20 to 30 years; it is no longer necessary to wait until railroads and roads are built, the air plane makes districts accessible which otherwise would yet have remained inaccessible for many years.

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I should like to cite as an example that in Peru tin mines situated 4,000 m. above sea-level have been developed by air service in that not only the machinery was taken right to the site by air planes but hauling of ores was likewise done in the same way; and all this on an absolutely economical and profitable basis.

Especially Columbia, "the country without roads and railroads", as it is often called, has profited from this development of plane service. The air port Barranquilla on the North coast, has developed into an air port of considerable world import. Columbia is doubtless a country whose development can still be carried very far. Among her most pressing problems ranges the question of the intensification of agriculture, especially as regards the growing of coffee so as to use the areas thereby released for the growing of food heretofore imported.

Also Venezuela whose fast development really occurred in the last two decades only, owes much to air transportation, apart from her rich oil deposits and its particularly favorable geographical position with regard to the United States as well as also with regard to Europe. Whether the granting of concessions to foreign groups - so liberally handled by the late president

Gomez and which undoubtedly increased the prosperity of the country very much - will be continued in the same manner remains a question as yet to be answered. In any way, industry and especially the foreign Konzerne for the moment are biding their time.

Chile whose old ties to the non-American rest of the world I already mentioned

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was able through international cooperation to free itself successfully from the difficult situation into which it had been placed by the development of synthetic nitrogen. Though today Chile's dependence on saltpeter is no longer so pronounced, the desire naturally exists to distribute the national production over various branches; copper plays a towering role here but prospects for the development of other mineral resources are also propitious.

Chile, at one time very rich, has a relatively low purchasing power now which is considerably depleted. Unless the industrialized countries try jointly to raise this purchasing power it will also not be possible to increase the total exports of the industrialized countries to Chile. Of Chile's population of almost 5 million hardly 1 million can actually be considered to have purchasing power.

Raising of
purchasing
power

I should like to add here a basic remark. Often the question is raised how, in view of the relative scarcity of Latin America's population, one should proceed in order to bring about an essential increase in purchasing power; it is important to remember that of the population actually existing today, only a relatively very small part - similarly as in Chile - can be considered as really able to buy and that the very task of establishing purchasing power for the population which actually exists today would mean a multiplication of the present purchasing power. This also includes the education of the poorer classes of the population in the various countries by which one would make them understand the meaning and the usefulness of modern products; this

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will largely be the task of the circles selling the products, in cooperation with the national authorities.

Similarly as in Chile, but on a smaller scale, the abundance of mineral resources is of primary importance for the industrial development of Bolivia. Bolivia evidently still suffers because of effects of the war but for that very reason, assistance intelligently granted by the industrial countries can contribute much to rebuild the purchasing power.

Ecuador, which resembles Peru and Bolivia in its industrial structure still offers possibilities for development in spite of its unfavorable geographical position, especially with regard to Europe. Ecuador will also benefit by the development in progress for Peru and Columbia.

In the series of medium-size states whose possibilities for industrial development can be called especially favorable, we find Uruguay, the only state situated on the east coast, which with predominantly agricultural problems has in its structure great similarity with Argentina. Although the market's capability to absorb is relatively limited, the good organization of the country constitutes nevertheless a sound basis for the industrialization.

I am not in a position to express an opinion on Paraguay because I have not been there. As regards the Central American States, their conditions have similarity, apart from Panama which occupies a special position.

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Other problems are the discontinuation of the mono culture of coffee and the shift to other cultures in addition, and closer bonds between the various states for the purpose of establishing an industrial field of greater magnitude.

Basic
perceptions
symptoms

Because of lack of time, I unfortunately had to desist from dealing with the individual countries in sufficient detail which at least would be fairly commensurate with their importance and the great interest which they deserve; I have attached greater value to bringing out the general basic perceptions and the common symptoms.

Basic
principles
of the
industrial
development

For all the countries mentioned, it seems to me decisive that the industrialization be built up in an organic manner, based on the sub-surface mineral deposits and on the products of the country: only under such conditions, of course, should the various industry groups be ready to participate in the development. Only when proceeding with such carefulness and thoroughness - which of course, is possible only if one systematically studies the economic structure of the whole country beforehand - so as to obtain perfectly clear picture of what constitutes the problems which will have to be tackled next - will the result be sound in every respect.

In all Latin American countries the development of Power sources and of the communication system is of particular importance. Difficulty arises almost everywhere because of the lack of qualified workers. In this connection, we are led to the problem of immigration and settlement of such qualified workers.

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No high
Industri-
alization

One more word to the basic question of industrialization: I do not think that from the point of view of the industrialized countries, there should be any reason for apprehensions - if such an expression has any justification at all - that even as an issue of long-range importance, not considering one or another exception the Latin American countries will develop to play a leading role as industry states comparable to that of the U.S. A. for instance. In the case of the Latin American countries, prerequisites such as are necessary for the development into a highly

industrialized country strictly speaking do not exist. Only large-size countries with large populations and purchasing power can develop special and leading productions because a large home market with purchasing power is a prerequisite for this: the only country for which these prerequisites might perhaps be given is Brazil; for the time being, however, this will fail because of the lack of suitable labor. Aside from this, however, the structure of most of the Latin American countries varies so much from that of the industrialized countries that even with most intensive development the direction of necessity will be a different one.

Adjustment
to the
markets

For highly industrialized countries to play a leading role in this field in the future, the prerequisite will be, however, a constant activity with a view to thorough exploration of the various markets and an adjustment of home production to the constantly changing demands of the markets.

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Methods of
national
partners

It would seem to me, however, that also as regards the methods which the industrialized countries apply in participating in the industrialization, a basic change - is imperative which in fact has already happened in many cases. The possibility to come as a stranger into the country and to start a new enterprise which is a 100 % foreign enterprise is no longer given because of the trends towards nationalization which exist markedly everywhere and can be understood. It is important that the national partner whom the foreigner must look for, has the feeling that the industrial development benefits his own country in the first place and public opinion in the country will the more be ready to accord full protection to the foreign partner if it sees in him an ally and not a person practising usufruct (Nutzniesser).

Financing

Even if with such developments financing has to be done mainly by foreign groups there are nevertheless already hopeful beginnings of a development of national financing, especially in Argentina, but also in Brazil, Mexico and Peru. It is evident that thereby a reasonable collaboration between partners of the various industrialized countries interested provides a more solid base, and it seems to me that the problems which are to be solved are too great to be carried into effect by one single nation.

Collaboration

It is evident that because of the varying amount of their investments and of their activity in the Latin American countries, the interests of the various industrialized countries must be appraised

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differently. But I believe that with loyal and just appreciation for this circumstance, there is an ample field for activity and that, after all, the greater this activity - based on reasonable collaboration, of course, and not on competition - the more benefit will result therefrom for the purchasing power of the respective countries, and thereby indirectly also for the volume of the world commerce.

German
methods

Although the methods according to which the individual industrialized countries presently proceed carry and frequently bring natural criticism ahead, I nevertheless ask your permission for the remark that especially the methods used by Germany which recently gave repeated cause for criticism will, I believe, because of the ratiocination and methodicalness in their development carry within themselves in embryo the germ-cell of the methods which will be generally acknowledged in the future; perhaps this is explained by the fact that as a result of her peculiar position after the war, Germany has suffered most from market fluctuations and crises and therefore has become more receptive for a correct and well-timed adjustment to the changed structure of the world.

Contact

I believe that for the economists and more particularly for the industrialists of our period, it is a basic requirement to obtain a clear concept of the change in structure of the various countries so as to find the methods which this new structure calls for.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, HERTHA C. KNUTH, AGO No. X-046355, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-1570.

HERTHA C. KNUTH
U. S. Civilian
AGO No. X-046355

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II. Department II of the Secretariat

1.) Powder Project Argentina/File Notes of 13.7. by Dr. P. MUELLER

JIGNER informed the meeting of the content of the file notes dated 13.7., of director-general Dr. Paul MUELLER which reveal that complete agreement exists concerning future proceedings in Argentina and that a common line of action has been found.

2.) The visit of Dr. WEISS/WALLOTH to Banks in Rio de Janeiro.

Postponed until Dr. WEISS' return.

3.) Support of BUNGE & BORN .

In accordance with his assignment, Dr. BOHN inquired about the attitude of the Imperial Chemical Industries, (I.C.I.) London, toward BUNGE & BORN and came to the conclusion that I.C.I. would consider it regrettable if technical support were given to BUNGE & BORN by I.G., since BUNGE & BORN failed to keep a previous agreement with I.C.I.

FRANK-FAHLE reported that co-operation with BUNGE & BORN was never considered seriously and that he has informed Dr. WEISS in South America of this accordingly, since the above firm, which is essentially a trading firm,

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merely wants to enter the chemical field for purposes of investing capital and speculation, whereas long-term constructive co-operation is out of the question. Dr. JACOBI is to be informed accordingly by Secretariat II. This matter is to be discussed at the meeting of the Commercial Committee.

4.) Attitude of Chemical Committee toward Chinese Projects.

JIGNER discussed the attitude of the Chemical Committee toward projects in China. This attitude, which was decided upon at the Chemical Committee meeting of 23.6. of this year, makes it clear that co-operation with interested parties in China will not be considered if we are not, at the same time, given controlling influence over the project.

On the other hand, it was shown that Dr. WOO had agreed to co-operate with I.G. on a 50:50 basis in several fields (dinitrochlorobenzol, artificial resin and carbon disulphide), and that, therefore, the objections of the chemical committee were untenable. The matter is to be discussed by the commercial committee.

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5.) Dr. ANDERHUB's Report on the First International Cellophane Meeting.

JLGNER informed all participants in the mail discussion meeting of the content of the report by Director Dr. ANDERHUB on the first international cellophane meeting.

III. Central Financial Administration.

1.) Application Concerning Iron Supplies for I.G.

The application in hand was discussed. In a joint discussion, FRANK-FAHLE, GATTINEAU, KERSTEN, DIHLMANN and GIERLICHS are to go over the application once more, taking into consideration the suggestions of Direktor WEISS, Ludwigshafen, (Direktor Dr. STRUSS has informed us that he has no more changes to suggest) and then to send it off.

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2.) Formation of a Company with I.C.I.

JLGNER reported that, in view of the general political situation, formation of a company is only possible in the form of a loose association and that it is planned to develop this company into a "DEN"-Company (German-English-Norwegian) by incorporating Norak HYDRO in it.

3.) Swiss Financial Settlement.

KERSTEN reported that, preliminary questions having been cleared, the application in its final form is on hand and is to go out on the same day with JLGNER's signature. A copy of the application, together with a personal letter by JLGNER, is to be sent to Geheimrat SCHMITZ.

4.) Suggestions to v. JAGWITZ's Office for the Promotion of Export.

The Foreign Trade Branch of the Office of the Four-Year Plan (Ministerialrat SCHLOFFNER) has urged I.G. to suggest possible measures for increasing exports, in particular, measures which become effective in the shortest possible time, in order to alleviate the German raw material and food situation. A provisional draft was discussed. It is to be gone over once more and then presented to the Commercial Committee for approval.

5.) Acquisition of Paris Real Estate.

KERSTEN stated that the Sopi (Soc. pour l'importation de Matieres Colorantes et des Produits Chimiques, Paris) has in the meantime acquired a double lot which is twice as large as originally intended. The requisite permission for the purchase has been granted by the German foreign currency office. The real estate acquired makes it possible to furnish

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rooms for I.G. representatives temporarily in Paris; in addition, it is planned to have representative conference rooms in order to be able to invite foreign business associates to negotiations at the Sopi.

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IV. Economic Policy Department.

1.) Lessing School.

GATTINEAU reported that the Central Committee has expressed misgivings about our acceptance of free tickets for our employees as partial compensation for our donations.

GATTINEAU is to submit to JIGNER the draft of a letter in which it is pointed out how important these free tickets are for the schooling and further training of employees. Should the Central Office oppose it on principle, I.G. Berlin NW7 is to provide a supplementary sum in compensation for the free tickets.

Not on the agenda: Trade Publicity in Brazil/Assistant for Curitiba.

Since the Wigrü Chemistry failed in its attempt to obtain the means for paying an assistant for Curitiba from the Publicity Council of the German Economy, it has turned to us once more and inquired whether we are willing, if necessary, to finance this project together with other firms.

JIGNER ordered that the Secretariat I was to ask Professor ENDELL what his attitude was toward this plan and that the Wipo was to find out the attitude of the authorities. A provisional decision is to be given to the Wigrü Chemistry.

V. Economics Department.

VI. Press Section.

1.) "Bayer" Flag for Prl. KAMMERGAARD.

GREFFNER reported about the incident and informed us that timely action by Herr LAURER prevented unpleasant publicity. Consul-General WAIN stated that he knew nothing of this incident, that it occurred as a result of independent action by the Pharma-representation at Copenhagen.

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VII. Organization/Employees.

1.) Appointments.

JIGNER announced appointments:
as Department Heads

of Dr. BACHEM, Dept. For the Promotion of Export,
Dr. NOACK, Wipo Liaison Office,

as Assistant Department Heads

of DORN, Economies Dept. II
Dr. RUPP, Economies Dept. I

KERSTEN is to investigate whether it is possible under the existing business statutes to commission an assistant business manager for Oelsaat-Verwertungs-G.m.b.H.; if not, he is to find out whether requisite changes can be carried out without difficulty.

2.) Inter-Plant Production Race.

KERSTEN reported on a circular letter of the Wigrü Chemistry according to which participation by plants of the chemical industry in the production race is out of the question until final clarification of the problem. Those firms which have already entered the competition are to withdraw.

Not on the agenda: Regulation of Working Hours.

HELPERT was instructed to examine, together with the department heads and section chiefs, whether it would be practical to fix working hours for summer and winter uniformly at from 08:30 until 17:30 hours. At the same time, investigation is to be made at all departments to see whether introduction of regular shifts (change of early and late shifts) is necessary and advisable.

Signed: JIGNER.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

13 June 1947

I, Arthur MACNAMARA, Civ. No. 20 191, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-5728.

Arthur MACNAMARA
Civ. No. 20 191

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-653
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Dr. G. von SCHWITZLER

Frankfurt/Main, 12 August 1937.

To
Geheimrat Professor Dr. C. Bosch,
LUDWIGSHAFEN/RHEIN

My dear Geheimrat,

may I take the liberty of informing you in this way that, at the suggestion of and in accord with Geheimrat Schmitz, we intend to establish a closer contact between the commercial directors of I.G. in the following manner:

It has become more and more evident that apart from the current commercial tasks of the individual Sparte which are being handled by the Sparte itself, questions of purely economic character as well as questions referring to political economy and financial politics which transcend the competence of the Sparte, arise which are either of general interest for the whole of I.G. or are likely to influence the interests of another Sparte apart from the one immediately concerned.

Today, the foremost of all these questions is the boosting of export which is not only acute as far as the levying of the tax or the equalization of the losses resulting from individual business transactions is concerned, but in connection with the execution of the Four Year Plan it has been positively stated that today boosting of exports has priority over everything else, to a certain degree even over defense politics.

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The problems in connection herewith concern, apart from the point of view of internal economics, our relations to the big foreign competitors with whom after all connections exist in practically almost every field of our activity nowadays in the highest degree. Mainly it is I.C.I., Dupont, Montecatini and the French chemical industry as a whole that must be considered. As you know, in the last years these latter relations to the various foreign groups have been strengthened as well as considerably extended without regard to the tension in foreign politics, it is hardly any longer possible for any single of us to survey the whole extent of the various obligations to any extent. Today the activities of our representatives abroad are also influenced in a far reaching degree by the inland trade measures (Control of foreign exchange economy clearing, compensation business etc.) on the one hand and consideration of the numerous contractual obligations to competitors on the other hand.

Our big I.G. meetings which today are held in a very concentrated form in accordance with the wishes of all participants have, because of the limited time, left us insufficient opportunity for discussing the only generally indicated problems with the commercial directors as thoroughly as had been tried and partly also carried out in former years and which has become necessary today. Following up the same ideas which you expressed in 1927 with the aim of effecting a stronger concentration

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of all the commercial interests, we would now like to initiate a closer cooperation of the leading sellers and for this purpose shall convene for the first time on Friday, 20 August in Berlin. Besides me the participants are:

Fischer (Benzine)
Haeffliger, Frankfurt
Ilgner, Berlin
Krueger, "
Mann, Leverkusen
Muehlen, Frankfurt
Oster, Berlin
Otto, "
Waibel, Frankfurt
Weber-Andrease, "

Frank-Fahle to keep minutes.

These meetings are to take place periodically at 6 weeks approximately intervals. The place is optional but in practice it will probably be Berlin to avoid too many special journeys. After all developments have led to the fact that the greater part of the matters which occupy us in this connection cannot be severed from Berlin because of the numerous public interests connected with them. At the first meeting for instance questions like the boosting of exports, foreign exchange control, procurement of raw materials etc. are almost exclusively to be discussed, that is questions which already with regard to their competence always point to Berlin. The meeting is planned as an informal one; similar meetings have already irregularly taken place in a shorter form. If you should be of the opinion that the Verwaltungsrat should nevertheless take up the matter, our September meetings would provide an opportunity for this. In September we shall also contact Dr. Paul Mueller as to the way in which we should

(Page 4 of original)

include the explosives interests in our circle. Now my request is that you attend our meeting (from 10 o'clock in Unter den Linden 82) in case you should be in Berlin around 20 August or if you have engagements during the day to spend the evening with us. We are inviting our representatives from abroad who are on leave in Germany to this evening meeting although not very many of them will be able to show up. In any case, Herr Weber of Shanghai and Herr Hamers of Rio de Janeiro will spend the evening

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-653
Cont'd

with us. I take the liberty of enclosing an invitation card.

Yours very truly,

(signature) G. von Schnitzler.

Carbon copy to Geheimrat Schmitz, Berlin.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. NI-653.

DOROTHEA L. GALEWSKI,
AGO 34079.

END

-3-

- 1) Minutes
of the Meeting of the Commercial Committee
on Friday, 20 August 1937 at 10 a.m.
in Berlin NW 7, Unter den Linden 82.

Attended by:

von SCHNITZLER ✓	Chairman
HAEFLIGER ✓	
ILGNER ✓	
KRUEGER ✓	
MANN ✓	
MUEHLEN ✓	
OTTO ✓	
WAIHEL ✓	
MEER-ANDREAE	
FRANK-FAHLE ✓	Recorder

- 1) Constitution and Basic Matters.

Dr. von SCHNITZLER gave an account of his conference with Geheimrat SCHNITZ and of his statements to Geheimrat BOSCH on the necessity of closer contact of the leading businessmen of the I.G., which led to the convening of today's meeting.

The following decisions were made:

- a) The Commercial Committee will consist, in the future, of the following members:

✓ von SCHNITZLER	Chairman
✓ FISCHER	
✓ HAEFLIGER	
✓ ILGNER	
✓ KRUEGER	
✓ MANN	
✓ MUEHLEN	
✓ OSTER	
✓ OTTO	
✓ WAIHEL	
✓ MEER-ANDREAE	
✓ FRANK-FAHLE	Recorder.

(page 2 of original)

Geheimrat BOSCH and Geheimrat SCHNITZ are always to be informed of the dates of meetings.

Dr. Paul MUELLER is to be invited to the meetings of the Commercial Committee as representative of the Explosives Group (Sprengstoff-Gruppe).

The commercial interests of the firm Kalle and Co. will be taken care of by Herr OTTO.

b) The Commercial Committee shall meet at least once a month, when possible on every first Friday of a month at 0930 hours. The exact time of the next two meetings is to be decided in the previous meeting.

c) The compilation and the preparation of the agenda is the task of the Office of the Commercial Committee, which places the agenda before the participants after it has been approved by the Chairman and the members of the Commercial Committee.

(page 3 of original cont'd)

2) Organization and field of activities of the I.G., Berlin NW 7.
a) Scheme of organization.

Dr. ILGMER reported on the field of activities of the I.G. organization in Berlin NW 7 and gave a brief account of how it came to be founded. As the work performed by the Berlin central offices consists mainly of centralized auxiliary functions in the field of business and economic^{ly} generally, close cooperation with individual sales combines and concern firms (Konzernfirmen) had already developed in the earlier years. As the present situation with regard to raw materials and foreign exchange made it necessary for increased attention to be paid to all these activities, it became essential to ensure still closer cooperation in future. In this connection all participants welcomed and accepted a proposal made by Dr. ILGMER to the effect that the Commercial Committee should in future share the responsibility for the general commercial and economic problems to be handled by the Berlin central offices.

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The organization scheme which had been submitted was then discussed and approved by the Commercial Committee. In view of the fact that in many instances leading gentlemen of the I.G. did not appear to be familiar with all the details of the field of activities and organization of the Berlin central offices, it was decided that these data should be made available to the members of the Central Committee by Mr. von SCHMITZLER.

b) Essential facts from the report on Latin America.
(Functions of the I.G. Verbindungsmann).

Following the debate on the report on Latin America compiled by Dr. ILGMER a discussion arose regarding the duties of the I.G. Verbindungsmann (hitherto called "Zefi-confidential agents" - Zefi-Vertrauensmann), their deputies and assistants. towards industrializat

There was general agreement that, owing to the ever increasing tempo in the world, it was imperative for the I.G. foreign organizations to have in all the larger towns abroad such persons as Verbindungsmann who, by virtue of the positions they held and their knowledge of prevailing conditions could judge correctly the developments of their own country and give advice to the management; to home accordingly. For that reason the Commercial Committee thinks it advisable that the former institution of the Zefi-confidential agents ("Zefi-Vertrauensmann"), who were already very active in this direction, be given increased consideration in their extended capacity as "I.G. Verbindungsmann."

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3) Promotion of export.
a) Letter to the Plenipotentiary for the realization of the Four Year Plan, Foreign Trade Branch (Geschäftsgruppe fuer Aussenhandel).

1) Dr. ILGMER reports that the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan Schlot- Foreign Trade Branch, has requested us to ascertain what additional terer measures can be taken, in view of existing conditions with regard to positiv German foreign exchange, raw materials and food-stuffs, to achieve as soon as possible a further increase in our exports. The draft of a

(page 4 of original cont'd)

reply composed on the basis of data made available by the sales combines is approved. Dr. von SCHMITZLER emphasizes that it is necessary to point out to the authorities in a suitable form that, if I.G.'s international trade is to be maintained and expanded, capital investments abroad for which foreign exchange will have to be allocated to us, will be unavoidable in the future as well. It is agreed upon that it will not be necessary to mention this point expressly in our reply, as it is already stressed in the attached memorandum by Dr. ILGNER: "Promotion of export within the framework of the Four Year Plan".

2) b) Letter to the Plenipotentiary for Iron and Steel Control.

In connection with the above-mentioned letter, the problem of securing iron supplies for the I.G. works was dealt with. The solution of this problem is essential if production is to be maintained and if, consequently, all our commitments are to be fulfilled. The petition drafted by the I.G., Berlin NW 7, in cooperation with Messrs. JAHNE, STEUSS, WEISS and the Vermittlungsstelle 4,

(page 5 of original)

dated 18 August 1937 and addressed to the General Plenipotentiary for the German Iron Control was read to the assembly. In the ensuing discussion it was decided that this petition was to be attached to our reply dealing with the promotion of export.

5) South-American problems.

Following a general report on the export-situation in South America and particularly on the activities of rival Konzerns, measures to be taken by the I.G. are being discussed. It is the general understanding that in order to be able to cope with the great activity of the Anglo-saxon Konzerns, reinforcements will be required throughout the whole of the foreign organizations. The individual items provided for by the agenda are adjourned till the next meeting.

6) Business with Old Spain.

The latest information received from the competent authorities was discussed. In this connection Dr. SCHMITZLER reported on

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the field of dyestuffs, Mr. MAFF on pharmaceutical goods, Mr. OTTO on photographic items and rayons.

7) Situation in China.

a) General situation.

Mr. WAISSL reports on the situation in China, stating in particular that the war insurance of the stocks in China had been recalled with the term expiring at 24.00 hours, Central European time, 21 August 1937. Considering that international insurance companies may, in case of need, recall war insurances at short notice, the question of whether there is any object in taking out war insurances at all is being discussed in principle. The Central Financial Administration

(page 6 of original cont'd)

has been ordered to find out whether it is possible for insurance abroad to be undertaken internally, or whether some other arrangement can be made to cover the war risk abroad in such a way that a short-term withdrawal of the insurance-contracts can be avoided.

(page 7 of original)

8) Uniform attention of the I.G. to be given to requests of U.S. Treasury agents.

- 3) Dr. von SCHMITZLER reports in detail on the experiences of the Eyestuff-Sparte on the occasion of visits by American Treasury agents, and on problems of American customs and dumping (Dumping-Probleme). Subsequently Mr. HANN reports on a recent visit of an American Treasury agent to Leverkusen, during which the question of general expenses was dealt with in particular. After a detailed discussion it was agreed that as long as there are no legal regulations in Germany which categorically prohibit the giving of information, it is inadvisable to decline in principle the requests of the Treasury agents. An attempt must rather be made to settle the matter amicably with the agent without informing him of any details of our business or of what our expenses are composed. Considering our present economic situation with regard to America, it is deemed inappropriate at the present time, to suggest to the German authorities that a general decree prohibiting information should be issued.

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It was decided that the next two meetings of the Commercial Committee will take place on Friday, 10 September 1937, at 09.30 hours and on ^{Thursday} 7 October 1937 at 09.30 hours, in Berlin NW 7, Unter den Linden 82.

Berlin NW 7, 25 August 1937

signed: v. SCHMITZLER signed: FRANK-FAHL

F.F./Ed. 1/37

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

June 27, 1947

I, Monica Wellwood, E 00525, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No HI-4927.

Monica Wellwood
E 00525

"END"

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5726
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Minutes of the Mail Discussion No. 72 Department I of the Secretariat 3 August 1937
G/Ri

Those present were: Ilgner (Chairman)
Frank-Fahle
Gattineau
Reithinger
Passargo
Helfert
Jacobsen
Schwarte
Kersten
Dihlmann
Gierlichs (recorder).

Not on the Agenda: Ilgner draws attention to the fact that it is not permissible to make the slightest alteration, be it only an alteration in style, to contracts already initialed, without having previously obtained the express consent of the contracting party.

1. Department I of the Secretariat

1. Transfer of card index of addresses

The card index of addresses hitherto kept by the Press Department is to be taken over, as from 1 October 1937, by Secretariat I, since it falls within the province of this department to dispatch the copies of the annual report, New Year greetings, etc. for Ilgner and it, therefore, has the greatest need of the card index. On the other hand it is the Department most promptly informed of changes of address.

2. Inspection Tours of the Works

After a thorough discussion of the future method of preparing and carrying out tours of inspection the following rule is agreed upon for the future:

From within the works, the full responsibility for preparing and conducting works inspections rests with Secretariat I.

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On the other hand, it is intended to exploit in full the works inspections for the goodwill of the individual departments which come into official contact with the visitor or the persons recommending him. From this there results the following practical procedure:

Incoming applications for permission to inspect the works are to be handed over by all departments to Secretariat I by the quickest route possible; the original of the application is to be enclosed. It is left to the discretion of the department approached to send a provisional reply to the applicant. In case of a negative decision on the application, the final reply is to be made in all cases via the department approached. If approval has been given, in principal, to the enquiry about the inspection of the works and sufficient time is left, the affirmative reply is to be sent to the applicant by the department approached, which will add at the same time, that Secretariat I will get in touch with the applicant to settle the technical details. If this cannot be done for lack of time, Secretariat I may get in direct touch with the applicant and make all the necessary arrangements. In this case, it is left to the discretion of the department approached in the first place to conclude the matter by

(page 2 of original cont'd)

direct letter to the applicant after the inspection has taken place, if it thinks fit to do so.

The question of providing outside visitors with a guide is to be settled in each case between Secretariat I and the department concerned. If the latter does not provide the guide, Secretariat I is to see to it that a report on the visit is sent to this department.

Visits of journalists which have been promoted by the Press Department are exempt from this general ruling. In such cases, only the Press Department is to maintain contact with the press representatives. For the preparation by Secretariat I within the works however, the general ruling given above is to be applied where practicable.

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In this connexion Ilgner asks if any proposals are being made for future inspections of the works. Kersten reports that the opinion of a number of offices has already been sought, but that, on the request of Director Dr. Struss, the whole question is to be discussed with him again before proposals are put forward in writing.

In this connexion Ilgner asks Secretariat I to take into account the authority of the individual works managements when compiling the suggestions and indicates the following authorities:

Director Dr. Fahrenhorst	}	Oppau Nitrogen plant
Director Dr. Mueller-Cunradi		
Director Dr. Stroebele, Limburger Hof/Agricultural Experimental Station	}	Ludwigshafen Works
Director Dr. Gaus		
Director Dr. Seidel	}	Director Dr. Ambros/Intermediates plants, Ludwigshafen,
Director Dr. Mohnen/Dyestuffs Plants, Ludwigshafen,		
Director Dr. Wurster/Inorganic Plants, Ludwigshafen,		
Director Dr. Hermann, Hoechst		
Director Dr. Jacobi, Griesheim		
Director Dr. Anderhub, Wiesbaden/Biobrich/Kalle & Co.		
Director Dr. Laux, Uerdingen		
Professor Dr. Hoerlein, Elberfeld		
Director Dr. Zetzsche, Premnitz,		
Lingg, Camera Works Munich		
Director Dr. Kuehne, Leverkusen/Plants		
Consul General W.R.Mann, Leverkusen/Department for the Dispatch of pharmaceutical products		
Director Dr. Pistor, Bitterfeld, Wolfen Dyestuffs		
Director Dr. Gajewski	}	Wolfen/Film, artificial silk, cellulose
Director Dr. Kleine		
Director Dr. Bustofisch	}	Leuna
Director Dr. Schneider		

Exceptions:

Wolfen/cellulose wool (Director Dr. Gajewski)
Rackwitz/light metals plant (Director Dr. Pistor)
Schkopau/Buna (Director Dr. Ambros)

3. Assistant for Curitiba Brazil / Economic Group Chemicals } postponed
4. Grun Broth., Cairo }

(page 4 of original)

5. Visits to the Duesseldorf Exhibition

Korsten refers to the discussions during the Clearing Conference and gives a report of the proposal worked out by Secretariat I providing the responsible department chiefs (V.A.s), section chiefs (R.L.s), office managers (A.L.s) and possibly also deputy office managers as well as the gentlemen being trained by us, with opportunities for visiting the Duesseldorf Exhibition.

Ilgner disagrees; he asks that the question of whether a visit to the exhibition could not be made possible to all employees interested therein, perhaps in the form of a Strength-through-Joy trip, be examined. The matter is to be further discussed by Helfert, the personnel department and Secretariat I, and new proposals are to be put before a later Mail Conference. Ilgner requests that the question of whether the expenses arising therefrom could not be partly defrayed - as in the previous year - by the starting of a collection among the men up to the rank of office manager inclusive.

6. German-Hungarian Chamber of Commerce

With the proviso that the Political Economy Department gives its approval after examination, Ilgner has no objections to the I.G.'s joining the Chamber of Commerce as long as its annual subscription fee amounts to less than 300 Reichsmark. Should it be higher, the matter is to be discussed again.

II. Secretariat II.

1. Card index of commercial agents

On Ilgner's orders this item is marked down for the next Secretariats I and II conference at which he is present. At that conference the best way of ensuring that the card index of agents is always kept up to date and that all interested departments are regularly informed of changes as soon as they occur, is to be discussed. Once this question has been clarified, it is to be put on the agenda of the next meeting of the Commercial Committee.

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2. Nitrogen and Hydrogenation Plant in China

Ilgner reports that a provisional agreement has been concluded with Mr. Woo, on the erection in the province of Kiangsi of a combined Nitrogen and Hydrogenation plant with a proposed production capacity of 13000 tons of Ammonia per year and 50 000 tons of gasoline per year, half of which will be aviation fuel and the other half motor fuel. The cost of the entire project amounts to 46 000 000 Reichsmark.

Not on the Agenda: Hollaendische Finanzierungsgesellschaft.

Korsten reports that, contrary to the arrangement made with him, Director Fritze has announced the Dutch Company's name as "MAPRO" Gesellschaft zur Foerderung des Handels in Produkten der chemischen Industrie in den Niederlanden und Kolonien A.G. ("MAPRO" Company for the Promotion of Trade in Products of the Chemical Industry in the Netherlands and the Dutch Colonies A.G.), although it has previously been agreed - with his assent - to call it "MAPRO" Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der Fabrikation von und des Handels in Produkten der chemischen Industrie in den Niederlanden und Kolonien A.G. ("MAPRO" Company for the Promotion of Manufacture of and Trade in Products of the Chemical Industry in the Netherlands and the Dutch Colonies A.G.)

(page 5 of original cont'd)

Ilgner orders Kersten to draft a letter on his behalf, telling Director Kersten that we cannot agree to that name for the Company and have to insist on the change of the name.

Passarge asks what reply should be given to the press if questions are asked about the agreement with the Chinese and the floating of the Dutch Company.

Ilgner replies that mentions in the press should be avoided if at all possible. If questions from the newspapermen cannot be evaded, Passarge is to get in touch with him.

III. Central Financial Administration

1. Supply of the iron requirements of the I.G.

Director Dr. Struss and Director Jaehne have reported that steadily mounting difficulties in satisfying the iron requirements of the I.G. - in as much as they do not fall within the quota - are being encountered

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It will therefore be necessary to approach Colonel von Hanneken, the Plenipotentiary General for the German Iron and Steel Economic System in the Office of the Four Year Plan, in order to succeed in obtaining a basic ruling for I.G. Director Dr. Struss, and Directors Jaehne and Weiss of the purchasing department, Ludwigshafen, are to be asked to come to Berlin in order to make preparations for the discussion with Colonel von Hanneken.

In connexion with this point, Ilgner orders the Political Economy Department to make another appointment with Colonel von Hanneken for a discussion of the "New Building" affair. When making the appointment it must be stressed that it has nothing to do with the fundamental discussion of the iron supply of the I.G. For this discussion, Kersten and Boehne are to prepare a memorandum for the files containing precise details of the iron requirements for the individual building periods.

2. Additional exports against grain

Frank-Fahle gives a report on the result of the Mail Discussion of 29 July this year which was exclusively concerned with this question. As soon as the results of the export which we are to expect from the Economics Department are known, practical proposals for the measures possible in the various countries are to be drawn up; Frank-Fahle, Gattineau, Reithinger, Helfort, Schwarte, Kersten (translator's note: this latter name partly erased), Dihlmann are to collaborate for this purpose. Ilgner asks that an examination be conducted at the same time to establish whether, to what extent, and in what way the assistance of the confidential agents of the Zeffi (Central Finance Department) can be sought in this question.

IV. Political Economy Department

1. Reception at the Bolivian Legation/Colonel Anez

Ilgner will take part in the reception arranged for Friday, 6 August, between 1200 and 1400 hours at the Bolivian Legation on the occasion of the presence of Colonel Anez.

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V. Economics Department

1. Expose on other countries / Kalle plans / South Africa / Australia

Reithinger reports that the existing mechanism of the Economics Department can no longer cope with its tasks because of the steadily increasing requirements of the sales combines and the firms within the Konzern as well as of the departments within the administration proper, particularly with respect to the preparation of the various trips.

A detailed discussion follows on the future organization of the Economics Department. Ilgner thinks that the Economics Department should in principle be organized on the same lines as the Secretariat II. Reithinger is to submit a practical proposal with diagram to Ilgner explaining the intended future organization of the Economics Department and the additional staff required as a result thereof. The additional staff requirements must not exceed six people, if at all possible.

2. Provisional examination of development of the Gorsthofen dam
Postponed.

VI. Press Department

1. Notice to the press concerning new building

The draft submitted is not yet fit for publication. Ilgner asks that another draft be submitted. Ilgner asks, moreover, that the Press Department influence the press to abstain from publishing any information on the subject before a final decision has been made on our applications for approval, in order not to prejudice our chances of an affirmative reply.

2. I.G. Manual

Postponed.

VII. Organization/Employees

1. I.G. Sports Association/St.S.

a) Re-organization

(page 8 of original)

Holfert reports on the agreements made between the Leader of the German Labor Front, Dr. Ley, and the Reich Sport Leader, Mr. von Tschammer-Osten, concerning the re-organization of Sports Association in the factories.

b) Sports Day, 11 September of this year

Ilgner asks the leading executives to give prizes for the sports day on 11 September. Holfert is instructed to submit proposals as to the prizes needed and the estimated expenses.

Passarge draws attention to the fact that no prizes of precious or other metals should be given (see the appropriate order issued by Reich Leader SS Himmler) and recommends the presentation of prizes made of amber or similar materials.

Gierlichs suggests that, in suitable cases, free trips to the Duesseldorf exhibition be given as prizes.

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Minutes of Mail Discussion No. 73 of 10 August 1937 not yet finished.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-5726
CONTINUED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

16 June 1947

I, BERYL C. BESWICK, No. D 427459, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-5726.

.....
BERYL C. BESWICK, No. D 427459.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. MI-5742
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Record of the Daily Staff Meeting No.82

Managing Department.
Ka/Ss.

26 October 1937

Present: KRUEGER (Chair)
FISCHER
GATTINEAU
PASSARGE
HELFFERT
JACORSEN
TERHAAR
SCHWARTE
VERSTEN (Recording Clerk)
V. MEISTER
RONG
PLATZER

I. Managing Department.

I.) Preparation for the Rome-journey.

The preparation of ILGNER's visit to Rome is discussed. GATTINEAU and PASSARGE recommend that ILGNER should call above all on Excellency VOLPI who has the best information on the Italian industrialisation movement and on the state of affairs as regards German-Italian industrial co-operation. GATTINEAU recommends introduction by Excellency ATTOLICO and reports in this connection about the negotiations between I.C. and MONTECATINI with regard to the import of dyes, which have had no result whatever.

II. Bureau des Kaufmaennischen Ausschusses.

III. Central Finance Administration.

I.) Inter-office exchange of monthly reports.

Postponed until ILGNER's return.

II.) Hungarian Safety Match Loan. - Offer of the Enskilda Bank.

Von MEISTER reports about the visit of Mr. K. LISSENDORF and Mr. KNAPP.

(page 2 of original)

The gentlemen submitted a proposition according to which a Swedish safety match loan to Hungary amounting to \$ 36.000.000 is to be transferred to Sweden via an intermediate German Agency at a rate of exchange of 30%. In compensation the Enskilda-Bank would place a credit of £ 3.000.000 at the disposal of the I.G. for the duration of 5 years. In addition Hungary is to be willing to grant political trade advantages in return for the German assistance.

Presuppositions for a continuation of the project are in our opinion, that the 3 million credit will not be burdened by guarantees which will make its use inconvenient for us, and that a synchronisation of the Hungarian payments to Germany and the German payment to Sweden as well as exclusion of the risk of transferment will be reached in Hungary.

We must examine the commercial-political wishes which we can grant in this connection to Hungary and the securities, we will be able to offer the Enskilda-Bank for the credit, without burdening ourselves.

IV. Economic-political Department.

I.) Economical Negotiation the Argentine.

According to the wish of the German delegation we are examining the possibility of additional exports to the Argentine in return for increased German imports from this country. In this connection the powder-project is of special importance.

II.) Consignment-Stocks the Argentine.

The affair has to be discussed orally with ministerial councillor KUHLEMANN, Reich Ministry of Economics.

(page 3 of original)

3. Inquiry A.C. (Foreign Organization)

This affair has to be discussed on grounds of a report of GATTINEAU and SCHWARTZ in the Commercial Committee. A temporary order has to be given to Mr. BISSÉ (Foreign Organization ?) After ILGNER's return this point has to be put on the agenda anew.

4.) Kopenhagen.

The affair has to be settled by telephone by Mr. KERSTEN with Mr. KVENILD.

5.) Connection with the RKM (Reich War Ministry ?) in commercial questions.

GATTINEAU has to compile the material for the December-session of the Commercial Committee.

(page 3 of original cont'd)

6.) "Wehrmacht" - calendars.

KRUEGER grants the order of 20 pieces of "Wehrmacht"-calendars.

7.) Correspondence from Spain.

The whole correspondence from Spain with the Union Quimica y Iluch has, owing to important reasons, to pass through the Dyes Department, Frankfurt.

8.) Patent-Question WALBEK-MENKE.

V. National-Economic Department.

1.) National Advertising Council of German Economy/Trivenovitch.

The Advertising Council asked for information whether it would be possible for us in respect of foreign exchange - economy, to put 100 of Mr. TRIVNOVITCH's books at the disposal of the Advertising Council. As the Advertising Council as an official institution, will probably be granted the foreign exchange-permission more easily, the Advertising Council is to be recommended to make the necessary proposals themselves. The judgment of the president of the Reichsbank, Dr. SCHACHT, and the manager of the Reichsbank, BLESSING, are to be at the disposal of the Advertising Council.

(page 4 of original)

VI. Press office.

1.) Designation "Press-Office".

According to the information given by the Ministry of Propaganda to the Reich Group Industry, the designation "Press-Office" is no longer admissible contrary to the information we received some time ago. Therefore, the Press-Office is called: "Communications Center" in future.

2.) "Schwarzes Korps" (Black Corps)

3.) Fanciful designations.

BRETTNER submitted the lists made by the I.G. to the German Labor Front. In consequence of our positive treatment of questions, the opportunity was given to discuss all the material at hand with the specialist. As we learned in the meantime, the considerations advanced against the publication, resulted in the plan being dropped.

(page 4 of original cont'd)

4.) Sponsorships (Patenschaften) of editors.

The office of the Commercial Committee has, according to the system of "Who is who?", to compose a short characterisation of the foreign gentlemen who are considered for sponsorship of the editors.

VII. Organization/Personnel.

1.) Work stopped owing to sports.

VIII. Points to be noted for the next session of the Commercial Committee.

Sponsorship NS-Y outh Editors. (NS Jungschrittleiter.)
and inquiry Foreign Organization.

(signed: KUEGER.)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

17 June 1947

I, Mary Flack Perry, AGO-# 20136, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NI-5742.

.....
Mary Flack Perry
AGO-# 20136

A F F I D A V I T.

I, Dr. Felix EHRMANN, residing at Baddeckenstedt, District of Wolfenbuettel in the British Zone of Occupation, having been advised that by making any false statements I will become liable to punishment, hereby voluntarily declare the following under oath and without having been subjected to any duress:

At the Foreign Exchange Control in Germany, I.G. Farben decidedly enjoyed privileges denied to any other firms, by granting it special credits for the purchase of raw materials

At that time Mr. LANDWEHR, the responsible consultant for foreign exchange at the Reich Ministry of Economics, was the man responsible for granting these credits and for devising the necessary legal procedure. But I am convinced that in the case of I.G. he did not decide of his own accord, but obtained the required authority from the Reich Ministry of Economics.

We at the Chemistry Control Agency were at first not at all informed about this special credit for raw materials in favour of I.G. - neither concerning the extent of this credit nor as to the list of goods to which it referred. But we knew that the I.G. had these possibilities and this matter was often discussed as most of the people of the Chemistry Control Agency were very much upset about these special privileges granted to I.G. and about the fact that for a long time we were not advised of it at all.

I have carefully read this one page of this affidavit and signed it with my own hand. I made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialled them with the first letters of my name and I herewith declare upon oath that I have said the pure truth in this statement to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signature) Felix EHRMANN

Sworn to and signed before me this 13th day of March 1947 at Nuremberg by Dr. Felix EHRMANN, known to me to be the person making the above affidavit.

(Signature) Paul H. KATSCHER
U.S. Civilian, AGO number D-150641,
Office of Chief of Counsel for
War Crimes, U.S. War Department

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. NI-4930
Cont'd

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

(initials): F.E.

21 April 1947

I, Dr. HORN, Civ. 20004, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document No. NI-4930.

Dr. HORN,
Civ. 20004.

END

AFFIDAVIT

I, Dr. Guenther FRANK-FÄHLE, employee of I.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE from 1933 to 1945 and director of I.G. FARBEN from 1935 to 1945, now residing at Oberursel, Hohemarkstrasse 183, after having been warned that I will be liable to punishment for making a false statement herewith state the following under oath of my own free will and without coercion.

The chart which is attached to this affidavit and which bears the title "Amounts Due From Transactions Abroad" was shown to me today by Mr. William A. Acton who found it in Room 6 of the Griesheim Documents Center.

The chart includes the amount of FARBEN's share in the foreign sales of the Nitrogen Syndicate and is executed on purple paper pinned to a gray folder marked in writing "Foreign Exchange Paid to the Reichsbank 1932-1939" and in print, "I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft, Frankfurt a. Main".

This chart probably represents a translation from the German chart which formed part of the financial statement made in the ZEFI. One copy was used by me in 1945 during the investigation made by a commission headed by Mr. Ritchin. I believe that the chart in question has been made up from this German chart upon Mr. Ritchin's request.


The green curve represents the Accounts Receivable abroad resulting from exports, the black curve represents the actual receipts in foreign exchange, and the red curve the amounts in foreign exchange which were delivered to the Reichsbank.

I have carefully read this one page of this affidavit and have placed my signature at the bottom of this page. I have made the necessary corrections in my own handwriting and initialed each correction in the margin of the page. I declare herewith under oath that I have stated the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

signed: Guenther Frank-Fähle
GUENTHER FRANK-FÄHLE

Sworn to and signed before me this 23rd day of July 1947 at Frankfurt, Main, Germany, by Dr. Guenther FRANK-FÄHLE, known to me to be the person making above affidavit.


signed: William A. Acton
WILLIAM A. ACTION, AGO No.
D-417491
OFFICE CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR
WAR CRIMES U.S. War Department



ACCOUNTS DUE FROM TRANSACTIONS ABROAD
 FOREIGN CASH RECEIPTS -
 (INCLUDING I.G. SHARES IN THE FOREIGN SLS OF HITLER & SYNDICATE)
 THE RICHSENER

Handschriftlich: This is the chart shown to me by
 Mrs. William A. Acton on July 23rd 1947.

sign.: Guenther Frank-Fello
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Handschriftlich; This is the chart shown to me by Mrs. William L. Acton on July 23rd 1947.

sign.: Guenther Frank-Ehl

"A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY"

Examples

of the furtherance of exports on the part of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. in recent time to permit an increased acquisition of foreign exchange and a direct supply of vital raw materials for Germany.

- I. Export of products involving especially heavy losses in order to permit maintaining and increasing of exports, and the increased acquisition of foreign exchange.

Export of Dyes and other products used in the manufacture of dyes, Chemical and Pharmaceuticals to East Asia and the British Indies.

We have always given special care to the above markets which take a considerable share of our total exports, all the more so as these countries are the most important ones for the procurement of free foreign exchange. Our endeavors to keep these markets open to German exports led to extraordinary losses in the fight against the competing export countries.

As a consequence thereof, we obtained prices in the first half of 1937, for products for which competition is keenest which, applied against the net proceeds on about 8 million Rm in foreign exchange, result in an average loss of more than 80 per cent of the net proceeds of foreign exchange.

Export of Dyes and other Products used in the Manufacture of Dyes to Central and South America

With a view to procuring actual foreign exchange, we have accepted actual foreign exchange for our current business with the Central and South American countries also in such cases where on the basis of the German foreign exchange regulations, we would have been authorized to accept "Aski" Marks (Compensation marks), and although our customers insisted in principal on payment in "Aski" Marks. To secure the acquisition of actual foreign exchange, we therefore had to cut down our prices by an approximate total of 1 million Rm a year.

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Export of the bleaching agent Perchloron.

The bleaching agent Perchloron is a very unprofitable export product that is manufactured for export purposes exclusively i.e. a product for which there is no home market. Our entire world-wide business winds up with a loss of approximately 60 % of the net proceeds and for this loss we do not have any possibilities for compensation at home. In spite of this we do keep up our sales of this product abroad at a level of more than 1 Million Rm a year. We do this especially because more than half of the value of the turnover goes to China and to the British Indies, i.e., to the countries which supply free foreign exchange. Our exports to China entail a loss of approximately 100 %, computed against the foreign exchange proceeds which is 50 % of our own costs.

Export of liquid Chlorine

In spite of increasing losses, the German Chlorine Convention (Deutsche Chlor-Konvention) in which I.G. participation is leading, has taken such pains in furthering the business with Finland, Norway and Sweden (90 %

of the turn over abroad) that compared with last year and on the basis of the results known up to date one can count with an increase in the turn over of approximately 80 % within one year, in terms of quantity, and approximately 54 % in value, i.e. transactions with these countries of approximately 2,4 Million Rm.

In view of the important position of Sweden for the German export trade, we have advocated an increased sale in this country without regard to the steadily sinking prices. As a result of our export boosting, the export of liquid chlorine to Sweden will presumably amount to approximately 1 million Rm. in the same period, i.e., $2\frac{1}{2}$ times as much as in the year of 1936.

Export of Solvents.

Last year our export of the two solvents having the greatest turnover abroad, namely Butanol and Butylacetate amounted to

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approximately 1,8 million Rm. We are keeping up this import although the average of our total foreign business winds up with a loss which still exceeds 100 % of our net proceeds. In the countries which supply free foreign exchange (East Asia) and with which, for this reason, we are especially interested in maintaining and increasing our turn over, the loss figures are still considerably higher.

Out of the multitude of solvents exported by us, we shall still add two more examples which show our endeavors to ensure the success of the German export interests in the face of foreign competition, even at prices which involve great losses.

Our export in the amount of Rm 600,000.— a year of carbon tetrachloride which, among others, is also used as a solvent winds up with a loss of approximately 60 - 70 % of the net proceeds. The loss figures for the sale of this product amount in some countries to 150 % of the net proceeds.

Our sale of the solvent Polycolvan E shows on an annual turn over of approximately 250,000 Rm., an average loss of approximately 100 % of the net proceeds. For the purpose of acquiring free foreign exchange on our sales of this product to Japan - which amount to one third of our sales abroad - are effected at losses which on the average are considerably higher still. We must point out that in the above mentioned loss figures, the export reimbursements officially granted for the purpose of compensating for losses and which, according to the instructions of the Reich Ministry of Economics cover only a fraction of the losses, are not considered.

II. The handling of export business as a means for the direct supply of vital raw materials to Germany.

Estonia.

To secure the supply of shale tar oil especially to the German Navy, we concluded a contract with

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Erste Estlaendische Brennschiefer-Industrie A.G., Tallin, by reason of which the latter pledges itself to furnish Germany in the coming years with an increased quantity of shale tar oil as against an additional

German export of machines. Within the scope of this contract deals for shale tar oil amounting to 2,250,000 Rm for the period of 1937-1938 were concluded. For the year 1939 deliveries amounting to 250,000 Rm are so far being projected. In addition to this the contract contains an option clause for the years 1939 and 1940 for further oil deliveries having a value of 1,5 million Rm a year.

France.

Because of special opportunities which presented themselves to us and following official suggestions we transacted private clearing-business to France having a total value of Rm 10,250,000.-- which made the import of products possible which are of vital importance to Germany. In the main the following products were involved:

cotton	wool
iron ores	hides and skins
scrap	crude rubber

Furthermore, we have carried through a food compensation program within the scope of which France grants additional contingents for the import of German goods proportionate to additional shipments of rice from Indonesia. We but little participated in this transaction with deliveries of our own but throughout the entire transaction of the deal we directed the negotiations, and upon the request of the business partners, we arranged for our agency in Paris to make its services available for carrying the compensation through as a trustee. The transaction amounts to 10 million Rm, considering the aspect of import and export as a whole.

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Italy

The Reich Ministry of Economics gave us the assignment to take steps for an increased sulphur supply to the entire chemical industry within the frame of the Four Year Plan and without the use of foreign exchange. Thereupon, we imported sulphur having a value of approximately 2 million Rm. in exchange for coal, machinery and, to a smaller extent, I.G. products.

Roumania

Incidental to German-Roumanian economic negotiations, the Foreign Office approached us with the request to make on a compensation basis the additional importation from Roumania of 2,000 heads of cattle possible at the cost value of approximately 730,000.-- Rm in round figures, to secure the German food situation. We have carried through such a compensation with great difficulties.

Soja Beans.

In 1934, we decided for the large scale cultivation of Soja beans in Roumania as well as in Bulgaria, thereby to increase the exchange of goods with these countries and at the same time, thus to make possible the importation of these defiant fruits indispensable for the nourishment the German people - without using foreign exchange. The following table shows the development in raising Soja beans:

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT No. HI-4453
(Cont'd)

	<u>1934</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1936</u>	<u>1937</u> ca.
<u>Bulgaria:</u>				
a) Area under cultivation in hectares	2297	14314	6286	17000
b) Crops taken over, in tons	745	8777	4786	12000 *
c) Total price fob, in RM	—	120000	73000	1800000 *
				approximately
<u>Roumania:</u>				
a) Area under cultivation, in hectares	1500	24537	58397	109000
b) Crops taken over, in tons	—	10754	27248	55000 *
c) Total price fob, in Rm.	—	1928000	4749000	9600000 *

* estimated

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Spain

In the fall of 1936, the Reich Ministry of Economics approached us with the request to take steps for the import of iron pyrite from Franco Spain (National-Spain) because of the inadequacy of iron pyrite deposits in Germany. A committee sent by us to Spain was able to conclude the first compensation transaction between Germany and Franco Spain in the amount of 1.8 million Rm. The deal was executed within 3 months.

U. S. A.

Upon the request of Government agencies and to improve the German supply of mineral oils, we put 500,000.- Rm's worth of dyes at the disposal of the United States against mineral oils as a compensation although considerable difficulties might have arisen for us by reason of the American tariff and dumping regulations.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Hertha C. KNUTH, AGO No. X-46355, hereby certify that I am thorough conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 4453.

HERTHA C. KNUTH
U.S. Civilian
AGO No. X-46355

(E N D)

87

MICROCOPY

892

ROLL

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